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PARTIES CASES

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Filipinas Industrial Corp., et al. vs. Hon. San Diego, et al. May 27, 1968[GRN L-22347 May 27, 1968]FILIPINAS INDUSTRIAL CORPORATION, RUBEN & CO., INC., and HONORIO ALLADO, petitioners, vs. HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO,Presiding Judge, Branch IX, Court of First Instance of Rizal and PASTOR AGO, respondents.1. PLEADING AND PRACTICE; ACTIONS; PROSECUTION OF CIVIL ACTIONS; REAL PARTY IN INTEREST.- Every action must be prosecutedin the name of' the real party in interest. This provision is mandatory. The real party in interest is the party who would be benefited oinjured by the judgment, or is the party entitled to the avails of the suit. This Court has held in various cases that an attorney-in- factis not a real party in interest, that there is no law permitting an action to be brought by an attorney-in-fact, and hence an action

brought by him cannot be maintained.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; DENIAL OF MOTION TO DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT CIVIL ACTION IS BROUGHT IN THE NAME OF ATTORNEY-IN-FACT CORRECTIBLE BY CERTIORARI.- Where the trial Court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the actionis brought in the name of the attorney-in-fact and not in the name of the real party in interest, said court acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion.ORIGINAL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Carlos Dominguez, Jr. for petitioners. Jose M. Luison for respondents.ZALDIVAR, J.:A petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction seeking to enjoin respondent Judge Lourdes P. San Diego of the Court of FirstInstance of Rizal, Branch IX, from further proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-7228 in said court and to have the complaint thereindismissed.On May 3, 1963, herein respondent Pastor D. Ago filed a complaint with the Court of First Instance of Rizal for damages withpreliminary attachment and injunction, entitled "Pastor D. Ago, in his capacity as attorney-in-fact of Francisco Laiz, Plaintiff, versusFilipinas Industrial Corporation, Ruben & Company, Incorporated, Honorio Allado, Arnaldo Borre, Forestry Officer in Charge in GeneralSantos, Cotabato, and Emilio Ongoy, Customs Inspector on Board M/S Kocho Maru, Defendants", which was docketed as Civil Case

No. Q-7228. The allegations of the complaint, relevant to the instant petition, are: that plaintiff Pastor D. Ago is a resident of 27 A.Roces Ave., Quezon City, and is the true and lawful attorney-in-fact of Francisco Laiz, with full power to sue and file complaint for theprotection of the rights and interests of the latter by virtue of a special power of attorney duly executed by said Francisco Laiz infavor of plaintiff, a photostatic copy of which is annexed to the complaint as Annex A; that the defendant Filipinas IndustrialCorporation has its principal office at General Santos, Cotabato; that defendant Ruben & Company, Incorporated has its principaloffice at General Santos, Cotabato; that defendant Honorio Allado is a resident of Davao City; that defendant Arnaldo Borre is aresident of General Santos, Cotabato; and defendant Emilio Ongoy is a resident of Davao City. In the copy of the power of attorney,Annex A to the complaint, it appears that Francisco Laiz is a resident of General Santos, Cotabato.On May 16, 1963, herein petitioners, - defendants in the court below - filed an urgent motion to dismiss the complaint upon theground that the venue of the action was improperly laid, it appearing that the complaint involves a personal action and Pastor D. Agofiled the complaint merely as an attorney-in-fact of Francisco Laiz who is the real party in interest and who is a resident of GenerealSantos, Cotabato; and it appearing, further, that the residence of the parties defendants is either General Santos or Davao City, sothat pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 5 of the (old) Rules of Court the action could be commenced only either in the Court of FirstInstance of the province of Cotabato or of Davao City, and not of Quezon City. On May 17, 1963, therein defendants filed asupplemental motion to dismiss the complaint, alleging the additional ground that the action is brought in the name of the real partyin interest.Plaintiff Pastor D. Ago filed his opposition to the motion to dismiss, arguing that Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules of Court speaks of

"plaintiff" and not "party in interest" and since he was the plaintiff and residing in Quezon City, the complaint could be filed in QuezonCity; that even if the word "plaintiff" in said section be held to mean "party in interest", he would be such inasmuch as he was not amere attorney-in-fact but had full power and authority to file the complaint; that whatever defect there might be regarding venue,said defect had been waived because the defendants voluntarily appeared before the court when, through counsel, on May 13 and15, 1963, during the hearing of the motion for preliminary injunction and motion to discharge attachment, they freely submitted to itsjurisdiction by filing with the court the "Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment" dated May 11, 1963, the "Motion to DissolveAttachment" dated May 14, 1963, and the "Urgent Motion to Dismiss" dated May 17, 1963.Both the original motion to dismiss and the supplemental motion to dismiss were denied by respondent Judge Lourdes P. San Diego inher order of August 12, 1963. In her order respondent Judge stated that the law of agency concedes the possibility of an agent, whenso expressly authorized, to sue for and in behalf of the principal in his own name, and all that the law requires is that the agentshould allege that he is pursuing the action for and in behalf of his principal, so that plaintiff Pastor D. Ago being a duly authorizedagent, whatever judgment might be rendered for or against him would surely be executed for or against Francisco Laiz himself.Respondent Judge further ruled that since the residence of Pastor Ago is in Quezon City he can file the suit in the Court of FirstInstance of the place where he resides.A motion for reconsideration of the order of August 12, 1963 having been denied, therein defendants - now petitioners - filed theinstant petition, alleging that respondent Judge had acted whimsically and capriciously and with grave abuse of discretion,

tantamount to having acted without jurisdiction, in completely and absolutely disregarding the applicable provisions of the law andthe clear and unequivocal rule established by this Court that an agent, attorney-in-fact or authorized representative can not bring anaction in his own name in behalf of a disclosed principal. Petitioners prayed for a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondentJudge from further proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-7228 pending decision of the instant petition, and, after hearing, to orderrespondent Judge to dismiss the complaint in said case.In a resolution of January 24, 1964, this Court ordered respondents to file their answer and, upon petitioners' posting the requiredbond, issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining respondent Judge from further proceeding in Civil Case No. Q-7228.

The principal question to be decided in the present case may be formulated as follows:May an attorney-in-fact, when so authorized in the power of attorney, bring an action in his own name for a disclosed principal?This is a well settled question.Section 2 of Rule 3 of the old Rules of Court provides that "Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party ininterest."1 This provision is mandatory. The real party in interest is the party who would be benefited or injured by the judgment or isthe party entitled to the avails of the suit.2This Court has held in various cases that an attorney-in-fact is not a real party in interest, that there is no law permitting an action tobe brought by an attorney-in-fact, and hence an action brought by him cannot be maintained. In the case of "Jose M. Arroyo, as

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attorney-in-fact of Ignacio Arroyo, plaintiff and appellee vs. Matias Granada and Celedonia Gentero, defendants and appellants,"3 theplaintiff Jose M. Arroyo was given full power of attorney by his father Ignacio Arroyo to transact his affairs. Jose Arroyo brought theaction as "apoderado" of his father. In dismissing the complaint, this Court held:"In a sense this opinion on the merits is useless, for the reason that the person bringing the action has no interest whatever in thesubject matter thereof and can have no interest whatever in any judgment rendered therein. The action is brought in the name ofJose M. Arroyo as apoderado of Ignacio Arroyo. There is no provision of law permitting an action to be brought in that manner. Jose M.Arroyo, as apoderado, has absolutely no interest in this litigation. He has absolutely no right to bring the defendant into court or puthim to the expense of a litigation. The real and only party in interest is Ignacio Arroyo. Under articles 114 and 122 of the Code of CivilProcedure he should be plaintiff. He is not a party to this action and has in no way appeared or taken part herein. A judgment for oragainst Jose M. Arroyo personally or as apoderado in no way binds or affects Ignacio. As a necessary result a decision in this case isutterly futile. It does nothing. It touches no interest, settles no question, binds no party, quiets no litigation. Courts ought not to berequired to spend their time solemnly considering and deciding cases where nobody can be bound and no interests affected as a

result of such deliberation and decision."In the case of "Catalino Hilario, representing Andres Garcia, plaintiff and appellant vs. La Congregacion de San Vicente de Paul,Robert M. Loper, and Henry M. Jones, defendants and essences''4 this Court, in affirming the judgment sustaining the demurrer to thecomplaint, held:"This action can not be maintained even though no account be taken of whether or not the complaint states facts sufficient toconstitute a cause of action in the sense presented by the demurrer. The action is brought, as will be observed from the title, byCatalino Hilario in representation of Andres Garcia. The complaint alleges: 'That Catalino Hilario, by virtue of a power of attorneyexecuted in the City of Manila on the 31st day of January, 1911, has authority from Andres Garcia to represent him in the presentaction, and that he resides at No. 239 Calle Magdalena, Trozo, Manila, Philippine Islands.'"It is not contended that the real party in interest, Andres Garcia, is a party to this action, or that he has appeared or taken any parttherein or that he has in any manner submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. A judgment rendered against the plaintiffmight have no force or effect against Andres Garcia. We have several times held that an action brought in this manner cannot bemaintained, and this court will, of its own motion, refuse to proceed with its consideration. (Lichauco vs. Limjuco, 19 Phil. Rep., 12.)The question of the power of plaintiff to bring the action is raised, at least indirectly, by the demurrer based upon the ground that thecomplaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. On its face the complaint shows that there is no cause ofaction in favor of the plaintiff, but, rather, that the cause of action, if any, exists solely in favor of Andres Garcia. Hilario has nointerest in the controversy and stands as a naked representative of the person who does have the interest. The complaint, therefore,does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action in favor of the present plaintiff."In the case of "C.E. Salmon and Pacific Commercial Company, petitioners vs. Chino Tan Cueco, Vicente Jocson, Judge of ThirteenthJudicial District, Antonio Babasa, provincial, sheriff of Batangas, and Gavino Singomoto, respondents"5 this Court reiterated thedoctrine enunciated in two cases above-cited, when it said:"It appears from the record that on the 21st day of February, 1916, a complaint was duly filed in the Court of First Instance of theThirteenth Judicial District in an action entitled Chino Tan Cueco vs. Antonio Babasa, sheriff of the Province of Batangas, Agapito E.Garcia, attorney-in-fact of the Pacific Commercial Company, and C.E. Salmon, defendants. The action went to a judgment in favor ofthe plaintiff and ,against defendants...."As to the applicant the Pacific Commerical Company, there can be no question that the judgment obtained below is void. Accordingto the record, not only was the Pacific Commercial Company not served with summons, but it was not even named in the process orpleadings as a party to the action. The title of the case shows that the company was not a party. The making of Agapito E. Garcia,attorney-in- fact of the Pacific Commercial Company, a party defendant does not make the company a party defendant. Section 114of the Code of Civil Procedure requires an action to be brought in the name of the real party in interest; and a corollary propositionrequires that an action shall be brought against the persons or entities which are to be bound by the judgment obtained therein. Anaction upon a cause of action pertaining to his principal cannot be brought by an attorney-in-fact in his name (Arroyo vs. Granada andGentero, 18 Phil. Rep., 484); or can an action based upon a right of action belonging to a principal be brought in the name of his

representative (Lichauco vs. Limjuco and Gonzalo, 19 Phil. Rep., 12). Actions must be brought by the real parties in interest andagainst the persons who are to be bound by the judgment obtained therein.As to the Pacific Commercial Company the judgment to which these proceedings refer, namely, that obtained in the case entitledChino Tan Cueco vs. Antonio Babasa, sheriff of the Province of Batangas, Agapito E. Garcia, attorney-in-fact of the Pacific CommercialCompany, and C.E. Salmon, is declared void and of no effect as against the said company, . . . ." (Italics supplied)Respondent Pastor Ago contends, and respondent Court upheld him in his contention, that he could file the complaint in the case atbar because he is specifically empowered by his principal, Fran Francisco Laiz, "to sue, file complaint, represent me in anygovernment office and agency for the protection of my rights, interests and privileges as a timber licensee." This contention runscounter to the ruling of this Court in the case of "Ceferino Marcelo vs. Nazario de Leon."6 In this case Ceferino Marcelo, as"apoderado" of Severino P. Marcelo, filed the complaint in his name to recover the possession of a lot belonging to Severino P.Marcelo. Ceferino held a power of attorney in which Severino authorized him to "pursue any and all kinds of suits and actions for meand in my name in the courts of the land." This Court, however, citing the cases of "Arroyo vs. Granada" supra, and "Hilario vs. LaCongregacion etc.", supra, held that the action of Ceferino Marcelo, as plaintiff, must fail. This Court said:"At any rate, this action must fail upon the second ground of defendant's motion to dismiss: the plaintiff is a mere apoderado of theowner, Severino P. Marcelo. The rule is that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest. (Sec. 2, Rule3)"

It follows, from the ruling of this Court in the above-mentioned case of "Marcelo vs. De Leon," that even if the principal authorizes hisagent to commence actions in court for and in behalf of the principal, such action must still be filed in the name of the principal whois the real party in interest, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.7From what has been stated in the foregoing, it is clear that respondent Pastor D. Ago has no right to bring the action in his own namein Civil Case No. Q-7228 in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. The action commenced by respondent Pastor D. Ago cannot bemaintained and cannot prosper, and it would be a waste of time to have the court proceed with the case, because the decision thatwould be rendered in that case would not bind the parties, in the case. We hold that respondent Judge acted with grave abuse ofdiscretion when she denied herein petitioners' motion to dismiss the complaint in said case, upon the ground that the complaint wasnot brought in the name of the real party in interest.Having resolved the principal question raised in the present case, We deem it superfluous to consider the other questions raised bythe parties.WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted. Respondent Judge, or any other Judge who presides Branch IX of the Court ofFirst Instance of Quezon City, is enjoined from further proceeding with Civil Case No. Q-7228 in said court, and the complaint in saidcase is ordered dismissed. Costs against respondent Pastor D. Ago.IT IS SO ORDERED.Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal Sanchez, Ruiz Castro and Angeles, JJ., concur.

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Writ granted.1. Also Sec. 2, Rule 3 of the new Rules of Court.2. Subido v. City of Manila, et al., L- 14800, May 30, 1960; Salonga v. Warner Barnes & Co. Ltd., L-2246, January 31, 1951.3. 18. Phil., 489-490.4. 27 Phil., 593, 595-596.5. 36 Phil., 556, 557-559.6. G. R. No. L-12902, July 29, 1959.7. The same section and rule in both the old and the new Rules of Court.

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FELIPA ARANICO-RABINO, MARCELO ARANICO and MELITON ARANICO, petitioners, vs. BON. NARCISO A. AQUINO, as Presiding Judgeof the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Third Judicial District, Branch XIV, Rosales, Pangasinan, and VICTORIANO MEIMBAN,respondents.R E S O L U T I O NSANTOS, J.:The records of this case - docketed as Civil Case No. 287-R in the Court below - were forwarded to this Court from the Court of FirstInstance of Pangasinan, Branch XIV at Rosales, Hon. Judge Narciso A. Aquino, presiding, in view of the appeal interposed by theplaintiffs (petitioners herein) on pure questions of law.Considering that Republic Act 5440 is applicable, as only questions of law are raised, this Court in its Resolution of June 29, 1977,required "the plaintiffs-appellants to pay the docket and legal research fund fees and to file petition for review on certiorari, filing andserving the same in the form required for petitions for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals, both within fifteen(15) days from notice hereof." Pursuant thereto, herein petitioners (plaintiffs below) paid the docket and legal research fund fees andfiled the required petition, both in due time. No proof of service of a copy thereof to the Court of First Instance and to the adverseparty accompanied the petition, However, the required proof of service was posted three (3) days later and was actually received bythe Court on October 10, 1977.It appears that petitioners-co-owners tiled a complaint in the court below to recover from private respondent possession of the lot incontroversy. In his answer, the latter resisted the action on the ground, inter alia, that the property is owned by the late PedroMeimban and his successors-in-interest, private respondent being one of them. At the conference on January 10, 1977, in thechainbets of respondent Judge attended by petitioners' counsel, Atty. Eugenio Ma. Mosuela, private respondent and his counsel, Atty.Hogo B. Sansano and Jacob Meimban who is one of the heirs of the late Pedro Meimban, it was agreed that the complaint beamended to include all the heirs of the late Pedro Meimban "in order that there will be a final adjudication of the rights of the partiesin this case." When Atty. Mosuela, as counsel for petitioners. received the order requiring him to amend the complaint within a periodof thirty (30) days, he filed instead a motion to set aside said order. The motion was denied and counsel was given another period often (10) days within which to file the amended complaint. A MOM)" to reconsider the order of denial was filed by Atty. Mosela whocontended that the heirs of the late Pedro Mwimban are not indispensable parties in the instant case for ejectment; that, even if theyare, they have already appeared in the case through their counsel; and prayed that the order requiring him to amend the complaintbe reconsidered and, instead, the other heirs of Pedro Meimball be "required to file their answer in intervention." Respondent Judgedenied the motion for reconsideration and again petitioners another period of ten (10) days from notice within which to file therequired amended complaint. Instead of complying wilt, latest order, Atty. Mosuela filed a motion for clarification of the same.Respondent Judge ruled that the order "is clear and explicit" and, as the petitioners did not amend the complaint within the extendedperiods given them, he ordered "the case DISMISSED without prejudice."The motion to reconsider the dismissal order having been denied, petitioners filed the instant petition for review to set aside theorder of dismissal and to order the lower court to reinstate their complaint.

The petition is clearly without merit. Section 2, Rule 17 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly empowers the trial' court to dismissthe action "upon motion of the defendant or upon the Court's own motion" if the plaintiff "fails x x x to comply with these rules or anyorder of the court." The trial court gave petitioners no less than a total of filly (50) days to amend the complaint to include all the heirof the deceased Pedro Meimban who are indispensable parties "in order (hat there will be a final adjudication of the rights of theparties in their case." (Rule 3, Section 7, RRC). Not only did petitioners counsel refuse to comply with the order of the trial court bill,instead, he would have the trial court require the other heirs of Pedro Meimban "to file their answer in intervention," which isunprocedural because under Section 2, Rule 12 of the Revised Rules of Court, intervention is purely a voluntary act on the part of aperson who "has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both."WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED due course for obvious lack of merit.Fernando (Chairman), Barredo, Antonio, Aquino and Concepcion Jr., JJ., concur.Petition denied.

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Laperal Development Corporatin vs. Court of Appeals June 8, 1993.[GRN No. 96354 June 1993.]

LAPERAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION and SUNBEAMS CONVENIENCE FOOD CORPORATION, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OFAPPEALS and the HEIRS OF FILOTEO T. BANZON, respondents.PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Vicente R. Acsay for petitioners.CRUZ, J.:

In Civil Case No. Q-34907 in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City, Atty. Filoteo T. Banzon sought recovery of attorney'sfees from Oliverio Laperal, Laperal Development Corporations, and lmperial Development Corporation for professional servicesrendered by him in the following cases:1. Land and Registration Case No. 20, Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch 1.2. Land Registration Case, Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch 2.3. G.R. No. L-4704, Laperal Development Corp., et al. vs. Hon. Abraham P. Vera, Ascario Tuazon, et al.4. Petition for Land Registration, Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch 1.5. Land Registration Case No. N-398, Court of First Instance of Baguio.6. Civil Case No. 3922, Court of First Instance of Bataan, Branch 2, Oliverio Laperal vs. Mario Francisco.

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7. Civil Case No. 4062, Court of First Instance of Bataan, Republic vs. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc., et al.8. Civil Case No. 4437, Court of First Instance of Bataan, Laperal Development Corporation et al, vs. Spouse, Escario Tuazon andPurificacion Ampil, et al.9. Administrative action filed by the Solicitor General against Laperal Development Corporation for annulment of title to 400 hectaresof land.10. Civil Case No. Q-22933, Court of First Instance of Quezon City, Imperial Development Corp. vs. P & B Taxicab Inc..

On April 8, 1963, the case was decided on the basis of a Compromise Agreement reading in part as follows:Atty. Filoteo Banzon by this agreement, does hereby voluntarily and freely waive, forfeit, or consider as fully paid any and all otherclaims of money or otherwise that he may have against the defendants, in all cases in the Philippines that he may have handled forthe defendants in the past, including whatever money claims he may have in the above-entitled case outside of this agreement,inclusive of representation fees, representation expenses, appearance fees, or retainers fees, or other forms of attorneys fees, and

he hereby re-affirm that he will undertake upon his professional oath and standing, to protect the interest of the defendants in allunfinished appealed cases that the herein plaintiff had appeared in the past in representation of the defendants, without any furtherrenumeration or attorney's fees, representation fees, appearance fees and expenses in connection therewith.

On May 19, 1987, Banzon filed a complaint against Oliven, Laperal, Laperal Development Corporation, Imperial DevelopmentCorporation, Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. and Vicente Acsay for: 1) the annulment of the aforequoted portion CompromiseAgreement; 2) the collection of attorney's fees for his services in the cases of: a) Imperial Development Corporation vs. Aover, b)Republic vs. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc., et al., and c) Laperal Development vs. Ascario Tuazon and Ascario Tuazon v. JudgeMaglalang, et al.; 3) the recovery of the amount of P 10,000.00 that was adjudged payable to him as attorney's fees by AscarioTuazon in Civil Case No. 3918; and 4) the payment to hm of nominal damages and attorney's fees.

Docketed as Civil Case 50823 in Branch 92 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, this case was dismissed on the ground that thetrial court had no jurisdiction to annul the Compromise Agreement as approved by an equal and coordinate court. It was held that theissue was cognizable by the Court of Appeals. Ali additional ground was that the Compromise Agreement at already covered theplaintiffs professional services in the aforementioned cases.1

On appeal, the decision was affirmed on the issue of jurisdiction. The Court of Appeals held, however, that attorney's fees were duethe private respondent in the cases of Laperal Development Corporation v. Ascario, Tuazon and Ascario Tuazon v. Judge Maglalangand Republic v. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc.2

In the petitioners are now before us to challenge the decision insofar as it orders them to pay Banzon attorney's fees for his legalservices in the aforementioned cases.

An examination of the list of cases for which Banzon was suing for attorney's fees in Civil Case No. Q-34907 shows that the case ofLaperal Development Corporation v. Ascario Tuazon was included therein although it was erroneously referred to as Civil Case No.4437. Even if it was not mentioned in the complaint, it was nevertheless covered by the Compromise Agreement, where Atty. Banzonwaived all other claims against the defendants** "in all cases in the Philippines that he may have handled for the defendants in thepast, including whatever money claims he may have in the above-entitledcase outside of this also undertook thereinto protect theinterest of the defendants in all unfinished appealed cases where he appeared in the past representation of the latter, without anyfurther remuneration or attorney's fees, representation fees, appearance fees and expenses in connection therewith.The undertaking clearly covered the case of Laperal Development Corporation v. Ascario Tuazon, (AC-G.R. CV No. 70189), which wasstill pending in the Court of Appeals at the time of the Compromise Agreement, and the subsequent case of Ascario Tuazon v. Judge

Maglalang (CA-GR SP No. 0730). The respondent court erred in supposing that the said agreement covered only past services,disregarding the clear stipulation for the continuation of the private respondents services in all pending appealed cases in which hehad earlier appeared.Concerning the case of the Republic vs. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. (GR. No. 50464), the Court v. Appeals said:

At the time of the execution of the compromise agreement and rendition of the judgment based thereon on April 8,1983, theaforementioned case bearing G.R. No. 50464 was still pending in the Supreme Court. It was not, however, the subject of thecompromise agreement (Exhibits C and 2; Annex 2, answer, pp. 4755, 65-66, rec.). It could not have been so because SunbeamsConvenience Foods, Inc. was not a party defendant in the second amended complaint, although reference was made to it in theappellant's seventh cause of action for which he has rendered professional services but for which attorney's fees were being claimedfrom the herein appellee Olihowio Lapowal (Exhibits A and 1). But nothing is mentioned in the second amended complaint and in thecompromise agreement (Exhibits A and 1; C and 2) which would indicate that Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. itself was a partyplaintiff therein or privy to the case. Appellee Olihowio Lapowal and Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. do not appear to be one andthe same.

It appearing that it was the herein appellant who riled the brief for Sunbeams Convenience Foods,Inc.in the Supreme Court on March

14, 1980 (Exhibit D), he should be compensated for his services.

Banzon's claim for attorney's fees in the said case was also among those enumerated in his compliant Civil Case No. Q-34907against Oliverally Laperal Development Corporation Imperial development corporation. Notably, Sunbeams the convenience Foods,Inc. (Sunbeams, for brevity), referre to in the complaint as "Mr. Laperal's Corporation," was not joined by name as a party-defendant.Apparently, the private respond, believed that Oliverio Laperal, being the president of the said company, was directly obligated tohim for the attorney's fee due him for his handling of the case for Sunbeams.

It is settled that a corporation is clothed with a personality separate and distinct from that of the persons composing it.3 It may notgenerally be held liable for the personal indebtedness of its stockholders or those of the entities connected with it.4 Conversely, astockholder cannot be made to answer for any of its financial obligations even if he should be its president.5There is no evidence that Sunbeams and Laperal are one and the same person. While it is true that Laperal is a stockholder, directorand officer of Sunbeams, that status alone does not make him answerable for the liabilities of the said corporation. Such liabilitiesinclude Barizon's attorney's fees, for representing it in the case of Republic v. Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc.

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Sunbeams should have been joined as a party-defendant in order that the judgment of the lower court could legally affect it. But evenif it was not impleaded, the court could still validly proceed with the case because Sunbeams was not an indispensable party but onlya proper party. A proper party is one which ought to be a party if complete relief is to be accorded as between those already parties.6A party is indispensable if no final determination can be had of an action unless it is joined either as plaintiff or defendant.7

The Compromise Agreement upon which the decision of the court was based was between plaintiff Atty. Banzon and the defendantsrepresented by Oliverio Laperal. To repeat, Sunbeams was not a party to this agreement and so could not be Appeals affected it isnoted, however, that in his complaint in Civil Case No. 50823 :against Sunbeams et al., Banzon stated:1. On the 1st cause of action, to declare the portions of the compromise co agreement (annex A) alleged in par. 4 of the 1st cause ofaction where plaintiff waives his attorney's fees and other fees in all other cases he handled in the past for the defendants OliverioLaperal and his corporations not included in the complaint for attorney's fee x x x (emphasis supplied)This declaration amounted to an admission that he had also waived his attorney's fees in the cases he had handled for Laperals

corporations which were not impleaded in Civil Case Q-34907, including Sunbeams.

Moreover, in the hearing Civil Case 50823, Banzon testified as follows:Atty.Banzon: I am not claiming my attorney's fees from 1974 to 1981. What I was claiming was the attorney's fees for the services Ihave rendered after the compromise agreement in 1983 to 1987 by virtue of the new agreement x x x, (TSN, Sept. 15, p. 7 Records,Vol. II, p. 129).xxx Court: So you are not claiming anymore your attorney's fees in those ten cases?Atty. Banzon: I am claiming only for the services I have rendered from 1983 to 1987 by virtue of a new agreement.Court: These services of yours exclude the ten?Atty. Banzon: Exclude the ten, Your Honor. (Ibid, p 16)xxx Atty. Banzon: I admit, Your Honor that those 10 services are those services I rendered in the past wherein I waived my attorney'sfees; my services covered from 1974 to 1981 but not my services after the compromise agreement. (ibid, p. 22)

The Sunbeams case was one of the ten cases listed in the complaint in Civil Case No. 34907. It was pending before this Court whenCivil Case No. Q34907 and Civil Case No. 50823 were instituted. To prove his claim for attorney's fees for his the unbeams case,Banzon submitted to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, "Petitioner's Brief Exhner's Reply to Respondents' Brief'(Exh. 'D-1") dated March 14, 1980 and August 12, 1980, respectively, which had earlier been filed with this Court in connection withthe said case. Significantly, the preporation and filing of those pleading were done sometime in 1980, which means that they wereamong those ten cases referred to by Atty. Banzon for which he had waived his attorney's fees. There is no other proof of his servicesin the said case after 1983 to 1987.

The private respondent's claim for attorney's fees in the Sunbeams case was waived by him not by virtue of the CompromiseAgreement to hich Sunbeams, not being a defendant in Civil Case N- Q-3497, could not have been a party. What militates against hisclaim is his own judicial admission that he had waived his attorney's fees for the cases he had handled from 1974 to 1981 for OliverioLaperal and his corporations, including those not implea ded in his complaint in Civil Case No. Q34907.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent court dated November 21, 1990 is MODIFIED. PetitionersLaperal Development Corporation and Sunbeams Convenience Foods, Inc. are declared no longer liable to the private respondents forattorney's fees in AC-GR CV No. 70186, CA-GR SP No. 07370 and GR No. 50464. Costs against the private respondent.SO ORDERED.Grino-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.Petition granted. Appealed decisio n modified.1. Decided by Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, J, Court of Appeals Rollo, p.13.

2. Penned by Ramirez, J., with Nocon and Santiago, JJ., concurring; Rollo, 25.).** In Civil Case No. Q-1097 .3. Philippine Bank of Communication v. Court of Appeals, 195 SCRA 67; Western Agro Industrial Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 188SCRA 709 Traders Royal Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 177 SCRA 288.4. Cease vs. Court of Appeals, 93 SCRA 483.5. Palay,lnc.v.( Clave,124 SCRA 638.6. Section 8, Rule ,Revised Rules of Court.7. Section of Rule Revised and Rules of Court.

~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~*o*~MAGULO PARTIES!!! THIS IS A ROTTEN COPY OF THE CASE! TOO MANY TYPOS (PARTICULARLY WITH REGARD THE PARTIES!!!)Barfel Development Corporation vs. Court of Appeals June 8, 1993.[GRN No. 98177 June 8, 1993]BARFEL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND SPOUSES VICTOR AND AIDA BARRIOS, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGINASINDUSTRIES AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION AND TEODORICO E. ZARAGOZA, respondents.PETITION for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.Sycip, Salazar, Hernandez & Gatmaitan for petitioners.Ermitanio, Asuncion, Manzano & Associates for private respondents.PADILLA, J.:This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking a reversal of the decision** of the Court of Appeals, dated 31January 1991, and its resolution of 2 April 1991, denying the petition for certiorari and prohibition, thereby upholding the order of theRegional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 134*** dated 30 April 1990 (Civil Case No. 17875) admitting partyplaintiffs' amendedcomplaint impleading an additional partydefendant (PISO Bank, a second mortgagee) after the former had concluded presenting theirevidence and while the original defendants (herein petitioners) were in the process of presenting their witnesses.In the Makati, RTC, the following relevant facts were established:Private respondents filed a complaint for specific performance and damages against the petitioners, the material allegations of whichare as follows:"3. On June 19, 1987, the defendants, as series and tariff corporation,AND REGINAS INDUSTRIES, as buyer, and representativesrepresentativeD BY its president plaintiff Zaragosa, concluded an Agreement To Buy/Sell two (z) parcel of land with two (2) houseserected thereon at 109 Bulusan St. Ayala, Alabang Muntinlupa, Metro Manila, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. T-132671 and 132651, both of the Register of Deeds fpr makti, Metro Manila. Said Agreeemnt beers the expressed stipulation, among

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others, that "The seller will apply the payment of the cash portion of the purchase portion of the purchase price to the removal ofany and all liens on the properties. x x x ;4. Plaintiff paid the amount of P100,000.00 as down payment upon the igning of the aforesaid Agreement;5. During the time the Agreement was under negotiation and even at the conclusion thereof, the defendants repeatedly warrantedthat except for a mortgage in favor of the Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) and the Deed of Restrictions annotated at the back ofthe titles mentioned above, the subject properties are "free from any liens and encumbrances";6. Sometime on June 24, 1987, plaintifss found out that defendants made a blatant misrepresentation when it was, discovered thatthe subject properties have a second mortgage with the PISO/Central Bank in the amount of P2,571,400.00;7. Informed of this discovery defendant Victor S. Barrios advised plaintiff that the second mortgage obligation is or has been reducedto only P54,000.00 and gave assurance that he will submit the necessary documents to support the same so that as legal valid andacceptable arrangement could be worked out with the Central Bank for the release of said second mortgage;8. x x x under date of June 29, 1987, the Philippine Savings Bank (PSB), gave notice that it has approved plaintiff corporation's

application for the loan with which to pay subject properties under the Agreement To Buy/Sell (Annex A), subject to certain terms andconditions, principal of which is a security of real estate mortgage upon the subject properties in favor of PSB. x x x;9. In this connection, the PSB also sent separate letters of undertaking/commitment to the defendants and the BPI detailing aworkable arrangement to consummate the transaction whereby new titles to the subject properties would first be transferred to theplaintiff corporation and the mortgage. in favor of PSB are to be annotated thereon. Once cone, the PSB, by virtue of authorityalready given by the plaintiff corporation, would directly pay BPI from the proceeds of the loan granted to plaintiff corporation themortgage obligation due to it in the amount of P57,539.36, and also pay the defendants the balance of the purchase price in theamount of P3,642,460.64 net of what has paid to BPI. x x x;10. The defendants expressed their conformity to the aforementioned arrangement as shown in their letter to the BPI dated June 81987 x x x;1l. In view of the assurances of defendants, plaintiffs, in a letter dated July 9, 1987 sent to defendants to further ensure theconsummation of the transaction, manifested its willingness to pay the sum of P2,000,000.00 ahead of the PSB loan proceeds uponrelease of the second mortgage by the Central Bank which was to be worked out by the defendants. Defendants conformed to thearrangement by affirming their signatures to the said letter were (sic) they also agreed to the release of the certificates of title toPSB, free and clear , any liens, upon payment of P2,000,000.00, x x x;12. Notwithstanding the contractual obligations, terms and conditions agreed upon by, between and among the parties and thoseinvolved in the transaction, plaintiffs consequently received informa. tion that defendants have been negotiating with other partiesfor the sale of the properties in question, although defendants denied such fact;13. Be that as; it may, the undisputed fact is that defendants, in gross and evident bad faith and in malicious breach of contract,deliberately failed and/or refused and to date continued to fail and refuse to comply with their contractual obligation of securing therelease of the second mortgage on the subject properties thereby effectively preventing the consummation of the sale to the damageand prejudice of the plaintiffs;14. The malice, fraud and the gross and evident bad faith on the part of defendants is further demonstrated by the fact thatsubsequently, BPI advised that it was disautorized by defendants to consummate the transaction despite previous rangements to thecontrary as per BPI's letter to plaintiffs bank dated July 31, 19871 x x x;"Petitioners (as defendants) filed an answer with the following affirmative allegations:5. Before Reginas signed Annex A, it was awareof all liens and encumbrances on the Property, including the mortgage in fair of PISO Bank ("PISO Mortgage")6. xxxc. The parties agreed that if full payment could not be effected, at pp. 38-41 or if the PISO Mortgage is not released, within 30 daysfrom July 9, 1987, they will each have the option to terminate the agreement.xxx8. In the documentation , Barfel and Reginas did not make reference to the PISO Mortgage because: (I) Barfel and Reginas believedthat since Barbel's balance to PISO was only about P54,000, release of the PISO Mortgage could be obtained within 30 days; and (it)

Reginas wanted to be able to present to PSB a "clean document' to expedite the approval of its loan.9. Regarding the release of the PISO Mortgage, plaintiffs undertook to make direct and active representations with the proper officersof the Central Bank (because PISO is in the custody of a Central Bank officer as receiver/liquidator) and agreed that the responsibilityof the defendants was solely to provide the documentation to support the position that Barfel's remaining balance under the PISOMortgage was only about P54,000.10. In accordance with that commitment, defendants gave and/ or made available to Reginas all documents they had in theirpossession necessary to show that the balance of the PISO Mortgage was only P54,000. With these documents, plaintiffs made directrepresentations with the proper officers of the Central Bank.11. The failure to obtain a release of the PISO Mortgage within the 30-day period was accepted by the parties as a possibility andtherefore could not be imputed on the defendants.12. Release of the BPI Mortgage could not be worked out because PSB, as a condition for the disbursement of the loan, wanted thetitle to the Property to be transferred first to Reginas and the mortgage to secure Reginas 'loan to be annotated on the title. Themechanics for payment was unacceptable to BPI.13. The refusal of BPI to agree to PSB's terms of payment was based solely on its own evaluation of the acceptability of themechanics for payment-suggested by PSB. And the failure to obtain a release on the BPI Mortgage is solely on account of PSB'stherefore plaintiffs', insistence on an unacceptable mechanics for payment.2

Pre-trial was concluded by the trial court. Plaintiffs therein (herein private respondents) presented evidence and rested their cage.During defendants' (herein Petitioners') presentation of evidence, private respondents filed on 13 March 1990, a motion for leave tofile an amended complaint and motion to admit the crime. The amendment consisted of implading PISO bank as additional partydefendant and compel it to accept payment of the existing second mortage from private respondent Reginas, since allegedly nocomplete relief can be had unless the second mortgage in favor of said PISO bank is released.Despite petitioners' opposition, an order was issued by the trial court on 30 April 1990 admitting the amended complaint. After denialof their motion for reconsideration on 1 June 1990, petitioners proceeded to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari andprohibition (CA-G.R. Sp. No. 23153) raising the issue of whether an amendment to the complaint pleading a cause of action against anew or additional party can be allowed after the private respondents (as plaintiffs) had rested their case and petitioners (asdefendants) had commenced the presentation of their evidence.Sustaining private respondents' contentions, the Court of Appeals' decision held in effect, as follows:'The change in language from the former to the present rule (Section 3, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court), does not stop thecourt from allowing substantial amendments, after the trial has begun, there being nothing in the role as changed, which limits thecourt's authority to allow substantial amendments to the pleading just because trial has already begun.

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The amendment of the complaint was made without intent to delay the action. The essence of the liberal interpretation accorded bythe courts on the filing of an amended complaint is the avoidance of multiplicity of suits. And also, private respondents 'cause ofaction has not been substantially altered.PISO Bank is a proper party under Section 8 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. For the defendants Barfel DevelopmentCorporation and the spouses Barrios to be able to comply with its obligation under the Agreement to Buy/Sell dated 19 June 1987 andthe letter. agreement dated 9 July 1987 and the related Deed of Sale, there had to be a determination of the amount really due PISOBank and corre. sponding order for said Bank to accept the payment of plaintiff corporation to extinguish the obligation secured bythe mortgage, before the consummation of said transaction can be effected.'3With the denial by the appellate court of petitioners' motion for reconsideration, 4 the same legal issue earlier brought before theCourt of Appeals is now beforer us for solution, with the following supportive arguments:5"In resolving the issue; in favor of allowance of the amended complaint, the Court of Appeals has decided it in a way not in accordwith Rule 10, Section 3, which we quote for the convenience of the Court;

'Section 3. Amendments by leave of Court. --After the case is set for hearing, substantial amendments may be made only upon leaveof court. But such leave way be efused if it appears to the court that the motion was made with intent to to delay the action or thatthe cause of action or defense is substantially altered xxx' (emphasis supplied)The amendment was made with intent to delay the action and substantially alters private respondents' cause of action andpetitioners' defense.xxxThe following circumstances, according to petitioners, show intent to delay;A. The pretext even is that PISO has to be joined as a codefendant so that it can be compelled to accept the payment of whateverwould be determined as the correct balance of the PISO mortgage. The amendment will bring into the case the controversy or disputebetween PISO and the petitioners as to how much is still due under the mortgage.B. But why is the dispute brought but only now? It was not as if the private respondents learned of the dispute only at the time theysought the amendment. As earlier pointed out when they filed the Complaint, they already knew about it."We rule for the petitioners, and reverse the appellate court's decision.Petitioners' assertion-which is not refuted by private respondents-is that the subject matter of the original complaint sought to beamended was well know private respondents from the start. The reason for the amendment impleading PISO is to compel the latteraccount herein respondents' payment and release the second. mortgage, thereby enabling petitioners to deliver to respondents thetitles from from all liens and encumbrances. But PISO bank is not a party to the three (3) contracts which are the subject of the actionfor specific performance and damages between the private respondents and petitioners. The bank which is not a party to thetransaction is not an indispensable party.6 Neither is there an acceptable explanation from private respondents why PISO Bank wasnot impleaded in the original complaint filed before the RTC of Makati. PISO is a second mortgage, whatever the outcome of thelitigation betwt en the petitioners and the private respondents would be. Its second mortgage lien attaches to the property. Theaction for specific performance by private respondents against petitioners is not the proper venue for releasing all liens andencumbrances on the subject property. Perhaps, herein private respondents have confused the possible liability of petitioner Barriosfor allegedly withholding information on the said second mortgage as another cause of action against him arising from the executedcontracts, But title to the disputed properties can still be delivered by petitioners to herein respondents, by way of specificperformance with damages, encumbered of course by the second mortgage in favor of PISO but the release of such encumbrance canbe obtained independently of this case. To include it as another cause of action in the case at bar against an additional defendant,would indeed change the theory of the case, let alone delay the proceedings on the original cause of action founded on specificperformance with damages.To compel PISO to accept payment cannot be allowed in an action for specific performance with damages between other parties.These are two (2) different causes. A second mortgagee like PISO has several options. It may either:1. foreclose the second mortgage for non-payment.2. pay off the first mortgagee (BPI in this instance) and be subrogated to its rights thereby becoming the sole lien holder.

3. collect on the loan without foreclosing on the mortgage.Under the facts alleged in the amended complaint, there is no statement the mortgage debt in favor of PISO is due anddemandable,PISO is due and is PISO foreclosing on the mortgage. And in an uncorrected act of liberality, PISO can even write off thedebt (of couse improbability). In any event private respondents (as plaintiffs below cannot compel PISO to accept payment as it isnot even apart of the mortgage contract (with PISO); the latter cannot impleaded as a party defendant, and the former only has aninchoate right to the property. Besides, if the principal mortgagee, BPI, is not even impleaded why should the second mortgage PISObe so impleaded, when it is a stranger to the transact. between petitioners and private respondents? Even the mortgage documentpurportedly sued upon is not attached to the amended complaint.In Marimperio Compania Noviera, S.A. v. CA, G.R. 40234, December 14, 1987,7 the Court held:"According to Article 1311 of the Civil Code, a contract takes effect between the parties who made it, and also their assigns and heirs,except in cases where the rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by stipulation or byprovision of law. Since a contract may be violated only by the parties, thereto as against each other, in an action upon that contract,the real parties in interest, either as plaintiff or as defendant, must be parties to said contract. Therefore, a party who has not takenpart in it cannot sue or be sued for performance or for cancellation thereof, unless he shows that he has a real interest affectedthereby."A "real interest" has been defined as "a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a future, contingent,

subordinate or consequential interest." (Moreno, Federico B. Philippine Law Dictionary, Third Edition)Complete relief by private respondents against petitioners may be had even if PISO/Central Bank were not impleaded as partydefendant in the original case, PISO is not an indispensable or necessary party without whom no Final determination can be had ofthe action for specific performance with damages. (See. 7, Rule 3, Rules of Court). Private respondents maintain that PISO is a properparty under see. 8, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court. The provision invoked reads:"Section 8. Joinder of proper parties.-When persons who are not indispensable but who ought to be parties if complete reliefs to beaccorded as between those already parties, have not been made parties and am subject to the jurisdiction of the court as to bothservice of process an venue, the court shall order them summoned to appear in the action. But the court may, in its discretion,proceed in the action without making such persons parties, and the judgment rendered therein shall be without prejudice to therights of such persons."From the above, it is clear that joinder of admittedly proper parties is permissive, that judgment will be decreed even if a I the partiesare not present if the court will be able to proceed to a decree and do justice to the parties already before it, without injury to thosewho are absent but equally interested in the litigation and who cannot conveniently be made parties to the suit.8 Wherever a casewill be completely decided as between the party litigants, an interest existing in some other persons whom the process of the courtcannot reach will not prevent a decree upon the merits.9 In short, as far as the complaint for ,pecific performance and damages isconcerned, complete relief maybe accorded between private respondents and Petitioners (as original parties) without the presence of

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the second mortgagee (PISO bank). If complete relief to herein private respondents is the ultimate aim of the RTC ruling, why did itnot include BPI as (proper) party defendant, since after all, there is an allegation in the original complaint that BPI refused to go alongwith the transaction because of petitioners' representations.Moreover, the amendment sought by private respondents, which is to include a new party defendant at a late stage in the proceedingis not a formal but a substantial one. Private respondents will have to present additional evidence on the PISO second mortgage, Theeffect would be to start trial anew with the practice recasting their theories of the case. The correct amount of the second mortgageowed by petitioners to PISO bank (apparently a controverted point), would have to be litigated and this could be time consuming.As a general policy, liberality in allowing amendments is greatest in the early stages of a law suit, decreases as it progresses andchanges a, times to a strictness amounting to a prohibition.10 This is further restricted by the condition that the amendment shouldnot prejudice the adverse party or place him at a disadvantage.11WHEREFORE, the petition for review is GRANTED. The decision appealed from is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case beremanded to the court of origin for continuation of the presentation of evidence by herein petitioners (as defendants) in Civil Case No

17875.SO ORDERED.Narvasa (C.J., Chairman), Regalado and Nocon, JJ., concur.Petition granted. Appealed decision reversed and set aside.** Justice Jorge S. Imperial writing for the court, Nathanael P. De Pano, Jr. and Jainal D. Hasul, JJ. concurring, former Tenth Division.***Judge Ignacio C. Capulong, presiding.1. Rollo at 38-41.2 Rollo at pp. 46 to 48.3 Summary of pp. 4 to 8 of the CA decision, Rollo p.67 to 68.4. Resolution date April 2, 1993. Rollo, p. 75. Petition, pp. 11 Rollo, pp. 25-26.6. Belleza v. Huntington, G.R. No. L-3319, August 16, 1951, 89 Phil. 689.7. 156 SCRA 368.8. Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall, (U.S) 425, 19 , ed, 260.9. Elmendorf v.Taylor, 19 Weals U.S. 162, 6 1 ed. 289.Both cases are cited in Martin, Ruperto, Rules of Court in the Philippines suchnotes and documents and 1986 .10. Torres v. Tomacruz, G.R. No. L-26251, February 7, 1927, 47 Phil. 913, cited in Garcia, Jr. v. Ranada, Jr., G.R. No. 60935, 27September 988, 166 SCRA 9.11. Shaffer v. Palma, G.R. No. L-24115, March 1, 1968, 22 SCRA 934 Phil. Banking Corp. v. The Hon Intermediate Appellate Court, etat.al G.R. No.66510, July 6, 1990, 1990,18 SCRA 257.

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Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr. July 30, 1993.[GRN 1033 July 30, 1993.]JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by their parents ANTONIO andRIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLEISADIUA, minor, presented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDASALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R.FORTUN, minor, represented by her parents SIGFRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA,minors and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN,minor, represented by his parentsANTONIO and ALICE 'PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parent, JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIACONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDFNIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA ESAMPARADO, minorrepresented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPARADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor, reppresented by his parents

GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, complainant vs. FACTORAN, JR., respondent.SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari of the dismissal order of the RTC of Makati, Br. 66.The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court. Oposa Law Office for petitioners.The Solicitor General for respondents.DAVIDE, JR., J.:In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the righ, of Filipinos to a balanced nd healthful ecology which the petition dramagesassociate that the educational -responsibility specifically, it touches on the issue of whehter the said petitioners have a cause ofaction to "prevent the misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrages of thecountry's vital life-support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth."

The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-777 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional TrialCourt (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors dulyrepresented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc.(PEND, a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action gearedfor the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., thenSecretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).It is substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, be

Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by the petitioners.1 The complaint2 was instituted as ataxpayers' class suit3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to thefull benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical rainforests." The same was filedfor themselves and others who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerousthat it is impracticable to bring them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent theirgeneration as well as generation ' at unborn."4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:"x x x ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting it is behalf to (1) all exceptions deast fromreceiving, a case from being, aprocess in renewing or pproval new timber licence agreements."and granting the plaintiffs "x x x such other chiefs just equitable under the premises."5

The complaint starts off with the general averment that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a idea had area of thirtymillion (30,000.00) hectares and is endowed with which, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of floraand fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is irresplaceable; they are also thehabitat of indigenous Philippines cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidencereveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio offifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other

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uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmentaltragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting from the drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the 11 aquifer," as well asof rivers, brooks and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertibleexamples of which may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and theconsequential loss of soil fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion(1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering andextinction of the country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of culturalcommunities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of river, and seabeds andconsequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in in marine resource productivity (g)recurrent spells of droughtas is prsently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds whichresult from the absence of windbreakers, (i) the flooding of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of theabsorbent mechanism of forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and

operated for the purpose of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and the reduction ofthe earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which had led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as thephenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."

Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable ofunquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter ofjudicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressedtheir intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.

As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:"CAUSE OF ACTION7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.8. Twenty-fiive (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests constituting roughly 53% of thecountry's land mass.9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said rainforests or four per cent(4.0%) of the country's land area.10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin oldgrowth rainforests are left, barely 2.8% of the entire landmass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.11. Public records reveal that defendant's predecessors have granted timber license agreements (TLA's') to various corporations tocut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging purposes.A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares p hour-nighttime, Saturdays, Sundaysand holidays included -the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources after the end of the cosuing not decade if not earlier.13 The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparableble damage of this continued trend of deforestrationto the plaintiff minors generation and to generations yet unborn are evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, theenvironmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation ofplaintiff adults.14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands will work great damage andirreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy thisrare and unique natural resource treasure.This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property he holds in trust for thebenefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled tc protection by the State in itscapacity as the parem patriae.

16. Plaintiffs have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defen.dant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in if the country.A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex 'B'.17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's, to the continuing serious damage and extreme prejudice ofplaintiffs.18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative to the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiffminors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenouscultures which the Philippines has been abundantly blessed with.19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy enunciated in the PhilippineEnvironmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the State '(a) to create, develop, maintain and improveconditions under which man and nature can thrive is productive and enjoy able harmony with each other;'(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos and;'(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and well being (P.D. 1151, 6June 1977)

20. Furthermore, defendant's continue refusal to cancel the aforementio ned to the constitutional of a. effect 'a more equitabledistribution of opportunities, income and wealth' and 'make full and efficient use of natural resources (sic). (Section 1, Article XII of

the Constitution);b. 'protect the nation's marine wealth! (Section 2, ibid);c. 'conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic).' (Section 14, Article XIV, id.);d. 'protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and harmony ofnature.' (Section 16, Article II id.)21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankindthe natural law-and violative of plaintiffs' right toselfpreservation and perpetuation.22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage ofthe country's vital life-support systems and continued rape of Motlher Earth.'

On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Facturan, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two ( ) grounds,namely:(1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and(2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question n which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branch ofGovernment.

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In their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable causeof action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse ofdiscretion.

On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss.7 In the said order, not only wasthe defendants claim-that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political question---sustained, therespondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the reliefs prayed for would result in the impairment of contracts whichis prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.

Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this court to recindand set the dismissal order on the ground the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion in discreasing the action. Again, theparents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined the latter in this case.8

On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda afterthe Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Commentin behalf of the respondents and the petitioners filed a replythere toPetitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegationsconcerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations),Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151(Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people toa balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man'sinalienable right to self-preservation and selfperpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on therespondent's correlative obligation, per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthfulenvironment.

It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretarys alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber LicenseAgreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.

Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the samedoes not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected bythe said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when public interest so requires.

On the other hand, the respondents over that the. petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by therespondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complain, but vague and nebulous allegationsconcerniong an "environmental" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parenspatriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a alid cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question ofwhether logging should be permitted in the country is a political question which should be properly addressed to the executive orlegislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the petitioners' recourse is not to file an action to court , but to lobbybefore Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging totally.

As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without due processof law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time-usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, thesame can can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated theterms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelledvithout the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due process.

Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter, Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the saidcivil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to allcitizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, toring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enogh to ensure thefull protection of all concerned interests. Hence all the requisites for the Filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of theRevised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to theformer.This case, however, has special and novel element Dt. Petitioners minors assist that they represent the veneration as well asgenera ions yet unborn . We find to difficulty in ruling that they an, for ourselves, the others of generation and for proceedingsclass sum of their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generat ions can only be based on the concept generationalresponsibility insofar as the right to and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as herein, ter expounded, considers the"rhythm and harmony of nature."Nature means the created world in its entirety.9 Such Rythm and harmony indispensably include,inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters,fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization beequitably accessible to the present as well as future generations.10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to

the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a littledifferently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performanceof their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.

The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been dressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and argumentsadduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order forhaving been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order read asfollows:xxx"After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the defendant. For although webelieve that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it (sic) feel short of alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legalright they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC).

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Furthermore, the Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on unverified datathe plaintiffs state a cause of action in its Complaint the herein defendant.Furthermore, the Court firmly believe the matter before it, being impressed with political color and invasing matter of public policy,may not be taken cognizance by this Court without doing violence to the sacred principle of Separation of Powers of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant th. reliefs played for by theplaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting,processing renewing or approving new timber license agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to 'impairment of contracts'abhored (sic) by the fundamental law.11

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusion that the plaintiffs failed to allege with ' sufficient, definiteness a specific legal rightinvolved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on

unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right-the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for thefirst time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987Constitution explicitly provides:"SEC. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the rhythmand harmony of nature."This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:"SEC. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health consciousness among them.While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and notunder the Bill of Rights, it does not fellow that it is important than any of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such aright belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation-aptlyand fittingly stressed by the petitioner the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. Asa matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they an assumed to exist from the inception ofhumankind. If they are now xiplicitly mentioned in the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers thatunless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, therebyhighlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the Brat and protect andadvance the second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those tocome-generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. Duringthe debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpiredbetween Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:"MR. VILLACORTA:Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution-air, water and noise pollution?MR. AZCUNA:Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it the correlative duty of not impairing thesame and, therefore, sanctions may be provided for impairment of environmental balance.12

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.Without such forest the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversibly accepted.Conformably with the minciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other relatedprovisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilzation of the countrys natural resources,13 thenPresident Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No.192,14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates that the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,management, development and proper use of the country's, environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing lands,mineral resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing andregulation of an natural resources as may be provided for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derivedtherefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of Filipinos.'Section 3 thereof makes the following statement ofpolicy:

"SEC. 3. Declaration of Policy. -It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable use, development, management,renewal, and conservation the country's forest, mineral, land, offshore areas and other natural resources, including the protectionand enhancement of the quality of the environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to thedevelopment and use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as well. It isalso the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and environmental cost implications relative totheir utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources."

This policy declaration is substantially re-stated in Title XIV, BooK IV of the Administrative Code of 1987,11 specifically in Section Ithereof which reads:

SEC. 1. Declaration of Policy.-(l) The State shall ensure for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full exploration and development asthe judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheried,wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural resources, consequent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance andprotecting and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objectivc of making the exploration, development and utilization ofsuch natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as well as future generations.(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and environmental costimplications relation to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural resources."

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the qualit yofthe environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on e other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makesparticular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said section provides:"SEC. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily responsible for the implementation ofthe foregoing policy.(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be. in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional mandate to control andsupervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the country's natural resources."

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Both E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.

It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attentionto the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmemtal Policy)and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing policy of the state (a) (a) to createdevelop, maintain and improve condition, under which man and not enjoyabler can threre in productive and enjointable harmed witheach other, (b) to fulfill the social, and other requirement of present and future generations to Filipinos and (c) to insureattainment of an environmental quality that is couconceive to able of dignity nd well being.16 As its goal, it speaks of the"responsibilties of each generations trustee and guardian the environment for succeeding generations.17 The latter statue, on theother hand, gave flesh to the said policy.

Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's dutyunder its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect andadvance the said right.

A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to acause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violatedtheir right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed orgranted,

A cause of action is defined as:"x x x an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal rights of the other; and its essential elements are legal right of theplaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the defendant in violation of said legal right.18

It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action,19the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No othermatter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the period for the saidallegataions thereof is deemed hypothicatically admitted. The only issue resolved in such case is: admitting such allegedfacts to be true,may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the complaint?20 In Militante vs,Edrosadano,21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon amotion to dismiss on he ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] , by its failure the to manifest a correct appreciation of thefacts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, that the law grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happpens there isa blot on the legal order law itself stands in that discrpute."

After a careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmitive allegations, aswell as the specific averments under the ih-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the faintedviolation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they mayt is be granted wholly or partly, the reliefs prayed for. lt hears stressinghowever, that insofar -as the cancelationof the TLA's is concerned, there is the need to implied,as party defendants, the granteesthereof for they are indispensable parties.

ON POLITICAL QUESTION

The foregoing considered, Civil Case . 90-777 cannot be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination by theexecutive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a

right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, evertheless, be emphasized that the politicaquestion doctrine is no , linger the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protectsexecutive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review, The second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitutionstates that:

"Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandableand enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave ahead discretion granting to lack of excess of jurisdictionon the part of branch or instrumental of the Government."

Implementing on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law,22. Just