PALS Criminal Law-libre

8/9/2019 PALS Criminal Law-libre

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CRIMINAL LAWBOOK 1 (ARTICLES 1-99, RPC)

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES

MALA IN SE AND MALA PROHIBITA

PADILLA v. DIZON(158 SCRA 127)

The respondent-judge has shown gross ignorance ofthe law in holding that to convict the accused forviolation of Central Bank Circular No. 960 i.e.,smuggling of foreign currency out of the country, theprosecution must establish that the accused had thecriminal intent to violate the law. The respondent oughtto know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens

rea) is not essential in offenses punished by speciallaws, which are mala prohibita.

IMPOSSIBLE CRIMES

INTOD ET. AL. v CA(215 SCRA 52)

G.R. No. 103119

Intod fired at Palangpangan's room, although in reality,the latter was not present in his room; thus, Intod failedto kill him. The factual situation in the case at barpresents an inherent impossibility of accomplishing the

crime. Under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the RevisedPenal Code, such is sufficient to make the act animpossible crime.

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended actseven if completed, would not amount to a crime.

PEOPLE v DOMASIAN(219 SCRA 245)

The accused illegally detained a child and sent a ransomnote to the latter's parents, but the child was rescued evenbefore the ransom note was received. The act cannot beconsidered an impossible crime because there was noinherent impossibility of its accomplishment or theemployment of inadequate or ineffective means, and thedelivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victimdid not extinguish the offense, which had already beenconsummated when the accused deprived the child of hisliberty.

STAGES OF EXECUTION

PEOPLE v LAMAHANG(91 Phil 703)

The accused was caught in the act of making an opening

with an iron bar on the wall of a store, and succeeded inbreaking one board and in unfastening another from thewall. The crime committed was not attempted robbery butonly attempted trespass to dwelling, since based on thefacts established, his intention was to enter by means offorce into the said store against the will of its owner.

PEOPLE v PANCHO(416 SCRA 506)

November 27, 2003G.R. 136592-93

Under Art. 6, in relation to Art. 335, of the Revised PenalCode, rape is attempted when the offender commencesthe commission of rape directly by overt acts, but doesnot perform all the acts of execution which shouldproduce the crime of rape by reason of some cause oraccident other than his own spontaneous desistance.There is no attempted rape in this case because theaccused just dragged the victim and held her feet, whichare not indicative of an intent or attempt to rape thevictim.

PEOPLE v ORANDE(415 SCRA 699)

November 12, 2003G.R. No. 141724

The trial court convicted the accused of frustrated rapedue to the fact that the latter did not succeed in insertinghis penis in the victim’s vagina. There is no such crime asfrustrated rape. Instead, the accused is guilty ofconsummated rape since perfect penetration is notessential for the consummation of rape.

VALENZUELA v PEOPLE(525 SCRA 306)

The accused argued that he should only be convicted offrustrated theft for taking cartons of detergent from the

supermarket since he was immediately apprehended bythe security guard. Thus, was not able to freely disposeof the said stolen articles. Theft cannot have a frustratedstage and the accused is guilty of consummated theftsince he has obtained possession over the stolen itemand the presumed inability of the offender to freelydispose of the stolen property does not negate the factthat the owners have already been deprived of their rightto possession upon the completion of the taking. Unlawfultaking is deemed complete from the moment the offendergains possession of the thing. The ability of the offenderto freely dispose of the property stolen is not aconstitutive element of the crime of theft.

CONSPIRACY AND PROPOSAL

PEOPLE v RECONES, ET. AL. (310 SCRA 809)

July 20, 1999G. R. No. 129535

Three (3) accused were charged with murder. The first

one hit the victim repeatedly with a stone marker, the

second one pummeled the victim with his fists while the

third only watched and acted as lookout in case others

will try to intervene. All of them, including the lookout, are

guilty of murder and are accountable for the death of thevictim on the principle that the act of one is the act of all.

Proof of a previous agreement to commit a felony is not

necessary to establish conspiracy, it being sufficient that

the acts of the accused, before, during, and after the

commission of the felony, demonstrate its existence.


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PEOPLE v CANTUBA(183 SCRA 289) G. R. No. 79811

The accused was correctly convicted as a co-conspirator.His knowledge of the plot to assassinate the victim, thefact that he had been ordered to scout for a man whocould do the job and his knowledge of the place, date andtime of the assault are sufficient to show unity of purpose.At the very least, therefore, he had to know the plot anddecided to join the execution. From the legal viewpoint,conspiracy exists if, at the time of the commission of theoffense, the accused had the same purpose and wereunited in its execution.

The degree of actual participation in the commission ofthe crime is immaterial in conspiracy.

CONTINUING CRIMES

PEOPLE v TUMLOS (67 PHIL 320)April 13, 1939

G.R. No. 46248

The theft of the thirteen (13) cows committed by thedefendant took place at the same time and in the sameplace. Consequently, he performed but one act. The factthat eight (8) of the said cows belong to one owner andfive (5) to another does not make him criminally liable fortwo (2) distinct offenses for the reason that to be liable fortwo (2) distinct offenses, the act must be divided into two(2). In this case, the act is not susceptible of division. The

intention was likewise one, namely, to take for thepurpose of appropriating or selling the thirteen (13) cowswhich he found grazing in the same place.

PEOPLE v JARANILLA(55 SCRA 563)

February 22, 1974 G.R. No. L-28547

The taking of the six fighting cocks from their coop shouldbe characterized as a single offense of theft as theassumption is that the accused were animated by asingle criminal impulse. The taking of the fighting cocks inthe same place and on the same occasion cannot giverise to separate crimes of theft.

SANTIAGO v GARCHITORENA(228 SCRA 214)G.R. No. 109266

Public prosecutors filed thirty-two (32) AmendedInformations against Santiago for violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, allegedlycommitted by giving "unqualified" aliens with the benefitsof the Alien Legalization Program. The thirty-two (32)Amended Informations charged the accused with what isknown as delito continuado or "continued crime" and

hence, there should only be one information to be filedagainst Santiago. The concept of delito continuado isapplicable to crime penalized under special laws.

ILAGAN v COURT OF APPEALS (239 SCRA 575)G.R. No. 110617

The series of acts committed against the seven (7) lotbuyers were not the product of a single criminal intent.The misrepresentation or deceit was employed againsteach lot buyer on different dates and in separate places,hence, they originated from separate criminal intents andconsequently resulted in separate felonies.

COMPOUND CRIMES

PEOPLE v CASTROMERO(280 SCRA 421)G.R. No. 118992

The rape victim jumped from a window of her house toescape from the accused; as a result, she sufferedserious physical injuries specifically a broken vertebra

which required medical attention and surgery for morethan ninety days. Here, the rape was complexed with thecrime of serious physical injuries, in accordance with thesettled principle that a person who creates in another’smind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latterto try to escape is responsible for whatever injuries theother person may consequently suffer.

PEOPLE v COMADRE(431 SCRA 366)

June 8, 2004 G.R. No. 153559

The accused dropped a hand grenade inside a house,killing one and causing 4 others to suffer shrapnelwounds on their bodies. The accused was found guilty ofthe complex crime of murder with multiple attemptedmurder under Article 48, and the penalty for the mostserious crime (murder) shall be imposed.

PEOPLE v MELECIO ROBINOS(382 SCRA 581)

May 29, 2002 G.R. No. 138453

The accused stabbed his pregnant wife with a knife,causing the instantaneous death of the latter and thefetus inside her womb. He was convicted of the complexcrime of parricide with unintentional abortion, and thepenalty to be imposed on him should be that for thegraver offense which is parricide.

When a single act constitutes two or more grave or lessgrave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crimeshall be imposed.

PEOPLE v BALOTOL(84 Phil 289)

The accused stabbed the victim at the back with the use

of a bolo. The bolo pierced through the victim'sabdominal region which also wounded another person,resulting to the death of both victims. The crimecommitted was double murder, defined and penalized inArticle 248, in relation to Article 48, of the Revised PenalCode.


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COMPLEX CRIME PROPER

PEOPLE v TALOOctober 25, 2000 G.R. No. 125542

The accused forcibly took the victim from her parents'house and, in a ricefield about 800 meters away, forcedher to have sexual intercourse with him. The accusedwas found guilty of the complex crime of forcibleabduction with rape, as the crime of forcible abductionwas a necessary means for committing the crime of rape.

PEOPLE v SABREDO(331 SCRA 663)

May 11, 2000 G.R. 126114

The accused, using a blade, forcibly took away the victimfrom Cebu to Masbate, and eventually raped her. The

crime committed is simple rape only since the informationfailed to allege that the forcible taking of the victim wasdone with lewd designs (an element of forcibleabduction). Hence, the crime of rape may absorb forcibleabduction.

PEOPLE v BARBAS (60 PHIL 241)

The defendant, a public officer, altered the duplicates ofthe cedulas by erasing the names originally written onthem and replacing the same with new names for thepurpose of selling them to other people and

misappropriating the money. The falsification of publicdocuments was, therefore, the means which thedefendant availed himself of in committing the crime ofmalversation.

CIRCUMSTANCES AFFECTING CRIMINAL LIABILITY JUSTIFYING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE v ABRAZALDO(397 SCRA 137)

While the accused admitted the commission of the crimein order to preserve his own life, he maintained that thevictim accidentally stabbed himself while they weregrappling for the knife. The justifying circumstance of self-defense cannot be appreciated considering the accused-appellant’s flight from the crime scene, his failure toinform the authorities of the incident and his failure tosurrender the knife to the authorities. The aforesaidcircumstances are inconsistent with having a cleanconscience and, instead, indicate his culpability to thecrime charged.

PEOPLE v TAC-AN(182 SCRA 601)

G.R. Nos. 76338-39

The accused killed the victim but claimed self-defense.The victim previously uttered some threatening wordsagainst him. Assuming that the victim uttered thosewords, such utterances cannot be regarded as theunlawful aggression which is the first and mostfundamental requirement of self-defense, and suchstatements could not reasonably inspire the "wellgrounded and reasonable belief" claimed by Renato that"he was in imminent danger of death or bodily harm."

PEOPLE v PATOTOY(261 SCRA 37)

G.R. No. 102058

The accused admitted to having killed the victim butclaims to have done so in self-defense. The victimappeared to draw something from his waist during theirconfrontation. The victim's alleged act of drawing"something" from his waist certainly is not the "unlawfulaggression" meant in the law that would justify a fatalstrike at him and no veritable physical force on the part ofthe latter has been shown that could have reallyendangered the life of the accused. Hence, self-defensecannot exist in this case.

Without unlawful aggression, self-defense cannot existnor be an extenuating circumstance.

PEOPLE VS. GENEBLAZO(361 SCRA 572)

July 20, 2001G.R. No. 133580

Assuming that the version of the accused of the incidentsis true, that unlawful aggression emanated from thevictim and his companion by throwing stones at him, theaggression ceased to exist when the victim and hiscompanion ran away. There was no longer any realdanger to the life or personal safety of the accused.When the perpetrator does not persist in his purpose orwhen he discontinues his attitude to the extent that theobject of his attack is no longer in peril, an act ofaggression is not unlawful aggression warranting self-

defense.

PEOPLE V. BAUTISTA(424 SCRA 63)

February 27, 2004 G.R. No. 139530

There is no self-defense in this case because even if theaccused believed that the victim did try to kill him whenhe saw him raise his bolo, such aggression ceased whenaccused succeeded in grabbing the bolo and he was nothit by the stone hurled at him by the victim; hence, theaccused no longer faced any danger to his life and limb.When an unlawful aggression no longer exists, the onemaking a defense has no right to kill or even injure theformer aggressor.

PEOPLE v ESCARLOS(410 SCRA 463)

September 10, 2003 G.R. No. 148912

Even assuming arguendo that there was an altercation

before the stabbing incident and that some danger did in

fact exist, the imminence of that danger had already

ceased the moment the accused disarmed the victim by

seizing the knife from the latter. After the accused hadsuccessfully seized it, there was no longer any unlawful

aggression to speak of that would have necessitated the

need to kill the victim. Hence, the accused became the

unlawful aggressor when he stabbed the victim.


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PEOPLE v APOLINAR C.A., 38 O.G. 2870

The accused, while looking over his land and believingthat the victim had stolen his palay, shouted for the latterto stop, fired his gun in the air and then at the victim,causing the latter’s death. Defense of property is not ofsuch importance as the right to life and it can be invokedonly as a justifying circumstance when it is coupled withan attack on the person of the one entrusted with the saidproperty.

BATTERED WOMAN SYNDROME

PEOPLE v GENOSASeptember 8, 2010

G.R. No. 135981

Marivic Genosa, charged with parricide for the killing ofher husband, anchored her defense on the theory of

battered woman syndrome (BWS), which constituted aform of cumulative provocation that broke down herpsychological resistance and self-control. The Courtconvicted Genosa as the defense failed to establish allthe elements of self-defense arising from BWS: (1) eachof the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven tohave characterized at least two battering episodesbetween the appellant and her intimate partner; (2) thefinal acute battering episode preceding the killing of thebatterer must have produced in the battered person'smind an actual fear of an imminent harm from herbatterer and an honest belief that she needed to useforce in order to save her life; (3) at the time of the killing,

the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarilyimmediate and actual -- grave harm to the accused,based on the history of violence perpetrated by theformer against the latter.

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE v DOMINGO(580 SCRA 436)

The accused asserted that he was insane or completelydeprived of intelligence during the commission of thecrimes and presented the results of a medicalexamination showing that he was suffering fromSchizophrenia. The medical examination was taken fouryears after the crimes were committed. The allegedinsanity of an accused should relate to the periodimmediately before or at the very moment the felony iscommitted, not at any time thereafter. Medical findings ofmental disorder referring to a period after the time thecrime was committed will not exempt him from criminalliability.

LLAVE v PEOPLE(488 SCRA 376)April 26, 2006

G.R. No. 166040

The accused (a minor), with methodical fashion, draggedthe resisting victim behind a pile of hollow blocks toensure that passersby would not discover his acts. Whenhe was discovered, he hastily fled from the scene toescape arrest. The Court ruled that he acted withdiscernment when he had carnal knowledge with thevictim. Based on the circumstances, the minor knew whathe was doing and that it was wrong. Such circumstances

included the gruesome nature of the crime and theminor’s cunning and shrewdness.

U.S. V. TANEDO(15 PHIL 196)

The accused, while hunting fired a shot at wild chickens;however, the slug recoiled and fatally hit another man. Aperson who, while performing a legal act with due care,causes some injury by mere accident without fault orintention of causing it, is not criminally liable.

PEOPLE v FALLORINA(428 SCRA ___)

May 4, 2004 G.R. No. 137347

The accused claims that the victim's death was causedby his gun accidentally going off. The Court convictedhim for the victim's death due to his failure to prove with

clear and convincing evidence his defense of accident.The following proved otherwise that the accusedaccidentally shot the victim: (1) his refusal to answerclarificatory questions of the prosecutor, which casteddoubt on his defense; (2) his refusal to surrender himselfand his firearm after the shooting; and (3) other pieces ofevidence which belie his claim that the death of the victimwas accidental and that he was not negligent.

PEOPLE v AYAYA (52 PHIL 354)

The accused, in order to prevent the door from crushing

her son's head, jabbed her husband with her umbrellawhich later led to her husband's death. The Courtconcluded that in thrusting her umbrella in the opening ofthe door in question, the accused did so to free her sonfrom the imminent danger of having his head crushed orbeing strangled and if she consequently caused herhusband's injury, it was by a mere accident, without anyfault or intention to cause it.

PEOPLE V. GENITA(425 SCRA 343)March 11, 2004 G.R. No. 126171

The appellant's claim that he "accidentally shot" the twovictims is incredible. In this case, it is clear that therequisites of accident as an exempting circumstancewere not proven: (1) appellant's manner of carrying hisrifle negates his claim of due care in the performance ofan act since he should have seen to it that its safety lockwas intact; (2) the fact that both victims sustained morethan one wound shows that the shooting was not merelyaccidental; (3) appellant manifested an unmistakableintent to kill the victims when he reloaded his rifle after hisfirst unsuccessful attempt to kill them.

PEOPLE v CASTILLO

(526 SCRA 215)June 29, 2007

G.R. No. 172695

Appellant contends that assuming he was the one whokilled his wife, the same was accidental and notintentional. However, the Court does not agree. By nostretch of imagination could playing with or using a


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deadly sling and arrow be considered as performing alawful act. Thus, on this ground alone, appellant’sdefense of accident must be struck down because hewas performing an unlawful act during the incident.

PEOPLE v BANDIAN

(63 PHL 530)September 30, 1936 G.R. No. 45186

The mother who went to the thicket to respond to the callof nature but, instead, gave birth therein is not criminallyliable for infanticide for leaving the child behind. Sheshould not be blamed for the act of abandonmentbecause it all happened by mere accident, she wasovercome by strong dizziness and extreme debility (alsoconsidered as an insuperable cause). Any person whoacts and behaves under such circumstances is exemptedfrom liability.

PEOPLE v MORENO(77 PHIL 548)

The accused admitted to having killed the victim butclaimed that he should be exempted from liabilitybecause he did so in obedience to an order given him byJapanese officers of the navy. The latter informed himthat the victim was one of those who were encounteredby the Japanese in a mountain and wounded a Japanesesoldier. The accused was held guilty because the lawprovides that to be exempted from criminal liability, it isnot enough to prove that the act was committed inobedience to an order, it must also be established that

the order being followed is lawful.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006(R.A. NO. 9344); ALSO REFER TO CHILD AND YOUTH

WELFARE CODE (P.D. 603, AS AMENDED)

VALCESAR ESTIOCA v PEOPLE(556 SCRA 300)June 27, 2008

G.R. No. 173876

The accused was 14 years old at the time he committedthe robbery which occurred in 2001. Although R.A. 9344

or the Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006 tookeffect only on May 20, 2006, the said law should be givenretroactive effect in favor of the accused who was notshown to be a habitual criminal (penal laws shall have aretroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty ofa felony who is not a habitual criminal).Hence, theaccused was exempt from criminal liability.

JOEMAR ORTEGA v PEOPLE(562 SCRA 450)August 20, 2008 G.R. No. 151085

The accused was only 13 years old at the time of thecommission of the rape and under R.A. No. 9344 (whichwas applied retroactively), he is exempted from criminalliability. Section 64 of the law further provides that casesof children 15 years old and below, at the time of thecommission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissedand the child shall be referred to the appropriate LocalSocial Welfare and Development Officer (LSWDO).

MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE v JAURIGUE (C.A. NO. 384)

The deceased placed his hand on the upper portion ofthe woman's thigh without her consent, which led to thewoman stabbing the neck of the deceased to defend herhonor. The means employed in the defense of her honorwas excessive and she cannot be declared completelyexempt from criminal liability. However, the fact that shehad acted in the immediate vindication of a grave offensecommitted against her a few moments before, and uponsuch provocation as to produce passion and obfuscation,or temporary loss of reason and self-control, should beconsidered as mitigating circumstance in her favor.

U.S. v AMPAR(37 Phil 201)

The accused, a 70-year old man, killed the deceased fortelling him, "Come here and I will make roast pig of you."

The offense which the defendant was trying to vindicate

would be considered a mere trifle to the average person

but it was evidently a serious matter to be made the butt

of a joke for the old man. Hence, he was given the benefit

of a mitigating circumstance.

PEOPLE v IGNAS(412 SCRA 311)

September 30, 2003G.R. No. 140514

The accused killed his wife's lover 2 weeks after hediscovered his wife's extramarital dalliance, but the courtdid not consider the mitigating circumstance of passionand obfuscation because for the same to be wellfounded, the following requisites must concur: (1) thereshould be an act both unlawful and sufficient to producesuch condition of mind; and (2) the act which producedthe obfuscation was not far removed from thecommission of the crime by a considerable length of time,during which the perpetrator might recover his moralequanimity. The period of two weeks between thediscovery of his wife’s extramarital dalliance and thekilling of her lover was sufficient time for appellant toreflect and cool off.

PEOPLE v BENITO(74 SCRA 271)

December 17, 1976G.R. No. L-38091

The accused (who had a pending case with the CivilService) contended that the victim insulted him when he(the victim) remarked that a thief was loitering in thepremises of the Civil Service Commission and furtherargued that that remark "was tantamount to kicking aman already down and to rubbing salt into a raw wound"

and that, as it was made publicly and in a loud voice, hewas exposed to ridicule in the presence of hisofficemates. Assuming that the remark was directed atthe accused, the Court did not apply the mitigatingcircumstance of vindication for a grave offense for thekilling of the victim because the accused had more thansufficient time to suppress his emotion over said remark ifhe ever did resent it.


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U.S. V. HICKS(14 PHIL 217)

The accused and the victim illicitly lived together for 5years. After they separated, the accused killed the victimfor living with another man. No mitigating circumstancewas considered in his favor, not even the loss of reasonand self-control produced by jealousy as alleged by thedefense, inasmuch as the only causes which mitigate thecriminal responsibility for the loss of self-control are thosewhich originate from legitimate feelings and not thosewhich arise from vicious, unworthy, and immoralpassions.

U.S. V. DELA CRUZMarch 29, 1912G.R. No. L-7094

The accused, in the heat of passion, killed his formerlover upon discovering her in flagrante in carnal

communication with a mutual acquaintance. The accusedwas entitled to the mitigating circumstance because inthis case, the impulse upon which defendant acted andwhich naturally "produced passion and obfuscation" wasnot that the woman declined to have illicit relations withhim but the sudden revelation that she was untrue to him,and his discovery of her in flagrante in the arms ofanother.

PEOPLE v RABAO(67 PHIL 255)April 10, 1939

G.R. No. L-46530

The accused and his wife had a heated argumentbecause the wife wanted to give their sick child a bathwhich was against the wishes of the accused. The Courtconsidered mitigating circumstance in his favor since,although he transgressed the law by an unjust attack onhis wife, the accused did not really have the intention ofcommitting so grave a crime as parricide, and the quarrelthat led to the aggression had its origin from the naturaland justifiable desire of the accused, as a father, toprevent his child, which was then ill, from being given abath.

PEOPLE v DAWATON(389 SCRA 277)

September 17, 2002 G.R. No. 146247

In trying to avail of the mitigating circumstance ofvoluntary surrender, the accused argues that he was notarrested but "fetched" as he voluntarily went with thepolicemen when they came for him. That he did not try toescape or resist arrest after he was taken into custody bythe authorities did not amount to voluntary surrender andit is also settled that voluntary surrender cannot beappreciated where the evidence adduced shows that itwas the authorities who came looking for the accused.

PEOPLE v VIERNES(372 SCRA 231)

December 13, 2001 G.R. No. 136733

Going to the police station “to clear his name” does notshow any intent of the accused to surrenderunconditionally to the authorities. The act of surrender

must be spontaneous, accompanied by anacknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save theauthorities the trouble and the expense that search andcapture would require.

PEOPLE v ABOLIDOR(423 SCRA 260)

February 18, 2004 G.R. No. 147231

The accused surrendered to the authorities more than

one year after the incident in order to disclaim

responsibility for the killing of the victim. The Court did

not consider the mitigating circumstance of voluntary

surrender because: (1) the facts of the case do not show

repentance or acknowledgment of the crime nor intention

to save the government the trouble and expense

necessarily incurred in his search and capture; and (2) at

the time of his surrender, there was a pending warrant of

arrest against him.

AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES

PEOPLE v CALISO(58 PHIL 283)July 1, 1933

G.R. No. L-37271

In the commission of the crime, the aggravatingcircumstance of grave abuse of confidence was presentsince the appellant was the domestic servant of thefamily and was sometimes the deceased child's "amah".

The circumstance that the crime had been committed inthe dwelling of the offended party which was consideredby the lower court as another aggravating circumstanceshould be disregarded as both the victim and theappellant were living in the same house.

PEOPLE v LORA(113 SCRA 366)March 30, 1982

G.R. No. L-49430

The accused was charged for the crime of serious illegaldetention with murder for illegally detaining a 3-year old

child, and attacking the same, which resulted to thechild's death. There are three aggravating circumstancesin this case, namely: (1) lack of respect due to the tenderage of the victim; (2) cruelty, for gagging the victim'smouth with stockings thereby causing slow suffocation;and (3) abuse of confidence since the main duty of theaccused in the household was to take care of the minorchild.

PEOPLE v LAGUARDIA(148 SCRA 133)

February 27, 1987 G.R. No. L-63243

The following aggravating circumstances were present inthis case of robbery with homicide: (1) despoblado oruninhabited place since evidence shows that the accusedlay in wait for the truck being driven by the victim at anisolated portion of the highway, choosing that particularspot where they could commit the crime withoutdisturbance or discovery and with easy opportunity forescape; and (2) use of motor vehicles because the


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conspirators took the vehicle of the victim to facilitatetheir escape and to prevent the other passengers fromreporting the offense to the authorities. The followingaggravating circumstances were rejected: (1) nighttimebecause it was not especially sought, as the victim's tripschedule and not the discretion of the culprits determinedthe time of its commission; (2) evident premeditationbecause it is inherent in the crime of robbery and was notproved in the commission of the killing; and (3) treachery,as there is no evidence of its employment since none ofthe witnesses actually saw the shooting.

PEOPLE v ZETA(549 SCRA 541)March 27, 2008 G.R. No. 178541

The span of thirty minutes or half an hour from the timethe accused showed their determination to kill the victim(2:00 in the morning of 28 October 1995) up to the time

the accused shot to death the victim (2:15-2:30 in themorning of 28 October 1995) could not have affordedthem full opportunity for meditation and reflection on theconsequences of the crime they committed. The Courtheld that the lapse of thirty minutes between thedetermination to commit a crime and the executionthereof is insufficient for a full meditation on theconsequences of the act. Hence, the aggravatingcircumstance of evident premeditation cannot beappreciated in this case.

ACCESSORIES

PEOPLE v ORTIZ AND ZAUSA(55 PHIL 993)

August 27, 1986 G.R. No. L-3507

Ortiz and Zausa were charged with conspiracy to kill thevictim but Ortiz contends that he should be acquittedbecause he did not take part in the attack. The Courtruled that Ortiz cannot be convicted either as principal oras accessory, for it has been shown that there wasneither plan nor agreement between him and Zausa tocommit the crime, and that he took no part in the latter'sattack with the spear.

VINO v PEOPLE(178 SCRA 626)

October 19, 1989 G.R. No. 84163

The information was correct. An accused can be validlyconvicted as an accomplice or accessory under aninformation charging him as a principal. Also, the trial ofan accessory can proceed without awaiting the result ofthe separate charge against the principal for thecorresponding responsibilities of the principal, accompliceand accessory are distinct from each other.

PEOPLE v FERNANDEZ(183 SCRA 511)March 22, 1990

G.R. No. L-62116

The accused entered the bathroom together withaccused Fernandez. In the bathroom, the latter tied apiece of cloth around the victim’s neck while accused

Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body.Thereafter, they raped the victim one after the other.Hence ,the Court was correct in imposing on each of theaccused of the penalty corresponding to two crimes ofrape because each of them (accused) cooperated in thecommission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by actswithout which it would not have been accomplished.

PEOPLE v CASTILLO(17 SCRA 721)July 26, 1966

G.R. No. L-19238

After his son had fatally hacked the victim with a bolo andwas about to strike the victim a second time, the accusedshouted: "You kill him." The accused is not guilty asprincipal by inducement because in determining whetherthe utterances of an accused are sufficient to make himguilty as co-principal by inducement, it must appear thatthe inducement was of such nature and was made in

such a way as to become the determining cause of thecrime and that such inducement was uttered with theintention of producing the result.

PEOPLE v DUMANCAS(320 SCRA 584)

December 13, 1999 G.R. No. 133527 –28

The accused cannot be held guilty as principal byinducement when she told the policemen to "take care ofthe two" victims, who were later killed by the saidpolicemen. There are 2 ways of directly inducing another

to commit a crime, namely: (i) by giving a price, oroffering reward or promise, and (ii) by using words ofcommand and in this case, there is no evidence that theaccused offered any price or reward should they kill thevictims, nor can the remark of the accused be deemed asa command required by law to justify a finding that she isguilty as a principal by inducement.

CARINO v PEOPLE(7 SCRA 900)April 30, 1963

G.R. No. L-14752

The accused cannot be held guilty as an accomplice inthe crime of rebellion through his acts of sending orfurnishing cigarettes and food supplies to a famous Huk,as well as changing $6,000 to Philippine money or inhelping Huks to open accounts (which were said to bepart of his functions as an employee of a bank). Theseacts by themselves do not and cannot carry or prove anycriminal intent of helping the Huks in committing thecrime of insurrection or rebellion and they cannot be saidto constitute acts of cooperation in the execution of theact of overthrowing the government.

PEOPLE v DELA CERNA(21 SCRA 569)

October 30, 1967 G.R. No. L-20911

The accused furnished the gun that was used to kill thevictim Casiano, however, he cannot be held liable as anaccomplice because he merely conspired with theprincipal to kill another victim, Rafael. The accused herewas not aware that the principal would use the gun to killCasiano. Hence, for other acts done outside the


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contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not thenecessary and logical consequences of the intendedcrime, only the actual perpetrators are liable.

DURATION OF PENALTIES

PEOPLE v ALVARADO(275 SCRA 727)

July 21, 1997 G.R. No. 117402

The Supreme Court reiterated the ruling in People v.Lucas, January 9, 1995, where it was clarified that“Although Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659 has fixed theduration of reclusion perpetua from twenty (20) years andone (1) day to forty (40) years, there was no clearlegislative intent to alter its original classification as anindivisible penalty. Reclusion perpetua, therefore, retainsits nature as having no minimum, medium and maximumperiods and is imposed in its entirety regardless of any

mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may haveattended the commission of the crime.

PEOPLE v MANTALABA(654 SCRA 188)

July 20, 2011 G.R. No. 186227

The privileged mitigating circumstance of minority wasappreciated in fixing the penalty necessarily reducing thepenalty from reclusion perpetua to reclusion temporal,which is one degree lower. The ISLAW is also applicablein the present case because the penalty which has been

originally an indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua todeath), where ISLAW is inapplicable, became a divisiblepenalty (reclusion temporal) by virtue of the presence ofthe privileged mitigating circumstance of minority. Hence,the minimum penalty should be taken from the penaltynext lower in degree which is prision mayor and themaximum penalty shall be taken from the medium periodof reclusion temporal.

PEOPLE v ESCARES(102 PHIL 677)

December 23, 1957 G.R. Nos. L-11128-33

It should be noted that the imposable penalty in each ofthe six cases where appellant pleaded guilty inaccordance with paragraph 5, Article 294, of the RevisedPenal Code, is prision correccional in its maximum periodto prision mayor in its medium period, which should beapplied in its minimum period in view of the mitigatingcircumstance of plea of guilty, not offset by anyaggravating circumstance, or from 4 years 2 months and1 day to 6 years one month and 10 days. In applying theIndeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should besentenced for each crime to an indeterminate penalty theminimum of which shall not be less than 4 months and 1day of arresto mayor nor more than 4 years and 2

months of prision correccional, and the maximum shallnot be less than 4 years 2 months and 1 day of prisioncorreccional nor more than 6 years 1 month and 10 daysof prision mayor. The trial court; however, committed anerror in applying the proper penalty by using the three-fold rule. Hence, the penalty imposed upon appellant bythe trial court should be modified in the sense that heshould suffer in each of the six cases an indeterminatepenalty of not less than 4 months and 1 day of arresto

mayor and not more than 4 years 2 months and 1 day ofprision correccional, plus the corresponding accessorypenalties provided for by law.

MEJORADA v SANDIGANBAYAN(151 SCRA 399)June 30, 1987

G.R. Nos. L-51065-72

The Sandiganbayan imposed eight penalties for the eightinformations (for violating Section 3E of Republic Act No.3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and CorruptPractices Act) filed against the accused. The penaltiestotaled to fifty-six years and eight days of imprisonmentwhich the accused impugns as contrary to the three-foldrule and insists that the duration of the aggregatepenalties should not exceed forty (40) years. Theaccused is mistaken in his application of the three-foldrule as set forth in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Codesince this article is to be taken into account not in the

imposition of the penalty but in connection with theservice of the sentence imposed. It merely provides thatthe prisoner cannot be made to serve more than threetimes the most severe of these penalties the maximum ofwhich is forty years.

PEOPLE v ALFREDO BON(506 SCRA 168)

October 30, 2006 G.R. No. 166401

In view of the statutory disallowance of the death penaltythrough Rep. Act No. 9346, "death," as provided in Article

71 of the Revised Penal Code shall no longer form part ofthe equation in the graduation of penalties. In the case ofthe accused, the determination of his penalty forattempted rape shall be reckoned not from two degreeslower than death, but two degrees lower than reclusionperpetua. Therefore, the maximum term of his penaltyshall no longer be reclusion temporal but prision mayor.

PROBATION LAW

FRANCISCO v CA(243 SCRA 384)

April 6, 1995 G.R. No. 108747

The accused who was found guilty by the MeTC of graveoral defamation in 4 of the 5 cases filed against him andsentenced to a prison term of 1 year and 1 day to 1 yearand 8 months of prision correccional in each crimecommitted appealed his case before the RTC buteventually applied for probation. The Court, in ruling thatthe accused is no longer eligible for probation, listed thefollowing reasons: (1) Sec. 4 of the Probation Law clearlymandates that "no application for probation shall beentertained or granted if the defendant has perfected theappeal from the judgment of conviction;" (2) the penaltiesimposed by the MeTC were already probationable,

hence, there was no need to appeal if only to reduce thepenalties to within the probationable period (multipleprison terms should not be added up); (3) the accusedappealed to the RTC not to reduce or even correct thepenalties imposed by the MeTC, but to assert hisinnocence; (4) the application for probation was filed waybeyond the period allowed by law, in this case was filed"only after a warrant for the arrest of petitioner had been


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issued . . . (and) almost two months after (his) receipt ofthe Decision" of the RTC.

SORIANO v CA(304 SCRA 231)March 4, 1999

G.R. No. 123936

Petitioner, whose probation was revoked since he wasnot able to comply with one of the conditions of probationwhich is to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the amountof P98,560.00, asserts that his non-compliance was dueto his poor financial condition and that his enjoyment ofprobation should not be made to depend on thesatisfaction of his civil liability. The Supreme Court, inruling that the revocation of probation was lawful andproper, held that his continued refusal to submit aprogram of payment creates the impression that he wantsto completely avoid paying his civil liability and that theconditions of probation must be satisfied in order that the

purposes of probation be fulfilled, which includepromoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offenderby providing him with individualized treatment, andproviding an opportunity for the reformation of a penitentoffender which might be less probable if he were to servea prison sentence.

TOLENTINO v JUDGE ALCONCEL(121 SCRA 92)

Petitioner Tolentino, who pleaded not guilty to the chargeof violation of Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act,changed his plea of not guilty to the lesser offense of

illegal possession of marijuana, which Judge Alconcelallowed, sentencing petitioner to imprisonment of 6months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months plus fines.The Supreme Court, in upholding the decision of JudgeAlconcel to deny Tolentino's subsequent application forprobation on the ground that "probation will depreciatethe seriousness of the offense committed", held that thepotentiality of the offender to reform is not the sole orprimordial factor that should be considered and that thedemands of justice and public interest must be observedin the grant or denial of an application for probation.

CABATINGAN v SANDIGANBAYAN(102 SCRA 187)

January 22, 1981 G.R. No. L-55333

Sandiganbayan, in denying the application for probationby the petitioner, merely relied on a report of theprobation officer which in itself, was mostly hearsay, anddid not give the petitioner a chance to be heard before itissued its resolution denying the application for probation.The Supreme Court held that respondent court appearsto have wholly relied on the probation report and did notmake its own determination as to whether or notprobation would serve the ends of justice and the bestinterest of the public and the applicant. It was not enough

for the respondent court to deny petitioner's applicationsolely on the report that she was involved in "maisiao"and that she was facing another preliminary investigationfor the "additional shortage" of the funds of which shehad already pleaded guilty.

BALA v JUDGE MARTINEZ(181 SCRA 459)

January 29, 1990 G.R. No. L-67301

Petitioner violated the terms and conditions of hisprobation but contends that there was no valid reason forits revocation since his probation period had alreadyterminated on August 10, 1983 (although no order of finaldischarge was issued as the probation officer had not yetsubmitted his final report). The Supreme Court, in holdingthat the probation is revocable before the final dischargeof the probationer by the court, held that: (1) theexpiration of the probation period alone does notautomatically terminate probation; (2) nowhere in theprovisions of the probation law can be found the ipsofacto termination of probation; (3) probation is notcoterminous with its period; (4) there must first be issuedby the court of an order of final discharge based on thereport and recommendation of the probation officer and

only from such issuance can the case of the probationerbe deemed terminated.

JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE ACT OF 2006(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344)

PEOPLE v SARCIA(599 SCRA 20)

September 10, 2009 G.R. No. 169641

If a mature minor, maybe 16 years old to below 18 yearsold is charged, accused with, or may have committed a

serious offense, and may have acted with discernment,then the child could be recommended by the Departmentof Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), by theLocal Council for the Protection of Children (LCPC), or byOffice of Juvenile Welfare and Restoration to go througha judicial proceeding; but the welfare, best interests, andrestoration of the child should still be a primordial orprimary consideration. In this case, since the accused-appellant is about 31 years of age, the suspension ofsentence has become moot and academic but he is stillentitled to confinement in agricultural camps and othertraining facilities under Sec. 51 of R.A. No. 9344.

PEOPLE v HERMIE JACINTO(645 SCRA 590)March 16, 2011 G.R. No. 182239

The benefits of a suspended sentence can no longerapply to appellant who is now 25 years old since thesuspension of sentence lasts only until the child in conflictwith the law reaches the maximum age of twenty-one(21) years. However, the offender shall be entitled to theright of restoration, rehabilitation and reintegration inaccordance with Republic Act No. 9344 in order thathe/she will have the chance to live a normal life andbecome a productive member of the community. Thus,

appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or anyother training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 ofRepublic Act No. 9344.


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PADUA v PEOPLE(559 SCRA 519)

July 23, 2008 G.R. No. 168546

The suspension of sentence under Section 38 of R.A. No.9344 could no longer be retroactively applied forpetitioner’s benefit as Section 38 provides that once achild under 18 years of age is found guilty of the offensecharged, instead of pronouncing the judgment ofconviction, the court shall place the child in conflict withthe law under suspended sentence. Section 40 of Rep.Act No. 9344 provides that once the child reaches 18years of age, the court shall determine whether todischarge the child, order execution of sentence, orextend the suspended sentence for a certain specifiedperiod or until the child reaches the maximum age of 21years. However, since petitioner has already reached 21years of age or over, he could no longer be considered achild for purposes of applying Rep. Act No. 9344.

REMIENDO v PEOPLE(603 SCRA 274)October 9, 2009 G.R. No. 184874

The accused, being above 15 and under 18 years of ageat the time of the rape, and having acted withdiscernment, claimed for the benefits of R.A. No. 9344 inview of Section 40, which provides that "if the child inconflict with the law has reached eighteen (18) years ofage while under suspended sentence, the court shalldetermine whether to discharge the child in accordance

with this Act, to order execution of sentence, or to extendthe suspended sentence for a certain period or until thechild reaches the maximum age of twenty-one (21)years." However, the application of Section 40 isrendered moot and academic since the accused wasalready 22 years old and could no longer be considered achild for the purposes of applying R.A. No. 9344.

MODIFICATION AND EXTINCTION OF CRIMINALLIABILITY

DAMASCO v LAQUI(166 SCRA 214)

September 30, 1988 G.R. No. 81381

The petitioner was charged with the crime of gravethreats (the crime was committed on 8 July 1987 and theinformation was filed only on 17 September 1987 or afterthe lapse of 71 days), but was only found guilty by thecourt of light threats (with a prescriptive period of 2months or 60 days). The Supreme Court, in agreeing withpetitioner's contention that he cannot be convicted of lightthreats since it had already prescribed, held that wherean accused has been found to have committed a lesseroffense includible with the graver offense charged, hecannot be convicted of the lesser offense if it has already

prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to sanction acircumvention of the law on prescription by the simpleexpedient of accusing the defendant of the graveroffense.

YAPDIANGCO v BUENCAMINO(122 SCRA 713)June 24, 1983

G.R. No. L-28841

On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed an information forslight physical injuries (with a prescriptive period of 60days) allegedly committed by the petitioner on December2, 1964. Thereafter, petitioner moved to quash thecriminal prosecution on the ground that the informationhaving been filed on the sixty first day following thecommission of the offense, the sixty days prescriptiveperiod had lapsed. The Supreme Court (in disagreeingwith the lower court's denial of the motion to quash due tothe fact that the 60th day fell on a Sunday andconsidering the rule that when the last day for the filing ofa pleading falls on a Sunday, the same may be filed onthe next succeeding business day) held that "where thesixtieth and last day to file an information falls on aSunday or legal holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be

extended up to the next working day for prescription hasautomatically set in”.

PEOPLE v BAYOTAS(236 SCRA 239)

September 2, 1994 G.R. No. 102007

The Supreme Court held that the death of the accusedBayotas extinguished his criminal liability and civil liabilitybased solely on the act complained of, i.e., rape. TheCourt ruled that: (1) death of the accused pending appealof his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well

as the civil liability based solely thereon; (2) the claim forcivil liability survives notwithstanding the death ofaccused, if the same may also be predicated on a sourceof obligation other than delict, such as law, contracts,quasi-contracts or quasi-delicts; (3) where the civil liabilitysurvives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action forrecovery therefor may be pursued but only by way offiling a separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure; and (4) theprivate offended party need not fear a forfeiture of hisright to file this separate civil action by prescription, incases where during the prosecution of the criminal actionand prior to its extinction, the private-offended partyinstituted together therewith the civil action for in suchcase, the statute of limitations on the civil liability isdeemed interrupted during the pendency of the criminalcase.

SERMONIA v CA(233 SCRA 155)June 14, 1994

G.R. NO. 109454

Petitioner, in contending that his criminal liability forbigamy has been obliterated by prescription, insists thatsince the second marriage contract was duly registeredwith the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of

registration makes it a matter of public record andconstitutes notice to the whole world. Hence, theoffended party is considered to have had constructivenotice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975 and thatprescription commenced to run on the day the marriagecontract was registered. The Supreme Court held thatunlike in the case of real property, the principle ofconstructive notice should not be applied in regard to thecrime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the


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fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into bythe offender in secrecy from the spouse of the previoussubsisting marriage and that a bigamous marriage isgenerally entered into in a place where the offender is notknown to be still a married person in order to conceal hislegal impediment to contract another marriage.

CABRAL V. PUNO(70 SCRA 606)April 30, 1976

G.R. No. L-41692

Petitioner was charged with the crime of falsification (witha prescriptive period of 10 years) for allegedly forging adocument that was registered in the Register of Deeds onAugust 26, 1948. The complaint of respondent, filed onSeptember 24, 1974, was dismissed on the ground ofprescription since the respondent had actual if notconstructive notice of the alleged forgery upon itsregistration in the Register of Deeds.

Act No. 3326, As Amended

ZALDIVIA v REYES (211 SCRA 277)

July 3, 1992G.R. No. 102342

The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to thepetitioner (quarrying for commercial purposes without amayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of1988, of the Municipality of Rodriguez, in the Province ofRizal) commenced from its alleged commission on May

11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11,1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326 and itwas not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with theOffice of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, asthis was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceedingthat could have interrupted the period was the filing of theinformation with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez,but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after thecrime had already prescribed.

PCGG v DESIERTO(527 SCRA 61)

July 9, 2007

G.R. No. 140231

The respondents were charged with violation of R.A. No.3019 (amending said law, Section 4, Batas PambansaBlg. 195 increased the prescriptive period from 10 to 15years), and the applicable law in the computation of theprescriptive period is Section 2 of Act No. 3326, whichprovides that "prescription shall begin to run from the dayof the commission of the violation of the law, and if thesame not be known at the time, from the discoverythereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for itsinvestigation and punishment". Records show that the actcomplained of was discovered in 1992 and the complaintwas filed with the Office of the Ombudsman on April 5,1995, or within three (3) years from the time of discovery.Thus, the filing of the complaint was well within theprescriptive period of 15 years.

PRESCRIPTION OF PENALTIES

DEL CASTILLO v TORRECAMPO(394 SCRA 221)

December 18, 2002 G.R. No. 139033

10 years after the petitioner was found guilty for violatingthe Election Code (whereby he was never apprehendedand remained at large), he filed before the trial court amotion to quash the warrant issued for his arrest on theground of prescription of the penalty imposed upon him.He based his claims on Article 93 of the Revised PenalCode which provides that the period of prescription shallcommence to run from the date when the culprit shouldevade the service of his sentence. The petition must bedenied since under Article 93, prescription shallcommence to run from the date the felon evades theservice of his sentence, which is inapplicable in the caseat bar since the petitioner was never brought to prison

and cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

PANGAN v GATBALITE(449 SCRA 144)

January 21, 2005 G.R. No. 141718

Petitioner, who failed to appear during the promulgationof the decision in the MTC on August 9, 1991, questionedhis arrest on January 24, 2000 on the ground that thesame was illegal since the straight penalty of two monthsand one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five yearsunder No. 3, Article 93 [of the] Revised Penal Code. In

ruling against the petitioner, the Court held that theprescription of penalties found in Article 93 of the RevisedPenal Code applies only to those who are convicted byfinal judgment and are serving sentence which consistsof deprivation of liberty. Hence, the period for prescriptionof penalties begins only when the convict evades serviceof sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence.

PARDON BY OFFENDED PARTY

PEOPLE v TADULAN(271 SCRA 233)April 15, 1997

G.R. No. 117407

The supposed pardon of the accused was allegedlygranted only by the mother (BBB) without theconcurrence of the offended minor, AAA. Hence, even i f itbe assumed for the sake of argument that the initialdesistance of the said mother from taking any actionagainst the accused constitutes pardon, it is clear thatupon the authorities cited above, such pardon isineffective without the express concurrence of theoffended minor herself.

PEOPLE v LIM(206 SCRA 176)

February 13, 1992 G.R. No. 95753

The accused, who was charged with the crime of rape,insists that he was pardoned by the offended party whenshe executed an Affidavit of Desistance, stating that therape case arose out of a mere misunderstanding. TheSupreme Court did not agree and held that to warrant thedismissal of the complaint, the victim's retraction or


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pardon should be made prior to the institution of thecriminal action. Hence, the alleged pardon could not beconsidered in his favor since the Affidavit was executedafter the present case was filed.

PARDON BY THE CHIEF EXECUTIVE

PEOPLE v SALLE(250 SCRA 581)

December 4, 1995 G.R. No. 103567

The accused was granted conditional pardon, but for thesaid pardon to take effect, he must first withdraw hisappeal. The conditional pardon granted the said appellantshall be deemed to take effect only upon the grant ofsuch withdrawal and in case of non-compliance with thisResolution, the Director of the Bureau of Correctionsmust exert every possible effort to take back into hiscustody the said accused, for which purpose he may

seek the assistance of the Philippine National Police orthe National Bureau of Investigation.

PEOPLE v BACANG(260 SCRA 44)July 30, 1996

G.R. NO. 116512

The conditional pardons were granted to accused-

appellants during the pendency of their appeal. The Court

held that such conditional pardons are void since the

“conviction by final judgment” limitation under Section 19,

Article VII of the present Constitution prohibits the grant

of pardon, whether full or conditional, to an accused

during the pendency of his appeal from his conviction by

the trial court and any application therefor, if one is made,

should not be acted upon or the process toward its grant

should not be begun unless the appeal is withdrawn.

BOOK II (ARTICLES 114-365, RPC) ANDSPECIFICALLY INCLUDED SPECIAL LAWS

CRIMES AGAINST NATIONAL SECURITY (ARTS. 114- 123)

TREASON

LAUREL v MISA (77 Phil. 856)

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus claiming thata Filipino citizen who adhered to the enemy, giving thelatter aid and comfort during the Japanese occupation,cannot be prosecuted for the crime of treason for thereasons that: (1) the sovereignty of the legitimategovernment in the Philippines and, consequently, thecorrelative allegiance of Filipino citizens thereto was thensuspended; and (2) that there was a change of

sovereignty over these Islands upon the proclamation ofthe Philippine Republic. The Supreme Court dismissedthe petition and ruled that the absolute and permanentallegiance of the inhabitants of a territory occupied by theenemy of their legitimate government or sovereign is notabrogated or severed by the enemy occupation becausethe sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure isnot transferred thereby to the occupier, and if it is not

transferred to the occupant it must necessarily remainvested in the legitimate government.

PEOPLE v PEREZ(83 PHIL 314)

7 counts of treason were filed against Perez forrecruiting, apprehending and commandeering numerousgirls and women against their will for the purpose of usingthem to satisfy the immoral purposes of Japaneseofficers. The Supreme Court held that his"commandeering" of women to satisfy the lust ofJapanese officers or men or to enliven the entertainmentheld in their honor was not treason even though thewomen and the entertainment helped to make life morepleasant for the enemies and boost their spirit; he wasnot guilty any more than the women themselves wouldhave been if they voluntarily and willingly hadsurrendered their bodies or organized the entertainment.

PEOPLE v ADRIANO(78 PHIL 561)

Adriano was convicted for the crime of treason for beinga member of the Makapili, a military organizationestablished and designed to assist and aid militarily theJapanese Imperial forces in the Philippines in the saidenemy's war efforts and operations against the UnitedStates and the Philippines. The Supreme Court inupholding the conviction held that the mere fact of having

joined a Makapili organization is evidence of bothadherence to the enemy and giving him aid and comfortand that being a Makapili is in itself constitutive of an

overt act. Hence, it is not necessary, except for thepurpose of increasing the punishment, that the defendantactually went to battle or committed nefarious actsagainst his country or countrymen.

PEOPLE v MANAYAO(78 PHIL 721)

Manayao argues that he cannot be charged with treasonbecause he had already lost his Filipino citizenship whenhe joined the Makapili, having considered himself amember of the Japanese armed forces. Manayao cannotdivest himself of his Philippine citizenship, otherwise, hisvery crime would be the shield that would protect himfrom punishment and would essentially place himselfbeyond the arm of our treason law.

CRIMES AGAINST THE FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OFTHE STATE

ARBITRARY DETENTION

UMIL v RAMOS(187 SCRA 311)

Subversion is a continuing crime. As such, authorities,upon determination of probable cause may execute a

valid arrest pursuant to Rule 113 of the Revised Rules onCriminal Procedure.

PEOPLE v BURGOS(144 SCRA 1)

When the accused is arrested on the sole basis of averbal report, the arrest without a warrant under Section6(a) of Rule 113 is not lawful and legal since the offense


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must also be committed in his presence or within hisview. It is not enough that there is reasonable ground tobelieve that the person to be arrested has committed acrime for an essential precondition under the rule is thatthe crime must in fact or actually have been committedfirst.

DELAY IN THE DELIVERY OF DETAINED PERSONS

EXPULSION

VILLAVICENCIO v LUKBAN(39 Phil 778)

The forcible taking of the women from Manila by officialsof that city, who handed them over to other parties anddeposited them in a distant region, deprived thesewomen of freedom of locomotion just as effectively as ifthey had been imprisoned. There is no law expresslyauthorizing the deportation of prostitutes to a newdomicile against their will and in fact Article 127 punishespublic officials, not expressly authorized by law orregulation, who compel any person to change hisresidence.

SEARCH WARRANTS MALICIOUSLY OBTAINED

STONEHILL v DIOKNO(20 SCRA 383)

Search warrant authorizing the seizure of books andrecords “showing all the business transactions” of certainpersons regardless of whether the transactions were

legal or illegal is a general warrant which contravenes theConstitution and the Rules of Court which require that thethings to be seized should be particularly described.

BURGOS v CHIEF OF STAFF(133 SCRA 800)

When the search warrant applied for is directed against anewspaper publisher or editor in connection with thepublication of subversive materials, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification,stating with particularity the alleged subversive materialhe has published or intending to publish since mere

generalization will not suffice. Also, ownership is of noconsequence and it is sufficient that the person againstwhom the warrant is directed has control or possession ofthe property sought to be seized.

OFFENDING THE RELIGIOUS FEELINGS

PEOPLE v BAES68 Phil 203

Whether or not the act complained of is offensive to thereligious feelings of the Catholics, is a question of factwhich must be judged only according to the feelings ofthe Catholic and not those of other faithful ones. It ispossible that certain acts may offend the feelings of thosewho profess a certain religion, while not otherwiseoffensive to the feelings of those professing another faith.

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC ORDER

REBELLION, INSURRECTION, COUP D’ ETAT

UMIL v RAMOS(187 SCRA 85)

July 9, 1990G.R. 81567

Being a member of the New People’s Army, an outlawedorganization, is punishable. Subversion like rebellion orinsurrection is perceived as a continuing offense andunlike other so called “common” offenses i.e. adultery,murder, arson, etc. which generally end upon theircommission, subversion and rebellion are anchored onan ideological base which compels the repetition of thesame acts of lawlessness and violence until theoverriding objective of overthrowing organizedgovernment is attained.

PEOPLE v LOVERDIORO(250 SCRA 389)

November 29, 1995G.R. 112235

In deciding if the crime committed is rebellion, notmurder, it becomes imperative for the courts to ascertainwhether or not the act was done in furtherance of apolitical end. The political motive of the act should beconclusively demonstrated as it is not enough that theovert acts of rebellion are duly proven otherwise if nopolitical motive is established and proved, the accusedshould be convicted of the common crime and not ofrebellion.

PEOPLE v GERONIMO(100 PHIL 90)

October 23, 1956G.R. L-8936

Not every act of violence is deemed absorbed in thecrime of rebellion solely because it was committedsimultaneously with or in the course of the rebellion. If thekilling, robbing, etc. were done for private purposes orprofit, without any political motivation, the crime would beseparately punishable and would not be absorbed by therebellion and the individual misdeed could not be takenwith the rebellion to constitute a complex crime, for theconstitutive acts and intent would be unrelated to eachother. The individual crime would not be a meansnecessary for committing the rebellion, as it would not bedone in preparation or in furtherance of the latter.

SEDITION

PEOPLE v UMALI(96 PHIL 185)

November 29, 1954G.R. L-5803

Where the purpose of the raid and acts of the raiders inrising publicly and taking up arms, were not exactlyagainst the Government and for the purpose of doing thethings defined in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code

under rebellion, but rather, by means of force andintimidation, to inflict an act of hate or revenge upon theperson or property of a public official, the crimecommitted is sedition. The raiders did not even attack theseat of the local government rather, the object was toattain by means of force, intimidation, etc. one object, toinflict an act of hate or revenge upon the person orproperty of a public official.


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PEOPLE v CABRERA(43 PHIL 64)

March 6, 1922G.R. 17748

Seventy-seven members of the Philippine Constabularywho rose publicly and tumultuously in order to attain byforce and outside of legal methods the object of inflictingan act of hate or revenge upon the police of the City ofManila were found guilty of the crime of sedition asdefined and punished by Act No. 292 of the PhilippineCommission.

The Philippine Law on sedition (Act No. 292), makes allpersons who rise publicly and tumultuously in order toobtain by force or outside of legal methods any one offive objects, including that of inflicting any act of hate orrevenge upon the person or property of any official oragent of the Insular Government or of a provincial ormunicipal government, guilty of sedition. In order to be a

violation of paragraph 3 of section 5 of Act No. 292, it isnot necessary that the offender be a private citizen andthe offended party a public functionary since the lawmakes no distinction between the persons to which itapplies.

PEOPLE v HADJI(9 SCRA 252)

October 24, 1963G.R. L-12686

The rule in this jurisdiction allows the treatment of thecommon offenses of murder etc. as distinct and

independent acts separable from sedition. Where theacts of violence were deemed absorbed in the crime ofrebellion, the same does not apply in the crime ofsedition.

INCITING TO SEDITION

US v TOLENTINO(5 PHIL 682)

March 6, 1906G.R. L-1451

The manifest, unmistakable tendency of the play, in viewof the time, place, and manner of its presentation, was toinculcate a spirit of hatred and enmity against theAmerican people and the Government of the UnitedStates. The principal object and intent of its author was toincite the people of the Philippines to open armedresistance to the constituted authorities, and to inducethem to conspire together for the secret organization ofarmed forces, to be used when the opportunity presentitself, for the purpose of overthrowing the presentGovernment and the setting up another in its stead. Themanner and form in which the drama was presented atsuch a time and under such conditions renders absurdthe pretense that it was merely or even principally aliterary or artistic production.

ESPUELAS v PEOPLEDecember 17, 1951

G.R. L-2990

A published writing which calls our government one ofcrooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazisand Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendencyto produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with

the disposition to remain loyal to the government, is ascurrilous libel against the Government. The violent andprovocative statements made by the accused against thestate was neither constructive nor with reason. It, instead,went beyond the ambit of criticism legally permitted sinceit had the dangerous tendency of appealing to thecommon mind and suggesting or inciting rebelliousconspiracies and riots against the duly constitutedgovernment.

MENDOZA v PEOPLE(90 PHIL 524)

December 17 1951G.R. L-2990

A published writing which calls our government one ofcrooks and dishonest persons ("dirty") infested with Nazisand Fascists i.e. dictators, and which reveals a tendencyto produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible withthe disposition to remain loyal to the government, is a

scurrilous libel against the Government. Any citizen maycriticize his government and government officials andsubmit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" but suchcriticism should be specific and constructive, specifyingparticular objectionable actuations of the government. Itmust be reasoned or tempered and not a contemptuouscondemnation of the entire government set-up.

VIOLATION OF PARLIAMENTARY IMMUNITY

MARTINEZ v MORFE(44 SCRA 22)March 24, ___

G.R. L-34022

The members of the legislature are privileged from arreston civil process during the session of that body, and for areasonable time before and after, to enable them to go toand return from the same. Prosecution for a criminaloffense is excluded from this grant of immunity. It wouldamount to the creation of a privileged class, without

justification in reason, if notwithstanding their liability for acriminal offense, they would be considered immuneduring their attendance in Congress and in going to andreturning from the same.

ILLEGAL ASSOCIATION

PEOPLE v EVANGELISTA(57 PHIL 372)

October 26, 1932G.R. L-36277

The principal defense that the Communist Party of thePhilippines is not an illegal association in that it preachesonly a social but not an armed revolution is obviouslyuseless, since a mere reading of the constitution of theCommunist Party will show that the purpose of suchassociation is to incite class struggle and to overthrow thepresent government by peaceful means or by armedrevolution. Therefore, the purpose of such association isto alter the social order and to commit the crimes ofrebellion and sedition. An association having such anobject must necessarily be illegal.


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PEOPLE v RODIL(109 SCRA 306)

November 20 1981G.R. L-35156

While the evidence definitely demonstrated that theappellant knew because the victim, who was in civilianclothing, told him that he was an agent of a person inauthority, he cannot be convicted of the complex crime ofhomicide with assault upon an agent of a person inauthority for the simple reason that the information doesnot allege the fact that the accused then knew that,before or at the time of the assault, the victim was anagent of a person in authority. Such knowledge must beexpressly and specifically averred in the information, otherwise, in the absence of such allegation, the requiredknowledge, like a qualifying circumstance, althoughproven, would only be appreciated as a genericaggravating circumstance.

PEOPLE v TAC-AN(182 SCRA 601)

February 26, 1990G.R. 76338-39

The last paragraph of Article 152 shows that while ateacher or professor of a public or recognized privateschool is deemed to be a "person in authority," suchteacher or professor is so deemed only for purposes ofapplication of Articles 148 (direct assault upon a personin authority), and 151 (resistance and disobedience to aperson in authority or the agents of such person) of theRevised Penal Code. A teacher or professor of a public

or recognized private school cannot be regarded as a"public authority" within the meaning of paragraph 2 ofArticle 14 of the Revised Penal Code.

ILLEGAL POSSESION OF FIREARMS (PD 1866, ASAMENDED BY RA 8294 AND RA 9516)

PEOPLE v QUIJADA(259 SCRA 191)

July 24, 1996G.R. 115008-09

The killing of a person with the use of an unlicensedfirearm cannot serve to increase the penalty for homicideor murder but rather, by express provision of P.D. No.1866, shall increase the penalty for illegal possession offirearm. When an accused is prosecuted for homicide ormurder and for aggravated illegal possession of firearm,the constitutional bar against double jeopardy will notapply since these offenses are quite different from oneanother, with the first punished under the Revised PenalCode and the second under a special law.

CELINO v CA(526 SCRA 195)June 29, 2007G.R. 170562

When the other offense is one of those enumeratedunder RA 8294, any information for illegal possession offirearms should be quashed because the illegalpossession of firearm would have to be tried togetherwith such other offense, either considered as anaggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, orabsorbed as an element of rebellion, insurrection,sedition or attempted coup d’ etat and conversely, when

the other offense involved is not one of those enumeratedunder RA 8294, then the separate case for illegalpossession of firearm should continue to be prosecuted.The constitutional bar against double jeopardy will notapply since these offenses are quite different from oneanother, with the first punished under the Revised PenalCode and the second under a special law.

DIRECT ASSAULT

PEOPLE v BELTRAN(138 SCRA 521)

September 13, 1985G.R. L-37168-69

Shooting the mayor and a policeman on duty isattempted murder with assault. Considering that MayorQuirolgico is a person in authority and Pat. RolandoTolentino is a policeman who at the time was in hisuniform, and both were performing their official duties to

maintain peace and order in the community, appellantsare guilty of attempted murder with direct assault.

PEOPLE v DOLLANTES(151 SCRA 592)June 30, 1987

G.R. 70639

When a barangay Captain is in the act of trying to pacifya person who was making trouble in the dance hall, he istherefore killed while in the performance of his duties. Asthe barangay captain, it was his duty to enforce the lawsand ordinances within the barangay and if in the

enforcement thereof, he incurs, the enmity of his peoplewho thereafter treacherously slew him, the crimecommitted is murder with assault upon a person inauthority.

JUSTO v COURT OF APPEALS(99 PHIL 453)June 28, 1956G.R. L-8611

The character of person in authority is not assumed orlaid off at will, but attaches to a public official until heceases to be in office. Assuming that the complainant isnot actually performing the duties of his office whenassaulted, this fact does not bar the existence of thecrime of assault upon a person in authority, so long asthe impelling motive of the attack is the performance ofofficial duty.||| Also, w here there is a mutual agreement tofight, an aggression ahead of the stipulated time andplace would be unlawful since to hold otherwise would beto sanction unexpected assaults contrary to all sense ofloyalty and fair play.

PEOPLE v RECTO(367 SCRA ___)

October 17, 2001G.R. 129069

The victim is considered a mere bystander even if he is aBarangay Chief Tanod, an agent of a person in authority,if he is not acting and had no occasion to act in theperformance of his official duties. As such, the attacks onhim do not amount to direct assault.


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RESISTANCE AND DISOBEDIENCE TO A PERSON INAUTHORITY OR THE AGENTS OF SUCH PERSONS

VYTIACO v CA(19 SCRA 744)April 24, 1967

G.R. L-20246-48

The accused cannot be held liable when the evidenceshows that the Constabulary Soldier was in civilianclothes, did not exhibit any badge and simply identifiedhimself verbally after the petitioner had wrested his gunfrom him since before a person can be held guilty of thecrime of resistance or disobedience to a person inauthority or the agent of such person it must be shownbeyond reasonable doubt that the accused knew that theperson he disobeyed or resisted is a person in authorityor the agent of such person who is actually engaged inthe performance of his official duties. Moreover, therefusal of petitioner to return the Constabulary Soldier's

gun was but a continuation of his efforts to defend himselffrom whatever harm that could come from.

DELIVERY OF PRISONERS FROM JAIL

ALBERTO v DELA CRUZ(98 SCRA 406)June 30, 1980G.R. L-31839

The crime delivering prisoners from jail under Article 156is usually committed by an outsider who removes from

jail any person confined therein or helps him escape and

not by a jailer of the province and by an assistantprovincial warden since if the offender is a public officerwho has custody or charge of the prisoner, he is liable forinfidelity in the custody of prisoner. However in Article223, it is necessary that the public officer had consentedto, or connived in, the escape of the prisoner under hiscustody or charge.

EVASION OF SERVICE OF SENTENCE

TANEGA v MASAKAYAN(19 SCRA 564)

February 28, 1967G.R. L-27191

Prescription shall only begin to run when he escapesconfinement. When the accused is never placed inconfinement, prescription of penalty will not run in hisfavor.

PEOPLE v ABILONG(82 PHIL ___)

November 26, 1948G.R. L-1960

Although destierro does not constitute imprisonment, it isa deprivation of liberty, though partial, in the sense that

as in the present case, the appellant by his sentence ofdestierro was deprived of the liberty to enter the City ofManila. Thus, if a person sentenced to destierro by virtueof final judgment and prohibited from entering the City ofManila enters said city within the period of his sentence,he is guilty of evasion of sentence under Article 157 ofthe Revised Penal Code.

VIOLATION OF CONDITIONAL PARDON

TORRES v GONZALES (152 SCRA 272)

A convict granted conditional pardon with an undertakingthat he would “not again violate any of the penal laws ofthe Philippines” who is recommitted should be convictedby final judgment of a court of the subsequent crime or

crimes with which he was charged before the criminal penalty for such subsequent offense(s) can be imposedupon him. Article 159 of the Revised Penal Code definesa distinct and substantive felony, the parolee or convictwho is regarded as having violated the provisions thereofmust be charged, prosecuted and convicted by final

judgment before he can be made to suffer the prescribedpenalty.

QUASI-RECIDIVISM

PEOPLE v DIOSOOctober 23, 1964G.R. L-38346-47

When the accused is a quasi -recidivist , having committedthe crime charged while serving sentence for a prioroffense, the maximum penalty prescribed by law formurder is death, regardless of the presence or absenceof mitigating or aggravating circumstance such asvoluntary surrender and plea of guilty or the completeabsence thereof.

CRIMES AGAINST PUBLIC INTEREST

COUNTERFEITING

PEOPLE v KONG LEON(48 O.G. 664)

The making of false coins of a foreign country ispunishable under Article 163, paragraph 3 of the RevisedPenal Code even if said country has withdrawn the coinsfrom circulation therein.

FORGERY

DEL ROSARIO v PEOPLE(3 SCRA 650)

Possession of genuine treasury notes of the Philippinesany of "the figures, letters, words or signs contained" inwhich had been erased and/or altered, with knowledge ofsuch erasure and alteration, and with the intent to usesuch notes of the Philippines, is punishable under Art.168 in relation to Art. 166, subdivision (1) of the RevisedPenal Code. Thus, possession of genuine treasury notesof the Philippine Government where one of the digits ofthe penultimate had been altered and changed from 9 soas to read 0 is punishable.

FALSIFICATION

SIQUIAN v PEOPLE(171 SCRA 223)

Falsification of public document is committed when theaccused issues a certification which states that funds areavailable for the position to which a person is appointed


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and the accused knows that, in reality, the position itselfdoes not even exist and no funds had been appropriatedtherefor. The existence of a wrongful intent to injure athird person is not necessary when the falsified documentis a public document. In falsification of public documents,the controlling consideration is the public character of adocument and the existence of any prejudice caused tothird persons or, at least, the intent to cause suchdamage becomes immaterial.

PEOPLE v VILLALON(192 SCRA 521)

The charge of estafa thru falsification of a publicdocument has sufficient basis to exist in fact and in lawsince falsification of a public document may be a meansof committing estafa because before the falsifieddocument is actually utilized to defraud another, thecrime of falsification has already been consummated,damage or intent to cause damage not being an element

of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercialdocuments. The damage to another is caused by thecommission of estafa and not by the falsification of thedocument, hence, the falsification of the public, official orcommercial document is only a necessary means tocommit the estafa.

US v CAPULE(24 PHIL 12)

January 2, 1913G.R. L-7447

A person who, taking advantage of the occasion when a

power of attorney is presumably being drawn up,prepares instead thereof, contrary to the wishes of theinterested parties and with malice aforethought, aninstrument of sale in his own favor, using deceit as to theparties and the witnesses, and afterwards induces anotary to certify falsely that the supposed vendorsactually appeared and ratified such instrument, is guilty ofthe falsification of a notarial or public document.

PEOPLE v MANANSALA(58 PHIL 796)

November 18, 1933G.R. L-38948

When a person has in his possession a falsifieddocument and makes use of the same, the presumptionor inference is justified that such person is the forger.

BERADIO VS CA (103 SCRA 567)

The crime of falsification of public document cannot beimputed to the accused when it is found that no criminalintent to commit falsification can be imputed on theaccused who in submitting daily time records not as alegal obligation but as a matter of practice, made entriestherein that were not absolutely false but had a color of

truth and who had caused no damage to the government,or to third parties but on the contrary rendered service inthe interest of the public with proper permission from thesuperiors.

LUAGUE v CA (112 SCRA 97)

If the accused acted in good faith when she signed herspouse's name to the checks and encashed them to payfor the expenses of the spouse’s last illness and burialupon the belief that the accused is entitled to them andconsidering that the government sustained no damagedue to such encashment, criminal intent may not beascribed, and the accused should be acquitted to suchcrime.

PEOPLE VS SENDAYDIEGO(81 SCRA 120)

If the falsification is resorted to for the purpose of hidingthe malversation, the falsification and malversation areseparate offenses. Thus, where the provincial treasurer,as the custodian of the money forming part of the roadand bridge fund, effected payments to his co-accused for

construction materials supposedly delivered to theprovince for various projects when in fact no suchmaterials were delivered, and to camouflage or concealthe defraudation, the accused used six vouchers whichhad genuine features and which appear to be extrinsicallyauthentic but which were intrinsically fake, the crimescommitted are not complex but separate crimes offalsification and malversation and the falsifications cannotbe regarded as constituting one continuing offenseimpelled by a single criminal impulse.

USE OF FALSIFIED DOCUMENT

US v CASTILLO(6 PHIL 453)

September 19, 1906G.R. 2829

The Court held that the unexplained fact that the accusedaltered a forged check which is strong evidence tendingto prove that the accused either forged the check himselfor caused it to be forged when accompanied by proof ofother facts, which render it difficult to understand how thecheck could have been forged without the intervention ofthe accused, is sufficient to sustain a conviction forforgery.

DAVA v PEOPLE(202 SCRA 62)

G.R. 73

A blank form of the driver's license which is filled up withpersonal data and the signature of the registrar of theSan Fernando LTC agency was affixed therein, even ifthe same was simulated, becomes a public documentwithin the purview of Articles 171 and 172.The driver'slicense being a public document, proof of the fourthelement of damage caused to another person or at leastintent to cause such damage has become immaterialsince the principal thing being punished is the violation of

the public faith and the destruction of the truth proclaimedtherein.


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ILLEGAL POSSESSION AND USE OF FALSE BANKNOTES

MARTINEZ v PEOPLE (652 SCRA ___)June 15, 2011G.R. 194367

Possession of false treasury or bank notes alone, withoutanything more, is not a criminal offense since thepossession must be with intent to use said false treasuryor bank notes. Hence, the pieces of counterfeit billsallegedly seized are not sufficient to show the element ofintent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments,for there must be an overt act to manifest such intent.

USURPATION

GIGANTONI v PEOPLE (162 SCRA 158)

It is incumbent upon the prosecution to establish bypositive evidence the allegation that an accused falselyrepresents himself. It is essential to present proof thatone actually knows at the time of the alleged commissionof the offense that he is already dismissed from theservice.

An argument that it makes no difference whether theaccused was suspended or dismissed from the service,“for both imply the absence of power to represent oneselfas vested with authority to perform acts pertaining to anof fice to which he knowingly was deprived of” is

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