Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 21943 September 15, 1924ASKAY,plaintiff-appellant,vs.FERNANDO A. COSALAN,defendant-appellee.A. de Guzman for appellant.Camus & Delgado and Pio Duran for appellee.MALCOLM,J.:The plaintiff in this case is Askay, an illiterateIgorrotebetween 70 and 80 years of age, residing in the municipal district of Tublay, Province of Benguet, who at various time has been the owner of mining property. The defendant is Fernando A. Cosalan, the nephew by marriage of Askay, and municipal president of Tublay, who likewise has been interested along with his uncle in mining enterprises.About 1907, Askay obtained title to the Pet Kel Mineral Claim located in Tublay, Benguet. On November 23, 1914, if we are to accept defendant's Exhibit 1, Askay sold this claim to Cosalan. Nine years later, in 1923, Askay instituted action in the Court of First Instance of Benguet to have the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim adhered null, to secure possession of the mineral claim, and to obtain damages from the defendant in the amount of P10,500. Following the presentation of various pleadings including the answer of the defendant, and following trial before Judge of First Instance Harvey, judgment was rendered dismissing the complaint and absolving the defendant from the same, with costs against the plaintiff. On being informed of the judgment of the trial court, plaintiff attacked it on two grounds: The first, jurisdiction, and the second, formal. Both motions were denied and an appeal was perfected.Two questions are suggested by the assignments of error. The first is whether Judge George R. Harvey had jurisdiction to try the case. The second is whether the plaintiff has established his cause of action by a preponderance of the evidence.I. On April 16, 1923, as appears from the Official Gazette, the Secretary of Justice authorized and instructed the Honorable George R. Harvey, Judge of First Instance of the Ninth Judicial District, to hold a special term of court in the City of Baguio, Mountain Province, beginning May 2, 1923. (Administrative Order No. 43, 21 Off. Gaz., p. 893.) Acting under the authority granted by the order of the Secretary of Justice, Judge Harvey proceeded to hear the case of Askay vs. Cosalan, without protest from anyone until after an adverse decision for the plaintiff and until after Judge Harvey had left the district.The point which plaintiff now presses is that Act No. 3107, amendatory of section 155 of the Administrative Code, which authorizes a Judge of First Instance to be detailed by the Secretary of Justice to temporary duty, for a period which shall in no case exceed six months, in a district or province other than his own, for the purpose of trying all kinds of cases, excepting criminal and election cases, was not in force until fifteen days after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, or not until August 3, 1923. Plaintiff relies on section 11 of the Administrative Code, which in part reads: "A statute passed by the Philippine Legislature shall,in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette, the date of issue being excluded."Now turning to Act No. 3107, its final section provides that "This Act shall take effect on its approval." The Act was approved on March 17, 1923. Obviously, therefore, there being a special provision in Act No. 3107, it applies to the exclusion of the general provision contained in the Administrative Code.Recalling, therefore, that Act No. 3107 went into effect on March, 17, 1923, and that it was subsequent thereto, on April 16, 1923, that Judge Harvey was authorized to hold court at Baguio, beginning with May 2, 1923, appellant's argument along this line is found to be without persuasive merit. We pass to the material issue which is one of fact.II. Plaintiff contends that the sale of the Pet Kel Mineral Claim was accomplished through fraud and deceit on the part of the defendant. Plaintiff may be right but in our judgment he has failed to established his claim. Fraud must be both alleged and proved.One facts exists in plaintiff's favor, and this is the age and ignorance of the plaintiff who could be easily duped by the defendant, a man of greater intelligence. Another fact is the inadequacy of the consideration for the transfer which, according to the conveyance, consisted of P1 and other valuable consideration, and which, according to the oral testimony, in reality consisted of P107 in cash, a bill fold, one sheet, one cow, and two carabaos. Gross inadequacy naturally suggests fraud and is some evidence thereof, so that it may be sufficient to show it when taken in connection with other circumstances, such as ignorance or the fact that one of the parties has an advantage over the other. But the fact that the bargain was a hard one, coupled with mere inadequacy of price when both parties are in a position to form an independent judgment concerning the transaction, is not a sufficient ground for the cancellation of a contract.Against the plaintiff and in favor of the defendant, we have the document itself executed in the presence of witnesses and before a notary public and filed with the mining recorder. The notary public, Nicanor Sison, and one of the attesting witnesses, Apolonio Ramos, testified to the effect that in the presence of the plaintiff and the defendant and of the notary public and the subscribing witnesses, the deed of sale was interpreted to the plaintiff and that thereupon he placed his thumb mark on the document. Two finger print experts, Dr. Charles S. Banks and A. Simkus, have declared in depositions that the thumb mark on Exhibit 1 is that of Askay. No less than four other witnesses testified that at various times Askay had admitted to them that he had sold the Pet Kel Mine to Fernando A. Cosalan.Having in mind all of these circumstances, how can the plaintiff expect the courts to nullify the deed of sale on mere suspicion? Having waited nine years from the date when the deed was executed, nine years from the time Fernando A. Cosalan started developing the mine, nine years from the time Askay himself had been deprived of the possession of the mine, and nine years permitting of a third party to obtain a contract of lease from Cosalan, how can this court overlook plaintiff's silent acquiescence in the legal rights of the defendant? On the facts of record, the trial judge could have done nothing less than dismiss the action.We conclude therefore, that Judge Harvey had jurisdiction to try this case, that his findings of fact are in accordance with the evidence, that no prejudicial error was committed in the trial, and that the complaint was properly dismissed. As a result, judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellant. So ordered.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-14283 November 29, 1960GIL BALBUNA, ET AL.,petitioners-appellants,vs.THE HON. SECRETARY OF EDUCATION, ET AL.,respondents-appellees.K. V. Faylona and Juan B. Soliven for appellants.Office of the Solicitor General Edilberto Barot and Solicitor Ceferino Padua for appellees.REYES, J.B.L.,J.:Appeal by members of the "Jehovah's Witnesses" from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Capiz, dated June 23, 1958, dismissing their petition for prohibition and mandamus against the Secretary of Education and the other respondents.The action was brought to enjoin the enforcement of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, issued by the Secretary of Education, promulgating rules and regulations for the conduct of the compulsory flag ceremony in all schools, as provided in Republic Act No. 1265. Petitioners appellants assail the validity of the above Department Order, for it allegedly denies them freedom of worship and of speech guaranteed by the Bill of Rights; that it denies them due process of law and the equal protection of the laws; and that it unduly restricts their rights in the upbringing of their children. Since the brief for the petitioners-appellants assails Republic Act No. 1265 only as construed and applied, the issue ultimately boils down the validity of Department Order No. 8, s. 1955, which promulgated the rules and regulations for the implementation of the law.This case, therefore, is on all fours withGerona, et al., vs. Secretary of Education, et al., 106 Phil., 2; 57 Off. Gaz., (5) 820, also involving Jehovah's Witnesses, and assailing, on practically identical grounds, the validity of the same Department Order above-mentioned. This Court discerns no reasons for changing its stand therein, where we said:In conclusion, we find and hold that the Filipino flag is not an image that requires religious veneration; rather, it is a symbol of the Republic of the Philippines, of sovereignty, an emblem of freedom, liberty and national unity; that the flag salute is not a religious ceremony but an act and profession of love and allegiance and pledge of loyalty to the fatherland which the flag stands for; that by the authority of the Legislature of the Secretary of Education was duly authorized to promulgate Department Order No. 8, series of 1955; that the requirement of observance of the flag ceremony, or salute provided for in said Department Order No. 8 does not violate the Constitutional provisions about freedom of religion and exercise of religion; that compliance with the non-discriminatory and reasonable rules and regulations and school discipline, including observance of the flag ceremony, is a prerequisite to attendance in public schools; and that for failure and refusal to participate in the flag ceremony, petitioners were properly excluded and dismissed from the public school they were attending.However, in their memorandum, petitioners-appellants raise the new issue that that Department Order No. 8 has no binding force and effect, not having been published in the Official Gazette as allegedly required by Commonwealth Act 638, Article 2 of the New Civil Code, and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code. We see no merit in this contention. The assailed Department Order, being addressed only to the Directors of Public and Private Schools, and educational institutions under their supervision, can not be said to be of general application. Moreover, as observed in People vs. QuePo Lay, 94 Phil., 640; 50 Off. Gaz., (10) 4850 (affirmed in Lim Hoa Tingvs. Central Bank, 104 Phil., 573; 55 Off. Gaz., [6] 1006), the laws in question (Commonwealth Act 638 and Act 2930) do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations or notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, regulations, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be published shall be published in the Official Gazette but said two laws do not say that unless so published they will be of no force and effect. In other words, said two acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the government issuing the same, and of the Bureau of Printing.It is true, as held in the above cases, that pursuant to Article 2 of the New Civil Code and Section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code, statutes or laws shall take effect fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless otherwise provided. It is likewise true that administrative rules and regulations, issued to implement a law, have the force of law. Nevertheless, the cases cited above involved circulars of the Central Bank which provided for penalties for violations thereof and that was the primary factor that influenced therationaleof those decisions. In the case at bar, Department Order No. 8 does not provide any penalty against those pupils or students refusing to participate in the flag ceremony or otherwise violating the provisions of said order. Their expulsion was merely the consequence of their failure to observe school discipline which the school authorities are bound to maintain. As observed in Gerona vs. Secretary of Education,supra,... for their failure or refusal to obey school regulations about the flag salute, they were not being prosecuted. Neither were they being criminally prosecuted under threat of penal sanction. If they choose not to obey the flag salute regulation, they merely lost the benefits of public education being maintained at the expense of their fellow citizens, nothing more. Having elected not to comply with the regulations about the flag salute, they forfeited their right to attend public schools.Finally, appellants contend that Republic Act No. 1265 is unconstitutional and void for being an undue delegations of legislative power, "for its failure to lay down any specific and definite standard by which the Secretary of Education may be guided in the preparation of those rules and regulations which he has been authorized to promulgate." With this view we again disagree. Sections 1 and 2 of the Act read as follows:Section 1. All educational institutions shall henceforth, observed daily flag ceremony, which shall be simple and dignified and shall include the playing or singing of the Philippine National Anthem.Section 2. The Secretary of Education is hereby authorized and directed to issue or cause to be issued rules and regulations for the proper conduct of the flag ceremony herein provide.In our opinion, the requirements above-quoted constitute an adequate standard, to wit, simplicity and dignity of the flag ceremony and the singing of the National Anthem specially when contrasted with other standards heretofore upheld by the Courts: "public interest"(Peoplevs. Rosenthal, 68 Phil. 328); "public welfare" (Municipality of Cardona vs. Binangonan, 36 Phil. 547); Interest of law and order"(Rubivs. Provincial Board, 39 Phil., 669; justice and equity and the substantial merits of the case" (Int. Hardwoodvs. Pagil Federation of Labor, 70 Phil. 602); or "adequate and efficient instruction" (P.A.C.U.vs. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil., 806; 51 Off. Gaz., 6230). That the Legislature did not specify the details of the flag ceremony is no objection to the validity of the statute, for all that is required of it is the laying down of standards and policy that will limit the discretion of the regulatory agency. To require the statute to establish in detail the manner of exercise of the delegated power would be to destroy the administrative flexibility that the delegation is intended to achieve.Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed. Costs against petitioner-appellants.Paras, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Barrera, Gutierrez David, Paredes, and Dizon, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-6791 March 29, 1954THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee,vs.QUE PO LAY,defendant-appellant.Prudencio de Guzman for appellant.First Assistant Solicitor General Ruperto Kapunan, Jr., and Solicitor Lauro G. Marquez for appellee.MONTEMAYOR,J.:Que Po Lay is appealing from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with section 34 of Republic Act No. 265, and sentencing him to suffer six months imprisonment, to pay a fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.The charge was that the appellant who was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of U.S. dollars, U.S. checks and U.S. money orders amounting to about $7,000 failed to sell the same to the Central Bank through its agents within one day following the receipt of such foreign exchange as required by Circular No. 20. the appeal is based on the claim that said circular No. 20 was not published in the Official Gazette prior to the act or omission imputed to the appellant, and that consequently, said circular had no force and effect. It is contended that Commonwealth Act. No., 638 and Act 2930 both require said circular to be published in the Official Gazette, it being an order or notice of general applicability. The Solicitor General answering this contention says that Commonwealth Act. No. 638 and 2930 do not require the publication in the Official Gazette of said circular issued for the implementation of a law in order to have force and effect.We agree with the Solicitor General that the laws in question do not require the publication of the circulars, regulations and notices therein mentioned in order to become binding and effective. All that said two laws provide is that laws, resolutions, decisions of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals, notices and documents required by law to be of no force and effect. In other words, said two Acts merely enumerate and make a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette, presumably, for the guidance of the different branches of the Government issuing same, and of the Bureau of Printing.However, section 11 of the Revised Administrative Code provides that statutes passed by Congress shall, in the absence of special provision, take effect at the beginning of the fifteenth day after the completion of the publication of the statute in the Official Gazette. Article 2 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) equally provides that laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. It is true that Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank is not a statute or law but being issued for the implementation of the law authorizing its issuance, it has the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence. (See U.S.vs.Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil., 119 and authorities cited therein.) Moreover, as a rule, circulars and regulations especially like the Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank in question which prescribes a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective, this, on the general principle and theory that before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specifically informed of said contents and its penalties.Our Old Civil code, ( Spanish Civil Code of 1889) has a similar provision about the effectivity of laws, (Article 1 thereof), namely, that laws shall be binding twenty days after their promulgation, and that their promulgation shall be understood as made on the day of the termination of the publication of the laws in the Gazette. Manresa, commenting on this article is of the opinion that the word "laws" include regulations and circulars issued in accordance with the same. He says:El Tribunal Supremo, ha interpretado el articulo 1. del codigo Civil en Sentencia de 22 de Junio de 1910, en el sentido de que bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien losReglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones,Circularesy Reales ordenes dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad. Tambien el poder ejecutivo lo ha venido entendiendo asi, como lo prueba el hecho de que muchas de sus disposiciones contienen la advertencia de que empiezan a regir el mismo dia de su publicacion en la Gaceta, advertencia que seria perfectamente inutil si no fuera de aplicacion al caso el articulo 1.o del Codigo Civil. (Manresa, Codigo Civil Espaol, Vol. I. p. 52).In the present case, although circular No. 20 of the Central Bank was issued in the year 1949, it was not published until November 1951, that is, about 3 months after appellant's conviction of its violation. It is clear that said circular, particularly its penal provision, did not have any legal effect and bound no one until its publication in the Official Gazzette or after November 1951. In other words, appellant could not be held liable for its violation, for it was not binding at the time he was found to have failed to sell the foreign exchange in his possession thereof.But the Solicitor General also contends that this question of non-publication of the Circular is being raised for the first time on appeal in this Court, which cannot be done by appellant. Ordinarily, one may raise on appeal any question of law or fact that has been raised in the court below and which is within the issues made by the parties in their pleadings. (Section 19, Rule 48 of the Rules of Court). But the question of non-publication is fundamental and decisive. If as a matter of fact Circular No. 20 had not been published as required by law before its violation, then in the eyes of the law there was no such circular to be violated and consequently appellant committed no violation of the circular or committed any offense, and the trial court may be said to have had no jurisdiction. This question may be raised at any stage of the proceeding whether or not raised in the court below.In view of the foregoing, we reverse the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costsde oficio.Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Diokno, JJ.,concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-63915 April 24, 1985LORENZO M. TAADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. [MABINI],petitioners,vs.HON. JUAN C. TUVERA, in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON. JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President , MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, in his capacity as Director, Malacaang Records Office, and FLORENDO S. PABLO, in his capacity as Director, Bureau of Printing,respondents.ESCOLIN,J.:Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution,1as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and administrative orders.Specifically, the publication of the following presidential issuances is sought:a] Presidential Decrees Nos. 12, 22, 37, 38, 59, 64, 103, 171, 179, 184, 197, 200, 234, 265, 286, 298, 303, 312, 324, 325, 326, 337, 355, 358, 359, 360, 361, 368, 404, 406, 415, 427, 429, 445, 447, 473, 486, 491, 503, 504, 521, 528, 551, 566, 573, 574, 594, 599, 644, 658, 661, 718, 731, 733, 793, 800, 802, 835, 836, 923, 935, 961, 1017-1030, 1050, 1060-1061, 1085, 1143, 1165, 1166, 1242, 1246, 1250, 1278, 1279, 1300, 1644, 1772, 1808, 1810, 1813-1817, 1819-1826, 1829-1840, 1842-1847.b] Letter of Instructions Nos.: 10, 39, 49, 72, 107, 108, 116, 130, 136, 141, 150, 153, 155, 161, 173, 180, 187, 188, 192, 193, 199, 202, 204, 205, 209, 211-213, 215-224, 226-228, 231-239, 241-245, 248, 251, 253-261, 263-269, 271-273, 275-283, 285-289, 291, 293, 297-299, 301-303, 309, 312-315, 325, 327, 343, 346, 349, 357, 358, 362, 367, 370, 382, 385, 386, 396-397, 405, 438-440, 444- 445, 473, 486, 488, 498, 501, 399, 527, 561, 576, 587, 594, 599, 600, 602, 609, 610, 611, 612, 615, 641, 642, 665, 702, 712-713, 726, 837-839, 878-879, 881, 882, 939-940, 964,997,1149-1178,1180-1278.c] General Orders Nos.: 14, 52, 58, 59, 60, 62, 63, 64 & 65.d] Proclamation Nos.: 1126, 1144, 1147, 1151, 1196, 1270, 1281, 1319-1526, 1529, 1532, 1535, 1538, 1540-1547, 1550-1558, 1561-1588, 1590-1595, 1594-1600, 1606-1609, 1612-1628, 1630-1649, 1694-1695, 1697-1701, 1705-1723, 1731-1734, 1737-1742, 1744, 1746-1751, 1752, 1754, 1762, 1764-1787, 1789-1795, 1797, 1800, 1802-1804, 1806-1807, 1812-1814, 1816, 1825-1826, 1829, 1831-1832, 1835-1836, 1839-1840, 1843-1844, 1846-1847, 1849, 1853-1858, 1860, 1866, 1868, 1870, 1876-1889, 1892, 1900, 1918, 1923, 1933, 1952, 1963, 1965-1966, 1968-1984, 1986-2028, 2030-2044, 2046-2145, 2147-2161, 2163-2244.e] Executive Orders Nos.: 411, 413, 414, 427, 429-454, 457- 471, 474-492, 494-507, 509-510, 522, 524-528, 531-532, 536, 538, 543-544, 549, 551-553, 560, 563, 567-568, 570, 574, 593, 594, 598-604, 609, 611- 647, 649-677, 679-703, 705-707, 712-786, 788-852, 854-857.f] Letters of Implementation Nos.: 7, 8, 9, 10, 11-22, 25-27, 39, 50, 51, 59, 76, 80-81, 92, 94, 95, 107, 120, 122, 123.g] Administrative Orders Nos.: 347, 348, 352-354, 360- 378, 380-433, 436-439.The respondents, through the Solicitor General, would have this case dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners have no legal personality or standing to bring the instant petition. The view is submitted that in the absence of any showing that petitioners are personally and directly affected or prejudiced by the alleged non-publication of the presidential issuances in question2said petitioners are without the requisite legal personality to institute this mandamus proceeding, they are not being "aggrieved parties" within the meaning of Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which we quote:SEC. 3. Petition for Mandamus.When any tribunal, corporation, board or person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes another from the use a rd enjoyment of a right or office to which such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the defendant, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be done to Protect the rights of the petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the defendant.Upon the other hand, petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.The issue posed is not one of first impression. As early as the 1910 case ofSeverino vs. Governor General,3this Court held that while the general rule is that "a writ of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected, independent of that which he holds with the public at large," and "it is for the public officers exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved [Mithchell vs. Boardmen, 79 M.e., 469]," nevertheless, "when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws [High, Extraordinary Legal Remedies, 3rd ed., sec. 431].Thus, in said case, this Court recognized the relator Lope Severino, a private individual, as a proper party to the mandamus proceedings brought to compel the Governor General to call a special election for the position of municipal president in the town of Silay, Negros Occidental. Speaking for this Court, Mr. Justice Grant T. Trent said:We are therefore of the opinion that the weight of authority supports the proposition that the relator is a proper party to proceedings of this character when a public right is sought to be enforced. If the general rule in America were otherwise, we think that it would not be applicable to the case at bar for the reason 'that it is always dangerous to apply a general rule to a particular case without keeping in mind the reason for the rule, because, if under the particular circumstances the reason for the rule does not exist, the rule itself is not applicable and reliance upon the rule may well lead to error'No reason exists in the case at bar for applying the general rule insisted upon by counsel for the respondent. The circumstances which surround this case are different from those in the United States, inasmuch as if the relator is not a proper party to these proceedings no other person could be, as we have seen that it is not the duty of the law officer of the Government to appear and represent the people in cases of this character.The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen's legal personality in the aforementioned case apply squarely to the present petition. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by petitioners herein is a public right recognized by no less than the fundamental law of the land. If petitioners were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has entered his appearance for respondents in this case.Respondents further contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Article 2 of the Civil Code:Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...The interpretation given by respondent is in accord with this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions,4this Court has ruled that publication in the Official Gazette is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, which is the fifteenth day following its publication-but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect.Respondents' argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or which he may authorize so to be published. ...The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansaand for the diligent ones, ready access to the legislative recordsno such publicity accompanies the law-making process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos, Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such publication.The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or. the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.6It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said inPeralta vs. COMELEC7:In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication. The answer is all too familiar. In similar situations in the past this Court had taken the pragmatic and realistic course set forth inChicot County Drainage District vs. Baxter Bank8to wit:The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton v. Shelby County, 118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, 1. & L. Ry. Co. v. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559, 566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular conduct, private and official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly, of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its previous application, demand examination. These questions are among the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts, state and federal and it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified.Consistently with the above principle, this Court inRutter vs. Esteban9sustained the right of a party under the Moratorium Law, albeit said right had accrued in his favor before said law was declared unconstitutional by this Court.Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937 to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published.10Neither the subject matters nor the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available. But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. InPesigan vs. Angeles,11the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that "publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal] regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby. " The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.SO ORDERED.Relova, J., concurs.Aquino, J., took no part.Concepcion, Jr., J., is on leave.Separate OpinionsFERNANDO,C.J.,concurring (with qualification):There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.I shall explain why.1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.1I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.23. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all.3It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.4Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.5In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity.6In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.TEEHANKEE,J.,concurring:I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e.a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication.2To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity3would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itselfbeforethe completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.,concurring:I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.PLANA,J.,concurring (with qualification):The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere.*It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in theOfficial Gazetterequired by any statute asa prerequisite for their effectivity, ifsaid laws already provide for their effectivity date.Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,unless it is otherwise provided" Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition thatfor their effectivity,laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.GUTIERREZ, Jr.,J.,concurring:I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.DE LA FUENTE,J.,concurring:I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of a public nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.Separate OpinionsFERNANDO,C.J.,concurring (with qualification):There is on the whole acceptance on my part of the views expressed in the ably written opinion of Justice Escolin. I am unable, however, to concur insofar as it would unqualifiedly impose the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette for unpublished "presidential issuances" to have binding force and effect.I shall explain why.1. It is of course true that without the requisite publication, a due process question would arise if made to apply adversely to a party who is not even aware of the existence of any legislative or executive act having the force and effect of law. My point is that such publication required need not be confined to the Official Gazette. From the pragmatic standpoint, there is an advantage to be gained. It conduces to certainty. That is too be admitted. It does not follow, however, that failure to do so would in all cases and under all circumstances result in a statute, presidential decree or any other executive act of the same category being bereft of any binding force and effect. To so hold would, for me, raise a constitutional question. Such a pronouncement would lend itself to the interpretation that such a legislative or presidential act is bereft of the attribute of effectivity unless published in the Official Gazette. There is no such requirement in the Constitution as Justice Plana so aptly pointed out. It is true that what is decided now applies only to past "presidential issuances". Nonetheless, this clarification is, to my mind, needed to avoid any possible misconception as to what is required for any statute or presidential act to be impressed with binding force or effectivity.2. It is quite understandable then why I concur in the separate opinion of Justice Plana. Its first paragraph sets forth what to me is the constitutional doctrine applicable to this case. Thus: "The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere. It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected Parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise.1I am likewise in agreement with its closing paragraph: "In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.23. It suffices, as was stated by Judge Learned Hand, that law as the command of the government "must be ascertainable in some form if it is to be enforced at all.3It would indeed be to reduce it to the level of mere futility, as pointed out by Justice Cardozo, "if it is unknown and unknowable.4Publication, to repeat, is thus essential. What I am not prepared to subscribe to is the doctrine that it must be in the Official Gazette. To be sure once published therein there is the ascertainable mode of determining the exact date of its effectivity. Still for me that does not dispose of the question of what is the jural effect of past presidential decrees or executive acts not so published. For prior thereto, it could be that parties aware of their existence could have conducted themselves in accordance with their provisions. If no legal consequences could attach due to lack of publication in the Official Gazette, then serious problems could arise. Previous transactions based on such "Presidential Issuances" could be open to question. Matters deemed settled could still be inquired into. I am not prepared to hold that such an effect is contemplated by our decision. Where such presidential decree or executive act is made the basis of a criminal prosecution, then, of course, its ex post facto character becomes evident.5In civil cases though, retroactivity as such is not conclusive on the due process aspect. There must still be a showing of arbitrariness. Moreover, where the challenged presidential decree or executive act was issued under the police power, the non-impairment clause of the Constitution may not always be successfully invoked. There must still be that process of balancing to determine whether or not it could in such a case be tainted by infirmity.6In traditional terminology, there could arise then a question of unconstitutional application. That is as far as it goes.4. Let me make therefore that my qualified concurrence goes no further than to affirm that publication is essential to the effectivity of a legislative or executive act of a general application. I am not in agreement with the view that such publication must be in the Official Gazette. The Civil Code itself in its Article 2 expressly recognizes that the rule as to laws taking effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette is subject to this exception, "unless it is otherwise provided." Moreover, the Civil Code is itself only a legislative enactment, Republic Act No. 386. It does not and cannot have the juridical force of a constitutional command. A later legislative or executive act which has the force and effect of law can legally provide for a different rule.5. Nor can I agree with the rather sweeping conclusion in the opinion of Justice Escolin that presidential decrees and executive acts not thus previously published in the Official Gazette would be devoid of any legal character. That would be, in my opinion, to go too far. It may be fraught, as earlier noted, with undesirable consequences. I find myself therefore unable to yield assent to such a pronouncement.I am authorized to state that Justices Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas, and Alampay concur in this separate opinion.Makasiar, Abad Santos, Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.TEEHANKEE,J.,concurring:I concur with the main opinion of Mr. Justice Escolin and the concurring opinion of Mme. Justice Herrera. The Rule of Law connotes a body of norms and laws published and ascertainable and of equal application to all similarly circumstances and not subject to arbitrary change but only under certain set procedures. The Court has consistently stressed that "it is an elementary rule of fair play and justice that a reasonable opportunity to be informed must be afforded to the people who are commanded to obey before they can be punished for its violation,1citing the settled principle based on due process enunciated in earlier cases that "before the public is bound by its contents, especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published and the people officially and specially informed of said contents and its penalties.Without official publication in the Official Gazette as required by Article 2 of the Civil Code and the Revised Administrative Code, there would be no basis nor justification for the corollary rule of Article 3 of the Civil Code (based on constructive notice that the provisions of the law are ascertainable from the public and official repository where they are duly published) that "Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance therewith.Respondents' contention based on a misreading of Article 2 of the Civil Code that "only laws which are silent as to their effectivity [date] need be published in the Official Gazette for their effectivity" is manifestly untenable. The plain text and meaning of the Civil Code is that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,unless it is otherwise provided, " i.e.a different effectivity date is provided by the law itself. This proviso perforce refers to a law that has been duly published pursuant to the basic constitutional requirements of due process. The best example of this is the Civil Code itself: the same Article 2 provides otherwise that it "shall take effect [only] one year [not 15 days] after such publication.2To sustain respondents' misreading that "most laws or decrees specify the date of their effectivity and for this reason, publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary for their effectivity3would be to nullify and render nugatory the Civil Code's indispensable and essential requirement of prior publication in the Official Gazette by the simple expedient of providing for immediate effectivity or an earlier effectivity date in the law itselfbeforethe completion of 15 days following its publication which is the period generally fixed by the Civil Code for its proper dissemination.MELENCIO-HERRERA,J.,concurring:I agree. There cannot be any question but that even if a decree provides for a date of effectivity, it has to be published. What I would like to state in connection with that proposition is that when a date of effectivity is mentioned in the decree but the decree becomes effective only fifteen (15) days after its publication in the Official Gazette, it will not mean that the decree can have retroactive effect to the date of effectivity mentioned in the decree itself. There should be no retroactivity if the retroactivity will run counter to constitutional rights or shall destroy vested rights.PLANA,J.,concurring (with qualification):The Philippine Constitution does not require the publication of laws as a prerequisite for their effectivity, unlike some Constitutions elsewhere.*It may be said though that the guarantee of due process requires notice of laws to affected parties before they can be bound thereby; but such notice is not necessarily by publication in the Official Gazette. The due process clause is not that precise. Neither is the publication of laws in theOfficial Gazetterequired by any statute asa prerequisite for their effectivity, ifsaid laws already provide for their effectivity date.Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazette,unless it is otherwise provided" Two things may be said of this provision: Firstly, it obviously does not apply to a law with a built-in provision as to when it will take effect. Secondly, it clearly recognizes that each law may provide not only a different period for reckoning its effectivity date but also a different mode of notice. Thus, a law may prescribe that it shall be published elsewhere than in the Official Gazette.Commonwealth Act No. 638, in my opinion, does not support the proposition thatfor their effectivity,laws must be published in the Official Gazette. The said law is simply "An Act to Provide for the Uniform Publication and Distribution of the Official Gazette." Conformably therewith, it authorizes the publication of the Official Gazette, determines its frequency, provides for its sale and distribution, and defines the authority of the Director of Printing in relation thereto. It also enumerates what shall be published in the Official Gazette, among them, "important legislative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the Congress of the Philippines" and "all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except such as have no general applicability." It is noteworthy that not all legislative acts are required to be published in the Official Gazette but only "important" ones "of a public nature." Moreover, the said law does not provide that publication in the Official Gazette is essential for the effectivity of laws. This is as it should be, for all statutes are equal and stand on the same footing. A law, especially an earlier one of general application such as Commonwealth Act No. 638, cannot nullify or restrict the operation of a subsequent statute that has a provision of its own as to when and how it will take effect. Only a higher law, which is the Constitution, can assume that role.In fine, I concur in the majority decision to the extent that it requires notice before laws become effective, for no person should be bound by a law without notice. This is elementary fairness. However, I beg to disagree insofar as it holds that such notice shall be by publication in the Official Gazette.Cuevas and Alampay, JJ., concur.GUTIERREZ, Jr.,J.,concurring:I concur insofar as publication is necessary but reserve my vote as to the necessity of such publication being in the Official Gazette.DE LA FUENTE,J.,concurring:I concur insofar as the opinion declares the unpublished decrees and issuances of apublic nature or general applicability ineffective, until due publication thereof.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. L-6339 April 20, 1954MANUEL LARA, ET AL.,plaintiffs-appellants,vs.PETRONILO DEL ROSARIO, JR.,defendant-appellee.Manansala and Manansala for appellants.Ramon L. Resurreccion for appellee.MONTEMAYOR,J.:In 1950 defendant Petronilo del Rosario, Jr., owner of twenty-five taxi cabs or cars, operated a taxi business under the name of "Waval Taxi." He employed among others three mechanics and 49 chauffeurs or drivers, the latter having worked for periods ranging from 2 to 37 months. On September 4, 1950, without giving said mechanics and chauffeurs 30 days advance notice, Del Rosario sold his 25 units or cabs to La Mallorca, a transportation company, as a result of which, according to the mechanics and chauffeurs above-mentioned they lost their jobs because the La Mallorca failed to continue them in their employment. They brought this action against Del Rosario to recover compensation for overtime work rendered beyond eight hours and on Sundays and legal holidays, and one month salary (mesada) provided for in article 302 of the Code of Commerce because the failure of their former employer to give them one month notice. Subsequently, the three mechanics unconditionally withdrew their claims. So only the 49 drivers remained as plaintiffs. The defendant filed a motion for dismissal of the complaint on the ground that it stated no cause of action and the trial court for the time being denied the motion saying that it will be considered when the case was heard on the merits. After trial the complaint was dismissed. Plaintiffs appealed from the order of dismissal to the Court of Appeals which Tribunal after finding only questions of law are involved, certified the case to us.The parties are agreed that the plaintiffs as chauffeurs received no fixed compensation based on the hours or the period of time that they worked. Rather, they were paid on the commission basis, that is to say, each driver received 20 per cent of the gross returns or earnings from the operation of his taxi cab. Plaintiffs claim that as a rule, each drive operated a taxi 12 hours a day with gross earnings ranging from P20 to P25, receiving therefrom the corresponding 20 per cent share ranging from P4 to P5, and that in some cases, especially during Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays when a driver worked 24 hours a day he grossed from P40 to P50, thereby receiving a share of from P8 to P10 for the period of twenty-four hours.The reason given by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is that the defendant being engaged in the taxi or transportation business which is a public utility, came under the exception provided by the Eight-Hour Labor Law (Commonwealth Act No. 444); and because plaintiffs did not work on a salary basis, that is to say, they had no fixed or regular salary or remuneration other than the 20 per cent of their gross earnings "their situation was therefore practically similar to piece workers and hence, outside the ambit of article 302 of the Code of Commerce."For purposes of reference we are reproducing the pertinent provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law, namely, sections 1 to 4.SECTION 1. The legal working day for any person employed by another shall not be more than eight hours daily. When the work is not continuous, the time during which the laborer is not working and can leave his working place and can rest completely shall not be counted.SEC. 2. This Act shall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with the exception of farm laborers, laborers who prefer to be paid on piece work basis, domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the employer working for him.SEC. 3. Work may be performed beyond eight hours a day in case of actual or impending emergencies, caused by serious accidents, fire flood, typhoon, earthquakes, epidemic, or other disaster or calamity in order to prevent loss of life and property or imminent danger to public safety; or in case of urgent work to be performed on the machines, equipment, or installations in order to avoid a serious loss which the employer would otherwise suffer, or some other just cause of a similar nature; but in all cases the laborers and the employees shall be entitled to receive compensation for the overtime work performed at the same rate as their regular wages or salary, plus at least twenty-five per centum additional.In case of national emergency the Government is empowered to establish rules and regulations for the operation of the plants and factories and to determine the wages to be paid the laborers.SEC. 4. No person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place or center of work shall compel an employee or laborer to work during Sundays and legal holidays, unless he is paid an additional sum of at least twenty-five per centum of his regular remuneration:Provided however,That this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing some public service such as supplying gas, electricity, power, water, or providing means of transportation or communication.Under section 4, as a public utility, the defendant could have his chauffeurs work on Sundays and legal holidays without paying them an additional sum of at least 25 per cent of their regular remuneration: but that with reference only to work performed on Sundays and holidays. If the work done on such days exceeds 8 hours a day, then the Eight-Hour Labor Law would operate, provided of course that plaintiffs came under section 2 of the said law. So that the question to be decided here is whether or not plaintiffs are entitled to extra compensation for work performed in excess of 8 hours a day, Sundays and holidays included.It will be noticed that the last part of section 3 of Commonwealth Act 444 provides for extra compensation for over-time work "at the same rate as theirregular wages or salary,plus at least twenty-five per centum additional'" and that section 2 of the same act excludes application thereof laborers who preferred to be onpiece work basis.This connotes that a laborer or employee with no fixed salary, wages or remuneration but receiving as compensation from his employer uncertain and variable amount depending upon the work done or the result of said work (piece work) irrespective of the amount of time employed, is not covered by the Eight-Hour Labor Law and is not entitled to extra compensation should he work in excess of 8 hours a day. And this seems to be the condition of employment of the plaintiffs. A driver in the taxi business of the defendant, like the plaintiffs, in one day could operate his taxi cab eight hours, or less than eight hours or in excess of 8 hours, or even 24 hours on Saturdays, Sundays, and holidays, with no limit or restriction other than his desire, inclination and state of health and physical endurance. He could drive continuously or intermittently, systematically or haphazardly, fast or slow, etc. depending upon his exclusive wish or inclination. One day when he feels strong, active and enthusiastic he works long, continuously, with diligence and industry and makes considerable gross returns and receives as much as his 20 per cent commission. Another day when he feels despondent, run down, weak or lazy and wants to rest between trips and works for less number of hours, his gross returns are less and so is his commission. In other words, his compensation for the day depends upon the result of his work, which in turn depends on the amount of industry, intelligence and experience applied to it, rather than the period of time employed. In short, he has no fixed salary or wages. In this we agree with the learned trial court presided by Judge Felicisimo Ocampo which makes the following findings and observations of this point.. . . As already stated, their earnings were in the form of commission based on the gross receipts of the day. Their participation in most cases depended upon their own industry. So much so that the more hours they stayed on the road, the greater the gross returns and the higher their commissions. They have no fixed hours of labor. They can retire at pleasure, they not being paid a fixed salary on the hourly, daily, weekly or monthly basis.It results that the working hours of the plaintiffs as taxi drivers were entirely characterized by its irregularity, as distinguished from the specific regular remuneration predicated on specific and regular hours of work of factories and commercial employees.In the case of the plaintiffs, it is the result of their labor, not the labor itself, which determines their commissions. They worked under no compulsion of turning a fixed income for each given day. . . ..In an opinion dated June 1, 1939 (Opinion No. 115) modified by Opinion No. 22, series 1940, dated June 11, 1940, the Secretary of Justice held that chauffeurs of the Manila Yellow Taxicab Co. who "observed in a loose way certain working hours daily," and "the time they report for work as well as the time they leave work was left to their discretion.," receiving no fixed salary but only 20 per cent of their gross earnings, may be considered as piece workers and therefore not covered by the provisions of the Eight-Hour Labor Law.The Wage Administration Service of the Department of Labor in its Interpretative Bulletin No. 2 dated May 28, 1953, under "Overtime Compensation," in section 3 thereof entitled Coverage, says:The provisions of this bulletin onovertime compensationshall apply to all persons employed in any industry or occupation, whether public or private, with theexceptionof farm laborers, non-agricultural laborers or employees who are paid on piece work, contract, pakiao, task orcommission basis,domestic servants and persons in the personal service of another and members of the family of the employer working for him.From all this, to us it is clear that the claim of the plaintiffs-appellants for overtime compensation under the Eight-Hour Labor Law has no valid support.As to the month pay (mesada) under article 302 of the Code of Commerce, article 2270 of the new Civil Code (Republic Act 386) appears to have repealed said Article 302 when it repealed the provisions of the Code of Commerce governing Agency. This repeal took place on August 30, 1950, when the new Civil Code went into effect, that is, one year after its publication in theOfficial Gazette. The alleged termination of services of the plaintiffs by the defendant took place according to the complaint on September 4, 1950, that is to say, after the repeal of Article 302 which they invoke. Moreover, said Article 302 of the Code of Commerce, assuming that it were still in force speaks of "salary corresponding to said month." commonly known as "mesada." If the plaintiffs herein had no fixed salary either by the day, week or month, then computation of the month's salary payable would be impossible. Article 302 refers to employees receiving a fixed salary. Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino in his book entitled "Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Commercial Laws of the Philippines," Vol. 1, 4th edition, p. 160, says that article 302 is not applicable to employees without fixed salary. We quote Employees not entitled to indemnity. This article refers only to those who are engaged under salary basis, and not to those who only receive compensation equivalent to whatever service they may render. (1 Malagarriga 314, citing decision of Argentina Court of Appeals on Commercial Matters.)In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against appellants.Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, and Diokno, JJ.,concur.Paras, C.J.,concurs in the result.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaEN BANCG.R. No. 18081 March 3, 1922IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF CHEONG BOO, deceased.MORA ADONG,petitioner-appellant,vs.CHEONG SENG GEE,opponent-appellant.Kincaid, Perkins & Kincaid and P. J. Moore for petitioner-appellant.Carlos A. Sobral for opponent-appellant.MALCOLM,J.:The two question presented for determination by these appeals may be framed as follows: Is a marriage contracted in China and proven mainly by an alleged matrimonial letter, valid in the Philippines? Are the marriage performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? As the decision of the Supreme Court on the last point will affect marriages consummated by not less than one hundred and fifty thousand Moros who profess the Mohammedan faith, the transcendental importance of the cause can be realized. We proposed to give to the subject the serious consideration which it deserves.Cheong Boo, a native of China, died intestate in Zamboanga, Philippine Islands, on August 5, 1919. He left property worth nearly P100,000. The estate of the deceased was claimed, on the one hand, by Cheong Seng Gee, who alleged that he was a legitimate child by a marriage contracted by Cheong Boo with Tan Dit in China in 1895. The estate was claimed, on the other hand, by the Mora Adong who alleged that she had been lawfully married to Cheong Boo in 1896 in Basilan, Philippine Islands, and her daughters, Payang, married to Cheng Bian Chay, and Rosalia Cheong Boo, unmarried.The conflicting claims to the estate of Cheong Boo were ventilated in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga. The trial judge, the Honorable Quirico Abeto, after hearing the evidence presented by both sides, reached the conclusion, with reference to the allegations of Cheong Seng Gee, that the proof did not sufficiently establish the Chinese marriage, but that because Cheong Seng Gee had been admitted to the Philippine Islands as the son of the deceased, he should share in the estate as a natural child. With reference to the allegations of the Mora Adong and her daughters Payang and Rosalia, the trial judge reached the conclusion that the marriage between the Mora Adong and the deceased had been adequately proved but that under the laws of the Philippine Islands it could not be held to be a lawful marriage; accordingly, the daughters Payang and Rosalia would inherit as natural children. The order of the trial judge, following these conclusions, was that there should be a partition of the property of the deceased Cheong Boo between the natural children, Cheong Seng Gee, Payang, and Rosalia.From the judgment of the Judge of First Instance both parties perfected appeals. As to the facts, we can say that we agree in substance with the findings of the trial court. As to the legal issues submitted for decision by the numerous assignments of error, these can best be resolved under two heads, namely: (1) The validity of the Chinese marriage; and (2) the validity of the Mohammedan marriage.1.Validity of the Chinese MarriageThe theory advanced on behalf of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee was that Cheong Boo was married in the city of Amoy, China, during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the Emperor Quang Su, or, according to the modern count, on February 16, 1985, to a young lady named Tan Dit. Witnesses were presented who testified to having been present at the marriage ceremony. There was also introduced in evidence a document in Chinese which in translation reads as follows:One hundred years of life and health for both.Your nephew, Tan Chao, respecfully answers the venerable Chiong Ing, father of the bridegroom, accepting his offer of marriage, and let this document serve as proof of the acceptance of said marriage which is to be celebrated during the merry season of the flowers.I take advantage of this occasion to wish for your and the spouses much happiness, a long life, and prolific issue, as noble and great as that which you brought forth. I consider the marriage of your son Boo with my sister Lit Chia as a mandate of God and I hope that they treat each other with great love and mutual courtesy and that both they and their parents be very happy.Given during the second moon of the twenty-first year of the reign of the Emperor Quang Su.

Cheong Boo is said to have remained in China for one year and four months after his marriage during which time there was born to him and his wife a child named Cheong Seng Gee. Cheong Boo then left China for the Philippine Islands and sometime thereafter took to himself a concubine Mora by whom he had two children. In 1910, Cheong Boo was followed to the Philippines by Cheong Seng Gee who, as appears from documents presented in evidence, was permitted to land in the Philippine Islands as the son of Cheong Boo. The deceased, however, never returned to his native hearth and seems never to have corresponded with his Chinese wife or to have had any further relations with her except once when he sent her P10.The trial judge found, as we have said, that the proof did not sustain the allegation of the claimant Cheong Seng Gee, that Cheong Boo had married in China. His Honor noted a strong inclination on the part of the Chinese witnesses, especially the brother of Cheong Boo, to protect the interests of the alleged son, Cheong Seng Gee, by overstepping the limits of truthfulness. His Honor also noted that reliable witnesses stated that in the year 1895, when Cheong Boo was supposed to have been in China, he was in reality in Jolo, in the Philippine Islands. We are not disposed to disturb this appreciation of fact by the trial court. The immigration documents only go to show the relation of parent and child existing between the deceased Cheong Boo and his son Cheong Seng Gee and do not establish the marriage between the deceased and the mother of Cheong Seng Gee.Section IV of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) provides that "All marriages contracted without these Islands, which would be valid by the laws of the country in which the same were contracted, are valid in these Islands." To establish a valid foreign marriage pursuant to this comity provision, it is first necessary to prove before the courts of the Islands the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact, and it is then necessary to prove the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence.As a case directly in point is the leading one of Sy Joc Liengvs.Encarnacion ([1910]), 16 Phil., 137; [1913], 228 U.S., 335). Here, the courts of the Philippines and the Supreme Court of the United States were called upon to decide, as to the conflicting claims to the estate of a Chinese merchant, between the descendants of an alleged Chinese marriage and the descendants of an alleged Philippine marriage. The Supreme Courts of the Philippine Islands and the United States united in holding that the Chinese marriage was not adequately proved. The legal rule was stated by the United States Supreme Court to be this: A Philippine marriage, followed by forty years of uninterrupted marital life, should not be impugned and discredited, after the death of the husband and administration of his estate, though an alleged prior Chinese marriage, "save upon proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of such impediment." Another case in the same category is that of Son Cuivs.Guepangco ([1912], 22 Phil., 216).In the case at bar there is no competent testimony as to what the laws of China in the Province of Amoy concerning marriage were in 1895. As in the Encarnacion case, there is lacking proof so clear, strong, and unequivocal as to produce a moral conviction of the existence of the alleged prior Chinese marriage. Substitute twenty-three years for forty years and the two cases are the same.The lower court allowed the claimant, Cheong Seng Gee, the testamentary rights of an acknowledged natural child. This finding finds some support in Exhibit 3, the affidavit of Cheong Boo before the American Vice-Consul at Sandakan, British North Borneo. But we are not called upon to make a pronouncement on the question, because the oppositor-appellant indicates silent acquiescence by assigning no error.2.Validity of the Mohammedan MarriageThe biographical data relating to the Philippine odyssey of the Chinaman Cheong Boo is fairly complete. He appears to have first landed on Philippine soil sometime prior to the year 1896. At least, in the year las mentioned, we find him in Basilan, Philippine Islands. There he was married to the Mora Adong according to the ceremonies prescribed by the book on marriage of the Koran, by the Mohammedan Iman (priest) Habubakar. That a marriage ceremony took place is established by one of the parties to the marriage, the Mora Adong, by the Iman who solemnized the marriage, and by other eyewitnesses, one of whom was the father of the bride, and another, the chief of the rancheria, now a municipal councilor. The groom complied with Quranic law by giving to the bride a dowry of P250 in money and P250 in goods.The religious rites began with the bride and groom seating themselves in the house of the father of the bride, Marahadja Sahibil. The Iman read from the Koran. Then the Iman asked the parents if they had any objection to the marriage. The marital act was consummated by the groom entering the woman's mosquito net.From the marriage day until the death of Cheong Boo, twenty-three years later, the Chinaman and the Mora Adong cohabited as husband and wife. To them were born five children, two of whom, Payang and Rosalia, are living. Both in his relations with Mora Adong and with third persons during his lifetime, Cheong Boo treated Adong as his lawful wife. He admitted this relationship in several private and public documents. Thus, when different legal documents were executed, including decrees of registration, Cheong Boo stated that he was married to the Mora Adong while as late as 1918, he gave written consent to the marriage of his minor daughter, Payang.Notwithstanding the insinuation of counsel for the Chinese appellant that the custom is prevalent among the Moros to favor in their testimony, a relative or friend, especially when they do not swear on the Koran to tell the truth, it seems to us that proof could not be more convincing of the fact that a marriage was contracted by the Chinaman Cheong Boo and the Mora Adong, according to the ceremonies of the Mohammedan religion.It is next incumbent upon us to approach the principal question which we announced in the very beginning of this decision, namely, Are the marriages performed in the Philippines according to the rites of the Mohammedan religion valid? Three sections of the Marriage Law (General Order No. 68) must be taken into consideration.Section V of the Marriage Law provides that "Marriage may be solemnized by either a judge of any court inferior to the Supreme Court, justice of the peace,or priest or minister of the Gospel of any denomination. . ." Counsel, failing to take account of the word "priest," and only considering the phrase "minister of the Gospel of any denomination" would limit the meaning of this clause to ministers of the Christian religion. We believe this is a strained interpretation. "Priest," according to the lexicographers, means one especially consecrated to the service of a divinity and considered as the medium through whom worship, prayer, sacrifice, or other service is to be offered to the being worshipped, and pardon, blessing, deliverance, etc., obtained by the worshipper, as a priest of Baal or of Jehovah; a Buddhist priest. "Minister of the Gospel" means all clergymen of every denomination and faith. A "denomination" is a religious sect having a particular name. (Hagginvs.Haggin [1892], 35 Neb., 375;In reReinhart, 9 O. Dec., 441; Halevs.Everett [1868], 53 N. H. 9.) A Mohammedan Iman is a "priest or minister of the Gospel," and Mohammedanism is a "denomination," within the meaning of the Marriage Law.The following section of the Marriage Law, No. VI, provides that "No particular form for the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage, that they take each other as husband and wife." The law is quite correct in affirming that no precise ceremonial is indispensable requisite for the creation of the marriage contract. The two essentials of a valid marriage are capacity and consent. The latter element may be inferred from the ceremony performed, the acts of the parties, and habit or repute. In this instance, there is no question of capacity. Nor do we think there can exist any doubt as to consent. While it is true that during the Mohammedan ceremony, the remarks of the priest were addressed more to the elders than to the participants, it is likewise true that the Chinaman and the Mora woman did in fact take each other to be husband and wife and did thereafter live together as husband and wife. (Traversvs.Reinhardt [1907], 205 U.S., 423.It would be possible to leave out of view altogether the two sections of the Marriage Law which have just been quoted and discussed. The particular portion of the law which, in our opinion, is controlling, is section IX, reading as follows: "No marriage heretofore solemnized before any person professing to have authority therefor shall be invalid for want of such authority or on account of any informality, irregularity, or omission, if it was celebrated with the belief of the parties, or either of them, that he had authority and that they have been lawfully married."T