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Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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PARTY GOVERNMENT AND TYPE OF REGIME IN FOUR LATIN AMERICAN COUNTRIES: THE CASES OF ARGENTINA, ECUADOR,
URUGUAY AND VENEZUELA
Mara Pegoraro
Instituto de Iberoamérica, Universidad de Salamanca
Abstract
The aim of this paper is to evaluate the characteristics of government parties in 4 Latin-American political
regimes: Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela. The main concern that addresses the research is if an
specific political regime generate an specific type of political party. The classification of political regime
responds to the variation of regime types according to Polity IV’s index: Argentina as a democracy, Uruguay
as a full democracy, Ecuador as an open anacrocy and Venezuela as a closed anacrocy. We distinguish types
of political parties regarding strength and cohesion. The claim of the paper is that in Ecuador and
Venezuela, pre-change parties show lower levels of strength than in Argentina and Uruguay. Likewise, we
hope to find that today’s government parties in Ecuador and Venezuela hold higher strength levels than
their predecessors. In Argentina and Uruguay, the strength levels remain the same through the selected
period of time, showing a slight increase from 2004 on and from 2007 on respectively. We analyze
government parties from 1978 on (year of Ecuadorian transition) and up to 2013.
Key Words: party government, political regime, party strength, democracy, Latin America
Mara Pegoraro: Candidata a Doctora en Procesos Políticos Contemporáneos por la Universidad de
Salamanca. Máster en Ciencia Política por la misma casa de estudios. Licenciada en Ciencia Política por la Universidad
de Buenos Aires, Argentina.
Versión borrador, por favor no citar sin autorización. Paper a ser presentado en el Seminario de Investigación Máster en Estudios Latinoamericanos, Instituto de Iberoamérica, Universidad de Salamanca.
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to explore the relationship between party government and type of
regime. The basic idea is that different kinds of political regimes generate different types of ruling political
parties. For that purpose, we focalize in four Latin American countries: Argentina, Ecuador, Uruguay and
Venezuela, who show variations across the type of regime and the type of party government.
The analysis includes government parties from 1978 on (year of Ecuadorian transition) and up to
2012 (last presidential election in Venezuela, in which Chávez was elected). Case selection responds to the
variation of regime types according to Polity IV’s index: Argentina as a democracy, Uruguay as a full
democracy, Ecuador as an open anacrocy and Venezuela as a closed anacrocy.
The research is driven from two questions. At first we wonder: does a specific type of political
regime generate a specific ruling political party? The purpose of this question is to establish the difference
between political parties in democratic and hybrid contexts. Once we assess the difference, the paper
concentrates in the analysis of party government in hybrid political regime. The main concern about this
matter is if different kinds of hybrid – open and close anacrocy – generates different kinds of political
parties.
We intent to answer these concerns through data analysis of levels of competitiveness and
contestation in the four political systems that we are taking into account. Going into deeper analysis, we
will study party organization through evaluating its strength. Strength is operationalized into indicators
scope and cohesion. Scores for party scope and cohesion (low = 0; medium = 1; high = 2) are summed into a
composite score (0-4: 4: High; 3: Medium High; 2: Medium; 1: Medium Low; 0: Low) (Levitsky and Way
2010).
In order to observe party strength, we consider the resources available for patronage distribution.
By providing institutional mechanisms for rulers to reward loyalists and by lengthening actors’ time
horizons through the provision of future opportunities for career advancement, parties encourage elite
cooperation over defection (Levitsky and Way 2010: 26; Bueno de Mesquita 2003). Where governing
parties are weak or absent, regime elites see fewer opportunities for political advancement from within
and are thus more likely to seek power from outside the regime (Way 2002; Brownlee 2007).
The claim of this paper is that ruling political parties show higher levels of strength in hybrid
political regimes after a democratic path (transition) than those who has been govern in democratic
regimes.
According to this idea, is likely to find that ruling political parties in institutionalized hybrid regime
show higher levels of scope than cohesion. And new hybrid regime stress higher levels of cohesion despite
the level of scope.
In regard of our cases under analysis, we expect to find that in Ecuador and Venezuela, pre-change
parties show lower levels of strength than in Argentina and Uruguay. In addition, we hope to find that
today’s government parties in Ecuador and Venezuela hold higher strength levels than their predecessors.
In Argentina and Uruguay, the strength levels remain the same through the selected period of time,
showing a slight increase from 2004 on and from 2007 on respectively.
At this point of the paper, we take as independent variable the political regime and as dependent
variable the type of party government. Since the argument is built from the idea that regime type and its
stability are driven primarily by the organizational power of their incumbents (Levitsky and Way 2010: 23),
we must also take into consideration the effect that the type of the ruling political party has in the stability
or propensity in the change of a determined political regime.
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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We assume that the break inside the government party’s elite and the subsequent defection of the
challenging dominant coalition (Panebianco 1988; Geddes 1999) explains regime change both in the
authoritarian and democratic direction.
In cases in which the democratic regime has been replaced by a hybrid –open and closed anacrocy
respectively in Ecuador and Venezuela- pre-change government parties had been inefficient in their
electoral strategies and post-change government parties have privileged strategies that undermine the
legitimacy of the democratic regime. The ability to maximize the vote and to undermine the legitimacy of
the democratic regime is a result of the strength of party organization.
The paper is organized in six sections. First, we explicit the theoretical routes of our analysis and
expose the main concepts that leads to our interpretations. In the third and fourth section, we describe the
kind of political party that rules both in the democratic and hybrid regime. The fifth part of the article,
exposes the differences between democratic and hybrid regime and inside the hybrid regime world. Finally,
we expose our conclusion and suggest a research agenda.
2. Theoretical framework
In this paper we are going to work with two basic perspectives. The first one refers to the study of
political parties as organizations, the other is considered the mainstream of the studies of political regimes,
especially those who focus on the differences between democracy and authoritarianism.
First of all, is important to notice that the classification of political regimes has historically followed
two paths: dichotomous or gradual. Dichotomous classifications draw a line between democracies and non-
democracies. The gradual, however, tries to distinguish between degrees of democracy and non-
democracy, according to the presence or absence of certain attributes (Collier and Adcock 1999: 546-549).
The gradual strategy is the one we adopt in our analysis but we are not going to focalize on the
quality of democracy, we stand on gradient idea because is the one that allows us to differentiate between
democracy, hybrid regimes and basic authoritarianism.
There is a difficulty in categorizing political regimes as full democracies or pure authoritarianisms,
due the diffuse role that elections have in actual regimes (Schedler 2002b; Morse 2012; Munck 2001;
Diamond 2002; Armony and Schamis 2005). This imposes a stress on the idea that the appointment of
rulers through elections is the defining element of a democracy.
If the condition does not seem to be the electoral differentiator and we simultaneously recognize
that hybrid regimes have features of competitive and effective dispute / political struggle, is relevant to
consider the nature of party government and the party systems.
This study views the political regime as a two-dimensional concept: procedural and attitudinal
(Munck, 1996). Based on this definition, this work will take into account the rules of the game, as they
define the number and the type of players eligible to participate. This suggests a first distinction between
restrictive and participatory regimes.
The introduction of the attitudinal dimension allows us to consider changes expressed at the level
of the party system. The interaction between these two dimensions will be feasible in the analytical
relationship dimension government - opposition as characteristic of each type of political regime.
We asume that political regimes are differentiated by their dynamics. The dynamics are the result
of the interaction between formal and informal norms and the incentives that each of these distribute
among actors. To focus, on the actors allows us to concentrate on political parties as organizations, which is
our main purpose here.
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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On this basis, the regimes are distinguished by the number of actors and the resources they have.
This element affects, in particular, the strategic calculus of the opposition, which determines their
effectiveness before their possibility.
The difference between authoritarian, democratic and hybrid referred to the question of the actors
is observed at first at the level of the party system in their levels of fragmentation, competition,
competitiveness and concentration. Second, we concentrate on the characteristics of the party
government, specially the level of strength.
The analysis of the characteristics of the incumbents and respect to variations of power they hold,
is essential to define the type of political regime and thus to clarify the differences (Levitsky and Way 2010:
56).
The study of political parties from an organizational perspective will allow us to get inside the
political organization and to stress out the relationship inside de dominant coalition. For that purpose, we
stand on Panebianco´s (1982) perspective and we will consider in first place if the dominant coalition is one
of “tendency” o “factions”. The degree of factionalism that show the dominant coalition will provide a
measure of the internal conflict that de party government needs to manage.
In a complementary way, we will pay attention to the type of political party who exercises
government, assuming that the government parties manage the conflict among elites through patronage
techniques and have the resources to reward loyalists and promote cooperation over defection (Geddes
1999; Brownlee 2007; Magaloni 2008).
Following this idea, the characteristics of the party organization that is in position incumbent have
an effect on the stability of the regime and suggests a direct relationship between organizations based on
patronage and stability of competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010: 353). However,
organizations built around patronage / clientelism are not unique in competitive authoritarianism. They
also appear in democratic regimes and often explain the persistence of regimes associated with diminished
subtypes of democracy (O'Donnell 1996).
Survival is not an imperative policy unique to a particular type of leader in a particular political
regime. On the contrary, it is a trait shared. However, following "the selectorate theory" (Bueno de
Mesquita et al. 2003) it is conceivable that there are differences between the strategies developed by the
incumbents in democratic political systems and hybrids.
The "selectorate" is the group of people who constitute the political community and have the right
to express their preferences in choosing their political leaders. In democracies, at least formally, this group
consists of citizens.
According to their model, the political leaders who want to retain power must build minimal
winning coalitions under its "selectorate" and they can pay taxes and spend public resources depending on
public and private property at their disposal. Members of the "selectorate" are potential members of the
winning coalition holding the leader and therefore potential beneficiaries. The number of members of the
winning coalition depends in the first instance, from the formal rules and the institutions that establish the
access to power and depends on the resources and strategies used by leaders.
As a complementary indicator of the nature of the political party who exercise government we are
going to use the model suggested by Levitsky and Way (2010: 377-378) which considers party strength.
The scope range it’s translated in the following way: high: mass organization that penetrates
virtually all population centers down to village and neighborhood level and/or civil society and/or
workplace. Evidence of significant grassroots activity – during and between elections – across the national
territory; medium: party does not meet criteria for high scope but possesses a national organization that
penetrates most population centers and is capable of carrying out election campaigns and fielding
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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candidates across the national territory; low: no party or little or no party organization outside of the
capital/major urban centers.
Cohesion has the following values: high: single governing party that achieved power via violent
conflict, including revolution or national liberation struggle in which much of the current leadership
participated o established single party with evidence of non – material source of cohesion including a)
shared ideology in a context in which this ideological cleavage is dominant b) shared ethnicity in a context
in which this ethnic cleavage is dominant. Medium: established single party that does not meet the criteria
for high cohesion or new party with evidence of shared ideology or ethnicity in a context in which the
ideological or ethnic cleavage is predominant. Low: incumbents rules with no party or incumbent rules
without a single party but is supported by multiple and competing parties or new party and for which there
is no evidence of nonmaterial source of cohesion.
In terms of an addition index, strength is operationalized into indicators scope and cohesion where
scores for party scope and cohesion (low = 0; medium = 1; high = 2) are summed into a composite score (0-
4: 4: High; 3: Medium High; 2: Medium; 1: Medium Low; 0: Low) (Levitsky and Way 2010).
Finally, it is important to acknowledge that elections, together with rising levels of electoral
competition that allow regime politicians to survive, are factors that change the calculation of coalition
members. Our purpose here is to contribute to determine how changing levels of electoral competition
affect the cost –benefit calculation of regime actors.
3. Four Latin American Political Regimes in Context
In this section we present a descriptive image of the basic features of the political regime in our
four countries. We pay attention to the rules of the game and then we describe the political dynamic
focusing on the main political actors and the interaction between them.
3.1 The rules of the game
The most important thing here is to understand the rules that points out the ways to access to
power. There is a difference, and that we must take into account, between access and exercise of power
because whereas regime transitions are changes in the form of access to power, problems of institutional
quality involve the exercise of power (Mazzuca 2010).
According to this idea, we need to know how the rules of each political regime establish the set of
alternatives that are available for the political parties and also if these rules benefit an even playfield or are
designed for reinforcing the position of the party in power. The distinction between access and exercise will
allow us to establish the effects of political parties on the democratic path of the countries that we are
studying.
We assume along with Mazzuca (2010: 335), that changes in the structures of exercise of power are
normally driven by a vector of forces that is not comparable to that which produces changes in the
institutions o the access to power. In order to establish those vectors, we will present the rules and the
political context, in terms of competitiveness, of Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela.
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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Table 1: Electoral system and political distribution
Argentina Uruguay Ecuador Venezuela
Electoral
system for
president
4-year term. Simple
majority with more
than 45 percent of the
vote or more than 40
percent and ten points
of difference with the
second. Reelection
permitted for a period.
Term of 5 years.
Elected by direct
popular vote. The
President has a term of
five years without
immediate reelection
until after the same
period from the
termination of his
cargo. Ballotage.
Second round simple
majority.
4 years. Reelection
permitted for a period.
Relative majority
system: more than
40% or 10 point
difference with the
second.
6 year term. Simple
plurality. No term limit.
(indefinite reelection)
Electoral
system for
legislative
Bicameralism
Chamber of deputies:
Proportional D`Hondt
257 seats; directly elected, 4 years term. Half elected every two years to four-year term. D`hondt system. Senate:
72 seats; directly elected, one-third elected every two years to six-year term
Bicameralism: Chamber of deputies: 99 members elected directly by the people under a system of proportional representation which take into count the votes cast
for each party
throughout the
country. Three ballots.
First D`hont to each
lema, then quotient
system.
Senate:30 seats. the distribution of seats is done by proxy proportional integral, awarded by the D'Hondt method, triple simultaneous vote, list closed and locked and
only national
constituency
Unicameralism.
Proportional D'Hondt and Hare 136 seats.
Unicameralism. 4 year
term. Segmented:
proportional and
mayority. D´Hondt and
plurality.
Forces
distribution
in Congress
Chambers of
Deputies: 34
parliamentary
groups.
Presidential
Political
party. FPV.
115 / 257
Chamber of deputies: 4
parliamentary groups.
Presidential political
party: 50/99.
Senate: 3 parliamentary
groups. Presidential
political party: 16/30.
12 parliamentary groups-
Presidential political party:
100/136 seats
20 parliamentary groups.
Organizados en dos polos:
oficialismo – oposición.
Presidential political party:
92/165
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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seats (see
Table 1 in
anexo)
Senate: 6
parliamentary
groups.
Presidential
Political Party
30/72
Table 2: Party government and margin victory
Año País
Argentina Uruguay Ecuador Venezuela
1978 CFP (3,84%) COPEI (3,34%)
1983 UCR (11,59%) AD (22,18%)
1984 PC (6,06%) PSC (1,53%
1988 ID (6,87%) AD (12,49%)
1989 PJ (15,04%) PN (8,22%)
1992 PUR (6,85%)
1993 CONVERGENCIA (6,86 %)
1994 PC (3,08%)
1995 PJ (21,57%)
1996 PRE (0,89%)
1998 DP (8,31%) MVR/MAS/PPT/ PCV/IPCN/GE/MEPSI/AA (16,23%)
1999 Alianza (10,1%) PC (52,52%)
2000 MVR/MAS/PPT/ PCV/IPCN/GE/MEPSI/AA (22,24%)
2002 PSP, MPD, MUPP/NP (3,06%)
2003 PJ/FPV (-2,21%)
2004 FA (16,15%)
2006 Alianza PAIS (3,99%) MVR/MAS/PPT/ PCV/IPCN/GE/MEPSI/AA (25,95%)
2007 PJ/FPV (22,25%)
2009 FA (18,89%) Alianza PAIS (23,57%)
2011 PJ/FPV (37,3%)
2012 PSUV (10,76%)
2013 PSUV (1,49%)
Source: Author’s elaboration based on official data
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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3.2 The rules of the game
In Argentina during the last 30 years only two political parties governed. Most of the time the
Partido Justicialista (PJ), also known as peronism, was the ruling party. After the crisis of 2001, the main
opposition party, Unión Cívica Radical (UCR), vanished as an alternative. When we look at the victory
margin we can see that the Argentinian political system became less competitive since 2007. The margin
victory shows this.
Despite this feature, Argentina is considered as a democratic regime since 1983. The score in the
polity IV index for 2012 is 8 and when we look the trajectory of the political regime we see that Argentina
was always in the segment of democracy experimented slightly decrease during the presidency of the
Peronist Carlos Menem between 1989 and 1999.
Uruguay is the other country that is considered inside the democratic world. In fact, Uruguay is
considered as a full democracy with a score of 10 points. Since the democratization, the Uruguayan politics
was dominated by two main parties: el Partido Colorado and the Partido Blanco. But in 2004 the political
scenario acknolewdged a new political party: the Frente Amplio – Encuentro Progresista.
It is important to notice that in both democratic countries the political party of the president
controls the majority in the Legislative. This scenario of unified government gives the ruling party an
important source of power. But if we take into account the limitation of the presidential power and
interaction between Executive and Legislative branches, the polity IV index qualifies as near parity with an
score of 6 points in Argentina and parity in Uruguay with 7 points.
Ecuador and Venezuela have a different path in regarding of the democratic regime. For over 30
years, starting in 1958, Venezuelan politics were defined by the peaceful rotation of power between the
two establishment parties, the Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) and the Democratic Action party (AD).
This was known as “Punto Fijo” agreement. In fact, till 2006 Venezuela was considered as a democratic
regime which has experimented a progressive decrease in the score of democratic index. And finally in
2006 Venezuela, entered the segment characterized as anacrocies (5 points on the Polity IV index). The
regime change is, in part, a result of the rule change promoted by President Chavez in 1999 through
referendum authorizing the formation of a Constituent Assembly to draft a new constitution. At last
Venezuela is characterized as a closed anacrocies (-3 points) since 2009, this is due to the public
referendum that was held that approved constitutional changes that further concentrated power in the
presidency and removed term limits on public office. In sum, the systematic elimination of constraints on
the presidential action after 1998 was the main element that explains why Venezuela cease to be a
democracy by any definition.
Ecuador is a country that has had more difficulty to generate frameworks minimum democratic
governance after its transition to democracy in 1978. It is argued that the pronounced regional split that
divides societies with high ideological polarization and centrifugal competition in the system party, the
political patronage, the constant change of the electoral system and the party scenario of high
fragmentation that generates governments weak with the veto power that particularistic interests have,
are the factors that explain the problems of the Andean country's democratic governance (Freidenberg
2004, 2008, 2009; Pachano 2006).
Despite the crisis of governability that has been characterized, the democratic political regime in
Ecuador and the fact that Ecuador is one of the countries that better expresses the idea of new pattern of
instability in the region (Pérez Liñán 2009) in terms of institutional and political variables to measure the
level of democracy Ecuador has shown a high score till 2000 (9 points).
The crisis of January 2000 expressed in massive social protests, the resignation of President
Mahuad, the attempted of a military-civilian junta to assume control of the government the military swore
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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in Vice President Gustavo Noboa Bejarano as the new president, marks a decline in the competitive nature
of executive recruitment. From this moment till 2006 Ecuador was in the minimum frontier of democratic
regime (6 points) and after the first election of Correa it changed to 5 points becoming an open anacrocy
with a notorious decrease in the level of competitiveness. In terms of formal rules, Ecuador also
experimented a Constitutional Reform after the referendum of 2007 that authorized President to call the
Constituent Assembly as well as indicating the strong popular support and bias plebiscite that Correa has in
the exercise of power.
As it shows in the graphics below, the four countries have a similar democratic path till a change
occurs in the formal rules of the game. In some cases, like in Argentina, the constitutional reform of 1994
did not mean the change of regime and also didn´t open and opportunity for diminishing the democratic
guarantees. The cases of Ecuador and Venezuela follow similar paths between each other after the reform
of the constitution. It is not daring to assert, then, that changes in the formal rules enable the probability of
regime change.
Chart 1: Democratic path in Argentina, Uruguay, Ecuador and Venezuela
Año Argentina Uruguay Ecuador Venezuela
1978 -9 -7 -5 9
1979 -9 -7 9 9
1980 -9 -7 9 9
1981 -8 -7 9 9
1982 -8 -7 9 9
1983 8 -7 9 9
1984 8 -7 8 9
1985 8 9 8 9
1986 8 9 8 9
1987 8 9 8 9
1988 8 9 9 9
1989 7 10 9 9
1990 7 10 9 9
1990 7 10 9 9
1991 7 10 9 8
1992 7 10 9 8
1993 7 10 9 8
1994 7 10 9 8
1995 7 10 9 8
1996 7 10 8 8
1997 7 10 9 8
1998 8 10 9 7
2000 8 10 6 7
2001 8 10 6 6
2002 8 10 6 6
2003 8 10 6 6
2004 8 10 6 6
2005 8 10 6 6
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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2006 8 10 7 5
2007 8 10 5 5
2008 8 10 5 5
2009 8 10 5 -3
2010 8 10 5 -3
2011 8 10 5 -3
2012 8 10 5 -3 Source: Polity IV Index Serie 2012
Figure 1:
Source: Polity IV Index Serie 2012
4. Four Latin American Political Regimes in Comparative Perspective
In this section, we provide a short overview of the characteristics of each party so as to understand
how they are organized and how they differ from one another. The variables to that characterize the
governing parties are: a) the nature of the dominant coalition or what is the same level of internal
factionalism and b) the strength of the party in terms of scope and cohesion.
Since our argument is constructed from the differentiation of political regimes this article takes the
actual incumbent party as the main actor under the analysis of the four cases.
4.1 Democracy and political parties
ARGENTINA
The current ruling party in Argentina is the Front for Victory (FPV) governing Argentina since 2003
adding a total of three administrations: that of Nestor Kirchner (NCK) (2003-2007) and two terms of his
wife, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (CFK) (2007-2011, 2011-2015). The Front for Victory is today the label
that identifies the Peronists.
The election of Nestor Kirchner in 2003 was held in a climate of political fragmentation and
uncertainty and reached the presidency with only 22% of the vote. For 2007 the political landscape had
changed significantly and the election of Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner FPV consolidation meant expressed
in the large percentage of votes obtained, winning more than three-quarters of Argentina’s 23
Argentina
Uruguay
Ecuador
Venezuela
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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governorships, the Justicialist Party (PJ) and other pro-Kirchner allies won large majorities in both legislative
chambers.
In the Chamber of Deputies, the lower house of Argentina’s bicameral National Congress,
progovernment Peronists and other Kirchner allies (including pro-Kirchner Radicals) won 160 of 257 seats,
while dissident Peronists won another 10 seats. The loosely organized Civic Coalition won 31 seats, while
the UCR won 30 seats. In the Senate, the Kirchnerista forces controlled 47 of 74 seats after the election,
while another 5 seats were held by dissident Peronists. The PJ thus emerged from the election in a
dominant position. For 2011, the election was even easy and the legislative control was reinforced.
Cristina Kirchner’s victory was also rooted in the continued strength of the Peronist party machine.
Argentina’s only mass party, the PJ possessed had a stable electoral base as well as a grassroots
organization and an activist base that dwarfed those of its rivals. PJ networks operated throughout the
country, mobilizing voters through a mix of clientelistic and other appeals. In many interior provinces,
where clientelism is most extensive and Peronist machines are most dominant, Cristina Kirchner’s victory
was overwhelming. In some northern provinces (for example, Formosa, Salta, and Santiago del Estero), she
won with more than 70 percent of the vote, more than quadrupling her nearest rival. (Levitsky and Murillo
2008).
Peronism has nos also earned more but also had a greater winning margin. There are different
interpretations of the reasons for the predominance of Peronism in Argentina. The literature agrees in that
the critical role of organizational characteristics most important thing is its adaptive capacity expressed as:
(a) the transformation of the relationship with their bases, favoring one type of patronage (Levitsky 2003;
Calvo and Murillo 2004), (b) the development of strategies aimed at strengthening electoral logic cross
(Calvo and Murillo 2012) and (c) the interpenetration between the party and the state structure observed
Justicialist especially at the provincial (Scherlis 2012). It is also possible to find interpretations based on the
role of identity issues in the persistence of Peronism (Auyero 2001).
Organizational explanations realize that the PJ was and is strong at the subnational level, but it
works more like a confederation of provincial parties which project alternately territorial leaders at the
national level rather than a national party with provincial "headquarters" provincial. This dispersion of the
center of the organization is observed even in the various "isms" that are inside the PJ. Isms that
correspond with provincial leadership pipeline and in some cases, are expressed electorally, as happened in
2003, and then reach national projection (Pegoraro and Suárez-Cao 2013).
Nestor Kirchner was a strengthening figure of the presidential office compared to other institutions,
including his own party (Cherny et al. 2010; Levitsky and Murillo 2008) and partisan appointments during
this period have become an essential tool for effective control over the state apparatus and simultaneously
reconfigure Peronist party elites under the wing of the president.
The combination of Kirchner's concentration of power and the PJ's growing electoral dominance
The Core Institutions of democracy REMAIN strong in Argentina: Elections are clean, civil liberties are
broadly protected, and the military-author of six coups. Between 1930 and 1976, has withdrawn from
politics. Nestor Kirchner's ability to concentrate power was limited by robust democratic Institutions, a
strong civil society, and the nature of his own Peronist coalition
The weakness of the non-Peronist opposition has several important consequences. Most obviously,
it leaves the opposition increasingly incapable of challenging the PJ in the electoral arena.
According to this brief description and sticking to the variables considered in this article, the Front
for Victory / Peronism has a high level of organizational power, reaching the highest score 4 points. From
the size of the scope, the value is high: 2 points. For Peronism penetrating across the country territorially
Seminario de Investigación #1: 4 de octubre de 2013 Mara Pegoraro
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while since the arrival of the Kirchner to power a growing interpenetration occurs with the state and are
increasingly turning to political patronage for both the electorate and to enhance partisan races.
Since the dimension of cohesion evaluation is also high. The kirchnerism seems to have managed to
overcome the factionalism that characterized the Peronist and build power from the concentration of
decisions on a minimum core and hard about the presidential figure. If we consider also the tradition that
characterized the Peronist bandwagon regarding presidential leadership and how this tradition affected the
level of cohesion of the dominant coalition especially in times of lame duck, we found that FPV has been
efficient in turning this informal institution that remained cohesion levels on an item to ensure the party's
electoral survival and increase the power organizational.
More than the absence of government party which can be seen from Kirchner's presidency is an
alternative mechanism for building and sustaining the ruling party.
URUGUAY
Uruguay has one of the systems of older political parties among modern democracies, Cavarozzi
(1995) includes the case of Uruguay in the type of "systems strong parties". But political parties have been
the main agents of nomination of candidates because the electoral system has allowed different candidates
of the same party competing for the same positions in the national election itself (Buquet 2004).
Organizations second level, i.e. between party factions are the central agents. The current configuration of
the Uruguayan party system is characterized by the presence of four parliamentary parties.
The two traditional parties, the Partido Colorado (PC) and the National Party or White (PN) that
currently are located from the center to the right of the ideological spectrum. With them other parties have
lived throughout most of the twentieth century a core of smaller parties, called "ideas", which came
together in 1971 in the formation of the Frente Amplio (FA). This party, which is clearly placed in positions
left, has ruled the country's capital - Montevideo for four consecutive periods and has become since 2004
in the ruling party.
The most characteristic feature of the main Uruguayan parties is the coexistence within different
fractions of heavy texture and great political autonomy, fractions show high stability over time. The white
and red party share an organizational feature: factionalizing internally associated bipolarity involves
caudillistic leadership. The batllistas in the Colorado Party, the herreristas in white or national.
In the case of FA was not so clearly presented bipolar scheme, although in general tends to
differentiate sectors "moderate" sectors "radical". Currently, in the internal schema of FA, we can
distinguish seven main fractions.
On one side there are three groups originated prior to FA, Advanced Democracy (Communist), Area
90 (socialist) and Popular Participation Movement (Tupamaros). On the other hand there are two major
fractions were that established and developed within their own Frente Amplio: Vertiente Artiguista and
Asamblea Uruguay. To these this must be added a sixth area called Progressive Alliance built in 1994 and
consists of white dissidents, former Communists and Democratic crisitianos. Finally, the last group is the
Nuevo Espacio de extraction batllista and founder of the FA but that 1989 was spun to return in 2004.
What at the beginning was formed as a coalition of parties (one integrated front) becomes became
then a coalition party and tends to be finally a unified party ("popular"). At its heart continue it continues to
act with its founders but also with weigh units created since its inception as nucleation frontage, with some
ancestors in the community or directly as new sectors.
At In any case, neither new nor old, they but keep their name, are autonomous parties: are
fractions of a complex conglomerate, with its own identity and its historical biography marks a major
electoral mobility scenario, the FA is in recent time the party that retains its voters more. The mobility is
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manifested within, so variable benefiting fractions better compete in every election by vote "frontage" and
on the fringes of growth, with a good location in relation to applications on end and shift leaders (Lanzaro
2004).
In terms of territorial expansion ,in the 2005 municipal elections for the first time in the country's
history, the FA manages to get to it eight municipalities, among which there are the departments of
Paysandu, Salto, Thirty-Three , Florida, Canelones, Maldonado, Rocha and Montevideo. In the next election,
by 2010, the Broad Front loses departments of Salto, Paysandu, Thirty-Three, and Florida, but wins the
department of Artigas.
The Frente Amplio has already surpassed the four decades of existence, won two presidential
elections and has governed in a total of nine departmental governments (in one of them, for more than
two decades).
In terms of our theoretical framework in order to characterize the ruling party, we can say that the
Frente Amplio offers a medium level of scope and cohesion where de the ideological cleavage and the
electoral rules for primaries are the main factors that explains the high level of factionalism and for that
reason diminished the incumbent´s organizational power.
In fact, if we agree with the literature that conceives al the Frente Amplio as a coalition party
instead of a parties coalition and we acknowledge its territorial extension along with the structure of the
presidential power as a majority party, we need to pay attention of to the effects that the nature of
leadership has in the survival of the party in government in the future.
4.2 Hybrid regimes and political parties
ECUADOR
The Ecuadorian case analysis requires temporal segmentation. The first segment of the analysis
corresponds to consider the type of political party that ruled in Ecuador under a democratic regime. That is,
between 1978 and 2005. Then it will be necessary to consider the characteristics of the ruling party, Alianza
País – Revolución Ciudadana under the leadership of Rafael Correa, in a context of semi-democratic
political system that we call open anacrocy.
The first thing to note is the difference that the party system has made in Ecuador. The literature
points out that Ecuador is not a case of party system where the fracture territorial (mountains vs. costs)
plus the ethnic cleavage - Indian has signed Ecuadorian politics. Interparty competition tended to favor
governments of weak and minority presidents struggling to maintain some consensus (Conaghan 1996;
Mejia 2002; Pachano 2007; Sánchez 2008; Freidenberg 2008). The fall in ten years three constitutionally
elected presidents, replaced by extra-tracks and popular mobilization settings and arrangements between
elites, has noticed the tendency to disrespect the rules by various stakeholders and the ease of adaptation
of these rules to the interests of the moment.
The Ecuadorian party system during the period 1978-2006 had characteristics of multi end, where
they have competed at least five or six parties, whose electoral strength, capacity or blackmail coalition
puts them in competition with each other, with minority coalition governments, bilateral oppositions unfair
move by patrimonial or clientelistic mechanisms and have serious difficulties to cooperate on key issues.
The presence of disloyal politicians generates instability in shaping legislative blocs and favored pork barrel
politics. This is an incentive for the creation of "mobile majorities" (Freindeberg, 2013). In general we can
say that political parties were highly regionalized (Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001, Pachano 2005) and had
few incentives to coordinate with each other.
The fact that a president can be elected without a legislation block to back it up and even that rule
may have to face a major opposition block has been common currency in Ecuador between 1978 and 2006.
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Strangely there have been they have been exceptional cases in which governments blocks were the first
majority since ever a president had an absolute majority in the legislature and only four times the President
had a large block of his party in Congress. This was in 1979 with PIC! (40.6%) in 1988 with ID (42.25%), in
1998 when DP was about 28.83% of the House and had the support of the Social and finally, in 2009 when
MPAIS now controls 47.8% of the seats (not counting its allies)
In this time period, the relationship between the Ecuadorian government and its parties has been
varied and complex. The link between members of the same party involved in different spheres of action of
the party has been of controversial character in most of the government experiences that have occurred in
the country after the democratic transition. These have led to conflicting relationships of conflict that give
gave low levels of partisanship in government and at different times the parties themselves have been the
action that hindered the government of President and others who sought his ouster. Furthermore, it is
argued that various factors have affected steadily Presidents such appointments have been made
(Freidenberg 2003).
In Ecuador, there have been has been party governments in the latter controlled the nominations
and had a greater presence in the cabinet. But this statement must be qualified by the fact of melting in the
same person the office of President of the Republic and with the top leader of the party, which made it a
very intense relationship, since the dominant coalition party gained control government.
There have been anti-party governments, led by presidents who did not believe in political parties
and independents and incorporating people from his inner circle in cabinet nonpartisan. Through these
governments sought to steadily carry out a political reform they removed importance to the parties in the
system. Protects governments have also been in parties in which the Presidents tried to alienate their own
party governance so as not to wear out with her. The consequence of this was very similar to a government
anti-party, since the party holder was removed from governance. The difference is in the attitude of the
President pro-party. That is, the party is far from the government because it is against him but to protect it
from the pressure of governing. Finally, there have been games against governments, i.e. the governments
that own party in the legislature ended up being the greatest opponent of governmental organization and
the main promoter of conflict between powers.
From the organizational perspective, Ecuadorian political parties have shared trait multiple internal
lines that meet three criteria: ideological, territorial (mountains vs. shore) and ethnic –native. The presence
of significant internal lines with their own share of power and fragmentation of leadership contributed to
anti-party trend.
According to this picture, we can say that the levels of scope and cohesion of the governing parties
in democratic Ecuador are low, assuming overall value 0 (zero). If we look at the characteristics of the
dominant coalition, volatility in composition, recurrent changes coalition members expressed ministerial
compositions (Freidenberg 2003) and the resulting factionalizing further indicate an organizational
weakness a weakness in terms of the dominant coalition which projects an image of weak governing parties
that substantially reduces the power of the incumbent.
In the 2006 presidential election, the Ecuadorian political system experienced a moment of major
upheaval. Rafael Correa, a political outsider, was elected president, marking the disappearance of a great
majority of the country’s longstanding political parties.
The victory of Correa, a political outsider with no political party backing and without presenting a
members list, could be explained form an organizational perspective form from the the strength of their
movement and the promises that he made to lead a social revolution to benefit the poor, to depoliticize
the courts, decentralize the state apparatus and rewrite the constitution in an effort to limit the power of
the traditional political parties
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At the beginning, Alianza PAIS was conformed by several organizations: Movimiento País, Jubileo
2002, Iniciativa Ciudadana (IC), Movimiento Bolivariano Alfarista (MBA) y Acción Democrática Nacional
(ADN), together with the con el Partido Socialista-Frente Amplio with the support of several provincial
intelectual left movements( such as Ruptura 25, Foro Urbano and Alternativa Democrática) and human
rights militants.
In an April 2007 referendum, the voters gave their overwhelming support to President Correa’s
plan to re-write the constitution. President Correa’s Alianza PAIS party won 80 of 130 seats in the new
body. The new Citizens’ Assembly was given “full powers” to overrule, dissolve or replace all existing
institutions. On 29 November 2007 the Citizens’ Assembly formally convened. In their first act, the
Assembly asserted its full powers by declaring the old legislature to be “in recesses” and assumed
lawmaking powers. In addition, the assembly sacked many congressionally appointed officials in the
judiciary and executive branch. With no formal institutional oversight and with the full backing of the
Citizens’ Assembly, President Correa enhanced his powers to push through significant political and
economic reforms.
For 2009, the choice was different. The President had a majority block in the Legislative Assembly.
In opposition groupings were as different as SP (18) Wood PSCN Guerrero Civic Movement (11), PRIAN (7),
MUPPNNP (4), and even the People's Democratic Movement (5), a former ally of MPAIS. Although the
common element seemed to be "front" Correa, was unlikely that these movements and parties act as a
united opposition bloc because of their ideological differences, programmatic, regional.
When we pay attention to the composition of the cabinet to show the power inside the
government of the party, its responded to the combination of selection criteria: PAIS Alliance activists,
technocrats and people you trust the President (Pachano 2010: 311; Basabe-Serrano 2009: 13), respecting
the diversity of provincial and regional interests, regional cleavage product of Ecuadorian politics divides
(Freidenberg and Alcántara 2001). Another criterion used was that of gender, maintaining the distribution
had occurred in previous years (Pachano 2010: 312): 57.14% to 42.86% men versus women.
It is important to consider the style of leadership of Correa, especially because we have assumed that in
anacrocies the political parties are important instrument to promote the regime change and to guarantee
stability.
Correa´s primordial leadership style has been its strong facing character that is shown every week
in the “cadenas sabatinas”. His objective is to show that he is as equal as its citizens and that he differs
from the “pelucones” and the “partidocracia”. Its highlighted the President´s capacity to generate conflict
and to promote discursive polarization.
Along with this characteristics of leadership and the intention to built a political party from the
state and the use patronage politics it is important to remark how the rules of the game reinforce the
presidential power and with it the power of the incumbent organization. We are referring to the 148 article
of the new constitution. That establishes the presidential prerrogative that will disolve the legislative
assembly, mechanism that it is known as “muerte cruzada”.
The dominant coalition nucleated around the figure of Rafael Correa organized around the partisan
label MPAIS appears weak in terms of its institutionalization and dependent on personal ties to the
president. However, the political party, again in terms of time, seems to gain more and more strength and
moves towards a process of institutionalization of state power dependent power dependent state,
suggesting it could be considered as a proto cartel party. The overlap between party and government,
policy dependency and patronage allocation of responsibilities via patronage and nepotism and the
consequent difficulty of differentiation, suggests that the current ruling party in Ecuador has an average
strength - low.
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From the regional perspective, although the strength of Correa is placed on overcoming the
territorial cleavage and political community to incorporate indigenous movement, generating an apparent
mainstreaming, it is equally true that the partisan territorial penetration process is under construction and
that is why the dimension of scope is described it to 0 (zero)
MPAIS is a new party, it has managed to survive and increase their power especially after the
constitutional reform and the legislative control. Evidence suggests that MPAIS should acquire increasing
levels of scope and cohesion and resolve internal conflicts that arise from trying to get presidential favor. If
successful, the organizational power is expected to rise over time. The question that remains is what effect
will this have on the openness of the Ecuadorian political system.
VENEZUELA
The analysis of the characteristics of the government parties in Venezuela requires, first, to note
that the Venezuelan party system happened in the course of a decade of being role models to be case
study required by its abrupt collapse. In less than a decade, the traditional parties, which held power for
nearly forty years, saw their levels of representation quotas completely minimized, and new parties, with
anti-establishment and renewal, came to occupy the new space. The collapse of the Venezuelan party
system has been studied and explained on the basis of a series of national events (Molina and Perez Baralt
2000; Seawright 2012; Dietz and Myers 2003; Morgan 2011).
From Punto Fijo, the two major political parties at that time, AD and COPEI, evolved rapidly to
become and became the only viable partners interlocutors between society and the state. The games were
highly centralized, with decisions made from the domes. Thanks to this' party (Coppedge 1994), the country
experienced three decades of relatively stable democracy (1958-1988).
The system agreed, however, had in itself the seeds of its own destruction (Coppedge 1994). For
example, the rigidity imposed from parties to ensure institutional control and prevent anti-democratic
adventure was made possible thanks to a funding based mainly on oil revenues (which until the beginning
of the 1980s were quite stable) which generated incentives for ambitious politicians to choose to
participate as members of the traditional parties (Penfold Becerra 2001: 41; Monaldi and Penfold 2006).
With the advent of the economic crisis in the 1980s, oil revenues fell significantly and the incentives in
order to stay in the political system disappeared while patronage of the same nature was made manifest
(Brewer-Carias 1988; Hellinger 1991).
Administrative decentralization allowed the governors to have a greater role in Venezuelan politics,
and thereby to increase increasing their independence vis-a-vis the national government (Cameron and
Falleti 2005: 266). When the subnational elections started, the ruling party lost the prerogative to appoint
state governors, which allowed the party leadership to control the path of its members, encouraging party
discipline and strengthening the centralization of AD and COPEI.
Also, the possibility of immediate re-election, the low barriers to of entry for new parties, and the
lack of voter turnout, increased the incentives for subnational elected officials to secede from the national
leadership. In short, the (re) election of the executive authorities at local and state level went from relying
solely on party leaders to rely solely on the voters themselves, creating a customization and voting
desideologización with implications for the party system level national.
As the vote went to the local level by customizing and membership benefits true to the major
parties were exhausted, the established party system began to show signs of weakening (Penfold-Becerra
2004).
These trends Federalists, therefore, removed from AD and COPEI certain powers in the early 1990s.
On the one hand, it took away the administrative and financial capacity of the subnational level, denying
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the possibility of maintaining centralized control of territorial politics. On the other hand, lost the ability to
control the militants that postulated for elected local and state level.
For the first two elections of governors, AD and COPEI used their political hegemony that still exists
to dominate the electoral market. In the next election, however, this rule was weakening while the new
political organizations grew in their vote. In 1998, the MAS, for example, now controls 13% of the
governorates, the MVR controlled 17.7%, and other regional parties obtained 12.9% (Monaldi and Penfold
2006: 32).
The two major political parties of the democratic Democratic Action (AD) and the Christian Social
Party (COPEI) parties have been characterized as factions with high level of internal conflict. The conflicts of
trends since 1973 AD have completely lacked a context program-not to mention one ideological and has
been solely the result of personal rivalries (Coppedge 1994).
The traditional party system in Venezuela experienced a process of disintegration that gradually
ended up collapsing. From the point of view of the party organization, an indication it can be indicated that
what happened was a breakup of the ruling - party coalition
Figure 2: Party fragmentation in Venezuela (1997-2000)
Having established the characteristics of the main Venezuelan parties under democratic conditions
of political competition we proceed to analyze the features that adopts the ruling party from the rise of
Chavez. It is therefore important to differentiate between the party Movimiento V República, created in
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1997 to promote the candidacy of Hugo Chavez and the current ruling party PSUV as it absorbed the
original party-movement
Chavez originally recognized the importance of having a strong party. But its parent meant a weak
electoral societal penetration and weak linkages with other organizations. In terms of Panebianco, we
might think that the MVR late institutionalization achieved through joining the PSUV as a party of
government and state, and in order to overcome the mere instrumentality that characterized electoral
MVR.
Chavez had the final say in all decisions, a prerogative accepted unanimously by party members.
Chavez favors military name for important positions alliance following a strategy of civil - military (Ellner
2006). Chavez's strategy was the mobilization of popular sectors large structured around anti-party
personality.
The "Chavez" as a political movement and penetration achieved territorial expansion
unprecedented. A decentralizing force that dragged the traditional parties responded with a strategy of
nationalization from Chavez's populist leadership. The PSUV is spread throughout the territory becoming
the only political force highly nationalized (Sagarzazu 2011).
Territorial penetration was reciprocated by building a wide network of social movement that joined
forces under the moving party. Chavez's party, both the MVR and the PSUV is a fundamental tool of
government and the prize distribution strategy through promoting careers locally and in government
positions promotes the cohesion of the coalition government.
Chavez’s death not only puts in tension the Venezuelan political system but essentially it puts in
tension the party government that must take a decision about the role that Chavez’s mythic leadership in
the survival probability of the movement and in maintaining the political regime functioning under the rules
of close anacrocy. From which the winner results from the primary election after the leaders death it will
depend the PSUV survival not only as a party government but also as a partisan expression in the
Venezuelan context. This is a remaining question that will stay here suggested thus it has not been analyzed
in the paper as a consequence of exceeding the indicated limits of the purpose of this study
Chart 1: Incumbent’s organizational power
Argentina
(FPV)
Uruguay
(FA)
Ecuador Venezuela
1978-
2006
2006-2012
(MPAIS)
1978-1999 1999-2012
(MVR/PSUV)
Party Scope 2 1 0 0 1 2
Party Cohesion 2 1 0 1 1 2
Dominant
coalition
Tendecy X (personal
linkage)
X
Factions X X X X
Total 4 2 0 1 2 4
Incumbent´s
organizational
High Medium Low Medium Medium High
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power Low
Source: Author’s elabroration
5. Conclusion
For two decades, comparative literature indicates a growing interpenetration process between parties and
state structures (Katz and Mair 1995). In this context, understanding contemporary party organizations
requires special attention to the link they establish with the state apparatus (van Biezen and Kopecký
2007). This is particularly relevant for Latin America, where the construction of parties from the state and
party colonization of the state apparatus has been a recurring practice. Recent literature highlights the
importance of the distribution of public office for the operation of the parties (Levitsky 2003; Leiras 2007).
In the preceding pages we have concentrated in showing the characteristics of these political regimes in
four Latin American countries and the distinction between democratic regimes and hybrid (open and close
anacrocies). Simultaneously, we have sought to identify the characteristics of the government parties in
these regimes for evaluating the elements that define the access to power and the way in which the
government parties in power and build coping strategies.
We have examined the conditions under which there is the government party (party rule), paying
particular attention to highlighting organizational power level of cohesion, scope and type of dominant
coalition.
According to these criteria, two political parties in the exercise of government shows a high level of
organizational strength: Argentina and Venezuela. One in democratic context, the other on the stage of
hybrid political regime. This difference does not appear to be located in the territorial penetration of the
parties nor the level of cohesion of the dominant coalition, but whether this but in its is of factions or
tendencies.
For Argentina we identified that the dominant coalition is of factions because we understand that
the flexibility as we implies adaptive bandwagon institution generates deep internal disputes but then
there is a process behind the winning line. The Venezuelan case, by contrast, has a dominant coalition
nucleated trends around leadership and person of Hugo Chavez.
We believe that the difference lies in the leadership of the founder effect and the effect it has on
the organization of the party and the exercise of government. While Peronism, the founding leader, Peron,
died and the current leadership of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner, situational leadership are indeed, in the
case of PSUV party building simultaneously with the change of regime, a democracy to a close anacrocy,
says that the founder leader is regarding who preach loyalties and it retains the ability to moderate the
internal disputes in their favor. It is also clear that the Venezuelan leader's recent death imposes to PSUV a
tension on resolving the issue of leadership.
The Uruguayan case is presented as Frente Amplio as a party highly institutionalized and
bureaucratized a true mass bureaucratic party (Panebianco 1982). The medium level of organizational
power obeys to his coalitional component resulting in a high fragmentation of the dominant coalition.
The Ecuadorian case is the most complex of the far analyzed. The study has been segmented not
only from the change of regime, but mainly because the appearance of MPAIS represents a substantive
change in the Ecuadorian party system and its impact on the interaction between parties which promotes
polarization that may partially explain the change of regime at the expense of democracy.
The medium low value which assumes the ruling party in terms of its organizational power respond,
at our discretion, to the youth of the party. MPAIS is a new party that from its cartelization strategy has
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succeeded mostly in Ecuador ruling while as well as is the use of the state apparatus that allows party
development.
In the same sense, the charismatic, confrontational and personalized leadership of Correa
personalizes the party not making visible yet the distinction between organization and members. It is from
our hypothesis that building a strong party organization is going to be the result of a hybrid regime
consolidation is Ecuador.
From the comparative analysis we can say that patronage is not exclusive of political parties in
authoritarian regimes. The logic of charges distribution, the empowerment of partisans careers and the
privilege of personal ties to the president seem to be rather features of parties in presidential designs that
are expressed with in higher or lower levels, with varying level of visibility as the type of regime that parties
deploy their strategies. This is evident especially when comparing Argentina and Venezuela.
In reference to the level of the dominant coalition factionalizing and the degree of personalization
of the party in the figure of the leader, the case studies suggest that hybrid regimes are the ones which
distribute more incentives, by the weak constraint that formal rules has in the power exercised.
Hybrid regimes have more incentives to build parties with lower factionalizing democratic political
regimes. The idea is that hybrid regimes promote less competition between parties, while the parties in
these regimes go through a process of cartelization almost from its inception / creation.
The idea is that frequently the maximum leader of the party is the member elected to represent the
party in the presidential elections leading to maximum driving fusion of party and government,
undermining the independence of the group, on the one hand, and subjecting the government to the direct
influence of the dominant coalition party, on the other. Traditionally, the party first goes to "capture" the
government, but ultimately ends up being co-opted and worn by him most of the time.
If democratization is the change from authoritarianism to democracy along the access to power
dimension in order to characterize the changes along the exercise dimension, we must pay attention to the
way in which the political parties process the institutional incentives and operate in them so as to change
their future access rules.
According to this idea, the paper suggests that the essential difference between political regimes
doesn´t seem to be in the access power dimension but in its natural exercise. According to this is that the
comparison of the characteristics of the ruling parties appears as a relevant in order to contribute in the
refinement in the difference between democratic and hybrid regimes
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