Parents, Private Schools, and the Politics of an Emerging Civil Society in Cameroon

Parents, Private Schools, and the Politics of an Emerging Civil Society in CameroonAuthor(s): Patrick M. BoyleSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 34, No. 4 (Dec., 1996), pp. 609-622Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/161591 .

Accessed: 09/05/2014 06:44

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to TheJournal of Modern African Studies.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 195.78.108.168 on Fri, 9 May 2014 06:44:49 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup

http://www.jstor.org/stable/161591?origin=JSTOR-pdf

http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


The Journal of Modern African Studies, 34, 4 (I996), pp. 609-622 Copyright C 1996 Cambridge University Press

Parents, Private Schools, and the Politics of an Emerging Civil

Society in Cameroon

by PATRICK M. BOYLE*

W H I L E scholarly cautions are needed as regards both simplistic dichotomies and the subtle rhetoric that converts 'civil society' into a new sacred depository for 'a wide range of emancipatory aspirations ',

frequently pitted against that 'predatory species' we call the state,2 the view from Yaounde suggests that questions about social classes are likely to be helpful in any analysis of the complex relationship between state and society in contemporary Africa.

The political and economic dynamics of inequality now affecting most of the continent include reductions in state financing for public education, the rise of parent groups and organizations, and the appearance of fee-based private preparatory and primary schools. Incipient patterns of associational behaviour for such initiatives attempt to fill the vacuum left by states unable to meet their commitments, and although this emerging civil society is neither uniform nor very organised, new realities in the education sector provide evidence that elites are finding opportunities to participate in, and thereby create a 'market' for, economically exclusive schools. Those who use institutions dependent on public finance are experi- encing abandonment or curtailed opportunities, while governments confront uncertain dangers as they calculate the political risks of increasing charges for social services.

Explanations for the striking reversals of decades of public effort to

* Assistant Professor of Political Science, Loyola University Chicago, Illinois. The author's research during I994 was supported by a grant from Loyola, while the Faculti des sciences sociales et de gestion of the Catholic University of Central Africa at the Institut Catholique de Yaoundd offered a pleasant work environment, as well as the help of Jean-Marie Benoit Balla and Aloys Nnama in the collection of data.

' Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'The Uses and Abuses of " Civil Society "', in Ralph Miliband and Leo Panitch (eds.), The Retreat of the Intellectuals. Socialist Register, i9go (London, i990), cited in Robert Fatton, Jr., Predatory Rule: state and civil society in Africa (Boulder and London, I992), p. i8.

2 Ren6 Lemarchand, 'Uncivil States and Civil Societies: how illusion became reality', in The Journal of Modern African Studies (Cambridge), 30, 2, June I992, p. I78, observes that civil society can be 'converted ... into a conservative ideology, or legitimizing myth, in defence of the state. Or, conversely, it can provide the basis for a logic of political action directed against the state'.



6io PATRICK M. BOYLE

achieve the popular goal of universal and 'free' primary education typically focus on how economic and political crises in African states have reduced the resources available for school systems already reeling under the twin pressures of rapid urbanisation and population growth. However commonplace, such an approach rarely addresses the harsh implications of these setbacks for the nature of the societies in which they are taking place. To be specific, contemporary struggles in Cameroon centre not only on political leadership at the highest levels, but also on the basic problem faced by so many families of where and how to enrol their children in a well-functioning school.

Does a new and, to some degree, imposed laissez-faire attitude towards educational opportunities spawn in its wake identifiable forms of inequality and restrictions? On the one hand, the monetisation of access to learning revives the spectre of continent-wide mass illiteracy and the probable loss of the battle to reduce ignorance.3 On the other, the reversal of the traditionally cosy relationship between elites and the state, from a relatively short-lived dependence on publicly supported social services to a gradual withdrawal from such deteriorating facilities, repositions education as one of the links between activities that help to form both classes and civil society.

Three steps comprise the argument. The first shows how post- colonial educational developments in Africa link scholarly perspectives on social class to those on civil society. The second identifies critical elements in the current transformation of education in Cameroon: the spread of Associations des parents d'61eves (APE), the appearance of privately-funded tuition, and the struggle of state-supported schools for survival. The third assesses the empirical findings from Yaounde, and uses the example of local elites taking initiatives to secure private education for their children to show the simultaneous emergence of civil society and the formation of classes.

SOCIAL CLASS ANALYSIS AND EDUCATION

Despite civil wars and ambiguous or stalled democratic transitions, the political landscape in African states no longer matches the once apt description of being 'an almost institutionless arena with conflict and disorder as its most prominent features'.' On the contrary, a plethora of institutions, organizations, structures, and practices now characterise

3 According to recent census data 40 per cent of Cameroonians over the age of i i are illiterate. Cameroon Tribune (Yaound6), I 3 March I 99 I .

4 Aristide Zolberg, 'The Structure of Political Conflict in the New States of Africa', in American Political Science Review (Washington, DC), 62, March i968, p. 70.



PRIVATE SCHOOL AND POLITICS IN CAMEROON 6I I

the situation in the continent. Indeed, studies of regimes generally assume that neo-patrimonial politics are at the very core of many states, while analyses of political participation and economic activity, particularly of elites, have emphasised the formation of social classes and, more recently, the emergence of civil society.5

Exploration of the usefulness of categories of social classes and theories about their formation stimulated interest in newly independent states. Richard Sklar's groundbreaking redefinition of classical Marxist categories, identifying an African bourgeoisie that derived its identity more from its dependence on the state than on relations of production,6 soon gave way to discussion of the contextual and fluid nature of class identity.7 An informal consensus held that, despite the oppressive activities of certain powerful groups, classes were, notably, 'in formation'. The decline of research into political development in the I980s brought controversies about the existence and significance of classes to a virtual standstill.' In parallel literature on the role of schools in the relationship between development and inequality, access to modern education during the colonial period was shown to have given certain groups and individuals distinct advantages over others.9 As David Apter wrote in the I960s, 'Development creates inequality; modernization accentuates it.'10

So scholars examined the extent to which post-colonial educational developments have either provided social mobility for the many or confirmed a few in their places of privilege, as in Zaire.11 Joined to this debate was speculation on the role of education in creating political instability,12 not least since African states were pouring IO to 40 per cent of their national budgets into popular attempts to both extend and

5 See, for example, Dwayne Woods, 'Civil Society in Europe and Africa: limiting state power through a public sphere', in African Studies Review (Atlanta), 35, 2, September I992, pp. 77-I00,

and Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, 'Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa', in World Politics (Princeton), 46, July 1994, pp. 435-89.

6 Richard L. Sklar, 'The Nature of Class Domination in Africa', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, 17, 4, December I979, pp. 53I-52.

See, for example, Michael G. Schatzberg, Politics and Class in Zaire: bureaucracy, business, and beer in Lisala (New York, i980), and Thomas M. Callaghy, The State-Society Struggle: Zaire in comparative perspective (New York, I 984).

8 David E. Apter and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Changing African Perspectives', in Apter and Rosberg (eds.), Political Development and the New Realism in Sub-Saharan Africa (Charlottesville and London, I994), p. 32.

Ali A. Mazrui, Political Values and the Educated Class in Africa (London, 1978), pp. xiii and I 97.

0 David E. Apter, The Politics of Modernization (Chicago, i965), p. 72.

1 Mwenene Mukweso, George J. Papagiannis, and Sande Milton, 'Educational and Occu- pational Attainment from Generation to Generation: the case of Zaire', in Comparative Education Review (Chicago), 28, February i984, pp. 52-68.

12 Archibald Callaway, 'Unemployment Among African School Leavers', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, I, 3, September i963, pp. 35I-7I, and Samuel P. Huntington, 'Political Development and Political Decay', in World Politics, I7, 3, April i965, pp. 386-430.



6I2 PATRICK M. BOYLE

broaden access to schools, colleges, and universities."3 Indeed, for two decades, governments earmarked important financial and human resources to build educational infrastructures, train teachers, and design appropriate curricula - typically in the name of egalitarian and nationalistic goals."4 By quantitative standards, the gains were impressive. But concerns were inevitably raised about the quality of the new instruction, as well as the place of first-rate schools in 'congealing structures of inequality' because of stiff competition for places.15 In addition, increasingly poor economic performance spread skepticism about the claimed positive role of education in development.16

If primary, secondary, and higher institutions of learning in sub- Saharan Africa were recognised mechanisms of stratification and redistribution, some scholars rejected their easy equation with class formation. 'Thus, the empirical data relevant to the three principal educational sectors', Philip Foster argued, 'hardly support the contention that the primary consequence of African educational systems is to maintain the existing elite, or overwhelmingly to perpetuate present social or occupational "strata".' Contemporary primary schools were by no means, he continued, 'the preserves of the privileged'."7 The author's more cautious but, for the time, convincing claim, served as an argument against the assumption held by many political scientists that schools perpetuated inequalities in societies rapidly stratifying along class lines.

Foster's reticence about class claims preceded a radical contraction of public resources for schools and the peaking of enrolments in the early I 980s.18 While the economic malaise spreading throughout Africa in the I970S had slowed educational expansion, reform and austerity measures thereafter brought it to a virtual halt,19 and in countries like

13 Roy A. Carr-Hill, Social Conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa (London, i99i), p. ioo.

14 Several African states formally incorporated into their constitutions Article 26 of the I948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights which reads: 'Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory.' UN Department of Public Information, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (New York, I 948), p. I 3.

5 Crawford Young and Thomas Turner, The Rise and Decline of the Zairian State (Madison, i985), pp. I34-5 and 402. See also, V. P. Diejomaoh and E. C. Anusionwu, 'Education and Income Distribution in Nigeria', in Henry Bienen and Diejomaoh (eds.), The Political Economy of Income Distribution in Nigeria (New York, i98i), pp. 320-3I.

16 Philip Foster, 'The Education Policies of Postcolonial States', in Lascelles Anderson and Douglas Windham (eds.), Education and Development: issues in the analysis and planning of postcolonial states (Lexington, MA, i982), p. 9.

17 Philip Foster, 'Education and Social Inequality in Sub-Saharan Africa', in The Journal of Modern African Studies, i8, 2, June i980, pp. 2I4 and 210. 1 Carr-Hill, op. cit. p. 98.

19 World Bank, Education in Sub-Saharan Africa: policies for adjustment, revitalization, and expansion (Washington, DC, x988), pp. x and 6.



PRIVATE SCHOOL AND POLITICS IN CAMEROON 6I3

Zaire, for example, the lack of funding reversed significant quantitative gains in a matter of years.20 Under conditions of increasing austerity and international pressures for reform, rapid urbanisation and population growth severely eroded the ability of even the most prosperous regimes to open new schools, much less meet huge payrolls and maintain existing infrastructures. Ambitious national projects for introducing universal primary education, and the 'welfare state' mentality upon which they were based, withered after a generation of effort.

Meanwhile, scholarly attention was shifting from questions about class formation to the seemingly fresh concept of a 'social space' outside and 'in opposition' to the state. There is no doubt that many African rulers, beginning in the I960s, tried to capture the political realm by suppressing and/or co-opting trade unions, political parties, churches, and ethnic associations, which meant that the resulting lack of autonomous centres for speech and action indicated a virtual absence of 'civil society'.21 While autocracy in post-colonial Africa, as claimed by Crawford Young, 'stifled the autonomous associational life in the public realm' thereby leaving behind 'a vacuum that cannot be instantly filled',22 contemporary challenges to autocracy are offering rich possibilities for determining whether they provide evidence of a vibrant civil society.

Indeed, neither the philosophical history of the notion of civil society nor its contemporary associations with Eastern European politicians, let alone the claims that African societies lack the requisite market economies, have dampened belief that its discussion enriches our understanding of new forms of participation and problems connected with associational activity in Africa. The belief that a robust and responsive civil society has a role in at least the 'constituent phase of new democracies', as recently claimed,23 has caught the attention of scholars trying to understand political developments in the I990s.

Whether or not this new interest constitutes a revival of modernization

20 Patrick M. Boyle, 'The Politics of Education in Zaire', Ph.D. dissertation, Princeton University, 199I.

21 See Jean-Francois Bayart, 'Civil Society in Africa', in Patrick Chabal (ed.), Political Domination in Africa: reflections on the limits of power (Cambridge, i986), pp. I09-25, and Mehran Kamrava, 'Conceptualising Third World Politics: the state-society see-saw', in Third World Quarterly (Abingdon), I4, 4, November I993, pp. 703-i6.

22 Crawford Young, 'The Democratization in Africa: the contradictions of a political imperative', in Jennifer A. Widner (ed.), Economic Change and Political Liberalization in Sub-Saharan Africa (Baltimore and London, I994), p. 242.

23 Jean L. Cohen and Andrew Abato, Civil Society and Political Theory (Cambridge, MA, I99i), p. i6.



6I4 PATRICK M. BOYLE

theory,24 or whether the emergence of civil society is undermined by neo-patrimonial rule,25 its meaningful application needs something more theoretically salient than simply a haven into which the oppressed or weary escape, and something less grand than an ethical ideal that the political community has presumably set for itself.26

Richard Crook, for example, in an effort to respect both the term's history in western political thought, pace Gianfranco Poggi,27 as well as the particularities of contemporary Africa, defines civil society as 'all those self-conscious associations and institutions representing private interests groups and local, class, religions and intellectual "publics" which tend to emerge with the rise of a market economy'.28 The recent creation of urban-based private education in Cameroon, mainly by an urban elite seeking social and political autonomy from structures of state and society beginning to hinder its reproduction, might well be regarded as evidence of civil society. Such a descriptive exercise, however, adds little specificity to the theoretical discussion of the concept, and tends to overlook the fact that this activity is being undertaken by an economic group.

A Gramscian understanding of ruling-class hegemony appears to have been integrated by Robert Fatton into a theoretical perspective that attempts to overcome such shortcomings, despite a lack of empirical support. In his view, civil society has a contradictory role by creating opportunities for subordinate class resistance while enlarging 'the domain of the site of ruling class formations to include areas of spontaneous social actions - that is, unofficial initiatives and organizations that operate independently of the state'.29 Thus, a ruling class that is seeking to establish itself and consolidate its hegemony will tend to direct projects in the nation towards its own goals. In other words, the emergence of civil society dovetails with the formation of classes: their interaction shapes each and the nature of local political conflict.

The severity of contemporary economic pressures on schools, combined with their relative proximity to the ordinary lives of most

24 Joel D. Barkan argues this point in 'Resurrecting Modernization Theory and the Emergence of Civil Society in Kenya and Nigeria', in Apter and Rosberg (eds.), op. cit. pp. 87-1 i6.

25 Bratton and van de Walle, loc. cit. p. 462.

26 Adam B. Seligman, The Idea of Civil Society (New York, I992), pp. x and 3I.

27 Gianfranco Poggi, The Development of the Modern State: a sociological introduction (Stanford, I978), pp. 7i and 8i.

28 Richard Crook, 'State, Society and Political Institutions in Cote dIvoire and Ghana', in James Manor (ed.), Rethinking Third World Politics (London, I99I), p. 2I5.

29 Fatton, op. cit. p. 75-



PRIVATE SCHOOL AND POLITICS IN CAMEROON 6I5

citizens, not to mention their importance in shaping future generations, offer appropriate empirical evidence for probing a possible connection between class and civil society. Successfully making that link begins with answering the following question: how is urban education in Yaounde changing under present conditions?

PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS AND PRIVATE INITIATIVES

Yaounde began as an inland retreat for German colonists fleeing the heat and humidity of Douala, but its population only started to grow rapidly when chosen to be the capital of the independent and newly federated Republic of Cameroon. The city's changing face is reflected both in the steady influx of two ethno-geographic groups - the Bamilike from the western regions, and the Beti, Bassa, and Boulu from the southern forests - and in the gradual loss of the political and economic predominance of autochthonous Ewondo in the whole Yaounde area of some 69 sq. miles. By I976, almost 65 per cent of those living there were first generation immigrants,30 and between I982 and I989 the city's population doubled, from 400,000 to over 8oo,ooo inhabitants.31 Projections for the year 2000, originally estimated at 2 million, have been recalculated at I5 million in light of the expected slow-down in the rate of urbanisation.32

Because the social services of Cameroon enjoyed a long period of uninterrupted growth and public financial support, Yaounde developed as a privileged site for an impressive array of educational institutions, some of which began in the nineteenth century. Although a great deal of informal learning took place in homes, churches, and offices adjacent to many local markets, opportunities for early formal education came to be provided by public and state-supported denominational preparatory and primary schools. But the lack of adequate roads and public transportation has challenged the ability of the educational network to meet the needs of new immigrants settling on the rural fringes of the capital, not least because they include so many families in search of jobs, a higher standard of living, and opportunities in a city reputed for its excellent schools and university.

30 Andr6 Franqueville, raoundi: construire une capitale (Paris, i984), p. I4. 31 Isabelle Verdier, 'Les Mutations de la capitale administrative et politique', in Marches

tropicaux et me'diterrane'ens (Paris), 233I, I3 July I990, p. 207I. 32 Ibid. p. 2072, and Jacques Alibert, 'Bilan et perspective de la politique de stabilization:

le Cameroon a Fheure de lajustement', in ibid. 2457, i i December I992, p. 3287.



6i6 PATRICK M. BOYLE

Since independence, the national budget for education, for many years the largest single category for state expenditure,33 ordinarily financed all the operating costs in public schools, and - because of an accord reached during the so-called risee scolaire' in i968-70 to 8o per cent of those in most denominational schools.34 Except for small fees for insurance and uniforms, public schools did not charge for tuition before the Ig8os, unlike state-supported denominational schools, albeit at levels controlled by the Government.

Yaounde boasted remarkable primary-school enrolment rates by the mid- 1970s: over 93 per cent for girls and 95 per cent for boys against a national average of 67 per cent. The Ministry of National Education operated 6o of the city's 8i primary schools in I979-80. Most were crowded, with I 12 pupils per class as opposed to 7 I in state-supported denominational schools.35 During the late 19705 and I98os, educational opportunities for young children continued to expand, but not nearly as fast as the city's population. Although the national net primary- school enrolment rate rose from 67 per cent in I 979 to an impressive 84 per cent in i990, the system was plagued by high costs and drop-out rates, as well as by its ambiguous value for economic development.36

The difficulty in finding reliable enrolment statistics after I 990,

combined with stagnant growth in the provision of schools at the national level, suggested that a valuable assessment of the rapidly changing situation would be gained by taking a close look at what was happening in particular neighbourhoods in Yaounde. If the state did little to maintain and expand public education, would local populations find new ways to address their needs? Would state-supported institutions wither for lack of funds and die? or would groups of citizens - elements of 'civil society', as some might claim - organise themselves to ensure that their children had continued access to good schools?

One of the capital's four major administrative districts, Yaounde II, was chosen for three months of fieldwork - mainly conversations with the directors and staff of schools in order to obtain a profile of urban education. Because of its size (over 200,000 inhabitants) and heterogeneity, that arrondissement constitutes something of a cross-

3 In Cameroon the funds allocated to education by the central government dropped from earlier levels of 20-30 per cent tojust 12 per cent in the I 986-go period. The country's expenditure in this category corresponds to the average for sub-Saharan Africa. Unicef, The State of the World's Children, I994 (New York, I994), Table 6, p. 74.

34 Jean Zoa, 'Le Problbme est philosophique et politique', in L'Effort camerounais (Yaound6), 37, 975, April i99i, p. I6. 3 Franqueville, op. cit. p. I38.

36 World Bank, 'Prqject Outline. National Private Education Development Fund, Preparation Mission, Yaound6, Cameroon, Draft for Discussion, February 24, I993', Washington, DC, p. i.



PRIVATE SCHOOL AND POLITICS IN CAMEROON 6i7

section of the city,37 with a broad mix of ethnic and socio-economic groups, including, for example, the nord-ouest zone, where nearly a quarter of the capital's inhabitants live in densely populated neighbourhoods.38

Profiles of each of the district's 44 primary and pre-primary schools during 1994 were limited to ascertaining enrolments, levels of tuition, sources of funding, and the participation of parents in helping to meet expenses in a difficult economic environment.39 The research revealed three general developments in Yaounde II: a fiscal crisis in state- supported education, greater parental involvement in the finance and management of most schools, and the near sudden appearance of private education. If such changes are not surprising, their existence suggests that education in Cameroon has entered a new phase that merits further examination.

I. Fiscal Crisis in State-Supported Education

The Ministry of National Education had instructed the directors of the 2I public primary schools in Yaounde II to start charging for tuition after i986, as well as adding new 'sections'. By the end of the ig80s, their annual tuition fees had risen to around CFA francs 7,ooo as against CFA francs IO,000 to 40,000 in state-supported denominational schools. The practice of adding extra classes to existing schools meant crowding more children into old buildings or running double shifts. The directors, quick to dispel the myth that school fees were not charged in Cameroon,40 constantly complained that neither new staff nor larger budgets ever accompanied instructions for adding sections. This new policy explains, at least in part, why the country's teacher- student ratio of 5I: I ranks with the highest io in the world.4'

The situation in state-supported denominational schools became particularly acute when their subsidies were reduced in i989 at the national level from CFA francs 8,ooo million to 6,ooo million.42 But the

37 Recent legislation dividing the capital into six arrondissements does not change the size of Yaound6 II. R6publique f6d6rale du Cameroon, 'D6cret 92/i87 du ier septembre 1992'.

38 Franqueville, op. cit. p. 39. 39 A reasonable 6i per cent of school directors participated in consultations in 1994. No

attempts were made to verify information or to make a qualitative assessment of instruction. 40 Solomon Shu, 'Education in Cameroon', in A. Babs Fafunwa and J. U. Aisiku (eds.),

Education in Africa: a comparative study (London, i982), p. 47, and 'Cameroon', in Africa South of the Sahara, I994 (London, 1993), p. 234-

4' National Union of Cameroonian Students (UK), Education Committee Report, Section 8, Article i. Convention of Culture and Maturity, University of Keele, 3 July 1992.

42 World Bank, op. cit. p. 2.



6i8 PATRICK M. BOYLE

situation worsened during the next three years as the Government began to delay making payments, and by I993 was over CFA francs 205 million in arrears for the 5I Catholic schools in Yaounde alone.43 The non-payment of subsidies and the consequent raising of fees led the Secretariat for Catholic Education to estimate that their national network was losing an average of close to 20,000 students per year.44 A campaign by local church officials to organise their congregations to save their state-supported denominational schools resulted in the creation of an association of limited effectiveness in obtaining subsidy payments.45

The beginning of the same kinds of delays in the payment of salaries for teachers in I 993 demonstrates the extent to which public and state- supported denominational schools faced a virtually identical set of problems created by the penury of public resources (despite their allocation on paper), and exacerbated by the rapid expansion of the population. Among the consequences of the crisis has been the closure of the only primary school in Nkolnkumu, a village on the outskirts of Yaounde. Typically, new residents in the rural areas around the capital find that the nearest school, usually private, could be as far away as io kilometres.

2. Associations des parents d'e'lves

If this crisis has generally made classrooms more crowded and instruction more costly, it has certainly stimulated changes in school management and financing, notably by the creation of an Association des parents d'e'1eves (APE) in every public and state-supported denominational school in Yaounde II. Outlawed until the early i980s because they were deemed 'subversive', each APE exists to 'promote the good management of the institution', and 'with complete autonomy manage its own funds'.46 Public school directors, restricted to exercising only advisory powers over APE expenditures, none the less boasted about the support for building repairs and equipment that came through local fund-raising efforts. Some complained, not surprisingly, about

43 'Rencontre des directeurs et principaux de l'enseignement catholique: qu'advienne lajustice scolaire?', in L'Effort camerounais, 37, 975, April i99i, p. io, and Archidiocese de Yaounde, 'Les Taux de scolarite pour 1993-1994', 7 May 1993.

44 Secretariat permanent de l'enseignement catholique, 'Tous ensemble sauvons l'ecole catholique', Yaounde, May 1992.

45 Parents d'elves du primaire des ecoles catholiques de l'Archidiocese de Yaounde, 'Lettre a Son Excellence le Premier Ministre, le 23 juin 1993'.

46 Ministere de l'education national, Lettre-circulaire du 23 septembre I992.



PRIVATE SCHOOL AND POLITICS IN CAMEROON 6i9

being caught between the policies of the Ministry of National Education and the newly voiced demands of their APE.

The voluntary organisations arose in response to the need to fund a social service from which the state was withdrawing financial support. The relative success or failure of each APE depends on several factors, including the presence and motivation of leading parents, and the degree to which local officials in both church and state help or hinder their activities. Unlike the earlier situation in which all state-supported institutions, public and denominational, received fixed levels of budgetary assistance, the financial well-being of each school now depends on the management skills of its director and the effectiveness of its APE. The differentiation that this has begun to create in Yaounde II is readily apparent: schools supported by a relatively wealthy APE have modern equipment and facilities, while others lack such basics as doors, desks, and blackboards. It is clear that few if any schools can any longer expect to rely upon the state alone.

The creation of APEs, and the parental participation they encourage, comes at the price of a new dependence on local economic conditions. Already, differentials in the availability of resources in various neighbourhoods determine the provision of social services to which the residents have access. The transformation of education in Yaounde II, however, extends beyond the realm of state-supported institutions.

3. The Emergence of Private Education

The principal roads leading from Yaounde, in the words of a recent description, stretch like a 'marvellous spider web' over the hills of the southern Cameroonian forest.47 Since I993 an increasing number of mostly private, independent elementary schools have lined several of these roads. Colourful signs alert passers-by: 'The Green Chickens', 'The Caterpillars', 'The Little Fingers'. Dozens of such schools, most with less memorable names, now enrol thousands of children.

The state has been responsible for only four of the 14 new schools established in Yaounde II since 1980, the others being profitable ventures that offer either preparatory and/or primary education. By the late I 98os the cost of tuition in private primary schools was in the order of CFA francs 35,000 (about ten times the fees charged in state- supported schools), but in private preparatory schools could be as high as CFA francs 20o,ooo.48 The premium on pre-primary education, and

47 Franqueville, op. cit. p. 7. 4 World Bank, 'Project Outline', P. 2.



620 PATRICK M. BOYLE

its dramatic 27 per cent net growth in enrolments in Cameroon between i980 and I984, can be explained in part by the fact that a good preparatory programme helps pupils to gain admission to the best primary schools.49

Since new schools are being opened in response to local initiatives and funding, and not according to any plan or design of the Ministry of National Education, they follow in rough manner the flow of population and resources. For example, many private schools are located in those neighbourhoods where the construction of cement- block houses on relatively large parcels of land is gradually creating sparsely populated urban areas out of semi-rural villages.50 In contrast, the Yaounde II neighbourhood of 'Carriere', so called because of the quarry around which it is built, had become by 1992 a densely populated low-income centre for over 40,ooo residents, with only two primary schools, both run for profit.5' In areas such as these, neither the state, nor the churches, nor even the private schools are able to keep up with the demand for education.

EDUCATION AND A CLASS-BASED CIVIL SOCIETY

The view from Yaounde II suggests that the partial retreat of the state from its near exclusive control over education has set in motion a profound transformation of the sector as public resources dry up and private initiatives begin to shape the future of schools and colleges in Cameroon. Apart from the impact of this shift on state-supported institutions and their students, there are important albeit more subtle implications for the emergence of civil society.

Urbanisation, fuelled by both population growth and in-migration, coupled with a decade of deep economic crisis,52 has meant that the maintenance of schools is now the main preoccupation of public education officials in Yaounde. Two decades of state-promoted expansion may have institutionalized popular expectations for free education, but financial crises in the face of multilateral donor pressures on the Government to reduce its obligations (and liberalise its

49 Republic of Cameroon, Sixth Five- rear Economic, Social, and Cultural Development Plan, 1986-1,991 (Yaound6, I 986), p. I 99.

50 Emile Le Bris, 'Crise urbaine et effets urbains de la crise: le cas de l'Afrique noire', in Espaces et socidti: revue scientifique international (Paris), 65, i99i, p. 67.

51 Bruno Dujardin, 'Mission: developpement des soins de sante primaire en milieu urbain'. Yaound6: World Bank, Ministry of Health of the Republic of Cameroon and the Institute of Tropical Medicine of Anvers. November i99i to February I992, p. 86.

52 Alibert, loc. cit. p. 3287.



PRIVATE SCHOOL AND POLITICS IN CAMEROON 62I

educational policies) have resulted in the non-payment of subsidies to denominational schools, the addition of new sections in existing state schools, and the mandated creation of APEs. Such a process can mask only for the short term an eventual shrinkage in educational opportunities for a fast growing population given the new attitude towards the provision of social services in Cameroon, namely that 'those who benefit are those who pay'.53

Whether or not a lack of organised efforts by neighbourhood-wide non-governmental organisations or church-based groups in Yaounde II indicates that citizens believe that education and health care are the state's responsibility, the very uneven performances of APEs are consistent with this view. The fact is that public and denominational schools are desperately struggling to raise funds while educational entrepreneurs, often university staff seeking supplementary income in a tight economy, are contributing to the creation of a private infrastructure of entry-level education.

What has been the impact of these developments on the nature and significance of civil society? On the one hand, the creation by wealthier elements of the population of their own system of private education (and health care) offers one socio-economic group autonomous control over their own institutions. These emerging middle classes, frustrated by state ownership, regulations, and corruption, are using their resources to provide themselves with services that correspond to their lifestyles and needs, as elsewhere in Africa.54 Although these elites are creating shields against the effects that rapid population growth and economic crisis have on publicly supported social services, they still fragment along all the expected cleavages: ethnicity, language, region, and religion. The difference now is that the state lacks the wherewithal and political will to direct change in Cameroon. And in so far as the Government maintains a laissez-faire approach to education rather than formally articulating a new policy, it plays the role of passive accomplice in a new process of social differentiation.

On the other hand, the rest of the population - not easily lumped

5 Benoit Mougoue, 'Yaound6: quelles perspectives de developpement?', in Marches tropicaux et mdditerraneens, 233 I, 13 July I 990, p. 2090.

" Kwame Anthony Appiah, In My Father's House: Africa in the philosophy of culture (Oxford and New York, I992), pp. i69-70, explains that local organizations in Kumasi in the i98os were increasingly 'becoming more and more central in organizing the financing, building, staffing, and equipping of schools; in supporting the city hospital; and working, often in combination with each other and the leaders of the Moslem community and the Catholic archbishop'. In the last decade and a half, according to Appiah, the churches and some of these organizations were 'taking over functions formerly reserved to the government and... they were doing so in circumstances where state officials were only too keen to have their aid'.



622 PATRICK M. BOYLE

into a neat category such as 'underclass', because it, too, fails to operate in a unified fashion - scrambles to find places for their children in schools of increasingly dubious quality. Small, typically ethnic associations known as 'tontines' raise funds that can be used for school fees, but function more to enable each member to survive under difficult circumstances than to help the group construct new institutions for society. The disappearance of 'free' primary education combined with only scattered openings of costly private schools makes the task of finding affordable tuition that much more daunting for parents in Yaounde today, not least since an ever larger number of children are competing for enrolment.

If certain class-forming activities are accompanying the emergence of civil society, and if educational changes are playing a role, then a complex situation is already beginning to unfold in Cameroon. The state retreats as a key variable in the dynamic. Caught between its politically popular, but economically unaffordable 'welfare state' goal and international pressures for liberalisation, the Government is not succeeding either in maintaining existing infrastructures or setting clear standards for the adjustments that have to be made. In the gap which has developed between failed welfare-statism and an uncertain liberalization, one reality stands out: Cameroonians of means are exercising their option to 'exit' and creating private institutions, while the relatively unorganised and poorer majority are struggling through APEs to maintain existing facilities.

What is likely to happen if present trends continue? The needs of the inhabitants will not decline, but access to almost any kind of teaching will be increasingly confined to those who have the means to pay for some, most, or all of the costs. Such is the diminution of public goods and services that accompanies a 'move to the market'. If there is any truth in the claim that greater inequality results from periods of economic liberalization, then harsh disparities will characterize the population's access to schools and colleges ... unless the creation of a private sector transforms the nature of educational services in ways that spread benefits throughout society. Meanwhile, will civil society in Yaounde divide into the more and the less literate as the spread of private education, in the absence of any new national commitment, accentuates differences in the formation of young Africans? At a time when class analysis is being largely ignored, the elements of a wholly post-colonial kind of social stratification are beginning to shape the everyday lives and future of a whole generation of Cameroonians.



Documents

Parents, Private Schools, and the Politics of an Emerging Civil Society in Cameroon