1

Party System Change: Conceptualization and Measurement

Dr. Zim Nwokora, University of Melbourne

Dr. Riccardo Pelizzo, Nazarbayev University

This article proposes a new measure of party system change that treats party systems as

complex compounds, and that can be used in a wide variety of empirical settings. The

standard measure of party system change, Pedersen’s index of volatility, is a crude measure

of such complex-system change, and other complex-system measures have limited

geographical scope. To develop our measure, we operationalize the notion of party system

change that emerges from Giovanni Sartori’s highly influential elaboration of the complex-

system view. We apply the measure empirically by examining the dynamic characteristics of

African party systems.

2

Are party systems in Eastern Europe, Africa and Latin American highly unstable when

compared to West European party systems?1 Do political systems function better when the

party system is stable than when it is not?2 To investigate these questions rigorously, we need

a measure of party system change. However, ‘party system change’ is a complex concept and

such concepts are often difficult to measure.3 There has been significant research on how

conceptualization relates to measurement – or measurement validity – for some political

concepts, especially ‘democracy’.4 But, issues of measurement validity receive little attention

in the party systems scholarship. In the strand on party system change, there are theoretical

studies that discuss the concept of party system change while drawing on empirical material

to flesh out conceptual points.5 However, these studies stop short of providing quantifiable

indicators that might be used in large-n research. On the other hand, there are studies, notably

by Mogens Pedersen, that develop and apply quantifiable indicators of party system change.

But, while these studies examine different indicators, they do not examine the different

conceptualizations of party system change.6 The implicit assumption seems to be that there is

broad agreement on what it means for a ‘party system’ to ‘change’. In fact, the concept of

party system change that Pedersen operationalizes diverges sharply from the concept of party

system change elaborated by theorists such as Giovanni Sartori and Peter Mair.

According to Sartori and Mair, party systems are multidimensional compounds – or ‘types’ –

and party system change is therefore the process of change from one complex compound to

another. In the alternative view, which is apparent in most quantitative research, party

systems are assumed to have a simpler structure. They are viewed as loose mixtures of

attributes rather than compounds, and party system change denotes, and is fully specified by

describing, any change in the mix of attributes. There have been few efforts to compare these

‘complex-system’ and ‘simple-system’ approaches, and a result is that some gaps in the

existing scholarship have gone unnoticed. One such gap, and the specific focus of this paper,

is the absence of a tool for measuring complex-system change across a wide variety of

empirical settings. Devising such a measure is our main goal.

First, though, we aim to clarify the different ways that ‘party system change’ might be validly

conceptualized. In the paper’s second section, we assess the potential for existing measures to

capture these different concepts of party system change. The absence of a measure capable of

tapping complex-system change emerges as an important weakness of current scholarship. In

the paper’s third section, we explain the steps we take to develop such a measure. In brief, we

overcome key obstacles by operationalizing the expressions of party system change that can

be derived from a close reading of Giovanni Sartori’s classic book, Parties and Party

Systems. We conduct a preliminary examination of the resulting ‘index of fluidity’ by

analyzing party system dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa. This analysis shows that the new

measure captures a distinct attribute of party systems – their complex-system dynamics – that

relates empirically to state fragility.

Conceptualizing Party System Change

1 Bogaards 2008; Mozaffar and Scarritt 2005; Mozaffar, Scarritt, and Galaich 2003; Roberts and Wibbels 1993;

Sikk 2005. 2 Kuenzi and Lambright 2001; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Sartori 2005[1976]; Weghorst and Bernhard 2014.

3 Collier and Levitsky 1997.

4 Bollen 1990; Collier and Adcock 1999.

5 Mair 1989; Mair 2006; Smith 1989.

6 Pedersen 1979; Pedersen1980.

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The first task in the assessment of an existing measure, or the development of a new one, is to

specify the attributes of the concept that the measure should capture. This gives the

‘systematized concept’.7 There is consensus in the literature on the basic definition of ‘party

system’ as the pattern of competition among political parties, and therefore on ‘party system

change’ as change in the pattern of inter-party competition. However, this consensus breaks

down in the move from these thin definitions to fuller systematized concepts, resulting in

disagreements about ‘the criteria to be used to identify party system change’.8 Such

disagreements, we argue, are due in part to deep-rooted division about the nature of party

system ‘systemness’.9

Scholars agree that party systems have attributes that are separate from the attributes of the

parties that produce them. But what exactly are these party system attributes, how do they

create a system, and what does it mean for that system to change? The scholarship reflects

two general answers to these questions. First, some view party systems as the product of a

fusion of fundamental attributes. Accordingly, a real-world system changes when it shifts

from one compound (i.e., a kind of fusion) to another, and this process embodies

transformation to its ‘core’ or ‘essence’.10

There are strong and weak variants of this

approach. In the strong version there is a well-defined set of compounds, while the weak

version admits possibilities beyond this well-defined set. The alternative to these logic-of-

fusion approaches is the representation of a party system as a loose mixture of attributes, and

of party system change as change in the balance of this mix. These distinct interpretations of

party system change (PSC) are fleshed out and compared in the sub-sections that follow.

PSC as Change between Specified Types

Suppose that X and Y are fundamental party system attributes; for example, in Sartori’s

framework, X might represent ‘fragmentation’ and Y ‘polarization’. Then, following this line

of thought, a party system is produced by the fusion of discrete characteristics (‘0’ or ‘1’) in

these dimensions. For example, party system XY0 is produced when X=0 joins with Y=0, as

shown in proposition [1] below:

[1] X0+Y0 XY0

If X=0 indicates ‘low fragmentation’ and Y=0 indicates ‘low polarization’, then XY0

represents the type conventionally known as the two-party system. As this example suggests,

the logic of fusion underpins the tradition in the literature that develops typologies.11

The

types that make up these typologies are ‘attribute compounds’, Sartori confirms.12

The logic

of fusion has two key implications for understanding party system change. First, change in

the characteristics of a party system attribute (i.e., a change to X or Y) will cause a change of

type. So, if Y=0 changes to become Y=1, then a change of type results, from XY0 to XY1, as

summarized in proposition [2] below:

7 Adcock and Collier 2001, 530.

8 Mershon and Shvetsova 2013, 4.

9 A few studies discuss issues of ‘systemness’ (e.g. Mair 1989), but they do so with the aim of making the case

for a specific position in this debate rather than to clarify the areas of agreement and disagreement, which is our

goal. 10

Smith 1989, 349; Mair 1989, 256. 11

For a summary see Wolinetz 2006. 12

Sartori 2005[1976], 110

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[2] X0+Y1 XY1

The new type, XY1, is its own unique compound, with its own distinct impact on the political

system. If Y1 indicates ‘moderate fragmentation’, then, following Sartori’s typology, XY1

corresponds to the moderate pluralism type. The logic of fusion also implies that party system

change occurs only as the result of change in fundamental attributes. Thus, the essential

attributes of the party system are not affected by conditions beyond X and Y. For instance, X0

and Y0 will produce XY0 irrespective of other (non-fundamental) characteristics of the party

system (Z), as shown in propositions [3] and [4] below:

[3] X0+Y0+Z0 XY0

[4] X0+Y0+Z1 XY1

An important example of this logic at work is in how complex-system theorists treat

volatility, understood, following Pedersen, as the overall stability in parties’ election returns

or seat holdings. Volatility is a property of the party system since it describes an aspect of

parties’ strategic interactions. But, scholars who follow the fusion logic do not usually

consider volatility to be a fundamental party system attribute. Different types are likely to

have different volatility characteristics but these are not definitional attributes. The relevant

test is whether a change in volatility is thought to necessarily produce a change of party

system type. With attributes X and Y – fragmentation and polarization (in Sartori’s typology)

– this is what happens, as represented in proposition [2]. But volatility impacts on the party

system only indirectly through its effects on system-defining attributes.

This treatment of volatility as something less than a fundamental attribute should not be

interpreted as a claim about its empirical importance.13

Rather, it is a theoretical assertion that

is strongly influenced by the fact that volatility does not feature in prominent theories – in

particular Sartori’s, which remains the dominant framework in this research tradition.14

Thus,

because volatility is not theorized in Sartori’s or in other frameworks, it is not regarded as a

fundamental attribute. For volatility to be considered a fundamental attribute, an entirely new

framework in which types are distinguished based on their volatility characteristics would

need to be developed.

There is also a third implication of the logic of fusion, which follows from Sartori’s

arguments about the scope of his typology. Sartori intended for his framework to have

comprehensive scope, with types devised to capture party competition not only in established

democracies but also in autocratic political systems and in new democracies. This

consideration suggests the proposition that each real-world party system (Pt) must correspond

to one of Sartori’s types. In the standard version of his typology, there are seven types, which

we can represent as XY0 through to XY6. So, it follows that a real-world party system (Pt)

must take one of these forms:

[5] Pt = XY0 or XY1 … XY6

With proposition [5] in hand, and assuming that fundamental party system change requires a

change of type (i.e., proposition [2]), it becomes possible to identify the various ‘channels’ of

party system change. One such channel would be the transition between two-partism and

13

Such conceptual assertions are ‘necessarily valid’ (Collier and Adcock 1999, 548). 14

Wolinetz 2006, 58.

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moderate pluralism, and another would be the transition from a hegemonic-party system to an

atomized party system. Given the range of types elaborated in Sartori’s standard typology,

there are forty-two such channels ((7*7)-7). Although the magnitude of systemic change is

greater for some channels than for others, all of these channels represent fundamental

transformations in the pattern of competition since this is what a type change represents.

Obviously, however, a party system can undergo change that does not warrant a type change.

Following the Sartori approach, such change is ‘marginal,’ not ‘fundamental’, because the

party system’s essential attributes, captured by its type, persist despite such change.15

However, the party system may emerge as a new ‘sub-type’ or ‘variant’ of that type.16

PSC as Change between Specified and Unspecified Types

For scholars such as Peter Mair, Sartori’s framework provides a useful baseline for theorizing

party system change, but one that needs to be extended to include the possibility of

fundamental changes that might be missed if the Sartori requirements are strictly adhered

to.17

Thus, Mair explains that if the Sartori approach is followed then:

party systems scarcely change at all, in that a change of party system necessarily

involves the case in question moving from one category to another … and the

conditions that allow for such a reclassification are usually so demanding that it

rarely occurs in practice.18

For Mair, the problem is that the Sartori approach excludes changes that should be properly

considered fundamental but which would not produce a change of Sartori type. Clearly, this

argument cannot be reconciled with propositions [3] and [4], so this claim implies a different

view of party system change. In fact, it must be supported by a different interpretation of the

concept of ‘party system’.

According to this revised view, the attributes identified by Sartori are still fundamental and

the types that they jointly produce remain so (in the sense that Sartori intended). Thus,

propositions [1] and [2], elucidated above, hold. However, Mair’s argument runs directly

counter to propositions [3] and [4], which establish that a fundamental party system change

requires change to one of the fundamental attributes (X, Y) underlying the Sartori typology.

For Mair, this is too restrictive. Thus, he suggests three additional dimensions which,

alongside Sartori’s ‘fragmentation’ and ‘polarization’, provide a basis for identifying

fundamental party system change. First, Mair argues that a party system can be altered by

change in the ‘pattern of alternation in government’, for example, a shift from ‘wholesale’

alternations to ‘partial’ alternations or to a pattern of ‘non-alternation’.19

A second

consideration is the stability of ‘governing alternatives’ presented to voters.20

A third is the

party system’s openness, that is, whether new parties have a chance to win access to

government or whether such opportunities are limited to a ‘subset of established governing

parties’.21

15

Smith (1979, 353) reserves the term ‘transformation’ for what we call ‘fundamental’ change, and identifies

three modes of change which correspond to what we call ‘marginal’ change. 16

Nwokora and Pelizzo 2013, 7; Ware 2009, 14. 17

Mair 2006; Smith 1989. 18

Mair 2006, 63. 19

Mair 2006, 66. See also: Mair 1979, 451-61; Nwokora and Pelizzo, 2013. 20

Mair 2006, 66. See also: Bartolini and Mair 1990; Mair 1989, 260-2; Rokkan 1968. 21

Mair 2006, 66. See also: Katz and Mair 1995.

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Mair does not define specific types based on these attributes, but his broader arguments make

clear his adherence to the logic of fusion as the basis of party system properties.22

Thus, Mair

elaborates what we term non-specified types, which have the fundamental status of a type but

which may not be determinable apriori. If X and Y are attributes that jointly yield specified

(Sartori) types, we can now identify a class of three attributes which, following Mair,

combine to produce non-specified types. Let us label these A, B, and C. Then, instead of

propositions [3] and [4] above, Mair’s view can be summarized in propositions [6], [7] and

[8] below:

[6] X0 + Y0 + A0 + Z0 XYA0

[7] X0 + Y0 + A1 + Z0 XYA1

[8] X0 + Y0 + A1 + Z1 XYA1

As shown in the propositions, there remains a class of properties (indicated by vector Z) that

do not qualify as fundamental attributes. As with the Sartori approach, change in these

elements, say from Z0 to Z1, does not constitute fundamental party system change because in

such a scenario there is continuity in a party system’s essential attributes. Additionally,

Mair’s adherence to the logic of fusion means that party system change retains its character

as a discontinuous process involving ‘jumps’ between types, with the possibility of marginal

adjustments within types.

PSC as a Matter of Degree

A third position in the literature rejects the logic of fusion and presents party systems in

entirely continuous terms. In this view, a party system is a mixture of attributes, rather than a

fusion of attributes; consequently, there are no types that capture discrete configurations of

party competition. Instead, every real-world party system is unique but comparable to other

party systems in continuous terms along specific dimensions such as their degree of

fragmentation or polarization.23

Advocates of the typological approach also accept that every

real-world party system is different, but they emphasize the clustering of real-world variation

on certain types. In contrast, advocates of the ‘degreeism’ school refute the apriori distinction

between fundamental attributes, which are the basis of types, and superficial differences,

which play no role in classification (e.g. volatility). All differences are treated as conceptually

equivalent and the question of whether some differences are more important than others is

considered an entirely empirical issue.

Following this approach, a party system can be presented as a string of system-level

attributes. The list of attributes will almost certainly include fragmentation and polarization,

as well as other attributes such as volatility, for example. A party system is full specified by

its characteristics in each of these dimensions. In theory, at least, the resulting list might be a

long one; but, in practice, scholars focus on certain key dimensions which they justify in

directly empirical terms. One way to think about the underlying logic is to view each

dimension as having a certain weight in the scholar’s analysis based on her expectations (or

findings) of its empirical importance. These considerations can be synthesized as a final

proposition:

22

For example, he explains that ‘the majority of cases of party system change involve the replacement of one

type by another’ (p. 67). 23

Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Pedersen 1979; Pedersen 1980; Rae 1971.

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[9] Xn + Yn + An + Zn αXn, αYn, αAn, αZn

Proposition [9] presents a party system as a mixture of attributes, in contrast to the

compounds depicted in propositions [1] through [8]. The importance of a particular

dimension depends on the size of ‘α’ associated with that dimension (we can assume that the

sum total of all α weightings equals ‘1’). Another hallmark of this approach, compared to the

previous approaches, is that differences in a dimension are conceptualized in continuous

terms. This is indicated by the replacement of a nominal variable ‘0’ or ‘1’ with a continuous

variable n, where n can take any positive number. This difference between the fusion and

mixture approaches is clearly the one that receives most attention.24

We would argue, though,

that it reflects a deeper division about the composition of party systems. If party systems are

considered to be – fundamentally – mixtures of attributes then it makes sense to

conceptualize their differences, both along a dimension as well as between dimensions, in

continuous terms. But, when party systems are conceptualized as fusions, continuous

differences may be relevant for understanding variation within types, but the actual

determination of types will necessarily depend on categorical differences. The view of party

systems as mixtures of attributes also means that there is no such thing as a fundamentally

stable party system. Every real-world party will be undergoing some change, and the key

issues become the identification of the changing attributes (and the assessment of their

importance) and the measurement of the magnitude of change in those dimensions.

Existing Measures of PSC: An Assessment

Pedersen’s index of volatility has long been the standard indicator of party system change.25

It measures the net change in parties’ vote totals from one election to the next. As Pederson

explains, the measure captures the rate of change of party system ‘format’, that is, ‘the

number of parties contesting the elections, and the distribution of electoral strength among

these parties’.26

For Sartori, though, ‘the format is interesting only to the extent that it affects

the mechanics – how the system works’.27

In Sartori’s framework, a party system’s

mechanical properties are captured by its type, and therefore a party system change requires a

type change, as we explained earlier. Volatility is not an essential attribute of any Sartori

type, so volatility has no direct relationship to party system change understood in Sartori

terms. Format, the static analogue of volatility, does contribute to types but whether a change

in format produces a change of type depends on: (1) which parties are gaining and losing

support; and (2) the characteristics of the system in place, in particular how it reacts to the

format change.

Measures that are more sensitive to these issues will better capture complex-system change.

Two measures stand out in this regard, both developed in response to the limitations of

Pedersen volatility as a measure of change to the mechanics of party systems. First, Bartolini

and Mair developed an alternative volatility measure, block volatility, which compares

volatility across social cleavages to volatility within cleavage-defined ‘blocks’.28

This

measure is necessary for a rigorous examination of Lipset and Rokkan’s conjecture that party

competition in Western democracies is highly structured by enduring social cleavages.29

24

E.g., Sartori 2005[1976], 271-84. 25

Pedersen 1979; Pedersen 1980. 26

Pedersen 1979, 3. 27

Sartori 2005[1976], 113 (emphasis in original). 28

Bartolini and Mair 1990. 29

Lipset and Rokkan 1967.

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Pedersen’s index is inadequate for this purpose because ‘There is little to suggest that the

Lipset-Rokkan theory can be tied so explicitly to the fortunes of individual parties’.30

Second,

Sikk measures change in support for genuinely new parties in his analysis of party system

change in Eastern Europe. Here, high levels of volatility have tended to persist, but in some

countries there has been change in the openness of the party system to new parties. However,

Pedersen’s index is blind to the difference between volatility due to flux among established

parties and volatility due to ‘powerful entry of new players’.31

Compared to Pedersen volatility, the measures developed by Bartolini and Mair and by Sikk

are more congruent with the complex-system approach. More precisely, both measures are

consistent with Mair’s looser version of that view, though in different ways. Bartolini and

Mair’s index taps Mair’s second (supplementary) attribute: the stability of governing

alternatives; and Sikk’s measure approximates Mair’s third attribute: the openness of the

party system to new parties. But neither measure captures the magnitude of change among

Sartori types. Moreover, while the aspects of complex-system change that they capture are

crucial in the contexts of Western Europe (for Mair) and Eastern Europe (for Sikk), they may

have less relevance elsewhere.32

For example, the stability of ideological blocks means little

when party politics is not usually structured by ideological divisions (as in Africa). Similarly,

the emergence of genuinely new parties is a weak indicator of systemic change when such

parties emerge very rarely, as in Western Europe, or extremely frequently, as in the atomized

party systems of some Pacific Island states such as Vanuatu.

Our aim is to develop a measure that can capture change among Sartori types and, more

generally, complex-system change in a broader range of situations. We hope, as a result, that

the measure contributes to more rigorous testing of hypotheses that depend on the complex-

system view. For example, complex-system theorists argue, in complex-system terms, that

two-partism and moderate pluralism are associated with high-functioning political systems;

and that (complex) party system stability enhances political system performance. Testing

such hypotheses using simple-system measures such as Pedersen’s index is less than ideal.

Pedersen’s index should instead be reserved for hypotheses relating to ‘voters’ propensities to

transfer votes between parties’,33

which makes it well suited for examinations of the overall

impact of ‘events’ – electoral law reforms, party leadership changes, scandals, economic or

foreign policy crises – on parties’ fortunes.34

The fact that the index captures fluctuations

both within and between types makes it highly valuable for such investigations, but this is a

serious handicap when it is used to test complex-system arguments.

Measuring PSC: A Complex-Systems Measure

In this section, we explain how we construct our complex-system measure of party system

change. Specifically, we take two steps in order to address two problems. The first is that

there are different versions of the complex-system view, depending on which types are

identified and also on whether there are non-specified types. We address this problem by

operationalizing Sartori’s framework, which is its single-most influential articulation, while

30

Bartolini and Mair 1990, 63. 31

Sikk 2005, 397. 32

Bartolini and Mair explain that Pedersen volatility, block volatility, and the volatility of the party system

(understood in the complex-system sense) are different ‘levels’ in the dynamic analysis of party systems. 33

Pedersen 1979, 14. 34

E.g., Bardi 1996; Morlino 1996.

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also adopting recent ‘friendly amendments’ that improve its coherence.35

The second issue is

that elaborations of the complex-systems view, including Sartori’s, are difficult to quantify;

in fact, some complex-system theorists are sceptical about the possibility of valid

quantification of party systems.36

To address this issue, we identify the three ways that the

magnitude of party system change might be expressed in Sartori terms, and synthesize these

expressions to produce a composite index. The synthesis process yields an absolute measure

even though some of its components cannot be enumerated on an absolute scale.37

Refining the Systematized Concept

Sartori’s typology remains the most influential in the party systems scholarship, and his

‘framework’ is the pre-eminent articulation of the complex-system view. Adherents of the

complex-system view typically accept Sartori’s framework as a baseline even when, like

Mair, they point to its limitations. Thus, a major advantage of this anchoring is that it is

consistent with both versions of the complex-system view.

A key reason for the widespread acceptance of Sartori’s types is that they seem to capture

distinct patterns of competition, unlike some types from other typologies.38

For example,

Duverger’s ‘multiparty’ category and Blondel’s ‘two-and-a-half party system’ are often

criticized for lumping together systems that function quite differently.39

Another important

advantage of the framework over potential rivals is its uniquely broad scope. Sartori’s

typology has been successfully applied to study party systems in numerous non-Western

settings, whereas other typologies seem to have a more limited scope.40

Thus, using Sartori’s

framework, party system change can be consistently measured across a wide range of

empirical settings.

But the framework also has liabilities. One important criticism is that it ignores the pattern of

power alternation. The pattern of power alternation can be understood constitutionally (is

power alternation possible?), temporally (how often do turnovers occur?), and spatially (are

turnovers ‘wholesale,’ ‘partial,’ or ‘absent’?). Whichever way it is understood, power

alternation is logically unconnected to fragmentation or polarization, and several scholars

argue that some consideration of it is necessary for a holistic view of party competition. For

example, Gordon Smith explains, contra Sartori, that:

Throughout the course of their historical development West European party

systems have been closely involved with the exercise of governing power in a

parliamentary framework. The twin concepts of government and opposition are

so bound up with the party systems that it is unrealistic not to add a further

35

Adcock and Collier 2001, 533. 36

Mair 2006, 67. 37

Collier, LaPorte, and Seawright 2012, 218-9. 38

A variety of approaches are used to test of the validity of a supposed ‘type’. Perhaps the most rigorous

criterion is whether there is a unique correspondence between a type and the expected direction of party

competition. If a type satisfies this condition then it can be considered a legitimate representation of a distinct

configuration of party competition. A strong case can be made that Sartori’s types pass this test. Indeed,

Sartori’s types take account of both the direction of competitive drives (centrifugal versus centripetal) and for

their strength (strong, weak, nominal, absent). 39

E.g., Sartori 2006[1976], 105; Siaroff 2003, 286-7; Ware 1996, 163. 40

Sometimes this is intentional, when a typology is designed to cater for a specific region (e.g. Africa); but for

the handful of typologies that attempt global coverage, the claim that they have limited scope seems a

reasonable inference from limited uptake of their categories.

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dimension – especially not considering that the relationship is par excellence one

of interaction.41

However, the criticism that Sartori overlooks power alternation is somewhat misplaced. This

dimension does feature in his framework, as shown in Table 1 below, which summarizes

Sartori’s typology including recent refinements. Several types cannot be fully specified

without introducing considerations from this dimension. The predominant-party system is

particularly dependent on power alternation: the potential occurrence of an alternation in

power is what differentiates (democratic) predominance from (autocratic) hegemony, and the

actual occurrence of power alternation (within a three-election cycle) differentiates

predominance from two-partism.42

But, unfortunately, Sartori’s analysis of power alternation

is both less explicit and less theoretical than his in-depth treatments of fragmentation and

polarization.43

Sartori’s (relative) neglect of power alternation meant that he did not follow through on its

implications for his framework. Recent research in the Sartori tradition suggests that greater

attention to power alternation necessitates some modification of the Sartori types. These

refinements turn on Sartori’s distinction between ‘format’ and ‘mechanics’ (i.e., essential

attributes), and his argument that classification should be primarily based on mechanics with

format playing a secondary role. A real-world system with the mechanical properties of a

type should be considered a legitimate instance of that type, even when its format is

unexpected or unusual. Following this principle, the predominant type can be extended to

include ‘sub-types’ that satisfy the mechanical requirements of the type – (1) a unimodal

power concentration and (2) limited power alternation – but in unconventional formats.44

Our

measure incorporates two unconventional sub-types: predominance in moderately fragmented

party systems (i.e., when a governing coalition is entrenched in power for a prolonged

period); and predominance in highly fragmented party systems (i.e., a longstanding ‘grand-

coalition’). These considerations also mean that the moderate pluralism and polarized

pluralism types must also be redefined. These types now have an essential property relating

to power alternation – namely, that power alternation is regular (i.e. occurs at least once in a

three-election cycle) – alongside their well-known characteristics in the fragmentation and

polarization dimensions.

[Table 1 here]

Calculating the Magnitude of Party System Change

In this section, we flesh out three alternative expressions of the magnitude of party system

change that are consistent with Sartori’s framework and therefore the complex-system

approach. We combine these expressions to produce a composite measure, which we call the

index of fluidity (to distinguish it from Pedersen’s index of volatility).

The most obvious expression of the magnitude of party system change is the frequency of

type changes. In Sartori’s framework, fundamental party system change requires a change of

41

Smith 1989, 351. 42

Attempting to locate the predominant type in fragmentation-polarization space is simply impossible, as Sartori

found (p. 260) and others have noticed (e.g., Evans 2002, 159). 43

Power alternation might be considered the ‘latent’ dimension in Sartori’s theorizing (Nwokora and Pelizzo

2013, 2). 44

Nwokora and Pelizzo 2013, 7-10.

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type. Therefore, the party system of country A is less stable than the party system of another

country, B, if A’s party system changes between types more frequently than B’s during a

historical period. For example, if A’s party system changes types 5 times and B’s only 3

times, then A’s party system is less stable in an important sense. Interpreted in Sartori terms,

the basic pattern of competition shifted more regularly in country A than in country B.

Focusing on frequency alone, however, we ignore the fact that not all transformations are

equivalent in terms of their effects on party system functioning. Transition from a two-party

system to a predominant-party system while far from trivial is less significant than, say,

transition from two-partism to polarized pluralism. The first transition will not alter the

direction of inter-party competition, only the strength of competitive drives, whereas the

second will likely change centripetal competition to a centrifugal pattern, with all the

consequences that follow.45

In general, therefore, some transformations are more severe than

others, and on this basis we identify the scope of change as a second expression of the

magnitude of party system change.

However, ‘scope’ can also be understood in second way. We might also say that the scope of

change is greater when, in a given period, a party system undergoes transformation between

more types than if change occurred just as frequently but between fewer types. For example,

consider two party systems that have both undergone three transformations. The first party

system underwent party system change between two different types: it changed from type x to

y then back to x. However, the second party system changed between three different types:

from x to y to z. It seems reasonable to conclude that the second party system has endured

more substantial change than the first since it has experienced a broader range of types than

the first.

Thus, our aggregate measure, ‘fluidity’, posits that party system change is a function of the

frequency and scope of systemic change, with the latter determined by the extent of type

changes and the number of type changes. This measure can be summarized in three simple

equations:

(i) FLUIDITY = FREQUENCY * SCOPE

(ii) FREQUENCY = Number of party system changes / Number of elections

(iii) SCOPE = Number of type changes * Extent of type changes

‘Frequency’ and ‘number of type changes’, the first sub-dimension of ‘scope’, are

straightforward to calculate once a country’s party systems during a specific historical period

have been categorized according to Sartori’s typology (see Table 1 above).46

But estimating

the extent of type change is more difficult. The clearest expression of Sartori’s thoughts on

this point is a graphical plot (and discussion) of the ‘distribution of political power’

associated with each type; that is, their differences in terms of power concentration or

dispersion.47

The scale that Sartori develops – with the ‘total monopoly’ of a one-party

system at one end, and the extreme dispersion of the atomized system at the other – can

ground an ordinal ranking of the scope of possible systemic transformations, as shown in

45

E.g., Bermeo 2003, 19. 46

It should be noted that cut-offs may be necessary to identify types. However, this is quite different from

saying that the types are approximations taken from a continuous scale, as is sometimes argued. 47

Sartori 2005[1976], 112-3. Elsewhere (p. 253), he offers a different justification for an identical ordering: the

‘intensity of repression’ versus ‘intensity of expression’.

12

Figure 1 below.48

This scale suggests, for example, that the scope of transformation embodied

in change from a one-party system to an atomized system exceeds that of any other possible

transformation. We can follow the logic of Sartori’s framework to plot the two latent sub-

types alongside his original types. The predominant-coalition embodies greater dispersion of

power than the predominant-party system, since the unimodal concentration of power is

based on a coalition of parties rather than a fusion of factions, as is the case with single-party

predominance. The predominant-grand coalition resembles the predominant-coalition, except

that power is even more dispersed.

[Figure 1 here]

As an example of how fluidity is calculated in practice, consider the dynamics of the UK

party system since WWII. Four changes can be detected during this period: the two-party

system established in the immediate aftermath of WWII was followed by a predominant-

party system from 1951 to 1964; which was succeeded by the resumption of two-partism; and

then a system of ‘alternating predominance’ from 1979 to 2010; and, finally, moderate

pluralism from 2010 onward. To calculate fluidity, the four changes of type across eighteen

elections give the frequency of party system change (4/18 = 0.22); system change occurred

between three distinct types; and the extent of change is given by the ‘mechanical’ distance

separating the two most different types (moderate pluralism (0) and predominant-party

system (+2)). Thus, the fluidity of the UK party system during this historical period equals

1.33. To put this figure in a comparative context, we have calculated fluidity scores for

several other West European nations for the post-war period. These scores are shown in

Table 2 below. As shown in the table, some countries with traditionally high rates of

volatility such as Italy display low rates of fluidity.

[Table 2 here]

Patterns of Party System Change in Africa

In this section, as a preliminary application of our fluidity measure, we analyze party system

dynamics in Sub-Saharan Africa. Are African party systems highly fluid? How does (Sartori)

fluidity relate to (Pedersen) volatility in this region? Is the fluidity of the party system related

to the fragility of the state? The absence of a direct measure of complex-system change has

meant that, despite the recent resurgence in research on African party systems, these

questions have not been thoroughly investigated.

Sartori devoted a chapter of his book to the ‘fluid polities’ that he considered to be ubiquitous

in Sub-Saharan Africa. One of their distinguishing features, he argued, is a highly fluid party

system. If we expect stability – ‘long durations and routine’ – in a mature party system then

fluid polities do not have fully fledged party systems but rather ‘quasi-party systems’.49

For

this reason, Sartori suggested, party competition in Africa should not be categorized using

complex-system types, which imply ‘a definiteness, a fixity, a form’ that fluid systems lack.50

Instead, fluid systems should be analyzed using provisional categories that are ‘suggestive of

what the consolidated outcome might be’ if, as the polity matures, the party system does not

48

While there are some suggestions in Sartori’s writings, and in other research, of second-order differences (i.e.

variation in the ‘differences-of-the-differences’), from a conceptual standpoint the basis for allocating what

would then be cardinal scores is much less certain. 49

Sartori 2005[1976], 227. 50

Sartori 2005[1976], 227.

13

undergo a transformation.51

In the resulting categorization, the ‘dominant authoritarian’

category corresponds roughly to the two autocratic types (one-party and hegemonic-party);

the ‘dominant non-authoritarian’ category corresponds to the predominant-party system; the

‘non-dominant’ type is an omnibus category that approximates two-partism, moderate

pluralism, and polarized pluralism; and the ‘pulverized’ category is the fluid analogue of the

atomized type.52

These categories are necessary, argued Sartori, because fluid polities have unstable party

systems. But is this actually the case? Sartori relied on the observation that African polities

lack mass parties to substantiate this claim. This was a reasonable assertion when Sartori was

writing – in the late 1960s and early1970s the idea that mass parties were closely associated

with stable, democratic party systems was no less than conventional wisdom.53

However, the

observation, due initially to Kirchheimer,54

that mass parties were being succeeded by catch-

all without party system change (in the Sartori sense) occurring showed that mass parties

were not necessary for a stable party system. It also meant that Sartori was wrong to think

that the absence of mass parties proved that a party system was fluid.

Sartori’s focus on mass parties was ‘misleading’,55

but his broader arguments about fluid

party systems remain influential, in particular: that African party systems are highly fluid;

and that party system fluidity is detrimental to political system performance. But, these

arguments are usually operationalized using Pedersen’s index, even though this does not tap

the fluidity of Sartori’s types. In other words, the concept of party system change being

measured is different from the concept at work in Sartori’s theorizing. We argue that our

fluidity index can be used for more valid tests of Sartori’s fluidity arguments. Of course, it is

possible that Sartori fluidity and Pedersen volatility are highly correlated empirically, but the

absence of a complex-system measure means that this possibility has not been explored.

To investigate these issues, we calculate fluidity for each country in sub-Saharan Africa for

the period since independence or the end of WWII (whichever is later). Two Africa-specific

issues complicate these calculations. First, as we have discussed, Sartori used provisional

categories instead of his principal types to categorize party competition in Africa, on the

grounds that the African party systems are highly fluid. In our view, the fluidity of African

party systems cannot simply be assumed, so therefore we continue to use Sartori’s principal

categories to calculate fluidity even in Africa. Second, in numerous cases, there are

significant events between elections (e.g. a military coup) that transform the party system but

which we exclude from our calculations of fluidity. We should note, though, that index scores

can be adjusted to take account of between-election party system changes.56

The fluidity scores for African party systems are shown in Table 3 below. The mean score for

the African sample (4.85) is much higher than the mean for the West European sample (0.78),

which suggests that, on the whole, African party systems are more fluid than those of

Western Europe. But this averagely high level of fluidity sits alongside substantial variation,

51

Sartori 2005[1976], 227. 52

Sartori 2005[176], 230. 53

Building on Lipset and Rokkan’s framework, scholars often considered social cleavages, mass parties, and

stable party systems were self-reinforcing foundations of democratic party politics. Note, however, that even

within this setup mass parties provided no leverage for identifying autocratic party systems (e.g. Sartori

2005[1976], 223-4). 54

Kirchheimer 1966. 55

Erdmann and Basedau 2007, 9. 56

This would parallel the innovation suggested by Mershon and Shvetsova (2013) for volatility.

14

with scores ranging from 0 (i.e., no system change; e.g. South Africa since 1994) to 20 (e.g.,

Sudan). Overall, the data leaves a mixed impression: the continent average supports Sartori’s

argument that African party systems are highly fluid but then there are also several low-

fluidity scores which run counter to this generalization.

[Table 3]

To clarify the implications of these fluidity scores for Sartori arguments, we introduce data

on state fragility. Specifically, we correlate fluidity against the index of state fragility index

produced by the Centre for Systemic Peace. Sartori argued that there was congruence

between fluid party systems and fluid polities: nation-building and modernization require

significant state capacity but this depends on a stable system of party competition, which

African countries usually lack.57

The result is that they tend to have weak or fragile states – ‘a

low incidence of stateness’, as Sartori puts it.58

A scatterplot summarizing the correlation

between fluidity and the CSP state fragility index is shown in Figure 2 below. The moderate

correlation (r = 0.336) is significant at the 0.05 level, which indicates that party system

instability in Africa is associated with state fragility. Interestingly, the data reveals two

clusters: broadly speaking, a high-fluidity group and a low-fluidity group. The dividing line

separating these groups is a fluidity score of approximately 10. For both groups, fluidity is

associated with state fragility, but the data suggests that the correlation of these variables

differs between the groups. Visually, it appears that the data would be more efficiently

summarized using two best-fit lines – one for each cluster – rather than in a single equation.

[Figure 2 here]

To investigate this possibility, we analyse the two clusters separately. The correlation

between fluidity and state fragility is stronger in both sub-samples than it is in the overall

sample, which confirms our suspicion that the relationship between fluidity and state fragility

varies depending on the level of fluidity. For low-fluidity countries, there is a moderately

strong relationship between fluidity and state fragility (r = 0.461), as shown in Figure 3

below. However, for the group of high-fluidity countries, the correlation is very high (r =

0.935), as shown in Figure 4. These results suggest that there is a point of inflection in the

relationship between fluidity and state fragility. Below a fluidity score of approximately 10,

fluidity accounts for around 20 per cent of the variance in state fragility scores; but above this

level, fluidity accounts for approximately 80 of the variance in state fragility.

This observation, though entirely empirical, can be interpreted by drawing on Sartori’s

theoretical arguments. An important theme in Sartori’s framework is the idea that there are

discontinuities in patterns of party competition. His types depend on turning points such as

the three-election threshold that distinguishes a predominant-party system from a two-party

system. For Sartori, such turning points reflect the fact that ‘real life hinges on thresholds …

and develops, at some point, through jumps’.59

Our empirical analysis suggests that there may

be important dynamic thresholds alongside the static ones that Sartori stressed. In particular,

at a fluidity level of about 10 there appears to be a turning point in the relationship of party

system stability to state fragility. Before this point, the party system significantly influences

the fragility of the state, but seemingly in a multi-factorial process, alongside other key

57

Sartori 2005[1976], 219-26. 58

Sartori 2005[1976], 219. 59

Sartori 2005[1976], 277.

15

factors. Beyond this threshold, however, party system stability seems to be, by a considerable

margin, the single most important determinant of state fragility.

[Figure 3 here]

[Figure 4 here]

As the final stage in our empirical analysis, we examine the relationship between our fluidity

index and Pedersen’s volatility index. The correlation between scores generated by these

measures provides some indication of how simple-system and complex-system change relate

empirically (on average, in Africa). The calculation of volatility in sub-Saharan Africa is far

from straightforward. It requires ‘information from consecutive multiparty elections’, with

three elections often considered to be the minimum requirement, and there are additional

complications due to party mergers, splits, and name changes.60

Matthijs Bogaards has

recently presented data on volatility (where it can be calculated) that is particularly sensitive

to such issues. Overall, there is a moderately strong, positive correlation between fluidity and

average volatility in a sample containing the 20 countries in the Bogaards’s sample (r =

0.507, significant at 0.05 level). This confirms that a party system that is relatively unstable

in the simple-system sense (in respect of volatility) is also likely to be relatively unstable in

the complex-system sense, and vice versa.

However, the correlation is not so strong that we can consider these treatments of party

system change to be empirically equivalent – approximately half of the variation in fluidity

scores is not accounted for by volatility. If we use average fluidity and volatility scores to

divide countries into low and high fluidity/volatility groups, then each country can be placed

in one of four categories.61

As shown in Figure 5 below, most of the countries in this

restricted sample combine lower than average fluidity with lower than average volatility.

These countries typically have lower state fragility scores than countries with high fluidity or

high volatility (average = 9), a result that comports with our earlier findings that fluidity

correlates with state fragility and with volatility.

[Figure 5 here]

The results from the other three groups contribute some less obvious findings concerning the

relationship of fluidity and volatility to state fragility. The party systems that are both highly

volatile and highly fluid (Benin and Senegal) have an average state fragility score that is only

slightly higher than the average for the low fluidity / low volatility countries (9.5). These are

countries that had experienced quite significant party system change but which have now

settled on multiparty systems which, unlike Western systems, lack the stabilizing effects of

ideology or partisanship. The countries that combine opposing tendencies in respect of

fluidity and volatility have especially fragile states. The combination of high fluidity and low

volatility, observed only in Mauritania, captures the situation of a country that has

transitioned frequently between the high power-concentration types (i.e., the one-party,

hegemonic-party, and predominant-party systems). Mauritania has the second highest

fragility score in the sample, suggesting that, in terms of the impact of party system change

on the state capacity, high fluidity matters more than low volatility. Finally, the five cases in

the low fluidity / high volatility category have an average state fragility score of 14.5. These

60

Bogaards 2008, 114. 61

We use the fluidity mean of the full sample.

16

countries have party systems that are stable but under considerable electoral pressure, as

Bogaards points out.62

Conclusion

This paper has investigated the conceptualization and measurement of party system change.

We have argued that scholarly consensus on the definitions of ‘party system’ and ‘party

system change’ masks a deeper conceptual rift about the structure of party systems.

Crucially, when this division is uncovered, and existing measures are assessed against this

backdrop, it becomes clear that we lack a wide-ranging tool for measuring complex-system

change. We have attempted to develop such an indicator by operationalizing the notion of

party system change that emerges from Sartori’s framework. Our preliminary tests of the

fluidity index suggest that it captures a distinct dimension of party system dynamics that

relates systematically to state fragility.

62

Bogaards 2008, 123.

17

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Table 1: Sartori’s Typology

Type

Number of

parties Polarization

Power

Alternation

Autocracy

One-Party

(e.g. China) 1 -- Impossible

Hegemonic

(e.g. Zimbabwe) 1 +n -- Impossible

Democracy

Predominant-Party

(e.g. Japan) 1 +n -- Infrequent

Two-Party

(e.g. Australia) 2 +n Low

Regular and

wholesale

Moderate

Pluralism

(e.g. Germany)

3-5 +n Medium Regular and partial

Polarized

Pluralism

(e.g. Italy)

6-8 High Regular and partial

Atomized

(e.g. Vanuatu) 8+ Extreme

Regular and

random

21

Figure 1: Mechanical Distance of Sartori Types

-2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4

Atomized Polarized

Pluralism

Moderate

Pluralism

Two-Party Predominant

(single-party)

Hegemonic One-Party

Predominant

(grand coalition)

Predominant

(coalition)

Table 2: Fluidity in Western Europe

France (1946-2012) 2.57

Germany (1949-2009) 0.53

Greece (1974-2012) 2.00

Ireland (1948-2011) 0.95

Italy (1948-2008) 0.13

Norway (1945-2009) 0.35

Portugal (1976-2011) 0.31

Spain (1977-2011) 0.36

Sweden (1948-2010) 0.30

UK (1945-2010) 0.33

Table 3: Fluidity in Sub-Saharan Africa

Angola (1975-2012) 3.60

Benin (1960-2012) 10.00

Botswana (1965-2009) 0.20

Burkina Faso (1959-2010) 9.14

Burundi (1961-2010) 7.20

Cameroon (1965-2011) 3.60

Cape Verde (1975-2011) 3.38

Central African Republic (1959-2011) 8

Chad (1962-2011) 6.85

Comoros (1978-2010) 4.50

Congo-Brazaville (1961-2009) 6

Congo-Kinshasa (1960-2011) 5.14

Cote d’Ivoire (1960-2010) 4.80

Djibuti (1977-2011) 0.57

Equatorial Guinea (1968-2009) 12

Ethiopia (1955-2010) 3.6

Gabon (1961-2009) 1.33

Gambia (1960-2011) 0.66

Ghana (1960-2008) 6

Guinea (1957-2010) 4

Guinea Bissau (1972-2012) 2.66

Kenya (1963-2007) 2.40

22

Lesotho (1965-2012) 4.5

Liberia (1951-2011) 3.27

Madagascar (1965-2006) 6

Malawi (1961-2009) 4

Mali (1957-2007) 8.88

Mauritania (1959-2009) 12

Mauritius (1959-2010) 2.25

Mozambique (1977-2009) 0.67

Namibia (1994-2009) 0

Niger (1965-2011) 4.5

Nigeria (1959-2011) 1.33

Rwanda (1965-2010) 0.28

Sao Tome (1975-2011) 8

Senegal (1963-2012) 10

Seychelles (1970-2011) 2.7

Sierra Leone (1957-2012) 10.67

Somalia (1965) 1.5

Somaliland (1997) 2.67

South Africa (1994) 0

South Sudan (2010) 0

Sudan (1953) 20

Swaziland (1964) 0.8

Tanzania (1962) 1.1

Togo (1961) 2

Uganda (1961) 6

Zambia (1968) 4.36

Zimbabwe (1980) 1

23

Figure 2: Fluidity and State Fragility

24

Figure 3: Fluidity and State Fragility (Low Fluidity Subsample)

Figure 4: Fluidity and State Fragility (High Fluidity Subsample)

25

Figure 5: Fluidity, Volatility, and State Fragility

Burkina Faso 16 Benin 10

Gambia 14 Senegal 9

Ghana 11

Zambia 13 AVERAGE 9.5

Zimbabwe 17

AVERAGE 14.5

Botswana 3 Mauritania 16

Cape Verde 4

Djibouti 13 AVERAGE 16

Guinea 18

Lesotho 8

Malawi 16

Mauritius 1

Mozambique 13

Namibia 5

South Africa 8

AVERAGE 9

High Volatility

High Fluidity

Low Volatility

Low Fluidity