• PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES:

INDIA, AFGHANISTAN, CHINA AND IRAN

Mir o

Directorate of Information and Short Term Educational Programmes Allama lqbal Open University

Islamabad

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COURSE DEVELOPMENT TEAM Prof. Javaid Iqbal Syed

Syed Riffat Hussain Amanullah Memon

COURSE DEVELOPMENT COORDINATOR Amanullah Memon •

STEPS COURSE PRODUCTION TEAM

Prof. Javaid Iqbal Syed Vice Chancellor

Qasim Haider Director Information & STEPS

Muhammad Umar Farooq Assistant Director STEPS

Riaz Ahmed Materials Coordinator STEPS

S. Athar Hussain

Ijaz Ahmed Designer

Directorate of Information and Short Term Educational Programmes Allama lqbal Open University

'Islamabad

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•Af

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CONTENTS

FOREWORD

COURSE DESCRIPTION PAKISTAN AND HER NEIGHBOURS: INDIA, AFGHANISTAN, CHINA AND IRAN Amanullah Memon 1. Pakistan's Relations with India:

Dynamics of Relations Reading 1. Z. A. Bhutto Reading 2. S. M. Burke

2. Survey of Issues in India - Pakistan Relations Reading 3. G. W. Chaudhry

3. Indo-Pak Relations in 1980 Reading 4. Mujtaba Rizvi

4. Pakistan's Relations with Afghanistan: History of Relationship Reading 5. Mujtaba Rizvi Reading 6. S. M. Burke Reading 7. Rifat Ayesha

5. Pak - Afghan Relations after Soviet Military Intervention in afghanistan Reading 8. W. Howard Wriggins Reading 9. A. R. Sidiqi

6. Sino-Pak Relations: Sino-Pak Relations before 1960 Reading 10. S. M. Burke Reading 11. G. W. Choudhry Sino-Pak Relations after. 1960 Reading 12. G. W. Choudhry

8. Sino-Pak-US-Axis Reading 13. G. W. Choudhry Reading 14. G. W. Choudhry

9. Pak-China Economic Relations Reading 15. K. Arif

10. Pakistan's Relations with Iran Reading 16.

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FOREWORD

The Allama Iqbal Open University since its inception in 1974 has rendered valuable contribution in dissemination of learning in a wide range of studies through its framework of Distance Learning System.

Now, on the eve of its 20th anniversary, the AIOU cherishes to explore new possibilities by introducing exclusive professional study programme titled "Short-Term Educational Programmes (STEPS)" without traditions of degree-oriented and period-bound semesters and sequence of examinations.

These STEPS Courses are progressive in character and open new avenues for further indepth studies in respective disciplines. Such academic activities are successfully in practice in the universities and colleges of many developed nations. Thus AIOU STEPS provides this facility to professionals and other interested groups in Pakistan as well.

The study material contained in the given book is only to help enhance your working proficiency and knowledge pertaining to the profession and therefore does not entail any formal examination. However, the Evaluation Paper is supplemented with the purpose of self-monitoring at the student's end.

I would put on record my appreciation for efforts of STEPS Committee which made the dream of Short-Term Educational Programmes come true.

(Prof. Javaid Iqbal Syed) Vice-Chancellor

COURSE DESCRIPTION

PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS• WITH NEIGHBOURING COUNTRIES:

INDIA, AFGHANISTAN, CHINA AND IRAN

By Amanullah Memon

T he objective of this course is to give you an overview of Pakistan's relations with its neighbouring countries. It is often said that foreign policy usually begins with the frontiers of the

countriesi . The security of a particular country always depends upon its frontier policy. A well determined and vigilant frontier policy plays positive role in preserving the territorial integrity of the states.

Besides political boundaries; physical boundaries of any state also have great strategic significance. High mountains, expanded deserts and wide rivers always play the role of natural barriers against the invaders. While the strategic access to sea has also a vital importance in strengthening the defence of the country. The Physical boundaries of Pakistan have the following distinctive features: "it has a southern coast line fronting on the Arabian sea", and shares border with Iran on the West, while it is bounded on the north by Himalayan mountains. In the North-West a narrow Waldian's strip of Afghanistan separates Pakistan from Central Asian State of Tajkistan. In the North, Pakistan shares its border with Peoples Republic of China and India is bounded on the East.

Having looked the significance of the frontiers and physical boundaries, we move ahead with studying Pakistan's relations with the neighbouring countries.

PAKISTAN'S RELATIONS WITH INDIA

The former Prime Minister and foreign Minister Z. A. Bhutto once maintained: "India and Pakistan have so much in common that the rest of sometimes find it hard to understand why they are in a state of perpetual confrontation? "The above question is deeply rooted in the "legacy of history, superstition and prejudice."3 Referring back to the history of Indian Subcontinent one can jump to the conclusion that it was the uncompromising and hegemonic attitude of the India Nation Congress which left no option but

the division of the Indian Subcontinent into two sovereign states of India and Pakistan. The partition of the Indian Subcontinent resulted into the loss of thousand lives and displacement of millions of refugees which caused widened psychological gulf between the Indians and Pakistanis. After partition, the Congress leadership accepted the emergence of Pakistan as "a temporary necessity", with the hope that very soon the bifurcated parts would be reuniting.4 In order to materialize the dream of re-union of the divided India it appears that, they created several problems for newly emerged country of Pakistan, few of them are as under:

Shutting off the Supply of Irrigation Water

The supply of irrigation water is the life line for the agrarian society of • Pakistan. David E. Lilienthal has correctly said that "no army with bomb and shellfire, could divested a land as thoroughly as Pakistan could be by the simple expedient of Indian's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields and the people of Pakistan alive".5 Realizing the cruciality of supply of the irrigation water for the economy of Pakistan, India attempted on the economic life of Pakistan by stopping the supply on April 1, 1948. Undoubtedly it was deliberate effort of India, aimed at threatening Pakistan to relook its decision of separating from the India.

Question of the Cash Balance

According to the December 1947 agreement, Indians agreed to pay Pakistan Rs. 750 million out of total cash balance of Rs. 4000 million. While Pakistan received just Rs. 200 million as its share. Indians refused to pay the remaining amount by linking it to the solution of the Kashmir dispute.

Analyzing the above facts one can jump to the conclusion that Indians left no stone unturned to bankrupt Pakistan's economy.

Military Assets

Notwithstanding attempts on economic life of Pakistan they also tried to weakened Pakistan's defence mechanism. Like economic assets Pakistan as refused to have its due share of military assets. Pakistan received only 4703 tons of ordnance stores instead of its due share of 165000 tons, the 160,000 tons remained undelivered to Pakistan. Similarly under the partition agreement, Pakistan was promised to get 150 Sherman tanks, but non was delivered to Pakistan.

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The above mentioned factors made Pakistani leadership believe that Indians had never accepted the reality of Pakistan and alters hegemonic designs caused a sever security menace to the existence of Pakistan.

The Question of Princely States

The question of accession of the princely states like Junagadh, Hyderabad and Kashmir; was an other source of contention between India and Pakistan. Regarding the future of these states it was decided that that the Princes of the concerned states had got the right to access any of the two dominions i.e. India or Pakistan, subject to take in account the following factors:

* to honour the will of the inhabitants of the concerned state, * to give due consideration to reality of geographical contiguity.

According to Mountbatten: You can not run away from the Dominion government which is your neighbour any more than you can run away from the subjects for whose welfare you are responsible.6

However, when the Nawab of Junagadh, who was a Muslim while the 80% population of the state was Hindu, declared his states accession to Pakistan, the Congress leadership and Mountbatten opposed the move of accession on basis of the above cited principles of accession. Mountbatten in a telegraph to Jinnah protested against Pakistan's decision of acceptance of the accession of Junagadh, in the following words:

Pakistan's acceptance of Junagadh's accession was utter violation of the principles of which partition of India was agreed upon.7

Soon after the above note Indian forces occupied Junagadh.

The case of Hyderabad state was not different to Junagadh. The Nizam of Hyderabad was a Muslim while the 85% population of the state was Hindu. The Nizam was intended to assume the status of an independent state or to join Pakistan. According to the established principles the honouring the will of majority and giving due consideration to the geographical contiguity Nizam was not neither allowed to join Pakistan nor to declare independence.

Contrary to the above cited two precedents of Junagadh and Hyderabad,. when Kashmiri Raja joined the India sating aside the popular will and geographical contiguity. Neither congress nor Mountbatten realized that the established rules had been broken. These facts compelled many experts to doubt Muntbatten's integrity. According to P. I. Cheema, Mountbatten not only

conspired against Pakistan in connection with boundary award but also favoured India in plans to invade Kashmir.8 The illegal accession of Kashmir to India sowed the seeds of contention between India and Pakistan. Indian hegemonic designs in the region, in general and against Pakistan in particular have become a matter of perpetual security concern in the region. Both countries have fought three wars in less than three decades, hence, the 1971 war resulted loosing its Eastern wing.

These factors adequately reveal that Pakistan's apprehensions regarding Indian threat are not unfounded. Hence, since the birth of Pakistan, Indian factor has been playing pivotal role in Pakistan's foreign policy behaviour. In the light of historical facts one can easily predict that there is no hope of establishing good relations between India and Pakistan until:

India do not repudiate "its solemn pledge to the world to abide" its commitment of holding plebiscite in Kashmir.

- India do not accept Pakistan's sovereign right of acquiring the means of self defence.

- India do not change its hegemonic attitude to the smaller nations of South Asia.9

In post Cold War times some significant changes have been observed in Pak-India relations such as the agreement of not attacking each others nuclear facilities. Despite that positive signs the controversy on seminal issue of Kashmir

' is still growing to the dangerous point. The nuclear and missile programmes of India are an other point of sever conflict between two countries.

PAK-AFGHAN RELATIONS

Despite sharing common faith, culture and history the Pak-Afghan relations can not be categorized as friendly.

It has already mentioned that soon after the emergence of Pakistan, Afghanistan posed security threat to the former by refusing to recognize Durand Line as the international boundary. Subsequently the later raised the issue of Pakhtoonistan and challenged Pakistan's sovereignty over several districts expanded from NWFP to Baluchistan provinces.10

Afghanistan is a land locked country. In order to reach the shores, Afghanistan seems ambitious to expand its boundaries up to the Arabian sea. In fact, the Pakhtoonistan issue reflects the above desire of Afghanistan of reaching the sea. In November 1947, King Zahir's representative Sardar Najeebullah

visited Karachi. During his visit he made following three demands with the Pakistani officials.

1: Tribal areas of Pakistan where Afghans and Pakhtoons were living, should be declared free, sovereign province.

2. Afghanistan should have access to Arabian sea, either by creating a Afghan corridor in the West Baluchistan or allotting free zone in Karachi.

3. Afghanistan and Pakistan should sign a treaty of neutrality according to that in case of foreign attack on one party other should be remained neutral.

The above mentioned facts adequately support the argument that main motive behind the raising of Pakhtoonistan issue was to make a bargaining point in order to access the Arabian sea.

The history of Pak-Afghan relations reflects that after India, Afghanistan has been an other security dilemma for Pakistan. Analyzing the issues and events in Pak-Afghan relations can be divided into following phases.

First Phase (1947-1955)

This phase can be called the phase of tension between two countries. During this period Afghanistan continuously raised the issue of Pakhtoonistan not only in bilateral talks but also on different international and regional forums. The afghan media kept on busy in intensified propaganda against Pakistan. In June 1949, Afghan Parliament refused to accept the Durand Line. This phase witnessed the incidents of skirmishes between the troops of either sides. In 1955 when Pakistan amalgamated all the provinces of the Western wing into One Unit, the Afghan Charged d Affairs lodged strong protest .against the implementation of One Unit scheme.

Second Phase (1956-1960)

This phase witnessed some positive changes in Pak-Afghan relations when President Iskasndar Mirza visited Kabul in August 1956. That visit followed by the consecutive visits of King Zahir Shah and Premier Daud of Afghanistan, to Karachi. During this period both countries signed the Air Agreement, Transit Agreement and an agreement of Direct Radio and Telegraph links. In the history of Pak-Afghan relations this short period can be called the period of relatively less tension. Despite son* tangible improvements in Pak-Afghan relations, Afghan stand on the Pakhtoonistan issue remained unchanged.

Third Phase (1961-1962)

During this phase Pak-Afghan relations again declined to their lowest ebb. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off /cease to exist. In this short period several air and land skirmishes were reported between the forces of both sides. In the light of these fact it seems correct to call this phase as the bitter period in Pak-Afghan relations.

Fourth Phase (1963-1978)

Analyzing the events and issues appeared in this era, this phase can be called period of betterment in Pak-Afghan relations. In 1963 both countries re-established their diplomatic relations. Soon after the re-establishment of diplomatic relations, as a good will gesture and a confidence building measure, Ayub Khan visited Kabul. During his visit Ayub Khan proposed to form a common political platform for Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.11 During this era several agreements were signed between two countries including Five Years Transit Trade Agreement. According to that agreement Pakistan made commitment to provide trade facilities to Afghanistan suffixing the space for storage at Karachi sea port.

In post Ayub era Pakistan tried to maintain that pace of relationship between two states. Despite some tangible improvements in the fields economic and trade, political relations between two countries remained depressed on the issue of Pakhtoonistan because of Afghanistan's inflexible stand on that issue.

In Bhutto's times palpable efforts were made for further improvement of bilateral relations. Bhutto and Daud visited each others countries. These visits created hopes of establishing cordiality between two neighbouring states. These hopes could not materialize because of the coup détentes against Bhutto in 1977 and President Daud in 1978.

Fifth Phase (1979- 1989)

In December, 1979 Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and it emerged as a troubled spot of the world. Presence of a unfriendly super power at the door step of Pakistan was undoubtedly a matter of great security concerned for Pakistan. These circumstances compelled Pakistan to become a front line state against Soviet expansionism.

In the aftermath of Russian invasion of Afghanistan a strong resistance movement emerged which culminated into a Guerrilla warfare which became popular as the Afghan Jihad. This bloody warfare forced millions of the Afghan civilians to take refuge in Pakistan. Pakistan welcomed this flood of refugees and

Third Phase (1961-1962)

During this phase Pak-Afghan relations again declined to their lowest ebb. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were broken off /cease to exist. In this short period several air and land skirmishes were reported between the forces of both sides. In the light of these fact it seems correct to call this phase as the bitter period in Pak-Afghan relations.

Fourth Phase (1963-1978)

Analyzing the events and issues appeared in this era, this phase can be called period of betterment in Pak-Afghan relations. In 1963 both countries re-established their diplomatic relations. Soon after the re establishment of diplomatic relations, as a good will gesture and a confidence building measure, Ayub Khan visited Kabul. During his visit Ayub Khan proposed to form a common political platform for Afghanistan, Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.11 During this era several agreements were signed between two countries including Five Years Transit Trade Agreement. According to that agreement Pakistan made commitment to provide trade facilities to Afghanistan suffixing the space for storage at Karachi sea port.

In post Ayub era Pakistan tried to maintain that pace of relationship between two states. Despite some tangible improvements in the fields economic and trade, political relations between two countries remained depressed on the issue of Pakhtoonistan because of Afghanistan's inflexible stand on that issue.

In Bhutto's times palpable efforts were made for further improvement of bilateral relations. Bhutto and Daud visited each others countries. These visits created hopes of establishing cordiality between two neighbouring states. These hopes could not materialize because of the coup détentes against Bhutto in 1977 and President Daud in 1978.

Fifth Phase (1979- 1989)

In December, 1979 Soviet forces entered Afghanistan and it emerged as a troubled spot of the world. Presence of a unfriendly super power at the door step of Pakistan was undoubtedly a matter of great security concerned for Pakistan. These circumstances compelled Pakistan to become a front line state against Soviet expansionism.

In the aftermath of Russian invasion of Afghanistan a strong resistance movement emerged which culminated into a Guerrilla warfare which became popular as the Afghan Jihad. This bloody warfare forced millions of the Afghan civilians to take refuge in Pakistan. Pakistan welcomed this flood of refugees and

braved a severe economic pressure despite of its meager economic resources. Pakistan supported Afghan cause and supported Afghan cause morally and materially, by doing so, infa'ct it risked its own security. With tremendous support of Pakistan and other powers including Western world, U. S. A., China and Japan, Afghan Mujahideen succeeded against foreign aggression and forced a super power to withdraw from Afghanistan in December, 1989.

Sixth Phase (1989 to date)

During this phase Pak-Afghan relations have again undergone sever tension. After the withdrawal of Soviet Union from Afghanistan, the warring factions of Mujahideen turned their guns against each other. The Soviet withdrawal caused a seminal change in international order. Soviet Union disappeared from the world scene as a counter force to U. S. A. In consequence of the disunion of the U. S. S. R. several independent states have appeared on the world map. With the emergence of these states a new region of economic and strategic importance has emerged. In order to exploit these opportunities, Afghanistan has become more important state because it is the door way to Central Asian states for Pakistan. The perpetual anarchy in Afghanistan has prevented Pakistan to get the economic and strategic benefits from Central Asia. These interests have compelled Pakistan to play its due role in establishing the peace in Afghanistan. In order to prevail the rule of law in Afghanistan, Pakistan initiated diplomatic activities with a power sharing formula of the government acceptable to all Afghan groups. The present government of Afghanistan depicted Pakistan's effort as an interference in internal relations of Afghanistan. These circumstances led Pakistan to an other phase of sever friction. The recent incident of attack on the Pakistani embassy in Kabul reflects the gravity of the tension between two countries.

Despite such bitterness Pakistan again has taken a pragmatic step by accepting Afghan governments apology regarding the incident of attack on the Pakistan embassy. Pakistan who was reluctant to initiate dialogue with Kabul, now has shown its willingness to begin bilateral talks with Afghanistan. Hope this gesture will culminate into a new phase of good relations.

SINO-PAK RELATIONS

'Pakistan's China policy has great importance in the history of Pakistan's foreign relations. Keeping in view the significant issues and the policies adopted by both, Chinese and Pakistani governments, Sino-Pak relations can be divided into following phases

Bandug Period (1950-1954)

During this phase Pakistan-China relation can be termed as lukewarm because, except modest amount of trade and some exchange of visits there was no significant diplomatic activity during this period. It seems that during the first decade of Pakistan's relations with China. For the Pakistani leadership, China had "little relevance to Pakistani goals and aspiration."12

The question arises that despite that little relevance why Pakistan recognize the P.C. The answer may be found from the fact that as Pakistan's principle foe India had recognized Peoples Republic of China immediately after its emergence hence Pakistan did not want to be isolated in the region and thus took the decision of recognizing P.R.C.

It seems appropriate to say that from the beginning Indian factor has been playing a vital role determining Pakistan's China policy. The other reason which forced Pakistan to establish relations with China was its urge to find the trade associate.

Immediately after the emergence of P.R.C., India ceased all trade links with Pakistan on the pretext of the devaluation of Indian rupee. In September 1949 India devalued its rupee against the U.S. dollar while Pakistan refused to devalue its currency. In this situation India anticipated 30% loss in trade with Pakistan. Consequently India halted all trade with Pakistan.13 In the aftermath of that trade halt Pakistan was exposed to a serious economic and energy crisis which led to an anxious look around for the customers "for her raw jute and cotton and for supplier of coal."14 In these circumstances for Pakistan, identified China as the obvious alternative to India.

Keeping all these justifications, one reaches to a conclusion that the perpetual security threats and economic exploitation of India forced Pakistan to establish relations with China uring this phase.

Second Phase (1955-1956) Post Bundug Era

This era witnessed a palpable progress in Sino-Pak relations. This period which is spread over two years , reveals that both countries did not extend their relations beyond the cultural exchange programmes and some confidence building measures. During this phase Pakistan's foreign policy was influenced by U.S. and its western allies. In 1954 Pakistan signed the Manila Treaty which later became popular with the names of South-East Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). On September 23rd, Pakistn joined an other pro-west alliance, the Baghdad Pact which was renamed as as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO). During this era Pakistan's response to the issues of Chinese concern,

was lukewarm. On several occasions 'Pakistan ment, against. ChirteshiintteSts::liv the period of Pakistan's alignment with the west, Sino-Pak relations were not cordial but both countries Were cautious in their approaches in order to ."avoid a situation whereby a point of.no return was•reathed."

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Phase Three (1957-1962) The Period of Mistrust and, Hopes . During this phase Pakistan's relations with China entered into a worst

phase of mistrust and deterioration. Suhrwardy assumed the' charge of Prime Minister of Pakistan in September 1956. In the sunimer of 1957 he visited the U.S. During his visit he bitterly criticized China and declared it'a threat to the peace in Asia:16 This event created a atmosphere of mistrust which prevailed till the eve of 1962.

During the period from 1957 to 1961 "three issues" says AnWar Hussain,strairted Sion-Pak relations these were:

the Chines suppression of the revolt in Tibet; Pakistan's support for two China policy; Ayub Khan's proposal of joint defense arrangement to India.' 7

During this phase Pakistan changed its position on the Tibetian issue, in order to please its allies. In 1950, When China occupied Tibet, Pakistan adopted a neutral policy, later on, in October 1959, when a resolution was presented in U.N. Pakistan switched over to the U.S. side and voted against China.

Begning of the Change

In August 1959 the first Sino-Indian border clash was reported at' Longju, North-East Frontier Area(NEFA). S. M. Burke has mentioned that there were"no less than twelve incursion by China into the "Indian claimed territory" including Ladakh. Ayub Khan, who was very cautious about the Communist threat from the north, without realizing the fact that Ladakh was the part of Kashmir declared that"it was India's problem."19 Having assumed the power Ayub Khan severely criticized' the previous governments irritant policies toward China but afterwards he changed his stance and adopted anti-China, anti-Communism and pro-western policies. It seems that Indian attitude had forced Ayub Khan to change his policies and follow the previous thesis of better relations with China. Consequently Pakistan took initiative and approached China for the mutually agreed demarcation of the border between the two countries. The Chinese response to Pakistan's offer was positive.

This event proved •a watershed in - Pakistan's foreign relations. In December 1962 Pakistan and China agreed on the location of the boundary and finally in February 1963 both countries signed a boundary agreement. According to that agreement "Pakistan got 1,350 square miles, including 750 square miles under Chines control, while China was left with 2,050 square miles which were already under its occupation."19

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SihoWaktRelations/in Pos t Tashkent' ttlati966:1971) 11,19 iv' .c.' • A. 011 /1.10:1)C;' ; `ifiterif : 'T e l 4 .; th I . . „

'This *Hod; de§pite .soMbileserVation-s iide,''SineTak• relations expanded in terms of .1:sblective politicalrand•etorithinic 'etpoperatiori."2° During this era following important events played significant in developing the understandings betweerrChinwand/Paleigtan.%:4$119l1 ri1i&i1 • - ' -

%int , •i ;,• ; ,; •.•. '1., „Cpristruction pf the, Kara kutam Highway7.,2; . . • , ,China's economic. and ,militasy aid to Pakistane! • • • • PAI,dstArt's mediatory. role.between China, and ;the.U. S.

1.• • ! It •:' , On october 21, 1967, both countries formerly agreed to construct the

Karakuram.Highway from. Kashghar (a Chinese town of Xinjiang province) to Gilgit. On February 16, 1971 this 1-ligh Way of .F.riendship!, was inagurated and till now is considered a bridge to fill the communication gap between the two countries. No doubt this high way enjoys a tremendous strategic importance and a source to develop trade relations between the two countries; .

A significant •deyelopment in , the --world affairs was noticed, apparent between the years 1966 to 1971, and that development was the establishment of contacts between China and America. Pakistan played a significant role to bridge diffrences between China and the U.S. A.. . • • • -

. , • 1971 Tragedy and China's Role .

In this situation China firmly 'stood ort Pakistan's side And supported Pakistan morally and materially. Addressing the Security Council, Chinese representative condemned the"aggrasive act of the Indian - GOvernmenrand denianded the, unconditional withdrawal of Indian forces from .the Pakistani territOry.21 The People's Daily in its' April 11, 1971's edition,strongly condemned the Indian aggression and promised support of the Chinese Government and people to the Governmentand the people of Pakistan. 2 '

Sino-Pak Relations in Post Cold War Era (1989 to date),. • One of the significant charectetstich of the Post Cold. War, period is is that

it caused a Palpable -shift of centre of gravity of international.strategic balance. This 'shift has compelled: the 'regional arid international nctors' fo feasseis their. foreighit policy behaviour. ObViously China has alid 'reevaluated its external .4 behaviour 'hence a tangible change has •been' nOtited in.'Clitria's.'aititude to regional actors in general and :to- India in -partkiAlat.• COn'sequentely both countries began a new phase of rapproclimirt. 'It ik-•nrath- whlIe'to mention that history of trianguar relations 'of ,•India-Chiriayaki§tan, ;reflects the fact that improving Sino-Indian, relations alway, negative,ly•pfte,cted pinp-Pak _relations. In the. ;light of that preposition 4socne • pb§erver§ beliverithat Sino-Pa k rela tions.,are rapidly going under.severe,deprat!ion.- fpwever some:analyst-say that keeping in view the.hing term intrest :of both•powers, whicWarep-bviously,antagonistic,jt would be mistakek to predict Sino-Indian rapprothrnent. would ,be long Jasting.

While, keeping in view the commonality of intrest in the region one can rightly predict bettre future of Sino-Pak relations: 4 jo?

PAK-IRAN RELATIONS•

Pakistan's relations with Iran are a good example of cordiality. Iran was the first country which recognised Pakistan and Shah of Iran was the first ever head of state who paid visit to Pakistan. Both .countires shares common history, religion and cultural heritage. Pak-Iran cultural ties are so deep that Iran often called the mother of Pakistani culture. Soon after the independence in order to meet the challenge of Indian threat, Pakistan tried to find friends in Islamic world. The response from the Muslim countries to Pakistan's move was discouraging only Iran and Turkey responded Pakistan positively.

Pakistan and Iran remain partners in • Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) and Regional Cooperation for Development (RCD). Some experts believe that Pakistan joined CENTO only because of Iran decided to join it.23 While their mutual association in RCD has been proved a most effective and fruitful association. RCD showed commendable progress in the field of Joint Purpose Enterprises which played significant role for the development of the eonomic and cultural sectors of the member countries. S. M. Burke has correctly said that the RCD was a good modle for other developing countries who had desire to achieve the goals of "internal stability and progress."24 After the Islamic revolution in Iran RCD ceased its activities and became dorment. In 1992, both countries enthusiastical reactivated RCD with a new nomenclature of ECO and expanded its membership from three (Iran, Pakistan and Turkey) to ten.

Notwithstanding effectine partnership in regional forums, bilateral relations of Iran and Pakistan have always been very good. Iran has always supported Pakistan in difficult moments. During 1965 war between India and Pakistan, Iran supported later morally and materialy. "Iran came out to help to help Pakistan against Indian aggression with full consciousness that it was helping the defence of its own country."25 Simultaneously, Iran supported Pakistan in 1971 war against Indian agression not only on diplomatic forums but also militarily. On Kashmir issue Iran has taken a bold stand in Pakista's favour. This stand remaimed unaltered despite the change of the political system in Iran. Present revolutionary Islamic government also ,supports Kashmir cause with religious fervour.

During Afghan crisis both countries took hormoneous stand, both shared the suffurings of Afghan people and supported them moraly and materialy. Recently analyst have observed mild tention between two countries on prevaling troubulent situation of Afghanistan. As far as long term intrests of both powers are concerned it would be not misguided if one anticipates that this tension will be proved short living.

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REFERENCES

General}, frontiers are considered synonimous with the term boundries. In fact, "frontir denotes a region or zone.., while boundries refer, to the line marked in a particular region, that is largely acceptable as the demarcation line between the sovereign states." For the detail see Mujtaba Razvi, The Frontiers of Pakistan, Karachi: National Publishing House, 1971, pp. 2-3.

2 Z. A. Bhuito, Myth of Independence, Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1960. 3 Ibid. • .• • • • • 4 For the detail see V. P. Menon, The Transfer .of Power i India, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 384:

Also see, Mplana Abul Kalam azad, India Wins Freedom, Longmans, 1960, p.242. S. M. Burke, op. cit, on authority of David E. Lilienthal, "Another 'Korea'in malting", ColIllie's Magazine, 4 August, 1951, p. Ch. Muhammad Ali, Emergence of Pakistan,Lahore: Research Societ. of Pakistan, 1988, p.114.

7 S. M. Burke, op. cit., p. 17. • • P. I. Cheema. "Is Mountbatten to blame for the Kashmir Dispute?", Frontier Post, (Peshawar), August 12,1995.

9 Agha Shahi, Pakistan-India Relations: Propects of Durable Peace", Pakistan India Relations, ed. Rafiq Ahmed, Lahore: Centre of South Asian Studies, 1989, p. 4.

10 In . this regard one can quote a book, entiteled Pakhloonistan written by a Afghan diplomate, Rahman Pazhwak. In this work he claims that the areas of Chitral, Hazara, Kahistan, Swat, Dir, Buner, Peshawar, Thrall, Bajour, Kohat,Bannu,

D. G. Khan, D. I. Khan, Waziristan, Khyber, Pezu, Gomal, Bolan and Malskand are the partof Pakhtoonistan. For detail see S. M. Burke, op. cit. p. Mujtaba Rizvi, "Pak-Afghan Relations since 1947: Analysis", Pakistan llirizon, vol. 32, No, 4, P.

12 Anwar Hussain Syed, China and Pakistan: Diplomacy of an entente cordiale,(Massachusetts: Oxford University Press, 1974), p.53.

13 Ibid., p. 14. Id Ibid., p. 102. 15 Curium Singh, "Pakistan's China policy: Casual consideration 1960g, K. Arif, ed., Pakistan's foreign

policy: Indian perspective, (Lahore: Vanguard, 1984),pp. 273-274. 16 Anwar Hussain op. cit., p. 73. 17 Ibid., p. 75. 18 Z. A. Bhutto in his work has mentioned that he strongly reacted on Ayub Khan's statement reported in

the press. He addressed him a letter maintaining that:"the statesmen we have made' and 'the entire attitude' we had evinced,we could be taken to have tacitly recognized India's authority over the part of

Kashmir under its occupation..." For the detail see Zulfikar Ali Bhutto,The Third world: New directions, op. cit., pp. 4446, and n. pp.110-112, 115-116.

19 Ibid., p. 176. 20 Ibid., p. 129. 21 K. Arif, China Pakistan relations: Documents, op. cit., p. 221. 22 Ibid., p. 210. 23 R. B. Rais, opcit., p.203. 24 S. M. Burke, op. cit., p.307. 15 Kusum Parsad, "Pakistan-Iran Relations", Pakistan's Foreign Policy: Indian Perspectives. ed., K. Arif,

Lahore: Vanguard, 1984, p.339. On authority of Dawn, 10 May, 1966.

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1. Pakistan's Relations with India: Dynamics of Relationship

READING I

(Excezptsfrom, 'Myth ofIndependence" by Zu!flqarAli Shutto, Karachi, Oxford Universiw Press, 1960).

Reproduced with Permission.

Relations between India and Pakistan should resemble those between Sweden and Norway, countries which had to break apart in order to come closer to each other. India and Pakistan have so much in common that the rest of the world sometimes finds it hard to understand why they are in a state of perpetual confrontation. The dictates of reason, the compulsions of geography, and the influence of international forces require them to live in peace, but their poverty-stricken masses have been denied the benefits that ought to have accrued to them from political independence. There are many reasons for this state of affairs: the legacy of history, superstition, and prejudice. The Hindus of the subconti-nent have borne a thousand years of subjugation and the Muslims have been victims of foreign domination for over 150 years. The mental outlook of all peoples of the subcontinent has been distorted by alien domination. They have still to find their bearings as independent nations. They still need to acquire confidence to break with the past.

To the end of his life, Mr. Nehru maintained that the resolution of the jammu and Kashmir dispute would not bring peace and amity to the subcontinent, because Indo—Pakis-tani disputes were only the symptoms of the bigoted attitude of theocratic and reactionary Pakistan to secular, progressive India. Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained that onlyby a resolutjon of the disputes, to which the Indian Government and Prime Minister Nehru were internationally committed, would it be pdssible to determine whether the disputes were the causes or the symptoms of Indo-Pakistahi differences. It is obvious that only by the resolu-tion of territorial and other essential disputes could it be possible to attain normal condi-tions. It is strange logic to usurp the territorial and economic rights of a country on the grounds that enmity with that country is unavoidable. There is no such thing as eternal en-mity. Once disputes are equitably resolved, tensions give way to normal conditions. The chief dispute between Pakistan and India hinges on the future of the state of jammu and Kashmir, to whose people India is in honour bound to give the right of self-determination. It would be wrong, however, to think that Kashmir is the only dispute that divides India and Pakistan, though it is undoubtedly.the most sigthficant. There have been others of consider-able gravity, such as the dispute over the canal waters, that over the future of the Ganges waters, and that occasioned by the persecution of MuSlims in India, resulting in their emigra-tion to Pakistan in large numbers. Other problems again, for historical and other reasons,

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• have not been properly taken up, but remain nevertheless of fundamental national interest. One at least is nearly as important as the Kashmir dispute: that or Assam and some districts of India adjacent to East Pakistan. To these East Pakistan has very good claims, which should not have been allowed to remain quiescent. India has never ceased to take an unpleasant in-terest in East Pakistan and continues to support certain irredentist movements in West Pakistan. At a time when the Nagas and the Mizos have revolted and thousands of Muslims been ejected from Assam, which did not have a majority Hindu community at the time of Par-tition, it would be wrong of Pakistan to ignore these problems. The eviction of Indian Mus-lims into East Pakistan and the disputed borders of Assam and Tripura should not be forgot-ten. The future of Farrakah barrage and the general problem of the uses of rivers have yet to be equitably settled; and, although the Nehru—Noon agreement was concluded ten years back, Berubari has still to be transferred to Pakistan. Both wings of the country have legiti-mate grievances against India and until the principal disputes are resolved, it would be futile to except relations to improve.

• Nehru's thesis that these disputes are a symptom of Pakistan's eternal hostility to-wards India is as sinister as it is baseless, for it is India and not Pakistan that harbours illwill. Pakistan achieved equality with India in the struggle for independence. The Indian Congress Party resisted the partition of the country, but failed to prevent the establishment of Pakistan. It is thus natural that some Indian leaders should continue to nurture grievances against Pakistan. Only because India persists in not permitting the completion of Pakistan have rela-tions between the two countries deteriorated into their present hopeless deadlock. The philosophy of Pakistan is based on the equality of man and on the concept of Islamic justice; and it would be a negation of this philosophy for Pakistan to harbour animosity towards her principal neighbour.

Muslims ruled the 'subcontinent for over 700 years and eventually succeeded in es-tablishing their separate homeland. Unfortunately, the Indian mentality is troubled with his-torical complexes and the obsession of defeat. In order to go to the roots of lndo—Pakistani relations, one must examine the nature of Indian nationalism.

From the time of the Rig Vedas, the dominant features of the Indian genius have, been its religious temperament and an exclusiveness derived from the caste system. Al-though Indian civilization is considered synonymous with Hindu culture, it has shown, over the centuries, a remarkable capacity for assimilating alien cultures. An impressive pre-Aryan civilization lies buried in the Indus valley among the ruins of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa. It is often forgotten that it was on the ruins of this civilization that the Aryan invad-ers established their new order, which led to the birth of Hindu-Brahmanism. As the Aryan invaders spread from the plains of the north-west to the upper regions of the Ganges, the his-torical centre of gravity shifted from the Indus Valley and the Punjab to the Gangetic Valley, and the Vedic age gave place to the era of Brahmanism.

The Rig Vedas record the existence of the two races: the high-spirited Dravidians, who were engaged in a life-an d-death struggle to defend their homeland; and the invading Aryans, the fair-skinned aliens. The Aryan rulers arrogated to themselves the attributes of Dewas or gods, and the indigenous people were classified as Rakhasas or devils. The caste system was a product of the Brahmanic concept of superiority, which came to be accepted as a way of life. Even the Shudras, or low-caste Hindus, were accorded some distinction from the Malech or non-Aryan; although both categories were excluded from domestic, civil, and military honours in this life and denied Mukti or salvation in the life hereafter. With the ad-vent of the Scythian invaders, Brahmanism suffered a setback. The Scythian rulers were con-

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tent with the nominal subjugation of the local population. They did not establish their own code of exclusive prerogatives in the domain of religion. The Brahmans continued to flourish, bowing before their new masters, but stoutly refusing to admit them within their so-cial or religious domains. At this time was born the great Buddha, Scythian prince. 'All men are equal, and salvation is equally open to all', declared Lord Buddha, to the horror of the Brahmans. Buddhism had to pay later the price of banishment from India. Jainism, which fol-lowed in the wake of the decline of Buddhistic influence, nearly met the same fate at the hands of the Brahmans.

A cursory examination of Indian history reveals how Hinduism has handled the in-cursions of external elements. Minor inroads have been repaired by assimilation; con-querors have been seduced by subservience; and those among the conquerors who have re-mained in India have escaped assimilation only by assiduous efforts to retain their separate identity.

This proud Indian order was broken by the Muslim conquest. The blow had to be en-dured, but defiance was offered consistently in the name of Dharma. The Indian order was not slow to perceive that, unlike other invading tribes, the Muslims were no barbarians to be readily assimilated. They did not consider admission to the indigenous polity a promotion, and so began the tragic Hindu—Muslim confrontation. Throughout the period of Muslim domination, the Hindu exhibited an intense pride of race and culture, which developed into violent xenophobia. All the hatred and fear associated with the notion of Malech—the unc-lean and uncivilized foreigner—were invoked in the struggle against the Muslim alien. Even when the Muslims sought compromise by adopting Indian ways and by marrying Indian women, they could not be accepted as equals because the faith of Islam was a challenge to the fundamental concept of the Hindu dogma. This militant spirit was freely invoked in countless uprisings against the Muslims.

One of the earlier attempts on the part of a conqueror to come to terms with Hin-duism was made by Akbar, but his objectives were neutralized by the sheer weight of Hindu dogma, which prevented a modusvivendi between the two communities. His policy of co-op-eration, however, gave the Hindus the opportunity to influence and encircle the Muslim elite. Aurangzeb thought it necessary to react by reversing the process, but came too late to com-plete his mission. By the time he ascended the throne, the Mughal Empire was in the throes of decay. He had to save the Empire, fight the Marathas, and face many other harassing prob-lems.

It was to fight the colonial domination of the British that a more consistent policy of assimilation was instituted by leaders of the National Congress. In both the 1857 War of Inde-pendence and the Khilafat Movement Hindus and Muslims fought side by side against British domination to achieve their common objectives. In each case, however, when the struggle reached a critical stage, their unity could not be sustained, with the result that the move-ments were suppressed. Neither the mughal attempt to work out a relationship of equality nor the common cause against imperialism was able to sustain co-operation leading to a lasting unity.

Eminent historians, who have exercised a powerful influence over the Indian mind, have elaborated the concept of Mother India as not only the Motherland, but also the Holy Land of the Hindus from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin. This veneration for Bharat-Mata, which isArya-Varta (Aryan homeland), is the central theme of Hinduism, the strangest welter of mythology, philosophy, cosmogony, and religion that the world has ever seen. The

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Aryans, from whom the Brahmans claim their descent, lived for many centuries in the Panjab before they advanced eastwards across northern India, conquering the indigenous Dasyus. The earliest Hindu holy scriptures, the Rig Vedas and the Upanishads, were composed by the Rishis, or ancient sages, in the Panjab.

In the Hindu national consciousness, as inspired by many great Hindu writers of the last century, the subcontinent is conceived as a unity—one and indivisible from the Khyber Hills to the far south, with the North-West, which is now Pakistan, its heart and soul. Geog-raphical India was never completely united under one rule, except that of the British and nominally for a few years under the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. Before that, the first Indian Empire, that of the Mauryas, had extended over the whole of northern India, reaching into Afghanistan and some parts of the southern peninsula. Indian influence spread eastwards across the ocean to Cambodia and Java. Brahmanical religious and cultural influence was more extensive than the frontiers of any single Indian Empire in the past. The Hindu religion expressly extols the concept of Chaptrapati or the Lord Paramount, a ruler who conquers and dominates his neighbours and extends his sway from ocean to ocean. This kind of con-sciousness of past greatness, regenerated by Indian writers to inspire Hindu cultural and political revival, has been the mainspring of twentieth-century Indian nationalism. Nehru's Discovery ofindia shows how the most westernized of Hindu minds fell captive to this spell of the 'essential Hinduness of India'.

The advent of Islam in force in the eleventh century brought not only a loss of polit-ical power, but also outrage to the dominant religion. An Indian author, analysing the reasons for the Hindu—Muslim conflict, observes:

The Muslim conquest of India could not be made innocuous for the Hindus through the caste system. The conquest was an extension into a new country of a well-estab-lished and mature society, with a fully developed way of life and a living culture . The final conquest of India was the adventure of a Muslim King whose main territories lay outside India, but even when the subordination of the new Muslim empire to an external Muslim Kingdom was ended, as it very soon was, Muslim rule in the coun-try remained the rule of a colonizing people who never forgot their affiliation with the wider Islamic world.

What was even more important was the fact that the Muslims were not barbarians at a low level of culture who would consider admission to the Hindu fold as a promo-tion. On the contrary, not only were they themselves the creators and defenders of a new and aggressive culture, they had a fanatical conviction of its superiority to all others, and thought it was their duty to propagate it even by force. Their religion did, in fact, make this one of the essential, though optional, duties of a Muslim. They were the first poeople in history to put forward the idea of an irreconcilable conflict between a particular way of life and all others, and to formulate a theory of perma-nent revolution. There could be no peace on earth, they declared, until the whole world was converted to their faith.

As if that was not enough, the Hindus on their side had an almost equal contribution to make. By the time the new invasions began, they had, as I have noted, completely lost whatever assimilating power and adaptability they had and hardened into a closed society with a conviction of its own superiority which amounted to megalomania. There could thus be no question of absorbing even a neutral foreigner, let alone a Muslim.'

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Fed on centuries of hatred, their sense of injury received at Muslim hands reinforced by religious dogma, all Hindu movements have conceived the assimilation of the Muslim minority as part of their political objective; differing only as to their methods. The Hindu Mahasabha and the RSSS (Rastriya Swaya Sevak Sangh) were committed to violence and the forcible conversion of Muslims into the lowest strata of Indian society. Gandhi's methods were more subtle. He frequently spoke of Muslims as blood-brothers and held out innumer-able assurances that their rights would be safeguarded under a Congress-governed India; but whenever called upon to define their rights and share of political power in an indepen-dent India, he invariably evaded a clear answer. Nehru, with his background of association with Muslim culture, not to speak of his Cambridge education and avowal of Marxist philosophy, dismissed the fact of a separate Muslim culture in the subcontinent. He asked, 'What is this Muslim culture? Is it Persian-Aryan culture or the Arab Semitic one?' The only difference between a Hindu and a Muslim that he could discern was that the Hindu wore the dhoti and the Muslim a pyjama and a Turkish fez.

Nirad C. Chaudhuri writes of Hindu militancy:

Life-long observation has convinced me that there is a streak of insanity in the Hin-dus and that nobody will arrive at a correct appraisement of Hindu private and public be-haviour on the supposition that they have a normal personality. This madness lurks within their ordinary workaday self like a monomania, and the nature of the alienation can even be defined in the psychiatrist's terms—it is partly dementia praecox, and partly paranoia. In all Hindu activities, especially in the public sphere, can be detected clear signs of either a feeble-ness of mental faculties or a perversion of them.

If anyone scouts this hypothesis I would ask him to remember the recent history of the German and the Japanese people when they forced disastrous wars on mankind. No other supposition except temporary collective insanity can account for the Nazi phase of German history or the courting of a war with the United States by the Japanese. These exam-ples led me to the conclusion that human groups, like individuals, can go mad. I have only ex-tended the view to the Hindus. But the Hindus show two important differences in their collec-tive madness: first, their insane behaviour is feebler in expression and therefore less catas-trophic for the rest of mankind, though very harmful to themselves; secondly, it is continuous and permanent, and cannot be expected to pass off as the German and the Japanese mad-ness has done? •

The Muslim League was founded in 1906, significantly, during a period of extremist ascendency in the Congress A key-Congress word during the 1920s and 1930s was Sanga-tan, solidarity, integration, consolidation. The RSSS was founded in Magpur in 1925. In 1923, when the late Maulana Mohammad Ali was collaborating with Gandhi in the famous Khilafat Movement, V.D. Savarkar published Hindustava, a book which has influenced Hindu nationalists up to the present day. Savarkar's definition of 'Hindu' is revealing: 'A Hindu means a person who regards this land of Bharatvarsha, from the Indus to the Seas as his Fatherland as well as his Holy land, that is, the cradle or land of his religion. "Hindustava" em-braces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole being of our Hindu race1 .3 The Hindus were a nation; the Muslims only a community.

Now that the Muslim has succeeded in carving out a home for himself, he poses a greater challenge to Hinduism. Pakistan is considered a cruel mutilation ofBharat-Mata, and Hindu militarism is straining at the leash. Patel once declared that if India so desired she could sweep up to Peshawar. Between 1947 and 1954 she was prevented twice, if not three

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times, from undertaking such an adventure for fear of international censure and repercus-sions. In 1965, however, came the treacherous attack; Indian militarism being under the chauvinistic illusion that it would be able to overwhelm Pakistan.

The Indian leaders agreed to Pakistan only when it became clear to them that parti-tion was inevitable and that they had to concede to this division as a price for the transfer-ence of power from British to Indian hands. Even while agreeing to Pakistan, Gandhi, Nehru, Patel, and the others never really conceded the two-nation theory. They accepted partition as a matter of bitter expediency, in the hope and expectation that the new State would not be viable and would collapse under pressure from its larger and more powerful neighbour.

India's attitude towards Pakistan since Independence is well known. The seizure of Junagadh, Kashmir, and Hyderabad is too fresh in our memory to need recapitulation. It has never seemed to India a contradiction that, while she laid claim to Junagadh and Hyderabad by reason of the overwhelming Hindu composition of the population, she rejected the same criterion in the case of Jammu and Kashmir with their overwhelming Muslim population. In-stead, Indian leaders introduced the falsely applied concepts of secularism and democracy and the hostage theory to deny to the people ofJammu and Kashmir their inalienable rights.

In the light of these historical and psychological factors which govern the Indian at-titude towards Pakistan, it is clear that Indian leaders have come to tolerate Pakistan, be-cause they do not have the power to destroy her. If they could forge this power, as they are endeavouring to do by the augmentation of their military forces, they would end partition and reabsorb Pakistan into the India of their dreams. They have pronounced Pakistan their chief enemy. The whole aim of Indian diplomacy under Nehru and his successors has been to isolate our country so that, when India has built up sufficient strength, she could overwhelm and absorb us as quickly and quietly as possible.

The founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was known as 'The Ambassador of Hindu—Muslim Unity' an the Indian National Congress regarded him as an apostle of their movement. At the height of his career he did his utmost, with all the fervour and enthusiasm of his earlier days, to promote the cause of Indian independence, so that Hindu and Muslim could live side by side within a single polity and find their emancipation under one roof The fact that he failed is in itself significant. Failure as such would have depressed a lesser man. Mr. Jinnah, whose singlemindedness and stamina have become a legend, could hardly have been deterred by failure alone. Experience had shown him that the Indian leaders sought the co-operation of Muslims not as equals, but only as a means to eliminate their identity. For some years he remained abroad, aloof from the tortuous course of Indian politics. Only when approached by such Muslim leaders as Maulana Mohammad Ali did he return to fulfil his his-toric mission. Enriched by his earlier experience, he then adopted the only logical course open to him: exposure of the Congress ambitions to subjugate the Muslims of the subconti-nent. For the Muslim League he formulated a policy of total confrontation, steadfastly refus-ing to succumb to the lures and promises of co-operation with which Congress sought to dis-tract or entice him. He was relentless in the pursuit of his objectives and would not be de-flected from his course by either the sweet words of Sarojini Naidu or the hypnotic dialectics of Gandhi.

In abandoning his advocacy of Hindu—Muslim unity, the founder of Pakistan left us a lesson which has, with the passage of time, become clearer in its relevance. The fact that the Hindus and Muslims of the subcontinent constituted two separate nationalities formed the foundation of the edifice of Pakistan. When this was first propounded as the Muslims'

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political objective, the leaders of the Muslim League Were ridiculed not only by the Indian Na-tional Congress and the British, but also by many eminent Muslims. It seemed to them pre-posterous that, after nearly two hundred years of united existence under one yoke as the most precious gem in the Crown of the British Empire, the country should be rent asunder. Subsequent events are now a part of history. Pakistan was achieved as a result of an over-whelming popular decision, in which the Muslims of the subcontinent, including those who knew that they would not form a part of Pakistan, cast their votes for its creation.

At this stage, it might be useful to examine the considerations which influenced the abdicating power. Britain had decided that it was no longer feasible to continue her colonial rule, but was not unaware of the need to protect her own considerable interests after the liquidation of the Empire. The partition of British—India had to be consistent with British re-sidual interests, successor states being established in a manner favourable to Britain's post-imperial objectives. Through India's devoted spokesman, Lord Mountbatten, Britain suc-ceeded not only in bringing about a truncation of Pakistan, but also in furnishing India with massive advantages against Pakistan. Referenda were held in the North-West Frontier Pro-vince and in the district of Sylhet in East Pakistan. The results in both cases were overwhelm-ingly in favour of Pakistan. Kalat was advised to declare its independence along with the ad-jacent territories of Baluchistan. The British Government, however, took every possible op-portunity to increase the imbalance against Pakistan. The Punjab was partitioned and, in violation of the principle of partition according to the composition of population in contigu-ous regions, vast Muslim-populated territories stretching up to the fringes of Amritsar and including Gurdaspur and Ferozepur were arbitrarily handed over to India. Assam was relin-quished, Bengal partitioned, and India was granted corridors allowing access to Jammu and Kashmir in the north and to Assam and Tripura in the east. In North Bengal, such a corridor leading to Assam provided India with an uninterrupted contiguity with the southern bound-aries of Nepal and gave her access to the Himalayan states of Sikkim and Bhutan bordering on China. In no instance was the benefit of doubt given to Pakistan in the division of territory or its other claims.

In the circumstances prevailing in the subcontinent at that time, the British Govern-ment could not have done more to tilt the balance of advantage in India's favour. The trans-fer of power was peacefully determined as a result of agreement between the British Govern-ment, the Indian National Congress, and the Muslim League; but the manner in which the transfer was effected by the ruling power betrayed prejudice against Pakistan. No attempt was made to provide Pakistan with the minimum requirements for administration, defence, and finance. The country was left to fend for herself. In the maintenance of law and order, the division of assets, military stores, and sterling balances, and even in the transfer of funds, India was given a stranglehold over Pakistan. It was intended to punish the Muslims for win-ning self-determination by giving them a weak and emasculated state which would quickly wither away in the non-Mancian sense.

It is not difficult to see why India has been strengthened in the belief that an isolated Pakistan would be to her advantage. When almost the entire Muslim population of the sub-continent voted for Pakistan, it voted in fact for a Pakistan consisting of the provinces of Pan-jab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West Frontier Province in the west, and for Bengal and Assam in the east, together with the Princely States having Muslim majorities. India felt she could liquidate, in the course of time, the truncated Pakistan that finally emerged. East Pakis-tan was considered particularly vulnerable and so forces of disruption and subversion were let loose there, but India had not bargained on the determination, patriotism, and pride of our nation. Indian economist made a cynical assessment of the economic viability of Pakistan.

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They believed the country could not survive the rupture of its trade and economic relations with India. On the basis of this assessment India forced an economic blockade on Pakistan, but Pakistan reacted bravely. Foreign trade was boosted, the processing of indigenous raw material was undertaken and, having withstood the initial dislocation, Pakistan was able to move on to a new era in which her economy became progressively more capable of with-standing India's economic aggression. In surmounting these problems, it was the single-mindedness of her people that saved the country. If Pakistan had weakened in her resolve, India would have tightened her grip in many other ways. Fortunately, Pakistan did not weaken, and not only broke the economic blockade, but took positive steps to make its economy more independent of India.

Every conceivable situation in our internal affairs continues to be exploited by India with the aim of aggravating our difficulties and weakening our national integrity. It is no coincidence that the genesis of every Indo— Pakistani dispute lies in a definite act of Indian hostility. The origin of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, the events leading to the United Na-tions resolutions of 1948 and 1949, the numerous mediation attempts by the United Nations and others, bilateral negotiations, India's repeated attempts to frustrate any settlement and, finally, her renunciation of solemn in international commitments, tell a tale of consistent illwill.

Her policy of evictions leaves no doubt that India's principal objective is the obliter-ation of Pakistan. The meanest intellect in the subcontinent must now be aware of the vic-ious circle of communal disturbance, exodus, repercussion, and exodus in the reverse direc-tion. It is axiomatic in our circumstances that oppression of minorities in one country has in-evitable ramifications in the other. Moreover, it is highly probable that, if as a result of such oppression any signiflcant migration ensues, it would provoke the majority community, cause unrest among members of the minority community and create a law and order crisis of grave magnitude. India formulated a deliberate and well-planned policy of harassing and evicting the Muslims of Assam. Thousands were torn from their homes and pushed across the border with a complete disregard not only for their fundamental human rights, but also for the resultant turmoil. The long series of communal riots in India have kept more than sixty million Muslims in the country in a state of perpetual fear. In the winter of 1963-64, the outbreak of rioting, looting, and arson cost many Muslim lives in West Bengal alone and set in motion a fresh wave of exodus of Muslims into East Pakistan. Notwithstanding every pos-sible precaution of the Government of Pakistan, there were lamentable episodes in which enraged Muslims wreaked their vengeance on members of the minority community.

The fact that India carried out a deliberate policy of evicting its Muslim minority, causing untold misery both to the direct victims and to the Hindu minority in Pakistan, is a matter of special significance. The objective is not difficult to understand. East Pakistan, which India failed to subvert, was to be kept under constant pressure from the outside. By evicting Indian Muslims they would not only subject East Pakistan to the physical pressure of having to rehabilitate thousands, but it would also confront Pakistan with the respon-sibilities of ensuring the protection of its Hindu minority. This dual pressure was designed to weaken East Pakistan and keep things perpetually on the boil. More than five million Mus-lims from India have been forced into East Pakistan in this process, which has strained our economy considerably and caused new tensions and problems of law and order. The war which was launched across the international frontier against Lahore on 6 September 1965 is a landmark in the history of Ind° —Pakistani relations. On this date India finally passed the

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Point of no return.

From time immemorial the exponents of Greater Bharat have maintained that its political, cultural, and economic hegemony should extend from the Hindukush to the Mekong. Throughout Indian history political philosophers have propounded this theme at such length and with such frequency that it has become a part of the tradition which modern India has inherited. The fact that it is nearly a thousand years since India was in a position to take any step towards that glorious.objective has not diminished either the intensity or the extent of this unwavering ambition. As a first step towards its realization, Pakistan must be neutralized, but ultimately the semi-religious concept of Aidiand thiarat demands the end of Pakistan itself

REFERENCES _

I. Nirad C. Chaudhuri, The Continent of Circe, 1965, p. 63. 2. Ibid., pp. 117-18. 3, Hindustava, 1942, p.4.

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READING 2

(Excerptsfrom, 'Pakistan's Foreign Policy: A Historical Analysis' by S. M. Burke, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 1975).

Reproduced with Permission.

Ask any Indian or Pakistani and he will tell you in all sincerity that it is imperative for the security and welfare of both India and Pakistan that the two neighbours should bury the hatchet and settle down to a friendly and co-operative relationship. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had said:

Their geographical position being what it is, India and Pakistan cannot help playing an important role in Asia.. If India and Pakistan follow a contrary policy and are op-posed to each other, they will obviously be neutralizing each other and cannot play that role. ...This conflict and wasteful effort will wipe us out from the face of the earth.'

Pakistan's first and most distinguished, Foreign Minister, Sir Zafrullah Khan, ex-pressed a similar view:

Pakistan and India. if they stood together, could play in world affairs an almost de-cisive role.... [But] from what might have been a position of positive and constructive beneficence for the human race, they have been pushed into one that threatens the

• peace and prosperity of the whole of South Asia and in its turn constitutes a grave menace to international security.'

What dark force, then, propels these intelligent peoples along the path of mutual de-struction, in contravention of their own good sense?

Nehru said the question of Indo— Pakistani relationship was difficult to deal with be-cause it was a 'psychological thing,' resulting from the way the subcontinent was divided be-tween India and Pakistan. There was 'a complete emotional upset of all the people in India and Pakistan because of this'.3

The Indian statesman was wholly right in describing the malaise which afflicts India and Pakistan as a psychological ailment. But by limiting his diagnosis to the bloody and de-structive character of the partition he was telling only the last part of a much longer story. The traumatic days of partition undoubtedly left behind deep scars on both sides, but an exp-lanation of lndo—Pakistani hostility limited only to that short period in the life of an ancient land at once begs a broader and more fundamental question. What deep-seated compulsion caused Hindus and Muslims to split a subcontinent, which geographically forms a single unit, when, at the termination of British rule, they clearly had the option of realizing the fas-cinating dream of a united, prosperous, and powerful India, after a lean and humiliating period of foreign rule?

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Once one has grasped the nature and depth of the differences between South Asia's two major communities, it is easier to understand why India and Pakistan follow different foreign policies and are perpetually feuding with each other.

Though the leaders of the Indian National Congress, who stood for a united India, spoke lightly of Hindu—Muslim differences and ascribed them solely to the British policy of 'divide and rule,' finnah believed Pakistan had 'started the moment the first non-Muslim was converted to Islam... [because] as soon as a Hindu embraced Islam he was outcast not only religiously but also socially, culturally and economically.. .throughout the ages Hindus. ..and Muslims.. .had not merged their entities—that was the basis for Pakistan.'4

A good seven centuries before Clive laid the foundation of Britain's Indian empire by winning the battle of Plassey, Alberuni, the noted Central Asian scholar, who studied Hindu religion and civilization in India for several years, had found that the Hindus entirely differed from the Muslims 'in every respect. ..we believe in nothing in which they believe, and vice versa.. .their fanaticism is directed against.. all foreigners. They call them mlecca, i.e., inture, and forbid having any connection with them, be it by intermarriage or any other kind of re-lationship, or by sitting, eating, and drinking with them, because thereby, they think, they would be polluted.'s R. C. Majumdar, the well-known Hindu historian, affirms that Alberuni's words 'were almost equally true in A.D. 1800.6

Indeed, it is difficult to think of any two religions more anti-thetical to each other than Islam and Hinduism. Islam is the youngest of the universal religions. Its basic doctrine is

. brief and explicit: belief in one all-powerful God, in Muhammad as his messenger, and in the Quran as the message. Hinduism, on the other hand, is an ancient religion and has no central dogma or agreed scripture: 'Hinduism, as a faith, is vague, amorphous, many-sided, all things to all men. It is hardly possible to define it, or indeed to say definitely whether it is a re-ligion or not in the usual sense of the word!'

Mahatma Gandhi defined the Hindu creed simply as 'search after truth through non - violent means.'8 Many Hindus, however, do not consider non-violence an essential part of Hinduism. 'We thus have truth left by itself as the distinguishing mark of Hinduism. That, of course, is no definition at al1.19 While belief in one supreme God is the central theme in Islam, the Hindu pantheon comprises some 330 million gods in Radhakrishnan explains that all the gods stand for some aspect of the Supreme. 1° Hinduism is also heavily cast-ridden. For a per-son to belong to a caste in the Hindu society he must be born in it. 'A convert is not burn in caste,' said Ambedkar, the well-known leader of 'untouchables', 'therefore, he belongs to no caste."'

Islam, too, sets up a strong barrier of its own. It divides all humanity into two water-tight compartments, Muslims and non-Muslims. All the Muslims, according to the Quran, belong to one 'brotherhood.'12 It follows, to use poet-philosopher Muhammad lqbal's words, that 'there is only one millat [community] confronting the Muslim community, that of the non-Muslims taken collectively.'I3 Quaid-i-Azam Muhammad Ali finnah pointed out that Islam imposes a duty on its followers not to merge their identity and individuality in any alien society.' 4

As a result of the unbridgeable gulf between Hinduism and Islam, their followers existed together in the same land for hundreds of years like two streams, which continue to run parallel to each other indefinitely, without ever becoming one body of water, Nehru cal-led them 'closed systems!' 5

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When the British began to consolidate their position in India the Moghul empire was in decay and the country was divided into countless princedoms. So numerous were these units that, even when the British relinquished power in 1947, no less than six hundred au-tonomous princedoms still honeycombed the map of India. It is clear, therefore, that had the British not come to India, unsettled conditions and strife would have continued for an inde-finite period. But what would have happened in the end?

After all, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries did witness many far-reaching changes all over the world. Several states in North Africa joined together to form the United States of America; national states emerged in Germany and Italy, which previously were geographical expressions only; France entered the modem phase, following a revolution; and Japan rapidly shed her medievalism.

The peoples of the Indian subcontinent could have developed in either of the two fol-lowing directions. Their nationalism could have followed the lines of the main civilizations, resulting perhaps in a Muslim national states in the northern parts and a Hindu national state comprising the central and western areas and the southern peninsula.' 6 Or they could have imbibed the philosophy of modern nationalism based on ties of geography, language, his-tory, and composite culture. In the letter case India could have seen the emergence of a Pun-jabi, a Hindi-speaking (corresponding in area roughly to the province called the 'United Pro-vince of Agra and Oudh' in British times), a Bengali, a Mahratta, and a Dravidian state.

But the British did come and they influenced Indian politics in two ways. First, by ad-ministering the entire country as a single unit, making communications between the diffe-rent parts easier, and giving the intelligentsia a common language—English—they created and strengthened the idea of a united India. Secondly, they nourished and perpetuated the existing tendency in India for nationalism to follow religion; and, in the end, this traditional conception prevailed over the newer idea of an all-India nation.

As soon as the British Government started India on the road to constitutional ad-vance, there was a demand that Muslims should vote separately from Hindus to elect their own representatives. This happened when Local Boards were being established in pur-suance of Lord Ripon's Resolution on Local Self-Government. Speaking on the Central Pro-vince Local Self-Government Bill in 1883, Sir Syed Ahmad warned against the danger of in-troducing representative institutions in India modelled on those in England. India, he said, was a heterogeneous continent in which 'in one and the same district the population may consist of various creeds and various nationalities.' It was not like England where 'the dis-tinctions of race no longer exist, [and]... the differences of sectarianism in religious matters have been mitigated by tolerance'. The larger community in India would 'totally override the interests of the smaller community.' ' 7

Under Muslim pressure, the Indian Councils Act of 1909 gave definite recognition to the claim of the Muslim community that it formed a political entity, distinct from the Hindus. Muslims were given separate constituencies and their representatives were to be elected by purely Muslim voters. This principle of 'communal represeration' henceforth became a necessary part of all constitutional enactments and culminated in the recognition of the Muslims as a separate nation.'

After the First World War the demand for the transfer of greater power to Indians be-came increasingly insistent and with it the rivalry between the Hindus and the Muslims for the fishes and loaves of political power also sharpened, leading to an intensification of

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Hindu—Muslim rioting. As the Simon Commission said, it was 'a manifestation of the an-xieties and ambitions aroused in both communities by the prospect of India's political fu-ture.' 19 After detailing the communal violence of the years 1920-40, Ambedkar labelled it 'twenty years of civil war between the Hindus and Muslims of India, interrupted by brief in-tervals of armed peace.'2°

By far the darkest period of Hindu—Muslim antagonism followed Prime Minister Attlee's announcement in February 1947 that the British would definitely leave India not later than June 1948. The fighting now took on the character and proportions of a war of suc-cession. At issue was the question whether power should be transferred to India as one unit, which was the Congress standpoint, or to two independent countries, which was the Muslim demand.

After trying hard to avoid the division of existing India, the Viceroy, Lord Mountbat-ten, concluded that the movement for Pakistan was irresistible, and on 15 August 1947, the two sovereign states of India and Pakistan came into being. The latter comprised the two predominantly Muslim areas of the subcontinent, one in the north-west and the other in the north-east.

The Pakistanis, having got their wish, had a sense of fulfilment and were mentally better conditioned to let bygones be bygones. Practical good sense also demanded that Pakistan should try to turn down the heat. She was the weaker of the two parties, and depen-dent on Indian mercy for her share of the joint assets. Jinnah, on entering the Government House at Karachi as the Governor-General of independent Pakistan, said, 'I never expected to see Pakistan in my lifetime. We have to be very grateful to God for what we have achieved. '21

But the Hindus of India accepted partition only as a temporary necessity. In his broadcast of 3 June Nehru said, 'It may be that in this way we shall reach that united India sooner that otherwise.'22 Similarly, the All-India Congress Committee, in its resolution agre-eing to Pakistan, stated: 'The picture of India we have learnt to cherish will remain in our minds and our hearts. The AICC earnestly trusts that-when the present passions have sub-sided, India's problems will be viewed in their proper perspective and the false doctrine of two nations in India will be discredited and discarded by all.'23

Azad has written that Sardar Patel was 'convinced that the new State of Pakistan was not viable and would not last. He thought the acceptance of Pakistan would teach the Moslem League a bitter lesson. Pakistan would collapse in a short time.'24

Subsequently, both Nehru and Krishna Menon conceded that Congress had ac-cepted partition to get rid of the British.25 Acharya Kripalani, then President of the Congress party, frankly declared, 'Neither the Congress nor the nation has given up its claim of a united India,' and Patel confidently prophesied: 'Sooner than later, we shall again be united in com-mon allegiance to our country. '26

This deep-seated reluctance on the part of Hindu leaders to accept the separate exis-tence of Pakistan has been a principal factor in hindering reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Almost till his dying day Nehru nursed the wish for India and Pakistan to come 'constitutionally closer... [because] there is no other way for India and Pakistan. '27

The war of succession continued at a mad pace for several months after indepen-

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dence. With its horrible loss of life and property, and the migration of millions of dazed and destitute men, women, and children on both sides, it left lasting scars on the minds of all Pakistanis and Indians. Some half a million persons were mercilessly slaughtered, and no less than fourteen million crossed the international border. Smaller Pakistan, having re-ceived 1.7 million more refugees that India, had a much greater problem of rehabilitation. She was, at the same time, faced with the overwhelming task of setting up a new administra-tion from scratch, amidst conditions of utter confusion. An American writer was amazed to . find in 1947 that the entire Pakistani Foreign Office had only one typewriter.28

The early years after independence, when the wounds of partition were still raw, were specially difficult. Even Gandhi, normally the apostle of non-violence, could not escape the evil spell of those furious days and added to the prevailing tension by some of his prayer-meeting pronouncements. On 26 September 1947, for instance, he threatened that, 'If Pakis-tan persistently refuses to see its proved error, and continues to minimize it, the Indian Gov-ernment would have to go to war against it.'29

Governor-General Jinnah complained: It is very unfortunate that vigorous prop-aganda has been going on. ..that Pakistan is...merely a temporary madness [and] that Pakis-tan will have to come into the Union as a penitent, repentant, erring son. It is now clear beyond doubt that it was well-planned, well-organized, and well-directed and the object of it all...was to paralyse the newborn Dominion of Pakistan.'3°

Indo—Pakistan Disputes

Premature Closure of Supreme Commanders Headquarters—A circumstance that specially placed Pakistan at a disadvantage in all her digputes with India was that the latter withheld Pakistan's share of military supplies. As Liaquat said, 'an army without equipment is as much use as tin soldiers. The responsibility for the movement of ammunition, stores, equipment, and installations from one Dominion to the other had been entrusted to Field-Marshal Sir Claude Auchinleck, erstwhile Commander-in-Chief of the British Indian Army, redesignated the Supreme Commander. It was intended that his Command should last till 1 April 1948. However, as personally reported by .Auchinleck to Attlee, 'the present India Cabinet are implacably determined to do all in their power to prevent the establishment of the Dominion of Pakistan on a firm basis.. ..The Indian leaders persistently tried to obstruct the work of partition of the Armed Forces.. .so that the one impartial body remaining in this country shall be removed....lf we are removed, there is no hope at all of any just division of assets.'31 When the question of the abolition of the Supreme Command was considered by the Joint Defence Council, Liaquat opposed its closure but the Indian Defence Minister, Bal-dev Singh, said 'I pledge myself, on behalf of my Government, to take upon myself the full re-sponsibility of delivering to Pakistan her share of stores.'32 The headquarters of the Supreme Commander having closed down on 30 November 1947, it was Auchinleck's prediction—that Pakistan would not get her share—which was eventually fulfilled, and not India's pledge to deliver to Pakistan whatever rightfully belonged to her.33

Evacuee Property

When millions of people fled in haste across the new international borders in search of a new homeland, they left behind all their urban and agricultural property and carried only such movable belongings as the distressing circumstances permitted. Both India and Pakis-tan were thus faced with the dual problems of having to rehabilitate the millions of refugees

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who had poured in and take care of the innumerable houses and millions of acres vacated by evacuees who had streamed out. The obvious solution was to utilize the property which the outgoing evacuees had abandoned to rehabilitate the incoming refugees, and in the end this is what was actually done.

In the opening years of independence, with hordes of distraught and destitute re-fugees on both sides pressing their respective governments hard, the differences over evacuee property generated much heat and and were the subject of frequent ex- changes and a large number of conferences but, with the gradual settlement of the refugees on both sides, the excitement died down and the matter has not been raised by either side for several years.

The Indus Waters34

Of all Indo—Pakistani disputes, that relating to Kashmir is the most substantial; but in immediate terms the most intolerable for Pakistan, and therefore the most explosive, was the question of sharing the waters of the Indus basin. No army with bombs and shellfire,' wrote David E. Lilienthal, 'could devastate a land as thoroughly as [West] Pakistan could be devastated by the simple expedient of India's permanently shutting off the sources of water that keep the fields and the people of [West] Pakistan alive.'35

On 1 April 1948, just one day after the life of the Arbitral Tribunal, set up to decide those questions relating to the division of joint assets which the joint committee of officials could not settle, had come to an end, India cut off the supply of water from the two head-works under her control. A Pakistani delegation had to rush to Delhi and sign an agreement at India's bidding before the flow was resumed.36

Luckily for the parties, Eugene Black, President of the International Bank for Recon-struction and Development, offered the good offices of the Bank for the solution of the water problem, which both governments accepted in 1952. Moving at a snail's pace, the negotia-tions were not finalized till 19 September 1960 when President Ayub Khan and Prime Minis-ter Nehru signed the Indus Waters Treaty and the Indus Basin Development Fund Agreement at Karachi.

The treaty allowed for a transitional period of ten to thirteen years, after which the three eastern rivers would fall exclusively to India's share and the three western rivers to Pakistan's except for certain limited uses in upstream areas in Kashmir. During the transi-tional period, Pakistan would construct a system of replacement works consisting of two dams, five barrages, and seven link canals. As the cost of financing these extensive works was far beyond the capacity of India and Pakistan, the Bank set up an Indus Development Fund totalling more than a billion37 dollars to which India was to contribute about $174 mill-ion. Other contributors to the fund were