19
. - - I ·- General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201 (517) 788-0550 May 15, 1979 Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att: Mr Dennis L Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555 DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 - PALISADES PLANT - RAPID RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUEST ON THREE MILE ISL.AND Consumers Power response to questions handed to us by A Schwencer at a meeting in Bethesda on Saturday May 12, 1979, is attached. These questions concern the TMI incident and were to have been telecopied to us on May 9, 1979. We never received them by telecopy, however. Our response to Item 1 was telephoned to the NRC contact on May 14, 1979. We attempted to telephone our responses to Items 2 and 3 on both May 14, and May 15, but the reviewer assigned to these items failed to return our calls. It should be noted that: 1. The plant staff worked overtime to these questions on Sunday, May 13, 1979, due to the NRC's failure to tele- copy the questions to us sn May 9, 1979. 2. After having formulated our responses , we unable to contact the NRC personnel assigned to accept them. These responses were requested by 3: 30 PM on May 14, 1979. They (Items 2 and 3) did not lend to telecopy. In the future, if you desire rapid responses, it is requested that you ensure the questions are sent through the NRC Project and that you make personnel available to accept our responses. David P Hoffman Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator CC: JGKeppler, USNRC /:i I

Palisades - Rapid Response to Additional Information ...ual). Transient caused FW pump trip. "B" FW pump trip. "B" FW pump trip occurred coincident to operators opening LP T &!r valve

  • Upload
    others

  • View
    2

  • Download
    0

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • . - - I

    • ~@LI]~Mml1l@~ l?JIDJW~if ~@film~@lffil!J

    ·-

    • General Offices: 212 West Michigan Avenue, Jackson, Michigan 49201 • (517) 788-0550

    May 15, 1979

    Director, Nuclear Reactor Regulation Att: Mr Dennis L Ziemann, Chief Operating Reactors Branch No 2 US Nuclear Regulatory Commission Washington, DC 20555

    DOCKET 50-255 - LICENSE DPR-20 -PALISADES PLANT - RAPID RESPONSE TO ADDITIONAL INFORMATION REQUEST ON THREE MILE ISL.AND

    Consumers Power Compa..~y•s response to questions handed to us by A Schwencer at a meeting in Bethesda on Saturday a~ernoon, May 12, 1979, is attached. These questions concern the TMI incident and were to have been telecopied to us on May 9, 1979. We never received them by telecopy, however.

    Our response to Item 1 was telephoned to the NRC contact on May 14, 1979. We attempted to telephone our responses to Items 2 and 3 on both May 14, and May 15, but the reviewer assigned to these items failed to return our calls.

    It should be noted that:

    1. The plant staff worked overtime to a..~swer these questions on Sunday, May 13, 1979, due to the NRC's failure to tele-copy the questions to us sn May 9, 1979.

    2. After having formulated our responses , we w~ere unable to contact the NRC personnel assigned to accept them. These responses were requested by 3: 30 PM on May 14, 1979. They (Items 2 and 3) did not lend to telecopy.

    In the future, if you desire rapid responses, it is requested that you ensure the questions are sent through the NRC Project Ma.~ager and that you make personnel available to accept our responses.

    [}pJ(7.4jf~-= David P Hoffman Assistant Nuclear Licensing Administrator

    CC: JGKeppler, USNRC

    /:i I

  • • • ATTACHMENT

    ITEM 1 - PRESSURIZER DATA

    A. Pressurizer Heaters Balance of Plant Instrument Power Source - (class IE or non class IE or both) -Backup Heater Power Source -

    B. Backup Heaters on set points = off set points =

    C. Variable Heater Transfer Function -

    D. Spray Valve Transfer Function -

    E. Power Operated Relief Valve #2 (if applicable) open set point (in control output units) close set point (in control output units)

    Describe Controller Transfer Function (output) =

    including, Proportional Gain = Integral Gain =

    Derivative Gain =

    Response

    psia

    A. Y-10 and Y-20 (preferred AC buses No 1 and No 2) provide power to pressurizer heater control circuits.

    Half of the backup heaters are powered from 480 volt Bus 16 (powered from 2400 volt Bus lD). Half are powered from 4Bo volt Bus 15 (powered from 2400 volt Bus lE).

    B. Backup heaters are maintained energized in manual control.

    C. Variable heater transfer fUnction:

    °/a off = P-1985 ~sia X 100 50 psia

    D. Spray valve transfer fUnction:

    °/a open = P-2o85 psia X 100 50 psia E. This question is not applicable to Palisades .

    1

  • • ITEM II

    Describe all events that resulted in a complete loss of main feedwater over the last three years of operation. Include as a minimum the following information: date, initiating event, power level, consequences (one paragraph description), and safety significance of event.

    Each event which occurred during a startup need not be described separately.

    Response

    The following table presents the data requested above:

    Date

    5-10-76

    1-17-77

    1-18-77

    3-25-77

    3-27-77

    11-27-77

    Initiating Event

    Feed-water pump trip from low suction pressure.

    High-level dump valve on moisture separator and reheater drain tank failed open, resulting in tank low level and tripping of the heater drain pumps which led to tripping of the "B" feed-water pump from low suction pressure. The reactor was manually tripped.

    The "A" feed-water pump tripped. The cause of the FWP was not known. The reactor was manually tripped.

    Loss of the·"A" main feed-water pump resulted in a reactor trip from low steam generator water level.

    The "B" main feed-water pump tripped resulting in a reactor trip from steam generator low water level.

    loss of the "A" main feed-water pump while attempting to shift from manual to automatic control •

    2

    Power Level

    253

    1003

    353

    Consequences and Safety Significance

    None

    None

    None

    None

    None

    None

  • Date

    4-21-78

    5-11-78

    6- 7-78

    6- 8-78

    6-13-78

    8- 7-78

    10-17-78

    12-16-78

    3- 3-79

    • • Initiating Event Power Level

    Loss of "B" MFW pump (due 50°/o to a damaged vibration detector).

    FW pump low suction pres- Beginning sure (due to condenser and power demin strainer plugging). escalation

    "B" steam generator low 23°/o level (malfunction of FW regulator valves during changing FW control from bypass valves to main FW regulator valves).

    "A" low steam generator 2Cfl/o level ( "B" steam generator FW isolation valve closed. After it was opened erratic swings in FW with FW regu-lator valves in auto) •

    "B" FW pump trip (lost auto control on FW regulator valves and changed to man-ual). Transient caused FW pump trip.

    "B" FW pump trip.

    "B" FW pump trip occurred coincident to operators opening LP T &!r valve •

    "A" FW pump trip (low steam generator level).

    FW pumps trip (low suction pressure. Heater drain pump had tripped.

    3

    84%

    86%

    84%

    88%

    100%

    Consequences and Safety Significance

    None - lowest steam generator level was 2Cfl/o.

    None

    None

    None - changes made to start-up checksheets to prevent this from re-curring. Lowest steam generator level ~ 24°/o.

    . None

    None

    None

    It aJ?l?eared that a portion of steam generators' tubes became uncovered. Approx-imately eight hours were required to regain the lost water inventory •

  • • Date 4- 7-79

    • Initiating Event

    "B" FW pump trip (cause unknown).

    •• Power Level

    lOofo

    4

    Consequences "and Safety Significance

    It appeared that a portion of steam generators' tubes became uncovered. Took

    ,..._, 1 hour to restore the level in steam generator. Subsequent to this trip, Bus 10 failed to transfer to start-up power and had to be manually switched to the 1-1 EDG. This re-sulted in a delay of about 1-1/2 minutes in estab -lishing auxiliary feedflow, but had no adverse effect on recovery •

  • • • Item 3

    Provide a schematic diagram of the steam generator. Identify important characteristics. As a minimum provide the liquid level and vol'l.lllle for normal plant operation at power and the liquid level and volume at low level set point for reactor trip (for W plants low level with steam flow/feed flow mismatch) subsequent to a loss of feedwater. Describe the basis for this determination including a description and use of steam generator level span.

    Response

    The attached prints and schematics provide the information requested. Water vol 'l.lllles and levels are as follows:

    Nonnal: 382 11/16" above tube sheet, 5022 cu ft

    Low Level Trip: 310 11/16" above tube sheet, vol tmJ.e not known

  • f 166 Steam Separators

    Secondary ·Manway

    Hi h W~er Level

    Normal Water Level

    Low Water Level

    709 2511 32

    Overall Length

    Primary Inlet Support Skirt

    Ste::im Outlet

    PALIS ADES FSAR -

    STEAM G~NERATOR

    111 Instrument Nozzle

    Surface Slowdown Nozzle Emergency Feedwater Nozzle Feedwater

    0 Nozzle

    180°

    Primary I n\et Nozzle

    Bottom Slowdown & Drain Nozzle

    A

    270° View B-B

    Primary Manway

    Primary Outlet Nozzle

    Bottom Blowdown & Drain Nozzle

    Primary Manway

    '

  • 4.3.4

    • PALISADES FSAR STEAM .GENERATOR

    The nuclear steam supply system utilizes two steam generators, Figure 4-3, to transfer the heat generated in the reactor coolant system to the secondary system. The design parameters for the steam generators are given in Table 4-5.

    The steam generator is a vertical U-tube heat exchanger and is designed in accordance with ASME Eoiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section III, Class A. -The steam generator operates with the primary coolant in the tube side and the secondary fluid in the shell side.

    Primary coolant enters the steam generator through the inlet nozzle, flows through 3/4" OD U-tubes, and leaves through two outlet nozzles. Vertical partition plates in the lower head separate the inlet and outlet plenums. The plenums are stainless steel clad, while the pri·· mary side of the tube sheet is Ni-Cr-Fe clad. The vertical U-tubes are Ni-Cr-Fe alloy. The explansion process is used for expanding the steam generator tubes in the tube sheet. The tube-to-tube sheet joint is welded on the primary side.

    Feedwater enters the steam generator through the feed-water nozzle where it is distributed via a feed-water distribution ring having bottom apertures which direct the flow through the downcomer. The downcomer is an annular passage formed by the inner surface of the steam generator shell and the cylindrical shell which encloses the vertical U-tubes.

    Upon exit at the bottom of the downcomer, the secondary water is directed upward over the vertical U-tubes. Heat transfer from the primary side converts a portion of the secondary water into steam.

    Upon exiting from the verticai U-tube heat transfer surface, the steam-water mixture enters the centrifugal type separators. These impart a centrifugal motion to .the mixture and separate the water particles from the steam. The water exits from the perforated separator housing and combines with the feedwater. Final drying of the steam is accomplished by passage of the steam through the cor-rugated plate dryers. The moisture content of the exiting steam is limited to a maximum of 0.2% at design flow.

    The power operated steam dump valves and steam bypass valve prevent opening of the safety valves following turbine and reactor trip from full power. The steam dump and bypass system is described in Section 9.

    The steam generator shell is constructed of carbon steel. Manways and handholes are provided for easy access to the steam generator internals.

    Overpressure protection for the shell side of the steam generators and the main steam line piping up to the inlet of the turbine stop valve is provided by twenty-four (24) safety valves. These valves

    4-10

  • • PALISADES FSAR a.re ASME Code spring loaded, open bonnet, safety valves and discharge to atmosphere. Twelve safety valves are mounted on each of the main steam lines upstream of the steam line isolation valves but outside the containment. The valves are divided into three groups of four valves, each valve within a group having the same nominal opening pressure, but with staggered group opening pressures consistent with ASME Code allowances. The valves can pass a steam flow e~uivalent to an NSSS power level of 2650 :Mwt at the nominal 1000 psia set pressure. Parameters for the secondary safety valves are given in Table 4-4.

    TABLE 4-4

    SECONDARY SAFETY VALVE PARAMETERS

    Design Pressure, Psia

    Design Temperature, °F

    Fluid - Saturated Steam

    Capacity, Mininrum per Valve, Lb/Hr

    Total Capacity, Lb/Hr

    Set Pressure

    Eight Valves, Four per Unit, Psia Eight Valves, Four per Unit, Psia Eight Valves, Four per Unit, Psia

    Body Material

    Trim Material

    1,000

    550

    !+86, 600

    11, 678, i+oo

    1,025 i,005

    985

    ASTM 216, Gr WCB

    Stainless Steel

    The steam generators are mounted vertically on bearing plates to allow horizontal motion parallel to the hot leg due to thermal expansion of the reactor coolant piping. Stops are provided to limit this motion in case of a coolant pipe rupture. The top of the unit is restrained from sudden lateral movement by energy absorbers mounted rigidly to the concrete shield.

    In addition to the transients listed in Section 4.2.2 each steam generator is also designed for the following accident conditions such that no component will fail either by rupture or by developing deformations (elastic or plastic) that will impair the function, performance, or integrity of the steam generator for further operation.

    1. Eight cycles during which the primary side is at 2500 psia and 600° F while the secondary side is depressurized to atmospheric pressure.

    4-11 Rev 4/10/69

  • • • PALISADES FSAR 2. One cycle during which the steam on the shell si.de is at 900

    psia and 532° F while tube (prime.ry) side is depressurized to atmospheric pressure.

    3.

    4.

    5.

    6.

    2400 cycles of transient pressure differentials of 85 psi across the primary head divider plate due to starting and stopping the primary coolant pumps.

    10 cycles of hydrostatic testing of the secondary side at 1250 psia.

    320 cycles of leak testing of the secondary side at. 1.000 psia.

    5, 000 cycles of adding 425 gpm of ·ro° F feedwater with the plant in hot standby condition.

    8 cycles of adding a maximum of 300 gpm of 70° F feedwater with the steam generator secondary side dry and at 600° F.

    The unit is capable of withstanding these conditions for the pre-scribed numbers of cycles in addition to the prescribed operating conditions without exceeding the allowable cumulative usage factor as prescribed in ASME Code, Section III .

    4-12

  • •••

    • ~ ...

    • P .ALIS ADES FSAR TABLE 4-5

    STEAM GENERATOR PARAMETERS.

    Number

    Type

    Number of Tubes

    Tube Outside Dia.meter Quantity

    Nozzles and Manways

    Primary Inlet Nozzle Primary Outlet Nozzle Steam Nozzle Feedwater Nozzle Instrument Taps Primary Manways Secondary Manways Secondary Handhole Secondary Drain & Blowdown Surface Blowdown Spare

    Primary Side Design

    Design Pressure, Psie Design Temperature, °F Design Thermal Power (NSSS), Mwt Cold Leg Temperature, °F Hot Leg Temperature, °F Coolant Flow Rate (Each), Lb/Hr Normal Operating Pressure, Psia

    1 2 1 1 9 2 2 1 1 1 1

    Secondary Side Design

    Design Pressure, Psia Design Temperature, °F Normal Operating Steam Pressure, Full Load,

    Psia Normal Operating Steam Temperature, Full Load,

    OF Steam Moisture Content, Maximum, % Blowdown Flow, Lb/Hr Drying Capacity at 770 Psia, Maximum (Each),

    Lb/Hr Design Thermal Power (NSSS), Mwt Steam Flow (Each), Lb/Hr Feed-Water Temperature, °F

    4-13

    2

    Vertical U-Tube

    8,519

    0.750 Inch

    ~

    42 Inch ID 30 Inch ID 34 Inch ID 18 Inch Nominal 1 Inch Nominal 16 Inch ID 16 Inch ID 5-11/16 Inch ID 2 Inch Nominal 1 Inch Nominal 4 Inch Nominal

    Initial.

    2,500 650 2,212 545 591

    io6 62.5 x 2,100

    1,000 550

    770

    514 0.20 2,000

    5.86 x 10 6

    2,212 6 4.701 x 10 418

    Stretch

    2,500 650. 2,650 540.5 595 6 65.45 x 10 2,250

    l,000 550

    764

    514 0.20 2,000

    5.86 x 10 6

    2,650 6 5.81 x 10 438

    Rev 12/15/73

  • PALISADES FSAR

    TABLE 4-5 (Contd)

    Dimensions

    Overall Height, Including Support Skirt Upper Shell Outside Diameter Lower Shell Outside Diameter

    Dry Weight·

    Flooded Weight

    Operating Weight

    59 Feet - 2 Inches 20 Feet - 10 Inches 13 Feet - 8 Inches

    921t,600 Lb

    1,496;000 Lb

    1,109,000 Lb

  • ••

    -111-

    3. 7. LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW INCIDENT

    Exxon Report XN-·NF-77-18

    A loss of feedwater flow incident may arise due to the rupture of

    the feedwater cross-over line downstream of the main feedwater pumps or a

    condensate pump fault which would cause low suction pressure on both feed-

    water pumps. When operating at full power, there would be no corresponding

    decrease in steam flow from the steam generators. If loss of main feedwater

    is unchecked, the normal primary coolant system heat sink would be reduced

    and eventually eliminated. The result would be an increase in core inlet

    temperature with only the presssurizer relief valves and auxiliary feedwater

    system available for the removal of decay heat, until a controlled system

    cooldown is initiated. The reactor protection system provides reactor

    protection through a reactor trip activated by low water level in each

    steam generator with additional protection for the reactor provided by the

    hi ~Jh pressurizer pressure and therma 1 margin trips.

    The transient was initiated from 102% of rated power (2530 Mwt).

    Only complete loss of feedwater is assumed in this analysis since this

    condition requires the most rapid response from the reactor control and

    portection system. Beginning-of-cycle (BOC) kinetic coefficients were

    conservatively assumed, with an 0.8 multiplier applied to the Doppler

    coefficient. The initial reactor pressure is 2010 psia which is 50 psi

    below the nominal value of 2060 psia. The feedwater flow is reduced to

    zero in two seconds.

    Figures 3.76 through 3.80 show the system responses during the

    loss-of-feedwater flow incident. The reactor trips at 26.7 seconds on low

    steam generator water level. This precipitates a turbine trip and activates

    !· ';~ . <

    ' [! ·' r, :1 ;j ~! \ ... t . I t I ~ '1! f Ii t

    \\ l l ,,

    l i ~. :\ l ·' ! I I ' i I ' I, ~ ,.

    I I ' ' I I f I~

  • -112-Exxon Report XN-NF-77-18

    the atmospheric and condenser steam dump systems. An MDNBR of 1.65 occurs

    0.3 seconds after trip. The atmospheric steam dump valves are controlled

    by the average primary coolant temperature following a turbine trip. The

    atmospheric dump valves are completely closed 38.3 seconds following the

    reactor trip, after which decay heat is removed via the steam bypass to

    the condenser. The water inventory in the steam generators is adequate to

    accommodate decay heat and pump heat for an additional 15 minutes, at which

    time the mass inventory of each steam generator is no less than 1700 lbs.

    Hence, the operator will have 16 minutes after the initiation of the

    incident to restore partial feedwater flow by activation of the auxiliary

    feedwater system .

    ..

  • 0 w l-a:

    14 0

    120

    100

    rY8 0 . LL 0

    1--z tj6 0 et: w a_

    40

    20

    0 0

    • PAL I SADES ++ LOSS OF FEED-WATER FLOW FROM 2 5 8 0. 6 MW

    1 PQi-JER EVEL 2 HEAT F1 ux 3 TOTAL ~RIMRRY CO ~LANT FLOl-J ti TOTAL EEOl-JATER LOW 5 TOTAL ~TEAH LINE FLOW

    l z,...... 5 l I) l " \\ . 3 3 3 3 7' ., -, ~ ~ '3

    \ f-..-.._s

    \ ~ I\ I!

    \11 \ \ \ r ~5 5 ~ \ .

    ~ ~ r-r-t-_ rL_ 2 , 2 , " .. lj lj lj lj lj lj lj :i ~

    10 20 30 ttO 50 SO ?O 80 TiME. SEC

    FIGURE 3. 76 PO\~ER, HEAT FLUX, AND SYSTEi1 FLOWS, LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW

    SEQ. 16ll 20 ·JUN 1? 13 1 22 1 11

    3

    5

    , 2

    lj

    90

    5

    100

    I --' .:... w I

  • ._. ·~· ----••O- "'"" ''"r •• ~-;:· "'....._'._. • .-~: _-· " -·· ..... .::-_·..:!:·-:..-:.-=-'='~~~..:· -· -:·~· ~- "':. .. ~ ··- ··"·':. ..&.... ··~·.-~-~-------~-·-------=---~-~----~==-~-~---~------------------~~~~~~.~ .. ~- ' ']

    LL

    (.!) w 0

    PAL! SADES • • LOSS OF FEED-WATER FLOW FROM 2 5 8 0. 6 MW 180 u l. AVE. F~El TEMPER~TURE

    2. CORE I LET iEHPE 1RTURE 3. RVE. C )RE COOLAN TEMP.

    "· CLAD T MPERATURE 160 u

    l 1 1

    \ r u \ 14 0

    \ I -u

    \ IJ

    \ "

    lj lj ~ ~ - .... ___ lj 1 .. '

    ., ., " " -- ~ ~ If l ;.: ;.: ;.: t) ::i lf " 3 II ') 3 ll 2 3 lj

    120

    100

    800

    600

    10 20 30 1io so so 70 80 TIME. SEC

    FIGURE 3. 77 CORE TEMPERATURE RESPONSES, LOSS OF FEED\·IATER FL0\-1

    SEQ. 784 20 JUN 77 13 122 116

    1 2 3 lj

    90 100

    I __.

    .;:::. I

  • lJ_

    (.!) w 0

    80

    60

    40

    20

    0

    -20

    -40

    \ 2 "! II --

    • PALISADES •• LOSS OF FEED-~ATER FLOW FROM 2580. 6 MW

    1 CHANG IN RVE. llR IMRRY CO )LANT TEMP • LOOP 1 2 CHANG IN AVE. bRil1ARY CO 1LANT TEMP .• LOOP 2 3 CHANG IN HOT L G - COLD I EG TEl1P. D1FFERENCE 1..00P t 'I CHANG IN HOT L G - COLD I EG TEMP. DIFFERENCE 1..00P 2

    I~ ~ ~ ;

    ....__ 3 11 3 11

    ~ \ \ N. -~ ~

    ~ ~ ;---....__3 tl l I) -........... ~ ~ ~

    3 " 3 'I --rz__

    10 20 30 40 50 80 70 80 90 100 TIME. SEC

    FIGURE 3.73 PRIMARY LOOP TEMPERATURE CHANGES, LOSS OF FEEDl·IATER FLOW

    SEQ. H!LI 20 JUN H 13 • 22 I 19

    - "I --1· - ·--- • ·---·- ·• ;.• .. • -.·: -

    _,_ .. .,... .... ·---· ___ ,_ ...... ,.~.~-- ~ ........... - ... ,,._, ....... -.~-........... - - -.. .

    I ........ ....... U1 I

  • cc (!) Q_

    800

    600

    400

    200

    0

    -20

    ·-4 0

    • PAL I SADES • + LOSS OF FEEO·-WRTER f="l_Oi-4 FROM 2 5 8 0. 6 MW

    1. STEAM ~OME PRES.Si JRE CYANGE .._ CJOP l 2. STEAM I DOME PRC:SSi URE CHAt~GE L.0ClP 2 3. PRES SU. ~IZER PRES ~URE CHANG.

    1 2 /- ~ '1 ')

    ~ ~ ~ rt-L_

    ~ -.!_2 -~

    1 ~ _1 2

    ~ ----~ ~'< -u ~ ~ ~ r--.L_

    ~ J I

    \ I " I \.J .. 20 30 ,.. 4 0 5 0 'J I) 80 90 100

    TIME. SEC

    FIGURE 3. 79 PRESSURE CHANGES IN PRESSURIZER AND SEO. 1 S4 20 JUN i7 13 :22 '21 STEAM GENERATORS, LOSS OF FEEDWATER FLOW

    I __. ...... C'I I

  • L__ __ _

    • • PRl_ I SADES + • LOSS oi:- ~EEO-WATER FLOW FROM 2 5 8 0. El MW

    50 1 · C..Hfl.NGE IN STEAM EN. WATER LEVEL. LO· 1P l 2 CHANGE !N STEAM EN. WATER LEVEL. ~a 0 2 ~ CHANGE !N PRESSU I2ER WRTE. LEVEL

    0

    -3rj~~~1Lo~~~2~0:--~-=1-30:--~--.i~~o~~~5~0~~,8~0:--~~?~0::--~-;::-s~o~~n9~0~~~i~0

    TIME. SEC FIGURE 3.80 LEVEL CHANGES IN PRESSURIZER AND

    STEAM GENERATORS, LOSS OF FEEDHATER FLO\~

    I _,