[A.C. No. 4017. September 29, 1999]GATCHALIAN PROMOTIONS TALENTS POOL, INC., complainant, vs. ATTY. PRIMO R.

NALDOZA, respondent.D E C I S I O N

PER CURIAM:On April 19, 1993, Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., filed before this

Court a Petition for disbarment against Attorney Primo R. Naldoza. The precursor of this Petition was the action of respondent, as counsel for complainant, appealing a Decision of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA). In relation to the appeal, complainant asserts that respondent should be disbarred for the following acts:

1. Appealing a decision, knowing that the same was already final and executory

2. Deceitfully obtaining two thousand, five hundred and fifty-five US dollars (US$2,555) from complainant, allegedly for “cash bond” in the appealed case

3. Issuing a spurious receipt to conceal his illegal act.[1]

In his Answer,[2] respondent denies that he persuaded complainant to file an appeal. On the contrary, he asserts that it was the complainant who insisted on appealing the case in order to delay the execution of the POEA Decision. [3] He also controverts complainant’s allegation that he asked for a cash bond and that he issued the fake receipt.[4]

In a Resolution dated May 17, 1993, this Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The pertinent portions of the complaint were summarized by the IBP in this wise:“Under its petition, complainant alleges that the respondent was given the task to defend the interest of the complainant corporation in POEA Case No. 8888-06-468, entitled Olano, et al. versus Gatchalian Promotions Talents Pool, Inc., et al.; that when the said case was resolved in favor of the complainant therein on October 5, 1992, the respondent Atty. Naldoza knowing fully well that the said decision had already become final and unappealable[,] through malpractice in [an] apparent desire to collect or to ‘bleed’ his client of several thousand pesos of attorney’s fees, convinced the complainant to appeal the case before the Supreme Court. Thus, on December 14, 1992, the respondent filed with the Supreme Court a Petition for Review which was docketed as G.R. No. 107984 and that two (2) days thereafter misrepresented to the complainant corporation that the complainant ha[d] to pay, which it did, [a] “Cash Bond’ in UNITED STATES DOLLAR amounting to TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY FIVE (U.S. $2,555.00) to the Supreme Court in order that the said appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Court. The said amount was given to the respondent.“x x x [S]ubsequently the complainant corporation came to know that the fees to be paid to the Supreme Court consist[ed] only of normal filing and docket fees for such kind of appeal but in order to cover up respondent’s misrepresentation, Atty. Naldoza presented complainant a fake xerox copy of an alleged Supreme court receipt representing payment of U.S. $2,555.00.“Subsequent verification from the Supreme Court made by the complainant corporation revealed that the said receipt issued by the treasurer’s office of the Supreme Court x x x [was] spurious, meaning a fake receipt. The said verification revealed that what was only paid by the respondent to the Supreme court was the amount of P622.00 as shown by the enumerated legal fees of the Supreme Court Docket-Receiving Section showing the handwritten name of the respondent for purpose of showing that the said computation was requested by and addressed to the respondent.”[5] (citations omitted)

Meanwhile, a criminal case[6] for estafa based on the same facts was filed against herein respondent before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 141. Although acquitted on reasonable doubt, he was declared civilly liable in the amount of US$ 2,555.

Thereafter, respondent filed before the IBP a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss on July 22, 1996, on the ground that he had already been acquitted in the criminal case for estafa. Complainant opposed the Motion.[7]

On February 16, 1998, this Court received the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution, which approved the investigating commissioner’s report [8] and recommendation that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for one (1) year. In his Report, Investigating Commissioner Plaridel Jose justified his recommendation in this manner:“x x x [R]espondent fails to rebut the position of the complainant that the signature [on the receipt for the amount of $2,555.00] was his. Hence, respondent anchors his position on a mere denial that it is not his signature. Likewise, the respondent denies the check voucher dated December 15, 1992, and the encircled signature of the respondent, which x x x according to him is falsified and irregular. No evidence, however, was presented by the respondent that his signature therein was falsified and irregular. [As to the altered Supreme Court Official Receipt, the respondent denied] that he ha[d] anything to do with it because it was the complainant who signed the Petition for Review and tried to explain that his name appear[ed] to be the payee because he [was] the counsel of record of the petitioner. But while it is true that the affiant in the said Petition for Review [was] Mr. Rogelio G. Gatchalian, president of the complainant company, the respondent does not deny that he signed the said petition as counsel of the petitioner corporation and that he was actually the one who prepared the same and the notary public before whom the affiant subscribed and [swore] as the one who ‘caused the preparation’ of the said petition.“The legal form (Exh. “G”) of the legal fees for the Petition for Review re G.R. 107984 was denied by the respondent because according to him he was never given a chance to cross-examine the person who issued the [certification] x x x. However, respondent does not deny that he is the person referred to by the handwritten name P.R. Naldoza who paid the legal fees of P622.00.

“In addition to the said respondent’s Formal Offer of Evidence, he submitted to this Commission as his most important piece of evidence the Decision of acquittal in Criminal Case No. 93-8748 entitled ‘People of the Philippines versus Primo R. Naldoza’, the copy of which Decision is appended to his Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated July 22, 1996 praying for the dismissal of the present administrative case in view of his being exonerated in the said criminal case based on the same facts and evidence.”[9] (citations omitted)

Commissioner Jose brushed aside respondent’s contention that his acquittal in the companion criminal case should result in the dismissal of this administrative complaint. The commissioner emphasized that the criminal case for estafa [10] was completely different from the proceedings before him; acquittal in the former did not exonerate respondent in the latter.[11] He further noted that the RTC Decision itself hinted at the administrative liability of respondent, since it found him civilly liable to herein complainant for $2,555.[12]

We agree with the IBP Board of Governors that respondent should be sanctioned. However, the recommended penalty is not commensurate to the gravity of the wrong perpetrated.

At the outset, the Court agrees with the IBP that respondent’s Motion to Dismiss should be denied. In that Motion, he maintains that he should be cleared of administrative liability, because he has been acquitted of estafa which involved the same facts. He argues that the issue involved there was “ the very same issue litigated in this case,”[13] and that his exoneration “was a result a full blown trial on the merits of this case.”[14]

In a similar case, we have said:“x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of xxx criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.”[15]

Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. [16] They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary;[17] in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required. [18] Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings.[19]

It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. [20] Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer.[21] The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa. For this reason, it would be well to remember the Court’s ruling in In re Almacen,[22] which we quote:“x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x” (emphasis ours)

We shall now discuss seriatim the specific charges against respondent.First. Complainant alleges that respondent appealed the POEA Decision, despite

knowing that it had already become final and executory. The IBP investigating commissioner had no explicit finding on this point. Rogelio G. Gatchalian testified that during the pendency of the appeal, his company had received from the POEA a Writ of Execution which led him to the conlcusion that “they [had] lost the case before the Supreme Court.”[23] This, however, does not substantiate the charge.

Complainant has failed to present proof regarding the status of the appeal. Neither has there been any showing that the appeal was dismissed on the ground that the POEA Decision had become final and executory. Worse, there has been no evidence that respondent knew that the case was unappealable. Indeed, the records of this Court shows that the Petition for Review was dismissed for petitioner’s failure to submit an Affidavit of Service and a legible duplicate of the assailed Order. Clearly, this charge has no leg to stand on.

Second. Be that as it may, we agree with the IBP that respondent obtained from complainant the amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it was needed for the appeal before this Court. According to Gatchalian,[24] respondent explained that the amount would “cover all the expenses to be incurred in the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount also will answer for the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be given or paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be garnished.” [25] Corroborating Gatchalian’s testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received the amount on the representation that it “would be paid to the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano case.”[26]

The defense of denial proferred by respondent is not convincing. Quite the contrary, when he paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his “moral obligation,” he indirectly admitted the charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. This is an admission of misconduct.[27] In his Answer submitted to this Court, he declared:“(8). That I have no knowledge, information or belief as to truthfulness of the allegation of the Petitioner, on his allegation no. 8 and no. 9, the truth being that in all the cases and assignments made by the Petitioner to me, I was made to report to him personally and to his Board of Directors the progress of the cases both orally and in writing. I even [went] to the extent of paying him P10,000.00 as my moral obligation only to find after accounting that he still owes me P180,000.00 as attorney’s fee [to] which I am entitled under rule 130 of the rules of court sec. 24, and under sec. 37 of the above-cited rules, I have the right to apply the funds received from Gatchalian in satisfaction of my claim for Professional Services, otherwise known as Attorney’s Lien, as shown in my Service Billings and Statement of Accounts.”[28] (emphasis ours)

Contrary to respondent’s claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorney’s lien. He demanded the money from his client on the pretext that it was needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court, but he actually converted it to his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes malpractice.[29] The claim that respondent merely applied his lien over the funds of his client is just an afterthought, the accounting being made after the fact. It is settled that the conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.[30]

Third. In an effort to conceal his misappropriation of the money entrusted to him, respondent gave complainant a photocopy of a receipt purportedly showing that the Supreme Court had received the sum of $2,555 from him. Again, the testimonies of Gatchalian[31] and Deles[32] were equally clear on this point. After respondent had presented the false receipt, Gatchalian learned that no such payment was made. Ms Araceli Bayuga of the Supreme Court Cash Collection and Disbursement Division issued a certification that respondent had paid the amount of P622 only, not $2,555. In fact, the records of the said case[33] contain no indication at all the Court has required the payment of the latter sum, or that it has been paid at all.

Juxtaposed to the complainant’s evidence, the bare denials of respondent cannot overturn the IBP’s findings that he has indeed presented a false receipt to conceal his misappropriation of his client’s money. We agree with the IBP that “it is unbelievable that the complainant in the person of Rogelio Gatchalian, being a layman as he is without any knowledge in the procedure of filing a case before the Supreme court, could spuriously weave such documents which are denied by the respondent.”[34]

In view of the foregoing, respondent has clearly failed the standards of his noble profession. As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson:[35]

“[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”

Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya,[36] the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution, viz.:“[E]ven as respondent consistently denied liability to Dumadag, his former client, the records abundantly point to his receipt of and failure to deliver the amount of P4,344.00 to his client, the herein complainant, a clear breach of the canons of professional responsibility.”

In Obia v. Catimbang,[37] we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the money entrusted to him:“The acts committed by respondent definitely constitute malpractice and gross misconduct in his office as attorney. These acts are noted with disapproval by the Court; they are in violation of his duty, as a lawyer, to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and to engage in no conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law. Such misconduct discredits the legal profession."

Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar.

WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.SYNOPSIS

Respondent’s disbarment is sought for deceitfully obtaining from complainant the amount US$2,555 allegedly for “cash bond” in connection with an appealed case to the Supreme Court and issuing a spurious Supreme Court receipt to conceal his illegal act. The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. In his answer, respondent denied the charges against him and claimed that the amount demanded was part of his attorney’s lien and that he paid P10,000 to complainant “as his moral obligation.” The IBP found that respondent, counsel of complainant, appealed a decision of POEA adverse to complainant and was given US$2,555 upon respondent’s misrepresentation that payment of a cash bond in said amount was necessary before the appealed case could be heard or acted upon by the Supreme Court. Respondent, to conceal the misappropriation of the money, gave complainant a xeroxed copy of a Supreme Court receipt purportedly evidencing payment of the subject amount. Verification with the Supreme Court, however, disclosed that the original of the receipt showed only the amount of P622.00 paid by respondent in connection with the appealed case. Respondent, who was also charged with the RTC for estafa, filed a manifestation with motion to dismiss the disbarment

case when his estafa case was dismissed. Respondent was acquitted on reasonable ground but was declared civilly liable in the amount of US$2,555. The IBP Board of Governors recommended the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for one year.

The Supreme Court held that administrative cases against lawyers are distinct from and may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases and that their disposition will not govern the administrative case and vice versa; and that conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. Respondent’s acts were more despicable when he not only misappropriated the money entrusted to him but also falsified an official receipt of the Court to cover up his misdeeds.

Respondent was disbarred.SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS, ATTORNEYS; DISCIPLINARY ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS; ACQUITTAL IN CRIMINAL CASE NOT A BAR THERETO.- “x x x The acquittal of respondent Ramos [of] the criminal charge is not a bar to these [administrative] proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of xxx criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases.”

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE.- Administrative cases against lawyers belong to a class of their own. They are distinct from and they may proceed independently of civil and criminal cases.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; BURDEN OF PROOF, DIFFERENT.- The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required. Thus, a criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. It should be emphasized that a finding of guilt in the criminal case will not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Conversely, respondent’s acquittal does not necessarily exculpate him administratively. In the same vein, the trial court’s finding of civil liability against the respondent will not inexorably lead to a similar finding in the administrative action before this Court. Neither will a favorable disposition in the civil action absolve the administrative liability of the lawyer. The basic premise is that criminal and civil cases are altogether different from administrative matters, such that the disposition in the first two will not inevitably govern the third and vice versa.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; PROCEEDINGS ARE SUI GENERIS.- For this reason, it would be well to remember the Court’s ruling in In re Almacen, which we quote: “x x x Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor purely criminal, they do not involve a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers. Not being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is [their] primary objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justices by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have prove[n] themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. x x x” (Italics ours)

5. ID.; ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF P10,000.00 AND ISSUANCE OF CHECK TO COMPLAINANT, AN INDIRECT ADMISSION OF MISCONDUCT; CASE AT BAR.- We agree with the IBP that respondent obtained from complainant the amount of $2,555, on the false representation that it was needed for the appeal before this Court. According to Gatchalian, respondent explained that the amount would “cover all the expenses to be incurred in the Petition for Review with the Supreme Court and which amount also will answer for the payment as sort of deposit so that if our case is lost, the money will be given or paid to the complainant in that case so that our deposit with the bank would not be garnished. Corroborating Gatchalian’s testimony, Edna Deles declared that respondent received the amount on the representation that it “would be paid to the Supreme Court in connection with the Olano case.” The defense of denial proffered by respondent is not convincing. Quite the contrary, when he paid P10,000 and issued a check to complainant as his “moral obligation,”, he indirectly admitted the charge. Normally, this is not the actuation of one who is falsely accused of appropriating the money of another. This is an admission of misconduct.

6. ID.; ID.; CONVERSION OF FUNDS ENTRUSTED TO HIM BY CLIENT CONSTITUTES MALPRACTICE.- Contrary to respondent’s claim, the amount of $2,555 was not a part of his attorney’s lien. He demanded the money from his client on the pretext that it was needed for the Petition before the Supreme Court, but he actually converted it to his personal gain. This act clearly constitutes malpractice. The claim that respondent merely applied his lien over the funds of his client is just an afterthought, the accounting being made after the fact. It is settled that the conversion by a lawyer of funds entrusted to him is a gross violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession.

7. ID.; ID.; MUST CONDUCT THEMSELVES WITH HONESTY AND INTEGRITY.- As we have stated in Resurrecion v. Sayson “[L]awyers must at all times conduct themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.”

8. ID.; ID.; MISAPPROPRIATION OF MONEY ENTRUSTED BY CLIENT AND FALSIFICATION OF SUPREME COURT RECEIPT TO COVER MISDEEDS; SANCTION; CASE AT BAR.- Clearly reprehensible are the established facts that he demanded money from his client for a bogus reason, misappropriated the same, and then issued a fake receipt to hide his deed. In Dumadag v. Lumaya, the Court ordered the indefinite suspension of a lawyer for not remitting to his client the amount he had received pursuant to an execution. In Obia v. Catimbang, we meted out the same penalty to a lawyer who had misappropriated the money entrusted to him. Respondent’s acts are more despicable. Not only did he misappropriate the money entrusted to him; he also faked a reason to cajole his client to part with his money. Worse, he had the gall to falsify an official receipt of this Court to cover up his misdeeds. Clearly, he does not deserve to continue being a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, Primo R. Naldoza is hereby DISBARRED. The Office of the Clerk of Court is directed to strike out his name from the Roll of Attorneys and to inform all courts of this Decision.

[A.C. No. 5957. February 4, 2003]WINNIE C. LUCENTE and ALICIA G. DOMINGO, complainants, vs. ATTY. CLETO L.

EVANGELISTA, JR., respondent.R E S O L U T I O N

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:In a sworn letter-complaint dated January 15, 1999 filed with the Integrated Bar

of the Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline, Winnie C. Lucente and Alicia G. Domingo charged Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. with gross misconduct, deceit, malpractice and crimes involving moral turpitude for falsification of public documents.

Complainants alleged that respondent is the son of the late Atty. Cleto Evangelista, who during his lifetime notarized a Deed of Quitclaim executed on May 7, 1977 by Pedro, Juanito, Eufracia, Cresencia, Consuelo, Maria, all surnamed Tan, and one Sabina Mascareñas, in favor of Asuncion T. Yared and Cynthia Yared Estudillo, involving Lot No. 5514 located in Salvacion, Ormoc City; and a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 7, 1972 by Wenceslao Magallanes and Apolonia Tan in favor of Salvador Estudillo and Cynthia Yared Estudillo, involving Lot No. 1187-B located in Poblacion, Ormoc City. On January 30, 1990, respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. issued certified true copies of the said instruments. On the basis of the certified true copies of the subject deeds, the Register of Deeds of Ormoc City issued on February 2, 1990 Transfer Certificate of Title No. 23889 in favor of Asuncion T. Yared.

Respondent filed a motion to dismiss the complaint interposing res adjudicata, arguing that the allegations in the complaint raise the same issues as those in the criminal case for falsification of public document filed against him before the Ormoc City Prosecution Office, docketed as I.S. No. 98-178. He also asserted that Civil Case No. B-1250 filed by complainants, among others, against Asuncion T. Yared, et al., which was pending before Regional Trial Court, Baybay, Leyte, Branch 14, for declaration of nullity of the quitclaim and deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 23889, raised a prejudicial question in the disbarment proceeding.

Respondent also contended that one Carmen Solidor together with Francisco Aves came to their law office, Evangelista Law Office in Ormoc City, Leyte, and asked him to certify true copies of the subject deeds. He acceded to the request considering that the documents were notarized by his late father as notary public. He alleged that he issued the assailed certification as a partner of the law office.[1]

After investigation, the IBP Board of Governors, on April 7, 2000, recommended the reprimand of Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista with stern warning that a repetition of the same would be dealt with more severely. The recommendation was noted by this Court in a Resolution dated July 19, 2000. Dissatisfied, complainants filed the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In his Comment, respondent alleged that the petition failed to comply with Section 4, Rule 45, Rules of Court considering that (a) the petition did not indicate the correct and true date when petitioner received the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution; (b) petitioners did not attach to the petition certified true copy of said resolution; and (c) the certification against forum-shopping was executed by only one of the petitioners.

Respondent claims that petitioner Alicia Domingo received the Resolution of IBP Board of Governors on May 25, 2000. It appears, however, that, petitioners’ counsel received the same Resolution on June 13, 2000. It is the receipt of counsel that the period to appeal is reckoned for purposes of determining the last day for filing of the petition for review.[2] Therefore, petitioners timely filed this motion for extension of time to file petition for review on June 22, 2000, which was granted. Petitioners, however, failed to attach a certified true copy of the assailed resolution. Moreover, only petitioner Winnie C. Lucente executed the certification against forum shopping.

In A-One Feeds, Inc. v. Court of Appeals,[3] we held:Litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on the merits and not on technicality. Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon, and the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice and thereby defeat their very aims. As has been the constant ruling of this Court, every party litigant should be afforded the amplest opportunity for the proper and just determination of his cause, free from the constraints of technicalities.[4]

The Rules must be so interpreted and applied as to achieve, not defeat, substantial justice as expeditiously as possible. Procedural rules should be liberally construed in order to promote their object and assist the parties in obtaining just, speedy and inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding. Where the rigid application of the rules would frustrate substantial justice, or bar the vindication of a legitimate grievance, the courts are justified in exempting a particular case from the operation of the rules.[5]

The appeal is impressed with merit. Records disclose that Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. admitted having certified true copies of the Deed of Quitclaim executed

on May 7, 1977 and the Deed of Absolute Sale executed on January 7, 1972. His late father, Atty. Cleto P. Evangelista, notarized the subject deeds.

Section 245 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads:Notarial Register. — Every notary public shall keep a register to be known as the notarial register, wherein record shall be made of all his official acts as notary; and he shall supply a certified copy of such record, or any parts thereof, to any person applying for it and paying the legal fees therefor. x x x.

Sections 246 and 247 of the same Code also require the notary public to forward his notarial register to the Clerk of Court of the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province or city wherein he exercises his office for safekeeping.

By certifying true copies of the subject deeds, Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. engaged in an unlawful and deceitful conduct. He was not the notary public before whom said documents were acknowledged and he was neither the custodian of the original copies thereof. The Records Management and Archives Office, Manila, certified that there was no copy on file of the Deed of Quitclaim notarized by respondent’s father.[6] Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court is broad enough to cover any form of misconduct of a lawyer in his professional and personal capacity.

In this connection, we have consistently held that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general.[7] It must be underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of the authenticity thereof. [8] For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties.[9]

Contrary to respondent’s contentions, the complaint for disbarment does not suffer from serious procedural defects that warrant its outright dismissal. Complainants did not engage in forum shopping as defined in Administrative Circular No. 28-91 when they filed the instant case. Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings. Moreover, Civil Case No. B-1250 for declaration of nullity of the quitclaim and deed of absolute sale covering TCT No. 23889 refers to the validity of the documents in question while the disbarment case refers to respondent’s having certified true copies of said documents.

Neither does res adjudicata lie against the complainants. Similarly, the doctrine applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the exercise of the Court’s administrative powers,[10] as in this case. Neither can it be argued that the instant disbarment case has been adjudicated in the criminal case for falsification of public documents. Respondent was proceeded against as a private individual in said case. In the present disbarment action, Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. is sought to be disciplined as a lawyer under the Court’s plenary authority over members of the legal profession.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Cleto L. Evangelista, Jr. is found guilty of gross misconduct. Consequently, he is ordered SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months effective immediately, with a warning that another infraction shall be dealt with more severely.

Let copies of this Resolution be furnished all courts of the land as well as the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant and recorded in the personal files of respondent himself.

SO ORDERED.[A.C. No. 4552. December 14, 2004]

JOSE A. ROLDAN, complainant, vs. ATTY. NATALIO PANGANIBAN and ATTY. JUANITO P. NOEL, respondents.

R E S O L U T I O NAUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before us is an administrative case for disbarment filed by complainant Jose A. Roldan against respondents Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban and Atty. Juanito P. Noel. Complainant charges that respondent lawyers reneged in their duties and obligations towards him as their client, especially in the complainant’s right to appeal to the higher court after losing his case in the lower courts. The allegations in the complaint dated February 12, 1996[1] in support of the accusations are as follows:1. Na ako ang plaintiff sa Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 “Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano,” na ang Judge ay si Honorable Severino De Castro, Jr. na ang kaso ay “Recovery of possession with damages.” Ito’y iniapila ko sa RTC Branch 43 with Civil Case No. 95-73739 na ang Judge naman dito ay si Honorable Manuel F. Lorenzo ng RTC. Si Atty. Panganiban at Atty. Noel ang abogado ko.. . .4. Na noong February 6, 1995 bago kami pumasok sa court room ay nagtanong sa akin si Atty. Noel, ng ganito: “Mr. Roldan nasaan nga pala yung resibo na ibinigay ni Tessie sa iyo na nagbigay ka ng down payment na Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) noong March 1, 1986.” Agad akong sumagot at sinabi ko sa kaniya, “Atty. Noel lahat po ng original ay hiningi ninyo sa akin, lahat po ay binigay ko sa inyo kasama iyong resibo ni Tessie Dalusong, na ako’y magbigay ng Ten Thousand Pesos bilang downpayment sa ipinagbili niyang bahay sa akin. Agad siyang sumagot “Wala kang ibinibigay sa akin!”5. Na kaya nga sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: “Ibigay ninyo sa akin ang folder at ako ang hahanap ng resibo ni Tessie Dalusong.” Tumulong din si Atty. Noel, at nakita din namin. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel “Sayang hindi na natin maipasok ito, hindi na kasi pwedeng magpasok pa ng mga ibidensya.” Di ko alam kung bakit hindi niya ipinasok noon pa man. (Ang resibo na nagpapatunay na ako ang unang nakabili ng bahay sa 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Maynila).6. Na noong nasa loob na kami ng court room ay handa na ako sa sinasabi ni Atty. Noel no “Rebuttal” pero nagtaka ako kinumbinsi ako na diumano ay malinaw na ang aking deklarasyon at malinaw ang mga ebidensya kaya hindi na raw dapat mag

“rebuttal” i-waive na lang daw sa Memorandum kaya nga sinabi ng Judge na: “Gumawa kayo ng Memoranda within fifteen days submitted for decision.” Noong March 8, 1995 ang memorandum ay submitted for decision;7. Na noong Abril 7, 1995 sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel, “Bakit may ibinigay na zerox copies ng decision si Robert Montano na aking kalaban “sumagot si Atty. Noel, at sinabi sa akin “Tsekin mo sa court.” Gayon nga ang aking ginawa. At bumalik ako kay Atty. Noel, at sinabi ko: Totoo nga na may decision na. Sinabi ni Atty. Noel na: “Ginapang nila yun, sapalagay mo, magkano ang inilagay nila?” Sa palagay ko ay hindi lang trenta mil (P30,000.00) pesos ang magagastos nila sa kasong ito, yun ang isinagot ko;8. Na iminungkahi ko kay Atty. Noel na magpayl ng “motion for reconsideration, sinagat ako ni Atty. Noel na: ‘Ginapang na nila yun kaya dapat umapila na lang tayo.’ Sinabi ko kay Atty. Noel na: Kung matalo pa rin ako dito, ay dalhin natin sa Supreme Court” para parehas ang laban; Na bilang bahagi nito inilakip ko dito ang decision ng MTC; at ang apilasyon sa RTC, at ang petsa ng decision ng RTC na tinaggap ni Atty. Noel.9. Na noong Abril 24, 1995 umapila ako sa “Court of Appeal” makaraan ang ilang buwan ay dumating sa office ni Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban, noong November 13, 1995 ang decision subalit tinawagan ako ng sekretarya nila Atty. Noel at Atty. Panganiban noon lang November 24, 1995. Tinanong ko ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban kung nasaan si Atty. Noel, ang sagot ng sekretarya ay “Nasa probinsiya maraming inaasikaso doon.” Agad kong sinabi: “Hindi ba fifteen days lang para maka-apila sa Supreme Court.” Sumagot si Zeny at sinabi “Isang buwan daw yun para sagutin.”10. Na madalas kong tawagan si Zeny (ang sekretarya ni Atty. Panganiban) na sinasabi kong nakahanda na ang pangbayad gawin na ninyo ang apilasyon sa “Supreme Court,” ito’y madalas kong sabihin sa sekretarya (si Zeny) kaya’t ibinigay niya ang bagong office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco Centre Rm. 134, 1564 Mabini St., Ermita, Manila.11. Na madalas akong magpunta sa bagong office ni Atty. Noel gaya noong Dec. 1, 1995, Dec. 4, 1995, Dec. 5, 1995, Dec. 7, 1995, Dec. 8, 1995 at noon pang huling linggo ng November ay sisimulan ko ng sabihin sa dalawang sekretarya (si Zeny at Marie Cris) na gawin na ang aking apilasyon sabihin kay Atty. Noel sa “Supreme Court.”12. Na noong December 12, 1995 maaga pa ay nagpunta ako sa office ni Atty. Noel sa Gedisco 3rd Flr. Mabini St., Ermita, Manila. Tinanong ko ang kaniyang sekretarya kung nakausap si Atty. Noel, sinagot ako ng sekretarya at sinabing ‘Tinanong ko si Atty. Noel kung yari na yung apilasyong ipinagagawa ninyo (Jose Roldan) hindi po niya ako sinasagot.’13. Na kaya agad akong magpunta sa RTC Branch 43 upang alamin ang katotohanan nabatid ko noon lang, na ako’y natalo ng walang kalaban-laban, pagkat nag-laps na o lampas na ang panahong ibinibigay ng batas para makapag-payl ng apilasyon sa Supreme Court.14. Na dahil dito sa mga panloloko, at pagwawalang bahala sa aking kaso ni Atty. Noel, at Atty. Panganiban ay idinidimanda ko sila ng Damages na halagang one hundred fifty thousand (P150,000.00) pesos at dapat silang alisan ng karapatan na makapag-practice sa kanilang propesyon.

In his Comment dated August 8, 1996, Atty. Panganiban avers that he was neither aware nor did he participate in the prosecution of “Civil Case No. 144860-CV M.I.T. Branch 25 “Jose A. Roldan vs. Ramon Montano & Robert Montano” and in the appeal of said case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 43; they do not have a lawyer-client relationship because he is on leave in the practice of law since October 18, 1993 when he was designated Acting Mayor of Laurel, Batangas, and during his incumbency as such, and up to the filing of this administrative complaint in 1996, he is still on leave as law practitioner because he was elected Mayor of Laurel, Batangas in the last 1995 election; probably, complainant included him as respondent because he thought that he is practicing law and is still an associate of Atty. Juanito P. Noel, due to the fact that on some occasions complainant might have seen him or they might have talked casually in the law office from which he was on leave in his practice of law because he drops there from time to time to meet visitors from Laurel who are living and who have problems in Metro Manila; and he has not received any single centavo from the complainant.

In his Comment, dated August 29, 1996, Atty. Noel alleges: Sometime in 1994, he agreed to represent complainant in recovering a one-half portion of the ground floor of a house located at 1723 Pedro Gil St., Paco, Manila which complainant bought from one Simplicia Villanueva represented by her daughter Teresita Dalusong on November 28, 1986. A civil complaint for recovery of ownership and possession was filed on February 8, 1994 with the RTC but upon the effectivity of the law expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) the case was transferred to the MTC. From the evidence of the defendant, he honestly saw no need to present a rebuttal evidence. The MTC rendered a decision dismissing the case on the alleged ground that the identity of the subject matter of the action was not clearly established. He filed an appeal in due time to the RTC of Manila (Branch 43) and not with the Court of Appeals as stated in paragraph 9 of the complaint. On November 13, 1995, he received a copy of the RTC decision dated October 10, 1995, affirming the decision of the MTC. Through the telephone, he informed the complainant about the decision of the RTC. Complainant instructed him to prepare an appeal to the higher court which actually refers to the Court of Appeals and not with the Supreme Court as complainant claims. He advised the complainant that he could find no error in the said decision and a further appeal would be frivolous and without merit and requested the complainant to come over so that he could discuss the matter with him. Whenever the complainant went to the law office, he failed to see him because the latter was still attending court hearings. The complainant asked for the records of the case which was given by his secretary. Complainant never returned the case folder to him, neither did he call up by phone, or see him personally. He then assumed that the complainant had hired another lawyer to handle the appeal. He was surprised when he received on July 18, 1996 a copy of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated June 19, 1996, requiring them to file their comment on the complaint of Jose A. Roldan.

We referred the matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation. After hearing, IBP Investigating Commissioner Manuel A. Quiambao submitted his Report and Recommendation dismissing the complaint against Atty. Panganiban and imposing censure to Atty. Noel. In a Resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP adopted and approved the said Report and Recommendation.

We shall first resolve the issue of the existence or non-existence of lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Panganiban and the complainant.

From a careful reading of the records of this case, it appears that Atty. Panganiban and Atty. Noel used to be law associates. However, Atty. Panganiban went on leave from the practice of law since October 18, 1993 when he was designated as acting mayor of Laurel, Batangas[2] due to the indefinite leave of absence filed by the mayor and by reason of his election as mayor of the said municipality in 1995. The complainant claims that he secured the services of Atty. Panganiban on January 6, 1994.[3] It is thus clear that Atty. Panganiban was not an active associate of the law firm, since at that time, he was already on leave from the practice of law. Moreover, the complaint filed in 1996 before the RTC for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages was prepared and signed by Atty. Noel alone and not in any representation of any law firm. In fact from the filing of the said civil case in the RTC, it was Atty. Noel who represented the complainant. Not once did Atty. Panganiban appear for the complainant nor did he sign any document pertaining with the aforesaid case. Necessarily, the complaint against Atty. Panganiban must be dismissed.

As to the complaint against Atty. Noel.The main issues to be resolved are: (1) whether there was a deliberate attempt

to suppress evidence on the part of Atty. Noel, to the prejudice of complainant and (2) whether it was correct for Atty. Noel to refuse to file a further appeal of the case to the Court of Appeals by way of petition for review despite the manifest desire of the complainant to do so.

Anent the first issue.Complainant insists that Atty. Noel’s failure to present in evidence the receipt

dated March 1, 1986 was fatal to his cause. The receipt shows that complainant made a partial payment ofP10,000.00 of the P40,000.00 price of the subject property. Complainant claims that this piece of document proves that complainant bought the subject property ahead of the defendants who bought it only on July 30, 1986. Thus, to the mind of the complainant, the non-presentation of the subject receipt is suppression of evidence.

Atty. Noel denied receiving the subject receipt and asserts that the same was mere fabrication of the complainant. He insists that said receipt did not exist during the preparation and filing of the complaint and even during the presentation of evidence. Otherwise, he argues that such fact should have been alleged in the complaint to show that complainant bought the subject property ahead of the other buyer. Atty. Noel also claims that assuming that the receipt was given to him, the same cannot be used as evidence because the receipt shows that it was signed by one Romeo Dalusong who is not a party to the sale; neither does it appear in the receipt that Romeo was acting in a representative capacity.

A short historical backdrop is necessary for a clearer insight of this issue.It appears that the subject property was subjected to a double sale by the same

seller. The Deed of Sale of the complainant is dated November 28, 1986 while that of the other buyer is dated July 30, 1986. But complainant claims that actually the sale as to him took place on March 1, 1986 as evidenced by the subject receipt. Complainant however failed to take possession of the subject property as the same is already in the possession of the other buyer. Complainant filed an ejectment case[4] against the tenant of the other buyer but the same was dismissed for the reason that “complainant failed to show that he had proprietary right over the property in question.” Unable to take possession of the subject property, complainant filed a case against the seller for the annulment of the contract of sale, the Deed of Sale dated November 28, 1986. Complainant won and the court awarded him damages of P80,000.00.

Subsequently, the seller and the complainant entered into a Compromise Agreement.[5] The seller, agreed to sell one-half of her duplex house which is the same property that was previously sold to complainant on November 28, 1986, including all her proprietary rights over the land, in the amount of P80,000.00. Since the Court awarded damages to the complainant in the same amount, this was set-off against the price of the property. Pursuant to the said compromise agreement, a Deed of Absolute Sale and Transfer of Right[6] in favor of the complainant was executed on December 22, 1990 by the seller over the said property.

Even with the sale on December 22, 1990 over the subject property as a result of the compromise agreement, complainant still failed to take possession of the subject property, hence he filed a complaint for Recovery of Possession and Ownership with Damages against the other buyer. It is in this case that complainant claims that Atty. Noel failed to present the subject receipt. The MTC dismissed the complaint and the RTC on appeal, dismissed it again. Upon failure of Atty. Noel to file a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, complainant filed the present administrative complaint against him.

We find credence to the allegation of Atty. Noel that the subject receipt was not in existence at the time he prepared the complaint or even at the time of presentation of evidence. The complaint was verified by the complainant stating the fact that he caused its preparation, that he read the same and attested that the contents thereof are true and correct. If complainant’s allegation that he gave the receipt to Atty. Noel at that time, and considering the importance of the subject receipt to his case, he should have called the attention of Atty. Noel that there was no allegation of the existence of the subject receipt.

We thus hold that Atty. Noel is not guilty of suppressing evidence.As to the second issue, that is, the issue of propriety of Atty. Noel’s refusal or

failure to file a petition for review before the Court of Appeals.

It is the contention of the complainant that he lost the right to file a further appeal because he was not informed immediately of the result of the appeal to the RTC. Complainant insists that Atty. Noel, through his secretary, called the complainant only on November 24, 1995 or 11 days after the receipt of the adverse RTC decision and was given the impression that he has still one month within which to file an appeal. The complainant also said that he paid the respondents visits on December 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8, 1995, to follow up the filing of the appeal to the higher court but that he was not able to talk to Atty. Noel; that it was only when he went to the RTC that he learned that he lost the case because the period of the appeal has lapsed.

Atty. Noel contends that he received the RTC decision on November 13, 1995 and on the following day, he instructed his secretary to contact the complainant to inform him of the adverse RTC decision with the directive for the complainant to call up Atty. Noel; that when complainant called, he was instructed by the complainant to prepare an appeal to the higher court; that he told the complainant that there is no need to appeal the case because, first, the decision of the court is “correct,” and second, he is obligated by the code of professional responsibilities to refrain from filing a frivolous and unmeritorious appeal; that thereafter, complainant went to his office twice, the last of this instance was when complainant took all the records of the case and never came back which led him to believe that complainant will not appeal the adverse RTC decision. Atty. Noel further states that, in any event, his relationship with the complainant ended upon the issuance of the decision and that the complainant should not expect that he would still appeal the case.

We find for the complainant.It is noted that the complainant has been very diligent in following up the status

of the case. From the time, complainant filed the case with the MTC up to the time he appealed with the RTC, complainant was vigilant with his rights constantly in contact with Atty. Noel. We find it strange therefore that upon receipt of the adverse RTC decision, it would seem, if Atty. Noel’s version is to be given credence, the complainant had lost his zeal and just allowed the time to appeal to lapse. As correctly observed by the Investigating Commissioner in his Report:Here was a complainant who went through several litigations over the same subject matter, including a case of ejectment, a case of annulment of contract of sale with damages, a case of action for recovery of ownership and possession, an appeal to the Regional Trial Court, and he did not seem perturb that he lost it (the appeal) and did not find it essential to discuss the matter with his lawyer for possible remedial action? That is, as claimed by his lawyer?. . .As opposed to the general denial given by the respondent about the claim that the complainant followed up his case several times with his office (outside of the two occasions that he conceded the complainant did so), the complainant was precise in detailing the circumstances which described how he tried his best to seek the presence of Atty. Noel to no avail. There were dates, detailed circumstances, and specific places. Given the character which had characterized the effort of the complainant to seek appropriate legal remedies for his complaints, the assertions would be consistent, that is, that he made great efforts to find Atty. Noel.

We note that the complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision within the 15-day prescriptive period to appeal. As stated elsewhere, Atty. Noel received the adverse RTC decision on November 13, 1995 and the complainant was informed about the adverse RTC decision on November 24, 1995. Hence, complainant has still four days to file an appeal. However, Atty. Noel failed to ensure that the client was advised appropriately. Atty. Noel entrusted entirely with his secretary the duty to inform the complainant about the adverse decision. And the secretary informed the complainant rather late and worse with the wrong information that the complainant has still a month within which to file an appeal. This resulted to the lapse of the prescriptive period to appeal without complainant having availed of the said remedy.

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable.[7] If only Atty. Noel’s position of not filing an appeal because it would only be frivolous has been properly communicated to the complainant at the earliest possible time so that the complainant would be able to seek the services of another lawyer for help, it would have been commendable. A lawyer’s duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice; to that end, his client’s success is wholly subordinate; and his conduct ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of law and ethics.”[8] But as it was, Atty. Noel’s negligence as afore-discussed robbed the complainant of the opportunity to at least look for another lawyer for professional help and file an appeal, after all, it is the client who finally decides whether to appeal or not an adverse decision.

We cannot also accept the reasoning of Atty. Noel that he should not be expected to file an appeal for the complainant because their lawyer-client relationship ended with the RTC decision. First, a lawyer continues to be a counsel of record until the lawyer-client relationship is terminated either by the act of his client or his own act, with permission of the court. Until such time, the lawyer is expected to do his best for the interest of his client.[9] Second, Atty. Noel admitted that complainant instructed him to file an appeal with the higher court. Even assuming that their contract does not include filing of an appeal with the higher courts, it is still the duty of Atty. Noel to protect the interest of the complainant by informing and discussing with the complainant of the said decision and his assessment of the same. A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of the law. [10] It is the obligation of counsel to comply with his client’s lawful request. Counsel should exert all effort to protect the interest of his client.

The determination of the appropriate penalty to be imposed on an errant lawyer involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the facts of the case. [11] In cases of similar nature, the penalty imposed by the Court consisted of reprimand, [12] fine of five hundred pesos with warning,[13] suspension of three months,[14] six months[15] and even disbarment[16] in aggravated case.

The facts of the case show that Atty. Noel failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer pursuant to the Code of Professional Responsibility. We conclude that a suspension from the practice of law for one month is just penalty under the circumstances.

Complainant’s claim for damages cannot be entertained in the present disbarment case as it is not the proper forum. It is not an ordinary civil case where damages could be awarded.[17] A disbarment case is a proceeding that is intended to protect the Court and the public from the misconduct of its officers; to protect the administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important function shall be competent, honorable and reliable, men in whom courts and clients may repose confidence.[18] It has been emphasized in a number of cases that disbarment proceedings belong to a class of their own, distinct from that of a civil or a criminal action.[19]

Wherefore, the complaint against Atty. Natalio M. Panganiban is DISMISSED. Atty. Juanito P. Noel is SUSPENDED for one month with a warning that a repetition of the same would be meted a more severe penalty. Let a copy of this decision be attached to respondent’s personal record in the Office of the Bar Confidant and copies be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and to all courts of the land.

SO ORDERED.[A.C. No. 4801. February 27, 2003]

MENA U. GERONA, complainant, vs. ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING, respondent.D E C I S I O N

MENDOZA, J.:This is a complaint for disbarment filed by Mena U. Gerona against Atty. Alfredo

Datingaling for allegedly falsifying a document and notarizing it afterwards.The complaint, which is in the form of an affidavit, concerns a document entitled

“Consent to Quarry” purporting to be an agreement whereby complainant Mena U. Gerona and her party, composed of Lucila Umali Magboo, Feliciano U. Umali, Marife Umali, Jovita Umali Galicia, P.J. Galicia, Wendy Sunshine Umali, and Aurelia Umali Miranda, allegedly agreed to allow Ronald Reagan Hernandez, represented by Engr. Bayani N. Melo, of legal age, Filipino, of Alangilan, Batangas City, his heirs, successors, and assigns, to enter or occupy a portion of their property in Anilao East, Mabini, Batangas and engage in a “QUARRY” business and related activities.[1]

Complainant stated:1. That I am filing a case for disbarment against ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING of Batangas City whose house is at the back of the Provincial Jail;2. That I am constrained to file such disbarment case for the reason that the said ATTY. ALFREDO DATINGALING in notarizing the attached document, Annexes A and A-1, he made it appear that I together with my brother and sisters appeared before him on July 2, 1997 when in truth and in fact we did not and in the said document Atty. Alfredo Datingaling said, and I quote:BEFORE ME, A NOTARY PUBLIC FOR AND IN THE CITY OF BATANGAS PERSONALLY APPEARED THE FOLLOWING PERSONS, NAMELY:RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ, represented by: ENGR. BAYANI MELOLUCILLE U. MAGBOOMENA U. ENRIQUEZ GERONAFELICIANO UMALIJOVITA U. GALICIAWENDY SUNSHINE UMALIAURELIA UMALI MIRANDAKNOWN TO ME AND TO ME KNOWN TO [BE] THE SAME PERSONS WHO EXECUTE[D] THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT AND THEY ACKNOWLEDGED TO [HAVE] MADE THE SAME AS THEIR FREE AND VOLUNTARY ACT AND DEED.THE FOREGOING INSTRUMENT RELATES TO A CONSENT TO QUARRY AGREEMENT, CONSIST[ING] OF TWO (2) PAGES, INCLUDING THE PAGE IN WHICH THE ACKNOWLEDGEMENT [IS] WRITTEN AND HAS BEEN SIGNED BY THE PARTIES TOGETHER WITH THEIR INSTRUMENTAL WITNESSES ON EACH AND EVERY PAGE THEREOF.WITNESS MY HAND AND SEAL THIS 2ND DAY OF JULY 1997 AT BATANGAS CITY, PHILIPPINES.3. That aside from the fact that not one of us appeared before Notary Public Alfredo Datingaling at Batangas City on July 2, 1997 and we have individual daily time records as we are working in Metro Manila, we have signed each and every document of Annexes A and A-1 before him as stated by him in his acknowledgement and clearly page 1 which is Annex A has not been signed by any of us and the name WENDY SUNSHINE UMALI refers to two persons which are my nieces, Wendy is nine (9) years old and Sunshine is twelve (12) years old and both of them have no legal personality to appear before a Notary Public to sign any legal document and moreover RONALD REAGAN HERNANDEZ who appears to have a Residence Certificate No. 8988196 is a son of Elvira Atienza and is only nine (9) years of age and the first page, Annex A has been written on a different typewriter and inserted to the document as the front page and allegedly signed on July 3, 1997 at Batangas City ahead of the notarization of the document which was on July 2, 1997. In short, Atty. Alfredo Datingaling falsified the whole document and he aggravated such act of falsification when he notarized the same; that moreover, it refers to a parcel of land which has never been agreed by the parties;4. That for such acts of falsification, I have filed with the City Fiscal’s Office of Batangas City a falsification case against Atty. Alfredo Datingaling and his clients, Elvira Atienza, Bayani Melo and Apolonia Bonado.[2]

Complainant charged that despite knowledge of the falsity of the document, respondent, as notary public for Batangas City, notarized it on July 3, 1997.

This Court required respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling to comment on the administrative complaint filed against him. In his counter-affidavit dated March 2, 1998, respondent claimed that the complaint is “baseless, out of focus, an afterthought, childish and in the nature of self-indictment.”[3] Respondent denied the allegations

against him and claimed that complainant had signed the documents on July 2, 1997 in Quezon City and had it notarized by respondent the next day (July 3, 1997) in Batangas City. Respondent stated in his counter-affidavit:The document was already prepared when it was brought to my law office by Bayani Melo and company who signed in our office on July 03, 1997. It was my secretary who stamped my name as Notary Public on the bottom of the “Acknowledgement” ready for my signature, but through inadvertence she overlooked that date July 02, 1997 thereof as the date of the actual notarization. It bears emphasis that such date (July 02, 1997) was typewritten beforehand which could easily be reformed if the parties so desire. So why does the complainant want to create trouble?Explaining a little further, the negotiation or transaction between the group of Ronald Hernandez represented by Bayani Melo on the one hand (my client), and the group of Mena Umali Gerona on the other took place at the residence of Mena Umali Gerona in Quezon City where the document in question was prepared on July 2, 1997, and the parties agreed to meet each other in Batangas City, the following day July 3, 1997 for purposes of notarization at the office of the Notary Public ATTY. ALFREDO R. DATINGALING.[4]

Attached to the counter-affidavit were the affidavits of Bayani Melo and Matias Magnaye (marked Annexes A and B, respectively),[5] corroborating respondent’s allegations. Bayani Melo had signed as the representative of Ronald Reagan Hernandez, while Matias Magnaye as a witness to the “Consent to Quarry.”

In reply, complainant submitted an affidavit, dated April 23, 1998, received by this Court the following day. Respondent was required to file a rejoinder within 10 days, but he did not do so.

In her reply-affidavit, complainant submitted a copy of the resolution of the provincial prosecutor of Batangas in I.S. No. 97-3353 (for falsification of public document), finding probable cause against respondent and recommending the filing of an information for falsification of a public document against all the respondents named in the case, including herein respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling. The prosecutor stated:After a painstaking study and careful analysis of the evidence presented by both parties, the undersigned has observed the following striking dissimilarities on the two copies of the document “Consent to Quarry” (Authorization) which would clearly distinguish one from the other, to wit:Page 1 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 reveals that it has that blank space for the technical description of a parcel of land subject of their agreement; it is undated; it is signed by Bayani Melo at the bottom but unsigned by Lucila Umali Magboo and it has insertions and modifications thereon.On the other hand, page 1 of the notarized copy of that consent to quarry reveals that the technical description refers to two parcels of land located at Anilao, Mabini, Batangas described in Tax Declaration No. 003-00097 and in the approved plan/“Application for Small Scale Mining Permit for Quarry”; it is dated July 3, 1997, it has two signatures of Bayani Melo and one signature of Ronald Reagan Hernandez and it is also unsigned by Lucila Umali Magboo.Page 2 of the unnotarized consent to quarry dated July 2, 1997 shows the signatures of Mena U. Gerona, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda as well as the signatures of witnesses Rosemarie, Matias, Geronimo and Apolonia before the acknowledgment portion; a signature of Lucila N. Magboo at the acknowledgment portion; blank as to the Notary Public and the Doc., Page No., Book No., and Series of.Page 2 of the notarized copy of the Consent to Quarry bears the signatures of Mena, Feliciano, and Aurelia as well as the witnesses before the acknowledgment portion; it is dated July 2, 1997 and signed by Notary public A.R. Datingaling and it is docketed as Doc. No. 3473, Page No. 67, Book No. XXVII, Series of 1997.It has been also established that the said document was brought to Mena’s residence on July 2, 1997 ready for signatures and in fact it was signed there by Mena, Feliciano, Aurelia and Bayani Melo in the presence of those witnesses. After the signing of said document, a copy was left with Mena and the other copies were brought by the group of Bayani Melo, which copies were notarized by Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling on July 3, 1997. The issue now is whether the crime of falsification has been committed by the respondents?From the glaring dissimilarities between the copies of the document consent to quarry and the testimony of the complainant and his brother Feliciano, the undersigned honestly believes that indeed the crime of falsification had been committed by the respondents in conspiracy with one another. The evidence is clear that Mena Umali and her brother and sisters had not presented themselves or appeared before said Notary Public for the acknowledgment of said document as their free act and voluntary deed and that the lots described in the notarized document are different from the lot they intended to be the subject of their agreement. From the unnotarized copy dated July 2, 1997 which bears the proposed insertions/modifications, the land intended to be described as the subject of that agreement is but a parcel of land while in the notarized copy, it describes two parcels of land. Further, had the complainant and her brother and sisters appeared before the Notary Public for notarization of said document, then there is no reason why Lucila Magboo, Mena Umali, Feliciano Umali and Aurelia Miranda would not be required to sign on the first page of the document. In fact, Bayani Melo signed again the said document on the first page while Ronald Reagan Hernandez who is already represented by Bayani Melo was required to sign said document on the first page. Hence, there is sufficient ground to hold respondents for trial for the said offense under I.S. No. 97-3353.. . . .WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that an information for Falsification of Public Document be filed against all the respondents under I.S. No. 97-3353 . . . . [6]

In addition, complainant submitted on December 4, 2000 a list of criminal cases, eight in all, filed against respondent, including that filed by complainant. Four of the

cases had been dismissed, while four others were pending. Most of the cases were for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, estafa, and estafa through falsification of a public document.

The case was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Thereafter, the IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato G. Cunanan, to whom this case was assigned, recommended the suspension of respondent Alfredo R. Datingaling from the practice of the profession for a period of one year. In his report, Atty. Cunanan stated:We are therefore of the impression that, to say the least, the respondent has not shown qualities that endear him to the profession or the Bar. While complainant’s present criminal case against the respondent may be pending, and he still enjoys the presumption of innocence so far as Crim. Case No. 9426 (I.S. No. 97-3353) is concerned, the fact remains that for purposes of this administrative complaint, the evidence presented by the complainant considered vis-à-vis the unconvincing explanation of the respondent, his silence and failure to file a rejoinder, and the criminal cases filed against him, it is clear that Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling has violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, more particularly Canons 1 and 7.We therefore recommend the suspension of Atty. Alfredo R. Datingaling from the practice of the profession for a period of one (1) year.[7]

The IBP Board of Governors approved the report with modification: RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, . . . the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner . . .; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering respondent’s violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility more particularly Canons 1 and 7, Respondent’s Commission as Notary Public is hereby SUSPENDED with disqualification for appointment as Notary Public for two years from receipt of notice.[8]

Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration declaring himself innocent and insisting he had no participation in the transaction. In addition, he denied receipt of the resolution requiring him to file a rejoinder. However, his motion was denied by the IBP Board of Governors on the ground that it no longer had jurisdiction over the case as it had already been endorsed to this Court. The IBP Board cited Rule 139-B, § 12(b) of the Rules of Court as the basis of this resolution.

Rule 139-B, § 12(b) provides:Section 12. – Review and decision by the Board of Governors.. . . .(b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action.

As the provision reads, no mention is made of motions for reconsideration. However, it was held in Halimao v. Villanueva[9] that although Rule 139-B, § 12(c) does not mention motions for reconsideration, there is nothing in its text or history which prohibits the filing of such motion. A motion for reconsideration of a resolution of the IBP Board of Governors may be filed within 15 days from notice to a party appealing. Indeed, the filing of such motion before the Board is in fact encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[10]

Be that as it may and considering that the motion for reconsideration was filed after the records of this case had been forwarded to this Court, we have decided to treat the motion as a petition for review within the contemplation of Rule 139-B, § 12 (b).

After due consideration of respondent’s motion for reconsideration, we find the motion to be without merit.

First. As regards the charge of falsification of a public document filed against respondent, the records show that as of the date of filing of respondent’s Urgent Motion for Reconsideration on September 16, 2002, the same is still pending trial before Branch 8, Regional Trial Court of Batangas City.[11] Respondent claims that although he notarized the document, he had no participation whatsoever in the transaction. He merely notarized the document on the representation of the persons who appeared before him.[12]

The power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of a respondent as an officer of the court and as a member of the bar. [13] Disbarment should never be decreed where any lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired.[14] To be sure, conviction in a criminal case is not necessary for finding a member of the bar guilty in an administrative proceeding. As we have held in Calub v. Suller,[15] the dismissal of a criminal case is not determinative of the liability of the accused for disbarment. In the case at bar, however, the criminal prosecution based on the same acts charged in this case is still pending in the court. To avoid contradictory findings, therefore, any administrative disciplinary proceedings for the same act must await the outcome of the criminal case for falsification of a public document.

Second. The findings of IBP Investigating Commissioner, Atty. Renato Cunanan, as to the violation of Act No. 2103 are fully supported by the evidence. Act No. 2103, § 1(a) provides:The acknowledgment shall be made before a notary public or an officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of instruments or documents in the place where the act is done. The notary public or the officer taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the instrument or document is known to him and that he is the same person who executed it, and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. The certificate shall be made under his official seal, if he is by law required to keep a seal, and if not, his certificate shall so state.[16]

Respondent had a duty to require the persons claiming to have executed the document to appear personally before him and to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated in the document. If the parties were represented by other persons, their representatives’ names should appear in the said documents as the ones who had executed the same and the latter should be required to affirm their acts. [17] Respondent failed to do this.

Respondent also failed to controvert complainant’s evidence that Wendy Sunshine Umali are actually two different persons named Wendy and Sunshine, both surnamed Umali; that they were minors at the time of the execution of the aforesaid document; and that their signatures therein had been made by an unidentified person. It is clear even from the face of the “Consent to Quarry” that Wendy and Sunshine Umali are two different minors, who were represented by a person who signed the document in their behalf, thus lending credence to complainant’s claim that the document is fictitious. In fact, the residence certificate number of Wendy Sunshine Umali is not stated in the notarized document. In addition, page one of the agreement appears to have been intercalated and to have been typed with a different machine.

The acknowledgment of a document is not an empty act. By it a private document is converted into a public document, making it admissible in court without further proof of its authenticity.[18]

The importance of the function of a notary public cannot therefore be overemphasized. No less than the public faith in the integrity of public documents is at stake in every aspect of that function.

However, the suspension of respondent from his commission as a notary public for two years, as recommended by the IBP Board of Governors, is too severe a penalty for what he has committed. In Villarin v. Sabate, Jr.,[19] this Court suspended respondent’s commission as a notary public for one year for notarizing the verification of a motion to dismiss when the fact was that three of the affiants had not appeared before him and for notarizing the same instrument of which he had been one of the signatories. In accordance with that case, the suspension of respondent from his commission as notary public for one year would be proper.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Alfredo Datingaling is found guilty of violation of Act No. 2103, § 1(a) and is hereby SUSPENDED from his commission as notary public for a period of one (1) year, with WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar negligent act charged in this complaint will be dealt with more severely. The charge of falsifying a public document is DISMISSED without prejudice to the filing of an administrative case for the same act should the evidence warrant such action.

SO ORDERED.IN RE: ALMACEN (31 SCRA 562 2/18/70)

FACTS: Vicente Raul Almacen’s “Petition to Surrender Lawyer’s Certificate of Title,” filed on Sept. 26, 1967, in protest against what he therein asserts is “a great injustice committed against his client by Supreme Court”. He indicts SC, in his own phrase, as a tribual “peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice, who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.” His client’s he continues, who was deeply aggrieved by this Court’s “unjust judgment,” has become one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy.”

He ridicules the members of the Court, saying “that justice as administered by the present members of the Supreme Court is not only bline, but also deaf and dumb.” He then vows to argue the cause of his client ”in the people’s forum,” so that “ people may know of the silent injustices committed by this court’ and that “whatever mistakes, wrongs and injustices that were committed must never be repeated.” He ends his petition with a prayer that:

“………a resolution issue ordering the Clerk of Court to receive the certificate of the undersigned attorney that at any time in the future and in the event we regain our faith and confidence, we may retrieve our title to assume the practice of the noblest profession.”

The genesis of this unfortunate incident was a civil case entitled Yaptichay v. Calero, in which Atty. Almacen was counsel for the defendant. The trial court rencered judgment agains his client. On June 15, 1966 atty. Almacen receive acopy of the decision. Twenty days later on he moved for its reconsideration but did not notify the latter of the time and plce of hearing on said motion. Meanwhile, onJuly 18, 1966, the plaintiff moved for execution of the judgment. For lack of proof of service, ‘the trial court denied both motions. To prove that he did serve on the adverse party a copy of his first motion for reconsideration, atty. Almacen filed on August 17, 1966 a second motion for reconsideration, however, was ordered withdrawn by the trial court on August 30, 1966, upon verbal motion of Atty. Almacen himself, who earlier, that is, on Aug. 22, 1966 had already perfected the appeal. Motion for reconsideration was denied by Court of Appeals.

HELD: Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as citizen, to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of courts and judges.

As a citizen and as officer of the court, a lawyer is expected not only to exercise the right, but also to consider it his duty to avail of such right. No law may abridge this right. Nor is he “professionally answerable for a scrutiny into the official conduct of the judges, which would not expose him to legal animadversion as a citizen. Atty. Almacen is suspended from the practice of law until further orders.