Part II Constitutional Law of Corrections. Chapter 12 – Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments – Due Process – Classification, Transfers, Personal Injuries,

Part II

Constitutional Law of Corrections

Chapter 12 – Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments – Due Process – Classification, Transfers, Personal Injuries,

and Property Loss

Introduction: Chapter looks at cases in which inmates raise due process claims Because of loss of property; also Some non-discipline cases where

inmates claim a loss of liberty by the actions of prison officials

Chapter Outline

The Nature of Classification Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v.

Haymes McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper Olim v. Wakinekona Howe v. Smith

Chapter Outline: cont’d

Vitek v. Jones Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane Farmer v. Brennan International Transfers Loss of Property and Personal

Injuries Use of Excessive Force

The Nature of Classification

One of the most important functions in running prisons, involves Where offender should serve her

sentence Where offender should be assigned, in

that setting, for housing, for special programs, and for work

Specially trained staff, and written policies

The Nature of Classification: cont’d

Classification procedures looks at many factors: Age and sex of the offender Criminal sophistication Geographical concerns (such as

home, location of family, and visiting)


Special needs (such as medical or psychiatric, educational and vocational training)

Special security problems (such as need for separation, and escape risk)

Special factors (such as court recommendation(s))


Availability of space in appropriate facilities Facilities classified according to security

level; types of inmates received; programs offered

Broad classifications – minimum, medium, and maximum security; for males and for females

Also classified according to programs offered, such as medical, psychiatric, vocational, educational, and for inmates with higher security needs (protection, disciplinary housing)


Basic (desirable) rule – inmate will be sent to an institution as close to his home as possible - appropriate for his security level and other needs


Classification determination is based on various reports Pre-sentence investigation Law enforcement and court reports Considerations from prior confinement

periods Diagnostic/reception center process

(where exists), including face-to-face interviews


Reclassification – can occur later in stay, based on factors that appear after inmate is in service of sentence

Meachum v. Fano (1976); Montanye v. Haymes (1976)

Meachum v. Fano involved the transfer of Fano and five other inmates from a medium to maximum security prison (where living conditions were less favorable)

Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes: cont’d

Transfer based on information inmates were involved in criminal conduct

None of the inmates punished by loss of good time or disciplinary segregation

Question involved whether inmates were entitled to a due process hearing prior to transfer to a prison with less favorable conditions

Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes: cont’d Supreme Court in Meachum held there

were no due process entitlements Prison officials have the discretion to

transfer inmates for any number of reasons Constitution does not guarantee the

convicted prisoner will be placed in any particular prison

Conviction has “sufficiently extinguished the defendant’s liberty interest” to empower the State to confine him in any of its prisons”

Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes: cont’d In Montanye v. Haymes, inmate

Haymes was transferred from one maximum security prison to a second prison of the same security Inmate alleged transfer was done for

disciplinary reasons, due to his circulating a petition among inmates complaining of his removal as an inmate clerk in the law library

Meachum v. Fano; Montanye v. Haymes: cont’d

The Court in Montanye held that as long as the conditions or degree of confinement are within the sentence imposed upon the inmate and are not otherwise violative of the Constitution, the Due Process Clause does not in itself subject an inmate’s treatment by prison authorities to judicial oversight

“As long as” language anticipates the standards for due process entitlements adopted in Sandin

McKune v. Lile (2002); Young v. Harper (1997)

In McKune v. Lile, an inmate refused to participate in prison’s mandatory Sexual Abuse Treatment Program (SATP)

McKune v. Lile; Young v. Harper : cont’d

SATP required inmate to sign “Admission of Responsibility” form

Accepting all responsibility for crimes for which sentenced

And required inmate to detail all prior sexual activities, even those not charged – no legal immunity provided


Failure to comply would result in reduction of prison privileges and transfer to another potentially more dangerous prison

Inmate sued for injunctive relief, claiming Fifth Amendment violation (right against self-incrimination)


Court upheld state, seeing Meachum as controlling authority

Transfer was incidental to state’s legitimate penological reason for transfer: limited space

By moving inmate out, room is made for other inmates to move in and take part in the program


In Young v. Harper, an inmate was removed from a preparole program The state’s Preparole Program

became effective whenever state prisons exceeded 95% of capacity


Program authorized the release by administrative action of inmates prior to sentence expiration – referred to as conditional release

Inmate was released after serving 15 years of a life sentence for two murders

He spent five months in the community


Governor under authority granted to him by the Program, subsequently denied the inmate parole and the inmate was returned to prison

Inmate filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming deprivation of liberty without due process


State argued Meachum was controlling, that reincarceration of a preparolee was only a transfer to a higher degree of confinement


Court disagreed with the state; Court affirmed appeals court holding that

Preparole “more closely resembles parole or probation than even the most permissive forms of institutional confinement”

Due process requires that program participants receive procedural protections

Olim v. Wakinekona (1983)

Inmate in Hawaii prison was identified as a serious troublemaker Inmate was transferred to a prison in

California Inmate filed a Section 1983 action

against state officials, claiming a denial of procedural due process because he did not receive a hearing prior to transfer

Olim v. Wakinekona: cont’d

Court held that reasoning of Meachum and Montanye apply, and that an inmate may be transferred out of state without a hearing

Such transfer does not “deprive inmate of any liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause”

Howe v. Smith (1981)

State inmate serving life sentence for murder was transferred to a federal prison pursuant to a federal statute (18 USC § 5003) allowing for such transfers State was planning to close its high

security prison

Howe v. Smith: cont’d Inmate provided hearing within state Hearing officer recommended

inmate’s transfer Based on dangerousness Not suitable for a community-based

program (all that state would have) Inmate seen as an escape risk And as requiring long-term maximum-

security supervision

Howe v. Smith: cont’d Supreme Court upheld validity of

transfer, principally on the federal statutory language, and not on constitutional protections

“[P]lain language, the legislative history, and the longstanding administrative interpretation of [Sec.] 5003(a) clearly demonstrate that the provision is a broad charter authorizing the transfer of state prisoners to federal custody.”

Vitek v. Jones (1980) Transfer case made outside the range of

conditions ordinarily to be expected by one serving a sentence of confinement

Inmate Jones serving 3-9 year sentence in state prison

He was placed in prison hospital, for psychiatric and behavioral problems Two days later placed in solitary

confinement There, he set his mattress on fire

Vitek v. Jones: cont’d Based on reports he was suffering from a

mental illness or defect, and a finding he could not receive proper treatment in prison, he was sent to a state mental hospital

Jones and other inmates challenged the transfer process, claiming denial of due process protections when transferred from the prison complex to the mental hospital

Vitek v. Jones: cont’d

Supreme Court agreed Such a transfer involves a protected

liberty interest and requires a hearing A criminal conviction and prison

sentence removes an inmate’s right to freedom from confinement for service of his sentence

Vitek v. Jones: cont’d But does not allow the state to classify

the inmate as mentally ill and subject the inmate to involuntary psychiatric treatment without providing additional due process protections

The due process required: Advance written notice to the inmate

that a transfer was being considered A hearing, with disclosure of the

evidence relied on, plus an opportunity for the inmate to be heard and to present documentary evidence

Vitek v. Jones: cont’d Opportunity at the hearing to present

witnesses and to confront and cross-examine witnesses (absent a finding of good reason not to allow)

An independent decision maker A written decision by the factfinder as

to the evidence relied on, and the reasons for the recommended action

Assistance by someone at the hearing Effective and timely notice of these

hearing rights

Kansas v. Hendricks ( 1997); Kansas v. Crane (2002)

Cases deal with state’s Sexually Violent Predator Act Act set procedures for civilly

committing persons who due to a “mental abnormality” or a “personality disorder” are likely to become involved in “predatory acts of sexual violence”

Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane: cont’d

In Kansas v. Hendricks, Hendricks had a long history of sexually molesting children After serving 10 years for taking

“indecent liberties” with two 13-year old boys, he was due for release

State filed a petition seeking his confinement under the new law


Inmate challenged the law, alleging a lack of due process, double jeopardy, and ex post facto statutory punishment

Inmate did not, at his hearing, dispute the diagnosis that he suffered from pedophilia


Supreme Court upheld the Act, likening it to state civil commitment procedures for mental patients that the Court had previously approved


Precommitment requirement of “mental abnormality” or “personality disorder” is consistent with the requirements of other statutes upheld by the Court in that it narrows the class of persons eligible for confinement to those who are not able to control their dangerousness

Court also rejected double jeopardy and ex post facto, holding that the Act is nonpunitive thus removing “an essential prerequisite” for both claims

Kansas v. Hendricks; Kansas v. Crane: cont’d In Kansas v. Crane, the Court looked at

the question of whether the Act required a finding that person is completely unable to control his dangerous behavior Court held that Hendricks did not require a

total or complete lack of control, but disagreed with the state position that Hendricks allowed commitment without any determination at all of lack of control


Court held there must be proof of serious difficulty in controlling behavior, and that this, when viewed in light of such features as the psychiatric diagnosis and the severity of the mental abnormality, must be sufficient “to distinguish the dangerous sexual offender, whose serious mental illness, abnormality, or disorder subjects him to civil commitment from the dangerous but typical recidivist convicted in an ordinary criminal case”

Farmer v. Brennan (1994)

Case raised serious questions about the proper classification of an inmate

Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d Farmer was a transsexual, medically

identified as a male because he possessed male sex organs Inmate’s status presented difficult

questions on how best he could be placed and treated within the prison

Prison officials must take steps to protect inmates, particularly when on notice a risk is posed by an inmate’s particular behavior

Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d

Two possible types of liabilities in such circumstances Common law tort liability

Applies if officials are negligent in taking protective steps, when they have received some notice of danger to the inmate and the inmate is then assaulted because of officials’ inaction

Farmer v. Brennan: cont’d Could also be liability for violating an

inmate’s constitutional rights Applies if an official knows that an

inmate faces a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards that risk and fails to take reasonable steps to avoid it

International Transfers

Treaty procedures exist for transfer of inmates between the United States and other countries Requires that both the holding and

the receiving country agree to the offender’s transfer

The offender also has to agree to the transfer

International Transfers: cont’d The procedure has been upheld in

federal courts against claims that criminal proceedings in the foreign country violated due process standards

The leading case considering challenges to the treaty process and the authority to hold prisoners under sentences imposed in another country is Rosado v. Civiletti (1980)

International Transfers: cont’d

Rosado and three other inmates made numerous allegations regarding the circumstances of their convictions in Mexico for drug offenses They challenged the constitutionality

of their detention by habeas corpus action


The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit noted that the U.S. Constitution only applied to actions taken in the U.S., or to actions taken by U.S. agents working in a foreign country Bill of Rights does not protect U.S.

citizens against any actions that might be taken by a foreign nation’s officials


A major concern in this case was the voluntariness of the prisoners’ consent to be returned to the United States

The appeals court found that the inmates’ decisions were voluntarily and intelligently made

The court further recognized the desirability of having the transfer procedures available and did not want to jeopardize the chances of other inmates to transfer out of Mexico


The court approved the concept and the legality of the international transfer process

Returning inmates can challenge (under the writ of habeas corpus or § 1983) any conditions or actions of U.S. officials after the inmates are returned to the custody of the United States

International Transfers: cont’d Transfer procedures have been upheld

against claims by a U.S. inmate that he should be returned to his native country even though the U.S. didn’t approve of the transfer Lower courts held the inmate had no

entitlement to mandamus relief, because the Attorney General had total discretion to make the transfer decision within the framework of the treaty

Loss of Property and Personal Injuries In Parratt v. Taylor (1981), the

hobby materials ordered, and paid for, by an inmate were lost Inmate sued under Section 1983

claiming deprivation of property without due process of law

Supreme Court noted that the inmate’s claim was that the property was negligently lost

Loss of Property and Personal Injuries: cont’d

The analysis would have to focus on whether the essential elements of a Section 1983 claim were present:

Was the loss caused by a person acting under color of state law and if yes

Whether that state official’s conduct deprived the inmate of a right given him under the Constitution


The Court found that the inmate had been deprived of his property under color of state law

The Court then looked at the applicable constitutional provision – the due process clause

Court found first part of clause was met – that there was a loss of property


The Court found, however, that the second part of the test – that he was deprived of his property without due process of law – was not met

The Court noted that the state provided a remedy to inmates who claimed a loss of property due to staff negligence – specifically, the state had a tort claims procedure


Court held that loss of property could be the basis of a claim for deprivation of constitutional rights under § 1983, if the state did not have an adequate remedy to compensate the inmate for that deprivation

Since state, in this case, did have such a procedure (tort claim), this was sufficient to have the § 1983 action dismissed for failure to state a claim


Hudson v. Palmer (1984), in addition to dealing with cell searches, also had a due process claim Inmate Palmer claimed the officers

intentionally destroyed some of Palmer’s property just to harass him


Court extended its holding in Parratt, saying that even intentional damage to property is not the basis for a constitutional claim, as long as the state has a remedy for the inmate to use to be compensated for his loss

In this case, the state did provide the inmate with a remedy – he could file a claim for compensation for his lost or damaged property


In Daniels v. Williams (1986), inmate sued under Section 1983 seeking damages for back and ankle injuries sustained when he fell on a stairway at the city jail Inmate claimed jail officer had

negligently left a pillow on the stairs, causing his fall


Court said that the due process clause was intended to secure inmates from abuse of power by prison officials

Court had to address the issue of whether ordinary negligence is enough to state a constitutional claim


Court held that the word “deprive” in the Constitution connotes more than a negligent act

That mere claims of negligence would not support a constitutional claim under Section 1983

That the lack of due care “suggests no more than a failure to measure up to the conduct of a reasonable person”


In Davidson v. Cannon (1986), Davidson sent a note, to the prison’s assistant superintendent, saying that he had been threatened by another inmate The note was forwarded to a

corrections sergeant, who failed to read the note right away, and left the institution


Davidson was assaulted and injured by the inmate identified in the note

Davidson sued under Section 1983 alleging violation of his constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments


Court held for the government “[W]here a government official is

merely negligent in causing the injury, no procedure for compensation is constitutionally required”

Such behavior does not approach the sort of abuse of government conduct that the due process clause was designed to prevent

Loss of Property and Personal Injuries: cont’d Rather than abuse of power, Court noted

that officials mistakenly believed that the situation was not serious, and that the sergeant simply forgot about the note from the inmate

Inmate wanted some form of remedy, but the state did not have one for this type of injury Court held that while it might be good to have,

the Constitution does not require it in situations where there has been no deprivation of a protected interest (life, liberty, or property)

Use of Excessive Force

Claims of excessive use of force can, and are brought or considered under the Eighth Amendment

Claims of staff abuse, of overreaction may also be brought under the Fourteenth or Fifth Amendments

Use of Excessive Force: cont’d

If action by staff was taken maliciously and sadistically, that would seem to show an abusive use of government power or authority, which the Court in Daniels and Davidson said the due process clause was meant to protect against

Use of Excessive Force: cont’d

The question then would be whether the state had an adequate compensation remedy under some claim procedure

If not, the injured inmate is left without a state remedy and would have a claim to be made under § 1983 for violation of due process rights

The Supreme Court has not yet decided that exact case

Documents

Part II Constitutional Law of Corrections. Chapter 12 – Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments – Due Process – Classification, Transfers, Personal Injuries,