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Violence in the Twilight Zone: informal non

The truce and everyday life in a violencefree municipality: The case of Santa Tecla

Violence Research and Development Project

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Violence in the Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South

The truce and everyday life in a violencefree municipality: The case of Santa Tecla

in El Salvador

Willian Carballo

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers

No. 11

state policing in the

The truce and everyday life in a violence -free municipality: The case of Santa Tecla

Papers

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 11

International Center for Violence Research – ICVR A Project of the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence – IKG Universität Bielefeld Universitätsstraße 25 33615 Bielefeld Germany Project Webpage http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/ Violence Research and Development Project | Papers http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/icvr/publications.html Contact [email protected] The Violence Research and Development Project Papers are a medium for circulating research within the Violence Research and Development Project of the International Center for Violence Research prior to publication in order to encourage discussion. The Violence Research and Development Project Papers represent work in progress. Comments are welcome and should be addressed to the author(s). Any opinions expressed in this paper are the author(s) and not necessarily those of the International Center for Violence Research and the Institute for Interdisciplinary Research on Conflict and Violence, Bielefeld University. If you want to be informed about new publications of the International Center for Violence Research please send an e-mail to: [email protected] The copyright of this Violence Research and Development Project Paper is held by the author(s).

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 11 1

Acknowledgements The Violent Research and Development Project series of papers documents the preliminary

results of a pilot project that was established to integrate higher education training in social

science research with cross-regional comparative research on violence. The overall aims of

the project, which has been generously supported by the German Federal Ministry for

Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), is to empower young academics in Africa,

Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East, so that they can contribute to international violence

research, publish their findings both nationally and internationally, and ultimately develop

scientifically grounded political and civil-society responses.

For that purpose, the Bielefeld University’s International Center of Violence Research (ICVR)

entered into cooperative agreements with five partner Universities in Asia, Africa, Latin

America, and the Middle East: the American University in Cairo (Egypt), the Universidad

Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas in San Salvador (El Salvador), the University of Benin

City (Nigeria), the University of the Punjab in Lahore (Pakistan), and the Pontifical Catholic

University of Peru in Lima.

The empirical research carried out in the pilot project was structured in five research lines:

“Parties, Passion, and Politics”, “Justifications and Legitimacy of Police Violence”, “Violent

and Non-Violent Neighborhoods”, “Violence in the Twilight Zone”, and “Violence against

Women”. These topics were chosen to cover intra-societal conflict and violence by looking at

aspects such as political violence, violence perpetrated by state institutions, violent events,

violent and non-violent locations, violence and gender, and forms of self-defense and

vigilantism.

This paper documents research that was conducted in the Research Line “Violence in the

Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South”. Groups carrying out informal

non-state policing such as vigilante groups or gangs take ”the law into their own hands“ and

act in lieu of the state. They thus operate in what has been referred to as a ”twilight zone“: a

zone in which public authority is exercised not exclusively by the state but by a variety of

institutions including informal, non-state groups. For these groups to be able to exercise this

kind of authority, let alone to maintain themselves for a longer period, they have to enjoy at

least some degree of legitimacy with the members of the communities in which they operate.

Thus, this research examines the basis of legitimacy of groups carrying out informal non-

state policing in four countries of the Global South, namely Egypt, El Salvador, Nigeria, and

Peru.

Bielefeld, April 2015

Rosario Figari Layús, Sebastian Huhn, Boris Wilke, Ciaran Wrons-Passmann

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No. 11 2

Research Line

Violence in the Twilight Zone: informal non-state policing in the Global South

The truce and everyday life in a violence-free muni cipality: The case of Santa

Tecla in El Salvador

Willian Carballo

Abstract

Youth gangs are the main source of violence in El Salvador. After repressive measures to

defeat the gangs failed, the government decided in 2012 to support a process called the

“truce.” Under its terms, El Salvador’s two most important gangs pledged to reduce violence

in exchange for an end to state repression against gang members and the establishment of

reintegration programs. On the local level, the process led to the creation of violence-free

municipalities – areas in which local authorities promote and support the truce through

reintegration and violence prevention measures. Lately, in violence-free municipalities the

gangs have boosted their role as agents of control through the “administration” of the crime

rate. In this study I investigate the impact of the truce at the local level and in the everyday

lives of the inhabitants of the municipality of Santa Tecla, and in particular the communities

of San Rafael and San José El Pino. I look into the community members’ perceptions of the

truce, the actual impact of the truce at the local level, as well as the role that gangs now play

in these municipalities.

Key words

El Salvador, gangs, violence, truce, everyday life

Willian Carballo

Willian Carballo holds a Master’s degree in communication science. He is a lecturer

at Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas (UCA) and at the Escuela de

Comunicaciones Mónica Herrera in El Salvador. His areas of interest and expertise

are violence, mass media, democracy and culture. He has worked in violence

prevention projects in vulnerable areas in San Salvador and as a journalist.

Violence Research and Development Project | Papers | No.11 3

Outline

1. Introduction

2. The hottest sun in a country that burns: a brief background on Salvadoran gangs

3. Lights and shadows on Santa Tecla, San Rafael and San José El Pino

4. Gangs and the truce in the literature

5. Gangs: shedding light unto a dark phenomenon

6. Methods

7. San Rafael and San José El Pino: findings from a twilight zone in Santa Tecla

7.1 The truce: distrust, indifference and relief

7.2 Gangs: new agents of control?

7.3 Fear and distrust are in the air

7.4 The truce and the power of gangs

8. Final conclusions before sunrise

9. Bibliography

1. Introduction

Youth gangs are the epitome of violence in El Salvador. Since their emergence in the 1980s

and their subsequent growth in the Salvadoran postwar period (1992 onwards), they have

terrorized much of the population and caused analysts a great deal of concern. At the same

time, the gangs’ growth has also provoked the state to adopt different strategies to combat

and contain them (Cruz, 2005; Aguilar, 2006).

After repressive measures did nothing but increase the number of homicides and

prisoners (Aguilar, 2006), the Salvadoran government finally put in place a process called

“truce” in March 2012. Simply put, the truce is an agreement between the two main gangs

operating in the country, namely Mara Salvatrucha (or MS-13) and Barrio 18 (both gangs are

also simply known as “maras”1), to stop killing each other. In return, the state authorities

1 Today in El Salvador the term “maras” is used synonymously with “youth gangs”, although originally it meant “a crowd” or “a group of friends”.


agreed to reduce repression against gang members and to create opportunities for

reintegration (Dudley and Pachico, 2013).

Locally, the truce manifested itself in the creation of so-called “violence-free

municipalities.” Within this initiative the same rules applied within certain municipalities.

However, in cases where only one of the groups was present in a community, the gangs

pledged to lower the crime rate and respect the people. Thus the gangs are considered to

have strengthened their control of people’s daily lives. This is especially the case in

communities that, since before the truce, had been strongholds of the gangs.

The purpose of this research paper is to describe the impact of the truce on the everyday

lives of the inhabitants of communities that are strongholds of one of the gangs. Field

research was conducted between November 2013 and July 2014 in San José El Pino2 and

San Rafael, two communities in the municipality of Santa Tecla, west of the capital San

Salvador. In both of these communities, state security forces have been absent in the past

and gangs control internal security.

On the basis of the accounts of community members, I show how the truce manifests

itself at the local level, how community members perceive the truce, as well as what role the

gangs have been playing in the communities since the agreement was signed. I not only

shed light on how gangs seek legitimacy in the communities they control. The accounts of

community members also contribute to enhance our knowledge of the truce – a measure that

marks a milestone in the Salvadoran government’s efforts to contain the growth of the gangs

– and they allow us to understand its impact at the local level.

According to Tager and Aguilar (2013) the truce and the creation of "violence-free

municipalities" led to a significant decrease in the number of homicides and opened up an

opportunity to lay the foundations for a peace process. However, the truce also carries a

number of risks, such as increased opportunities for criminal activity and the possibility that

the government can be held hostage through the threat of violence (Dudley and Pachico,

2013). Against this background, it is important to know more about the impact of the truce at

the local level, because it provides us with hints on how it actually works and, thus, whether it

is worth replicating elsewhere in the country.

In addition, this study fills a gap in the literature. To date, with the exception of Dudley and

Pachico (2013) and Tager and Aguilar (2013), there are hardly any academic studies on the

truce. Existing reports are mainly journalistic (El Faro, 2012 and 2013) or written by non-

governmental organizations (Interpeace, 2014). Moreover, none of the existing research has

focused on the perception of the community members who interact daily with gangs.

2 In this paper I use San José El Pino and El Pino interchangeably.


Although some quantitative research has been conducted (UCA, 2014; Universidad

Tecnologica, 2013), none of it delves into the stories and discourses of the people who live

inside communities controlled by gangs.

2. THE HOTTEST SUN IN A COUNTRY THAT BURNS: A BRIEF BACKGROUND

ON SALVADORAN GANGS

El Salvador is a country that has historically been associated with violence. Despite being no

bigger than 20,000 square kilometers, this small Central American country with six million

inhabitants has seen many bloody episodes since its independence in 1821.

One of the most recent violent episodes was the civil war in the 1980s3. During the war

more than 75,000 people were killed and many more were forced to migrate, mainly to the

United States. After the war ended in 1992, the US-government increased deportations of

Salvadorans with criminal records, mainly from California. Since many of those deported had

joined local gangs in California, they brought the culture of gangs to El Salvador when they

returned. Once they were back in Central America, the deported gang members encountered

young people living in poverty and in a society that excluded them. As a result of these socio-

historical developments, gangs or “maras” proliferated (Cruz, 2005).

Although in the beginning the “maras” were viewed merely as youth gangs — youngsters

who just hung out, other phenomena such as the rise of drug trafficking in Central America,

as well as impunity and increasing social and economic exclusion eventually made them

become organizations specialized in violent crime (Tager and Aguilar, 2013, p. 5).

In El Salvador, there are two main gangs: MS-13 and Barrio 18, which closely worked

together initially (El Faro, 2012)4. Barrio 18 emerged in Los Angeles, mainly in

neighborhoods populated by Mexican immigrants. It soon became one of the few gangs,

which accepted members of different nationalities in their ranks, including Central Americans

(Iñiguez, 2007). This was how Barrio 18 grew and, over the years – and due to the

intensification of the deportations – came to Central America.

Meanwhile, MS-13 also emerged in Los Angeles, as the number of Salvadorans living in

California increased. At first, it was a peer group that enjoyed rock music. However, due to

their coexistence with other gangs, and in order to survive on the streets and in jail, its

members started to emulate other youth groups in the city (by wearing loose clothing and

3 Economic inequality and state repression triggered a civil war in the 1970s. Five underground organizations took up arms and joined forces under the flag of the Farabundo Martí Front for National Liberation (FMLN) to fight against the military regime in power. As it turned out that neither side could win the war, a negotiated solution was finally sought. Thus, in 1992 peace accords were signed that ended the war. 4 At the beginning, in the United States, members of both gangs went to the same parties, used drugs together and even had common enemies. However, due to disagreements among their respective leaders, the two gangs split and a bloody chain of acts of revenge followed (El Faro, 2012).


shaving their heads, for example). At the same time, they continue to identify strongly with

their home country (El Faro, 2012).

Government officials calculate that in El Salvador there are some 60,000 gang members

and that over 10,000 are in prison. Moreover, gangs have a support network of up to 400,000

people (Tager and Aguilar, 2013), especially close relatives, such as parents, wives and

siblings. The state authorities accuse gangs of being the main cause of violence in El

Salvador. In early 2012, on average 12 people were murdered a day in El Salvador.

Moreover, gangs operate a scheme in which they extort what is known as “rent”5 from

traders and business people. This scheme generates losses of over US$18 million for private

companies every year (La Prensa Gráfica, 2013).

This problem has led the government to adopt different measures to put an end to the

gangs’ criminal activities. During the periods when the Nationalist Republican Alliance

(ARENA)6 ruled, different measures to eradicate gangs were taken. Thus, in 2003, then-

President Francisco Flores launched “Plan Mano Dura” (the “Iron Fist Plan”), taking

repressive measures against youths involved in gangs. These measures were accompanied

by the so-called Anti-Gang Act, according to which any young person was suspicious if he or

she had a tattoo (Aguilera, 2013, in Tager and Aguilar, 2013). However, the Supreme Court

later declared this law to be unconstitutional.

In 2004, Antonio Saca, also an ARENA politician, came to power. His strategy was even

more radical: “Plan Super Mano Dura” (the “Super Iron Fist Plan”). As with Plan Mano Dura,

at its core was repression. In order to restore public safety the army and police sought to

arrest large numbers of gang members in the most critical areas.

Besides these measures, the parliament enacted the “Prohibition of Maras, Gangs,

Groups, Associations and Organizations of Criminal Nature Act” in 2010. The Act openly

declared Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, among other gangs, as criminal organizations (El

Faro, 2013).

Despite all these plans, laws and measures, violence and crime continued to increase

(Tager and Aguilar, 2013). This was due, in part, to the fact that the measures only led to

overcrowded prisons7, where gang leaders continued issuing orders (through the illegal

smuggling in of cellular phones) to their subordinates. Likewise, new arrivals learned the

tricks of the trade from fellow inmates.

5 The "rent" is a form of protection money that gangs extort from traders each month. The amount to be paid varies depending on the size of the business. Public transportation and goods-delivery businesses, grocery stores and drugstores are the most affected by this form of extortion. 6 ARENA is the main right-wing party that was in power from 1989 to 2009. 7 The utilized capacity in the prisons went from 11,451 inmates in 2003 to more than 26,848 in 2013, according to the Bureau of Prisons (IUDOP, 2014).


Finally, in 2012, midway through the legislature of the first left-wing government in El

Salvador, headed by President Mauricio Funes (FMLN), a new strategy emerged to tackle

the growing problem: the “truce.” On March 2012, leaders of the MS-13 and Barrio 18

established a truce in which they agreed to a cessation of hostilities between the two gangs,

pledging to reduce the number of homicides. In return, they requested that their basic rights

be guaranteed and the conditions for members in detention be improved, while the

persecution and harassment of relatives of gang members should stop (Tager and Aguilar,

2013). Indeed, as the online newspaper El Faro (2012) revealed, in the first half of March

2012, 30 gang members left the maximum-security jail, including the leaders of both gangs.

Accordingly, right after the signing of the truce, it was agreed that the number of daily

homicides dropped from 12 or 14 to an average of 5.5.

The government denied being part of the agreement and called it “a pact between the two

gangs” without state participation. Senior police officers – and even President Funes –

claimed that the decline in homicides was the result of the effectiveness of the government

apparatus. However, versions about the origin of the truce started to come and go. Months

later, for example, the then Minister of Justice and Security, General Munguia Payés,

revealed that the Funes government had facilitated the process (El Faro, 2012).

In January 2013, the truce entered a new phase: the initiative was implemented at the

local level. The idea was to conclude agreements between the local governments, churches,

local businesses and gangs. From these agreements there emerged the so-called “violence-

free municipalities.” As a result, gangs pledged to stop crime. In exchange, authorities

offered reintegration plans.

The first agreements were reached in Ilopango, a small industrial city east of San

Salvador. There, gang members, local government representatives and representatives of

the national executive publicly signed an “act of peace”, something that then would be copied

in other violence-free municipalities, such as Santa Tecla, Quezaltepeque and Sonsonate.

The fragility of the process, however, was revealed after the Supreme Court ruled that

former members of the army, such as the Minister of Security, David Munguía Payes, were

not allowed to be in charge of public security. With the arrival of his successor, the frequency

of communication between the government and the gangs decreased. In addition, the new

security minister, Ricardo Perdomo, asserted that the government did not support the truce

and removed some of the privileges the government had granted to the leaders of both

gangs. Consequently, the gangs, in a show of force, decided in July 2013 to set off a wave of

murders that returned the homicide rate to where it was before the truce.

Since then, gangs have continued to "administer" the number of homicides, according to

whether or not their requirements are met under the truce. For example, prior to the

presidential elections in 2014, gang members unleashed a wave of murders in an attempt to


put pressure on the presidential candidates to keep the process going. The FMLN candidate,

Salvador Sanchez Cerén, won the election. He said that his government would not support

the truce since it implied engaging with people who had broken the law (LPG, 2014).

However, his security minister revealed that they would just get rid of the controversial name

"truce" but keep its principles, including the development of social policies to address the

problem of gangs, making deals to reduce the homicide rate, and engaging in a dialogue with

the gangs (El Faro, 2014). At the same time, the mayors of the violence-free municipalities

maintained their pacts and took their own measures. These measures included prevention

programs and providing zones for economic activity for local gang members. However, in

early 2015, President Sanchez Cerén said the central government would no longer continue

to support the truce.

3. LIGHTS AND SHADOWS IN SANTA TECLA, SAN RAFAEL AN D SAN JOSÉ EL

PINO

Santa Tecla officially joined the truce in 2013. On January 24th at a public event held in the

heart of San José El Pino and San Rafael, the municipality was declared violence-free.

However, Santa Tecla had already gone a long way toward preventing violence before

joining the truce. The municipality, which is part of the metropolitan area of Greater San

Salvador and had an estimated population of 135,000 inhabitants in 2014, was ranked No. 2

nationwide in the 2014 Human Development Index of the UNDP. Since 2002 it trusted in the

development of violence prevention programs, which culminated in the adoption of the truce

in 2013. Moreover, the local government of Santa Tecla put in place a major economic and

cultural initiative: Paseo El Carmen, a new business area that has created sources of income

for local inhabitants but has also brought new problems, such as everyday crimes (robbery

and theft). However, with reference to daily homicides rates, the change is remarkable: while

in 2005 the rate stood at 81, it went down to 13 in 2013 (according to data from the state

police), a number that was confirmed by the municipal Observatory of Violence Prevention.

Nevertheless, within the municipality of Santa Tecla there still are several communities

which are controlled by gangs. Two of these are San Rafael and San José El Pino, which

together add up to approximately three square kilometers and have around 3,000 inhabitants

(Interpeace, 2014).

San Rafael is a group of narrow passageways. There is no central plaza, only long rows

of streets, which inhabitants call “lines.” Some of them are so narrow that three people can

barely walk next to each other. The houses are tiny and very few have flowerbeds or green

space. Its streets, during the day, are always full of people: children, women with their

purchases and workers going to or coming home from work. Young people without tattoos


walk or cycle the streets and are very attentive to visitors. While not all of these young people

are gang members, many are, or are related to them. When you go deeper into this

community, you see other groups of youth hanging around in small vacant spaces or in

corners, with tattoos on their bodies indicating their membership of a gang.

In San José El Pino the situation is a little different from its neighbor, San Rafael. Thus, El

Pino was founded in 1970 on lands donated to the Catholic Church by the owner of a coffee

farm in order to build 520 dwellings (Interpeace, 2014). This allowed better planning of the

area. And this in turn, permitted, for example, for a small park to be created. It also has

public facilities, a school and less narrow streets. Regarding the rest, the residences are also

small and poverty is widespread. In addition, the presence of gangs is undeniable since most

of its members live here.

The stigma of violence haunts both communities. Indeed, according to a survey

conducted by the associations representing the Mayor’s Offices of Great San Salvador

(COAMSS and OPAMSS) (2009), the communities are considered “the most dangerous

places in the municipality of Santa Tecla” by 41.7 percent of people, followed by downtown

Santa Tecla, with 5.8 percent (Morales, 2011).

4. GANGS AND THE TRUCE IN THE LITERATURE

The first academic studies on Salvadoran gangs were published in the early 1990s. Argueta

(1991) for example showed in a journal article that youth groups in El Salvador already

existed in the 1980s. Their members were excluded socially and economically and exhibited

a similar ethos of violence and internal solidarity as can be found in the “maras” today

(Proceso, 2003, in Martel, 2007).

In the late 1990s, first in-depth studies of the phenomenon appeared. Thus, the

Universidad Centroamericana Jose Simeón Cañas (UCA) published a series of working

papers entitled “Maras and Gangs in Central America”, that addressed issues such as social

capital, rehabilitation and the response of organized civil society (Santacruz and Cruz, 2001;

Cruz, Carranza and Santacruz, 2004; Carranza, 2004; Cruz, 2006). The studies dealt with

different aspects of the gang phenomenon, portrayed the gangs and their members, as well

as the institutions committed to their rehabilitation. Similarly, in their monograph “Inside the

neighborhood, the violent solidarity of gangs”, Santacruz and Concha-Eastman (2001)

described how gangs increasingly participated in acts of violence and in drug trafficking.

In the 2000s scholars’ attention shifted to the causes of as well as to the responses to the

emergence of gangs by the government and by society. For example Cruz published an in-

depth study on the root causes of gangs in Central America (specifically in El Salvador,

Honduras and Guatemala). He concluded that the emergence of these groups was neither


the result of a single cause nor historically predetermined by the experience of a civil war.

Aguilar (2006), meanwhile, studied the adverse effect of the anti-gang policies in El Salvador,

especially focusing on the Mano Dura and Super Mano Dura plans.

Moreover, in two publications entitled “Indifference and frights: Stories of youths and

gangs in the written press of Guatemala, El Salvador and Honduras” and “The discourse of

the Salvadoran press about the truce” Marroquin (2007 and 2014) investigated the discourse

on gangs in the Salvadoran media. Meanwhile, in “The Salvadoran gangs, new forms of

terror and social control” Martel (2007) takes us through the narratives of gangs. The latter is

part of a larger study called “The gangs, youth identities to the limit” (Velenzuela, Nateras

and Reguillo, 2007), published in Mexico, with different articles on gangs in different

countries of the region.

More recently, the international peacebuilding organization Interpeace published several

case studies on the process of the truce and its impact on some municipalities declared free

of violence such as Ilopango (Interpeace, 2014a) and Santa Tecla (Interpeace, 2014b). The

studies describe how the phenomenon has developed in the said municipalities. Interpeace

also edited a document detailing the historical development of the process and its

contribution to the construction of social peace (Tager, A. and Aguilar, 2013). Likewise,

referring to the truce, Dudley and Pachico (2013) studied the positive and negative aspects

of the process, while Ribando (2103) analyzed the United States’ policy toward the gangs in

Central America.

Regarding the perception of the truce, a number of university research centers measured

how the public perceives the truce. For example, a survey by the Institute of Public Opinion

(IUDOP) of the Universidad Centroamericana Jose Siméon Cañas (UCA) of El Salvador

(2014) found that 79.6% of interviewees believed that the truce reduced crime a little or not

at all, while 19.4% said that it had dropped somewhat or a lot. Meanwhile, a study of the

Centro de Investigación de la Opinión Pública Salvadoreña of the Universidad Tecnológica

(2013), stated that 47% of the population believed that gang members were the beneficiaries

of the truce, while 68.1% believed that it had political purposes and five out of ten

interviewees did not see any change.

As the findings of these opinion polls indicate, it is important to get an in-depth picture of

the particular experiences and specific discourses of ordinary people, particularly those living

in communities controlled by gangs. Therefore this study investigates the truce qualitatively –

the advantage of qualitative research being that it can carve out nuances, contradictions and

ambivalences in the perception of a given phenomenon.


5. GANGS: SHEDDING LIGHT UNTO A DARK PHENOMENON

The classical definition of gangs is that of Thrasher (1927). He defines gangs as an

interstitial group, originally formed spontaneously, and then integrated through conflict. It’s

characterized by the following types of behavior: meeting face-to-face, milling around,

moving through space as a unit, conflict, and planning. The result of this collective behavior

is the development of tradition, internal structure, esprit de corps, solidarity, morale, group

awareness, and attachment to a local territory (Thrasher 1927, p. 57, in Rodgers, 1999).

Although this definition still is useful today, it is important to keep in mind that gangs are

extremely heterogeneous social institutions with distinct characteristics (Rodgers, 1999, p.

1). Youth gangs, for example, are considered to exhibit a propensity to violence and

criminality. Even if in many instances violent behavior is attributable to individual gang

members or small groups of members, society associates them with gang membership

rather than individual delinquency (Cohen 1990 in Rodgers, 1999).

In the 1990s, in El Salvador academics typically identified two types of gangs: student

gangs, whose members attended school and thus came together there, and street gangs,

which were made up of young people with a strong sense of belonging usually linked to the

exercise of territorial power in certain neighborhoods or communities (Cruz and Santacruz,

2001). According to Tager and Aguilar (2013, p. 5) it was the street gangs that developed

into "criminal gangs who commit crimes of a different nature, such as theft, robbery,

extortion, rape, murder and drug dealing.”

With regard to the gangs’ relationship to the local community, outsiders generally consider

it to be negative (Rodgers, 1999). However, in many cases gangs and communities develop

a working relationship based on mutual aid and respect. Thus, youth gangs refrain from

harming community members and damaging community property. Sometimes they even go

as far as to act as informal vigilante groups for the community, which then tends not to

denounce gang members to the police. According to Rodgers (1999, p. 3) the development

of this kind of working relationship “is not surprising, since the youth gang members are

themselves inhabitants of the community and embedded in wider kinship and friendship

networks”.

With regard to the exercise of public authority at the local level, controlled by gangs

closely resemble what some social anthropologists such as Lund (2006) call “twilight zones.”

Twilight zones are areas in which the state is not the sole institution exercising public

authority. Rather, authority is exercised by a variety of local institutions such as, for example,

gangs (Lund, 2006, p. 686). These institutions operate in the twilight between state and

society, between public and private (ibid.).


However, similar to armed groups in civil wars for example, it is important for these groups to

enjoy legitimacy, since without legitimacy it will be extremely difficult for them to endure

(Schlichte, 2009, p. 33-34). Following Weber (1978, in Schmelzle, 2012, p. 8) legitimacy can

be defined as a relationship of authority (or domination) between rulers and subordinates,

which both parties perceive as binding. According to Schlichte (2009, p. 113-114) groups

operating in “twilight zones” can seek legitimacy through three ways. First by family ties:

gang members take advantage of family ties to gain legitimacy in the community. A second

way to achieve legitimization is by bringing unstable situations under control, especially when

violence prevails. Finally, there is charisma, i.e. the ability to do certain things, such as

establishing projects and programs, which are temporarily used to legitimate their claims.

Society, meanwhile, looks for ways to deal with institutions such as gangs. Thus there

arises a set of strategies of social control through which society responds to behaviors of

groups and individuals who are qualified as deviant, disturbing, threatening, criminal and

undesirable (Cohen, 1985, p. 15). According to Janowitz (1985, p. 84) social control is the

ability of society to regulate itself according to agreed principles and values. Among social

control mechanisms, a range of responses or initiatives can be identified, such as

demoralization, exclusion, confinement and annihilation; but also prosecution, prevention and

reform (Pegoraro, 2001, p. 352).

Since in the Salvadoran context the mechanisms imposed by state often did not bring

about the intended results, at the local level institutions the gangs continue to exercise public

authority in lieu of the state. State authorities, gang members and communities thus

coexisted and imposed rules in confusing and contradictory ways. It’s in this context that a

new, more conciliatory approach toward the gangs was adopted: the truce.

1. METHODS

In this exploratory study qualitative methods were used. Thus, semi-structured interviews

provided information on the perceptions of citizens of the municipality of Santa Tecla. Field

research was conducted between January and June 2014.

The interviewees could be divided into three categories of people: a) community members

of San Rafael and San José El Pino, b) inhabitants of the rest of Santa Tecla and c) key

agents. The interviewees in the first two categories were selected according to criteria of

inclusion, that is it was important that perceptions of different categories of people such as

young people who were not gang members, adults, elder people, men, women, students,

people with or without a job as well as people with small businesses were taken into account.

Selecting community members with different backgrounds was important since perceptions

among different categories of people in the different areas might vary a lot depending on the

interviewees’ background. It thus made it possible to arrive at a broader and at the same


time more differentiated picture of community members’ perceptions. The distribution was as

follows:

Table 1: Overview of interviewees Place of origin of interviewees

Total number Gender Age groups

Community members from San Rafael and San José El Pino

13

8 women

4 youths8 that were not involved in gangs

4 adults, two of which had stores inside the communities

5 men

3 youths that were not involved in gangs

2 adults that worked in factories outside of the communities

People living outside of San Rafael and El Pino

10

6 women

2 youths

4 adults

4 men

2 youths

2 adults, both professionals

Keys agents

7

− An employee of the San Antonio Parish

− The director of the Social Harmony and Citizen Security Directorate, a department of Santa Tecla City Hall

− A deputy director of the Social Harmony and Citizen Security Directorate, a department of Santa Tecla City Hall

− A person in charge of the Observatory for Violence Prevention, a department of Santa Tecla City Hall

− A principal of a private school in Santa Tecla who works with youngsters

− 2 members of Community Boards9 of San Rafael and El Pino

Source: Elaborated by the author.

It’s important to note that, in the case of the community members, for reasons of personal

safety, interviews were conducted under the condition of anonymity. Thus all names were

changed.

As part of the fieldwork, I also visited San Rafael and San José El Pino on several

occasions. Although for reasons of personal safety it was difficult to conduct prolonged

fieldwork inside the communities, it was possible to get an impression of the “day-to-day”

routine of the communities’ inhabitants. It was also possible to observe how community

8 The term youth compromises people aged 18 to 25. 9 The Community Board consists of a group of neighbors who administer social projects in their respective communities. All communities have a Community Board. It is elected by all community members and is mandated to take decisions in the name of the communities’ inhabitants.


members interacted with gang members that participated in income generating programs.

With regard to the other communities of Santa Tecla in which gangs were not present, similar

research was conducted there in order to enquire about the peoples’ perception of the truce.

These communities included downtown Santa Tecla and different neighborhoods and

communities in the North and West of the municipality.

7. SAN RAFAEL AND SAN JOSÉ EL PINO: FINDINGS FROM A TWILIGHT ZONE

IN SANTA TECLA

7.1. The truce: distrust, indifference and relief

Critics of the truce and the “violence-free municipalities” initiative believe that the truce gives

more power to the gangs, because making a pact with them means tolerating their presence,

which not only bolsters their authority but also allows them to reorganize and rearm. Against

this background many analysts have doubts regarding the government’s ability to ensure that

the “peace zones” don’t become havens of lawlessness (Ribando, 2013. p. 12). The

countrywide rise in murders that occurred when the government implemented repressive

policies that stood in the way of the gangs’ interests, seems to confirm this thesis.

Many of the inhabitants of Santa Tecla that don’t deal with gang members on a daily basis

agree with this negative view of the truce, because they live in communities that are not

controlled by gangs. Yamileth V., for example, lives northwest of Santa Tecla, in a middle-

class neighborhood. This 29-year-old employed woman believes that the truce has

empowered the gangs. “They [the government] have let them be”, she explains. She believes

that the number of police operations in many dangerous communities has decreased.

According to her, this, among other things, has led to an increase of drug consumption by

youths who now feel less harassed. Beyond that, she thinks, “things are as they were before

the truce.” (Interview, April 2014)

Paula A. – a 35 years old merchant and resident on the north side of town, at a distance

from San Rafael and El Pino – absolutely mistrusts the truce as well:

“In my neighborhood it hasn’t changed anything. It has not affected residents. I think this

is a way to empower them, to make gang members important. I don’t think that negotiating

with them is an option to reduce violence, because that is a way to win hearts and lose

authority.” (Interview, April 2014)

According to her the state authorities are trying to get the approval and applause of citizens

for the immediate results of the truce. However, in the end, this process will be illusory and it

will only mean to cede full control to the gangs.


In contrast, inhabitants who are in daily contact with gang members because they live in

communities controlled by them, consider the truce to be a relief, a chance for tranquility.

According to most of the interviewees that lived in San Rafael or El Pino, after the signing of

the truce, MS-13 – the gang that controls these communities – promoted peace (in fact, gang

members prefer to call themselves “peacemakers” in these communities) and “managed”

security in the communities. Thus, MS-13 imposed some basic rules on its members (such

as not extorting money from community members), established prevention programs for

children and youths and “controlled” the crime rate which had a positive effect on the image

of the communities.

“The truce has benefitted us because we are no longer with that fear, that threat”, says, for

example, Marlene G., a 20-year-old girl who is studying at a high school through distance

learning and has lived all her life in San Rafael (Interview, March 2014). “Yes, we felt a

change, I no longer heard anything like that [violence]”, says Patricia R., a 43-year-old

woman who sells handicrafts in El Pino (Interview, March 2014). “Yes, the community itself

has seen the change. The boys don’t bother us, the people who live there; they behave

peacefully with us”, adds Joel, a 22-year-old student of Business Administration and a

resident of San Rafael (Interview, March 2014).

Thus, in San José El Pino and San Rafael – communities in which people until recently

were used to see police chases, raids, fights, injuries and murders – most interviewees did

not think that the truce has gone unnoticed. On the contrary, they thought that the truce had

fostered an environment of greater tranquility and peace.

Living inside the communities even turned out to be beneficial for some people – for Mrs.

Raquel and her husband, for example. Gang members helped them find a place to live. The

couple – both around 60 years old – worked in the informal sector, hauling and selling

firewood. However, the money they earned did not suffice to afford a place to call “home.”

The person with whom they lived one day decided to kick them out. Concerned, the elderly

couple turned to the Community Board, but it didn’t have the means to help them. Neither

could the City Hall. “Why don’t you turn to the boys?” proposed a Board member. “The boys”,

of course, were gang members. That is what they did. Soon they had an impromptu hearing

with the members of MS-13. Knowing the neighborhood well, the gang members knew of an

uninhabited place that could work and decided to “give it” to the elderly couple.

There is more. Gang members started thinking about prevention as well. In early 2014,

the main leader of the gang showed up at San Antonio Church which is the local church in

Santa Tecla and whose jurisdiction includes San Rafael and El Pino. The leader looked for

the priest in charge to suggest a project to turn a vacant piece of land owned by the Church

into a small soccer field. The idea was that the initiative would keep younger generations

engaged in recreational activities. A member of the Board was distraught for what the leader


from the local gang said to her: "I remember he said that one of his goals was to avoid

having new gang members from the community." (Interview, April 2014). However, the

project has been delayed due to problems with legal permits (the land belongs to the

Archdiocese of San Salvador, not the local parish).

Despite these problems, the truce and Santa Tecla’s newly acquired status as violence-

free municipality generated several programs designed to prevent violence. Thus, programs

involving the establishment of bird and fish farms, vegetable gardens, welding shops, etc.,

were launched with the financial support of NGOs. According to the Social Harmony and

Citizen Security Directorate of the Municipality of Santa Tecla, 30 gang members were

involved in these projects. Besides participating in small-scale economic activities, gang

members also took part in efforts to establish contacts for future projects aiming at improving

the urban and social environment.

Following Schlichte (2009), all these initiatives can be seen as a mechanism of

legitimization through charismatic ideas. According to Schlichte (2009, p. 114), groups such

as gangs “invoke political projects and programs which serve as legitimizing narratives for

their claims. These programs allow surpassing the limited temporality of basic legitimacy.” By

“handling” security and getting involved in different kinds of programs, gang members not

only seek to gain more legitimacy in the eyes of the inhabitants of the communities, but also

try to establish their group as a legitimate institution that exerts control.

This, however, doesn’t always work. While some neighbors believe in the gang members’

good intentions, others call it “a mask.” As an inhabitant of San José El Pino put it, “They all

are the same people. It’s like a mask that they wear to be, let’s say, working,” (Interview,

March 2014). As this quotation shows, the fear that gangs instill as well as their history of

violence still affects their acceptance.

7.2 Gangs: new agents of control?

Six months after the truce was signed in Santa Tecla, Wilfredo, a street vendor who sells

coconut water on a corner a few blocks from downtown Santa Tecla away, received a phone

call: “We need a loan of $400”, a young voice, agitated and sharp, said across the cell

phone. Then, the caller told him how and where to deliver the money. After that, without

explanation, he hung up. Wilfredo knew it was not a request for charity or a voluntary aid but

someone demanding a “rent”.

Worried and fearful, Wilfredo put his products away, grabbed his small cart with fruit and

ice and left to look for his sister at Colonia San Rafael, south east of the city, where they both

live. There, on tenterhooks, he told her the story. His sister recognized the modus operandi

of the gang and. On the basis of her personal experience, concluded, that “the person who


called has to be someone who knows you, from here in the community. If not, how come he

has your number?”

The decision she made then was risky, but the key to resolving the conflict. Cellphone in

hand, she invited her brother to walk toward the corner where she knew the MS-13 gang

members met. When she found them, she asked for one of their leaders. The boys, friendly

as most of them usually are with the neighbors who know them since childhood, sent

someone to look for the leader. Within seconds, from inside a house, the leader showed up,

shirtless, a human canvas full of tattoos. His look was frightening, contrary to the

cheerfulness with which he greeted Wilfredo and his sister. While he was standing in front of

Wilfredo, who was still doubtful about the consequences his sister’s decision could generate,

the sister told the leader in detail what had happened and, as evidence, showed him the

phone number from which her brother had been called. “We are poor, we cannot pay!” she

argued.

The leader immediately understood the situation. He identified the phone number

registered on the street vendor’s mobile and exclaimed, “They never get out of it!” referring to

the habit of young gang members to demand money from people they know. "And we are

continuously telling them not to do it".

That moment, he sent for the person who supposedly had demanded the “rent.” The

accused showed up immediately. Then, right there, in front of all his mates, Wilfredo and his

sister, the gang leader reminded him what they had agreed upon: that they should not mess

with people in the community.

What followed was a demonstration of internal order. Law enforced by the gang. With all

the gang members present, and as a form of punishment for disobedience, the accused was

beaten vigorously until, by dint of kicking and punching, the message and the rules to obey

were clear. In gang terms, he was applied a “descontón” (internal reprimand). “Let this not

happen again!” the leader warned the rebel and rebuked him at the end of the beating.

Never again did Wilfredo receive any phone call asking him to pay money since then.

Why did his sister not go to police to report the crime, as it should be under the rule of

law? Why did she instead go to the leader of a gang with a violent criminal record? As she

explains:

“In the community, nobody calls the police, because if you go to the police station, they

[gang members] arrive at night where you live [to take revenge]. We cannot call the police.

Here in the community the gang handles security. You feel safer with them.” (Interview,

July 2014)


Many people living in both San Rafael and El Pino had a similar experience to Wilfredo and

his sister. Most people considered the gang to be in control of the community. Moreover, all

inhabitants interviewed said that the gang maintains order in the communities. Whether

community members found that good or bad or whether they said so out of fear, respect or

need, varied depending on whom you talked to. Nevertheless, the conclusion in the end

remains the same: in San Rafael and El Pino, the state barely exercises public authority

when it comes to security. Rather the gang takes on the role of security agents. The police

are usually there to enforce court orders such as arrests or for prevention work, but the

majority of people don’t trust them. As Edgar Portillo, resident of San Rafael and principal of

the private school Hispanoamerica, in Santa Tecla, said:

"I can guarantee that the communities San Rafael and San José del Pino are the

safest residential areas from Santa Tecla (...) They [gang members] have a security

posture, and become security officers, in charge of protecting their territory because

although they are in the process of pacification, they are organized, taking care of the

process.” (Interview, July 2014)

The City Hall of Santa Tecla itself corroborated the feeling of many people. Manuel Cornejo

is the Director of Social Harmony and Citizen Security Directorate, a department of City Hall

that is responsible for promoting peace in town and leading specific prevention efforts in both

communities. He and his people have worked for several years in both settlements. That has

allowed them to make comparisons between how it was before and after the signing of the

pact.

"El Pino is perhaps one of the most peaceful communities. Therefore, I think they also

look after their interests, protecting their settlement or operation base. They take care

that their actions don’t jeopardize their safety. Therefore, in this area there is no

crime.” (Interview, July 2014)

The division led by Cornejo is also in charge of evaluating and providing crime statistics. The

data recorded revealed that there were no criminal incidences within the two communities

other than cases of domestic violence. “Until 2011, it wasn’t like this. If a seller came in, his

products would be destroyed. In fact, two police investigators were murdered there.”

(Interview, July 2014)

Community members confirmed this assertion: there is no crime in San Rafael and El Pino.

However, and again in contradictory ways, many recognized that they live under the rule of a


criminal group that takes justice in its own hands and is extorting merchants or assassinating

rivals, and would even act against the members of the community if they dared to betray a

gang member.

What about the rest of Santa Tecla? Here, the news is not so flattering. According to the

municipal Observatory of Violence Prevention of the municipality, in the first six months of

2013 only three homicides occurred, but in the same period in 2014, eight homicides were

committed. The number of extortions hasn’t changed: 13 in both periods. However, regarding

other crimes, such as theft and robbery, there has been a decrease of up to 40 percent,

according to the Observatory’s data.

Regarding the increase in homicides, Cornejo, the Director of Social Harmony and Citizen

Security Directorate, ascribed it to an increase in cases that were not committed by gangs

but fell under the category of common delinquency or to murders in other municipalities

whose perpetrators left the corpses in Santa Tecla. Indeed, it is important to keep in mind

that Santa Tecla had shown a significant reduction of murders over the past decade.

With regard to extortion, the numbers confirm what the residents of San Rafael and San José

El Pino claimed: whereas in the rest of Santa Tecla, extortion continues unabated, in San

Rafael and San José El Pino it has effectively disappeared.

Why isn’t there any extortion any more in these two communities? Because residents and

gang members have extensive family or fraternal ties. In fact, all residents of the

communities that were interviewed said they had a friend or a family member who was a

member of MS-13: a cousin, a brother or a childhood friend. Esteban, a 21-year-old boy who

ascribes the reason why he did not join the gang to the education his father gave him, is a

good example of someone who entertains these kinds of ties. Thus, he explained that he had

many friends that were gang members:

"In 2010, I met about 15 friends ... Some time ago I bumped into one of them, who

recently got out of jail, and asked him “Hey! What about the others?” And he replied, “they

have been given eight years [in prison] just now!”. I don’t feel well, because those are the

boys I hung out with. We were many, and of them, some are dead, others are in prison.”

(Interview, March 2014)

These relationships are capitalized on by both, the residents and the gang. On the one hand,

many residents of San Rafael and San José El Pino take advantage of these fraternal ties to

seek protection, either from external (from members of other gangs or other criminals) or

internal threats (e.g. from a member of the same local gang). On the other hand, the gang

protects members of the community whom they know and have close ties with. However, this

"protection" is not always disinterested. As Rodgers (1999) point out, gang members use


family ties and relations of friendship to get legitimacy and power in the community, thus

becoming socially accepted as local agents of control.

The relationship between gang members and community members thus often is merely

characterized by interest and mutual benefit. As a 20-year-old girl explained, “Sometimes we

bump into one of those people [gang members] and if that person greets or something, we

must answer, otherwise, there can be a problem.” (Interview, March 2014)

A school principal and teacher of a small private school located in downtown Santa Tecla

experienced the same situation as Wilfredo, the street vendor, and resorted to the same

strategy. After receiving a phone call demanding a “rent” he turned to a befriended leader of

MS-13 to “ask for his intervention” and stop the threat (Conversation, April 2014). Again, it

worked, and the extortion stopped.

7.3 Fear and distrust are in the air

Another reason why gang members can act as agents of control has to do with fear and

distrust. Most of the community members that were interviewed accepted the gang as a

guarantor of security, but more out of necessity than by choice. Thus, while gang members

were perceived as treacherous, untrustworthy and as having a disposition for violence, the

fear of retaliation or rather the fear of the reaction of gang members conditioned the

community members’ acceptance of the gangs. In this sense and following Schlichte (2009),

gangs also use force and fear to achieve legitimization.

Thus, the inhabitants of San Rafael and San José El Pino mentioned several examples in

which gang members beat, raped and harassed community members. These incidences

intimidated community members and are still remembered by the people many years later.

For example, a man who works at a factory in San Salvador explained, “whether we like it or

not, they can give us a stab in the back. It’s not good to trust blindly.” (Interview, March

2014). In turn, a young woman proclaimed:

“Why should I trust a gang member? They, eventually, will pay me badly. I mean, if I am

not useful to them at all, they are just going to say: 'we have to kill her because she knows

a lot about us; she can give away information or something else” (Interview with a young

woman, March 2014).

The control exerted by the gangs thus is also based on fear. Phrases such as “is a mask” or

“pay back will not be good” and “there are no warranties” come to light in many of the

interviews, even though the same people who use these phrases say they live quieter with

the truce.


However, it should be made clear that not all community members distrust the gang. Some

say they have no fear. A member of the Community Board, who has met with gangs

members approximately 50 times in the last two years to discuss local projects, is one of the

people who think that way. She even supports them: “Because we see them tattooed and the

way they act, we believe that they are extremely evil and no, it is not like that.” (Interview,

April 2014)

The problem is that community members don’t trust the police either. The perception is

similar in San Rafael, San José El Pino and the rest of Santa Tecla. As a government

employee who lives in Santa Tecla put it: “I would not like to have to tell them [the local

security authorities] that I have a problem, because I don’t think they can solve it.” (Interview,

August 2014)

From what people say, it can be inferred that the state has little if any credit and it is

perceived as ineffective. On the one hand, people question the moral and ethical integrity of

public security officers, accusing them of corruption and connivance which is the reason why

they don’t trust them. On the other hand, people don’t believe they are capable of protecting

citizens.

The situation is a bit more complicated in communities such as San Rafael and San José

El Pino. In San Rafael, there is a community police station that is responsible for both

communities. It was established in 2012, months before Santa Tecla became a violence-free

municipality. The police collaborate with gang members in keeping the communities clean

and in the organization of sports and cultural events. As in other areas of Santa Tecla, the

Mayor has also installed delegations of Metropolitan Community Agents Corps10. Their

function, rather than being repressive, is preventive.

However, even though the police are present in the heart of El Pino, despite joint

prevention efforts, mistrust and accusations against the authorities persist. As one resident

explained:

“I don’t trust the police. Why did they not arrive to the community before the truce began?

Why being the highest authority, they did not come in? I guess that’s because they were

afraid of them [gang members]. If they are the highest authority, why should they fear

somebody, a criminal? It should not be like that.” (Interview with a woman March 2014).

10 Metropolitan Community Agents Corps are responsible for enforcing municipal laws but do not have the same authority as the police. They are called “community agents” since they are closer to the people and get involved in their activities.


7.4 The truce and the power of gangs

As mentioned earlier, community members in San Rafael and El Pino agreed that the truce

strengthened the gang’s role as security agent because it gave the gang greater prominence

and freedom of action. However, community members also made clear that the gang already

controlled security in both communities before the truce.

The case of Diana, who ten years ago experienced sexual harassment, is an example of

how the gang already exerted a certain degree of control before the truce. In 2006 Diana was

just 14. In order not to arouse any attention, “I had to look like I was a nun”, she recalls. It

was at that time that a gang member noticed her beauty and wanted to conquer her. He

came up to her as any Casanova would. Then, consumed by the power that being a gang

member gave him and because Diana refused and tried to stay away from “this kind of

youngster”, he tried to conquer her in a different way: “He wanted to force me”, she recalls

(Interview, March, 2014).

Diana explained her mother what had happened. Instead of going to the prosecutor or the

police her mother turned to the leader of the gang, to “report” the case and tell him she did

not want gang members to bother her daughter. The verdict: a “descontón” – a reprimand for

the young gang member and an immediate end to the harassment.

Back then Diana benefitted from the fact that the gang leader was well acquainted with

Diana’s family. Her sister had a catering business, which often supplied gang members with

dinner or lunch. The gang member that harassed the girl, however, was a newcomer to the

community. "Despite what they did to him” – Diana confesses – “I was a little scared because

he would say it was my fault and maybe wanted to get even.” (Interview, March, 2014)

What Diana’s case shows, is that before the truce whether the gang intervened in a

specific case or not strongly depended on whether or not they knew the victim. In other

words, the provision of protection wasn’t a strategy in itself, pursued in order to gain

legitimacy, but a favor that was granted to community members that requested it.

So Diana’s case rather was an exception. As she explains, friends of hers were not as

lucky as she was:

“They [girls] were abused because they [gang members] wanted to touch us (...) I know

that in school a girl my age was taken away at that time; she was dating one of them.

They were boyfriend and girlfriend but she wanted to break up with him and she said: “It’s

enough, this is the end” and he couldn’t deal with it. She was raped by all of the gang

members.” (Interview, March 2014)

Nowadays, according to Diana, this does not happen anymore. In fact, community members

in Santa Tecla named this out as an outcome of the truce. Today, Diana walks freely through


the narrow streets of San Rafael. “Since the truce, we have come to rest. For example, I

sometimes don’t come home until 12 at night and nothing happens to me nor do I feel fear.

Or I can even walk around freely wearing shorts. In the past, this was not possible.”

(Interview, March 2014)

This view is supported by other interviewees: in their view MS-13 wields more authority

and exerts control more systematically since the signing of the truce. While in the past it

stopped individual gang members from committing crimes against community members from

time to time, with the truce it became a rule. The truce thus seems to have provided a

framework, which allowed MS-13 to assert control over the communities without having to

expect repression.

This view is widespread in many communities outside of San Rafael and San José El

Pino, as the case of this resident of downtown Santa Tecla shows: "Of course they have

more power, the truce turned gang members into groups with the blessing of the

government; therefore, they act more freely" (Interview with a woman, April 2014).

8. FINAL CONCLUSIONS BEFORE SUNRISE

Based on the interviews two opposing perceptions of the truce and the “violence-free

municipalities” initiative, as well as its impact on San Rafael and El Pino can be discerned.

On the one hand, people who don’t live in areas controlled by gangs strongly criticized the

truce and the “violence-free municipalities”-initiative. In turn, members of communities that

are controlled by gangs and who thus interact daily with gang members, considered the truce

to be positive because it was deemed to have positive effects. These people said that there

is less harassment and criminality and that gang members support prevention efforts and

help people in need.

Regarding this last point, it is important to note that members of MS-13 already acted as

agents of security in San José El Pino and San Rafael before the truce, and that the

agreement signed in Santa Tecla in 2013 just provided a new institutional framework. The

police presence in both communities was minimal or limited to particular operations to

capture criminals (mainly at nighttime). Apart from these kinds of operations, MS-13 could

decide, for example, whether a girl was actually raped, or whether a stranger to the

community was attacked. As a consequence of the truce, MS-13 could operate more freely.

As noted during fieldwork and as some researchers such as Ribando (2013) and Dudley and

Pachico (2013) have pointed out, gang members now have more freedom of movement and

control over the communities. They now know they won’t be persecuted by the authorities

just for being gang members. Moreover, they are entrusted with the implementation of

projects designed by the local government to prevent violence. In addition to the fact that the


projects can either be used to spread fear of to create tolerance toward the gang, MS-13 can

now exert control more easily.

Once MS-13 got involved in the truce, it sought to use the protection given to neighbors,

friends and families as much as it could to strengthen its legitimacy. Thus, MS-13 agreed not

to extort money from neighbors or to intimidate them through threats or through violence, and

established a rule that they would not cause harm to anyone within San Rafael and San José

El Pino. Also, the gang supported some community members who were in financial

difficulties and sought opportunities for reintegration. However, they did not abandon their

criminal activities, nor did they stop attacking their rivals or extorting money from people from

other communities.

Nevertheless, as was pointed out by the representatives of the Observatory of Violence

Prevention in Santa Tecla, the process has helped communities such as San José El Pino

and San Rafael to reduce the crime rate. This means that, at least in the cases of El Pino

and San Rafael, there is less violence compared to before. However, this phenomenon, as

the interviews show, does not imply in any way that community members live in tranquility,

since fear and mistrust persist.

In fact, in San Rafael and San José El Pino, people accept the gang, even though they

fear that it could go back to the levels of pre-truce violence. Community members accept the

gang for three reasons: First, out of fear of the gang members, who are regularly use of

violence. Second, because it is usual to turn to gang leaders to solve security problems. And,

third, because community members distrust the police, which is seen as corrupt and

ineffective.

People who live in other areas of Santa Tecla where the presence of gangs is scarce or

nonexistent, in turn saw little or no change after the introduction of the truce. To a large

extent this is due to the fact they don’t interact with gang members on a daily basis and thus

don’t experience firsthand the fear that they instill. Though these inhabitants distrust the state

authorities as well, they not only don’t consider the gangs to be agents of security, but also

think that the only thing the truce did was to give more power to the gangs.

These findings have several implications. First, the fact that the truce is reinforcing a

dynamic that existed before implies that the gangs can decide to go back to their previous

modus operandi if they wish. That is, given that the truce strengthened the control that MS-

13 exercised in communities such as San José El Pino and San Rafael, the truce as of now

has not fundamentally changed the complex problem of gang violence. On the contrary, it

looks as if the truce has allowed the gangs to become stronger and better organized.

Furthermore, by allowing the gang to exert a higher degree of control, the decision to go

back to the modus operandi they had before the truce is left to the gangs. This makes the

process very fragile and limits its scope.


To address the problem of gangs, friendship and family ties should be taken into

consideration. The same goes for the fact that neighbors often tolerate gang members

because they fear them. Whether it is out of fraternity or out of fear, gang members have

established networks in the areas they control. Any measure in these neighborhoods should

take all members of the communities and not just gang members into account. It should be

clear that capturing a gang member does not mean the end to the problem, since it leaves

behind a network of friends, family and neighbors who, out of fear or convenience, are loyal

to them. This should also be taken into account by NGOs that work in the field of violence

prevention.

The central government should also note that the police are not trusted. The reason for

this distrust is the perception that the police are morally corrupt and unable to protect

communities.

Finally, local and national authorities should be aware that it is not always advisable to

apply the same measures everywhere, not even within the same municipality. As shown in

this study, the truce generated an apparent tranquility for members of communities controlled

by gangs such as San Rafael and El Pino, but people living in the rest of Santa Tecla did not

feel safer and even disapproved of the pact. Thus, the truce is only a partial solution and it

generates more antipathy than approval in communities that are not controlled by gangs.


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