Panel Discussion Safety Culture

Richard Lagdon, Chief of Nuclear Safety, Office of the Under Secretary for Nuclear Security

Panel Members

Matthew Moury, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Safety, Security and Quality

Programs Office of Environmental Management

Don Nichols,Associate Administrator for Safety and HealthNational Nuclear Security Administration

Carol Sohn,Chief Nuclear Safety, Office of Science

Safety Culture Overview

Panel Members Definition Principles DNFSB Recommendation 2011-1 Recent Improvements in the Project Management

Order Considerations for Construction Projects

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Safety Culture - Definition

An organization’s values and behaviors, modeled by its leaders, and internalized by its members, which serve to make safe performance of work the overriding priority to protect workers, the public, and the environment.

DOE Integrated Safety Management Guide

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Safety Culture Attributes

Leadership Demonstrated safety leadership Risk-informed, conservative decision making Management engagement and time in field Staff recruitment, selection, retention, and

development Open communication and fostering an

environment free from retribution Clear expectations and accountability DOE Guide 450.1c, Integrated Safety Management Guide, Attachment 10

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Safety Culture Attributes (Continued)

Employee/Worker Engagement Personal commitment to everyone’s safetyTeamwork and mutual respect Participation in work planning and improvement Mindful of hazards and controls

6DOE Guide 450.1c, Integrated Safety Management Guide, Attachment 10

Safety Culture Attributes (Continued)

Organizational Learning Credibility, trust and reporting errors and

problems Effective resolution of reported problems Performance monitoring through multiple

means Use of operational experience Questioning attitude

DOE Guide 450.1c, Integrated Safety Management Guide, Attachment 10

Safety Culture –2011-1

Initial concern raised by a WTP contractor employee to the DNFSB

Board issued Recommendation 2011-1, Safety Culture at the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant

Assert Federal control at the highest level

Conduct an extent of condition review

Conduct a non-adversarial review and determine impact on Safety Culture

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Safety Culture

S-1/S-2 Dec 5, 2011 Memo Nuclear Safety at the Department of Energy

DOE is Committed to a strong and sustained safety culture

A strong safety culture is embedded in DOE’s objective of management and operational excellence

No retaliation for raising concerns

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Lessons Learned

Line Management must walk the talkHave a regular presence in the work place Show interest when walking the floorReward those with the courage to raise issues Follow up promptly and visibly on all issues raised

Delays in addressing raised issues undermines safety cultureDelays sends the message that line management doesn’t

care about safetyDevalues the risk that employee took in raising issue

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New PM Order Improvements& Safety Culture

Design Reviews - Design sufficiently mature prior to CD-2 and reviewed by OECM as part of EIR

Design Maturity - Prior to CD-3 approval, the Final Design must be complete and reviewed to determine that the design is sufficiently mature to start procurement or construction.

Safety Design Strategy - Prepare SDS at CD-1 and update SDS at CD-2 and CD-3;

Code of Record - Created Requirement for definition of the body of requirements for a nuclear project

Design Authority - Defines Design Authority as the engineer who establishes design requirements; provides design control and technical adequacy

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CONSIDERATIONS FOR EXISTING NUCLEAR PROJECTS

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Business process improvements Transfer/designation of design authority Sharing of lessons learned Establishing expectations Design completion/design

margin Construction Project Reviews Standard processes for issue identification/resolution Matching skill sets with the oversight functions Establishing risk acceptance

Transition from a design/testing organization to construction/commissioning

Questions

Please comment on this…It appears our safety culture has tilted. In some instances, our

greatest nuclear safety risks are upon us – here and now – like liquid radioactive waste in aging tanks – but, we delay addressing those risks by

trying to trying to achieve perfection by minimizing the potential of future risks decades

from now.

Questions

Have we gone over the top? Has the nuclear safety culture gone too far with

respect to the amount of dollars spent on planning before we actually start

construction? Is the nuclear industry pricing themselves out of the market, and within DOE, meeting our nuclear mission

and cleanup requirements?

Questions

Are you aware of instances where the application of a graded approach to Safety has been used successfully to improve the timeliness and cost effectiveness of project

delivery? If so, can you provide some information regarding the approach?

Questions

WTP has received a lot of high-level attention with respect to safety, what fallout for this do you see for the rest

of the complex?

Questions

Do peer reviews have a positive or negative effect on the safety culture at

nuclear projects?

Questions

From a safety culture perspective, how do regulatory oversight organizations hurt or help the nuclear safety culture

in DOE?

Questions

Are there any new nuclear safety regulations coming? If so, will these improve the safety culture in DOE?

Questions

Is our safety culture on large nuclear projects real or perceived? Are there examples of “just going through the

motions” with respect to safety? Your thoughts?

Questions

Would more widespread use of a design-bid-build project delivery

method, as opposed to fast-tracking projects so that design and

construction overlap, make Nuclear Safety Management more

straightforward? In what way?

Questions

To what extent are some of our safety culture issues attributable to trying to

stretch technology too far, too fast?

Questions

Would greater use of pilot scale testing of unproven processes help to resolve some of our safety culture problems?