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Parfit Paper Revised Ideas

1. Argue that the incompleteness is bad because it doesn't adequately rule out the argument from

disagreement, which Parfit tells Wolfe is his entire goal (Christian suggests this, as well)

On 554 Parfit seems less concerned about disagreement about why actions are wrong, at least, at

the level of philosophical theory. He still seems concerned about which acts are wrong, however.

He also reiterates here that he claims to have shown that, properly understood, the theoriescoincide.

Parfit does justice to the importance of actual consent by appeal to a reason; this may be a

key example of how, at critical moments, Parfit relies on reasons or it's an example of a case

in which rational disagreement may be maintained.

Is Parfit's discussion of imprecision on 559 compatible with the TT? Perhaps they're OK

because this discussion could be read as being about normativity broadly and not

demarcating clearly wrong acts?

Revised Ideas- entirely courtesy of Christian2. Assuming that Parfit doesn't collapse into act consequentialism, how has he shown that his view

is at all preferable to act consequentialism? The critical question, as Christian suggests it, iswhether Parfit's theory or act better lines up ...the purposes and nature of the various

senses of wrong.

If I follow the claim, one point might be that, if the suggestion is which view has more intuitive

appeal, the suggestion that we ought to forsake good acts because a principle based on them

would, if always followed, lead to worse overall outcomes seems rather counter-intuitive; thetraditional objection that rule collapses into act seems relevant here.

If the senses of wrong make reference to the whole deserving of blame + the belief relative,

fact relative, etc. stuff that Parfit laid out at the beginning then I ought to re-read this material.

1. Another attempt at vacuity: if we have a complete theory of the reasons then the Triple

Theory is superfluousFrom Christian: o Along these lines, check this out, I like this: Does such and such the-

ory of normative reasons say that you have a reason to resent x because of his act? If you

do, then THIS mere subset of our normative reasons will give us our moral theory (its

that simple!) one might argue. And if you dont have a non-deontic reason to so resentthen maybe you shouldnt after allafter all, impartial reasons do not recommend your

doing so (theyre non-deontic)someone could reasonably reject the principle of so re-

senting. So Parfit, it would seem, MUST accept the simple theory, regardless of whetherTT is true or if it is not (you following me)? I think someone needs to write this paper.

But maybe Ive forgotten something.

I think I see how this would be true in the case of act: what is the point of saying we always have

most reason to what is impartially best -and- that this is what everyone could rationally will?

Once I have the first I have answered all relevant normative questions.

Christian provides another account of this which is I am struggling to follow.

The suggestion, laid out slowly, is this:

A theory of reasons may maintain that we have reason to resent a person if they perform a certainaction...

...but, because Parfit suggests that moral badness should be understood in terms of our having

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reasons to resent someone if they do such an action, it seems we get a moral theory the moment

we allow such a reason! Who needs the Triple Theory?!

OK, that's clear but the second part of the suggestion seems a little more confusing. It begins thus:

If we didn't have such a non-deontic reason to resent as part of our input to the TT why should

we resent someone when the TT says the principle under question is not one everyone can

rationally accept?

Indeed, if there is no impartial reason to resent then someone could reasonably reject a principlewhich requires resentment for a particular action and so the TT would not require resentment for

this action.

(This may be bolstered by the thought that we have at least some impartial reasons not to resent:resent can be a painful emotion to experience and others subject to it might be harmedso it's

non-optimific to resent, absent some adequate reason to resentlike that an action is immoral.)

Does the last lineunless an action is immoralsave Parfit against the second line of the

argument? He may be able to grant that we may not have a reason to resent as input to the

theory but that the deliverances of the TT create reasons for resentment because failure to

pass TT means an action is immoral. It's not like we apply the TT again to its own outputs

to see if someone could reasonably reject a new principle of resentment.

In response to the first partthat is in direct response to the simple theory--it seems thatParfit must claim that there can be no such reasons for resentment prior to the TT; all

reasons for resentment exist because an act follows from a principle which fails TT. He must

claim this in the same way that, as he points out, Scanlon must omit what we might think

are fully fledged moral claims into his contractualism because, if Scanlon did not do this,

his theory would be empty.

Another possible response is to claim that there are different sorts of resentment. One sort

of resentment may be a sort of non-moral resentment the reasons for which may be entered

into the TT as considerations. Moral resentment is stronger and must, as I point out above,

follow from the TT or the TT is vacuous.

In Defense of This Tactic

1. What defense would Parfit have against it? Sure, he can claim that if our theory just posited

reasons for resentment this would make TT pointless. But so what?! Parfit cant object that thistheory of normative reasons would be bad because it would be bad for his theory. And it seems

the most Parfit can say as to why we cant have such reasons is: 1.) that would make TT pointless

2.) we just dont have such reasons and we can intuit this 3.) such a theory would be pointlessbecause it would assume what we have to prove.

2. Option 1 will not work for obvious reasons. This actually may be a big deal, as an objection.

Why would what reasons we have be held hostage to whether a particular moral theory

works or not? This would only be the case if we had considerably more reason to accept TT

than the reason in question. But its not at all clear that TT would have more plausibilitythan any such reason. It may be legitimate to reject a theory of reasons if it + TT yielded a

bad conclusion. But claiming we dont have certain kinds of reasons because theyre a

problem for TT seems bad. A utilitarian cant argue against our deontic intuitions simply by

saying But if those exist then my theory doesnt work!

3. Option 2 will not work because it seems that its admitting that Parfits theory is only

contingently worthwhile; in the possible worlds where the simple theory reasons exist, TT is

redundant. But we might think that TT is supposed to be a modal thesis (is it?) and so the

existence of a possible world were TT is pointless defeats it.

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4. Option 3 is in one sense correct, but ultimately it doesnt seem that direct reasons of

resentment would be any more problematic than any of the other reasons Parfit thinks we

have. That is, Parfit already claims we have objective, external, mind-independent reasons

to care about everyone elseis it really much more of a stretch to just say oh, we also have

reasons to resent people who do certain actions? I cant see how it is.

5. Another tack: in his reply to Wolfe, Parfit seems to think its OK that theres not a single

ultimate moral principle. He is worried that it would be objectionable if it turned out thatmorality were empty and thinks that the apparent disagreement between the main moral

theories is evidence that morality is empty. As such, he isnt even invested in the success of

the TT as a moral principle. Why does he think we have any actual moral principles as

such? The simple theory seems to lack principles (it simply posits that there are moral

reasons not to do things) but on its own how can this be a mark against it? Morality would

not be empty were the simple theory true.

6. Another tack: Parfit never really seems to directly motivate the idea that TT captures the

truth about morality. He argues that the main moral theories, ultimately, ought to be

understood in such a way that they agree and insofar as we think each of the main theories

is somewhat independently plausible we might be inclined to think that this agreement lends

credence to TT. Further support would be given by its capturing our intuitive moral

judgmentsbut the same could be said about a theory which just posits that we have

disparate moral reasons of varying weights that pull against one another. Indeed, the later

theory may even be more likely to capture intuitive judgments ifthe methodology for

discovering our reasons is some form of intuition, even if it is of the sort of sophisticated

intellectual intuition that Parfit and Christian discuss and compare to intuition of

mathematical and logical truths.

7. This actually might be reinstating the objection that there is no importantdifferencebetween saying everyone has reason to do this and everyone can rationally will this.

Parfit on the senses of wrong Note: it may be best to focus on one sense or other (the

reactive-attitude sense in particular, given Christians thoughts and that it seems weird)

1.) Indefinable sense: the meaning of wrong in this sense is, like ought and has a reason to,

basic in that it cannot be analyzed. Parfit says we can only get at it by describing what it is

like when it holds to people. For example, Parfit says this sense obtains when some act mustnot be done or musnt-be-done. We might also define this sense of wrong by defining it

in terms ofundefinedother basic normative concepts. For example we might say that an

action is wrong when we ought not to act in this way. (165)

Although Parfit says we should avoid senses of wrong whichjust mean we have decisive

reason to/not to (166)

2.) Blameworthiness sense: in this, definable, sense wrong means blameworthy.

3.) Reactive-attitude sense: in this definable sense wrong means an act of a kind thatgives its agent reasons to feel remorse or guilt, and gives others reasons for indignation and

resentment A lot may hinge on how this sense is cached out. If these reasons can be prior

to TT then it seems TT is superfluous, at least for this sense of wrong (this seems to be

Christians point). Off of this: if Parfit claims that these reasons are created as the

outputof the TT, where do these reasons fit in his typology of reasons?! He tells us we

have partial and impartial reasons at the beginning ofOn What Matters. I dont recall

his having discussed some other kind of reason. Presumably, they are moral reasons and

he doesnt want to flesh them out much more in relation to other kinds of reasons? Are

they impartial reasons created by a moral failing? Partial reasons?

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4.) Parfit also denies that it would be worthwhile to speak ofmoral reasons as a kind of

reason 166-7what does the TT give us as its output? What are the reasons for

resentment, then? They apparently cannot be moral reasons given as output of TT or

prior to TT. But if theyre partial or impartial reasonswhy cant they be fed back into

TT? It seems we would have to come up with special sub-classes of partial and/or

impartial reasons which cannot be fed back into the TTthat seems rather ad-hoc.

Alternately, perhaps we would worry that theres some circularity here? Output: Xing iswrong in the reactive-attitudes sense, therefore Xing gives others reasons to feel remorse

and the perpetrator (so presumably this is a partial reason, as only they could have

this?) reasons to feel guiltywe now have some new reasons and ask whether we could

Y in virtue of these and other reasonshow does this work?

5.) Parfit does say we have reasons to be concerned with preventing others pain, and more

reason to prevent it insofar as it is worse. This comes up in a discussion of the following

case in which I can: 1.) prevent 10 hours of pain to you 2.) prevent 9 hours of pain to you

and 8 hours of pain for someone else (Parfit 32). Parfit says that in this case I ought to go

with option 2 and this is because the reasons to do option 2 outweigh the reasons to do

option 1.

6.) But if I already have reasons to be concerned with preventing everyone's pain, and these

reasons can weigh against one another, why don't these reasons on their own constitute

moral claims? Perhaps they are supposed to be outputs of the TT (i.e. no one could

rationally will that I prevent less instead of more pain), but then why isn't the example

explained in terms of the TT and not how more aggregate pain outweighs less aggregate

pain? Sure, in the passage in which this comes up Parfit has not yet presented the TT,

but he doesn't even gesture at it in this section.

7.) Moreover, some philosophers (names?) claim that morality is simply the set of reasonswe have to be concerned with others. This may be too limited (because of cases in which

we think we have moral reasons to be concerned solely with how we affect ourselves,

presumably), but such philosophers seem readily posed to just say the reasons we have

to prevent the pain of othersjust are moral reasons. This seems especially tempting if the

reasons we have to prevent the pain of others are not products of TT.

The Profoundest Problem

1. The Profoundest Problem:Q1: What do I have most reason to do? Do I have sufficient or decisive reasons to act inany of these ways?

Q2: What ought I morally to do? Would any of these acts bewrong?

These questions might, it seems, have conflicting answers, since wemight sometimes have sufficient or decisive reasons to act wrongly. Ourproblem is to decide whether we do or could have such reasons, and, ifthat is true, what further conclusions we should draw. (Parfit 144)

Basically, what Parfit refers to as the profoundest problem is whether we always have

most reason to do the morally right thing. He thinks stating the problem in terms of reasons

and not rules is the proper way, because rules cannot be weighed against one another

whereas reasons can be weighed against one another. Thus, for example, if we think of

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normativity in terms of rules we cannot ask whether we ought to do the morally or legally

right thing, where these two conflict, because there is no neutral comparison possible

between alternating sets of rules (at least, I think this is what Parfit is getting at; strictly

speaking he just says that it would be pointless to say that such and so action would be

legally overriding or morally overriding because this would not decide the issue for us: we

need a neutral standard and reasons provide this). If we have reasons, we may weigh them

against one another. Thus, we may have less reason to do the legal thing because the reasonsgiven by legality are outweighed by the reasons of morality (Parfit 146).

Parfit gives the following statement: We can compare the strengths ofour reasons to follow these requirements. The men who fought duelshad at most weak reasons to follow the code of honour, and they hadstrong moral reasons not to fight. And when we are legally required toact wrongly, we may have decisive moral reasons to break the law. Moralrequirements may thus be more important in the reason-implying sensethan the requirements of the code of honour, or the law. (Parfit 146)

But consider the simple theoriest spin on the duel case: the moral reasons not tofight the duel are that it causes considerable pain, injury and possibly death and thatwe always have reasons to prevent such things (these are called moral reasons

because they are other-regarding). In opposition to this we have the reasons ofhonor. It's unclear how resentment works in but intuitively reasons of resentmentfollow as well (consider: if I kill you in a duel, it seems right that your family hasreasons to resent me for this action, I have reasons to feel guilty because I killed youover my honor, but honor is stupid, etc. That honor is stupid is doing important moralwork: your family may be pissed off if I killed you in self-defense but, if we're runningwith intuitive reasons, it may plausibly may be maintained that they lack reasons toresentme and I lack reasons to feel guilty if I kill you in self-defense because I havestrong reasons to protect myself and this is not stupid. In contrast, because honor isstupid, killing over it deserves resentment.

List of Arguments by type

1. The Simple Theory (ST) argument and reasons for resentment/guilt: Parfit can give no adequate

response to why we couldnt have a simple theory according to which certain actions give

reasons for resentment and remorse directly, making the TT unnecessary for at least the reactive-attitude sense of wrong.

2. Parfit provides no real motivation for the TT: Parfits motivation seems to be: 1.) morality follows

when we are more impartial (this appears in the Golden Rule/KC chapter) and 2.) moraldisagreement between the main theories is a reason for skepticism therefore showing they all

really agree defeats one skeptical worry; we might also think (though Parfit doesnt seem to say

this directly, that the TT can observe the intuitive appeal of each of the theories it attempts to

incorporate. Motivation 1 is equally captured by ST because the direct moral reasons are plausibly

impartial 2.) morality is not empty just because the three main theories Parfit discusses disagree;the argument from disagreement may be aimed more at first-order judgments and appropriate

reflection/sophisticated intuition on first order judgments may provide the content of ST. Further,Parfits own discussion of moral disagreement in Volume 2 ofOn What Matters seems to lend

itself more to there being certain intuitively correct moral truths, none of which are TT or even

easily related to it.3. Objective reasons are no different in relation to error-theoretical arguments like the argument

from queerness: Parfits objective reasons, especially the impartial ones, already seem so close to

moral reasons that they might as well be moral reasons, at least as regards metaphysical

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