OakeshottRevisited 

Beyond nostalgia 

In1992,almosttwoyearsafterMichaelOakeshott’sdeathandnearlyoneaftertheposthumous

publicationofanenlargededitionofhis1962collectionofessaysRationalisminPolitics,Perry

Anderson expressed his disconcertment and even surprise over how little public notice

Oakeshott’spassingreceived.Afterall,toAndersonOakeshotthadbeen“themostoriginalthinker

of post‐war conservatism” and “one of the quartet of outstanding European theorists of the

intransigentRightwhose ideasnowshape–howevermuch,or little, leadingpractitionersare

awareofit–alargepailofthementalworldofend‐of‐the‐centuryWesternpolitics.”1

TothosesympathetictothefirstpartofAnderson’ssentimentsitmusthaveseemeddisparaging

ifnotoutrightdegradingthatOakeshott’sconservatismshouldbeclassifiedasan“oddlyfearful

quasi‐hedonism”ameredecadeandahalflater.2Provewasbeingofferedinformoftheperhaps

mostwidelyquotedpassageofOakeshott’swork:

                                                            1PerryAnderson:TheIntransigentRightattheEndoftheCentury.In:LondonReviewofBooks,Vol.14,No.18(September24,1992),pp.7‐11.ComplementingthequartetareCarlSchmitt,LeoStraussandFriedrichvonHayek.Oakeshott’sobituariesintheGuardian,theDailyTelegraph,theTimesandtheIndependent,however,weregenerallylaudatorywiththeDailyTelegraphofDecember21,1990callingOakeshottthe“greatestpoliticalphilosopherintheAnglo‐SaxontraditionsinceMill–orevenBurke.”EventhoughPatrickT.Riley,aformerstudentofOakeshottatLSE,didnotagreewithanythingelseAndersonsaid,healsonotedtheinadequacyandinattentionofmostobituaries.PatrickRiley:MichaelOakeshott,PhilosopherofIndividuality.In:ReviewofPolitics,Vol.54.No.4(Fall1992),pp.649‐664.2Jan‐WernerMüller:ComprehendingConservatism:ANewFrameworkforAnalysis.In:JournalofPoliticalIdeologies,Vol.11,No.3(October2006),pp.359‐365,p.363.Inalatteressay,MüllerjuststopsshortofridiculingOakeshottbyportrayinghimasadandy‐philosopher“fondofcockingandcricketmetaphors[…]forwhompoliticsappearedvariouslyas‘vulgar’orasa‘necessaryevil’.”SeeRe‐imaginingLeviathan.In:CriticalReviewofInternationalSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy,Vol.13,Nos.2‐3(June‐September2010),pp.317‐336,directquoteatpp.317‐18.

Prepared for „Workshop on Conservatism“, 6‐7 November 2014, University of Zurich, Ethics Centre, Zollikerstr. 117 (ZOB‐E‐2), 8008 

Zurich, Switzerland    CONFERENCE DRAFT – Do not cite without permission of the author 

Christoph M. Michael,  

Martin‐Luther‐Universität Halle‐Wittenberg,  

Philosophische Fakultät I,  

Institut für Politikwissenschaft  

06099 Halle (Saale) 

Germany 

christoph.michael@politik.uni‐halle.de 

“Tobeconservative,then,istopreferthefamiliartotheunknown,topreferthetriedtotheuntried,factto

mystery,theactualtothepossible,thelimitedtotheunbounded,theneartothedistant,thesufficientto

thesuperabundant,theconvenienttotheperfect,presentlaughtertoutopianbliss.”3

ItisthispassagethatledPrincetonpoliticalscientistJan‐WernerMüllertoclassifyOakeshottasa

proponentofwhatMüllercallsdispositionaloraestheticconservatism.Semanticallythismaybe

justified in so far as Oakeshott himself frequently talks of conservatism as a disposition. But

analyticallythisreductiontothelevelofpassivenostalgiainfavorofthepast(orapeculiarvision

of the present) seems hasty at best. ThoughDana Villa and others have also picked up on “a

palpable(Burkean)nostalgiaforestablishedwaysofdoingthings”4,justafewpagesfurtherinto

thesameessay,Oakeshottexpoundsontheconservativedisposition inrespecttogovernment

statingthatitisfoundin

“thepropensitytomakeourownchoicesandtofindhappinessindoingso,thevarietyofenterpriseseach

pursued with passion, the diversity of beliefs each held with the conviction of its exclusive truth; the

inventiveness,thechangefulnessandtheabsenceofanylargedesign;theexcess,theover‐activityandthe

informalcompromise.”5

Itisfromthisobservationoftheself‐governmentpracticedbymenandtheinformaladjustments

of interests to one another that Oakeshott’s understanding of the purpose of government

develops.Itisrootedin

“ritual,notinreligionorphilosophy;intheenjoymentoforderlyandpeaceablebehavior,notinthesearch

fortruthorperfection.[It]restsupontheacceptanceofthecurrentactivitiesandbeliefsofitssubjects,[and

that]theonlyappropriatemannerofrulingisbymakingandenforcingrulesofconduct.”6

Oakeshott,thus,regardstheexerciseofgovernmentasaveryspecificandlimitedactivity,as“the

ruleofthoseengagedinagreatdiversityofself‐chosenenterprises”7,notasthemanagementof

somebroadpoliticalvisionorsinglepurposeofhumanactivity,norastheexerciseofpreserving

present social and political arrangements, be it to undercut the rise to power of subordinate

classesorsimplyoutofaestheticpreferences.

                                                            3MichaelOakeshott:OnBeingConservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.407‐437,p.408.“OnBeingConservative”wasoriginallyalecturegivenattheUniversityofSwanseain1956.4DanaVilla:OakeshottandtheColdWarCritiqueofPoliticalRationalism.In:TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,ed.byEfraimPodoksik,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,pp.319‐344,326.Villa,however,isclearthat,unlikeStraussorVoegelin,thereis“nolonginginOakeshottfor‘theworldwehavelost’”and,unlikeBurke,Oakeshottisnotanti‐modernbutan“idiosyncraticmodernist”.Ibid.5MichaelOakeshott:Onbeingconservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.426‐27.6Ibid.,pp.428‐29.7Ibid.,p.429.

TheclassificationofOakeshott’sconservatismasaestheticisevenmoresurprisinginviewofthe

factthatintheintermediaryyearsbetweenAnderson’sessayandMüller’sresearchnotemore

thantwodozenmonographsandnumerousarticlesonOakeshott’sworkhadappearedonboth

sidesoftheAtlantic.8Thesehaverecentlybeencomplementedbytwocompanionsandabilingual

edited volumewhich – a few contributions aside –alsomerits the name.9All of these, though

addressingoftenquitediverseaspectsoftheOakeshottianoeuvre,showthatitdoesnotfitthe

clichés of political conservatism as reactionary, anti‐modern or instinctively traditionalist.

MeanwhileOakeshott’sreceptionhastranscendedAnglophoneacademiaandisbuildingacross

theContinent.10ThiswouldsuggestthatOakeshott–afteraninitialslumpininterest–isindeed

onthewaytobecomingaclassicoftwentiethcenturypoliticalphilosophy.Perhapsnotquiteas

iconic as Rawls or Habermas but certainly on parwith Friedrich A. v. Hayek, JohnDewey or

RichardRorty.ItalsoseemsthatOakeshott,inthegreaterperspectiveofthehistoryofphilosophy,

hassuccessfullysecuredaplace forhimself.AnnHartle, forexample,argues thatOakeshott is

joinedwithMicheldeMontaigneinwhatMontaignetermsaccidentalphilosophyfor“Oakeshott’s

accountoftheessayformandofthemeaningofphilosophyareidentical”andbothacknowledge

                                                            8AbibliographycompiledbyEfraimPodoksikbetween2003and2009canbeaccessedviatheMichaelOakeshottAssociationathttp://www.michael‐oakeshott‐association.com/index.php/bibliographyItincorporatesJohnLiddington’searlierbibliographywhichupuntil1993providedthemostcompleteoverviewofOakeshott’spublishedwork.SeeJohnH.Liddington:TheAchievementofMichaelOakeshott,ed.byJesseNorman,London:GeraldDuckworth,1993.9PaulFrancoandLeslieMarsh(Eds.):ACompaniontoMichaelOakeshott.UniversityPark:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,2012;EfraimPodoksik(Ed.):TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012;MichaelHenkelundOliverLembcke(Eds.):PolitikundPraxis–MichaelOakeshottimDialog.Tübingen:MohrSiebeck,2013.ThelatterincludestencontributionsinEnglishandseveninGerman.10RecenttranslationsincludeinItalian:Lapoliticamodernatrascetticismoefede,ed.byAgostinoCarrino,SoveriaManelli:Rubbettino,2013;inSpanish:Laactitudconservadora,prólogodeJesúsSilva‐HerzogMárquez,Madrid:EdicionesSequitur,2009;MoralypoliticaenlaEuropamoderna,traduccióndeCarmenOrsMarqués,prólogoalaediciónEspañolaGerardoLópezSastre,Madrid:EditorialSíntesis,2008;Lavozdelaprendizajeliberal,traduccióndeAnaBello,BuenosAiresyMadrid:Katzeditors,2009;Leccionesdehistoriadelpensamientpolitico,vol.I(DesdeGreciahastalaEdadMedia)yvol.II((ElcarácterdelestadomodernoEuropeo),introducción,traducciónyediciónalcuidadodeFranciscoJavierLópezAtanes,Madrid:UniónEditorial,2012/13;Sobrelahistoriayotrosensayos,traduccióndeMaríaVictoriaRodil,BuenosAiresyMadrid:Katzeditors,2013;inFrench:Moraleetpolitiquedansl'Europemodern,prefacedeOlivierSeyden,Paris:LesBellesLettres,2006;L'associationcivileselonHobbes(suividecinqessaissurHobbes),traductiondeDominiqueWeber,Paris:Vrin,2011;Duconservatism,traductiondeJean‐FrançoisSené,prefaced’AdrienGuillemin,Paris:EditionsduFélin,2012;inHungarian:Politikairacionalizmus,trans.byT.KállaiandT.Szentmiklósi,Budapest:ÚjMandátumKönyvkiadó,2001;inPortuguese:Serconservador,traduçãoporRafaelBorges,availableathttps://dl.dropboxusercontent.com/u/35133614/SerConservador_Oakeshott.pdf;andinRussian:RatsionalizmvPolitikeiDrugieStatii,ed.byL.B.Makeeva,A.B.TolstovaandM.F.Kosilova,trans.byI.I.Myuoberg,E.V.Kosilova,Y.A.NikiforovandO.V.Artemieva,Moscow:Ideia‐Press,2002.

the radical contingency of being and recognize the limits of politics.11Oakeshott’s 1929essay

ReligionandtheWorld,Hartleclaims,mightwellbereadasaportraitofMontaigne.12

However,scholarsofMontaigneasofOakeshotthavelongdebatedwhethertheyshouldbebest

thoughtofasconservativeorliberalthinkersandbothviewsseemcredibletosomeextendbut

neither satisfactory by itself.13 This is the case because, as Hartle suggests, the categories of

conservatismandliberalismdonotcapturebutratherobscurethedeeperdivisionbetweenthose

“who profess a faith in politics, and thus in human reason, to secure the human good (i.e.

perfection)andthosewhoareskepticalconcerningtheabilityofgovernmentandwhowantto

limititspower”.14Andbearinginmindthat“conceptsarenothermeticallysealedandallowfor

fluid, if controlled,movementacross theirvagueboundaries”15, suchquarrelsoverconceptual

branding might be entertaining in their own ways but more often than not converge on

tediousness.Theyalsosufferfromamisunderstandingoftheworkingsofpoliticalideologies.In

hispoliticalessaysOakeshotthimselfrecognizedthatpoliticalconceptsareinterrelated,mutually

interactingandoftencharacterizedbyfundamentalambiguityanditisthisambiguitywhich,as

HannaPitkinpointsout,givesthemtheirmeaningandmakestheirfunctioningpossible.16

Forthepoliticalscientist,whattakesprecedencethenisnotthequestionofhowtocoherently

integrate heterogeneous and often inconsistent elements of a particular ideology or distill a

                                                            11AnnHartle:MicheldeMontaigne:AccidentalPhilosopher.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2003,directquoteatp.37.ThankstolettertoPatrickT.RileyweknowthatOakeshottregardedMontaigne–alongwithSt.Augustine–asthe“twomostremarkablemenwhohaveeverlived”.SeePatrickRiley:MichaelOakeshott,PhilosopherofIndividuality.In:ReviewofPolitics,Vol.54.No.4(Fall1992),pp.649‐664,664.12Ibid.,p.167.SeeMichaelOakeshott:ReligionandtheWorld.In:Religion,PoliticsandtheMoralLife,ed.byTimothyFuller,NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,1993,pp.27‐37.13OnMontaigneseetheoverviewinHartle:MicheldeMontaigne,p.278n14;onOakeshottsee,forexample,LeslieMarsh:OakeshottandHayek:SituatingtheMind.In:ACompaniontoMichaelOakeshott,ed.byPaulFrancoandLeslieMarsh,UniversityPark:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,2012,p.261;AndrewGamble:Oakeshott’sIdeologicalPolitics:ConservativeorLiberal?andWilliamA.Galston:Oakeshott’sPoliticalTheory:RecapitulationandCriticisms.Bothin:TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,ed.byEfraimPodoksik,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,pp.153‐176and222‐244respectively,aswellasthereferencesgivenonp.242n1.EdmundFawcetthasfurtherarguedthatbothOakeshott’sandIsaiahBerlin’s“modestviewofwhatpoliticscouldaccomplish”exemplified“aspectsoftheconstraintsthatliberalsplaceonacceptablesocialorder.”EdmundFawcett:OakeshottandBerlin:LettingPoliticsAloneand‘Negative’Liberty.In:Liberalism:TheLifeofanIdea.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2014,p.317.14Hartle:MicheldeMontaigne,p.220.TothesameeffectseealsoNoelMalcolm:OakeshottandHobbes.In:ACompaniontoMichaelOakeshott,ed.byPaulFrancoandLeslieMarsh,UniversityPark:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress,2012,p.224.15SeeMichaelFreeden:PoliticalConceptsandIdeologicalMorphology.In:TheJournalofPoliticalPhilosophy,Vol.2,No.2(June1994),pp.140‐164,directquoteat154‐55.Freedenarguesthatthespecificityofpoliticalconceptsistheresultofrespectivecombinationsoftwofactors,“thepresenceofanineliminablecomponent,albeitanundifferentiatedformratherthanhardandsubstantive;andanonrandom,evenifwidelyvariable,collectionofadditionalcomponentsthatarelockedintothatvacuous‘defacto’coreinalimitednumberofrecognizablepatterns”.Ibid.p.149.Seealsothein‐depthdiscussioninFreeden’sIdeologiesandPoliticalTheory:AConceptualApproach.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1996.16HannaFenichelPitkin:InhumanConductandUnpoliticalTheory.In:PoliticalTheory,Vol.4,No.3(August1976),pp.301‐320,317.

‘standardcase’butratherwhycertainviewsattainedadominantpoliticalpositionat thetime

they did. Liberalism and conservatism thus do not appear as mutually contradictory sets of

political ideas.Rathertheyneedtobesituatedwithinthebroaderpolitical,socialandcultural

shiftstowhichbothhadtofindnewwaystoaccommodate.17

Both,Montaigne aswell as Oakeshott, did not believe that politics can provide away for the

attainmentofthehumangoodanditisthisskepticismwhichmoderatesagainstrationalschemes

ofchangeandrationalidealsofperfection.Contrarytothemodernbeliefthat“therealizationof

theidealstateisinherentinreasonitself”,bothseemtothinkthatthetaskofpoliticalphilosophy

isnot tobe an instrumentof rulebut that of limiting thepretensionsofpolitics.Butperhaps

MontaignewasmoreawarethanOakeshottthatthereis“nopossibilityofrealinnocenceinthe

worldofpolitics.”Thatis,evenifoneconsciouslyshiedawayfromgettingone’sownhandsdirty

asOakeshott,notoutofasenseofaloofnessbutforgenuinemethodologicalreasons,seemsto

havedone.Politicalphilosophy,forhim,couldnotbeexpectedtoprovidesecurefoundations,nor

to“increaseourabilitytobesuccessfulinpoliticalactivity”,ithadnopowerto“guideortodirect

us in the enterprise of pursuing the intimations of our tradition” and thus, in a sense, it had

“nothingbutahistory.”18

ForMontaigne,thedefenseofprivatelife–whatOakeshottcalledtherichnessandpluralityofany

tradition–requiredresistanceto theever‐expandingclaimsof theuniversalandhomogenous

state.19Tobesure,thisisofmorethanjustincidentalconcern.InOakeshott’stimescarcelyanyone

needed reminding that the ethnic, religious and cultural homogeneity of the European nation

stateswastheresultofanageofextremesandOakeshott’smightinparthavewellbeena“callfor

quiet”20aswellasconstraintinthefaceoftotalitarianism’smid‐centurysuffocatinggriponthe

meaningofhumanexistence.Inourowntime,concernsmayseemoflessimmediacyandgreater

ambiguity such as the increasingdisenfranchising anddepoliticizingof thepublic sphere as a

forum of political deliberation, the effects of a global consumer culture or the increasing

                                                            17ForamoredetaileddiscussionseeHaraldBluhmundChristophM.Michael:Anglo‐AmericanConservatismsinceThatcherandReagan.In:NeuePolitischeLiteratur,Vol.58,No.3(2013).Itisespeciallyintermsofcomparativeresearchthatthecontextualizationofconservatismandliberalismwithinasharedconceptualfieldrecommendsitself.SeealsoparadigmaticallyDanielT.Rodgers:AgeofFracture.Cambridge,MA:BelknapPress,2011.18MichaelOakeshott:PoliticalEducation.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.43‐69,directquotesatpp.65.19Hartle:MicheldeMontaigne,pp.223‐225.20EdmundFawcett:Liberalism:TheLifeofanIdea.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2014,p.317.OakeshotthadexpressedagrowingdisdaintowardspoliticalideologiesinTheSocialandPoliticalDoctrinesofContemporaryEurope.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1939.

encroachment on private life bywhat to its critics seems like the realization of an Orwellian

surveillancesociety.21

Inwhat follows I cannot hope to comprehensively review the yields of almost a quarter of a

centuryofscholarshipsinceOakeshott’sdeath,nordistillhisvisionofpolitics–orforthatmatter

political philosophy – in any conclusive form. I will have very little, if anything, to say on

Oakeshott’sphilosophicalinheritanceofidealism,hisphilosophyofhistoryandreligion,noron

hiswritingsoneducationandaesthetics.Rather,Iwouldliketorevisittwoofhismostimportant

andwidelyreadcontributionstopoliticalphilosophyand,secondly,inpairingOakeshottwithSir

BernardWilliams,Iargue–perhapscounter‐intuitively–forthecontinuedrelevanceofhisstyle

ofthought.Assuch,I’mnotquitesurewhetherthismakesmeguiltyof JesseNorman’scharge

madeatlastyear’sOakeshottMemorialLectureatLSEthatmostofthosewho“invokeOakeshott

inandaroundpoliticshaveactually[not]readmuchofhim,sincetheyalmostalwaysignorehis

greatestworksExperienceanditsModesandOnHumanConduct.22

“Rationalism in Politics” and “Hobbes on Civil Association” 

WhatOakeshottis,andverylikelywillcontinuetobe,bestknownforishiscritiqueofrationalism

andhisworkonthehistoryofpoliticalthought,inparticularhisreadingofHobbes.Asascholar

ofHobbesOakeshottarguedthatboththemechanistic‐materialistviewandthatofHobbesasa

defenderofdespotismwere in factmisconceived.Aswere theones that saw inHobbes’s civil

philosophythebeginningof“sociology,orascienceofpolitics”.Oakeshott,instead,readHobbes

as“themostradical”ofallsceptics(e.g.MontaigneorPascal)withadistinctlatescholasticlegacy

thatsethimapartfromSpinozaandDescartes,aphilosophicalrationalistandyetanti‐rationalist

whenitcametopolitics.23

WhatseemedtodrawOakeshotttoHobbeswasaparticularreadingofthehistoricaldevelopment

ofindividualityandtheformofpoliticalorder–civitas–itgaveriseto,andofLeviathanasan

                                                            21ExemplarilyseeHelenFenwick:CriminalisingPublicDisorderandAnti‐SocialBehaviour.In:CivilLibertiesandHumanRights.London:Cavendish,2007,pp.505‐517;andGraemeGerrardandRichardThompson:TwoMillionCamerasintheUK.In:CCTVImage,No.42(Winter2011),pp.11‐12.22JesseNorman:Burke,OakeshottandtheIntellectualRootsofModernConservatism.[OakeshottMemorialLecture],November,122013.ApodcastoftheLectureisavailableathttp://www.lse.ac.uk/newsAndMedia/videoAndAudio/channels/publicLecturesAndEvents/player.aspx?id=210623MichaelOakeshott:IntroductiontoLeviathan.In:HobbesonCivilAssociation.Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1975,pp.11,21,27,32.

explorationofthemoralityofindividualityof“separateandsovereignindividualsassociatedwith

oneanother”andintothecausesofsuchassociation.24Oakeshottarguedthatitledtoaparticular

formofmutualaccommodationinwhichmen“havenotsurrenderedtheirrighttopursuefelicity,

theyhavesurrenderedonlytheirrighteachtodothisunconditionally”and

“transferredtherightofeachtogovernhimselftoasovereignActor;theyhavecovenantedwithoneanother

toauthorizeallhisactions,eachtoavoucheverysuchactionashisown,tosubmittheirjudgementsand

willstohisjudgementandwillinallthatconcernstheirpeaceandsecurity,toobeyhiscommands,andto

pledgealltheirstrengthandpowertosupporttheexerciseofthisauthority”.25

Moreinterestingly,OakeshottinterpretsHobbestounderstandhumanlifeasatensionbetween

theprimarypassionsofpride(toberecognizedandhonoredbyothermenaspreeminent)and

fear(thedreadofviolentandshamefuldeathatthehandofanotherman)andheultimatelythinks

thatHobbesgaveprecedence topride,not fear, in theemancipationofmenmanifesting itself

withinacivitas.This,Oakeshottthinks,isthe“obscureheartofHobbes’smoraltheory”.Whereas

“those whose heads were [not] strong enough to withstand the giddiness provoked by his

scepticism”wouldonlygraspHobbesassayingthatprideisaviceandmankindmustpurgeitself

ofitsillusionsevenwhenitisnotvainglory;andthatitisfearwhichprovokes“reasontosuggest

the convenient articles of peace” (thus generating the morality of the tame man), Oakeshott

recognizedanother,esotericmeaninginHobbes’stheoryofcivilobligation.

Inthisimplicitlineofargument,emancipationfromthefearofshamefuldeathisstillsoughtbut

ittakesplacebya“moralizationofprideitself”,emancipationresultfromthecharacterofaman

“whosedispositionistoovercomefearnotbereason(thatis,byseekingasecureconditionof

externalhumancircumstances)butbyhisowncourage”,aman,“who(inMontaigne’sphrase)

‘knowshowtobelongtohimself,’andwho”[…]keepshisword“notmerelybecausehefearsthe

consequencesofbreakingit,butfrom‘agloryorprideinappearingnottoneedtobeakit’.”The

virtuoussideofprideisself‐lovefreefromdelusionsofomnipotence,aself‐lovewhich“appears

asself‐knowledgeandself‐respect,”andinwhich

“the delusions of power over others is replaced by the reality of self‐control, and the glory of the

invulnerabilitywhichcomesfromcouragegeneratesmagnanimity,peace.Thisisthevirtueofpridewhose

lineageistobetracedbacktothenymphHybris,thereputedmotherofPanbyZeus;thepridewhichis

reflectedinthemegalopsychosofAristotleandata lowerlevel inthewisemanoftheStoics;thesancta

superbia which had its place inmedievalmoral theology; andwhichwas recognized by Hobbes as an

                                                            24Oakeshott:TheMoralLifeintheWritingsofThomasHobbes.In:Ibid.,p.82.25Oakeshott:IntroductiontoLeviathan.In:Ibid.,p.44,47.

alternativemannertothatsuggestedbyfearandreasonofpreservingone’sownnatureandemancipating

oneselffrom…thestrifewhichthisfeargenerates.”26

Pride and self‐esteem thus do supply “an adequatemotive for endeavouring peace” and this

specificidiomofthemoralityofindividualityrescuesproudmanfromthelowsofthebourgeois

moralityofthetamemanwhohassettledforsafetyinsteadofthebrillianceoflife;andthuscan,

accordingtoOakeshott,justlybecalled“aristocratic”.27

Hobbesisportrayed,here,asastoutindividualistandperhapsthisismostclearinthediscussion

ofcivilobligationandthenon‐instrumentalityandnon‐purposivenessofthestate.AsOakeshott

putsit,

“Hobbes isnotanabsolutistpreciselybecausehe isanauthoritarian”and this separateshim from“the

rationalistdictatorsofhisoranyage.Indeed,Hobbes[…]hadinhimmoreofthephilosophyofliberalism

thanmostofitsprofesseddefenders.”28

Neither, Oakeshott argued, does Hobbes’s civitas compromise the individuality of the

covenanters,noristheSovereign’sabsolutismdestructiveofindividuality.Thisisthecasesince

thecovenanters“havenotsurrenderedtheirrighttopursuefelicity;theyhavesurrenderedonly

their right each todo this unconditionally”, evendespite this rightnot being retractable, and,

secondly,thoughascivestheyaresubjecttoartificialimpedimentstotheirconduct,namelycivil

laws, these impediments “have been authorized by themselves” and are thus a self‐inflicted

diminutionoffreedom.Themoralauthorityofthesovereign,that“MortallGod”,derivessolely

fromanactofwillofthoseobliged.

Whatismore,thereisandcanbenocommonorcommunalfelicitysince“neitherbeforenorafter

theestablishmentofcivilassociationisthereanysuchthingasthePeople,…Whatevercommunity

existsmust be generated by individual acts of will”, and there is in Hobbes’s association “no

concordofwills,nocommonwill,nocommongood;itsunityliessolelyinthesinglenessofthe

Representative, in the substitution of his onewill for themany conflictingwills.”29AsHobbes

famouslyputitinchapter17ofLeviathan:“ForbythisAuthoritie,givenhimbyeveryparticular

manintheCommon‐Wealth,hehaththeuseofsomuchPowerandStrengthconferredonhim,

thatby terror thereof,he is inabled to forme thewillsof themall”.There isadistinctechoof

Hobbes consistently present in Oakeshott’s work on questions of political obligation and

legitimateauthority. Ina1975essay, forexample,Oakeshott faultswhatheperceives tohave

                                                            26ThisandtheprecedingquotescomefromOakeshott:TheMoralLifeintheWritingsofThomasHobbes.In:Ibid.,pp.98,126‐133,italicsintheoriginal.27Ibid.,p.133.28Oakeshott:IntroductiontoLeviathan.In:HobbesonCivilAssociation.Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1975,p.67.29Ibid.,pp.40,44,65,italicsintheoriginal.

achieved anunwarrantedorthodoxy inpolitical discourse,namely a conceptionof rule as the

exerciseofpowerandthemodernstateasconstitutedbyanapparatusofpower.Thisdoctrinehe

dismissesas“ahalf‐bakedaffair[…]unabletorecognizethedifferencebetweenlegitimateand

illegitimatepower”.ForOakeshott,therelationshipoftheofficeofruleinamodernstateandits

subjectsisfirstofalloneofauthorityandobligation,andnotapowerrelationshipofcompulsion

andobedience.Theauthoritytoeffectivelyenforcethefulfilmentofobligationsderivesnotfrom

the power‐apparatus at hand, but from the authority to prescribe non‐instrumental rules of

conduct.Whatturnsapersonintoasubjectoftheapparatusofpower,andaninjuryintoapenalty,

isfailuretofulfilanobligation.Wherethislinkbetweenpowerandauthorityinanassociationis

severed,tyrannyreigns.30

InterestinglythoughalookattheCambridgeCompaniontoHobbes’sLeviathanpublishedin2007

maysuggest,quitetothecontraryofmuchoftheworkonOakeshott,thathisframingofHobbes

lost itsrelevance forcontemporaryscholarship.There,Oakeshott isonlymentionedtwiceand

thatmerelyinpassing,trailingbothLeoStraussandCarlSchmittbyaconsiderablemarginwhile

intheCambridgeCompaniontoHobbes,AlanRyanploughsalonelyfurrowinacknowledgingthat

his general perspective onHobbes is not “unlike that ofMichaelOakeshott inHobbesonCivil

Association”.31

Oakeshottunderstoodpoliticsas“attendingtothegeneralarrangementsofasociety”bywhich

hemeant firstofall those“hereditaryco‐operativegroups…awareofapast,apresent,anda

future, which we call ‘states’”. What he termed general arrangements included customs,

institutions,lawsordiplomaticdecisions.Acollectionofpeoplelacking“recognizedtraditionsof

behavior”andwhosearrangements“intimatednodirectionforchange”or“needednoattention”

weretohimclearly“incapableofpolitics”.32Thesetraditionsofbehaviorfromwhichpoliticsas

anactivity“springs”areunderstoodasdynamic,generatingtheneedoftheirownamendment

andOakeshottviewedthemas“atoncecoherentandincoherent”.Politicsisthusconcernedwith

theamendmentofexistingarrangementsofasociety,asanexplorationof“whatisintimatedin

them”or,asIwouldputitinamorecontemporaryidiom,asacontinuousprocessofcivilrepair.

Thisconceptionofpoliticsurgesustothoroughlyengagewithourowntraditionandmakeits

                                                            30MichaelOakeshott:TalkingPolitics.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.438‐461,directquotesatpp.446,447.31AlanRyan:Hobbes’sPoliticalPhilosophy.In:TheCambridgeCompaniontoHobbes,ed.byTomSorell,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996,pp.208‐245,directquoteonp.241.SeealsoAlanRyan:HobbesandIndividualism.In:PerspectivesonThomasHobbes,ed.byG.A.J.RogersandAlanRyan,Oxford:ClarendonPress,1988,pp.81‐105.32MichaelOakeshott:PoliticalEducation.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.43‐69,directquotesatpp.44,56.

whole resources available to us – it is, at the academic level, primarily “anhistorical study…

concernedwiththedetailoftheconcrete”33–whileitmilitatesagainstthethreatofrationalism.

Thehead‐onattackonRationalistandnear‐RationalistpoliticsOakeshottlaunchedinhis1947

essayRationalisminPoliticsneedstoberead,Iwouldargue,aswedgedbetweenthetraumasof

Europeanempiressweptaway,rabidnationalism,bloodshedandgenocideonanunprecedented

scale, and the seeming ascendency of Fabian socialism to power with a postwar Labour

governmentaswellasthebeginningofblocconfrontationoftheColdWar.34Thisisofparticular

importance, forthecontemporaryreaderunfamiliarwithotherpartsofOakeshott’sworkmay

wellthinkhimtoputforthan(epistemologicallygrounded)versionofculturalcritique.

The“disease”ofRationalisminpolitics,heclaims,notonly“amountstoacorruptionofthemind”

butalso“driesuptheminditself”,“youcannotescapeitserrors”sinceitis“withoutthepowerto

correctitsownshortcomings”.Onceasocietyhasbeenthoroughlyinfected,there’snocureand

“howdeeplytherationalistdispositionofmindhasinvadedourpoliticalthoughtandpracticeis

illustrated by the extent towhich [unselfconsciously established] traditions of behavior have

givenplacetoideologies”.35Especiallyinviewofthepassagesinthebeginningofsection5,one

cannot butwonderwhetherOakeshott is not in fact being ironic here in the same sense that

MachiavellihimselfwasthoughttobebyRousseauinBookIII,Chapter6ofDuContractSocial:

thesecretagentofrepublicanism.Butalsosection4,whereOakeshottarguesthatnoneofthe

“new and inexperienced social classes which […] have risen to the exercise of political initiative and

authority[…]hadtimetoacquireapoliticaleducationbeforeitcametopower:eachneeded[…]apolitical

doctrine, to take theplaceof ahabit ofpolitical behavior […]but they are abridgementsof a tradition,

rationalizationspurportingtoelicitthe‘truth’ofatraditionandtoexhibititinasetofabstractprinciples,

butfromwhich,nevertheless,thefullsignificanceofthetraditioninevitableescapes”,36

isbound to raiseanumberof eyebrows. Suchknowledgeof thepolitical traditionsof society,

Oakeshott maintains, takes “two or three generations to acquire” in the most favorable of

circumstances.IfthisaloneweretobeOakeshott’sposition,itsurelyinvitesridicule,andwell‐

justifiedatthat.ButalthoughOakeshott’scritiqueofRationalismisprimarilyepistemological,it

becomesclearthathisreadingoftraditionaspracticeistiedtothemoralityofindividualityhe

exploredinHobbes.First,itstandsinoppositiontoamoralideology,“thedesiccatedrelicofwhat

oncewastheunselfconsciousmoraltraditionofanaristocracy”:aself‐consciouspursuitofmoral

                                                            33Ibid.,p.63.Thismightjustlybereadasasincerepleaforfull‐fledgedliberaleducation.Itisalsoatimelyreminderofitsvalueinthefaceofthelargescalecutsinhighereducationthathaveoccurredoverthelastdecadeortwo.34MichaelOakeshott:RationalisminPolitics.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.5‐42.InthisessayIretainOakeshott’snotationofRationalismwithcapital‐R.35Ibid.,pp.26,37.36Ibid.,p.30.

ideasnolonger“suspendedinareligiousorsocialtradition”or“belongingtoareligiousorasocial

life”and,thus,withoutanyrealmoralsignificance.37

Themoresympatheticreader,familiarwithExperienceanditsModes,willundoubtedlygraspthe

similarityofconcernsdrivingOakeshott’sinquiryinRationalisminPolitics.AsStevenB.Smithput

it,hisentireworkcanbeconsideredasa“sustainedreflectiononasingleproblem:therelationof

reason and the moral life [… and] at the core of Oakeshott’s moral theory is the concept of

experience.”38Secondly,inOnBeingConservativeOakeshottdistanceshimselffromtheBurkean

needtoplaceabsolutevalueincertainsocialedificesandgeneralideassuchasthefreeplayof

humanchoiceorprivatepropertyintheguiseofanaturalright(andthussomewhatcontradicts

whathehadwrittennearlyadecadeearlier),whichhethinks isunnecessaryandpretentious.

Equallyimplausibleistheassumptionthat“thosewhoruleareendowedwithasuperiorwisdom

whichdisclosestothemabetterrangeofbeliefsandactivitiesandwhichgivesthemauthorityto

imposeupontheirsubjectsaquitedifferentmanneroflife.”39Oakeshottdoesnotsimplycriticize

theapplicationofabstractprinciplestohumanaffairbutthefailuretoappreciatethatscienceand

practice(butalsohistoryandaesthetics)aredistinctmodesofhumanexperienceandnoneof

these canbeprivilegedover theothers.Politics thusposesnotmerelyproblemsof technique

callingfortheadvancementofmanagerialsolutionsinformedbyscience.JesseNormanisrightto

pointoutthat,contrarytoBurke,Oakeshott’sisnotasocialconservatismofvaluebutaliberal

one of disposition. It is not the duty of those in public authority to preserve the social order

becauseitisareservoirofvaluebut“thetaskofgovernmentistogeneralisethatdispositionand

sopreserveman’sfreedomtopursuehisownprojectswithoutinterruptionoroppression.”40

ThisindividualismandtheparticularcastitreceivedbyOakeshott’sinterpretationofHobbes,I

believe,iskeytounderstandingwhatmightotherwiseappearasaristocraticdisdainforthenewly

enfranchisedmasses.Theuomo singolarewho emerged first in Italy and “whose conductwas

markedbyahighdegreeofself‐determinationandalargenumberofwhoseactivitiesexpressed

personalpreferences”infactturnedoutformostofthenewlycreatedmodernmenpluggedfrom

the “familiar anonymity of communal life” a burdensome enterprise since they could not

transform their personal identity into an individuality. The historical emergence of human

individualitythusdidnotonlycreatetheindividualbutalsothe“individualmanqué”,notasan

                                                            37Ibid.,p.41.38StevenB.Smith:PracticalLifeandtheCritiqueofRationalism.In:TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,ed.byEfraimPodoksik,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,p.131.39MichaelOakeshott:OnBeingConservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.407‐437,p.427.40JesseNorman:Burke,OakeshottandtheIntellectualRootsofModernConservatism.[OakeshottMemorialLecture],November,122013.

relic of a past age in the individual’s tow but a modern character in his own right.41 As a

consequence, the masses as they appear in European history, Oakeshott claimed, were not

composed of individuals, “they are composed of ‘anti‐individuals’ united in a revulsion from

individuality.”Anti‐individualismthusestablisheditselfas“oneofthemajordispositionsofthe

modern European moral character” and the “mass man” had no disposition to become an

individual.42Andtodeliverthefinalblowinthefaceofallprogressives,hedrylyremarksthat

“what, in fact, prevented him [the anti‐individual] enjoying the rights of individuality (which were as

availabletohimastoanyoneelse)wasnothis‘circumstances’buthischaracter–his‘anti‐individuality’.

Therightsofindividualitywerenecessarilysuchthatthe ‘massman’couldhavenouseforthem.[…]In

short,therightheclaimed,therightappropriatetohischaracter,wastherighttoliveinasocialprotectorate

whichrelievedhimoftheburdenof‘self‐determination’.”43

If,forwhateverreasons,one’saimwastosplitwideopenOakeshott’slaterworkandadminister

ascaringcriticalreassessment,TheMassesinRepresentativeDemocracysurelymustbeseenasan

invitation.

I think itevident,however, that thekindofabstractprincipleswhichOakeshottdenouncesas

progeny of Rationalism – such as Locke’s 1690 SecondTreatiseofCivilGovernment, the 1776

DeclarationofIndependenceofthethirteenstateofAmericaorthe1789DeclarationoftheRights

ofManandoftheCitizen–havebecomeaconstitutivepartofhowweunderstandourselvesas

humanbeings, that is, an essential and irreducible part of our political tradition.His peculiar

argument for the recovery of our lost tradition becomes intelligible by understanding it as

hermeneutically inspiredby theStraussiandistinctionbetweenesoteric andexoteric teaching

whichOakeshotthadputtouseintheIntroductiontoLeviathanayearearlierinordertoclear

awayperceivedinconsistenciesinHobbes’smoralphilosophy.ThismightalsoexplainOakeshott’s

ownmisunderstandingregardingtheformsofknowledgeconstitutiveofthegenuineactivityof

politics, as he envisioned it. The practical knowledge destroyed by Rationalism cannot be

recoveredasthepotentialityofacquiringthisknowledgeandformingcorrespondingsetsofbelief

isno longeravailable topeopleand,even if it couldberecovered, itwouldno longerprovide

guidancethroughthosepeople’ssocialworld,norcouldhaveapartinformingit.

Morality and the Ethical Life 

                                                            41MichaelOakeshott:TheMassesinRepresentativeDemocracy.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.365,371.42 Ibid. , pp. 371, 373, 376‐377. 43 Ibid. , p. 378. 

ItshouldhavebecomeclearfromtheprecedingsectionsthatOakeshottwasamoralparticularist

andthestandardformoralreasoning,asheunderstoodit,wasnotsomeabstractuniversalrule

butthedegreeofcoherencewiththeconcretetraditionwithinwhichthatreasoningoccurred.44

Hewas not expressing a conservatismof rootedness, unselfconscious traditional conduct and

hostilitytowardsreflection.Probingone’sowntraditionisakeyprerequisiteforanymeaningful

politicaleducation,notleastbecause,asBernardWilliamspointedout,itmattersagreatdealin

whatwaypastconceptionsofjusticeandlegitimationsofhierarchyinearliersocietiesareseenas

eitherdiscreditedorprovidinghistoricalcontinuity.

In this section I attempt to readOakeshott’s position through theparticular lensprovidedby

Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy as well as a later essay on philosophy as a

humanisticdiscipline.45Thismightwellstrikesomeasacontradictionintermsbutgenerates,I

believe,relevantinsightsbeyondthequestionofwhatOakeshott’spositionreallywas.Although

there’sscantreferencetoOakeshottinWilliams’swork,inhis1972essayKnowledgeandReasons

Williamsrecognizesthedistinctionbetweenpropositionalandpracticalknowledgeas“genuine

andineliminable,neithersortofknowledgebeingreducibletotheother”.Butitdoesnotfollow

fromthisthatwhatisnotrootedinpractice,is“inthatsensetheory”andWilliamsthinksthatthis

ideahasgeneratedseriousconfusiononthepartofMichaelOakeshottinRationalisminPolitics.46

WhatBernardWilliamshascalledtheabsoluteconceptionoftheworldhelps to illuminate this

misunderstanding.47Sciencemightdescribetheworldasitisinitself,thatis,giveascientific–not

afactual–representationofit,onewhichistothelargestpossibleextentindependentofthelocal

perspectivesoridiosyncrasiesoftheenquirer.ArepresentationthatWilliamscalledtheabsolute

conception.Whethersuchconceptionisatallattainableorcoherentisofcourseepistemologically

muchdisputedandHilaryPutnamfindsithardtoseewhysciencewouldatallneedtoconverge

inthedirectionofanabsoluteconception,justonesingleexplanatorypictureoftheworld.48But

muchof thehistoryofWestern science, especially its inherentnotionofprogress, undeniably

                                                            44StevenB.SmithhasfurtherpointedoutthatOakeshott,ratherthanbeingarelativist,isaboveallamoralpluralistwhounderstandsmoraltraditionsascomplex,attachesvaluetodifferentmoralvoicesandrejectsthenotionthatspecificfeaturesofamoraltraditioncouldbeprivilegedoverothersasimposing“anintolerabledullnessanduniformityontherichnessandvarietyoflife.”SeeStevenB.Smith:PracticalLifeandtheCritiqueofRationalism.In:TheCambridgeCompaniontoOakeshott,ed.byEfraimPodoksik,Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012,pp.131‐152,here140‐141.45BernardWilliams:EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1985;andPhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.In:Philosophy,75,October2000,pp.477‐496,reprintedinPhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006,pp.180‐199.46BernardWilliams:KnowledgeandReasons.In:PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006,pp.47‐56,directquotesatp.47,italicsintheoriginal.47HereandinthefollowingIheavilydrawfromBernardWilliams:EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1985,esp.pp.133‐139,andBernardWilliams:PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.In:Philosophy,75,October2000,pp.477‐496.48HilaryPutnam:ObjectivityandtheScience/EthicsDistinction.In:RealismwithaHumanFace.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1992,p.170.

appearsasanexerciseinconvergence.Bethatasitmay,inthepresentcontexttheimportantpoint

isanother:

Whenreflectingonourconceptualisationoftheworld,itispossibletorecognisefrominsidethat

veryconceptualisationthatsomeoftheconceptsandrepresentationsoftheworldaretoagreater

degree dependent than others on our perspective and particularities of apprehending things.

Manyofoureverydayintellectual,social,politicalandotheractivitiesevolvefromandrequire

conceptsandexplanationswhicharedeeplyrootedinour localpractices,ourculture,andour

history.Conceptsthatcannotbereplacedbysuchminimallyperspectivalconceptionswemight

sharewithallofhumanity.Itisthuswrongtosupposethat,eventhoughourconceptionsofthe

worldareboundbyourhistory,practices,andculture,theyareallequallylocalorperspectival,

therebydisallowingtocontrasttheconceptsofphysicsandtheconceptsofpoliticsorethics.Itis

equallywrongtosupposethatifsuchdifferentiationcouldbeestablished,andonesetofthese

conceptscouldbeshowntobepotentiallyuniversal,thenitfollowsfromthisthatthosepotentially

universalconceptssomehowintrinsicallytrumpthemorelocallyandhistoricallygrounded.

Inbothcases,thescientificandtheethical,convergencemust–irrespectiveofwhetheritactually

occurs – be understood differently. Actual convergence in the sciences can at least ideally be

explainedashavingbeenguidedbyhowthingsanywayare,whereasintheareaoftheethicssuch

hopecannotbutremainfrustrated.Agreementonhowsatellitesarebestflownintospaceentails

adifferentsortofconsensusthantheapprovalordisapprovalofthedeathpenalty.Withinthe

ethicalsphere,anabsoluteconceptionoftheworldremainsasmucherroneousasinadequatein

attemptingtoconflatetwodistinctepistemologicalspheres.Thisis,ofcourse,notsynonymous

with Oakeshott’s distinction between technical knowledge and practice but correspondswell

enough.Formypurposehere I believe it sufficient tonote thatWilliams’distinctionbetween

ethicalandscientificconceptsamountstotherealizationthatourethicaldescriptions(especially

thatofonehumancommunityasopposedtoanother)areindeedparochial.Thisshouldbeboth

unsettling and relativize our confidence in our own ethical vocabulary49 and, hence, it cannot

remainwithouteffectonourfirst‐orderethicaljudgements.

Williamsneverthelessdoesnotmeantoimplybyitthatethicalstatementscannothaveatruth

valueor,onamoregenerallevel,thattherecannotbeethicalknowledge,evenifthosewhotryto

settlesuchepistemologicalquestionswouldthinkit littlebetterthanalayman’sconceptionor

indeedacaseofbadpragmatism,anallusionRonaldDworkinhasrepeatedlymadetotheviews

Rortyexpressedonthesubject.50Ethicalstatementscannotbecategoricallytrue,evenifitwould

makethelivesofpeople,politiciansandindeedmanyphilosopherseasier.Theyarecontingenton

                                                            49HereIfollowRichardRorty’suseofthatterminContingency,IronyandSolidarity.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1989.50SeeRonaldDworkin:JusticeinRobes.Cambridge,Mass.andLondon:BelknapPress,2006,pp.36‐41.

theacceptanceofacertainsetofbeliefs,socialpractices,andpublicinterpretationofthosebeliefs.

Thecentralquestionregardingtherelationofethicalknowledgeandpoliticalactivityis,thus,not

thephilosophically inspiredoneofhowethicalknowledge ispossible(aquestiontowhichwe

mighthopetofindakindofapriorianswerabsolvingusfromthemessinessofrealworldcontexts

and that allows to bypass the historical conditions that gave shape to them). Rather than

attempting such escape from history, thinking about the relation of ethical knowledge and

politicalactivityrequiresthehistoricizationofsocialpracticesandself‐imagesthatgiveriseto

thekindofbeliefsthatpeopleconsiderbothtrueandjustified.

Ethicalconceptscanprovidedecisivereasonsforaction–aswhengivingawaysparechangeto

thehomeless–ortheycanbeoutweighedbyotherreasonsthatpreventthemfrombecoming

action‐guiding.Atthesametime,actions,irrespectiveofthetypeorsetofreasonsthatmotivate

them,canimpactoneitherour,theother’s,orindeedbothourthickethicalconcepts.Becauseof

theway these are tied tomatters of identity, ofwhatwe understand ourselves to be, purely

economicallymotivatedactions,forexample,canseemtothreatenourbeliefsandthewayswe

makeourjudgements,indeedourwayoflife.Itisnothardtorecognizethepotentialforgroup

conflictinthis.ItisherethatWilliams’distinctionbetweentheethicalandthescientifichelpsus

seethatnotallpiecesofknowledgecanbecombinedintoalargerbodyofknowledge,thatitis

preciselythethickethicalconceptsthatsometimesevadetranslationorareincommensurable.51

Eventhemostsophisticatedofrationalchoiceaccountsofbehaviour,forexample,mustfallshort

ofincorporatingsuchdistinctionwithintheirmethodologicalapparatus.

People’sthickethicalconcepts(asopposedtoanothercommunity’sconceptswhetherdistantin

placeortime)oftenarecharacterizedbyanunwieldysingularityinmeaningineliminablytiedto

practicethatmightnotpermitanobservertoapplytheminthesamedeepandsubstantialsense.

Thecasefor“irreduciblysocialgoods”CharlesTaylormakesinhisPhilosophicalArgumentsaims

atthis“peculiarstrongrelation”thatpresupposesandrequiresaparticularbackgroundofshared

meanings and practices, but it is slightly off target.52 I cannot see how it follows form the

irreducibly social conditions in which thick ethical concepts historically develop that these

concepts,butnotonlythose,alsothewholecultureinwhichtheyhavedeveloped,isintrinsically

good:

“Tosaythatacertainkindofself‐givingheroismisgood,oracertainqualityofaestheticexperience,must

betojudgetheculturesinwhichthiskindofheroismandthatkindofexperienceareconceivableoptions

                                                            51BernardWilliams:EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1985,pp.142ff.52CharlesTaylor:IrreduciblySocialGoods.In:PhilosophicalArguments.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1995,pp.127‐145,132.

asgoodcultures.Ifsuchvirtueandexperienceareworthcultivating,thenthecultureshavetobeworth

fostering,notascontingentinstruments,butforthemselves.”53

Incaseofpeople’sthickethicalconceptsthereisaconditionthatneedstobesatisfiedinorderto

usethoseconcepts.Itisamatterofbelongingtothatculture,thatis,itisamatterofbelongingto

acertainpractice.ButtojudgethatcertainculturesaregoodculturesthewayTaylorhasinmind

involvesconceptson the levelof reflectivegenerality, conceptswhichOakeshottwouldsurely

judgeRationalist.54Sinceinallsocietiesthereissomedegreeofreflectivequestioningorcriticism

(and it is perhaps here that Williams located Oakeshott’s confusion, because this reflective

criticism is not synonymous with a self‐conscious deliberation over the principles of moral

behaviour,withwhatOakeshotttermed“reflectivemorality”55),therelationbetweenpracticeand

reflection raises a questionWilliams phrased as follows: “Does the practice of the society, in

particular the judgements that members of the society make, imply answers to reflective

questionsaboutthatpractice[...]?”56

Itseemssufficientlycleartomethatthegeneralanswertothisquestionmustbeinthenegative.

Itdependsonthemodelofethicalpracticeweareadopting–anobjectivistoranonobjectivistone

–andthis,inturn,willdeterminewhetherwegrantthemembersofaparticularethicalpractice

topossessethicalknowledgeorsimply thinktheirpracticeanunreflectivecontingentcultural

artefact. The ethical knowledge in question is knowledge involved in people’s making of

judgementsthatemploytheirthickethicalconcepts.

AsWilliams points out, it is the collective reference to the society that invites a comparative

perspective.Butcomparingtheethicalrepresentationsofdifferentsocieties(whetherdistantin

placeortime)isanexercisethatoccursonthereflectivelevel.LikewiseTaylor’sjudgementon

the intrinsical goodness of cultures is clearly located on the reflective level and reflection, as

Williamsnotes,characteristicallydisturbsandmightevendestroytheethicalknowledgethose

culturesunselfconsciouslyhave.Itisdifficulttoseehow,atthereflectivelevel,therecanbean

adequatebodyofethicalknowledgethatwouldallowustomakejudgementsaboutwhatisworth

                                                            53Ibid.,p.137.54Williamsgrantsthatgeneralandabstractethicalconceptswithintheperspectiveofpracticalreasonmightcometohaveasortofweakobjectivityinarrivingatthetruthabouttheethicalafterhavingconsideredallethicalexperience.Evenso,Williamscannotseehowreflectiveethicalthoughtcouldbeepistemologicallyconvincinglymodelledtoconvergeonethicalreality.Ithasbeenargued,though,thatthickandthinethicalconceptsmightnotbeasdifferentwithregardtoobjectivityasWilliamsthinks.SeeWarrenQuinn:ReflectionandtheLossofMoralKnowledge:WilliamsonObjectivity.In:PhilosophyandPublicAffairs,16,(Spring)1987,pp.195‐209.55Forthedistinctionbetweena‘moralityofaffectionandbehavior’anda‘moralityofreflection’seeOakeshott’s1948essayTheTowerofBabel,reprintedinRationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.465‐487.56BernardWilliams:EthicsandtheLimitsofPhilosophy.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1985,p.146.

cultivating.57Onthecontrary,ifwesubscribetoanonobjectivistviewofethicalpractice,asTaylor

wouldsurelydo,itissimplynotpossibleatalltoadvancesuchaclaim.

Fosteringculturesandarguingfortheirmember’scontinuationoftheirpracticesisthereforea

ratherstrangeidea.Itwillremainone,evenifwereadilyacknowledgeboth,theirreduciblysocial

conditionsthatshapesuchpracticesandsubscribetothe“affirmationofordinarylife”inlocating

thegood life forhumanbeingsnot insomehigheractivitybut“at theverycenterofeveryday

existence,intheacquisitionthroughlabourofthemeanstoliveandthereproductionoflifeinthe

family.”58

Normativeethics,understoodasasetofrationallyacceptablemoraljudgementsorprinciplesof

conduct,sacrificetheintegrityofamoraltraditionandthewealthofmoralpraxisinfavourofthe

priorclassificationsofcertainandoftencompetingnormativeethicaltheoriesandwecanseethat

this is precisely one of the defects that Oakeshott criticized as the produce of Rationalism.59

Normativeethics,Oakeshottmayhaveagreed,islikeasoundknowledgeofthetechnicalworking

ofaninstrumentwithoutbeingabletoplayitwell;andneitheryetmakesamusician.Itisthus

importanttolookatthehistoryofourownethicalconceptsandviewtheircontentasanoften

contingenthistoricalphenomenon.AsWilliamspointedout,areflectivestancetowardsourown

ethicalconceptsmustinvolvesuchhistoricalunderstanding.Evenconceptualdescriptionisnot

self‐sufficientandattemptstoderiveourconceptsapriorifromuniversalconditionsofhuman

life are likely to leave unexplained many important features for understanding one’s own

concepts.60Thoughweareshapedbythem,wearenotchainedtothemandIthinkitissafetosay

thatwehavestoppedalongtimeagobelievingthatreasoncaninstructusbothastowhatour

trueendisandhowtoreachit,evenifsomeendeavoursofneurosciencestillseeminclinedto

upholdtheuniversalityandcategoricalcharacterofcertainrulesofreason.WhatOakeshottcalled

the morality of reflection, as much as the effects of Rationalism in politics he so adamantly

criticised,bothcarrywithinthemmuchmoreofthe“rhythmandcontinuity”ofsocietythanhe

waspreparedtoacknowledge.

Political choices and their justification must be viewed as social phenomena rather than

somethingthatdependsontherelationofourknowledgeclaimstoreality.Sincethatmessageis

ahistoricistone,politicalphilosophymustwinitsgameonabiggerfieldthantherealmofreason

provides.Onlythenwillitsinquiriesbeabletovoicemorethantheoryimmanentcriticismthatis

                                                            57SeeIbid.,p.148.58CharlesTaylor:IrreduciblySocialGoods.In:PhilosophicalArguments.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1995,pp.127‐145,144.59SeeAntonioS.Cua:ReflectionsonMoralTheoryandUnderstandingMoralTraditions.In:InterpretingAcrossBoundaries:NewEssaysinComparativePhilosophy,ed.byGeraldJamesLarsonandEliotDeutsch.Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1988,280‐93.60BernardWilliams:PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline.In:Philosophy,75,October2000,pp.477‐496.

ofrelevanceonlywithinthenarrowconfinesofouracademicdepartments,eventhoughsome

universitydepartmentsmaybemorespaciousthanothers.Butthisargumentmightreflecttoa

greaterextendmyownideasofadirectionworthtravelinginthanitiscoveredbybothWilliams

and Oakeshott. It shows – far too briefly – that, and why, certain forms of liberalism and

conservatismshouldbeviewedasequallymisguided in findingwaysofdealingwithcommon

challengesandwhyneitheroftheselabeldostickwellwiththeOakeshottianposition.

Neither Aesthetic nor Political 

In 1976, nearly a decade afterOakeshott’s retirement fromhis chair at the London School of

Economics,HannaPitkinclaimedthat

“moreprofoundlythananyonesinceBurke,he[Oakeshott]developedforusavisionofsocietythatmight

todayproperlybe called "ecological" anawarenessof the complexity anddelicacyof interrelationships

among institutions, customs,andwaysof life. […]Hehassought toremindusof thenatureofahealthy

politicallifeandtodefenditagainstboththefragmentationofself‐interestedconflictandthesuffocationof

bureaucraticadministration.”61

Pitkinwithherusualacutenessstillprovidesoneof themost rewardingreadsonOakeshott’s

workandwecannowsee thatOakeshottwasneither the “quintessentiallyEnglishgentleman

scholar”62wellshieldedfromthemessyworldofpoliticsintheivorytowersofeliteuniversities

andlateronbytheserenityofrurallifewithitsstone‐walledfieldsandmeadowsanditsscenic

viewsoftheremnantsofavanishedwayoflifeturnedheritageside,norwashea“refusenikof

modernlife”assomecommentatorscontinuetoclaim.63Self‐administeredvillagepoliticswasnot

Oakeshott’simplicitidealandtoclassifyhispoliticalthoughtsimplyasthepoliticizationofrural

aestheticswouldbeagrossmisrepresentation.Onthecontrary,hehadanacuteawarenessofthe

deepshiftsintheideationalandpoliticalmake‐upofhisowncenturyandwouldhaveconcurred

withWilliamsinhisassessmentthatitwasnoparadoxthat“intheseverynewcircumstancesvery

oldphilosophiesmayhavemoretoofferthanmoderatelynewones,andahistoricalstorycould

betoldtoshowwhythisisso.”OakeshotthadMontaigne,Pascal,HobbesandHumehighonthe

listandnotjustforhimtheproblemlayin

                                                            61HannaFenichelPitkin:InhumanConductandUnpoliticalTheory:MichaelOakeshott'sOnHumanConduct.In:PoliticalTheory,Vol.4,No.3(Aug1976),pp.301‐320,301‐302.62Jan‐WernerMüller:Re‐imaginingLeviathan.In:CriticalReviewofInternationalSocialandPoliticalPhilosophy,Vol.13,Nos.2‐3(June‐September2010),p.317.63EdmundFawcett:Liberalism:TheLifeofanIdea.Princeton,N.J.:PrincetonUniversityPress,2014,p.317.

“afalseimageofhowreflectionisrelatedtopractice,animageoftheoriesintermsofwhichtheyuselessly

elaboratetheirdifferencesfromoneanother,[andbecause]mostofmodernmoralphilosophy…istoomuch

andtoounknowinglycaughtupin[themodernworld],unreflectivelyappealingtoadministrativeideasof

rationality.”64

Oakeshott,however,Pitkinpointsout,adds

“acurioustwisttoalineofpoliticaltheoryrunningfromAristotlethroughMachiavelliandTocqueville[…]

Butwheretheotherwritersinthistraditionseeself‐determinationintermsofcollectiveself‐government,

Oakeshott is interested not in self‐government but in obedience – obedience that is obligatory tough

unchosen”65,

andthusneverseriouslyconsideredthepossibilityof“freedomascollectiveself‐determination”.66

This, forPitkin, is connectedwithOakeshott’s failure to see that “procedure is substance” and

althoughthecivilconditionisbydefinitionwithoutpurpose,itspurelyformalrulesentailsocial

andeconomicconsequences.FromitresultsadilemmaPitkinphrasesasfollows:

“[H]eisdeterminedtoprotectmoralandpoliticalidealsagainstselfishnessandcynicism.Thissomehow

becomes equatedwithprotecting themagainst economic concerns, thepoor, socialism, radicalism, and

participatorypoliticalaction. […]The intent is toprotect the integrityof these realms, their capacity to

educateandennobleusandtogiveourlivesmeaning.Buttheresultistoemptymoralityandpoliticsofall

valueandmeaning,all significantconnectionwithouractual livesandthecaresandcommitments that

reallymoveus.[…]Oakeshotthasconfusedtheaimofmoralityandpoliticswiththeirsubstance.”67

Pitkin’scriticismnotwithstanding, itseemstomethatOakeshottindeedisconservativewhere

modesofgovernmentareconcerned,butarobustliberalwhenitcomestoquestionsofpolitical

authorityand(moral)obligationandforhimtherewasnoinconsistencyinbeingconservativein

respectofgovernmentand“radical inrespectofalmosteveryotheractivity.”68Hehadamuch

more sophisticated grasp on the workings of political ideologies than many contemporary

scholars of conservatism. A disposition to be conservative in politics, for Oakeshott, neither

presupposedcertainbeliefs,forexampleinnaturallaworaprovidentialorder,nordiditreflect

an organic theory of human society. He acknowledged that many people disposed toward a

conservativeattitudeinpoliticalactivityhaveactuallyheldsuchviewsbutwasadamantthat“a

dispositiontobeconservativeinpoliticsdoesnotentaileitherthatweshouldholdthesebeliefs

                                                            64BernardWilliams:PhilosophyasaHumanisticDiscipline,selected,edited,andwithanintrod.byA.W.Moore,PrincetonandOxford:PrincetonUniversityPress,2006,pp.197‐198.65 HannaFenichelPitkin:InhumanConductandUnpoliticalTheory:MichaelOakeshott'sOnHumanConduct.In:PoliticalTheory,Vol.4,No.3(Aug1976),pp.310‐311,66TheonlypassageIcanthinkofwhereOakeshottcomesclosetoacknowledgingapossiblenetgainoffreedominsucharrangementisonp.48ofHobbesonCivilAssociation.Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1975.67 Pitkin:InhumanConductandUnpoliticalTheory,pp.314‐316,italicsintheoriginal. 68MichaelOakeshott:OnBeingConservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,p.435.

tobetrueoreventhatweshouldsupposethemtobetrue.”69ForOakeshotttheseviewswere

quitedivorcedfrombeliefsaboutthepropertaskofgovernmentanditsinstruments.

As Christopher Ellis and James Stimson have recently shown in their excellent study of the

meaning of ideology in America, there is indeed no systematic correlation between social

conservativeattitudesandpoliticalpreferences.70Thereisinfactnosystematicrelationbetween

ideological self‐identifications of, for example, social, cultural or religious conservatives and

politicalchoices.Forideologicalunawarecitizens,“ideologicalidentificationisnotthecauseof

(nordoes itreflect)apoliticalworldvieworasetof issuebeliefs. Instead, totheextentthat it

reflects anything at all, it reflects identificationsquitedivorced from the realmofpolitics and

politicalpreferences,butstronglyreflectiveofpersonalorientationstoprivatelife”.71AsIhave

arguedelsewhere,thiscallsintoquestionthoseapproachesbendondistillingaunifyingcoreor

presentingconservatismasacoherentbodyoftheoryandpractice.72

InOnBeingConservative,Oakeshott argued thatadisposition tobe conservative in respect to

government, to think it inappropriate for government to be “conspicuously progressive”,was

preeminentlyadispositionofthosewho“havesomethingtodoandsomethingtothinkabouton

theirownaccount,whohaveaskilltopracticeoranintellectualfortunetomake,[appropriate]to

peoplewhosepassionsdonotneedtobeinflamed,whosedesiresdonotneedtobeprovokedand

whose dreams of a better world need no prompting.”73 I have a hunch that, from a more

sociologicalperspective,whatweshouldtakeOakeshotttobesayinghereisthatwhatpolitical

conservatism is often portrayed as – a reactionary, anti‐modern or socially and culturally

instinctivelytraditionalistdisposition–ismostlikelytobefoundinthelowermiddleclassesand

well‐educated strata of the working classes. Below that, politics as such takes on a different

relevanceandPeter(Pete)Doreyhaspointedtothechangingmodesofsocialstratificationinthis

regard.Theyarenolongerbasedondivisionsoflaborbutratherondivisionsofleisure:“Celebrity

imitation, not socialmobility, has seemingly become the goal ofmanypoorerpeople, and the

criterionbywhich they judge themselves (and eachother).”This is not simply an instanceof

culturalcritiquefromtheleftbutshowshowthedesireforsocialmobilitymightbebluntedand,

inconsequence,leadto“theblitheacceptanceofgrossinequality”withsuper‐richcelebritiesas

thenew“opiumofthemasses”.74

                                                            69 Ibid. , p. 423. 70ChristopherEllisandJamesA.Stimson:IdeologyinAmerica,Cambridge:CambridgeUP,2012.71Ibid.,p.142.72See,forexample,CoreyRobin:TheReactionaryMind.ConservatismfromEdmundBurketoSarahPalin.Oxford:OxfordUP,2012.73 MichaelOakeshott:OnBeingConservative.In:RationalisminPoliticsandOtherEssays,forewordbyTimothyFuller,Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1991,pp.434‐435. 74 Peter Dorey: British Conservatism: The Philosophy and Politics of Inequality. London: Tauris, 2011, direct quotes at pp. 170, 249. 

Finally,Oakeshottisofcontinued(ifonlyperhapshistorical)interestduetothefactthat,asReba

Soffer argues, “[e]very issue that [British] conservatives championed [in the course of the

twentieth century] already existed in the rhetoric and policy endorsements of conservative

historians in the 1920s and 1930s”.75 This might move Oakeshott’s perspective – however

passionately denied byOakeshott himself – in direct vicinity to the socially and economically

accommodatingtypeof“romanticBurkeanToryism”76prominentlyadvocatedbyAnthonyEden

andHaroldMacmillan.Indeed,thecentralityofpracticeinOakeshott’sthoughtprovidesthebasis

forapowerfulconservativecritiqueofcapitalism,clearlymarkingthelimits,ifnotexhaustion,of

neoliberaldogma.

Inamoregeneralsense,Oakeshottwasnotapublicintellectualand,tosome,hewasnotevena

politicalphilosopherforhethoughtthattherewasnothingofimmediatepoliticalusefulnessin

politicalphilosophy,justthestudyofitshistory.Hewasconcernedtounderstandwhichedifice

of human life could be trusted to sustain a healthy balance in the forms of civil association

characteristicof themodern state.What couldbeexpectedof themodern statewasmerely a

“negativegift”,notacloselyintegratedmannerofliving,northeadvanceofmoralperfection,but

the“onlyconditionofhumanlifethatcanbepermanentlyestablished”:peace.77Whatisstrikingly

absentfromOakeshott’saccount–somuchsothatitisnotevenindexedinRationalisminPolitics

andOtherEssays – is thesocialedificeonwhichconservativesareoftendisposed toerect the

wholearchitectureofsociety,thefamily.Onceagain,thisillustratesboth,hisdistancefromBurke

andhisstrongcommitmenttoindividualism.

AndalthoughOakeshottwasregardedasavoiceofauthority,bothasateacherandascholar,and

noteventhoseindisagreementwiththepositionshetookthoughtofhimas“lookinglikeafatgirl

inaminiskirt.”78Hehimself,however,neverseemedentirelypersuadedoftheimportanceofhis

own voice in the conversation of mankind. Remaining ultimately doubtful in the

acknowledgementofthefallibilityandlimitationsofreasoningmayjustbethemostimportant

ingredientinwhatmakesforagreatteacher.Or,asOakeshottputit:“Theironyofalltheorizing

isitspropensitytogenerate,notanunderstanding,butanot‐yet‐understood.”79

                                                            75RebaN.Soffer:History,Historians,andConservatisminBritainandAmerica.FromtheGreatWartoThatcherandReagan.NewYorkandOxford:OxfordUP,2009p.292.76Ibid.,p.302.77MichaelOakeshott:IntroductiontoLeviathan.In:HobbesonCivilAssociation.Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1975,p.79.78Oakeshott,whenbeingpresentedwithafestschriftattheoccasionofhisretirement,commentedthathe“hadthetemperament,thewillandthepatience,but[…]lackedtheability.Andthat’sratherpathetic.Isucceededonlyinlookinglikeafatgirlinaminiskirt.Thespiritiswillingbutthefleshisweak.”QuotedfromtheOakeshottarchivesattheBritishLibraryofPoliticalandEconomicScienceatLSE,File1/3,inPaulFranco:MichaelOakeshott:AnIntroduction.NewHavenandLondon:YaleUniversityPress,2004,p.18.79MichaelOakeshott:OnHumanConduct.Oxford:ClarendonPress,1975,p.10.