Paper draft to the PIREDEU Final Conference, · 2010-11-15 · Paper draft to the PIREDEU Final Conference, Brussels, 18-19 November 2010: «Value Orientations and The Vote in European

Paper draft to the PIREDEU Final Conference, Brussels, 18-19 November 2010: «Value Orientations and The Vote in European Parliament Elections:

Micro and Macro level determinants»

WORK IN PROGRESS – DO NOT CITE WITHOUT AUTHOR PERMISSION

By André Freire

Assistant Professor with Agrégation / Professor Auxiliar com Agregação (Political Science and Methodology),

Head of the Bachelor Degree in Political Science

(and co-director of the Master in Political Science),

ISCTE - IUL (Lisbon University Institute),

Avenidas Forças Armadas,

1649-026 Lisboa,

PORTUGAL

[email protected]

[email protected]

www.cies.iscte.pt http://www.cies.iscte.pt/investigadores/ficha.jsp?pkid=5&a=-816410170&subarea=doutorados (telephone: +351.217935000; +351.963334578)

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mailto:[email protected]

mailto:[email protected]

http://www.cies.iscte.pt/

http://www.cies.iscte.pt/investigadores/ficha.jsp?pkid=5&a=-816410170&subarea=doutorados

«Value Orientations and The Vote in European Parliament Elections:

Micro and Macro level determinants»

Research questions RQ1

How relevant are value orientations to explain the vote in European Parliament (EP) Elections?

RQ2

Concerning the impact of values on the vote in EP elections, what is the most relevant dimension of competition, pro vs anti (further) European unification or Left-Right?

RQ3 and RQ4

What is the impact of the different sets of value orientations upon the vote in European Parliament (EP) Elections? Is their impact congruent across the diferent dimensions of competition (pro vs anti (further) European unification vs Left-Right)?

RQ5 and RQ6 – Central RQs in the present paper

Are there relevant differences across countries in terms of the impact (direction and strength) of the different sets of value orientations upon the vote in European Parliament (EP) Elections? If yes, what are the macro level determinants that can account for those variations?

Objectives, definition of concepts and relevance of the topics

Major objective We want to know not only what is the impact of values in the vote for EP elections but also what are the (cross country) contextual conditions that may explain the increase or the decrease in the impact of values upon the vote in EP elections.

Definition of concepts We follow van Deth and Scarbrough’s definition of values as not directly observable conceptions of the desirable world (Deth and Scarbrough 1995: 21–47). According to Hechter (1993), ‘values are relatively general and durable internal criteria for evaluation. [original emphasis]’.

Values are usually said to be long-term predispositions with both direct and indirect influence on the vote. In terms of the ‘funnel of causality’ metaphor, they are located near the base, while issues are usually considered to be short-term factors. However, as Thomassen points out when referring to position issues, they ‘often are a reflection of the same domains of conflict as the value dimensions just discussed’ (Thomassen 2005: 17).

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Relevance of the topics (and short literature review)

In a large measure, elections are about meaningful choices concerning the type of society we want to live in. Additionally, elections are about choices concerning the major policy options to reach the diferent desirable types of society we want ot live in.

First, it is important to study this topic (namely “the contextual conditions that may explain the increase or the decrease in the impact of values upon the vote in EP elections”) because it may help us understand what the factors that might increase the quality of political representation are at the EU level: the more the vote is anchored in policy preferences the higher the quality of political representation (Pierce 1999: 9). Therefore, considering these values can be said to be the underlying constructs behind issue packages, the level of value voting can be said to be a necessary precondition for the quality of political representation at the EU level.

Second, at least until the 1980s some schollars of public opinion and elections in the EU polity have not taken public opinion seriously (non-attitudes, non-structured public opinion concerning EU issues, voting in the EU as a mere reflection of domestic politics, etc.) (see Hooghe and Marks, 2008, for a review), but if we find that voting in EP elections is indeed anchored in policy preferences (as measured by the underlying value orientations) than we can conclude that the conflict over the EU is anchored in major value conflicts and thus there is a structured public opinion concerning EU issues.

Third, several authors have argued the impact of values on political attitudes and behaviour is increasing in post-modern societies (Inglehart, 1997; Knutsen and Scarbourgh, 1995; Thomassen, 2005); therefore, it is important to understand in which contextual conditions this is more likely to happen, especially at the EU level.

Fourth, this is an understudied topic both at the national (Knutsen and Kumlin, 2005; Freire, forthcoming) and, above all, at the EU level (especially in what concern the impact of values on the vote at the mass level):

- Inglehart (1971-1991); Inglehart and Reif (1991) – cognitive mobilization and post materialism vs more support for European integration (mixed results, declining impact) (see also Janssen, 1991; post materialism vs EU support: spurious relationship)

- GAL-TAN (or authoritarian-libertarian values): impact has been argued to be relevant but especially at the party level: TAN partires more euroceptic; GAL parties more support for EU (several papers in Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2008, for a review); at the mass level, studies about this are rather rare and: 1) do not concern the EU vote but on attitudes towards the EU; 2) concern only EU 15 (Ray, 2001)

- Attitudes towards immigrants have shown to have a major impact on both attitudes towards the EU and EU voting: “cultural threat” (vs “interests”) (McLaren, 2002-2007)

- There is also some controversy over what is the major dimension of conflict across the EU: 1) neoliberalism (market deregulation) vs regulated capitalism OR 2) GAL&TAN: again, existant studies have focused mainly in the

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party/system level and studies at the mass level are pretty rare or non-existant (see several papers in Marks and Steenbergen, 2004; see also Hooghe and Marks, 2008, for a review)

- Studies about the impact of traditional socioeconomic values (concerning inequalities, atitudes towards the market and state intervention in the economy, social protection, etc.) at the EU level are even more scarce (at least partly, because the indicators measuring socieconomic values have not been included in EES studies until EES 2009: one of its major innovations) and have been concentrated exclusively at the party system level (see Hooghe and Marks, 2008, and Leconte, 2010, for reviews).

- Ideological left-righ self-placement is often taken as proxy for socioeconomic values (Ray, 2001) but left-right is a multi-dimensional construct (Inglehart and Klingemann, 1976; Knutsen, 1995-2002; Freire, 2006-2008) and thus, from our standpoint, it is not to correct to associate it only with socioeconomic values

- Religion and moral issues have been shown to be relevant to attitudes towards the EU (and EU voting), at least indirectly through (authoritarian vs libertarian & immigration) value orientations (Nelsen and Guth, 2003; Leconte, 2008; Boomgarden and Freire, 2009).

Data and Methods

Data EES 2009 Mass Survey: to measure values and their impact on the vote (ordered in terms of either pro and anti (further) European Unification or in terms of Left-Right): see Table 1.1 and 1.2 for the Dependent and Independent variables at the mass level

(Insert Tables 1.1 and 1.2 around here)

At the macro level, several indicators are taken (from several sources) to explain variation in the impact of values across countries – See Table 1.3

(Insert Table 1.3 around here)

Methods We use the multi-level technique known as ‘two-step hierarchical regression’ to estimate the impact of contextual factors on the strength of value voting, (Achen, 2005; Jusko and Shively, 2005):

1st step) To test the net impact of values at the individual level (after controlling for social factors: class, religion and habitat) on party choice (at EP elections) across the 27 countries, is the first step in the ‘two step hierarchical regression’.

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2nd step) Following Achen’s (2005) and Jusko and Shively’s (2005) indications for the two-step hierarchical regression, now use the regression coefficients (non-standardized) for each one of the three sets of values to explain the EP vote as our dependent variables. In Tables 4.1 to 5.2 the regression coefficients of values explaining the EP vote (ordered either in termos anti vs pro (further) European Unification, or left-right) terms (from Tables 2 and 3) are the dependent variables. The independent variables are the macro level indicators mentioned above (see Table 1.3).

Hypotheses

I - Micro-level Hypotheses:

H1.1 – Individuals that are more tolerant vis-à-vis immigrants are also more prone to vote in parties that favour further European unification

H1.2 - Individuals that are more tolerant vis-à-vis immigrants are also less prone to vote in rightwing parties

(MacLaren, 2002-2007; TAN theories)

H2.1 - Individuals that are more oriented towards state intervention in the economy are also less prone to vote in parties that favour further European unification

(following the neoliberal trend in the EU… since at least Masstricht…: Hooghe and Marks, 2008, and Leconte, 2010, for reviews)

H2.2 - Individuals that are more oriented towards state intervention in the economy are also less prone to vote in rightwing parties

(Knutsen, 1995-1997; Freire, 2006-2008; etc.)

H3.1 - Individuals that share libertarian values are also more prone to vote in parties that favour further European unification

(GAL theories)

H3.2 - Individuals that that share libertarian values are also less prone to vote in vote in rightwing parties

(Flanagan, 1987; Flangan and Lee, 2002)

II - Macro-level Hypotheses:

H4 (Clarity of Policy Alternatives) – The higher the clarity of policy alternatives (measured either by the polarization index or by the distance in ideological placemente of the two major parties) the stronger the impact of values on the vote in EP elections

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(structured either across the (further) European Unification dimension of competition or across the Left-Right dimension of competition)

(Rationale: the greater the ideological polarization between the parties or the more clear the policy alternatives presented to the electorate, the more frequently the citizens will use their value orientations to guide them in their voting choices)

H5 (Institutionalization of Parties’ Positions vis-à-vis the EU) – The higher the numbers of years of a country’s membership in the EU the stronger the impact of values on the vote in EP elections structured either in terms of the (further) European Unification dimension of competition

(Rationale: similar to H6 – see below)

H6 (Party System Institutionalization) – The higher the level of party system institutionalization (as measured by the number of years of the demcratic regime since 1920s) the stronger the impact of values on the vote in EP elections structured in terms of the Left-Right dimension of competition

(Rationale: We expect that in the newer democratic regimes the impact of values on party choice will tend to be weaker than in the more consolidated democratic regimes: New democratic regimes are less likely to exhibit high levels of party system institutionalization, and where these elements are absent, party ideological placements and electoral choices tend to exhibit high levels of instability and fluidity.)

H7 (Net contributor to the EU) - The higher the level of net contribution of a country to the EU budget the weaker stronger the impact of values on the vote in EP elections (structured either across the (further) European Unification dimension of competition or across the Left-Right dimension of competition) (because “interests” will weight more than “values” to explain the vote)

H8 (Social Expenditure) - The higher the level of a country’s social expenses the less individuals with pro state intervention values will be tend to vote in parties favouring (further) European unification.

(for other situations: control variable)

(Rationale: Ray, 2004; Brinegar et al, 2004)

H9 (Immigration) – In higher the number of a country’s percentage of immigrants in the resident population, the stronger the impact of attitudes vis-à-vis immigrants in the vote in EP elections (structured either across the (further) European Unification dimension of competition or across the Left-Right dimension of competition)

(…)

H10 (Secularization) – The higher the level of secularization in a country (as measured by the percentage of persons that declared “never go to church”) the stronger the impact

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of authoritarian vs libertarian values upon the vote in EP elections (structured either across the (further) European Unification dimension of competition or across the Left-Right dimension of competition).

(Rationale: authoritarian vs libertarian values: new politics divide: typical of advanced post industrial societies, also usually more secularized)

Empirical Tests

RQ1

How relevant are value orientations to explain the vote in European Parliament (EP) Elections?

RQ2

Concerning the impact of values on the vote in EP elections, what is the most relevant dimension of competition, pro vs anti European unification or Left-Right?

Value orientations are relevant to explain the vote in EP elections, either when the latter is ordered in terms of a pro vs anti (further) European unification (R2 for values after controlling social factors: 3,2% of variance explained for the 27 countries) or Left-Right (9,5%), although more for the latter than for the former. (see Tables 2 and 3)

(Insert Tables 2 and 3 around here)

RQ3 and RQ4

What is the impact of the different sets of value orientations upon the vote in European Parliament (EP) Elections? Is their impact congruent across the diferent dimensions of competition (pro vs anti (further) European unification vs Left-Right)?

European unification Considering only the impact of the different sets of values on the vote that is statistically significant, we can see that more tolerant individuals vis-à-vis immigrants are also more in favour of further European unificantion (confirming H1.1); on the contrary, individuals more favourable to state intervention in the economy are less favourable to further European unificantion (confirming H2.1) (see Table 2). The authoritharian-libertarian divide makes no difference for the merged data set (27 EU countries). (not confirming H3.1)

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Left-Right Additionally, for the merged data set (27 EU countries), we can see that overall individuals that are either more tolerant towards immigrants, or more favourable to state intervention in the economy, or that show more libertarian attitudes are all also less prone to vote for rightwing parties in EP elections (or more prone to vote in left-wing parties that competed in the 2009 EP elections). (Thus, confirming H1.2, H2.2 and H3.2)

Thus, across the two different dimensions of competition (Europe vs Left-Righ) the impact of values is different both in terms of strenght (more important for the Left-Right dimension than for the European unification dimension of competition) and in terms of direction.

RQ5 and RQ6

Are there relevant differences across countries in terms of the impact (direction and strength) of the different sets of value orientations upon the vote in European Parliament (EP) Elections? If yes, what are the macro level determinants that can account for those variations?

I - the anti vs pro (furhter) European unification dimension of competition: There are indeed important variations across countries for the impact of values upon the vote in EP elections ordered in terms of the anti vs pro (furhter) European unification dimension:

I - 1st) The level of variance explained is much more important in some countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Italy, Austria, Sweden), always above 11% of R2 or more, than in others: always equal or bellow 5% (all except: Germany, Spain, Cyprus, Netherlands, Finland and Britain - around 7% and 9%). (the R2 value for the merged data set is 3,2%)

(See Table 2)

I - 2nd)

In terms of direction, there are also variations:

(see Table 2)

Attitudes towards immigrants: more tolerant people are usually more pro unification, except in Estonia (the other way around: rejection of H1.1);

Citizens more in favour of state intervention in the economy are usually less favourable to further European unification, except in Italy, Poland and Slovenia, where it is exactly the other way around (rejecting H2.1).

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Although the authoritarin-libertarian divide has no significant impact on the EP vote for the merged data set (27 EU countries), in some countries libertarians are more favourable to further unification than authoritarians (Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Austria, Slovenia): confirming H3.1. However, in some other countries, it is exactly the other way around: authoritarians more in favour contrary to the GAL-TAN predictions (Greece, Cyprus, Poland, Portugal, and Sweden) (Rejecting H3.1).

II - the EP vote ordered in terms of the Left-Right dimension of competition:

There are also important variations across countries for the impact of values upon the vote in EP election ordered in terms of the Left-Right dimension:

II - 1st) The level of variance explained is much more important in some countries (Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Spain, France, Italy, Netherlands, Austria, Sweden and Britain), always equal or above 15% of R2 or more, than in others (all except Slovakia and Finland), always equal or bellow 9% (the R2 value for the merged data set is 9,5%).

(see Table 3)

II - 2nd)

In terms of direction, there are also variations: (see Table 3)

Attitudes towards immigrants: although in all countries where the coefficients are significant more tolerant people always vote less for the right (confirming H1.2), in several countries the effects of immigrantion attitudes are not significant;

Citizens more in favour of state intervention in the economy are usually less prone to vote for the right (confirming H2.2), but in Poland it is exactly the other way around (rejecting H2.2); moreover, there are some countries (Belgium, Latvia, Hungary and Romania) where the effects of this set of values in not significant.

In terms of the authoritarian-libertarian divide, except in Latvia (rejecting H3.2) libertarians are always less prone to vote for the right (confirming H3.2). However, in several countries the impact of the authoritarian-libertarian divide is not significant (Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, France, Ireland, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Britain, Bulgaria and Romania).

III)

Overall, from this 1st step of the Two Step Hierarchical Regressions approach we can conclude:

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III - 1st) The impact values is much more important to explain the EP vote when the dimension of competition if Left vs Right than when it is anti vs pro (further) European unification.

III - 2nd)

When the dimension of competition is European unification variantion across countries is more pronounced because it concerns both direction and strenght (for the impact of each of the three sets of values);

on the contrary, when the dimension of competition is Left vs Right the variantion across countries is less pronounced because in most of the cases it concerns only strenght (for the impact of each of the three sets of values).

III - 3rd) Contrary to what one might expect, namely from GAL-TAN theory, the authoritarian-libertarian divide (like the two other sets of values) is much more important to explain the EP vote when the latter concerns Left-Right divisions than when it concern divisions across the European Unification dimension

Recalling RQ5: Are there relevant differences across countries in terms of the impact (direction and strength) of the different sets of value orientations upon the vote in European Parliament (EP) Elections?

And passing to RQ6: If yes, what are the macro level determinants that can account for those variations?:

2nd Step of the Two Step Hierarchical Regressions

IV – Explaining cross country variation in the impact of values on the vote in EP elections (anti vs pro further European Unification dimension of competition)

See Table 4.1

The higher the net contribution of a country to the EU budget the more important the impact of immigration upon the vote in EP elections (dimension: Europe) – (contrary to H7)

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The higher the level of social expenditure in a country the more important the impact of immigration upon the vote in EP elections (dimension: Europe) – (H9: not expected – control variable)

&

The higher the level of secularization in a country the stronger the impact of libertarian values on the vote in EP elections (dimension: Europe: pro unification) – (H10 confirmed: stronger relationship)

See Table 4.2

Divisions West vs East (rationale: Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Schmitt and Freire, forthcoming):

West: The higher the clarity of policy alternatives concerning Europe the less voters with pro state intervention attitudes will vote for pro further unification parties (H4 confirmed: stronger relationship)

East:

The higher the clarity of policy alternatives concerning Europe the more voters with tolerant atitudes vis-à-vis immigrants will vote will vote for pro further unification parties (H4 confirmed: – much stronger relationship)

The higher the level of social expenditure in a country the less voters with tolerant atitudes vis-à-vis immigrants will vote will vote for pro further unification parties (H8: not predicted – control variable)

The higher the level of secularization in a country the stronger the impact of libertarian values on the vote in EP elections (dimension: Europe: pro unification) – (H10 confirmed: – much stronger relationship)

V – Explaining cross country variation in the impact of values on the vote in EP elections (Left-Right dimension of competition)

See Table 5.1

The higher level of party system institutionalization the less individuals with more tolerant attitudes towards immigrants will vote for rightwing parties in EP elections (H6:confirmed)

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The higher the clarity of policy alternatives the less individuals with more pro state intervention will for vote for rightwing parties in EP elections (H4:confirmed)

The higher the clarity of policy alternatives the less individuals with more libertarian attitudes will vote for rightwing parties in EP elections (H4:confirmed)

Table 5.2

Divisions West vs East (rationale: Taggart, 1998; Taggart and Szczerbiak, 2004; Hooghe and Marks, 2008; Schmitt and Freire, forthcoming):

West: The higher the clarity of policy alternatives the less individuals with more pro state intervention will for vote for rightwing parties in EP elections (H4:confirmed – much stronger relationship)

The higher the clarity of policy alternatives the less individuals with more libertarian attitudes will vote for rightwing parties in EP elections (H4:confirmed – much stronger relationship)

The higher the level of party system institutionalization the more individuals with more libertarian attitudes will vote for rightwing parties in EP elections (H4:confirmed??? Reversed…– much stronger relationship)

East:

The higher the percentage of immigrantes in a country the less voters with tolerant atitudes vis-à-vis immigrants will vote will vote for rightwing parties (H8: confirmed – much stronger relationship)

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Concluding Notes and Cues for Future Research The vote of European citizens in EP elections is significantly anchored in value orientations – from this standpoint there are indications of a structured public opinion and a structured polity across the EU

The impact values is much more important to explain the EP vote when the dimension of competition if Left vs Right than when it is anti vs pro (further) European unification. (L-R is even more important for GAL-TAN issues…)

When the dimension of competition is European unification variantion across countries is more pronounced because it concerns both direction and strenght (for the impact of each one of the three sets of values): Worst conditions for a structured and unified polity across the EU?

On the contrary, when the dimension of competition is Left vs Right the variantion across countries is less pronounced because in most of the cases it concerns only strenght (for the impact of each of the three sets of values): Better conditions for a structured and unified polity across the EU?

Contrary to what one might expect, namely from GAL-TAN theory, the authoritarian-libertarian divide (like the two other sets of values) is much more important to explain the EP vote when the latter concerns Left-Right divisions than when it concern divisions across the European Unification dimension.

Part of the explanations for cross variations in the impact of values across the are “good news”:

Finding: the higher the clarity of policy alternatives (either for European issues or L-R) the stronger the impact of values on the EP vote (although this relationship is not always significant). This means that at least when this relationship does hold it depends on the politicians actions to increase the quality of political representation in the EU…

Finding: Party institutionalization vs higher level of anchoring of the citizens’ vote in EP elections in value orientations - Question: can we conclude from this that as time goes by there will more anchoring of the citizens’ vote in EP elections in value orientations in the polities that are now less institutionalized?

(similar ideia for level of institutionalization of the EU issues in the party system – “number of years of country’s EU membership” – vs the stronger impact of values on the citizens’ vote in EP elections)

Other contextual factors are not so clearly dependent on politicians:

The higher the number of immigrants in a country, the higher the impact of values related with immigration on the vote in EP elections;

The higher the level of secularization in a country, the higher the impact of libertarian-authoritarian values on the vote in EP elections (new politics).

West vs East:

There are relevant differences in the factors that account for cross national variation in the impact of values across West and East - some reflection about this is needed…

Table 1.1: List of dependent and independent variables at the individual level Variables Categories Dependent variable Party choice_EU: party voted for in the last 2009 European election ordered in a anti-pro European unification scale (q25recod)

Ordered from 0 (European unification has already gone too far) to 10 (European unification should be pushed further) according to the average position of each party following citizens’ perceptions (EES 2009 mass survey): only citizens with secondary education or more were considered

Party choice_LR: party voted for in the the last 2009 European election ordered in a Left-Right scale (q25recod2)

Ordered from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right) according to average position of each party following citizens’ perceptions (EES 2009 mass survey): only citizens with secondary education or more were considered

Control variables (independent) Social Class Q114r – Social Class (subjective) 1 – Upper class; (...) 5 – Working class. v200r - education: ISCED level (cross-country comparable)

1 – Level 6; (...) 17 – Level 0.

Religion Q117D1 – Non religious 1 – No religion; 0 – Roman Catholics; Q117D2 – Protestants 1 – Protestants; 0 –Roman Catholics; Q117D3 – Orthodox 1 – Orthodox; 0 – Roman Catholics; Q117D4 – Other religions 1 – Other religions; 0 Roman Catholics. Q118 – Attendance at religious services 1 – several times a week; (...) 6 – Never. Habitat Q115 – rural vs urban area 1 – rural area or village; (...) 6 – Large

town or city

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Table 1.2: List of issues and value indices at the individual level Independent Variables: tested for inclusion of indices

Index

Immigration issues Immigration value orientation Q56 - Immigrants required to adapt to customs of [country] Q67 - Immigration to [country] should be decreased significantly

(q56 + q67) / 2 Cronbach’s Alpha: 0,536. Maximum: 5 (tolerance) Minimum: 1 (intolerance)

Socio-economic issues Market vs State intervention values Q57 - Private enterprise best to solve [country's] economic problems

(q57 + q59r + q63r) / 3

Q59r - public services and industries should be in state ownership

Cronbach’s Alpha: 0,289.

Q63r - Income and wealth should be redistributed towards ordinary people

Maximum: 5 (pro state intervention) Minimum: 1 (pro market freedom)

Libertarian and authoritarian issues Libertarian and authoritarian values Q58 - Same-sex marriages should be prohibited by law Q60r - Women should be free to decide on matters of abortion

(q58 + q60r + q62 + q64 + q66) / 5 Cronbach’s Alpha: 0,531.

Q62 - People who break law should get much harsher sentences than now Q64 - Schools must teach children to obey authority

Maximum: 5 (libertarian) Minimum: 1 (authoritarian)

Q66 - A woman should cut down on paid work for her family

Notes: 1) the answers were all originally coded in an ordinal scale: from “strongly agree” (1) to “strongly disagree” (5); when there is the mentioned “r” is present after the variable name, it means that the coding was reversed. Thus, lower values in each variable indicates intolerant attitudes towards immigration, pro market attitudes and authoritarian attitudes.

Table 1.3: List of independent variables at the macro-level Independent and Control Variables – Macro Level

Categories

Independent contextual variables Anti-pro European unification polarization index (PI_European)

Minimum: 0,037; Maximum: 0,352.

Left-Right polarization index (PI_Left-Right)


Anti-pro European unification distance between the two major parties (Distance European) (absolute distance between average positions of each major party in each camp divided by the range of the scale)


Left-Right distance between the two major parties (Distance Left-Right) (ditto)


YearsEU – Years of membership in the EEC-EU

Minimum: 52; Maximum: 2.

YearsDemocracy – Years of democratic regime, 1920-2009, in each country (polity >= 7)

Minimum: 19; Maximum: 90.

Netcontributor_ReceiverEU - Net contributor (or receiver) to EU Budget 2009 (in € per head: negative indicates ctry net receiver)

Minimum: -2364,00; Maximum: 211,00.

SocialExpenditure - Social Expenditure in each country - Euro per inhabitant Eurostat 2007


Percent_Immigrants - Percentage non-nationals in resident Population by country, Eurostat 2009 (BE & UK: 2008)


Secularization - Percentage of respondents (EES 2009) that declared (q118) that "never" go to church


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The left-right polarization index, which was originally designed by Hermann Schmitt

(see Schmitt and Freire, forthcoming), is as follows (for the anti vs. pro (further)

European unification the values for LR are replaced by the respective values for

the anti vs. pro EU):

IP= (∑ |LRm-LRpx|*EPpx ) / IPmax

Where:

IP=ideological polarization

LRm=the numerical centre of left-right scale;

LRpx=the (average) position of party x on the left-right scale; and

EPpx=the proportion of party x of the valid vote in the last election.

IPmax=maximum ideological polarization defined by two equally strong

parties located at opposite poles of the ideological spectrum.

Consider Spain in 2004, for example, where the LRM is 10.5 (on a 0–20 scale); now

consider the LRpx for the Spanish socialist party (PSOE—Partido Socialista Obrero

Español) (8.2). Calculate the difference between LRM and this latter value, which gives

2.3. Then calculate this value and multiply it by the proportion of the vote for each party

(|LRm-LRpx|*EPpx): 2.3*0.426. Add the result of this calculation to the values

calculated for the other parties with parliamentary representation then divide it by

IPmax (9.5)1 to obtain IP: 0.414.

1 IPmax is just the distance from one OR the other end of the scale to its middle (LRM). For example, for a scale of 1 to 10, LRM is 5.5 and IPmax is 4.5. For a scale of 0 to 20, LRM is 10.5 and IPmax is 9.5.

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Table 2: OLS regressions, 1st step—micro level: the impact of values on party vote ordered in an anti-pro European unification scale (0–10), 2009. Regression coefficients and variance explained Independent variables: regression coefficients Variance explained Attitudes

towards immigration

Attitudes towards the state and the market

Libertarian vs. Authoritarian orientations

R2—Values (controlling social factors)

R2—Values and social factors

All countries 0,093*** -0,088*** 0,027 0,032 0,045 Belgium- BE 0,107** 0,019 0,009 0,021 0,052 Czech Rep. –CZ -0,040 -0,555*** 0,245** 0,220 0,281 Denmark – DE 0,335*** 0,066 0,227** 0,124 0,134 Germany – DE 0,017 -0,250*** -0,053 0,078 0,143 Estonia – EE -0,082** -0,149*** 0,045 0,051 0,323 Greece – EL -0,072 -0,282*** -0,221** 0,043 0,163 Spain – ES 0,038 0,072** 0,120*** 0,093 0,165 France – FR 0,080 -0,035 0,018 0,002 0,018 Ireland – IE 0,000 -0,065 0,048 0,001 0,039 Italy – IT 0,165*** 0,229*** 0,068 0,113 0,130 Cyprus – CY 0,027 -0,326*** -0,178** 0,072 0,162 Latvia – LV 0,030 -0,026 0,044 0,009 0,006 Lithuania – LT -0,009 -0,075 -0,081 0,008 0,022 Luxembourg –LU -0,052 -0,076 -0,018 0,010 0,055 Hungary – HU 0,022 -0,101 -0,136 0,000 0,029 Malta – MT 0,064 -0,256*** -0,103 0,046 0,152 Netherlands – NL 0,352*** -0,062 0,121 0,069 0,113 Austria – AT 0,448*** -0,068 0,247** 0,130 0,185 Poland – PL 0,116 0,453*** -0,510** 0,060 0,116 Portugal – PT -0,003 -0,198** -0,212* 0,017 0,126 Slovenia – SI 0,000 0,122** 0,241** -0,001 0,192 Slovakia – SK 0,015 -0,053 -0,045 0,002 0,025 Finland - FI 0,272*** -0,498*** 0,022 0,076 0,150 Sweden – SE -0,040 -0,630*** -0,185* 0,164 0,243 Britain – UK 0,175*** 0,036 0,112 0,068 0,121 Bulgaria – BG 0,031 -0,050 0,036 -0,015 0,020 Romania – RO 0,020 -0,028 -0,118 -0,013 0,246 Sources: data elaborated by the author from EES 2009 - PIREDEU. (a) Dependent variable: voting choice in each country with the parties ordered from 0 (European

unification has already gone too far) to 10 (European unification should be pushed further) as the average position of each party in the anti-pro European unification scale according to the citizens’ perceptions in each country, 2009 (only citizens with secondary education or more were considered for this purpose).

(b) Values: 1) Immigration: 1, less tolerant vis-à-vis immigrants, 5, more tolerant; 2) Market vs State: 1, more favourable to free market, 5, more favourable to state intervention; 3) Libertarian vs. Authoritarian orientations: 1, more authoritarian, 5, more libertarian.

(c) *** p < .01; ** p < 0.05; * p < .1. (d) In the cells we present the regression of coefficients concerning the impact of each of the three sets of

value orientations, after controlling for social structure (social class, religious denomination and church attendance).

(e) Two types of variance explained are presented: the total, i.e., considering both values and social structure in the OLS regressions; the added variance explained of values, vis-à-vis regression equations that only considered social structure.

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Table 3: OLS regressions, 1st step—micro level: the impact of values on party vote ordered in a left-right scale (0–10), 2009. Regression coefficients and variance explained Independent variables: regression coefficients Variance explained Attitudes

towards immigration

Attitudes towards the state and the market

Libertarian vs. Authoritarian orientations

R2—Values (controlling social factors)

R2—Values and social factors

All countries -0,261*** -0,624*** -0,334*** 0,095 0,14.2 Belgium- BE -0,257*** -0,097 -0,082 0,047 0,068 Czech Rep. -CZ -0,047 -1,581*** 0,386 0,221 0,275 Denmark – DK -0,512*** -0,879*** -0,356** 0,287 0,322 Germany – DE -0,153** -0,816*** -0,564*** 0,187 0,312 Estonia – EE -0,253*** 0,566*** 0,068 0,083 0,328 Greece – EL -0,173* -0,617*** -0,637*** 0,125 0,280 Spain – ES -0,315** -0,761*** -0,796*** 0,157 0,295 France – FR -0,495*** -0,612*** -0,193 0,167 0,332 Ireland – IE 0,013 -0,212*** 0,038 0,026 0,099 Italy – IT -0,591*** -1,037*** -0,653*** 0,239 0,300 Cyprus – CY 0,096 -1,081*** -0,556** 0,068 0,157 Latvia - LV -0,275*** 0,025 0,211* 0,020 0,351 Lithuania – LT 0,036 -0,584** -0,201 0,014 0,063 Luxembourg -LU -0,215** -0,182** -0,248** 0,048 0,121 Hungary – HU 0,299 -0,064 -0,868** 0,045 0,145 Malta – MT 0,141 -0,707*** -0,261 0,067 0,183 Netherlands – NL -0,654*** -0,521*** -0,377** 0,225 0,315 Austria – AT -0,544*** -0,438*** -0,289** 0,232 0,315 Poland – PL 0,012 0,334** 0,139 0,030 0,030 Portugal - PT -0,167 -0,862*** -0,660** 0,061 0,164 Slovenia – SI 0,022 -0,722*** -1,151*** 0,060 0,418 Slovakia – SK 0,019 -0,689*** -0,240 0,094 0,119 Finland - FI -0,219** -0,759*** -0,393** 0,093 0,237 Sweden – SE -0,201** -1,274*** -0,449** 0,269 0,458 Britain – UK -0,250*** -0,341*** 0,006 0,159 0,271 Bulgaria – BG 0,074 -0,819*** -0,523 0,052 0,059 Romania – RO 0,068 -0,119 -0,238 -0,022 0,035 Sources: data elaborated by the author from EES 2009 - PIREDEU. (f) Dependent variable: voting choice in each country with the parties ordered from 0 (left) to 10 (right)

as the average position of each party in the left-right scale according to the citizens’ perceptions in each country, 2009 (only citizens with secondary education or more were considered for this purpose).

(g) Values: 1) Immigration: 1, less tolerant vis-à-vis immigrants, 5, more tolerant; 2) Market vs State: 1, more favourable to free market, 5, more favourable to state intervention; 3) Libertarian vs. Authoritarian orientations: 1, more authoritarian, 5, more libertarian.

(h) *** p < .01; ** p < 0.05; * p < .1. (i) In the cells we present the regression of coefficients concerning the impact of each of the three sets of

value orientations, after controlling for social structure (social class, religious denomination and church attendance).

(j) Two types of variance explained are presented: the total, i.e., considering both values and social structure in the OLS regressions; the added variance explained of values, vis-à-vis regression equations that only considered social structure.

19

Table 4.1: OLS regressions, 2nd step—macro level: Explaining variation in the impact of values on party vote ordered in an anti-pro European unification scale (0–10), 2009 Dependent variables Independent variables Regression

coefficient: Immigration value orientations (β)

Regression coefficient: Pro Market vs Pro State value orientations (β) )

Regression coefficient: Libertarian-authoritarian value orientations (β)

European unification polarization index (party system) (A)

n.s. n.s. n.s.

Years of EU membership n.s. n.s. n.s. Net contributor to EU 0,493** n.s. n.s. Social protection expenditure: % of public budget

0,526** n.s. n.s.

Secularization: “never” go to church (%)

0,570**

Immigration: Non-nationals in resident population (%)

n.s.

Adjusted R2 0,360 - 0,298 N Valid 27 27 27 Sources: data elaborated by the author from EES 2009 - PIREDEU. (a) Dependent variable: the regression coefficient (value for each country) for the impact of a)

immigration value orientations, b) pro market vs. pro state intervention value orientations; c) libertarian and authoritarian values, upon party choice (ordered in a anti-pro European unification dimension) – always after controlling for both social class and religious denomination (several dummies).

(b) *** p <.001; ** p < .05; * p < .1. (c) In the cells we present the Beta regression coefficients concerning the impact of each of the macro

level variables to explain variation in the regressions coefficients (non-standardized) from step 1 regression (micro level).

(d) Stepwise regressions.

20

Table 4.2: OLS regressions, 2nd step—macro level: Explaining variation in the impact of values on party vote ordered in an anti-pro European unification scale (0–10), 2009: Western vs. Central and Eastern European Countries Dependent variables Independent variables Regression


Regression coefficient: Pro Market vs Pro State value orientations (β) )


Western EU countries European unification polarization index (party system) (A)

n.s. -0,604** n.s.

Years of EU membership n.s. n.s. n.s. Net contributor to EU n.s. n.s. n.s. Social protection expenditure: % of public budget

n.s. n.s. n.s.



Adjusted R2 - 0,323 - N Valid 17 17 17 Central and Eastern EU countries European unification polarization index (party system) (A)

0,893** n.s. n.s.

Years of EU membership n.s n.s. n.s. Net contributor to EU n.s. n.s. Social protection expenditure: % of public budget

-0,532** n.s. n.s.


0,703**


n.s.

Adjusted R2 0,638 - 0,432 N Valid 10 10 10 Sources: data elaborated by the author from EES 2009 - PIREDEU. (e) Dependent variable: the regression coefficient (value for each country) for the impact of a)

immigration value orientations, b) pro market vs. pro state intervention value orientations; c) libertarian and authoritarian values, upon party choice (ordered in a anti-pro European unification dimension) – always after controlling for both social class and religious denomination (several dummies).

(f) *** p <.001; ** p < .05; * p < .1. (g) In the cells we present the Beta regression coefficients concerning the impact of each of the macro

level variables to explain variation in the regressions coefficients (non-standardized) from step 1 regression (micro level).

(h) Stepwise regressions.

21

Table 5.1: OLS regressions, 2nd step—macro level: Explaining variation in the impact of values on party vote ordered in a left-right scale (0–10), 2009 Dependent variables Independent variables Regression


Regression coefficient: Pro Market vs Pro State value orientations (β)


Left-right polarization index (party system)

n.s. -0,616** (-0,546**)

-0,552** (-0,472*)

Years of democracy, 1920-2009 -0,626*** n.s. n.s. Net contributor to EU n.s. n.s. n.s. Social protection expenditure: % of public budget

n.s. n.s. n.s.


n.s.


n.s.

Adjusted R2 0,368 0,355 (0,270) 0,277 (0,192) N Valid 27 27 27 Sources: data elaborated by the author from EES 2009 - PIREDEU.

(a) Dependent variable: the regression coefficient (value for each country) for the impact of a) immigration value orientations, b) pro market vs. pro state intervention value orientations; c) libertarian and authoritarian values, upon party choice (ordered in a anti-pro European unification dimension) – always after controlling for both social class and religious denomination (several dummies).

(b) *** p <.001; ** p < .05; * p < .1. (c) In the cells we present the Beta regression coefficients concerning the impact of each of the

macro level variables to explain variation in the regressions coefficients (non-standardized) from step 1 regression (micro level).


22

Table 5.2: OLS regressions, 2nd step—macro level: Explaining variation in the impact of values on party vote ordered in a left-right scale (0–10), 2009: Western vs. Central and Eastern European Countries Dependent variables Independent variables Regression


Regression coefficient: Pro Market vs Pro State value orientations (β)


Western EU Countries Left-right polarization index (party system)

n.s. -0,858*** (-0,708**)

-0,538**

Years of democracy, 1920-2009 n.s. n.s. 0,422** Net contributor to EU n.s. n.s. n.s. Social protection expenditure: % of public budget

n.s. n.s. n.s.


n.s.


n.s.

Adjusted R2 - 0,718 (0,408) 0,654 N Valid 17 17 17 Central and Eastern EU Countries Left-right polarization index (party system)

n.s. n.s. n.s.

Years of democracy, 1920-2009 n.s. n.s. n.s. Net contributor to EU n.s. n.s. n.s. Social protection expenditure: % of public budget

n.s. n.s. n.s.


n.s.


-0,833**

Adjusted R2 0,655 - - N Valid 10 10 10 Sources: data elaborated by the author from EES 2009 - PIREDEU.

(a) Dependent variable: the regression coefficient (value for each country) for the impact of a) immigration value orientations, b) pro market vs. pro state intervention value orientations; c) libertarian and authoritarian values, upon party choice (ordered in a anti-pro European unification dimension) – always after controlling for both social class and religious denomination (several dummies).

(b) *** p <.001; ** p < .05; * p < .1. (c) In the cells we present the Beta regression coefficients concerning the impact of each of the

macro level variables to explain variation in the regressions coefficients (non-standardized) from step 1 regression (micro level).


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ANNEX Table A.1: – Independent variables at the macro-level (I): The clarity of policy alternatives in the European countries across two dimensions of competition: European unification (0-10) and Left-right (0-10) scales European unification Left-right Distance

between the two major

parties

Polarization index

Distance between the two

major parties

Polarization index

Belgium- BE 0,03 0,109 0,98 0,208 Denmark – DE 0,34 0,174 2,91 0,33 Germany – DE 0,21 0,186 2,82 0,325 Greece – EL 0,08 0,286 2,36 0,329 Spain – ES 0,51 0,182 4,64 0,42 France – FR 0,22 0,088 3,73 0,318 Ireland – IE 0,49 0,079 0,6 0,179 Italy – IT 0,83 0,085 4,72 0,394 Cyprus – CY 2,21 0,204 7,38 0,519 Luxembourg –LU 0,55 0,211 2,46 0,246 Malta – MT 1,39 0,204 3,5 0,343 Netherlands – NL 3,82 0,244 1,95 0,297 Austria – AT 0,59 0,257 4,08 0,315 Portugal – PT 0,29 0,189 2,43 0,315 Finland - FI 1,25 0,237 2,11 0,362 Sweden – SE 1,37 0,244 4,91 0,426 Britain – UK 1,89 0,137 2,5 0,178 Mean & std: West 0,886 / 0,98 0,186 / 0,06 3,223 /1,64 0.332 / 0,89 Bulgaria – BG 0,97 0,102 5,61 0,403 Romania – RO 0,18 0,176 2,73 0,24 Czech Rep. –CZ 1,3 0,145 5,38 0,472 Estonia – EE 1,02 0,055 3,36 0,261 Latvia – LV 0,12 0,073 0,31 0,262 Lithuania – LT 0,11 0,037 2,62 0,225 Hungary – HU 0,33 0,199 5,86 0,528 Poland – PL 4,78 0,352 1,06 0,146 Slovenia – SI 0,92 0,228 4,74 0,397 Slovakia – SK 0,54 0,155 3,92 0,23 Mean & Std: East 1,027 /1,39 0,151 / 0,09 3,559 / 1,91 0,316 / 0,12 Sources: data elaborated by the author from EES 2009 - PIREDEU.

(a) Clarity of policy alternatives across the European unification dimension of completion: from 0 (European unification has already gone too far) to 10 (European unification should be pushed further) considering the average position of each party in the anti-pro European unification scale according to the citizens’ perceptions in each country, 2009 (only citizens with secondary education or more were considered for this purpose).

(b) Clarity of policy alternatives across the Left-right dimension of completion: from 0 (Left) to 10 (Right) considering the average position of each party in the Left-Right scale according to the citizens’ perceptions in each country, 2009 (only citizens with secondary education or more were considered for this purpose).

(c) Explain how the distance in EU scale was calculated... (d) Explain how the Polarization index in EU scale was calculated... (e) Explain how the distance in Left-Right scale was calculated... (f) Explain how the Polarization index in Left-Right scale was calculated...

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Table A.2: – Independent variables at the macro-level (II): Years of

membership EU

Net contributor / receiver to EU budget

Social Expenditure in each country

Belgium- BE 52,00 -90,00 9284,20 Denmark – DE 36,00 211,00 11982,50 Germany – DE 52,00 107,00 8186,20 Greece – EL 28,00 -267,00 4936,90 Spain – ES 24,00 -10,00 4929,50

France – FR 52,00 100,00 9056,30 Ireland – IE 36,00 35,00 8247,60

Italy – IT 52,00 101,00 6944,90 Cyprus – CY 5,00 34,00 3690,70

Luxembourg –LU 52,00 -2364,00 15081,30 Malta – MT 5,00 -18,00 2408,20

Netherlands – NL 52,00 90,00 9872,10 Austria – AT 14,00 60,00 9123,30 Portugal – PT 24,00 -196,00 3812,30 Finland - FI 14,00 114,00 8624,90

Sweden – SE 14,00 44,00 10738,20 Britain – UK 36,00 63,00 8471,50

Mean & Std: West 32 / 17,7 -116,8 / 590,8 7964,15 / 3250,2 Bulgaria – BG 2,00 -77,00 568,30 Romania – RO 2,00 -75,00 741,40

Czech Rep. –CZ 5,00 -150,00 2293,40 Estonia – EE 5,00 -416,00 1450,30 Latvia – LV 5,00 -219,00 1016,90

Lithuania – LT 5,00 -438,00 1213,80 Hungary – HU 5,00 -265,00 2244,30 Poland – PL 5,00 -160,00 1480,10 Slovenia – SI 5,00 -93,00 3657,40 Slovakia – SK 5,00 -89,00 1629,70

Mean & Std: East 4,3 / 1,3 -210,3 / 136,0 1629,6 / 909,0 Sources: data elaborated by the author from Eurostat: 1) Net contributor (or receiver) to EU Budget 2009 (in € per head: negative indicates country net receiver): http://ec.europa.eu/budget/documents/2009_en.htm?submenuheader=2#table-3_2; 2) Social Expenditure in each country - Euro per inhabitant Eurostat 2007: http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=spr_exp_sum&lang=en

25

http://ec.europa.eu/budget/documents/2009_en.htm?submenuheader=2#table-3_2

http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=spr_exp_sum&lang=en

26

Table A.3: – Independent variables at the macro-level (III): Years of

democracy, 1920-2009

Immigration: Percentage of non-

nationals among the resident population in

each country

Secularization: Percentage of people that

declared they “never” attend religious services/church

Belgium- BE 85,00 10,0 51,70 Denmark – DE 85,00 5,8 40,20 Germany – DE 47,00 8,8 32,20 Greece – EL 50,00 8,3 9,50 Spain – ES 40,00 12,3 42,60

France – FR 87,00 5,8 57,10 Ireland – IE 89,00 11,3 17,30

Italy – IT 62,00 6,5 26,60 Cyprus – CY 39,00 16,1 5,10

Luxembourg –LU 62,00 43,5 39,70 Malta – MT 39,00 4,4 6,70

Netherlands – NL 85,00 3,9 48,40 Austria – AT 77,00 10,3 25,90 Portugal – PT 40,00 4,2 19,30 Finland – FI 76,00 2,7 32,20 Sweden – SE 90,00 5,9 46,00 Britain – UK 90,00 7,2 47,80

Mean & Std: West 67,2 / 20,7 9,9 / 9,3 32,3 / 16,4 Czech Rep. –CZ 29,00 3,9 61,10

Estonia – EE 19,00 16,0 34,70 Latvia – LV 19,00 17,9 24,50

Lithuania – LT 19,00 1,2 9,00 Hungary – HU 20,00 1,9 40,00 Poland – PL 25,00 0,1 4,70 Slovenia – SI 19,00 3,5 36,50 Slovakia – SK 29,00 1,0 25,50 Bulgaria – BG 19,00 0,3 20,30 Romania – RO 19,00 0,1 5,50

Mean & Std: East 21,7 / 4,3 4,6 / 6,7 26,2 / 17,7 Sources: data elaborated by the author from: 1)Years of democracy: For the ‘years of democratic regime’ (YRSD) variable in each country, we considered the polities that scored seven or more in the ‘POLITY’ variable of the the Polity IV Dataset (‘Combined Polity Score: The POLITY score is calculated by subtracting the AUTOC score from the DEMOC score; the resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to –10 (strongly autocratic). Polity IV dataset - http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/ 2) Immigration: Eurostat – Statistics in Foucs - Population and Social conditions, 45/2010: migr_pop1ctz, migr_pop3ctb; 2009 for all countries except Belgium (2008) and UK (2005-2008). 3) Secularization: Percentage of respondents (EES 2009 - PIREDEU) that declared (q118) that "never" go to church.

http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/

Documents

Paper draft to the PIREDEU Final Conference, · 2010-11-15 · Paper draft to the PIREDEU Final Conference, Brussels, 18-19 November 2010: «Value Orientations and The Vote in European