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Participation, citizen journalism and the contestations of identity and national

symbols:AcaseofZimbabwe’snationalheroesandtheHeroes’Acre

ShepherdMpofu

DepartmentofCommunication

UniversityofJohannesburg

mpofu.shepherd@gmail.comsmpofu@uj.ac.za/mpofu.shepherd@gmail.com

Abstract

ThisarticleconstitutesanexaminationonhowcitizenjournalismhaschallengedRobert

Mugabe’sauthoritarianregimeonissuespertainingtonationalheroesandusagesofthe

HeroesAcreascentralnationalidentitymarkers.UnderMugabe’sZANU‐PF,Zimbabwe

hasseenthepublicbeinglimitedfromdirectlyparticipatinginsalientnationaldebates.

ZANU‐PF’s control of theofficial public spherehas also constrained alternative views

fromventilatingthegovernment‐controlledcommunicativespaces.Theparty’snarrative

onheroes,theHeroesAcreandnationalidentityhasgainedataken‐for‐grantedstatusin

thepublicmedia.Thishasobtainedagainstthebackdropofwhathasbecomeknownas

theZimbabwecrises,characterisedbyadecliningeconomy,aconstrictedpoliticalspace,

abreakdownintheruleoflaw,andthesubsequentflightofanumberofZimbabweans

into the diaspora. The accompanying wave of technological advancements and the

mushrooming of mostly diaspora‐based online media have opened up new vistas of

communication, enabling a hitherto ‘silenced’ community of ordinary people to

participate in national conversations. The conclusion reached here, is that citizen

journalismhasnotonlyenhancedthecultureofconversationamongpeople(asespoused

underdemocraticconditions)buthasalsocoveredupthedemocraticdeficitexperienced

inthepublicsphere,mediatedbytraditionalmedia,parliamentandpavementradio.

Keywords: alternative public spheres; citizen journalism; ; Heroes’ Acre; national

identity;newmedia;participation

INTRODUCTION

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Since the Zimbabwe ‘crisis’1 (Masunungure 2006; Mlambo and Raftopoulos 2010;

Muzondidya 2009; Ndlovu‐Gatsheni 2009; Raftopoulos 2006) in the early 2000s the

Zimbabwe Heroes’ Acre, and the selection and burial of heroes have become potent,

controversialandcontestedterrainsinZimbabwe’scontentiousnation‐makingproject.

Besidesmyths,monumentssuchasheroes’acresandnationalheroesareamongstthe

most important nation‐making symbols to have featured in the Zimbabwe African

National Union‐Patriotic Front’s (ZANU‐PF) post‐colonial national bonding narrative,

particularly post‐2000. Successive ZANU‐PF governments have controlled national

identitynarrativesinthepublicmediasince1980.Theyear2000markedadipinZANU‐

PFs’ popularity in Zimbabwe, characterised by declining support; the formation of a

formidable opposition party (the Movement for Democratic Change [MDC] that

performedbetterthanexpectedintheparliamentaryelectionsofthatyear,disrupting

ZANU‐PF’shegemonyfor the first timesince the1987UnityAccord[Mpofu2014a];a

slump in theeconomy; risingunemployment levelsanddwindlingopportunities fora

betterlife.Thesefactorswerecompoundedbytheexodusofaconsiderablenumberof

(especially)skilledandeducatedZimbabweansintothediaspora.Withpassingtimeand

ZANU‐PF’s dictatorial tendencies wearing off its liberation war‐inspired legitimacy,

ZANU‐PFhasusedtheHeroes’Acreanddeadheroesto‘re‐freeze’itsideologies,bothin

spaceandtime(Osborne1998)soastopreservethis legitimacy.Amongotherthings,

ZANU‐PFutilisesculturalformsofnationalismwhichincludecelebratingheroesthrough

music galas (Ndlovu‐Gatsheni and Willems 2009; Willems 2013), documentaries or

featurearticlesinstate‐controlledmedia,patriotichistory(Ranger2004)andnational

holidaycelebrations(Mpofu2015;Willems2013).

Inacontextwheretherulingpartyandgovernmentofthedayareconflated,the

Heroes’AcrehasbeenusedasanexclusivelyZANU‐PF innermembers’privateburial

shrine, rendering it a contaminated space and site of national identity conflict and

contest.Osborne(2001,n.p.)arguesthatinsuchacasenationalmythologies,symbols

andshrines‘aremanipulatedtoencourageidentificationwiththestateandreinforceits

continuityandubiquity’. Shrines (especially inpostcolonial settings)are importantas

they freeze the past which becomes meaningful and activated ‘by the contemporary

1 Elsewhere (Mpofu 2014a) the argument is made that the Zimbabwe crisis is multilayered, complex and cannot be said to have begun in the early 2000s. Zimbabwe has always gone through moments of crisis, the major instance perhaps being the 1963 break-up of the nationalist movement. 

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desiresofindividualsandcommunities,and,mostpowerfully,bythewillofthenations’

(Osborne2004, xvii). They act as spaces for ceremonies,mourning and therapy, thus

seeminglyharmonisingandforminganassociationwithcertainideologies(Kalipeniand

Zeleza 1999). The Heroes’ Acre is meant to symbolise the painful route followed in

birthingtheZimbabweannation.Italsostandsasareminderofwherethenationisgoing,

insofarasthedecolonisationprojectisconcerned.However,asthisarticledemonstrates,

theshrinestandscorrupted,contestedandcondemned.

This article suggests thatWeb 2.0 has created an architecture of participation

(O’Reilly 2005). Here, we examine how citizen journalism challenges Zimbabwe’s

authoritarianregimeonissuespertainingtonationalheroselectionandtheusagesofthe

Heroes’Acreasacentralnationalidentitymarkerfrom2000–2015.Thisperiodiskeyin

Zimbabweanpolitics, as the ‘crisis’ in the countryhad global relevance. ZANU‐PFhas

advanced a hitherto dominant narrative on heroes, the Heroes’ Acre and national

identity,andthesediscourseshavegainedcurrency,dominationandtaken‐for‐granted

statusovertime–especiallyinthepublicmedia.SincethesigningoftheUnityAccordin

1987,burialsandtheHeroes’Acrewerenotas intenselycontestedas iscurrentlythe

case.Thiscanlargelybeattributedtothederegulationoftheeconomy(andthemedia

space) in the 1990s, and the advent of new media technologies as alternative

communicativeforafortheostracisedandexcludedmajority.

THECASE,METHODANDFOCUS

Thewaveoftechnologythatsweptthroughthecountry’scommunicativespacefromthe

2000shasalteredZANU‐PF’sdominanceonsalientnationaldebates.Thisstudyrelieson

adiasporic online news site and citizen journalism to analyse the ordinary everyday

citizens’attitudesandopinionsongovernment’s treatmentofdebatesonZimbabwe’s

nationalheroesanditsHeroes’Acre.Forthepurposesofthisresearch,onlythestories

and citizen journalism activities from a case study – are used, namely the online site

Newzimbabwe.com.Thisdoesnotinanywaysuggestthatitistheonlysiteavailableto

Zimbabweans,butsufficetosaythatthisisoneoftheleadingonlinenewsplatformsin

Zimbabwe. It is probably theoldest andwas the first to introduce citizen journalism,

allowing users to debate issues without much gatekeeping. In addition, users could

contributetocertainstories.Therefore,studyingthiswebsite(whichwassoonemulated

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post‐2003) provides some insight into how citizens appropriate newmedia as tools

whichenablethemtoconfrontthestatusquo.Newzimbabwe.comisownedbyaWales‐

based company, New Zimbabwe Limited. The current editor of the government‐

controlledChroniclenewspaper,MduduziMathuthu,whopreviouslycompiledtheletters

totheeditorinthisnewspaperandworkedasajournalistatDailyNews,isthefounding

editorofNewzimbabwe.com.MathuthusoldhissharestoJeffMadzingoin2013before

joining The Chronicle. In company describes itself as follows: ‘We boast the finest

correspondentsandcolumnistsyoucanassembleinZimbabweandabroad.Theconstant

flowofbrilliantlypresentedideasandstrongargumenthasbroughtusplaudits,while

thosewho hate our cause inevitably frown upon us’ (Newzimbabwe.com 2003). The

newssiteisfundedthroughadvertisingandboastsprofessionallayouts,withcategories

suchas:‘News,Business,Showbiz,Sports,Opinion,Local,Diaspora,ReligionandBlogs’

(ibid.)–allofwhichallowspaceforcitizenengagement.

Themainagendaofthisarticleistoanalysehowcitizenjournalismhas‘liberated’

the discourse of nation‐formation from ZANU‐PF control, while affording ordinary

Zimbabweans an opportunity to exercise agency by giving them a voice on national

debates.Todothis,ofcoursethedominantnarrativesofZANU‐PFandthepublicmedia

on issues related to theHeroes’Acre andnational heroes need to be intimated, even

thoughthisconstitutesaseparatestudyaltogether.Citizenjournalism,accordingtoLuke

Goode(2009:1289)refersto‘arangeofweb‐basedpracticeswhereby“ordinary”users

engageinjournalisticpractices…suchascurrentaffairsbasedblogging,photoandvideo

sharing, and posting eyewitness commentary on current events’ and commenting on

stories. Methodologically, this researcher used the website’s search bars to enter

keywords like ‘Heroes’ Acre’, ‘heroes’ and ‘heroes’ burial’. Stories related to these

keywordswereconvenientlyselectedandread.Next,storiesandcommentsconsidered

useful for this article,were subjectively selected. The selected postings largely railed

againstthestatusquo.Asaresult,thestudygrappleswiththefollowingquestions:What

are the meanings of ZANU‐PF’s constructions and imaginations of the Heroes’ Acre,

heroesandnationalidentity,andhowarethesereceivedbyonlineaudiences?Howhave

new media technologies altered the way people engage on national identity, with a

specialfocusonheroesandtheHeroes’Acre?

Toanswerthesequestions,thisstudyemployscriticaldiscourseanalysis(CDA)to

engagewithcitizenjournalists’debatesinanin‐depthfashion.CDAisusedtostudy‘the

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waysocialpowerabuse,dominance,andinequalityareenacted,reproduced,andresisted

bytextandtalkinthesocialandpoliticalcontext’(VanDijk2001,352).TheroleofCDA

isthereforeto‘takeexplicitposition,andthuswanttounderstand,expose,andultimately

resist social inequality’ (ibid.). This research takes the position that ZANU‐PF has

narroweddownandevenexcludedthecitizenryfromparticipatinginnationaldebates,

which has led to onlinemedia debates railing against the ruling party. This research

concludesthatcitizenjournalismhasgivenordinarypeopleaplatformtochallengethe

dominantnarrativesofautocraticregimesviasecureandsafeonlineavenues.Further,

citizenjournalismhasnotonlyenhancedthecultureofconversationamongpeople,as

espousedunderdemocratictheory(CarpentierandDahlgren2013;Mouffe2000),but

hasalsocoveredupthedemocraticdeficitexperiencedinauthoritariancountries.This

researchoccupiesaspecialplaceinthegrowingZimbabweanliteratureonmonuments

andidentity(Fisher2010;Mpofu2014a;2016);culturalnation‐makingprocessesusing

nationalmonuments,holidaysandheroes(Kriger1995;Mpofu2015b;Ndlovu‐Gatsheni

andWillems2009;Willems2013)andtheroleofnewmediainaffordingordinarypeople

avoiceandcreatingalternativeplatformsfordiscourseonnationalidentityissues(Mano

andWillems2008;L.Moyo2009;Mpofu2014a;Peel2009).

CITIZENJOURNALISMASALTERNATIVEPUBLICSPHERE

Part of Mugabe’s totalitarian legacy in post‐2000 Zimbabwe is the contributions he

inadvertentlymadetothegrowthofnewmedia–especiallyonlinenewssites.Thus,as

the socio‐political and economic chaos which ZANU‐PF has ushered Zimbabwe into

gainedmomentuminthe2000s,alargenumberofpeoplefledthecountryaspolitical

and economic refugees. Among these were journalists and activists who started and

participatedinonlinepublicationsanddebatesfromthediaspora(e.g.,in2000alonethe

intolerantZANU‐PFgovernmentarrested20localjournalistsanddeportedthreeforeign

correspondentsfromthecountry).Thesemediaarealsoaccessibleinthehomeland,even

though there are challenges related to affordability of software and hardware,

technological know‐how and connectivity in a highly informalised economy like

Zimbabwe.Diasporiconlinemedia,togetherwithwhatEllis(1989)calls‘radiotrottoir’

[pavementradio],continuetochallengegovernment‐sponsoreddominantdiscoursesin

thelocalofficialmedia.Intheprocess,thisventilatesthepublicspherewithalternative

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oryettobeofficiallyconfirmed/deniedinformation.Diaspora,inthisarticle,isusedin

accordancewiththedefinitionsprofferedbyWalterConnor(1994),JudithShuval(2000),

WilliamSafran(1991)andMartinBaumann(2000),torefertoasegmentofpeopleliving

outsidetheirhomeland(Zimbabweinthiscase)whilemaintaininginterestsinitfrom

theirnewhomes(bases)inthediaspora.Shuval(2000,41)clarifiesthatthediasporalive

andact in ‘host countriesbutmaintaining strong sentimental andmaterial linkswith

their countries of origin – their homelands’. The Zimbabwean diaspora’s definition

(becauseofthewaysomeofthemleftthehomeland)has‘emotion‐ladenconnotationsof

uprootedness, precariousness and homesickness provid[ing] explanations for the

group’senduringandnostalgicloyaltyto…thecountryoforigin’(ibid,314).

Whilejournalismhashithertobeenviewedasalecture,onlinenewsmediahave

upset this ‘status quo’ and introduced citizen journalism, which has shown that

journalismcanbeaconversationaswellwhereaudiencesinteractbothwithjournalists

andamongstthemselves(Marchionni2013;Mpofu2014aandb).Thediasporiconline

mediahaveenteredintoapolarisedmediascapeasalternativemedia(Atton2002;Bailey,

Cammaerts and Carpentier 2008; Mpofu 2014a and b) to the public media, whose

politicaleconomymeanstheyhavetosupportZANU‐PF.Thisexpansionhasenrichedthe

constrained Zimbabwean public sphere. According to Atton (2002) and Bailey et al.

(2008),alternativemediaareorganisedandoperatedifferentlyfrommainstreammedia,

especiallywherefinancing,thedistributionofmediaproductsandthemanagementof

organisationsandtheirrelationshipwiththestatusquoareconcerned.Alternativemedia

are usually conceptualised as playing a counter‐hegemonic role in society, in railing

against the dominant discourses advanced by the ruling elite. This function bears a

semblanceto‘letterstotheeditor’intraditionalmedia.Citizenjournalismhasgivenlife,

agencyandcharactertothoseaudiencesthatpreviouslyexistedintraditionaljournalists’

imagination.

ThecontributionsofdiasporiconlinemediatotheZimbabweanpublicsphereare

simple to account, yet profound. Those members in the news consumption chain

(previouslycalled‘consumers’)arenowbothconsumersandproducers,asonlinemedia

allowthemtogather,processanddistributematerialbywritingblogsattachedtonews

sites, posting videos and photographs, or commenting under ‘stories’. Another

revolutionary characteristic of online media is the empowerment of dispossessed,

ostracisedandexcludedcitizensbygivingthemavoice(Mitra2001,2004)whichallows

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themtochallengethoseinpower.Thisbecomesauniqueforumforexpressionthatisnot

accessible in the print and broadcast media controlled by ZANU‐PF in Zimbabwe.

Recently,almostallZimbabweannewspapers–privateandpublic–wentonline,making

provision forreadercommentaryonstories.However,comments that railagainst the

statusquodonotmakeitintothehardcopynewspapersthataresoldonthestreetsand

supermarkets,sinceonlyalimitednumberofpositivecommentsandSMSsarechosen.

Theuseofdiasporiconlinemediaisinformedbyanestablishedtrendofmostofthese

mediabeinganti‐statusquo,operatingoutside localmedia lawsandrelyingononline

advertising/funding from their founders – a political economy vastly different from

publicly owned media. Reader participation or citizen journalism gives some stories

credibility,especiallywhenconfirmedbycitizenswhoare inproximitytoaneventor

experienced it first‐hand (Gulyas 2013). In the absence of official communication –

especiallyduring election time – citizen journalists ‘trade’ in andwith information in

parallelcommunicativespaces(seeMoyo’s[2009]studyofZimbabwe’s2008elections).

While scholars likePavlic (2000) suggest that citizen journalismhas created a

two‐waystreetofcommunicationbetweenjournalistsandthepublic,evidencefrommy

researchinZimbabwepointstothefactthatjournalists,afterpublishingstoriesonline,

remain silent and allow readers to debate. This does not, however, suggest that

journalistsdonotreadthecomments:insomecases,readerspointoutinaccuraciesin

stories,whicharelatercorrectedbythejournalists.Tiedtothisnotionisthefactthat

citizenjournalistscannowmonitortraditionalmediaandjournalists,thusassumingthe

role of the Fifth Estate bywatching over thewatchdogs (Mabweazara 2014;Milioni,

KonstantinosandVenetia2012).

Moreover,scholarssuchasMcElroy(citedinMabweazara2014)‘raiseconcerns’

abouttheauthenticityofonlinematerialwrittenunderpseudonyms.Itisimportantto

point out that in countries where state security agents monitor people’s private

communications, it is imperativethatcitizen journalistsbecautiousandnotrisktheir

own security or that of their families. Besides the negative aspects of participatory

journalism(e.g.,anavalancheofuncontrolledcommentsorflaming[lackofcivilityand

use of vulgar language]), new media have revolutionised and expanded the options

citizenshavetosubvertandundermineauthoritarianregimesthroughdiscourse(Bernal

2004,2005;ManoandWillems2008;Mpofu2014a,2015a;Parham2004).

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Thepracticeofcitizenjournalismisnotwithoutchallenges,especiallyforcitizen

journalistsinsideZimbabwe.Withtheeconomyperformingpoorlyandmostemployed

peoplehavingbeen reduced tovending second‐hand clothing, fruit andvegetablesor

telephone recharge card, bread‐and‐butter issues tend to be more important than

informational needs.While citizen journalism has dismantled gatekeeping and other

ethics‐enhancing codes used by traditional media to protect audiences, this has left

audiencesexposedtounethicaljournalisticpracticeswhichinfringeonpeople’ssecurity

andprivacy.Bethatasitmay,thisarticlewilldemonstratehowcitizenjournalismhas

beeninstrumentalincontestingZANU‐PF’sdominantideologiesandaffordingordinary

peopleanopportunitytodiscursivelyconstructalternativemeaningsof,amongstothers,

theHeroes’ Acre, heroes and national identity. The internet as a safe and alternative

platformallowsforexpressionsthatwouldnotusuallyseethelightofday,particularly

notinthepublicmedia.a

TheHeroes’Acreanddefinitionsofheroes

TheMinistryofInformation(1989,3)imaginesashrineasaplaceofpilgrimageforthe

massesintentoncreatingtheirownhistory,designedto‘arousenationalconsciousness,

forgenationalunityand identity… theprideof thepeopleofZimbabwe.Asymbolof

braveryandselflessnessofthosewhoseremainsarelaidtorestthere.’Onitswebsite,the

ZimbabweTourismAuthority(n.d.)advertisesanddescribestheHeroes’Acrethus:

... a burial ground and national monument … Its stated purpose is to commemorate

Patriotic Front guerrillas killed during the Rhodesian Bush War, and contemporary

Zimbabweanswhosededicationorcommitmenttotheircountryjustifytheirinterment

attheshrine.

Thesetwodefinitionslimitthemselvestotheliberationwar,butbringoutanimportant

aspectofnationhood,dedicationandsacrifice,andattempttolegitimateacertaingroup’s

contribution to (and, toa certainextent,dominanceof) thenation.ForSavage (1994,

130),monumentsandthecommemorationofthewardeadanchorandlegitimate ‘the

verynotionofcollectivememory’askeytonationalidentityformation.InZimbabwe,this

isattheexpenseofgender,democracy,diversityandinclusivity.

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The Heroes’ Acre hosts the remains of undistinguished guerillas who only

participated in the violent Third Chimurenga, people such as Cain Nkala, Chenjerai

Hunzvi and Border Gezi, ZANU‐PFmembers andMugabe loyalists with questionable

liberation‐warcredentials.ThismakesZANU‐PF’scriteriafornationalheroconferment

aspeculiarasitiscontroversial.Clearly,theprinciplesaccordingtowhichsomeonemay

bedeclaredanationalheroarenotthosethatthewarofindependencewasfoughtfor.

PractisingtherighttobelongorformapoliticalpartyalternativetoZANU‐PFnullifiesan

individual’sstatusasanationalhero,alongwithhis/hercontributiontothecountry’s

nationhood.WhenMugabe’scousinJamesChikerema(oneofthefoundingfathersofthe

country’s liberation struggle) died, Mugabe insisted on burying him ‘KwaZvimba’ (in

Mugabe’sruralhome),asChikeremahad‘betrayedhiscomradeswhenhejoinedupwith

BishopAbelMuzorewaandIanSmithaspartoftheinternalsettlement...[andignoring

partypolicyof]consistencyandpersistence...[whichare]keytoourdefinitionofnational

hero’(Newzimbabwe.com,September18,2010).

In addition, when Thenjiwe Lesabe (a PF‐ZAPU foundingmember and later a

ministerandmemberofZANU‐PFpostthe1987UnityAccord)diedin2011,shewasalso

deniednationalheroinestatus.TheUnityAccordwasacompromisepeacedealmeantto

endfurtherbloodshedthroughagenocideinZimbabwe’ssouth‐westernregions,where

20 000 Ndebele‐speaking people, perceived to be PF‐ZAPU supporters, were killed

(Mpofu2015b).Lesabehadthecredentialsofanationalheroine,having fought in the

country’sliberationwarandlaterservedasaminister.AccordingtoAmosNgwenya,in

anopinionarticle inNewzimbabwe.com(February14,2011),Lesabe’scrimewasthat

she ‘decided to go back to her roots to re‐join the revived ZAPU and was elected

chairpersonoftheZAPUCouncilofEldersattheparty’s9thcongressheldinBulawayoin

2010’.

AccordingtoZANU‐PF’sthenSecretaryforAdministration,DidymusMutasa,this

actobliteratedLesabe’schancesofbeingconferredheroinestatus.Mutasaisquotedby

SitholeinanopinionarticleinNewzimbabwe.comassaying:

We could not confer to her a national heroine status, which was her rightful status,

because she was not consistent when she joined ZAPU led by Dabengwa. … ZAPU

membersarestillpartandparcelofZANU‐PFbecauseoftheagreementthatwesigned

andnobodyshouldgoagainstthatagreement.(Sithole,15February2011)

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However,thisdidnotapplytoEdgarTekere,whowasdeclaredanationalherodespite

hisfrictionwithMugabe.Hishistoryiscapturedthus:

TekereticksmostboxesonthecriteriausedbyZanu‐PFtopicknationalheroes,helped

in no small measure by his liberation war credentials, but his post‐independence

dalliancewithoppositionpoliticscouldbeseenasfallingshortofastandard…thatheroes

musthave‘pursuedandpromotedtheidealsoftheliberationstruggleconsistentlyand

persistently, without deviating from the same, right through to the bitter end’.

(Newzimbabwe.com,June9,2011)

Clearlytheprinciplesonwhichsomeoneisdeclaredanationalheroarenotthosethatthe

warofindependencewasfoughtfor.Accordingtosomeonlinedebates,theTekereissue

bringsinanethnicdimension(exploredlaterinthearticle).Other‘heroes’buriedatthe

Heroes’ Acre, who had no post‐war connection with ZANU‐PF, include the former

CommercialFarmers’UnionleaderGaryMagadzireandJosephCulverwell.Thereisscant

scholarship on these issues, but it is sufficient to suggest that this highlights the

problematicnatureofZANU‐PF’sdeterminationofheroes.

Citizenjournalism:ContestingHeroes’Acreandheroes

NarrativesontheselectionofheroesandontheHeroes’Acreasanationalspaceinonline

mediaandcitizenjournalists’postings,exploreissueswhicharerarelyraisedinpublic

media.Theseincludetheproblematicsofdefiningahero,issuesofethnicityandtheneed

for the shrine to be inclusive. These alternative voices attempt to upset ZANU‐PF’s

dominantdiscourses.Whiletherulingpartyhasforcefullyharnessedcolonialmemory

whichtendstoexpedientlyprivilegeitspositionasanationalistpartyforthepurposeof

nation building and identity construction, debates in online media rail against this

(ab)use of colonialmemory, patriotic history and journalism (Kriger 2006; Phimister

2012;Ranger2004;Tendi2008).Forexample,inachallengetoZANU‐PF’sdominance

andcontrolovertheHeroes’Acreandliberationmemory,Newzimbabwe.comblogger,

Chofamba Sithole (February15, 2011), argues that the construction anddefinition of

heroescanbemadebyZimbabweans‘apartfromZANU‐PFpronouncements’.

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Citizens’definitionofahero

Thediscussionthat followsconcernscontestationsaroundthemeaningsattributedto

thenationalHeroes’Acreasanation‐makingspace,andoffersalternativedefinitionsof

who/whataherois.ThesedebatesoccurinacontextwhereZANU‐PFhasdeniedsome

‘heroes’burialat thenationalshrine,whileothersreject,outright,burialat theshrine

evenpriortotheirdeath.Oneoftheforemostargumentsregardingnationalheroesin

onlinediscourses is theneedtocomeupwithasatisfactory,operativedefinition.The

MDCfindsthecurrentsystemofheroselectionas‘nonsensical[as]ZANU‐PFmonopoly

[carriedoutbya]groupofforsakenmenandwomen...[who]callthemselvestheZANU‐

PFpolitburo’(Newzimbabwe.com,March8,2011).ZimbabweanshavereactedtoZANU‐

PF’smonopolisationofthenationalshrinebyarguingthatthepeopleneedtodefinewhat

aherois,ratherthanwaitingforZANU‐PFtodecide:

Mostprofoundly,manyZimbabweanshavenowcometorecogniseheroismapartfrom

ZANU‐PFpronouncements, andwhateverMugabe and his Politburo say of thosewith

whomtheydonotagreepolitically,ifpeopleseethemasheroes,thenheroestheywill

foreverbe.(Sithole,NewZimbabwe.com,February15,2011)

TsitsiMaguvaz’s remarks advocate for an inclusive and fair system of hero selection

underthesameblog:

WhatqualifiesaheroinZimbabwe?Istheresomekindofcriteriaorapanelthatdecides

this? Ifnot there isaneed foroneor let thepeopledecide.Ahero isdefinitely to the

countryandnottothepoliticians.Letusnotallget tangledup inpoliticsandgivethe

respecttoourheroes.Idonotthinkitisfairforsomeonetodeemaherobasedmerelyon

theirpersonal,emotionalopinionoraffiliation.

ThepropositionbytheoppositionMDC‐T,forinstance,istoassemble

an all‐stakeholders’ bodywithno single subjective interest in the conferment of such

nationalstatusonanyindividual...aninclusivenationalpolicywithsetparametersand

clearlydefinedyardsticks[todeterminewhoqualifiestobeanationalhero]...notonly

politiciansqualifytobenationalheroes[as]Zimbabweanshaveproducedthebestminds

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in business, in sport, in music and in the arts in general and these people must be

recognisedasnationbuilders.(MDCPressStatement2009)

ThesuggestionisthatZANU‐PFneedstochangethecriteriaforconferringherostatus,

becauseobservationsbypoliticiansandacademicssuggestthatthepartyusestheshrine

toselectivelyrewardMugabeloyalists,notnecessarilynationalloyalists(Mpofu2014a).

This contestation emphasises that the process needs to be all‐inclusive and should

encompassdifferentfieldsofachievement.

Inastory‘Zanu‐PFsaysGamatoxMidzideservesnohonour’,Newzimbabwe.com

(June11,2015)reportsonthedeathofZANU‐PF’ssuspendedmemberAmosMidzi,who

wasdeniedherostatusbytheparty.Midzi’sformerallies,whoweresackedfromZANU‐

PF, include Didymus Mutasa, Rugare Gumbo and then Vice‐President Joice Mujuru,

amongothers.Mutasa’stonechangedfromhisfamoussupportfortheprivatisationofthe

shrinebyZANU‐PF,arguingthatpeoplehavetobeaccordedheroes’statusforwhatthey

contributedtoZimbabweandZANU‐PF,notfordaringtochallengeMugabe.

Umuntu comments on the story, pointing out: ‘I thought that placewas called

NationalHeroes’Acrebutnow I see Iwasmistaken. It’s ZanuHeroes’Acre.’Another

interlocutor,Chuck,respondsthus:

Againyouaremistaken:it’saMugabeheroes’acre.MidziisstillZanu‐Pfmemberbutnot

a Mugabe boot licker. That’s why he’s no hero! For same reason Mujuru and all her

sympathizerswillneverbeheroes.BycriticisingMugabetheyhavelosttheirrightstobe

viewedasheroes.That’sthewaythesystemtheysetupalwaysperksandGumboshould

notcryfoul.(Newzimbabwe.com,June11,2015)

ThiscapturespublicawarenessofhowZANU‐PFoperatesinawardingherostatus.Italso

helpstoillustratetheperceivedsecuritywhichonlinemediaofferusers,allowingthem

todebateissuestotheextentofcrossingpoliticalandculturalboundariesofcorrectness,

e.g.,by ‘insulting’thepresident.Brad(Newzimbabwe.com,June16,2015)summarises

mostofthecommentsonthestorythus:‘Nationalherostatushaslostitslustreeversince

ZANU‐PFstartedburyingthievesandmurderers.Wenolongertakeitseriously.’

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OnlinedebatesseemtosuggestthatanyoneaffiliatedtoZANU‐PFisavillain.However,

apparently leaving ZANU‐PF also makes one a hero in the eyes of ordinary people.

MastadoncomparesMidzi(amemberofZANU‐PF)toMujuru,GumboandMutasa:

Theguyhadsomuchbloodonhishands.Hedidnotrepent,soIhopeheisgettinghistrue

Justicefromthemanupstairs.AtleastthelikesofMutasaandMujuruhaverepentedand

said sorry for their transgressions.Wehave to see if they liveup to theirnew image.

(Newzimbabwe.com,June16,2015)

Theabovesuggeststhatlikeidentity,herostatusisnotfixedbutchangesaccordingto

circumstances.Morethanthreedecadespost‐independence,ordinarypeople’sdefinition

ofaheroseemstobemutating:fromreferringtothosewhofoughtinthewar,tothose

whoarefightingthepostcolonialinjusticesperpetratedbyZANU‐PF.Inessence,online

publicdeliberationsattempttosalvagethenationalmemoryandnarrativefrombeing

‘owned’ by ZANU‐PF – a party that dominates the grand narrative of the liberation

struggle–andopenuppossibilitiesofparticipationonthepartofordinarycitizens.

ContestingandrebuffingthenotionoftheHeroes’Acre

ZANU‐PFhas‘Zanu‐nised’theshrineandinstitutionofZimbabweanheroes.Mugabeis

quoted by Newzimbabwe.com (March 26, 2011) as contending that the Heroes’ Acre

belongstoZANU‐PFand‘onlymembersof…ZANU‐PF…willbeburiedatthenational

Heroes’Acre inHarare ... thoseunhappywith thedevelopmentwere free toestablish

separateshrinesfortheirownheroes’.This,toacertainextent,hasmadetheshrinefail

toarousenationalpride,belongingandconsciousness,asithasbecomeacontestedsite

ofshamewherecrooks,thievesandviolentMugabeloyalistsareburied.Ultimately,ithas

failed to foster the national unity and collective national identity for which it was

intended.Theuseofthisspacehasbeencontestedsincethe1980s,firstbyPF‐ZAPU(the

mainoppositionuntilaftertheUnityAccord),thenlaterinthepost‐2000sbytheMDC,

humanrightsNGOsandcriticalpublicintellectuals:

Heroes’Acre… isnowa truereflectionnotof thehistoryofour liberation,butof the

betrayalofourIndependence…ithasbecomeaplacewherethosetrueheroesareforced

towitnessthedestructionofwhattheystruggledtoachieve.ZANU‐PFhasappropriated

Heroes’ Acre, turning it into a cemetery for the human instruments of murder and

14 

corruption and oppression through which they have stolen Zimbabwe from the

Zimbabweanpeople.(Sokwanele,November21,2004)

TheHeroes’ Acre is not only a contested space: some heroes and their families have

rejectedthe‘honour’ofhavingtheirremainsinterredatthesite,brandingitaspacefor

crooksandthieveswithwhomtheywouldnotwanttobeassociated.While‘insiders’to

the country’s liberationwar andnation‐makingprocess have rejected the ‘honour’ of

beingburiedattheshrine,‘outsiders’/oppositionpartieshaveclamouredforinclusion,

both in terms of identifying heroes and burial at the shrine (particularly during the

Government of National Unity [GNU] period, which saw a compromise government

betweenZANU‐PFandthetwoMDCfactionsaftertheinconclusive2008elections). In

bothinstancesZANU‐PFretainedpowerandlargelyremainedinchargeoftheHeroes’

Acreandheroselection.

Thetrendisfortheopposition(justlikePF‐ZAPUdid)torequestfromZANU‐PF

thatoneoftheirpartymembers(orinpost‐2009Zimbabwe,aGNU‐partymember)be

declared a national hero. A prominent example is that of Gibson Sibanda, Deputy

PresidentofMDCandaGNUcabinetminister.Whenhediedin2010,boththeMDCand

MDC‐TapproachedZANU‐PFtohavehimdeclaredanationalhero.Theirrequestspeaks

to the recognition of the shrine as a national monument central to national identity

formation,especiallyduringtheGNUwhennationalpoliticswaspolarisedandprospects

ofreconcilingpoliticalandethnictensionswerethoughttobehighlylikely.Briefly,what

qualifiedSibandaasaheroaccordingisthathewasimprisonedanddetainedforthree

years for his role in the liberation struggle and was instrumental in postcolonial

oppositionpolitics,includingtheformationoftheGNUin2008:

Hewasacriticalcog in the liberationstruggle… instrumental increating theZCTU…

playedapivotalroleintheformationofthepowersharinggovernment…[and]kepttrue

to his principle of ‘Zimbabwe first’ and if there’s anyonewho deserves to be called a

nationalhero,thenitishim.(Newzimbabwe.com,August24,2010)

Thisassertioncontests the limiteddefinitionofaheroprofferedbyZANU‐PF.For the

party,Sibandadidnotqualifyasaheroashehadstoodagainsttheliberationmovement’s

principlesbyformingandbelongingtoanoppositionparty.Fromthequote,heroesare

15 

notonlythosewhobelongtoZANU‐PFandfoughtintheliberationwar,butalsothose

whocontinuallystruggledforthebirthofafair,justanddemocraticZimbabwe,evenafter

1980. In response, Mugabe’s spokesman, Charles Charamba, writing under the

pseudonymNathanielManheru,arguedthattheHeroes’Acreis

notafacilityforbleachingdarkenedpoliticalsouls.Itisasiteandrecognitionofhonour:

honour irrevocably achieved and thus honour which cannot be reversed or undone

throughsubsequenttransgressions.ZANU‐PF,thesolecreatorofthatAcre…soleauthor

ofrulesofentrytothatshrine,reliesondeathforthisirrevocability.(Newzimbabwe.com,

August28,2010)

Thusa‘darkenedsoul’seemstobeanyonewhoopposesanddoesnotbelongtoZANU‐

PF.Regardlessofsuchaperson’scontributiontothefightagainstcolonialismortyranny

inpostcolonialZimbabwe,s/hecannotgainentryintotheHeroes’Acre,aspaceZANU‐PF

hasappropriatedasitsown.

InhisNewzimbabwe.comcolumnentitled ‘Crynot forherostatus’ (August26,2010),

AlexMagaisa,formerChiefofStaffinTsvangirai’soffice,makesacriticalinterjectionthat

seekstoneutralisetheHeroes’Acreasapivotalnationalmonument.Heexpressesshock

that‘theMDCsentthepetitionatallandsecondly,thecollectivereactionbythetwoMDCs

of shock and disgust at the rejection (of Sibanda). Did they really expect anything

positive?’(ibid.).Magaisafurtherdentsthecredibilityandcentralityofthemonumentto

nationhoodbyarguing that itselitistandprivatisednature isexclusionary, sexistand

classist:

ThereareonlysixwomenburiedattheNationalHeroes’Acreandallofthemexceptone

were spouses of the male political elites. The other one recently buried there was

President’s sister. Yet it is true that thousands of women played major roles in the

liberation struggle. Thousands went to the front and fought alongside their male

counterparts. Thousands more have played diverse roles in nation‐building since

independence.Howcanitbethatonlysixofthem(andthosesixwhoareconnectedto

malepoliticalelites)weredeemedworthyofnationalherostatus?(ibid.)

Magaisadismantleselitistandpartisanconstructionsofheroismandnationalidentityas

insufficient in contributing to the construction of national identity in Zimbabwe. The

16 

institutionalsoactsinfavourofmen‘asablack,male,political,partybiasedelitistproject’

(ibid.)which,whenitdecidestoincludewhitepeople,areinvariablymale.Toundermine

thissystem,Magaisasuggestsdevising‘novelwaysofhonouringcitizens’,perhapslike

ZAPUdidbeforetheUnityAccord.

Besides boycotting national heroes’ holidays/burials, and openly criticizing

ZANU‐PF for its ‘sectarian process of selecting heroes’ (Kriger 1995, 151), PF‐ZAPU

establishedtheZIPRAWarShrinesCommitteewhosetaskwas‘tolocatethegravesites

ofZIPRAfreedomfighters,bothinsideandoutsidethecountry…andmarkingthemwith

gravestonesandbuildingshrinesthatcontainthenamesofthefallenheroes’(ibid,154–

155).AttheburialofLookoutMasuku,JudithTodd(2007,165)quotesJoshuaNkomoas

saying:

Butthey(ZANU‐PF)can’ttakeawayhisstatusasahero.Youdon’tgiveamanthestatus

ofahero.Allyoucandoisrecogniseit.Itishis.Yes,hecanbeforgottentemporarilyby

thestate.ButtheyoungpeoplewhodoresearchwillonedayunveilwhatLookouthas

done.

Togetherwithoppositionparties,ZimbabweanshaveunderminedtheZANU‐PFmethod

of identifyingandhonouringheroesby celebrating these ‘heroes’ inalternativeways,

includingthroughtheirburialplacesandinonlinemedia,regardlessoftherulingparty’s

stance.Suchonlinedebatesthusformsitesofprotest,wherecompetingnarrativesofthe

nation’s alternative to ZANU‐PF are produced, circulated and reproduced via online

media(Sumartojo2012).Forinstance,attheburialofGibsonSibanda,PrimeMinister

MorganTsvangirayisaid:‘[T]odayweareburyinganationalherowhoseworksspeakfor

themselves’ (Newzimbabwe.com, August 30, 2010). Similarly, Moyo (2011), writing

aboutLesabe’sburial,arguesherheroinestatuswasattestedtobythenumberofpeople

whoturnedupforthefuneral–somethingwhichchallengesZANU‐PF’sdefinitionofa

hero.AccordingtoSithole(ibid.),‘if[we]seethemthosenotchosenasheroesbyZANU‐

PFasheroes,thenheroestheywillforeverbe’.

InaNewzimbabwe.comstory,NormanMabhenaisquotedassayingthepeopledonot

needZANU‐PFtodeclareanyoneahero.AtthefuneralofWelshmanMabhena,aformer

cabinetministerandGovernorofMatabelelandSouth,hisbrotherNormansaid:

17 

Asafamily,weinsistedthatwewouldfollowtheMabhenaritualsinhisburial.Mabhena

himselfwasclearaboutthis,hesaidwhenhediesheshouldnotbeburiedinHarare.No

personwasgoingtochangethat.Weareinourownrightveteranpoliticians.Wedon’t

apologise for that and whether you recognise it or not, that does not change.

(Newzimbabwe.com,October10,2010)

Accordingtothisreport,herostatusneednotbepoliticisedordeclaredbyZANU‐PFfor

it to carry weight, as a person’s life and contribution to the country testify to their

heroism. Takura Zhangazha, a blogger on Newzimbabwe.com, reiterates these

sentiments:‘Sibandaaherowhereverheisburied’:

myfirmconviction[is]thatSibandawasaherowellbeforehedied;andthathewasnot

a hero by the narrow definition of ZANU‐PF’s central committee. That his colleagues

wrotealettertoPresidentMugabeseekingtohavehiminterredattheNationalHeroes’

Acrebafflesthemind.Thisisbecausethatparticularrestingplaceofmostoftheleaders

of the liberationstrugglehasbeenappropriatedby theZANU‐PFculturalandpolitical

hegemonicproject.Tobeclearer,theNationalHeroes’Acreisaninstitutionthatserves

thepoliticalandpowernarrativesofZANU‐PFandnotthenation.(Newzimbabwe.com,

September1,2010)

Thus,theburialspaceofthesethree‘heroes’,inthisinstance,doesnotcontributetotheir

hero status, while their works and the respect shown by ordinary Zimbabweans do.

ZhangazhaalsounderminesthenationalHeroes’Acreasacredibleshrinefornational

consciousness,brandingitatainted.It isaspace ‘explicitlydesignedtoimpartcertain

elementsofthepast–and,bydefinition,toforgetothers’(HoelscherandAlderman2004,

350).Thiscontestationofspaceandthenational identitynarrativesupportsBhabha’s

(1990)assertion thatnational identitynarrativesmustspeakto issuesofmultiplicity,

flexibilityandhybridity,notrigidityandexclusivity.

BycomparisonandmoreproblematicisthecaseofTekere,whose‘greatheroic

deedsinhisyoungerdaysasayouthactivistandguerrillaleaderfightingtoendwhite

rule’.Hewasawardedherostatus,despiteinconsistenciesthatparallelthoseofThenjiwe

Lesabe.ThefactthatthelatterwasdeniedthehonourofbeingburiedintheHeroes’Acre,

while the former received this honour, is contentious and speaks to ZANU‐PF’s

inconsistencyinhonouringheroes.

18 

ZANU‐PF’sdominantnarrativeon theHeroes’Acreas theultimatedefinerofa

heroandsymbolofnationhoodischallengedbyDinizuluMacaphulana’sassertioninan

article titled, ‘On the heroism of Gibson Sibanda’. He argues that it ‘shouldn’tmatter

where[ahero’s]remainsareinterred—itcanbeonananthill,itcanbeonamountain,

onaplainsurfaceorinariver‐butthatspotwhereheisburiedisnowamonumentand

ashrine’(Newzimbabwe.com,September3,2010).

Monuments like the Heroes’ Acre are mythologised as the sole ‘Official …

monument…[thatplays]auniqueroleinthecreationofnationalidentitybecause[it]

reflect[s]howpoliticaleliteschoosetorepresentthenationpublicly’(ForestandJohnson

2002,256).Thisofficialisedandnarrowed‐downrepresentationofnational identityis

underminedanddismantledonlinebyordinarypeople.

Alternative versions of nationhood (see Mpofu 2014a, 2016) suggest that

monuments like the Heroes’ Acre and national holidays ‘rather than being sites of

consensus building ... [have] become contested terrains’which are not passive visual

statements,butactive‘elementsinapublicdiscoursedefinition’(Osborne2001,17–18).

Thesecontestationshaveledtodefinitions(andredefinitions)ofwhatitmeanstobea

heroorevenaZimbabwean.

Ethnicityandheroism

The 1980s, Zimbabwean state and nation formation was hampered by the yet‐to‐be

addressedissueoftribaltensionsthatcharacterisedtheliberationmovement.Ethnicity

hasbeen,foralongtime,‘notmerelyanemptyidentitymarkerofidentity,butavalue‐

ladenpoliticaltoolthatinfluencespoliticallifeinZimbabwe’(Mpofu2013,116).Entry

intostatepowerandcontrol,accordingtosomecitizensparticipatinginsocialandonline

media debates, are tilted in favour of the dominant Shona (who are characterised by

intra‐ethnictensions)(Mpofu2014).Currently,theZimbabweannationalprojectstands

asa‘permanentlystained…clothofpostcolonialnationalism(Worby1998,566),owing

to the 1980s genocide which claimed well in excess of 20 0000 mainly isiNdebele‐

speaking people, who were seen by Mugabe as supporters of his opponent, Joshua

Nkomo. This, in a way, informs myths on national insiders (Shona) and outsiders

(Ndebele).Thus,ethnicityhasmadenationalherodeterminationdebatesmorecomplex.

Therearesuggestionsincitizenjournalists’debatesthatethnicityinfluencedthedenial

ofherostatustoLookoutMasuku,aformerZIPRAmilitarycommanderwhomZANU‐PF

19 

believed to be an architect of the dissident insurgency of the 1980s. JoshuaNkomo’s

assertion that ‘political and ethnic grounds’ (Kriger 1995, 153) were used to deny

Masukuthatstatuslendscredencetotheargument.Further,thegrandnarrativeofthe

liberationstruggleprivilegesZANU‐PF(andmainlytheShonaethnicgroup’sversionsof

events)creatingthemyththatShonasandZANU‐PFliberatedZimbabwe.Thismythwas

advancedbyZANU‐PFarguingthat‘duringthewar…ZAPUwaswithholdingguerrillas

fromthebattlefield’(ibid,151)andpost‐independencewithholdingthemfromjoining

thearmy,hencetheyoperatedasdissidents.

Ake(1963,3)arguesthatinmostAfricancountriesnationalismhasmutatedinto

‘politicalethnicitywhenthenationalistmovement,whichwasunitedmainlybycommon

grievances, started to disintegrate on the verge of independence as its leaders

manoeuvredtoinheritpower’.Thesemovementswerecharacterisedbyethnictensions

anda lackof intra‐groupcohesion,astheyconsistof ideologicallyopposedsub‐ethnic

groups. In the absence of a larger body of scholarly writing, many possible and

unconfirmedinterpretationsofhowethnicityinformsnationalheroismarediscussedin

onlinemedia.Eventhoughtheveracityofsomediscussionscannotbeascertained,itis

important to considerdiscourses fromordinary citizens as a cognitiveprism through

whichtheydiscursivelyengagewithoneanotherandwiththoseinpower.

OnlinedebatessuggestanawarenessthatethnicityisonecriteriathatZANU‐PF

allegedlyusestoconferherostatus.Althoughcontestable,afewcasessufficetohighlight

argumentsthatvalidatethisassertion.MethuseliMoyo,arevivedZAPUspokesman(now

with Joice Mujuru’s newly formed People First opposition party) wrote in

Newzimbabwe.com (March 8 2011) after the death of Thenjiwe Lesabe: ‘Lesabe’s

passing‐onalsobrought intoperspectiveZANU‐PF’s slideback toGukurahundimode,

which says there canbenoheroes in ZAPU,worse if they areNdebele likeThenjiwe

Lesabe…ZANU‐PFdemonstratedthisthroughdenyingLesabeheroinestatus’.

InresponsetoMethuseliMoyo’sopinionpiece,JJ(March82011)wrotethatthe

selectionofheroes

ispartisanandtribal.ZAPUisthefirstpoliticalpartytobebraveenoughtoopenlytalk

aboutthis…[thereisneedfor]condemningtheprivatizingofthenationalheroessystem

inZimbabwe...ifyouwant…guarantee[of]beingaZimbabwenationalhero,youhaveto

20 

beinnoorder;1‐Shona,2‐ZANU,3‐Athug.ThemostimportantoftheseisbeingaShona

ofcourse.

The line of argument pursued here, is that ethnicity and party loyalty are the only

credentialsusedtodeterminewhocanbeburiedatthenationalshrine.Further,JJargues

thatZANU‐PFhasadulteratedthedefinitionofahero,bybasingitonethniclines:

LesabeisnotthefirstnationalherowhofitsthecriteriaNOTtobeaZimbabweannational

hero.ThecriteriaNOTtobeanationalheroinnospecificorderisthat1‐Youhavetobe

part of ZAPU; 2‐You have to be Ndebele. Being one of these is bad, being both

GUARANTEES that you are not a national hero. There are countless examples of this;

GibsonSibanda(ZAPU&ndebele),LookoutMasuku(ZAPU&Ndebele),ThenjiweLesabe

(ZAPU&Ndebele)...Thelististoolong.(ibid.)

JJthusaddressescertaintaboo/sensitiveissuesinAfricanpolitics–matterstodowith

ethnicityarecriminalisedandrarelydiscussedinZimbabwe’spublicmedia.Mostpost‐

colonial ethnically diverse countries would rather promote national identity at the

expenseofethnicidentity.BeingZANU‐PFisconflatedwithbeingShona,byseemingly

NdebelediscussantslikeJJ.Again,useofwordslike‘you’hasadifferentmeaningfrom

thewayTsitsiMaguvazuses‘our’‘we’and‘us’.The‘you’inJJ’spostisspecifictoaNdebele

ethnicin‐grouporsubnationalgroup.Thisdemonstratesthefluidityofidentitiesandthe

tensionsinvolvedatdifferentstages.Sometimesethnicdebatesbecomecombustiveboth

on‐ and offline,with protestations of discrimination againstNdebele‐speaking people

andtheirregions.Whendiscussedonline,ethnicitybecomesa touchysubject,causing

discussantslikebBenBowntoarguethatsomethingsshouldnotbesaidbecausethey

aredivisive.InacommentBenBownstates:

@JJ,CanyoustoptalkingaboutShonaandNdebelesinsuchdifferentlight....theseare

peoplewhoarecountrymenandwomen.Jesus!Ihavelookedateachoneofyourpostings

anditsallabouthowbadtheShonasare,pleasespareus!Whynottalkaboutimminent

issues like sanctions on Zimbabwe, Tsvangirai, Mugabe etc ... that is less divisive.

(Newzimbabwe.com,March8,2011)

21 

Here, ben bown suggests that ethnic particularism and the institutionalisation of

differencesperpetuateconflictanddivision.Theappealtospeakaboutissuesthataffect

Zimbabwe, rather than about ethnicity, seems to suggest that since ethnicity is

constructed it can be reconstructed into new shared ‘consociational forms’, while

overlookingtheextentofsuchreconstructions(NangleandClancy2012).

CONCLUDINGREMARKS

Fromthe foregoing it is clear thatcitizen journalismhasempoweredordinarypeople

basedbothinthehomelandandthediasporawithavoiceandaccesstoalternativepublic

sphereswheretheyengagewiththemedia,thoseinpowerandothers.Suchinteractions

keepcertaintopicsonthepublicagenda,sincetheyareofinteresttopeopleinthehost

country, or even internationally. Citizens’ participation in identity debates by using

alternativespaces‘illustratesthatordinarypeoplehavestrong,long‐standingopinions

aboutthefutureofthenationandnationalidentityandwillexpresstheiropinionswhen

anoutlet isprovidedtothem’(Kaftan2013,167).Thisoutlet isnotavailabletomany

poor Zimbabweans, however, who rely on radio. Moreover, contrary to Appadurai’s

(1996) and Hobsbawn’s (1990) arguments, modernity, technological advances,

globalisationandthemassmovementofpeoplehavenotunderminednationalaffections,

but have rathermade it possible for people to participate in important debates. This

assertion complements global scholarship which abounds with case studies on how

technologicaldevelopments(internetanditsenablingtechnologies)challengethenotion

that the territorial integrityof anationequals cohesivenational identity (Chan2005;

Eriksen2007;Everad2000;Sheyholislami2008,2011).Instead,citizenjournalismand

participationindebatesaroundmonumentsandheroesshowhownewmediaareused

astoolstoexpressthepublic’sideasontheconflictualritualsofnationalidentitymaking.

Thisarticlehashighlighted theproblemsassociatedwithauthoritarianandpolitically

self‐serving narratives and the use of monuments like the Heroes’ Acre. ZANU‐PF’s

heightenedandexclusiveappropriationofthesesymbolsastoolsforpoliticalsurvival

cameatatimeofmassdissent,sanctionsandintrapartyfriction.Tomaintainpolitical

hegemony,ZANU‐PFhasused,amongotherthings,suchmonumentsandrecognitions.

However, new media give people a platform to deconstruct ZANU‐PF’s imagined

nationhood.Citizenjournalists’debateslargelydemonstratethe‘nationalinterest’,while

ZANU‐PFadvancesaprovincialandpoliticalself‐servingnationalistagendatoensureits

22 

politicalsurvival,morethananythingelse.Yes,somedebatesweresupportiveofZANU‐

PF’sconstructionsofidentityintheonlinemediastudied.Itisaweaknessofthisarticle

that,duetospaceconstraintsandtheparticularlineoffocus,thosesentimentssupportive

ofZANU‐PF’sconfigurationsofnationalidentity,usingtheHeroes’Acreandheroes,could

notbeentertained.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

Iamparticularlygratefultotheanonymousreviewersfortheirhelpfulcommentsonan

earlierdraftofthisarticle,whichhelpedmeaddnewdimensionsandclarifysomeaspects

thatIhadinitiallytakenforgranted.

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