Pakistan Aff

1ac

Stability Adv.

Quadrilateral Afghan peace talks going nowhere – Taliban leaders won’t cooperate

Panda 16—Ankit Panda is an editor at the Diplomat, 2016 (“Road to Quadrilateral-Backed Peace Talks

Uncertain as Taliban Refuse to Participate”, March 7th, Accessed 7/7/16, Available Online at

http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/road-to-quadrilateral-backed-peace-talks-uncertain-as-taliban-refuse-to-

participate/, JRR)

A resumption of long-stalled peace talks between the government of Afghanistan and the Taliban may be

in jeopardy. The Taliban issued a statement noting that Mullah Akhtar Mohammad Mansour, the leader of the group since Mullah

Mohammed Omar’s death was revealed last summer, had not accepted any invitation to return to peace talks. “We

unequivocally state that the leader of Islamic Emirate has not authorised anyone to participate in this meeting,” the Taliban noted in a statement.

Mansour, like Omar before him, has largely kept silent and remained in the shadows since prevailing in a power struggle to lead the Taliban after

Omar. While Mansour controls a large portion of the Afghan Taliban, a splinter group has rallied around Mullah Mohammad Rassoul in western

Afghanistan. Given Mansour’s apparent lack of interest in peace talks and splits within Taliban ranks, the

prospect of a return to productive peace talks appears remote, despite efforts by regional powers and the

Afghan government. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group, which comprises the United States, China, Pakistan, and

Afghanistan, and met officially for the first time in January 2016, was aiming for a resumption of peace talks in March. The

Afghan government, for practical purposes, recognize the Mansour-led Taliban faction as the group’s

“legitimate interlocutor.” Crucially, Mansour’s faction is represented by the Taliban’s political office in Qatar. According to Dawn,

Pakistan’s powerful chief of army staff, General Raheel Sharif, had traveled to Doha in February to encourage the Taliban to participate in the

QCG-backed talks. The Pakistani military is thought to exercise the most influence over the Afghan Taliban of any state group in the region.

With the Taliban’s refusal to participate, the QCG’s efforts at resuming reconciliation and peace talks

have been scuttled once again. The group initially had set a deadline to resume the talks in February, but

the Taliban’s inflexibility and lack of interest delayed matters. With this second round of failure,

Pakistan’s ability to exercise influence over Mansour’s Taliban will likely come under question. Recently,

Sartaj Aziz, adviser on foreign affairs to Pakistan’s prime minister, acknowledged publicly that the leadership of the Afghan Taliban live in

Pakistan, giving the Pakistan government influence over their decision-making. “We have some influence on them because their leadership is in

Pakistan, and they get some medical facilities, their families are here. So we can use those levers to pressurise them to say, ‘come to the table’,”

he said. While Aziz’s statement reflects much of the conventional wisdom on how Pakistan used to exercise influence over the Taliban, at least in

the days when the group was still thought to be a fairly unitary organization under Mullah Omar’s thumb, the repeated failures of

Pakistan-led efforts to realize the QCG-backed talks suggest that influence may have waned with last

year’s turbulent leadership transition within the group. Despite these setbacks, the Quadrilateral Coordination Group will

likely meet soon to assess a path forward for the talks.

Security is key to CPEC implementation

Abid and Ashfaq, 2015 (Massarrat, Professor and Dean of Pakistan Studies Centre @ University of

the Punjab and Ayesha, Assistant Professor of Communication @ University of the Punjab “CPEC:

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan” Pakistan Vision 16.2 Accessed 7/8/16

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-7_v16_2_2015.pdf JJH)

Security concerns have been the most critical challenge to the CPEC and both Pakistan and China

have been trying to meet these. An arc of militancy stretches from Xinjiang to Gwadar consisting of groups like

the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Daesh (ISIS),Balochistan Liberation

Army (BLA), Balochistan Liberation Front (BLF) and the militant wings of some political parties. Most of these groups may not

have an enmity with China itself but rather intend to attacks the Chinese interests like the CPEC as a

means to deal with the Pakistani state.37 Gwadar is the tail of the Silk belt, which will connect at Kashgar

through different communication networks. The security of the whole corridor and Gwadar is a real

concern for China. After the military operation in different parts of Pakistan, the terrorist infrastructure

still exists inside and outside of the borders which will continue to pose a threat.38 The support of American CIA,

Israeli Mossad and Indian RAW has continuously been assisting the militant groups and Sub-Nationalists in all the provinces to conduct

subversive acts-and using terrorist elements in the whole country to threaten the Pak-Chinese plans of developing the CPEC. In the past few

years, they kidnapped and killed many Chinese nationals in Pakistan despite Pakistan’s efforts to provide best possible security. The army has

announced the creation of 10,000 man special force for protecting the development projects. The new force, named the Special Security Division,

will comprise nine army battalion and six wings of paramilitary forces, the Rangers and the Frontier Corps.39 There are major concerns

about the Kunar and Nuristan provinces of Afghanistan, where multiple terrorist groups including Al

Qaeda, the self-styled Islamic State, the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, the Movement of Islamic Uzbekistan

and the Turkmenistan Islamic Party, etc are concentrated. These groups can pose a direct threat to the

CPEC in Pakistan’s northern region. A better understanding between Islamabad and Kabul is imperative

to achieve border security.40

Chinese pressure on Pakistan is empirically effective – actions against ETIM prove.

Rehman 2014 (Zia Ur, Pakistani Journalist that focuses on Security in Pakistan, “ETIM’s presence in

Pakistan and China’s growing pressure” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center Accessed 7/11/2014

http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/381280b226170116bb6f07dc96

9cb17d.pdf JJH)

A strong military operation against al-Qaeda-affiliated militant groups, including ETIM, operating in Pakistan’s North Waziristan area can only

benefit Sino-Pakistani relations. Analysts believe that the ongoing military operation strongly signals Pakistan’s

resolve to fight terrorism. The U.S. and China have equally been pressuring Pakistan to end the presence

of foreign militants operating in the latter’s tribal areas. However, it seems that the Pakistani government

has been more worried about the impact of Chinese concerns on Pakistan’s economic, diplomatic and strategic

relationship with China. With the Pakistani military carrying out a military operation in North Waziristan,

analysts believe that many foreign militants, including ETIM fighters, will be forced to flee (Stewart, 2014).

Major General Zafarullah Khan, the officer in charge of the ongoing military operation in North Waziristan, admitted that many of the militant

leaders may have had time to escape before the operation got under way (BBC, 2014). Local analysts say that some foreign

militants could move across the border into Afghanistan or into the neighbouring Pakistani tribal districts

of Orakzai and Khyber, from where they could later return to North Waziristan.9 After the withdrawal of U.S.-led NATO forces,

instability in Afghanistan could benefit ETIM: Uyghur militants could establish bases there, regroup, and both relaunch their attacks in China and

target Chinese interests elsewhere (Khattak, 2014). While pressuring Pakistani authorities to carry out the operation

against ETIM, China has also started to crack down on terrorist groups involved in violent activities in

Xinjiang (Tiezzi, 2014b). Media reports suggest that this crackdown will mainly focus on religious extremists and terrorist groups and their

training camps, and will last until June 2015 (Global Times, 2014). Experts believe that the recent attacks carried out in China did not need

external planning and local radicalised militants could have executed them (Stewart, 2014).

Economic development is the only path for stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

China is key.

Rashid, 2015 (Ahmed, former Pakistani Militant and a journalist and best-selling foreign policy author

of several books about Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia and Afghanistan Pakistan Security

Analyst. “Can China Replace the US in Stabilising Afghanistan?” Diplomaatia April Accessed, 7/4/2016,

http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/can-china-replace-the-us-in-stabilising-afghanistan/)

Surprisingly, US officials say that Washington is not averse to a larger Chinese role in Afghanistan, if it can

broker peace, keep out terrorists and help Afghanistan's economy. In fact, Beijing has interests that directly

coincide with Washington’s. China and the US are already cooperating in training Afghan diplomats, and the next step would be for

both countries to host training for Afghan army and police officers. China's main reason for trying to stabilise Afghanistan is

that it now faces a national security threat from Islamic radicals belonging to the Uighur ethnic group that

live in Xinjiang province and train with the Taliban in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Some of these militants

are members of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), which is based in both Pakistan and Afghanistan. China is now

infected with its own terrorism problems emanating from beyond its borders and it is desperate to end this

threat—which is why it is pressuring Pakistan and Afghanistan. China would also like to exploit the

mineral and energy resources in Afghanistan that have been identified by the US, but have gone untapped

due to the continuing civil war there. ''Our broader strategy is also economic development—the construction of the Silk Road,

which includes Pakistan and Afghanistan,'' said Ambassador Yuxi. Chinese investments in copper mining and oil and gas drilling have so far

been largely suspended because of the fighting. China is investing billions of dollars in a road and rail transportation

network that will stretch from western China to Germany via a new Silk Road crossing a dozen countries. In early March the first goods train completed a journey from eastern China to Berlin and returned home, taking three weeks. China wants to help

build a route that will take just three days. It wants to build a railway in Afghanistan to carry minerals to China and a

four-lane highway from the port of Gwadar on the Arabian Gulf across the length of Pakistan to the

Chinese border. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif has already signed economic corridor projects with China amounting to US$ 45 billion over a

decade. Economic aid and money is the ultimate lure, making China's chances of calming a region that has

seen nothing but war since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 much greater than the Americans

could offer. The US failed to build a sustainable economy in Afghanistan or convince the Pakistani army

to stop backing extremism. China's economic plans and its need for raw materials could finally give

Afghanistan and Pakistan an economic bonanza and provide the incentive to end state support for

extremist violence in both countries. For any fragile nation state, it's a once in a lifetime opportunity.

Whether both nations will grasp it is still an open question.

Central Asian instability causes Russia War that goes nuclear

McDermott 11—Roger N. McDermott specializes in Russian and Central Asian defense and security

issues and is a Senior Fellow in Eurasian Military Studies, The Jamestown Foundation, 2011 (“General

Makarov Highlights the “Risk” of Nuclear Conflict”, December 6, 2011, Accessed 7/9/16, Available

Online at

http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=38748&tx_ttnews%5Bbac

kPid%5D=27&cHash=dfb6e8da90b34a10f50382157e9bc117#.V4FJwGgrK03 JRR)

In the current election season the Russian media has speculated that the Defense Minister Anatoliy Serdyukov may be replaced, possibly by

Dmitry Rogozin, Russia’s Ambassador to NATO, which masks deeper anxiety about the future direction of the Armed Forces. The latest rumors

also partly reflect uncertainty surrounding how the switch in the ruling tandem may reshuffle the pack in the various ministries, as well as

concern about managing complex processes in Russian defense planning. On November 17, Russia’s Chief of the General Staff, Army-General

Nikolai Makarov, offered widely reported comments on the potential for nuclear conflict erupting close to the country’s borders. His key

observation was controversial, based on estimating that the potential for armed conflict along the entire Russian

periphery had grown dramatically over the past twenty years (Profil, December 1; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, November

28; Interfax, November 17). During his speech to the Defense Ministry’s Public Council on the progress and challenges facing the effort to

reform and modernize Russia’s conventional Armed Forces, Makarov linked the potential for local or regional conflict to

escalate into large-scale warfare “possibly even with nuclear weapons.” Many Russian commentators were bewildered

by this seemingly “alarmist” perspective. However, they appear to have misconstrued the general’s intention, since he was actually discussing

conflict escalation (Interfax, ITAR-TASS, November 17; Moskovskiy Komsomolets, Krasnaya Zvezda, November 18). Makarov’s remarks,

particularly in relation to the possible use of nuclear weapons in war, were quickly misinterpreted. Three specific aspects of the

context in which Russia’s most senior military officer addressed the issue of a potential risk of nuclear

conflict may serve to necessitate wider dialogue about the dangers of escalation. There is little in his actual

assertion about the role of nuclear weapons in Russian security policy that would suggest Moscow has revised this; in fact, Makarov stated that

this policy is outlined in the 2010 Military Doctrine, though he understandably made no mention of its classified addendum on nuclear issues

(Kommersant, November 18). Russian media coverage was largely dismissive of Makarov’s observations, focusing on the idea that he may have

represented the country as being surrounded by enemies. According to Kommersant, claiming to have seen the materials used during his

presentation, armed confrontation with the West could occur partly based on the “anti-Russian policy”

pursued by the Baltic States and Georgia, which may equally undermine Moscow’s future relations with

NATO. Military conflict may erupt in Central Asia, caused by instability in Afghanistan or

Pakistan ; or western intervention against a nuclear Iran or North Korea; energy competition in the Arctic or foreign inspired “color

revolutions” similar to the Arab Spring and the creation of a European Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) system that could undermine Russia’s

strategic nuclear deterrence also featured in this assessment of the strategic environment (Kommersant, November 18). Since the reform of

Russia’s conventional Armed Forces began in late 2008, Makarov has consistently promoted adopting network-centric capabilities to facilitate

the transformation of the military and develop modern approaches to warfare. Keen to displace traditional Russian approaches to warfare, and

harness military assets in a fully integrated network, Makarov possibly more than any senior Russian officer appreciates that the means and

methods of modern warfare have changed and are continuing to change (Zavtra, November 23; Interfax, November 17). The contours of

this evolving and unpredictable strategic environment, with the distinctions between war and peace often

blurred, interface precisely in the general’s expression of concern about nuclear conflict: highlighting the

risk of escalation. However, such potential escalation is linked to the reduced time involved in other actors

deciding to intervene in a local crisis as well as the presence of network-centric approaches among

western militaries and being developed by China and Russia. From Moscow’s perspective, NATO “out of area operations”

from Kosovo to Libya blur the traditional red lines in escalation; further complicated if any power wishes to pursue intervention in complex cases

such as Syria. Potential escalation resulting from local conflict, following a series of unpredictable second

and third order consequences, makes Makarov’s comments seem more understandable; it is not so much a

portrayal of Russia surrounded by “enemies,” as a recognition that, with weak conventional Armed Forces, in certain crises Moscow may have

few options at its disposal (Interfax, November 17). There is also the added complication of a possibly messy aftermath

of the US and NATO drawdown from Afghanistan and signs that the Russian General Staff takes Central

Asian security much more seriously in this regard. The General Staff cannot know whether the threat environment in the

region may suddenly change. Makarov knows the rather limited conventional military power Russia currently

possesses, which may compel early nuclear first use likely involving sub-strategic weapons, in an effort to

“de-escalate” an escalating conflict close to Russia’s borders. Moscow no longer primarily fears a theoretical threat of

facing large armies on its western or eastern strategic axes; instead the information-era reality is that smaller-scale intervention in areas vital to its

strategic interests may bring the country face-to-face with a network-centric adversary capable of rapidly exploiting its conventional weaknesses.

As Russia plays catch-up in this technological and revolutionary shift in modern warfare capabilities, the

age-old problem confronts the General Staff: the fastest to act is the victor (See EDM, December 1). Consequently,

Makarov once again criticized the domestic defense industry for offering the military inferior quality weapons systems. Yet, as speed and

harnessing C4ISR (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance) become increasingly

decisive factors in modern warfare, the risks for conflict escalation demand careful attention – especially when the

disparate actors possess varied capabilities. Unlike other nuclear powers, Russia has to consider the

proximity of several nuclear actors close to its borders. In the coming decade and beyond, Moscow may pursue dialogue with

other nuclear actors on the nature of conflict escalation and de-escalation. However, with a multitude of variables at play ranging

from BMD, US Global Strike capabilities, uncertainty surrounding the “reset” and the emergence of an

expanded nuclear club, and several potential sources of instability and conflict, any dialogue must

consider escalation in its widest possible context. Makarov’s message during his presentation, as far as the nuclear issue is

concerned, was therefore a much tougher bone than the old dogs of the Cold War would wish to chew on.

Pakistan stability is key to combat the export of global terrorism.

Smith, 2011 (Paul J., Prof. of National Security Affairs @ US Naval War College “The China–

Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the “War on Terrorism”” Asian Affairs: An

American Review 38:4 Taylor and Francis

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291 JJH)

Nevertheless, in July 2010, the newly elected British Prime Minister David Cameron made several blunt remarks regarding Pakistan’s

relationship to terrorism. Specifically, he asserted that Pakistan should not be allowed to “promote the export of terror,

whether to India, Afghanistan or anywhere else in the world.”87 Cameron’s statement, while controversial in Pakistan,

captured sentiments that can be quietly heard within police and intelligence agencies in Europe and North America, particularly as an

alarmingly high percentage of major terrorist plots uncovered in Europe or the United States have some

linkage to Pakistan.88 Moreover, Pakistan itself is a victim of terrorist violence perpetrated by various

domestic militant groups. From January 1, 2010, to December 31, 2010, Pakistan experienced 1,032 terrorist attacks (with 1,680 persons

killed and 3,561 persons wounded), placing it third globally (after Afghanistan and Iraq) on the list of countries with the highest incidences of

terrorist violence.89 Admiral Mike Mullen stated that “the border area between Pakistan and Afghanistan is

the epicenter of global terrorism .”90 Similarly, a U.S. Congressional Research Service report highlighted

the fact that the “increase in Islamist extremism and militancy in Pakistan is a central U.S. foreign policy

concern.”91 Few events highlight the severity of the terrorism challenge emanating from Pakistan as well

as the November 2008 attacks in Mumbai, in which a ten-man terrorist squad launched a nighttime maritime attack on the city,

killing more than 179 people over a two-day period. Subsequent investigations indicated that the attack had been coordinated from Pakistan using

satellite telephones. When U.S. officials detained Pakistani-American David Headley in a routine immigration

inspection at the Chicago airport, they unwittingly unraveled a key part of the Mumbai attack. Headley

had conducted surveillance in India on behalf of Lashkare-Taiba, the group believed to have directed the

attacks.92 Even more disturbing were subsequent press reports that appeared to implicate Pakistani

intelligence officials in the plot. Headley reported attending “dozens of meetings” with officials from the

ISI and representatives from Lashkar-e-Taiba.93 Headley also reported carrying two memory sticks for his digital camera that

were used to conduct surveillance in India on future targets. He allegedly provided one stick to his Lashkar-e-Taiba handlers and the other to the

ISI representative.94 The Headley revelations appeared to confirm what many scholars had asserted for years:

official (albeit clandestine) support for Islamist militancy is ingrained in Pakistan’s military and

intelligence culture.95 Husain Haqqani, Pakistan’s current ambassador to the United States, wrote in 2004 (prior to

his current post) that “Pakistan has looked upon militant Islam as a strategic option for at least three decades,

going back to the Bangladesh war with India in 1971.”96 Such an option was apparently being exercised in the July 7, 2008,

bombing of the Indian embassy in Kabul, Afghanistan, an attack that was later attributed by the U.S. government to Pakistan’s intelligence

service.97 U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne Patterson reportedly stated that there was “no chance” that Pakistan’s military would withdraw its

covert support for militant groups targeting Afghanistan and India, despite the provision of billions of dollars in U.S. aid to Islamabad.98

A successful nuclear terrorist attack results in massive proliferation and global

nuclear war

Frank 5/9/2013 (Forrest, research associate at Naval War College, “NUCLEAR TERRORISM AND

THE ESCALATION OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT,” Accessed 7/10/16

https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:Ww-5IEL-

O9UJ:https://www.usnwc.edu/getattachment/9508e128-a340-4760-8666-5192428cdb15/Nuclear-

Terrorism-and-the-Escalation-of-Internatio.aspx+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us JJH)

The use of military force in response to nuclear terrorism by the victim state cannot be overlooked.

Military force could be deployed against the same wide variety of states noted above. The range of military actions that

could be undertaken could vary greatly from minimum efforts to close the border between the victim state and its neigh- bors to more drastic

actions. These actions might include some or all of the following: interdiction of terrorist infil- tration routes; attacks on

terrorist base camps; .embargo or blockade of states aiding terrorists or permitting terrorists to operate from their territories; attacks

on the civilian population of other states roughly equaling the destruction caused by a nuclear terrorist act;

destruction of other states' nuclear facilities; o r even a full-scale invasion and occupation of other states in

reprisal for nuclear terrorism It is clear that acts undertaken by the victim state toward other states would have

profound effects on international order . The military actions described above would be sufficient to

unleash a major war , depending on the states directly involved and the strength of their respective alliance systems. Incidents of

nuclear terrorism involving materials nominally under international safeguards would automatically raise very serious

questions about the reli- ability of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards on nuclear materials. IAEA inspection of

national nuclear materials accounts, the primary safeguard against diversion of nuclear materials, that fail to detect the diver- sion of nuclear

materials subsequently thought to have been used in the com- mission of a nuclear terrorist act may raise very grave questions about the entire

safeguards system. Such questions once raised would be very hard to quiet, hence weakening the IAEA's ability to

perform its critical function of verifying the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.29 Nuclear terrorism may also raise a number of

problems relating to the obligations assumed by the nuclear weapon states in their adherence to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty- Security

Council Resolution 255, (19 June 1968).3 0 The nuclear weapon states might find themselves in a posi- tion of direct confrontation with one

another because of demands on the part of the government of the state attacked by nuclear terrorists for assistance. Furthermore, use of nuclear

terrorism by a group claiming the status of a state, i.e., a liberation movement, might cause major political problems.in relations among the

nuclear weapon states, as well as between the nuclear weapon states and nonnuclear weapon states. Successful nuclear terrorism

might also give rise to more general security states would become concerned about nuclear terrorism and

might undertake actions that could easily be misinterpreted by other, potential adversaries. Successful

nuclear terrorism in one part of the world might be an invitation to terrorists in other parts of the world to

use nuclear explosive devices, radiologi- cal weapons, or attacks on nuclear facilities as an effective, spectacular means of achieving

political and eco· nomic objectives. Government leaders might conceivably be faced with a new set of dominoes-

nuclear facilities, sources of radioactive materials, or sources of fissionable materials. In surveying the political conse· quences of nuclear

terrorism, it becomes clear that nuclear terrorism creates problems which, in turn, may be more destructive over the long

term than the act of nuclear terrorism itself. Initiation of hostilities between two or more states as the result of a catalytic nuclear terrorist

act ought to be an outcome over which great efforts would be ex- pended in an effort to avoid it. Unfortunately, little attention has

been paid to the problem of limiting the escalation of conflict arising from nuclear terrorism. We now turn to

some possible steps that might be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, or multilaterally by nations of the world to avoid the "worst case" outcome of a

nuclear terrorism incident.

Scenario 2: CPEC

CPEC is key to integrate Xinjiang

The Indian Express, 4/18/2016 (“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pakistan’s road of high

hopes” Accessed 7/5/16 http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/cpec-pakistan-china-nawaz-sharif-xi-

jinping-2758111/ JJH)

Much more than what there is for Pakistan, many feel. The CPEC is part of China’s larger regional transnational ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR)

initiative, whose two arms are the land-based New Silk Road and the 21st century Maritime Silk Road, using which Beijing aims to create a Silk

Road Economic Belt sprawled over a large patch of Asia and eastern Europe, and crisscrossed by a web of transport, energy supply and

telecommunications lines. Gwadar lies close to the Strait of Hormuz, a key oil shipping lane. It could open up an energy and trade

corridor from the Gulf across Pakistan to western China, that could also be used by the Chinese Navy. The CPEC will

give China land access to the Indian Ocean, cutting the nearly 13,000 km sea voyage from Tianjin to the Persian Gulf through the

Strait of Malacca and around India, to a mere 2,000 km road journey from Kashgar to Gwadar. The development of Kashgar as a

trade terminus will reduce the isolation of the restive Xinjiang province, deepen its engagement with

the rest of China, and raise its potential for tourism and investment. Central Asian republics are keen to

plug their infrastructure networks to the CPEC — this will allow them access to the Indian Ocean, while

contributing to the OBOR initiative. For Chinese companies, the massive scale of the CPEC provides investment

opportunities for several years to come. As per the terms of the agreement, they will be able to operate the projects as

profit-making entities, Reuters reported. The China Development Bank and the Industrial and Commercial Bank of China Ltd, one of

China’s ‘Big Four’ state-owned commercial banks, will loan funds to the companies, who will invest in the projects as commercial ventures.

Major Chinese companies investing in Pakistan’s energy sector will include China’s Three Gorges Corp., which built the world’s biggest hydro

power scheme, and China Power International Development Ltd.

Lack of Xinjaing integration causes CCP collapse.

Devary, 10/2/2014 (Scott, Master’s of Arts in International Relations and Diplomacy from Seton Hall,

“The Approaching Xinjiang Crisis Point” The Diplomat Accessed 7/10/16

http://thediplomat.com/2014/10/the-approaching-xinjiang-crisis-point/ JJH)

“China Executes 8 Convicted on Terrorism Charges,” the headline reads. It is a succinct, eye-grabbing statement that causes me to pause. As I finish the byline, I

recognize an all-too familiar pattern in the Chinese justice system. Where the Uighur ethnic minority are concerned, excessive force and an opaque sense of

impartiality are the rule. Official Chinese news sources read off charges linking the men to violent and dangerous separatist activities. The Tiananmen Square attack

from the end of October in 2013 that left five dead and twenty-nine injured is laid at the feet of one of the men, an alleged mastermind, but the response by the state

rings hollow and the reason is a complicated one. The Uighur separatism issue is far from solved, and the threat of domestic terrorism still

looms large in Xinjiang. For Western observers, Chinese domestic security policy has never had the appearance of justice or finesse, due largely in part

to restrictions on a free press in matters important to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Law and order are important to every state, but a functioning justice system

must rely on transparency and citizens’ rights as much as the guarantee of punitive action against a society’s worst offenders. One need only review the complex and

controversial history of the CCP’s claims to the Xinjiang and Tibet Autonomous Regions to recognize that the law and public good have been capriciously applied in

the CCP’s recent past. This relative inconsistency in the use of force and treatment of citizens’ rights belies one of

the central failings of Beijing’s policy regarding the violence of the Uighur separatist movement in

Xinjiang: Overzealous use of force from a variety of official and unofficial agencies in the region only

hinders the CCP leadership’s goal of a pacification. Despite this inconsistency, these events can give

foreign analysts insight into what means the CCP is willing to take to maintain its rule – and how far it is

willing to go. At the very least, they reveal how adaptable and responsive the central party apparatus is at dealing with such a nebulous security threat. The use

of force in domestic police action within China is difficult to fully conceptualize for the Western observer, whose political systems are usually based on the idea of

political costs and finite political capital. How does one assess political costs for an arcane single-party system with state-run and officially-sanctioned public news

bureaus? There can be no doubt that there are internal power struggles: Competition over resources and policy preferences and priorities must surely exist within the

closed doors of the CCP. Ascertaining how much compromise, bargaining, and public influence are weighed by

policy elites remains difficult, however. This is why the Uighur separatism issue is becoming more

important and warrants greater scrutiny from foreign policy and academic circles. It is a litmus test to

see how far the CCP and its leaders are willing to go in resolving a perceived internal existential threat

in either direction: citizen rights reform or increasingly draconian security measures. Complex History Uighurs are

the plurality in the western Xinjiang Province, which covers roughly one sixth of China’s territory: 47 percent of the population, with Han Chinese accounting for 38

percent. This is significant when considering just how important Xinjiang may become to China. Being the largest region within China, and a considerable energy

resource base (Xinjiang is home to the Tarim basin, one of China’s largest potential domestic energy development sites according to Sinopec and PetroChina

estimations). This information can be readily found in the first paragraph of virtually every news story in Western media discussing the recent surge in violence and

ethnic strife in the region. What these pieces fail to discuss further when acknowledging the approximately 300 dead Han Chinese and Uighurs are the changes in

Chinese domestic security apparatus within their cities. They ignore the complex history of Xinjiang’s annexation in 1949, the policies of the Xinjiang Production and

Construction Corps (a quasi-military body in charge of both peacekeeping and infrastructure development for the region empowered by the PLA), and the relative

disparities in resource extraction to development and income the Uighurs face versus their Han Chinese counterparts in the region. China’s hold on Xinjiang has not

always been as consistent as in the last six decades. The Uighur population has never been compliant with Han dominion, with a variety of uprisings and violent

incidents since the annexation of Xinjiang in the 18th century. Moreover, during the 19th century, Uighur Chieftain Yakub Beg led a fierce uprising against the Qing

dynasty rulers for twenty-two years, even gaining foreign support and trade from Tsarist Russia and the British Empire at the time. Additionally, the Uighurs

established an independent state of Eastern Turkestan Republic in the 1930s, which lasted until Communist forces reoccupied the western province at the end of the

Chinese Civil War in 1949. During the early years of communist rule, the establishment of the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps led to a quasi-military

body being in charge of the region’s security and economic development. Performing a hybrid role of economic planning, construction, infrastructure management,

and militia, the XPCC, although technically a civilian bureaucracy, was instructed to remain armed at a time when China feared border incursions and an escalation of

tensions with the Soviet Union. Although it was temporarily dissolved by Mao Zedong in 1975, it was reestablished by Deng Xiaopeng in 1981 and continues to be a

powerful economic and kinetic security body in the region. Tellingly, Han Chinese largely fill the XPCC and exclude the local Uighur population from economic and

security policy development. Complicating the reputation of communist rule in Xinjiang are controversial policies such as virtual slave labor (Kuomintang nationalist

troops captured during the civil war and being sent to the west to civilize and transform the desert into arable farmland) and the relocation of the “Shanghai Girls”

during the Cultural Revolution which, under the auspices of resettling urban Chinese to rural areas, is viewed by many historians as a means of pacifying the colonial

Han by providing them with brides. Modern Uighur resistance to Han dominion over Xinjiang is peculiarly

murky. It involves both legitimate appeals for human rights, and violent extremism and terrorism. The

varying separatist political factions have received training and material support throughout Central Asia

and from sympathetic extremist organizations, performing bombings, leading bloody riots that leave

hundreds dead or injured, and assassinating local officials. These insurgency tactics complicate domestic

security policy for Beijing, and of special consideration is the Uighur émigré population, of whom there are approximately one million worldwide,

according to Chien-Peng Chung. Chung wrote in 2002 that “Beijing fears them nevertheless, because the mere possibility that

they may cause disruption creates an impression of instability in Xinjiang and dampens foreign

investment.” At the time, Xinjiang’s economic and civil infrastructure were considerably less developed. Twelve years later, with greater economic investment,

energy resources, commodity production, and Han migration the Uighur separatist threat has even more potential to disrupt Beijing’s interests. Chung asserted that the

impact on investment and development in the region of the physical threat would be of primary interest for the CCP in 2002, but economic growth (although of

considerable value to the central party for maintaining its leadership mandate) is only half the equation. Beijing knows that a Han pogrom against the Uighur minority,

even despite the continued terrorist threat, would have drastic consequences for the CCP both economically and politically. The other major threat to

Beijing is the continued physical threat the Uighur separatists represent to territorial unity for China.

Losing control of territory, especially territory as valuable as Xinjiang, is a particularly troublesome

concept for the CCP leadership, and very likely an existential threat to the party’s leadership

mandate . Consider the psychology that has undergird the CCP since the fall of the last imperial dynasty: fear of foreign aggression and dominance over China,

dissolution of China as a single entity into separate states, and civil war. Henry Kissinger’s 2011 On China summarizes this psychology well in an eminently readable

text, but a separatist group that is consistently able to secure training and material support from outside China

and is able to consistently wage a violent opposition to Beijing is a very serious threat to the CCP’s image

of absolute control, and its ability to provide the best leadership possible for its civilian population. Uighur

separatists have been able to provoke radical domestic security measures from Beijing that apply to its own Han majority as well: long lines for security check points

to ride the subway, armed paramilitary police patrols, and helicopters in the skies of Beijing are just the first of costly security measures that change the way the

average Chinese citizen is affected by the separatist movement. Removing the insulation of the general Han populace from the fight in the remote western province

has only further increased public scrutiny on the CCP’s domestic security policy. A popular Sina Weibo commentator blogged, “the terrorists have achieved their

goals, in part. Increase the costs of law enforcement, reduce social efficiency, and raise public tensions.” A further complication comes from slowing GDP growth. A

decline in annual economic growth of even a few percentage points is no small matter for the CCP leadership. Beijing has a vested interest in making sure its control

is perceived as absolute (as well as competent) in order to maintain the party’s position at the head of Chinese society. On the subject of competence: Beijing’s

draconian and paternalistic methods for dealing with the Uighur threat have been ineffective in curtailing the violence. Consider the more recent security policy

decisions. Beijing has used a number of different tactics to quell disruption in the region at each instance of violence. The Chinese security forces have monitored and

cut off Internet and communications infrastructure for the Uighur populace, instituted curfews, used “shock and awe” reprisal, enforced economic and political

isolation, and even instituted public dress codes. What we see now is the nexus of Chinese security policy with the complications of its economic development policy.

Throughout its history under communist rule Xinjiang has experienced dramatic and sudden economic and demographic changes. Chung wrote in 2002 that Beijing’s

“war on terror” was ultimately fruitless because it was not addressing the systemic economic and political isolation that the Uighur minority faced in China.

Furthermore, the lengths to which Beijing will go to subdue the Uighur separatists shows an inability to adapt to a complex ethnic divide in its own state. “China is

distorting the real situation of the Uighur struggle,” Dilxat Rexit, a spokesman for the World Uyghur Congress in Germany, said. “This so-called charge of terrorism is

a way for the government to avoid taking responsibility for the use of excessive force that causes so many casualties.” Rexit argues a point that we have heard before

in reference to Beijing: a failure to address human and citizen rights issues, only avoidable in the past because the CCP was able to consistently make good on

economic development and security promises (or because of the threat of violence). This trend exacerbates the party’s problems in the modern era as interconnectivity

through social media and internet publications continues to make it harder for a regime to enact information control on a populace. The harder they squeeze, the more

the rest of the world hears of it, and that comes with consequences. The pressure of developing a robust economy in the last four decades has often led the CCP to

forsake regional politics in favor of a greater macro-end result. And while the results of this focus speak for themselves, lifting hundreds of millions out of poverty and

dramatically changing the balance of economic power in the world, the CCP continues to alienate the party from the majority of its countrymen (the lower and middle

classes) by failing to address citizen rights and quality of life issues. Uighur Separatists have engaged in terrorism and abhorrent violence, and those responsible

should be prosecuted in accordance with accepted standards of justice. However, it can hardly be said that there is no legitimacy to the claims of economic and social

inequality for the peaceful members of the Uighur populace within China. Denial of basic human rights, overzealous policing, and lack of access to the economic

infrastructure of their homeland are a very real threat to their existence and way of life. In May this year President Xi Jinping paid lip service to the plight of the

Uighurs in acknowledging efforts to increase bilingual education and job access, but absent from his assertions was any mention of the XPCC and other quasi-military

structures employed by the Han migrants that continue to keep the Uighurs at barrel’s length. Stranger still is Xi’s push for “inter-ethnic fusion” by attempting to

promote via cash incentive Han and minority marriages, a concept rooted in lofty goals of a melting pot society but ultimately seeking to dilute the ethnic identity of

troublesome minorities in China. The speech and the solutions are tone deaf to the plight of the Uighurs, even going so far as to suggest dispersing the Uighur

population into the rest of China in a “reverse migration.” There are few data to suggest that these measures are curtailing the separatist movement any more than their

predecessors did. Why is the CCP consistently unable to resolve the threat of Uighur separatism and terrorism?

There are no shortage of bright and dynamic leaders. Much is certainly written about ethnic divide and

insurgency, with data to support it, and party control is no longer bolstered by ethnic chauvinism. It is

obvious that part of Beijing’s policy for “integration” and maintenance of domestic peace and harmony

between the minorities and Han within China should be a careful assessment and reform of discriminatory

behavior by economic and political institutions, and yet those measures seem dangerous in the CCP’s

eyes. Is the idea of reform linked with being perceived as weak on security issues for Beijing, or is it merely really a protracted campaign against extremists where

even the slightest redress of grievances is seen as appeasement? Two Threats The Uighur minority represents two threats to the CCP:

the existential threat of losing regional continuity (and therefore jeopardizing the strength of communist

rule), and the inability to adapt to reform in order to diminish internal security threats. Considering the CCP’s

necessity to appear strong at all times, it foregoes the scalpel in favor of the sledgehammer, ignoring a minority population rather than seeking to give them a greater

economic stake in the region. Despite the control the party exerts in all facets of the Chinese state, the CCP leadership is content to either tie its hands and face the

violence of Uighur separatists with paramilitary force and “shock and awe tactics” or it is fundamentally incapable of seeking broader income redistribution, citizens’

rights, and social reform that would help to appease or at least mollify and control Uighur groups. It would serve foreign analysts and academic bodies well to delve

further into this issue, and seek to establish precisely what variables are affecting the decision-making process for the party.

CCP collapse decimates the stability of the international order – laundry list of

conflicts.

Perkinson 12 — Jessica, Faculty of the School of International Service of American University in

Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Affairs; reviewed

by: Quansheng Zhao, Professor of international relations and Chair of Asian Studies Program Research

Council at American University, and John C. King, Assistant Professor School of International Service,

2012 (“The Potential for Instability in the PRC: How the Doomsday Theory Misses the Mark,” American

University, April 19th, Available Online at

http://aladinrc.wrlc.org/bitstream/handle/1961/10330/Perkinson_american_0008N_10238display.pdf?seq

uence=1)

Should the CCP undergo some sort of dramatic transformation – whether that be significant reform or complete collapse, as some

radical China scholars predict2 – the implications for international and US national security are vast . Not only does

China and the stability of the CCP play a significant role in the maintenance of peace in the East Asian

region, but China is also relied upon by many members of the international community for foreign direct

investment, economic stability and trade . China plays a key role in maintaining stability on the

Korean Peninsula as one of North Korea’s only allies, and it is argued that instability within the Chinese government could

also lead to instability in the already sensitive military and political situation across the Taiwan Strait . For

the United States, the effect of instability within the CCP would be widespread and dramatic . As the United

States’ largest holder of US treasury securities, instability or collapse of the CCP could threaten the

stability of the already volatile economic situation in the US. In addition, China is the largest trading

partner of a number of countries, including the US, and the US is reliant upon its market of inexpensive

goods to feed demand within the US. It is with this in mind that China scholars within the United States and around the world should be studying

this phenomenon, because the potential for reform, instability or even collapse of the CCP is of critical importance to the

stability of the international order as a whole . For the United States specifically, the potential - or lack thereof - for reform of the CCP

should dictate its foreign policy toward China. If the body of knowledge on the stability of the Chinese government reveals that the Chinese market is not a stable one,

it is in the best interests of the United States to look for investors and trade markets elsewhere to lessen its serious dependence on China for its economic stability,

particularly in a time of such uncertain economic conditions within the US.

Cooperation Adv.

Chinese credibility on terror is low now but US-Sino Cooperation in Pakistan solves

their credibility and increases US-Sino relations. That spills over into other issues

in US-Sino relations.

Small et al 15— Andrew Small , transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United

States, Wei Zhu, program associate with the religion program at the Social Science Research Council in

New York, Eric Hundman, doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Chicago, 2015 (“Is

China a Credible Partner in Fighting Terror?”, November 24, 2015, Accessed 7/5/16, Available Online at

http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/24/china-islamic-state-terrorism-war-beijing-paris-us/, JRR)

There clearly are reasons to doubt China’s credibility as a partner in fighting terror. Its unwillingness to draw clear

lines between the terrorist, the political activist, and the aggrieved citizen makes certain forms of cooperation — such as detailed intelligence

sharing — very problematic. Beijing’s repressive behavior in Xinjiang actively is worsening the conditions in which terrorist threats are liable to

grow. And Beijing is willing to use its position on the U.N. Security Council to extend protection to members of specific terrorist organizations

— such as Lashkar-e-Taiba — when it has political reasons to do so. Nonetheless, there is no question that China

increasingly is the victim of serious terrorist attacks, both at home and abroad. These are not just attacks on Chinese state

institutions but atrocities against Chinese civilians, exemplified by the Kunming attack in 2014. A number of the incidents also have the

hallmarks of jihadi methods, implying some degree of external influence even if not direct support. Although their numbers are small and their

capacity to act on the Chinese mainland is limited, there are active militant groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party that have had a visible

presence in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and now Syria. And after a long period in which Al Qaeda and its affiliates, for tactical reasons, largely

considered it inadvisable to make China a target, the Islamic State, by contrast, has been very explicit about the fact that it sees China as an

enemy. This is a completely different landscape for Beijing from the one it faced ten years ago. It already has prompted more

serious efforts on China’s part to help stabilize Afghanistan, which it fears becoming a safe haven for Uighur militants.

Beijing is now one of the leading actors in trying to bring about a political settlement between the Taliban

and the Afghan government. Many of its economic initiatives in the region are motivated as much by security considerations as

commercial ones. China believes that the conditions in which militancy has thrived really only can be addressed through a transformation of the

economic situation in these countries, including Pakistan. In many of these efforts — particularly the reconciliation push in Afghanistan —

Beijing is working already with the United States as a close partner. Syria is a more complicated case, where China’s antipathy towards the

Islamic State coexists with its aversion to regime change, its backing of Russia’s position, and its caution about the sectarian dimensions of the

conflicts underway there. China already has shown tacit support of anti-Islamic State measures though, including military strikes, and if the

political pieces fall into place, it is not impossible to imagine a larger Chinese role. Conceived solely through the prism of Xinjiang and Beijing’s

domestic counter-terrorism practices, there is good cause to be skeptical about China’s credibility as partner. There are forms of direct counter-

terrorism cooperation with Beijing that will be limited, necessarily and rightly. But looking more broadly at stabilizing the whole

arc running from Xinjiang to the Middle East, China’s economic and political role is likely to be a crucial

one, and aspects of that partnership already are underway. In between offering condolences and expressing solidarity in

light of the Nov. 13 Paris attacks, Chinese officials had some pointed comments for those in the West. Chinese President Xi Jinping also strongly

criticized the double standard over how terrorism is treated compared to terrorism in the West and emphasized the crucial need for international

cooperation against terrorism, linking the Paris attacks to the similar attacks in Xinjiang. While the Chinese government has usually followed an

insular approach to domestic issues, it has consistently pushed to connect the unrest in Xinjiang with the Western-led war on terror and

extremism. There are certainly some disaffected Uyghurs joining the likes of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State; a recent Islamic State video, for

example, highlights its Chinese Uyghur members and includes some harsh words for Chinese infidels. But while the actual extent of those links

are debatable, the government has taken a heavy-handed approach to clamp down on any potential subversive activity in Xinjiang, particularly

given the instability in neighboring Afghanistan. In light of the Paris attacks, and the death of Chinese citizen Fan Jinghui at hands of the Islamic

State, such policies may intensify. But the Chinese government is paying a price for its opaque ways: Western nations have been

skeptical and sometimes dismissive of terrorism in China, accusing the government of exaggerating those risks. The Paris

attacks are only the latest reminder to many Chinese people that while the Chinese expressed solidarity with France and denounced the

perpetrators, the West has been more reluctant to express similar sentiments when such attacks (like the 2014 Kunming attacks) happen in China.

The fear and terror caused by these attacks are real, as are the anger and frustration shared by many

Chinese at how the West views attacks by Uyghur militants; that is, without sufficient concern and

seriousness. The Chinese government has long tied the unrest in Xinjiang to the wider war on terror, but these latest remarks are the most

vocal yet, strongly rebuking those that fail to recognize Xinjiang as another frontier in that struggle. At a time when many countries around the

world are grappling with the extent and threat of Islamist extremism and terror, Chinese officials want to make clear the legitimacy of their

country’s domestic terrorism problems and the importance (and effectiveness) of their policies, both through official statements and state-run

media. China is decisively on the same page as Western nations in the struggle against militant Islamist

groups. But already in uneasy collaboration with Russia in Syria, will Western nations accept China as another partner if it means compromises

elsewhere — such as treating Xinjiang as a legitimate theater of terrorism? Will the threat of groups like the Islamic State necessitate a true global

response with all five permanent members of the UN Security Council together as a united front? China has made its goals and

interests clear, and the working relationship between China and the West in the war on terror will be an

increasingly important topic moving forward. The question of whether China can be a credible

partner for the United States is critical — China’s credibility not only will impact the effectiveness

of any efforts to cooperate with the United States on terrorism, it also will affect cooperation in

other areas where the two share interests, such as climate change, territorial disputes, and trade .

However, China’s credibility is not just about China’s actions — it also rests on U.S. perceptions of those

actions. In the case of fighting terror, these perceptions hinge on the degrees to which (1) the two

countries agree on the nature of terrorism and (2) the United States trusts that China’s ultimate intentions

are benign. Given increasing concerns about China’s rise, prospects that the United States will view China as a credible partner in fighting

terror appear dim.

US-China cooperation over Pakistani terrorism prevent attacks against India.

Smith 11—Dr. Paul J. Smith is a Professor of National Security Affairs at the US Naval War College,

2011 (“The China–Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the “War on

Terrorism””, December 14, 2011, Accessed 6/30/16, Available Online at

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291, JRR)

The weapons of mass destruction factor—particularly nuclear technology and materials—adds a powerful urgency to

worries about Pakistan’s links to global militant organizations, especially given fears that Pakistan could

fall under the control of militants. Pakistan played a central in the A. Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network.

Although the activities of the Khan network have been portrayed as the actions of rogue scientists and individuals who operated outside of

official state direction, more careful analysis suggests purposeful state involvement, particularly with regard to Pakistan-Iran nuclear

cooperation.110 Consequently, Pakistan is perceived to be a key node in potential international proliferation

networks, especially with regard to the possibility of nuclear materials being transferred from the state into

the hands of nonstate actors. In 2008, the American Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission stated: “Were one to map

terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in Pakistan.”111 Today, Pakistan

is believed to be the fifth largest nuclear power in the world (ahead of France and Britain), with an estimated one

hundred deployed nuclear weapons.112 Concerned about proliferation possibilities, the United States has unsuccessfully attempted

to remove a stockpile of highly enriched uranium located near an aging nuclear reactor in Pakistan. The U.S. government provided this uranium

to Pakistan in the 1960s under the Atoms for Peace Program, during an era in which Washington gave “little thought to proliferation [because]

Pakistan seemed too poor and backward to join the nuclear race.”113 The United States reportedly is concerned about

diversion by insiders of nuclear material to militants. The issue has gained such priority in Washington

that the Obama administration characterized the imperative to prevent terrorists from gaining access to

Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as a “vital interest.”114 Consequently, Pakistan is likely to remain the center of gravity

for much global terrorism for many years (and possibly decades) to come. Historically, the United States and China have had the

greatest ability to positively influence the Pakistani government , particularly when they act in concert

toward common objectives. Beijing and Washington also have a strategic interest in mitigating or

containing Pakistan-originating militant Islamist activities within their own borders or other areas associated with

their national interests. However, before cooperation can be effective, both countries will need to reconcile

differences in how each views Pakistan’s terrorism challenges. For example, China seeks to boost Pakistan’s nuclear

program, presumably to maintain Pakistan as a strategic hedge against India, while the United States would prefer to restrain such capabilities out

of concern for proliferation and linkages to terrorism. In addition, the larger challenge of an emerging U.S.-China rivalry worldwide—and the

implications of reduced cooperation on global challenges such as terrorism—must be managed to prevent

Pakistani leaders from playing the two powers against each other. Conclusion. The strategic triangle comprising

the United States, Pakistan, and China was created during the Cold War and existed within a larger security configuration in which the Soviet

Union served as the external antagonistic referent. It overlaid, dominated, and sometimes assuaged two other subregional structures (the 1947

Indo-Pakistan and 1962 Sino-Indian configurations). Within the Cold War superstructure, the strategic triangle could endure competitive

periods—such as the early- to mid-1960s for the United States and China—because of the perceived threat posed by the Soviet Union. In the

1990s, after the end of the Cold War, the resilience of the triangle began to atrophy as U.S. engagement with Pakistan largely declined and was

complicated by an array of economic and military sanctions. Consequently, the United StatesPakistan leg of the triangle diminished in strength,

while the China-Pakistan leg continued to flourish, stimulated largely by the two countries’ rivalry over India and other common interests. For its

part, the United States concentrated on advancing and improving relations with China. This trend was dramatically interrupted by the 9/11

terrorist attacks on the United States, after which Washington reinvigorated its relationship with Islamabad. The rise of global terrorism appeared

to represent the onset of a new Cold War–like external referent or threat that could sustain the strategic triangle among China, Pakistan, and the

United States. The fact that U.S. military operations in Afghanistan during the early 2000s were assisted or at least tolerated by Pakistan and

China adds credence to this view. For Pakistan, terrorism continues to pose a long-term threat to the country’s

political and economic viability, as well as to regional security. The United States and China have the

greatest potential to constructively influence Pakistan’s counterterrorism posture. However, if the

countries choose competition and rivalry over cooperation, the range and extent of cooperation

that both countries could employ vis-a-vis Pakistan will likely be circumscribed. If, for example, the United

` States strengthens ties with India with designs on containing China, this action will most likely contribute to Pakistan’s “neuralgic security

concerns regarding India’s intentions and capabilities.”115 In turn, Islamabad’s old habits might be revived, such as

turning to nonstate actor proxy groups to launch small-scale attacks against India or other countries.

Indeed, possession of a nuclear deterrent has apparently emboldened Pakistan to continue pursuing such a

proxy war strategy.116 On the other hand, if the United States and China can find and cultivate areas of

common interest in terms of counterterrorism and stability in Pakistan (and, by extension, Afghanistan), their

combined influence may help mitigate or contain regional violence, terrorism, and weapons proliferation.

Under such circumstances, the China-Pakistan-U.S. strategic triangle may provide an alternative power

structure that constrains the worst proclivities of the Pakistani state. However, before such goals can be

realized, Beijing and Washington must acknowledge their common interests and recognize the

indispensable and symbiotic role that the other plays in this triangular power dynamic.

Continued Pakistani terrorists attacks on India causes war.

Zarate 2/20/2011 (Juan C, senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, was

deputy assistant to the president and deputy national security adviser for combating terrorism from 2005

to 2009, “An alarming South Asia powder keg,” Wasington Post 7/9/2016,

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/02/18/AR2011021805662.html JJH)

In 1914, a terrorist assassinated Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo - unleashing geopolitical forces and World War I. Today, while the

United States rightly worries about al-Qaeda targeting the homeland, the most dangerous threat may be another

terrorist flash point on the horizon. Lashkar-i-Taiba holds the match that could spark a conflagration

between nuclear-armed historic rivals India and Pakistan. Lashkar-i-Taiba is a Frankenstein's monster

of the Pakistani government's creation 20 years ago. It has diverse financial networks and well-trained and well-armed

cadres that have struck Indian targets from Mumbai to Kabul. It collaborates with the witches' brew of

terrorist groups in Pakistan, including al-Qaeda, and has demonstrated global jihadist ambitions. It is merely a

matter of time before Lashkar-i-Taiba attacks again. Significant terrorist attacks in India, against Parliament in 2001

and in Mumbai in 2008, brought India and Pakistan to the brink of war. The countries remain deeply distrustful of

each other. Another major strike against Indian targets in today's tinderbox environment could lead to a broader,

more devastating conflict . The United States should be directing political and diplomatic capital to prevent such a conflagration. The

meeting between Indian and Pakistani officials in Bhutan this month - their first high-level sit-down since last summer - set the stage for

restarting serious talks on the thorny issue of Kashmir. Washington has only so much time. Indian officials are increasingly dissatisfied with

Pakistan's attempts to constrain Lashkar-i-Taiba and remain convinced that Pakistani intelligence supports the group. An Indian intelligence

report concluded last year that Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate was involved in the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and late last year the

Indian government raised security levels in anticipation of strikes. India is unlikely to show restraint in the event of another attack. Lashkar-i-

Taiba may also feel emboldened since the assassination in early January of a moderate Punjabi governor muted Pakistani

moderates and underscored the weakness of the government in Islamabad. The group does not want peace talks to resume, so

it might act to derail progress. Elements of the group may see conflict with India as in their interest, especially after months of unrest

in Kashmir. And the Pakistani government may not be able to control the monster it created. A war in South Asia would be

disastrous not just for the United States. In addition to the human devastation, it would destroy efforts to bring stability to the

region and to disrupt terrorist havens in western Pakistan. Many of the 140,000 Pakistani troops fighting militants in the west would be

redeployed east to battle Indian ground forces. This would effectively convert tribal areas bordering Afghanistan into a playing field for militants.

Worse, the Pakistani government might be induced to make common cause with Lashkar-i-Taiba, launching a proxy fight against India. Such a

war would also fuel even more destructive violent extremism within Pakistan. In the worst-case scenario, an attack could lead to a

nuclear war between India and Pakistan . India's superior conventional forces threaten Pakistan, and Islamabad could

resort to nuclear weapons were a serious conflict to erupt. Indeed, The Post reported that Pakistan's nuclear weapons and capabilities are

set to surpass those of India.

Indo-Pak nuclear war escalates quickly and causes extinction – computer models

prove.

GSN 10 (Global Security Newswire, 3/16/2010, “Regional Nuclear War Could Devastate World

Population, Report Warns,” http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20100315_4193.php)

Computer modeling suggests a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan would block out the sun

with large amounts of airborne debris, disrupting global agriculture and leading to the starvation of

around 1 billion people, Scientific American reported in its January issue (see GSN, March 4). The nuclear winter scenario

assumes that cities and industrial zones in each nation would be hit by 50 bombs the size of the atomic bomb dropped on Hiroshima, Japan, in

World War II. Although some analysts have suggested a nuclear exchange would involve fewer weapons,

researchers who created the computer models contended that the panic from an initial nuclear exchange could cause

a conflict to quickly escalate. Pakistan , especially, might attempt to fire all of its nuclear weapons in case

India's conventional forces overtake the country's military sites, according to Peter Lavoy, an analyst with the Naval

Postgraduate School. The nuclear blasts and subsequent blazes and radiation could kill more than 20 million people

in India and Pakistan, according to the article. Assuming that each of the 100 bombs would burn an area equivalent to that seen at

Hiroshima, U.S. researchers determined that the weapons used against Pakistan would generate 3 million

metric tons of smoke and the bombs dropped on India would produce 4 million metric tons of smoke. Winds

would blow the material around the world, covering the atmosphere over all continents within two weeks.

The reduction in sunlight would cause temperatures to drop by 2.3 degrees Fahrenheit for several years and

precipitation to drop by one-tenth. The climate changes and other environmental effects of the nuclear war would

have a devastating effect on crop yields unless farmers prepared for such an occurrence in advance. The observed effects of volcano

eruptions, smoke from forest fires and other events support the findings of the computer modeling, the researchers said. "A nuclear war

could trigger declines in yield nearly everywhere at once, and a worldwide panic could bring the global

agricultural trading system to a halt, with severe shortages in many places. Around 1 billion people

worldwide who now live on marginal food supplies would be directly threatened with starvation by a

nuclear war between India and Pakistan or between other regional nuclear powers," wrote Alan Robock, a climatology

professor at Rutgers University in New Jersey, and Owen Brian Toon, head of the Atmospheric and Oceanic

Sciences Department at the University of Colorado at Boulder.

Plan

The United States federal government should offer to support economically viable

infrastructure projects in the China Pakistan Economic Corridor if and only if the

People’s Republic of China substantially increases its pressure on Pakistan to

reduce extremist organization presence in Pakistan.

Solvency

The plan increases Chinese pressure on Pakistan.

Curtis, 3/10/2016 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, “China’s South Asia

Strategy” Testimony Before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Accessed 7/1/16

http://www.heritage.org/research/testimony/chinas-south-asia-strategy JJH)

With regard to Afghanistan, the U.S. should continue to work closely with China to bring a peaceful solution to

the conflict. But the U.S. must also convince China that unless Pakistan cracks down on the Taliban on its

side of the border, the insurgents will continue to make military gains in Afghanistan. While Pakistan has

a critical role to play in encouraging Afghan reconciliation, it must prove that it is willing to pressure

Taliban leaders to reduce the violence in Afghanistan. It is not enough for Pakistan to merely convince the

Taliban to come to the negotiating table. Otherwise, a reconciliation process would merely turn into a way for the Taliban to bide

its time while making military advances in Afghanistan. The U.S. should also seek to convince China that overcoming

the Islamist extremist threat in South Asia will require Pakistan to give up its reliance on terrorist proxies

that attack India. The U.S. should convince China to cooperate on banning Pakistani terrorist organizations and individuals within the UN

Security Council as a way to delegitimize terrorism more broadly. Washington must emphasize that, by giving Pakistan a pass on supporting

terrorist groups that attack India, China is, in fact, encouraging overall extremist trends in Pakistani society. Lastly, the U.S. should

support the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). The U.S. should help evaluate the progress of

CPEC and encourage U.S. companies to support projects that are economically feasible and that will

contribute to economic development in Pakistan and regional economic integration. Although questions persist

about China’s willingness to commit to major investments in the projects, and about Pakistan’s capacity to absorb the same, any steps that might

even marginally improve the energy sector and infrastructure in Pakistan are welcome.

China is an honest broker and can pressure Pakistan to stop proving the Taliban a

safe haven.

Caragliano and Coburn, 4/21/2015 (David, lawyer and an international development professional

currently managing programs in Asia; Fellow of the Truman National Security Project and Noah,

professor of political anthropology at Bennington College who served as an election monitor in

Afghanistan in 2014; Fellow of the Truman National Security Project “Could Afghanistan Be a Model

for US-China Cooperation?” The Diplomat Accessed 6/30/2015 http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/could-

afghanistan-be-a-model-for-us-china-cooperation/ JJH)

Afghanistan is one place they can start. The U.S. and China both have an interest in a peaceful and self-

sustaining Afghanistan. On the diplomatic front, the U.S., China, and Afghanistan have already been

engaged in trilateral cooperation. At the London Conference, a multilateral event, senior officials from the three countries met

privately to discuss Afghanistan’s future. Recent statements from China’s representative at the UN Security Council indicate a willingness to act

as a mediator in Afghan peace and reconciliation process. The reasons for Chinese and U.S. interest in Afghanistan are

clear. From the U.S. perspective, President Barack Obama’s decision to slow the withdrawal of troops through 2015

underscores the importance his administration attaches to the outcome of America’s engagement there.

From China’s perspective, the shared border between Afghanistan and China’s Xinjiang Uyghur

Autonomous Region means that China will continue to have a stake in its neighbor’s stability. Xi’s “One

Belt One Road” development strategy envisions Chinese-built oil pipelines, telecom, and high-speed rail

crossing Central Asia and bridging China, the Middle East, and Europe with Xinjiang as the hub. Further, the

possibility that separatist Uyghur fighters may receive training in the lawless Afghanistan-Pakistan border region presents China with a

troublesome vulnerability. Peace with the Taliban starts with establishing trust between the Afghan

government and the Pakistani government, which has provided a safe harbor to Taliban

insurgents. U.S. pressure on Pakistan has had limited effects, but China’s entry into the conversation

could reshape the dialogue. As close allies and “all weather friends” with Pakistan, China is well positioned to play the

role of honest broker , particularly given the fact that U.S.-Pakistani relations have deteriorated since

they were declared a key partner in the global war on terror over a decade ago. Afghanistan needs a government that

can bring infrastructure, jobs, education, healthcare, and justice to its people for any lasting peace. Both the U.S. and China have made

investments in Afghanistan’s development, yet they take different approaches. Of the $1.594 billion in U.S. assistance to Afghanistan in FY2015,

about 19 percent is solely dedicated to the country’s economic development. The remainder covers peace and security, democracy and

governance, health, education, and social services, and surely, these underpin sustainable, long-term growth. China’s contribution in Afghanistan

pales in an absolute sense, but in Afghanistan and throughout the world, China has made targeted investments in infrastructure and natural

resource extraction (much for its own consumption). Put in context, China’s recent promise of $327 million (RMB 2 billion) to Afghanistan over

the next two years is not insignificant; U.S. assistance toward infrastructure in Afghanistan this year stands at $69 million. The countries’

divergent approaches to development are rooted in ideological differences. China’s rhetoric emphasizes its policy of non-interference in the

domestic politics of sovereign governments. This principle goes back to the Final Communiqué of the 1955 Bandung Conference. (The event

which this week’s Asian-African Conference in Indonesia commemorates.) Western donors are more inclined to link aid with the promotion of

good governance as outlined in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and the Accra Agenda for Action. Despite their ideological

differences, both countries face many of the same challenges on the ground. The crippling costs of endemic Afghan

government corruption make any international development efforts challenging, to say the least. According to the Wall Street Journal, an Afghan

diplomat admitted that the Afghan government viewed the China Metallurgical Group’s investment in the Aynak copper mine as a “cow to milk”

for bribes. The U.S. Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction has made similarly bleak assessments on the misuse of U.S.

project funds. In the context of Afghanistan, the U.S. and China may more easily broach otherwise sensitive

topics – like transparency and openness in procurement. Chinese companies have already reported under

the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative in Central Asian and African countries. A trilateral

dialogue allowing exploration of these issues could contribute to mutual understanding and may yield

positive results. Each party in the tripartite holds special interest in ensuring a stable and predictable

marketplace. Such cooperation is not equivalent to interfering in Afghan domestic politics because President Ashraf Ghani himself has

prioritized these problems. Ghani has moved quickly, firing local officials and centralizing billions of dollars in procurement deals under his

purview. There are daunting challenges, but he has acknowledged that multi-stakeholder initiatives to promote transparency can be useful to push

for reform in government systems. Afghanistan presents challenges and opportunities for both the U.S. and China.

Working together, they could fix the significant problems, energize high-level diplomacy, and

provide a future model for U.S.-China cooperation .

Additional US Aid is mutually reinforcing with Chinese projects. Only the plan

solves.

Markey and West, 5/12/2016 (Daniel S., Adjunct Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia

@ CFR, and James, Research Associate, India, Pakistan, and South Asia @CFR, “Behind China’s

Gambit in Pakistan” Council on Foreign Relations Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-

chinas-gambit-pakistan/p37855 JJH)

The United States will also have its own long-term concerns about the CPEC, as it represents the leading edge of

China’s expanding access to, and likely influence within, Eurasia. As Pakistan grows closer to China, there may be temptation in Washington to

compete for influence in Islamabad. This competition is best avoided, as it would be costly, unwinnable, and almost

certainly counterproductive to other U.S. goals in Pakistan and the region. Pakistanis will reach their own

conclusions about how best to pursue relations with Beijing and Washington, and are likely to pursue

distinct ties with both sides. U.S. officials should seize the opportunity provided by Pakistan’s intense

focus on the CPEC to advance its own set of politically sustainable goals in Pakistan, paying particular attention to U.S. concerns about

terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and the war in Afghanistan. Finally, though Chinese and Pakistani officials are wary of U.S. overtures, the

CPEC should be appreciated as an opportunity for closer trilateral cooperation. The United States could

redirect a portion of current civilian assistance funds into projects that are aligned with CPEC goals—

such as technical improvements to Pakistan’s national power grid—to help create jobs, spur economic

growth, and provide incentives for additional outside investment. U.S. aid can and should continue to play

a constructive role in Pakistan, and if harmonized with Chinese efforts could enhance the efficacy of

both . This would require opening a new, detail-oriented dialogue with both Pakistani and Chinese officials. In addition, U.S. officials,

including from the State Department and Export-Import Bank, should use their conversations with Pakistani counterparts to ensure that CPEC-

style protections for Chinese corporations and investors are also applied to U.S. firms. The CPEC will have the best chance of

transforming Pakistan’s economic outlook if it also sparks a wave of foreign investment from other

countries, including the United States.

CPEC/Stability Adv.

Extensions of 1ac Args

Afghanistan Peace Talks Fail

QCG peace talks are failing because the Taliban won’t cooperate, the QGC won’t

allow Iran and Russia to help, and the Afghan government is weak

Kaura 16—Vinay Kaura is an assistant professor in the department of International Affairs and

Security Studies, and Coordinator at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Sardar Patel University of

Police, Security and Criminal Justice, Jodhpur, Rajasthan, India, 2016 (“Afghan Peace Talks: Road to

Nowhere”, April 06, 2016, Accessed 7/7/16, Available online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/afghan-

peace-talks-road-to-nowhere/, JRR)

Making peace with a violent extremist group was always going to be difficult and dangerous for a fragile

government. When the group is one of the most viciously radical and intransigent in the world, it becomes

all the more tricky to persuade its leadership to enter into the peace process. Governments that are

accountable to the electorate invariably find it ethically uncomfortable talking to people whose hands are

“stained with blood” and who have committed horrifying acts of terror. Mindful of the fact that they walk a thin moral line

when they engage with terrorist groups, the governments do not want to be seen negotiating under the threat of violence. But one can hardly dispute the fact that

ending a conflict means talking to all those who are parties to the conflict. Arriving at that momentous moment when two

enemies shake hands takes years of exasperating groundwork, often far longer than outsiders realize. Before a peace process can end in a formal agreement meant to

end a violent conflict, a number of other agreements usually must be achieved, including pre-negotiation agreements, interim agreements, framework agreements, and

implementation agreements. Each type of agreement has a specific purpose, although sometime they may overlap. Pre-negotiation agreements are “talks about talks”

as they tend to deal with issues such as who is going to negotiate with what status, and what will be on the agenda. At this stage of negotiations, the preconditions of

talks are discussed, such as the release of political prisoners, or the cessation of hostilities, or a ceasefire during peace negotiations. In Afghanistan,

unfortunately, the peace process is still stuck in this primary stage. The Quadrilateral Coordination Group (QCG),

comprising Afghanistan, China, Pakistan and the U.S., has taken a much-needed initiative to pacify the

conflict-ridden country. The QCG mechanism, set up on the margins of the Heart of Asia Conference on Afghanistan held in Islamabad in December

2015, became operational in January 2016 when it met officially for the first time. And just before the fourth round of QCG discussions in February, Pakistan’s army

chief traveled to Doha to persuade all Taliban factions and groups to return to the negotiating table. But it is hard to avoid the conclusion that

any substantial breakthrough in peace negotiations remains as remote as ever. It is worth asking why the

performance of QCG has been so disappointing. The QCG will not prove to be a balanced and efficient

mechanism to bring lasting peace to Afghanistan as it effectively blocks Russia and Iran, two of the most

important players in Afghanistan, from the negotiating table. Most importantly, multiple rounds of talks among

the quartet have failed to convince the Afghan Taliban to talk peace with the government in Kabul. Although

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-e-Islami, formally allied with the Afghan Taliban, has decided to join the peace talks, it will not have a significant impact on the peace

process because Hizb-e Islami’s ability to conduct an insurgency has been declining over the years and it has little influence over the Taliban. Why does the latest

refusal by the Taliban to join the peace negotiations seem so much more frightening today than it did a few years back? Afghanistan remains a

violently contested and unsettled land. There are serious concerns about the deteriorating security situation. Jihadists and

insurgents pose multiple challenges to the prospects of peace and security in the volatile country. This is borne

out by the recent observations of Nicholas Haysom, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General for Afghanistan. Haysom has painted a very grim picture

of the situation in Afghanistan, where conflict has grown in intensity and scope, presenting critical challenges on all fronts to all Afghan government institutions,

including security forces. The two most disturbing features of the report are the rise in security related incidents in 2015 as compared to 2014, and the deterioration in

security in areas that have not previously been the Taliban’s stronghold. The Taliban has undoubtedly expanded its territorial reach over the past year, reflected in the

temporary capture of about two dozen districts in almost all parts of the country, the temporary seizure of the provincial capital of Kunduz being the most notorious

and audacious. Control over Helmand is now a Taliban priority, as most of its attacks last year focused on the province. For the Kabul government, the Taliban

must end the attacks if talks are to take place. Another symbolic but significant demand from the

government is that the Taliban must give up the use of banner of “Islamic Emirate.” On the other hand, some of

the Taliban’s demands include the removal of their officials from the black list, the release of prisoners,

and the unfreezing of their funds. But the central Taliban demand, which seems to be non-negotiable for

them, is the complete withdrawal of the U.S.-led foreign troops from Afghanistan and direct negotiations

with the U.S. to finalize the withdrawal deadline. Meanwhile, the Afghan “unity” government seems to have

neither any viable peaceful conflict settlement plan nor any overarching war strategy. To make matters worse, the

political, economic and social angst and discontent of a large segment of the Afghan people with the

Kabul regime have not been properly addressed, and this has allowed the Taliban to exploit real or

perceived grievances. There is no doubt that a decade-long democratic process in Afghanistan has provided political leadership that can claim some

semblance of legitimacy, but the quality of its governing institutions has been severely criticized. A government that is incapable of defending the country’s territory

from both internal and external enemies cannot be expected to deliver elementary public goods to its struggling people. Afghanistan is also badly

plagued by awfully high levels of corruption, which in turn undermines the legitimacy of its government.

The Afghan state in its present shape may not survive if its internal and external supporters do not address

the problem of pervasive corruption and chronic insecurity. And the country has yet to recover from the prolonged political

uncertainty and crisis generated by the highly controversial 2014 presidential election, with the delicate power-sharing arrangement between President Ashraf Ghani

and CEO Abdullah Abdullah continues to be contested by the two men and their networks. With the Taliban having once again rejected the

latest peace offers from the QCG, insisting on their own terms and conditions, the already fragile peace process has

entered its most crucial phase. It is unrealistic to expect the inadequately trained Afghan security forces, supported by an insufficient number of U.S.-led NATO

forces, to attain a military edge over their opponent. Besides ethnic fragmentation, factionalism, and a high level of desertions, the Afghan security forces have been

suffering from financial problems and deficiencies in logistics, deeply affecting their performance and sustainability. In fact, Western military support for the Ghani

regime is more of a background psychological factor than a physical one, since the U.S. has almost quit Afghanistan. If the Afghan Taliban escalates the fight in the

coming months, the country faces the prospect of sliding down a perilous path towards turmoil and mayhem. Faced with a rapidly intensifying insurgency,

Afghanistan is at risk of being carved up into rival fiefdoms. The emergence of the Islamic State, or ISIS, which is trying to recruit from among the disgruntled

Taliban ranks and other terrorist groups, has further diminished hopes of the country returning to a state of normalcy anytime soon.

Four way Afghan peace talks are failing now- Taliban won’t budge

IBT 5/27/16 (International Business Times, Vasudevan Sridharan, “Afghan Taliban's new leader rules

out peace talks”, Accessed 7/7/16, Available Online at http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/afghan-talibans-new-

leader-rules-out-peace-talks-1562324, JRR)

The newly appointed Afghan Taliban leader has reportedly ruled out continuing the ongoing peace

negotiations with the Kabul administration. Mawlawi Haibatullah Akhundzada is believed to have

insisted on pressing ahead with the fight against the Afghan government. According to a well-placed

source in the Islamist group cited by CNN, Akhundzada said there will be no more peace talks with the

representatives of President Ashraf Ghani. Akhundzada's recent appointment by the Taliban group was to

"bring back the era of Mullah Mohmmad Omar", the one-eyed leader who was the founder of the

organisation. The source added that Akhundzada would lead Taliban with a "simple life, loyalty and

terror on enemies". Akhundzada, who is thought to be more of an Islamic cleric than a jihadist fighter

unlike his predecessors, took over the leadership of Taliban as the group is fighting for its survival.

Akhundzada was nominated following the killing of Mullah Akhtar Mansour in a US drone strike. Other

parties including Pakistan and the US who are brokering four-way talks between Taliban and the Afghan

government have also expressed pessimism on the discussions proceeding in the wake of Mansour's

death. US President Barack Obama, who is in Japan for the G7 meeting, told reporters: "I doubt it will be

happening anytime soon." Pakistan, in whose territory Mansour was killed without prior notice, squarely

slammed the US for queering the pitch for talks. Sartaj Aziz, top aide to Pakistani prime minister on

foreign affairs, said: "We believe that this action has undermined the Afghan peace process ... we believe

this approach will further destabilise Afghanistan, which will have negative implications for the region,

especially due to the presence of a large number of terrorist groups in Afghanistan," reported the Pakistani

daily Dawn. "Pakistan believes that a politically negotiated settlement re­mains the most viable option for

bringing lasting peace to Afghanistan... will continue to pursue the objective in close consultation with

Afghanistan government and other members of the QCG [Quadrilateral Coordination Group]." Even as

the talks have been going on for several months with little or no progress, Taliban militants have

increased their attacks in the war-torn nation. The Islamists have made inroads into many Afghan

territories capturing key positions.

Plan Solves Security of CPEC

Pakistan fighting terror is key to CPEC

Kaura, 5/2/2016 (Vinay, Assistant Prof. of International Affairs and Security Studies and Coordinator,

Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies @ Sardar Patel University of Police Security and Criminal Justice

“CONFRONTING CPEC CHALLENGES” The Pioneer Accessed 7/8/16

http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/oped/confronting-cpec-challenges.html JJH)

Pakistan Army’s historical support for ‘ideological proxies’ has over the years led to a situation where

some extremist organisations enjoy enormous clout and wealth. Without reining in these terror groups,

Pakistan can never hope to secure the areas where CPEC related networks of highways, railways, special

economic zones, pipelines are being established. Without categorically rejecting terrorism as an

instrument of Pakistan’s foreign policy, whatever successes its Army has achieved against jihadi forces in

recent year, they are fragile and reversible. China is worried about the security of the CPEC and its

nationals working in different projects. Beijing knows that the successful implementation of OBOR is an

illusion without peace and stability in the region. Clearly, Pakistan’s domestic challenges have created a

strong possibility of CPEC projects being subjected to unscheduled delays.

Security Key

Stabilizing Pakistan is key to CPEC implementation

Markey and West, 5/12/2016 (Daniel S., Adjunct Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia

@ CFR, and James, Research Associate, India, Pakistan, and South Asia @CFR, “Behind China’s

Gambit in Pakistan” Council on Foreign Relations Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-

chinas-gambit-pakistan/p37855 JJH)

The primary obstacle to the CPEC’s full implementation is security. To address Chinese concerns and

ensure the safety of these projects, Pakistan announced in early 2016 the creation of a dedicated CPEC

force of ten thousand security personnel, but even a force of that size will be stressed by the task at hand.

In Pakistan’s northwest frontier, road networks are planned to run near or through territories where the

Pakistani Taliban and other antistate militant groups could attack construction crews and disrupt the flow

of goods. In ongoing military operations targeting those groups, the Pakistani military has placed a special

emphasis on the ETIM due to Chinese pressure and is concerned that attacks could delay or derail the

CPEC. In October 2015, the military claimed to have eradicated the ETIM from Pakistan, but the threat of

other groups remains. Islamist militant groups have already attacked Chinese targets, including

kidnapping construction personnel, and hinted that their campaigns could expand to include more

targeting of Chinese interests. A decades-long insurgency simmers in Balochistan, where a number of

important CPEC projects are underway. Baloch insurgents have attacked Chinese projects and workers.

To protect Gwadar’s port town, one proposal includes the construction of a perimeter security fence with

entry checkpoints. Such schemes threaten to further alienate local communities.

CPEC will fail without increased security measures- insurgent groups in Gwadar

attacking workers and infrastructure and multiple security vulnerabilities

Fazil 16 — Muhammad Daim Fazil is Lecturer of International Relations and Political Science at

University of Gujrat, Sialkot Campus, Pakistan. (“Pakistan: What Stands in CPEC’s Way?”, February 15,

2016, Accessed 7/9/16, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2016/02/pakistan-what-stands-in-

cpecs-way/)

Security Vulnerabilities The security atmosphere inside Pakistan poses numerous difficulties for CPEC.

Starting from Kashgar, the project will pass through Gilgit-Baltistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, followed

by Baluchistan. Unlike Gilgit-Baltistan, the latter two have complex security challenges, owing to years

of militancy and the presence of secessionist elements. The government has decided to install 10,000

army personnel under the command of a major-general, whose primary objective will be to safeguard

Chinese engineers and guard the entire trade route. The deployment of army personnel has already begun.

This shows that the civilian and military leaderships – despite differences over foreign policy – are on the

same page when it comes to this strategically vital project. The rapid pace of construction and initial

security measures could allow the Chinese to work with minimal problems, but putting down the

insurgency in Baluchistan will be a serious challenge. Separatists have frequently targeted Chinese

workers in Baluchistan, while ruthless assaults on state apparatus continue. Chinese authorities are also

wary of the Uighur militants’ connections with the Afghan Taliban. Islamic militants in China have

expanded the extent of their fight against the government in recent years, and the perpetrators are believed

to have links with terrorist groups in the northwestern belt of Pakistan. Islamabad doing its best to

eliminate anti-China elements from its territory; however, there is a possibility that Uighur and Taliban

(TTP) militants may join forces to threaten CPEC. China is undoubtedly aware of these conundrums.

Beijing surely considered the persistent security threats and political ailments in Pakistan when deciding

on the feasibility of this project. Half a century of cordial relations with Pakistan have given China the

confidence to initiate the project. However, given Pakistan’s unpredictable nature, China will not be able

to relax until the project is completed.

Security is key to the CPEC- infrastructure is getting attacked now

Baloch 15—Kiyya Baloch is a freelance journalist who reports for the leading Pakistani English

newspaper Daily Times in Balochistan and other outlets on foreign affairs and the insurgency, militancy

and sectarian violence in Balochistan, 2015, (“The China-Pakistan Economic Corridor Challenges”,

September 28, 2015, Accessed 7/9/16, Available Online at http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-china-

pakistan-economic-corridor-challenges/)

The indigenous people of the coastal town of Gwadar – gateway to the much-discussed China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor (CPEC) – very much have their own opinions when it comes to reaping the benefits from

this $46 billion project. As such, concern is rising over speculation that the project will benefit only Chinese

interests, with little to offer locals. “It is a conspiracy to convert the local population into a minority, rather than empowering them,” said Syed Essa Noori, a

Baloch Nationalist Party legislator in Pakistan’s National Assembly. Noori cited Karachi as an obvious example the local populace being marginalized in the name of

economic development. “At the time of the creation of the country, Karachi was Baloch-majority. Within a decade, it had turned into a city of migrants, from parts of

India as well as from other parts of Pakistan.” The Baloch nationalist fears the same will happen with Gwadar unless

safeguards are put in place to guarantee the rights of indigenous Balochs before the massive development

kicks off under CPEC. Asked about the future of Gwadar, Lt. Gen. Abdul Qadir Baloch, Minister for States and Frontier Regions, told The Diplomat, “It

is uncalled for that Balochs will be converted into a minority when Chinese investment floods the coastal town.” A retired general, Qadir Baloch was elected from

Balochistan’s remote Kharan district, representing the center-right Pakistan Muslim League (N). The party, headed by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, is claiming credit

for opening the floodgates of Chinese investment in Pakistan since coming into power in May 2013, and insists that Gwadar would be a major beneficiary from

CPEC, with radical improvements in the economic and social lives of local residents. Baloch Militancy That assumes, of course, that CPEC will be able to overcome

the challenges it faces, most notably a lack of political will and a surge in Baloch militancy. In late August, heavily armed militants stormed an airport and destroyed

its radar system, killing two engineers in the coastal town of Jiwani in Gwadar district. The airport is located strategically near the Pakistan-Iran coastal border.

Gwadar Deputy Commissioner Abdul Hameed Abro told The Diplomat that a group of around 12 militants, riding motorbikes, launched the pre-dawn attack on Jiwani

airport, killing two electronics engineers while kidnapping a third. The Balochistan Liberation Army (BLA) has taken

responsibility for the attack, adding to its reputation as one of the deadliest militant groups, with regular

attacks on Pakistani security forces and installations in the province. In another assault, this time on the outskirts of Gwadar

port, at least four were killed when containers carrying cement were incinerated. The Baloch Republican Army (BRA) claimed responsibility for kidnapping the

container crew, and later killing them. Baloch insurgents said the privately owned container was targeted because it was engaged in building a road that is opposed by

the militants. Police Superintendent Imran Qureshi says the militants whisked the container along with its crew, before killing the crew and torching the tanker. The

militants sped away on their motorcycles after the incident. Baloch militants have been attacking key government

installations, security forces, multinational companies, gas pipelines, construction companies, and

containers for years now. Recently, however, laborers have become their primary target. A particularly

deadly attack took place in April this year, when Baloch militants attacked a labor camp near a dam construction site in Pakistan’s southwestern Balochistan province,

killing at least 20 workers and wounding three. A large number of construction companies are operating between Gwadar and the provincial capital Quetta, working to

connect the port city with other parts of Pakistan. The companies have never been secure in Balochistan, partly because of

the activities of Baloch militants and partly because of a nationalist insurgency by nationalist and

separatist Baloch groups who want complete autonomy from Islamabad. Who is behind Balochistan’s deadly unrest?

Frontier Corps (FC) Balochistan chief, Major General Sher Afgan and the powerful Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence agency both blame Indian and Afghan

intelligence agencies. At a recent conference in Quetta, Afgan said that India and Afghanistan were behind subversive activities to disrupt peace in the province. He

also claimed to have foiled their plots on several occasions. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson said that Pakistan would raise the issue of Indian involvement in

terrorism activities in Pakistan at the international level. Baloch rebel leaders and New Delhi deny the allegations of the Pakistani government. Rebel leader Dr. Allah

Nazar, operating in Balochistan, rejects any claim of foreign support for his movement, although he says he will welcome foreign help from any country, whether

India or America. Balochistan’s Chief Minister Dr. Abdul Malik Baloch has a somewhat more nuanced stance. He doesn’t completely rule out foreign involvement in

his province, but emphasizes that former military ruler Pervez Musharraf is responsible for the current unrest. The minister said that Musharraf’s policies worsened the

situation. Malik says the issues cannot now be resolved through investment alone, but will only be resolved when locals are empowered and unemployment as well as

poverty ratios are decreased. Poverty Indeed, poverty is a root cause of the conflict. Apart from security challenges, Balochistan has been hit by both abject poverty

and unemployment. The ratio of poor here is much higher than it is in other parts of Pakistan, despite the fact that Balochistan is endowed with rich reserves of gas,

oil, coal, gold and copper. A 2013 report compiled by the Islamabad non-governmental organization Social Policy and Development Center had Balochistan at the top

of the nation’s poverty list, with 45.68 percent of its population living below the poverty line. Another report, “Clustered Deprivation,” published in 2014 by the

Sustainable Development Policy Institute had 52 percent of the region’s nine million people living in poverty. The coastal towns of Gwadar district are among the

most deprived places in Pakistan, struggling with high unemployment, poor health, weak infrastructure, a poor education system with just a single college, and

rampant crime. The crisis starts from Jiwani and continues through Gwadar city to the towns of Pasini and Ormera. The $46 billion that China has announced it will

invest in the economic corridor will be allocated to projects encompassing mining, infrastructure, textiles, energy, and industry. In the meantime, the people of

Gwadar must make do with a single 12-bed hospital and a college with 13 classrooms.

CPEC is being attacked now- new security measures are key to solve

Syed 16— Shahzadi Tooba Hussain Syed works at Strategic Vision Institute in Islamabad, 2016

(“Developments in CPEC Project and evolving issues and threats”, January 13, 2016, Accessed 7/9/16,

Available online at http://foreignpolicynews.org/2016/01/13/developments-in-cpec-project-and-evolving-

issues-and-threats/)

The ‘game changer’ and the ‘fate changer’ also entitled with a ‘controversial project’. The CPEC project while it is underway started

facing a variety of challenges that seek to undermine its beneficial impact for all the stake holders. The main

issues are the concerns of Gilgit-Baltistan KPK and Balochistan. CPEC projects were actually initiated with the construction of

the Gwadar Port by the Chinese and the up-gradation of the Karakorum Highway (KKH) entering

Pakistan through GB. The GB concern is that it has never been formally integrated into the Pakistani state

and does not participate in Pakistan’s constitutional political affairs. The Gilgit-Baltistan Empowerment and Self-Governance

Order 2009, was passed by the Pakistani cabinet and granted self-rule to the people of Gilgit-Baltistan, by creating, among other things, an elected Gilgit-Baltistan

Legislative Assembly and Gilgit-Baltistan Council. Gilgit-Baltistan thus gained a de facto province-like status without constitutionally becoming part of Pakistan.

Officially, Pakistan has rejected calls for full integration of Gilgit-Baltistan with Pakistan on the grounds that it would prejudice its international obligations with

regard to the Kashmir conflict. Another concern is that for GB, except for the KKH up-gradation no CPEC projects have been included in the overall plan.

Surprisingly, no hydropower project has been identified for funding under CPEC. The government of Pakistan is focused on coal and LNG projects located in the

plains of Punjab and Sindh. The Planning Division has oddly ignored the potential of hydropower projects. Along the KKH, the potential of run-of-the-river projects is

phenomenal. At Bunji alone, a project of 7,400MW of energy can be established with two additional projects of 2,000MW each upstream from this location. These

alone can meet much of Pakistan’s energy requirements. Hydro energy is environment-friendly, low-cost and economically viable; it can save billions of dollars.

Balochistan remains the Achilles heel of the CPEC. Baloch ethno-nationalist separatists remain the

keenest opponents of Chinese investments in the province. Recently a new course of action has been initiated by some sub-nationalist

parties that are alleging a change in the routes by the Federal government, that would only favor the eastern provinces of Pakistan and deprive the western provinces.

Despite this allegation meeting no facts on the ground, the Pakistani and Chinese governments have tried to allay the fears, by interacting with the political parties that

are making the allegations. There is also a stark need to engage the common man on the ground to stop the public

from taking part in acts such as agitation that could halt work on the CPEC. In 2006, three Chinese engineers lost their lives

in an attack claimed by the BLA in Hub, a town west of Karachi. A week before the Chinese president’s visit, at least 20 laborers were killed in cold blood by BLF

gunmen in Turbat. Separatists routinely attack power and energy transmission lines. In order to specifically

counter security threats to the CPEC, the Pakistani government established a ‘Special Security Division’ for Chinese workers. With all the

‘corns’ the ambitious CPEC program is progressing. Mainly it has two components. It plans to develop a new trade and transport route from Kashgar in China to the

Gwadar Port. The other component envisages developing special economic zones along the route, including power projects. The first-phase projects will receive

$45.69bn in concessionary and commercial loans, for which financial facilitation to the Chinese companies is being arranged by the Silk Road Fund. These include

$33.79bn for energy projects, $5.9bn for roads, $3.69bn for railway network, $1.6bn for Lahore Mass Transit, $66m for Gwadar Port and a fibre optic project worth

$4m. The prioritised, short-term projects involve over $17bn in investment. Apart from Karot, they include the upgrading of the 1,681km Peshawar-Lahore-Karachi

railway line ($3.7bn); Thar coal-fired power plants worth 1,980MW ($2.8bn); development of two Thar coal mining blocks ($2.2bn); the Gwadar-Nawabshah natural

gas pipeline ($2bn); imported coal-based power plants at Port Qasim worth 1,320MW ($2bn); a solar park in Bahawalpur worth 900MW ($1.3bn); the Havelian-

Islamabad link of the Karakoram Highway ($930m); a wind farm at Jhimpir for 260MW ($260m); and the Gwadar International Airport ($230m). Pakistan Chinese

friendship has been hailed as” higher than the mountains, deeper than the oceans, sweeter than honey, and stronger than steel “. As China’s friend, it is up to Pakistan

to deal with issues in appropriate way because China is having huge investment. Government should consider all the concerns of the stakeholders. In Balochistan

specially the government must engage the local dissidents in a dialogue process, and bring them back into the national mainstream. A combination of Diplomacy,

Intelligence networks, Economic measures and Military tools can be used to implement that ‘route of prosperity’.

CPEC can only work if security measures are increased

The Express Tribune 16 (“‘CPEC a game changer only if Pakistan tackles security issues’”, March

9, 2016, Accessed 7/9/16, Available Online at http://tribune.com.pk/story/1061978/cpec-a-game-changer-

only-if-pakistan-tackles-security-issues/)

ISLAMABAD: Former diplomat Riaz Muhammad Khan said that the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor

(CPEC) could only become a game changer, if Pakistan succeeded in overcoming its security challenges.

The former ambassador to China, in a lecture on “CPEC: a geo-economic initiative”, organised by the

Sustainable Development Policy Institute (SDPI), late on Monday said the Chinese would have invested

10 times more in Pakistan over the last few decades, if the security situation had been better. He said

Pakistan needed to handle not only the security challenges at home, but it also needed to contribute

towards promoting regional stability. “In the past, Pakistan has been thinking of engaging China

economically and this thinking of Pakistan has been neatly tucked in ‘One Belt, One Road’,” Khan said.

“‘One Belt, One Road’, is the biggest ever programme of building infrastructure after the Marshall Plan,”

he said, and added that four important questions that needed to be answered, before they could understand

the CPEC initiative, included China’s perspective on the subject, its scope and the underlying challenges,

Pakistan-China economic cooperation, and lastly, lessons from cooperation in the past and its limitation.

Khan said Pakistan had depended on China for its economic growth, energy development, and when it

came to civil-nuclear cooperation in a substantive way, for a long time. “$46 billion Chinese investment is

not big for China, but from Pakistan’s perspective it is important, which can materialise in a period of 10

years,” he said. Khan said the China would need two important contributions from Pakistan, provision of

security and the feasibility of the projects. Discussing different route options for the project, he said,

China was comfortable with any route that was safer and economically better placed. He said the project

was mostly funded through private investment from Chinese companies, which maintained focus on

economic returns. He said the US policy of “Pivot to Asia” was ambiguous and was security oriented.

“China’s project is much more specific and it is based on commerce,” Khan added.

Pressure Solves

Pressure on Pakistan works.

Nadim, 3/14/2016 (Hussain, PhD at the University of Sydney. He is also Project Director for the Peace

and Development Unit at the Ministry of Planning, Development & Reforms, Government of Pakistan,

“Pakistan's New Thinking on Security” National Interest Accessed 7/11/16

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/pakistans-new-thinking-security-15489 JJH)

However, many political pundits in Pakistan believe the shift is the result of direct pressure from China,

which has invested more than $50 billion in Pakistan through the development of the China-Pakistan

Economic Corridor (CPEC). This speculation holds that it is Chinese pressure and direction that has

prompted Pakistan to take action for the first time against extremist organizations operating within its

borders under the National Action Plan, and maintain neutrality in the Middle East. Chinese pressure or

not, the ideological and policy changes in Pakistan are real and may result in sustainable peace in the

region.

Pressure on Pakistan can solve – they can effectively remove terrorist presence.

Hussain, 2/8/2016 (Murtaza, journalist and political commentator, “AFTER YEARS OF VIOLENCE,

PAKISTAN IS WINNING ITS FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM” The Intercept Accessed 7/10/16

https://theintercept.com/2016/02/08/after-years-of-violence-pakistan-is-winning-its-fight-against-

terrorism/ JJH)

In the long term, however, given the scale of terrorist violence in Pakistan, which far outpaces that in the

U.S., strengthening and extending the reach of democratic institutions, while cutting support to terrorist

proxies, may be the only way to prevent militant groups from reconstituting themselves. In its short

history, Pakistan has several times found itself going to war to maintain sovereignty over parts of its own

territory. One such failed campaign resulted in the wholesale secession of the eastern half of the country,

while another battle against separatist guerrillas in the province of Baluchistan continues to rage to this

day. The growth of militant and separatist movements in the provinces has long been a consequence of

Pakistan’s failure to economically and politically integrate these regions with the central government. In

the tribal areas in particular, the local population has long suffered from chronic underdevelopment by the

state. Nearly 70 years after Pakistan’s creation, a significant portion of these regions are still governed by

absurd British-era laws that trample on individual rights and freedoms, rendering their inhabitants less

like citizens than colonial subjects. In such an unjust environment, even widely loathed extremist groups

like the TTP will inevitably find recruits. As noted by Georgetown University fellow Claude Rakisits in

the 2011 book Pakistan’s Stability Paradox, “A critical factor that has assisted the growth of this

militancy is the failure since the creation of Pakistan to integrate FATA politically, legally and

economically with the rest of the country.” Military force may now succeed in achieving a temporary

victory in Pakistan’s fight against terrorism . But providing development, legal rights, and political

enfranchisement to the residents of the tribal areas will be necessary to ensure that the battle against the

TTP and other extremist groups will truly come to an end.

CPEC Solves Pakistan Econ

CPEC solves Econ which provides stability

Abid and Ashfaq, 2015 (Massarrat, Professor and Dean of Pakistan Studies Centre @ University of

the Punjab and Ayesha, Assistant Professor of Communication @ University of the Punjab “CPEC:

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan” Pakistan Vision 16.2 Accessed 7/8/16

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-7_v16_2_2015.pdf JJH)

Economic Development China Pakistan Economic Corridor will help build a robust and stable economy

in Pakistan and will create a significant opportunity for Pakistan to revive its industry and advance its

economic interests. It will also help in overcoming the psychological barriers to flows of foreign

investment from other sources. Despite its restrictive economic regime, over 150 private equity funds,

foreign and domestic, are active in India. Only three or four such funds are dedicated to investing

government, with the participation of the private sector, to encourage foreign direct investment in

Pakistan is indispensable.59Finance Minister Ishaq Dar said war phobia can also be defeated through

economic development. Peace and prosperity can be achieved with economic advancement.60 This

project will go beyond regional ambits to bring about enormous changes not only to the national

economies of the benefiting states but also to the economics of the people at the grassroots level.

Solves Regional Security

CPEC is key to regional stability

Abid and Ashfaq, 2015 (Massarrat, Professor and Dean of Pakistan Studies Centre @ University of

the Punjab and Ayesha, Assistant Professor of Communication @ University of the Punjab “CPEC:

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan” Pakistan Vision 16.2 Accessed 7/8/16

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-7_v16_2_2015.pdf JJH)

Pakistan has been playing a significant role in South Asia. After the completion of China Pakistan

Economic Corridor; economic, commercial as well as geostrategic environment will improve in Pakistan.

It will help Pakistan in dealing with the problems of poverty, unemployment and inequities of

undeveloped provinces. During his meeting with President Xi Jinping, President Mamnoon Hussain said the China Pakistan economic

Corridor would prove to be a game-changer in the whole region by generating massive trade and economic activity and opening new vistas of

progress and prosperity for the people of the two countries and about three billion people of the region.48 CPEC from all counts will

prove a game changer and will make China a real stakeholder in Pakistan’s stability and security. It is a

win-win situation for both. It will greatly expand the scope for the sustainable and stable development of

China’s economic development. Investments by China will boost Pakistan’s $274 billion GDP by over 15

%.Corresponding progress and prosperity in Pakistan and China’s patronage will help Pakistan in getting

rid of the decade old labels of ‘epicenter of terrorism’, ‘most dangerous country’ and a ‘failing

state’. Pakistan enjoys a more favorable fiscal situation compared to India by reducing its budget deficit to 4.7% of GDP in 2014 (as against

India’s 7%) and Pakistan is both competitive and cheaper as an emerging market. China’s economic and military assistance will help Pakistan a

great deal in narrowing its ever widening gap in economic-military-nuclear fields with India and in bettering its defense potential. 49 Ambassador

of China to Pakistan Sun Weidong while talking about the corridor said that the setting up of energy, transport, infrastructure and industrial

projects under China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) would benefit all the provinces of Pakistan. He said that the CPEC was not limited to

just a road but it will connect the country with a number of motorways and infrastructure projects. He explained that infrastructure projects

included Gwadar port, the second phase of the upgrading project of Karakoram Highway, motorway project between Karachi and Lahore,

Thakot-Havelian motorway, Gwadar port expressway, Gwadar international airport and Karachi Sukkur motorway, adding further that the project

will increase collaboration in areas of energy, finance, commerce, banking, industry and education.50

CPEC is key to regional stability

Cheema 15 – Zumra Cheema, Master's degree in Defence & Strategic Studies from Quaid-i-Azam

University, Islamabad, 2015, (“Geostrategic importance of China-Pakistan Economic Corridor,” Foreign

Policy News, Available online at http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/11/25/geostrategic-importance-of-

china-pakistan-economic-corridor/, Accessed 7-1-2016, SAA)

At the end of cold war, with the emergence of multi-polar system at international arena, process of globalization got impetus. Resultantly,

interdependence among states increased and now states have begun to develop their diplomatic relations with each other on the basis of their

geostrategic and geopolitical interests. Likewise, Pakistan and China, who are considered as two “all weathered” strategic and diplomatic

partners in South Asia, decided to enlarge their relationship in broader spectrum. In the past, generally they did cooperate

with each other in political and military affairs but over the time, they felt the need to develop economic ties with each

other to gain compatibility in the changing dynamics of the international milieu. Therefore, they started cooperating

with each other in commerce and trade. The bilateral cooperation in almost every field of life strengthened the relations to get deeper with the

passage of time and both countries celebrated year 2011 as “Pak-China friendship year”. Recently, Pakistan and China signed a mega

project called as China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as an endorsement and continuation to the enhancing

bilateral friendly ties between the two countries. The CPEC project is being viewed as very beneficial not

only for the states involved but also for the region as well. Regional connectivity and economic development are two major

aspects of the project. Furthermore, the land-locked Central Asian countries and Afghanistan will get short and

easy access towards the warm-watered Indian maritime under the implementation of CPEC .The project

will prove helpful to tackle the menace of terrorism from the region as well, which is a major risk for the

security and stability of the region. Moreover, through the economic uplift of Pakistan under CPEC, there are

chances for the betterment of India-Pakistan relations. Likewise, there is probability of stability in

Afghanistan, because China would easily access and invest in Afghanistan through the stability and

improved infrastructure of Pakistan. Therefore, Pakistan’s President Nawaz Sharif called CPEC as a “Game-Changer” and “Corridor

to Peace” for the region. The project has tremendous importance for a weaker country like Pakistan. Pakistan and China signed 51

agreements worth of $46 billion under CPEC, The four main areas of collaboration between the two countries are; infrastructure,

transportation, energy, and industrial cooperation. The route of the CPEC has not yet been confirmed, and all that is certain for the moment is its

reach from Kashgar to Gwadar. The CPEC also has immense importance for China. China considers CPEC as “flagship project” because through

this project China will get easy and short routed reach towards the Middle East, Africa and Europe. Additionally, China’s market will further

boost up, and it will become economically stronger. China can also counter the US dominance in the region through the accomplishment of

CPEC. China can play a significant role in the Asian region in terms of economic uplift and regional stability being emerging as an economic

giant and future super power. China will also get the chance to develop its North-western province Xinjiang, which is an under developed area. In

Xinjiang separatist movement has started by Uyghur’s Muslims. Thus, China wants to develop the socio-economic framework of that region.

Only in this way, China can curtail aggressive sentiments against its central government. China sees US “pivot to Asia” strategy against its

fundamental interests. China has view that US wants to hamper its progress and development by improving cooperation and making alliance with

rising powers (India, Singapore, Malaysia, North Korea and other East-Asian countries) so that it can keep its supremacy and hegemony in the

South-Pacific region. Another Chinese concern over CPEC is to find an alternative to Strait of Malacca. The South-China Sea, which is a rich

source of resources and a way towards Strait of Malacca is being disputed among China and other Southeast Asian countries. China imports

largest part of its oil supply through the Strait of Malacca, so it has some reservations that, if other East Asian countries make alliance against

China, then they can impose naval blockade on narrow Strait of Malacca and can choke China economically. Along keeping in view the

importance of CPEC, both the countries should keep various challenges and constraints under consideration. Administrative issues, political

instability, militancy problems and resentment in the domestic labor force in Pakistan are some of the major challenges, which could impede the

proper execution of CPEC. All of these issues need to be address for smooth implementation of the project. In the past, Pakistan and China have

achieved various difficult plans, which were appeared unattainable due to the involved challenges and risks. The Karakorum Highway is an

exemplary to the fact. Currently, there is a need to have better understanding between both participant countries to achieve expected results. Both

countries would have to join hands to assure security situation at the workplace of the project. Moreover, there is a need to achieve proper public

support, therefore, both countries should make clear to their people that the project has huge importance for both countries.

This will further catalyze the speedy and timely completion of the CPEC.

Central Asian Instability Bad

Central Asia war would trigger WWIII with Russia

F. William Engdhal, Global Research Associate, 10/11/08, “The Caucasus —Washington Risks

nuclear war by miscalculation” http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=9790

So far, each step in the Caucasus drama has put the conflict on a yet higher plane of danger. The next step

will no longer be just about the Caucasus, or even Europe. In 1914 it was the "Guns of August" that

initiated the Great War. This time the Guns of August 2008 could be the detonator of World War III and a

nuclear holocaust of unspeakable horror. Nuclear Primacy: the larger strategic danger Most in the West

are unaware how dangerous the conflict over two tiny provinces in a remote part of Eurasia has become.

What is left out of most all media coverage is the strategic military security context of the Caucasus

dispute. Since the end of the Cold War in the beginning of the 1990’s NATO and most directly

Washington have systematically pursued what military strategists call Nuclear Primacy. Put simply, if one

of two opposing nuclear powers is able to first develop an operational anti-missile defense, even

primitive, that can dramatically weaken a potential counter-strike by the opposing side’s nuclear arsenal,

the side with missile defense has "won" the nuclear war. As mad as this sounds, it has been explicit

Pentagon policy through the last three Presidents from father Bush in 1990, to Clinton and most

aggressively, George W. Bush. This is the issue where Russia has drawn a deep line in the sand,

understandably so. The forceful US effort to push Georgia as well as Ukraine into NATO would present

Russia with the spectre of NATO literally coming to its doorstep, a military threat that is aggressive in the

extreme, and untenable for Russian national security. This is what gives the seemingly obscure fight over

two provinces the size of Luxemburg the potential to become the 1914 Sarajevo trigger to a new nuclear

war by miscalculation. The trigger for such a war is not Georgia’s right to annex South Ossetia and

Abkhazia. Rather, it is US insistence on pushing NATO and its missile defense right up to Russia’s door.

Central Asian instability causes Indo-Pak and Korea wars that go nuclear

Reder 6/4/16—Dr. Julian Reder is a former researcher from the University of Hull, (“The Apotheosis

of Central Asia?”, Accessed 7/9/16, Available Online at http://intpolicydigest.org/2016/06/04/the-

apotheosis-of-central-asia/)

The most neglected foreign policy debate today is the role Central Asia will play in the future. Since

2001, the United States, Russia, and China have actively sought strong relations with the Central Asian

countries, which are former Soviet Republics. The centers of the world stage are increasingly driven by

the affairs of the Middle East and East Asia. Regardless of which of these two centers will become

increasingly important to foreign policy interests, Central Asia will play a pivotal role in providing a

geopolitical path as it has for the past fifteen years. The renewed interest in Central Asia may be the first

chapter in the new era of international triangulation in which the three powers previously mentioned are

able to facilitate maximization of benefits and opportunities. During the 1990’s former National Security

Advisor to President Jimmy Carter Zbigniew Brzezinski applied the term “Eurasian Balkans” to Central

Asia. Given the time and chaos in the former Yugoslavia, this obviously ominous term came to signify

Dr. Brzezinski’s trepidation and forewarning that the Central Asian region was a hotbed of territorial,

ethnic, nationalistic, and religious tensions that were akin to a tinderbox. During that decade, the Central

Asian countries were in an inchoate status forming distinct identities different from their Soviet history.

Nearly fifteen years after Dr. Brzezinski laid out his dire assessment of the “Eurasian Balkans,” the

preeminent expert on Central Asia, Professor Alexander Cooley from Columbia University, has asserted

that the region is stricken with kleptocracies and patrimonial ground rules that make it the most

unpredictable and puzzling foreign policy dilemma for all three powers with stakes involved. The world

we are living in today has seen the securitization of collective security. US-NATO forces have pursued

retrenchment from Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, and the region as a whole after being unable to sustain basing

agreements and relocating to Romania and the Czech Republic. Furthermore, there is renewed discussion

of increasing US-NATO operations in Poland, which President Obama decided to cancel in 2009. The

Western collective security organization is beginning a trend of refocusing on Europe and the Middle

East, while increasing American military forces in East Asia via Australia. The United States shows no

effort to reengage with Central Asia on the level it did in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks. China and

Russia have taken measures to increase economic incentives to court the Central Asian kleptocratic

governments in the hopes of oscillating the region toward a non-Western orient. China has outdone

Russia in this regard and even though Russia considers Central Asia as its “near abroad,” China has used

its tremendous economic clout to curry favor and maintain its influence in a region that is a pathway to

Europe and the Middle East. Russia and China lead their own respective collective security organizations:

China’s Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization. The

SCO and CSTO share four potential conflicts as they are both intricately involved with Central Asia and

each other. Central Asia has two festering territorial disputes that can ignite a military confrontation.

While Russia recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia, China does not. China has a long history of

squashing separatism in Tibet, Fujian province, and so forth. China seeks stability and disagrees with

Russia’s frozen conflict paradigm as a means of stopping Georgia from becoming part of the European

Union and NATO. The second flashpoint of territorial conflict is Nagorno-Karabakh between Azerbaijan

and Armenia. The dispute has gone endlessly in circles with no resolution or any of the three outside

interlocutors pursuing mediation. While there may be no tangible political benefit in the current situation,

a peaceful solution today may avert a deadly conflict involving NATO, the SCO, and the CSTO as all

three collective security organizations would be involved in varied degrees. The most underappreciated

feature about Central Asia is that it lies within the sphere of nuclear catastrophe by virtue of the Korean

peninsula and Indian-Pakistani nuclear activities. A spillover effect is more than likely if North Korea,

India, or Pakistan initiate nuclear strikes and it would necessitate a clash of all three collective

security organizations . The focus on Central Asia for the United States has been to provide deterrence

against Islamic extremism and possibly China’s adventures in Southeast Asia and the South China Sea.

Few foreign policymakers in the West have recognized that Central Asia can be a transit point in the

event of Korean and Indian-Pakistani nuclear conflicts. The potential for Central Asia to become a major

source of international attention and activity is without question. Whether it becomes a transit hub

stemming from events on Central Asian borders or a tinderbox because of internal regional religious,

nationalistic, or ethnic strife, Central Asia should not be underestimated. There are also untapped

resources and trade opportunities; this may mean that the three external powers may have to work with

the kleptocratic governments or facilitate a new era of providing trade and security benefits with the

precondition that transparent democratically-elected governments with foreign, unbiased election

observers are ascending to the highest corridors of power. Central Asia is today’s foreign policy question

that must be debated and discussed. Its geographic location and possibilities are now the apotheosis of its

importance in world affairs. The countries in Central Asia now face the dilemma of whether to reform and

pursue bilateral relations with all three external powers or selectively engage on an ad hoc basis and

maintain current government apparatuses that fall short of being constitutional or democratic.

Washington, Moscow, and Beijing would be ill-advised to discount the region for it holds a cornucopia of

trade and geopolitical opportunities. Fifteen years passed since the renewed interest in the region began.

Today we are at a crossroads of where and how Central Asia will feature prominently on the world stage.

CCP will Crackdown on Xinjaing

China will crack down with WMD---wrecks the global taboo and causes nuclear war

Brown 10 – Michael E. Brown, Dean of the Elliott School of International Affairs at George

Washington University, The Ethnicity Reader: Nationalism, Multiculturalism and Migration, Ed.

Guibernau and Rex, p. 104-105

Ethnic Wars and Weapons of Mass Destruction

The proliferation of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction has added a new dimension

to ethnic conflicts: the possibility, however remote, that these weapons could be used in interstate or intrastate

ethnic wars. Both India and Pakistan have nuclear and chemical weapon capabilities, and tensions between the two have

risen to high levels on more than one occasion in recent years.22 One of the main sources of tension between the two is India's claim that Pakistan is supporting

Kashmiri separatists and Pakistan's claim that India is supporting Sindh insurgents. India and Pakistan are also involved in a prolonged, bitter battle over the Siachen

Glacier and their northern border. Russia and Ukraine both have nuclear weapons stationed on their territory, although the

latter does not yet have operational control of the weapons on its soil. Although military hostilities between the two are unlikely at present, they cannot

be ruled out for the future. Another possibility is that central authorities could use weapons of mass destruction

against would-be secessionists in desperate attempts to maintain the integrity of their states. China has

both nuclear and chemical weapon capabilities , and the current regime in Beijing would presumably

use every means at its disposal to prevent Tibet, Xinxiang , or Inner Mongolia from seceding, which

many in these nominally autonomous regions would like to do. Iran has chemical weapon capabilities and is trying to develop or

acquire nuclear weapon capabilities. One suspects that Tehran would not rule out using harsh measures to keep Azeris in northwestern Iran from seceding, should they

become inclined to push this course of action. It is not inconceivable that Russian, Indian, and Pakistani leaders could be persuaded to take similar steps in the face of

national collapse. Use of nuclear or chemical weapons in any of these situations would undermine

international taboos about the use of weapons of mass destruction and, thus, would be detrimental to

international nonproliferation efforts, as well as international security in general . Although the possibility that a state

would use weapons of mass destruction against its citizens might appear remote, it cannot be dismissed altogether: The Iraqi government used chemical weapons in

attacks on Kurdish civilians in the 1980s. Ethnic Wars and Chain Reaction Effects Ethnic conflicts can spread in a number of ways. If

a multiethnic state begins to fragment and allows some ethnic groups to secede, other groups will inevitably press for

more autonomy, if not total independence. This is happening in the former Soviet Union, where 14 republics successfully broke away from Moscow. Now,

other groups want to redefine their relationships with the Russian Federation; as noted earlier, Bashkortostan, Chechnia, Kalmyk, Tatarstan, Tyumen, and Yakutsia

(now Sakha) have been lobbying for—and some have already received— substantial amounts of autonomy from Moscow. India is fighting tenaciously to retain

control of Kashmir because it fears that Kashmiri secession would be the first step in a process that would lead to disintegration of perhaps the most heterogenous state

in the world. The view in Delhi, a view not unsupported by logic and history, is that fragmentation is easier to prevent than control.

Alternate Impacts

Pakistan-Sino Relations Impact

Terrorist attacks on China undermine cooperation with Pakistan.

Khan 13— Dr Rashid Ahmad Khan is Chairman, Department of International Relations & Political

Science, Dean, Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Law, University of Sargodha, Sargodha, 2013

(“Pakistan and China: cooperation in counter-terrorism” Strategic Studies 4.1, March 31, 2013, Accessed

7/1/16, Available online at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1446361143?pq-

origsite=summon&accountid=11091, JRR)

As a member of global coalition against terrorism, Pakistan entered into partnership with a number of

countries, including China, to fight the menace of international terrorism. For Pakistan and China,

however, there were some compelling reasons to strengthen their bilateral cooperation on counter-

terrorism. The two countries are focusing on expanding their economic and trade relations and promoting

connectivity with a view to providing a more solid foundation for a long term strategic partnership and

sustainable friendship. This objective, however, could be achieved only in a peaceful environment. The

deteriorating law and order situation and insecurity in Pakistan undermines the long term, comprehensive

and strategic cooperation between Pakistan and China . The forces of terrorism , extremism and

separatism represent not only internal threats to peace, security and prosperity of the two countries; they

also tend to undermine their long established close friendship and strategic cooperation . In view of

Pakistan and China embarking on a path towards greater cooperation in economic, trade and

investment fields that include energy, agriculture, industry, science and technology, infrastructure

development, water management, mineral development and construction , this issue becomes

particularly pertinent. Acts of terrorism committed against the Chinese workers and engineers in Pakistan

are in fact aimed at sabotaging the fast growing Pakistan-China cooperation in the development sectors.

These attacks began in 2004, a year before Pakistan and China signed, during Premier Wen Jiabao‟s visit

to Pakistan in April 2005, a number of agreements and MoUs for cooperation and joint ventures in a large

number of areas. From 2004 to 2010, there were four separate terrorist attacks on the Chinese workers

engaged in the development projects in different parts of Pakistan. In these attacks 12 Chinese lost their

lives.3 Both Pakistani and the Chinese authorities felt extremely concerned about these terrorist acts. Both

concurred that the terrorist acts were aimed at undermining growing Pakistan-China cooperation in the

development areas, particularly, which related to the development of Pakistan‟s economy. The Chinese

were worried that deteriorating law and order situation in Pakistan, particularly attacks on the Chinese

workers, would deter the Chinese business community from investing in Pakistan. The Chinese

leadership, therefore, advised Pakistan to improve law and order situation in the country and review its

security policy, and for that purpose the Chinese President Hu Jintao even The forces of terrorism,

extremism and separatism represent not only internal threats to peace, security and prosperity of the two

countries; they also tend to undermine their long established close friendship and strategic cooperation.

Strategic Studies 72 offered the visiting Pakistani Prime Minister, Syed Yusuf Raza Gilani, Chinese help

in 2009.4 The disclosure by the Chinese authorities that the terrorists responsible for a recent series of

bomb blasts and murderous attacks on the civilians in Kashgar city of Xinjiang region of China had

received training for making explosives in the tribal areas better known as FATA of Pakistan underlines

the need for the two countries to further intensify their cooperation in counter-terrorism. Both the

countries regard terrorism as a common threat, have similarity of views on the nature of this threat, have

been cooperating at various levels to eliminate this threat and have time and again reiterated their firm

resolve to jointly fight the terrorists, extremists and separatists. From Pakistan‟s perspective, any attempt

to destabilize Xinjiang will have an adverse impact on the prospects of trade with China. As President

Zardari, during his recent visit to Xinjiang said, the development in the region would provide the

Pakistani entrepreneurs an opportunity to expand trade with China. He also underlined the strategic

importance of Kashgar as an intersection for facilitating and promoting communication between Pakistan

and China, Central Asia and beyond.5

Sharif 2018 Impact

Now is key for CPEC – there needs to be early returns on investments to ensure

stable governance.

Markey and West, 5/12/2016 (Daniel S., Adjunct Senior Fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia

@ CFR, and James, Research Associate, India, Pakistan, and South Asia @CFR, “Behind China’s

Gambit in Pakistan” Council on Foreign Relations Accessed 7/5/16 http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/behind-

chinas-gambit-pakistan/p37855 JJH)

Security Through Development Understanding the CPEC requires an appreciation for China’s security

concerns, especially those stemming from its restive western region of Xinjiang. Beijing has sought to

clamp down on Xinjiang’s ethnic Uighur community and has met political violence with an expanded

security presence and push for economic development schemes. These efforts implicate Pakistan because

Uighur militant groups, like the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), have sought refuge in the

Pakistan-Afghanistan border areas, where they have established links with al-Qaeda and the Taliban in

Afghanistan and Pakistan. China perceives the ETIM as a persistent threat, committed to targeting China

and attacking Chinese interests (PDF) inside Pakistan. In this context, the CPEC represents an

international extension of China’s effort to deliver security through economic development. Investments

in Pakistan are intended to create jobs, reduce antistate sentiment, and generate public resources for

additional improvements in law and order. By tackling the threat of jihadi organizations in neighboring

Pakistan, China hopes to better secure its own territory. Consequently, while the CPEC is often portrayed

as a transportation corridor, security concerns will likely impose limits on the cross-border flow of people

and goods, at least in the short to medium term. Pakistan’s ruling civilian and military leaders also

appreciate the economic, political, and security opportunities that the CPEC offers. Pakistan needs direct

investment to spur economic growth, but investors have generally shied away over the past decade. If

delivered, China’s investment plan represents more than double all foreign direct investment (FDI) in

Pakistan since 2008. China’s investments in energy infrastructure are especially welcome. National

demand outstrips supply by an average of 4,500 megawatts. Supply shortages and distribution problems

lead to frequent blackouts and cost as much as 2 percent GDP growth (PDF) a year. These troubles will

worsen as Pakistan’s population of nearly two hundred million expands at a rate of almost 2 percent

(PDF) annually. Without the creation of new jobs, however, the nation’s youth (over half of Pakistanis are

under the age of twenty-four) will lack productive outlets for their energies. In a state riven by sectarian,

ethnic, and political cleavages and populated by networks of extremism and militancy, the need for a

growing economy takes on special significance. Politically, Pakistan’s ruling civilian government

recognizes that by delivering a range of “early harvest” projects, it will have a better chance of winning

national elections slated for 2018. From a security perspective, Pakistan’s military leaders believe that

if Chinese investments can turn around the nation’s sagging economic fortunes, they will also strengthen

the state against challengers, both foreign (India) and domestic (antistate insurgents).

Sharif maintain power is the only hope for long-term Pakistan stability

Hussain, 5/31/2016 (Tom, “Nawaz Sharif is the only viable option for Pakistan” Aljazeera Accessed

7/10/16 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2016/05/nawaz-sharif-viable-option-pakistan-

160530095043904.html JJH)

With her gone, Sharif is the only politician in Pakistan with the stature of a credible national leader, albeit

it a highly flawed one. Thus Pakistanis have good reason to feel nervous about their prime minister's

scheduled open-heart surgery on Tuesday. Sharif's detractors, after pausing briefly to pray for his

recovery, have created a furore about who, constitutionally, can rule Pakistan while he is indisposed.

Perhaps they should broaden their perspective. Minus Nawaz Sharif, Pakistan would be leaderless at a

time when it is deeply involved in fighting two insurgencies - one against the Taliban, the other against

Baloch rebels. Its economy is tentatively emerging from eight years of austerity. Meanwhile, Pakistan's

relations with neighbouring Afghanistan and India are uncomfortably antagonistic, and it is being

diplomatically squeezed by the United States on matters of national security, as evidenced by the US

drone strike that recently killed Taliban leader Mullah Akhtar Mansoor. As such, any pursuit of Sharif's

political demise that is not focused on a legitimate transfer of power after the 2018 general election is

rooted in callous disregard for Pakistan's stability. Those political actors are either blind to the nationally

divisive consequences of their actions, or just don't care.

Sino-Pak Relations Impact

CPEC is key to Pakistan economic development and Sino-Pak relations

The Indian Express, 4/18/2016 (“China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Pakistan’s road of high

hopes” Accessed 7/5/16 http://indianexpress.com/article/explained/cpec-pakistan-china-nawaz-sharif-xi-

jinping-2758111/ JJH)

The CPEC can theoretically be a gamechanger for Pakistan. At a time when terrorism has severely

affected Pakistan’s prospects of foreign investment, the $ 46 bn promised by China is three times the total

FDI it has got in the last decade. The project is estimated to directly create some 700,000 jobs up to 2030,

and speed up GDP growth significantly. Investors will be backed by Beijing and Chinese banks, and

Pakistan will not pick up any more debt in the process. The bulk of the investment will be in energy. $

15.5 bn worth of coal, wind, solar and hydro energy projects will come online by 2017 and add 10,400

megawatts to the national grid, Dawn and Reuters reported, quoting officials. In all, Pakistan expects to

add 16,000 MW by 2021, and reduce power shortage by 4,000-7,000 MW. The shortage of power has

been a huge issue in Pakistan, including in elections, and has sparked violent protests . The CPEC deal

also includes $ 5.9 bn for road projects and $ 3.7 bn for railway projects, all to be developed by 2017. A $

44 million optical fibre cable between China and Pakistan will be built too. Pakistani newspapers have

been reporting great enthusiasm for the project, including domestic investment aligned to the CPEC’s

goals. Besides the potential for growth, power and jobs, Pakistan also expects the CPEC to bind it in an

even tighter embrace with close friend China, giving it greater strategic leverage with both India and the

United States in the Indian Ocean region.

Energy Crisis Impact

CPEC is key to Pakistan’s energy crisis.

Abid and Ashfaq, 2015 (Massarrat, Professor and Dean of Pakistan Studies Centre @ University of

the Punjab and Ayesha, Assistant Professor of Communication @ University of the Punjab “CPEC:

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan” Pakistan Vision 16.2 Accessed 7/8/16

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-7_v16_2_2015.pdf JJH)

Overcoming Energy crises Energy is described as life line of the economy of any country. It is most

vibrant instrument of socioeconomic development of a country. Due to population growth and industrial

demand, there have been severe energy crises in Pakistan. The major reason behind Pakistan’s poor

power generation is the political instability and the exponentially increasing demand for power and lack

of efficiency. No significant solution to the problem has yet been found and it continues to torment the

citizens as power supply is one of the basic necessities in this era of modern technology. Power blackouts

and load shedding (deliberate blackouts) are common in every area around Pakistan especially the major

cities. Wapda and KESC have failed to tackle the problem that exposes the failure of the system of the

state.51 CPEC is the ideal project which will help rid country of the energy crises. Energy availability in

country will revive existing industries, such as textile to full production and add an estimated 2 percent to

Pakistan’s GDP growth.52 Chief Minister Punjab, Shahbaz Sharif said that China is extending great

economic cooperation to Pakistan and that the government is making serious effort for resolving the

energy crisis and a number of projects with Chinese cooperation would start producing electricity.53

Planning Development and Reforms Minister Ahsan Iqbal said CPEC framework will cover four major

areas and energy zone is one of them. In the energy sector, project totaling 10,400 megawatts had been

included in the early harvest (first priority) programme, which could be completed by 2018. In all,

Chinese firms will put up $35 to $37bn in the foreign direct investment for independent power production

(IPP)under an investment policy that was available to all investors.54 These projects would be based on

wind, solar, coal and hydropower generation of 16,400 MW as well as the transmission system and would

be located in all the provinces and Azad Kashmir. He further said China would be setting up 10 projects

of 6,600MW in the Thar Desert that would transform this remote and underdeveloped region into

Pakistan’s energy capital and open up economic opportunities for the people.50

Answers To

A2: Squo Solves Terror (General)

Gains aren’t fixing the problem – Pakistan still supports terror.

Washington Post 16 (“The Easter bombing is the latest reminder that Pakistan must stop tolerating

terrorism”, March 30th, Accessed 7/1/16, Available Online at

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-easter-bombing-is-the-latest-reminder-that-pakistan-must-

stop-tolerating-terrorism/2016/03/30/0e5dbc34-f693-11e5-8b23-538270a1ca31_story.html, JRR)

PAKISTAN HAS made progress in fighting terrorism in the past two years, but a horrific suicide bombing in

one of its heartland cities on Sunday showed how serious the threat remains. A militant dispatched by an offshoot of

the Pakistani Taliban attacked a crowd of families in Lahore who were peacefully strolling in a park on Easter; the group later said Christians

were its target. In the end, more than 70 people were killed, the majority of them Muslim, including some 30 children. Since a 2014 attack on a

school that left more than 150 dead, the Pakistani government — and more importantly, its military — has finally

begun to fight in earnest against domestic jihadists. But the latest attack exposes the gaps in the

campaign. A long-overdue army offensive destroyed Taliban bases in the western frontier territories, forcing many of the militants into

eastern Afghanistan. Progress was also made in combating terrorists in the southern city of Karachi. Last year saw a noticeable reduction in

successful attacks. Pakistani authorities largely neglected militant groups deployed in other parts of the

country, however, including in populous Punjab province, where Lahore is located. They have also shrunk from measures needed to protect

religious minorities, including Pakistani Christians, who number more than 2 million. A poisonous blasphemy law, which provides the death

penalty for perceived insults to Islam, remains in force and is regularly used to target Christians. Pakistan’s failings are hardly unique: Christians

are in danger of being eliminated as a significant minority community across the Middle East. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, like the Taliban,

have adopted the genocidal aim of killing all non-Muslims, a departure from Islamic law as well as centuries of practical coexistence. Christians

are being systematically driven out of Iraq, and communities in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and the Palestinian territories are shrinking as refugees flee

to the West. Even as President Obama and responsible leaders in Europe try to fight prejudice against Muslims, Muslim governments are fueling

demagogues such as Donald Trump by failing to protect Christians. Following the attack in Lahore, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif

vowed in a televised address to fight terrorism “until it is rooted out from our society,” and authorities arrested hundreds of suspected militants.

But the government faces formidable opposition: In Islamabad, thousands of demonstrators this week protested the execution of an extremist

convicted of assassinating a governor who criticized the blasphemy law. The best approach, as Pakistan should have

learned by now, is not to tolerate or negotiate with such extremists, but to forcefully confront them.

Exceptions cannot be made for jihadists who fight for causes favored by the Pakistani elite, such as the

“liberation” of Kashmir from Indian rule, or Taliban battling the Afghan government. While Mr. Sharif and the military

leadership have come a long way toward accepting those tenets, they have not yet fully embraced them.

That means terrorism will remain a threat to Pakistan for the foreseeable future.

A2: No Internal To Nuke Terror

Pakistan will be the suppliers of non-state actors with nuclear material.

Smith, 2011 (Paul J., Prof. of National Security Affairs @ US Naval War College “The China–

Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the “War on Terrorism”” Asian Affairs: An

American Review 38:4 Taylor and Francis

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291 JJH)

The weapons of mass destruction factor—particularly nuclear technology and materials—adds a powerful

urgency to worries about Pakistan’s links to global militant organizations, especially given fears that

Pakistan could fall under the control of militants. Pakistan played a central in the A. Q. Khan nuclear

smuggling network. Although the activities of the Khan network have been portrayed as the actions of

rogue scientists and individuals who operated outside of official state direction, more careful analysis

suggests purposeful state involvement, particularly with regard to Pakistan-Iran nuclear cooperation.110

Consequently, Pakistan is perceived to be a key node in potential international proliferation networks,

especially with regard to the possibility of nuclear materials being transferred from the state into the

hands of nonstate actors. In 2008, the American Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission stated:

“Were one to map terrorism and weapons of mass destruction today, all roads would intersect in

Pakistan .”111 Today, Pakistan is believed to be the fifth largest nuclear power in the world (ahead of

France and Britain), with an estimated one hundred deployed nuclear weapons.112 Concerned about

proliferation possibilities, the United States has unsuccessfully attempted to remove a stockpile of highly

enriched uranium located near an aging nuclear reactor in Pakistan. The U.S. government provided this

uranium to Pakistan in the 1960s under the Atoms for Peace Program, during an era in which Washington

gave “little thought to proliferation [because] Pakistan seemed too poor and backward to join the nuclear

race.”113 The United States reportedly is concerned about diversion by insiders of nuclear material to

militants. The issue has gained such priority in Washington that the Obama administration characterized

the imperative to prevent terrorists from gaining access to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program as a “vital

interest.”114 Consequently, Pakistan is likely to remain the center of gravity for much global terrorism

for many years (and possibly decades) to come. Historically, the United States and China have had the

greatest ability to positively influence the Pakistani government, particularly when they act in concert

toward common objectives. Beijing and Washington also have a strategic interest in mitigating or

containing Pakistan-originating militant Islamist activities within their own borders or other areas

associated with their national interests. However, before cooperation can be effective, both countries will

need to reconcile differences in how each views Pakistan’s terrorism challenges. For example, China

seeks to boost Pakistan’s nuclear program, presumably to maintain Pakistan as a strategic hedge against

India, while the United States would prefer to restrain such capabilities out of concern for proliferation

and linkages to terrorism. In addition, the larger challenge of an emerging U.S.-China rivalry

worldwide—and the implications of reduced cooperation on global challenges such as terrorism—must be

managed to prevent Pakistani leaders from playing the two powers against each other.

A2: CPEC Injects Too Much Money

Doesn’t inject too much money.

Ahmed, 1/24/2016 (Shahzada Irfan, “A question of capacity” The News on Sunday Accessed 7/8

http://tns.thenews.com.pk/question-capacity/#.V3wVZfkrLIU JJH)

The efficiency of the country’s human resource is also being questioned in the context of CPEC. There

are doubts that the administrative, technical, and operational capacity of the local workforce employed in

the CPEC may not match the Chinese efficiency and make absorption of this huge investment difficult. If

these issues are not handled properly the CPEC can be a non-starter. Such fears are strengthened by the

fact that Chinese companies have stepped back from energy projects in Pakistan in the past, owing to

public sector incapacity, unclear tariff structures, and other regulatory issues. Adil Najam, Dean,

Frederick S. Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University thinks otherwise. He feels there is no

reason why Pakistan should not be able to absorb the CPEC investments. “We keep using the $46 billion

number as if it’s going to be delivered to us in cash in one go. Much of this will not come directly into the

economy as cash. Some will be accounting artifacts with the budget. Parts of this — maybe large parts —

will go to Chinese companies for work in Pakistan. And so on.” But even if this is pumped into the

economy as cash, it would happen over a number of years. “Let’s assume it will be around $10 billion a

year. But let us remember that the size of the Pakistan economy is around $280-300 billion per year. So,

at least theoretically, there is no reason why an economy should not be able to absorb a three to four per

cent additional injection.”

A2: Squo Solves – Reconciliation

China’s current reconciliation strategy will fail.

Clarke 15—Michael Clarke is Associate Professor at the National Security College, ANU, 2015, (“In

Afghanistan, China Is Put to the Test”, August 18, 2015, Accessed 7/1/16, Available Online at

http://nationalinterest.org/issue/july-august-2016, JRR)

Even after the events of 9/11 and U.S. and NATO intervention to oust the Taliban, Beijing continued to seek similar assurances

from the group’s leadership council in exile in Pakistan, the Quetta Shura. Ultimately, Beijing’s pragmatism vis-à-

vis the Taliban has been based on the judgement that it will remain a core political actor in the country

and that its goals remain limited primarily to Afghanistan. Recent reports of the defection of some elements of the Taliban

and associated fellow travellers, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), to IS however should give Beijing reason to reassess these

judgements. The demise of Mullah Omar and the apparent fracturing of the Taliban, as Andrew Small recently noted,

fundamentally undermines China’s push for a political settlement as “Beijing risks being in the position

of pushing peace talks...with a wing of the Taliban, rather than with representatives who can carry the

broader movement with them.” The switch of allegiance of groups such as the IMU to IS should also be

worrisome for Beijing. The IMU has in the past hosted Uyghur militants in camps along the Af-Pak frontier, a threat underlined in

February this year when Afghan government security forces arrested fifteen Uyghur militants in Kunar Province along the border with Pakistan

who had formerly been affiliated Pakistani Taliban. Second, the multiple bomb attacks that have rocked Kabul on August

10 and August 12, killing fifty and injuring hundreds, has prompted Beijing to offer increased provision

of equipment and support to Afghan security forces. Will this go beyond the supply of limited “non-lethal” security equipment

and training (largely to Afghan police) that has characterized Beijing’s activities in this realm in the recent past? The rising number of

terrorist attacks in Xinjiang over the past year, which Chinese officials have linked to instability in

Afghanistan and Pakistan and the rise of IS, combined with perceptions of its own growing interests

and influence may prompt Beijing to modify this stance. While there has been no official change announced in Beijing,

it is clear that some are beginning to question the utility of current policy. Indeed, even the Global Times, the CCP’s English-language

mouthpiece, published an editorial in October last year that suggested while greater involvement in Afghanistan “will bring huge risks,” Beijing

has no choice but to “be there” and “bear the cost of being a major power.” Finally, President Ghani’s charge in the wake of Monday’s bombings

that Pakistan is in a state of “undeclared war with Afghanistan” due to its provision of safe havens to the Taliban promises to inject further

tension into Beijing’s “all weather friendship” with Pakistan. A key element of Beijing’s strategy to encourage a political

settlement in Afghanistan has been built on the belief that it can leverage its influence with Pakistan to

compel the Taliban to the negotiating table. Pakistan’s continuing provision of safe haven for the Taliban

and associated militants (such as Uyghurs) not belies this belief but also actively undermines China’s

interest in achieving a stable Afghanistan. With the Taliban fracturing, IS influence on the rise and the utility of its close ties to

Pakistan in the Afghan context arguably declining, the question remains as to how high a cost Beijing is willing to pay to

secure its interests as a “major power” in Afghanistan?

CPEC/OBOR Addon

2ac CPEC Key OBOR

CPEC is a key spearhead for OBOR

Global Times 15- Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Sun Weidong. Photo: Li Hao/GT Editor's Note:

Chinese Ambassador to Pakistan Sun Weidong (Sun) spoke with Global Times reporter Chu Daye (GT)

in a recent exclusive interview about the ­China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), the flagship project

of China's "One Belt and One Road" (OBOR) initiative, which aims to improve infrastructure

connectivity of neighboring countries and regions. The following is an excerpt of the interview.

GT: CPEC is regarded by the media as the flagship project of the OBOR initiative. What do you think is the key element in ensuring the success

of CPEC? Sun: CPEC is a major and pioneering project of the OBOR initiative proposed by President Xi Jinping. After

Premier Li Keqiang's visit to Pakistan in May 2013, the two governments set up the Joint Cooperation Committee (JCC), with working groups on

different sectors to help promote cooperation. So far, the JCC has held four meetings. Working groups such as energy, infrastructure, planning

have held a number of meetings and field visits were also conducted. CPEC borders the Silk Road Economic Belt to the North, and connects to

the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in the South. China and Pakistan are all-weather strategic cooperative partners, and the government and

people of Pakistan have expressed unanimous hope that the CPEC could play a key role in the development of Pakistan by

invigorating its economy. The hope is in line with the principles of the OBOR initiative. The Chinese Embassy

in Pakistan hopes to seize this opportunity to push forward the building of the CPEC by working with relevant

government organizations, serving as a bridge, providing policy guidance and protection to Chinese

enterprises in Pakistan. We will do our best to create a favorable external environment for the CPEC. President Xi's recent visit in April

has achieved a lot concerning CPEC. Our job now is to implement and deliver. I believe the key in pushing forward the development of CPEC is

a down-to-earth approach to see every project, proposal and agreement get fully implemented. GT: How do you view the exemplary role of

CPEC under the framework of the OBOR initiative? Sun: The CPEC is an important part of the OBOR initiative. CPEC

not only benefits Pakistan and China but also boosts regional connectivity and common development and

prosperity of the region. In the planning and building of CPEC, the two sides have been working closely. China's National Development

and Reform Commission, Pakistan's Ministry of Planning, Development and Reform are playing a leading role in the JCC. China's Ministry of

Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Commerce, Ministry of Transport and the National Energy Administration are also playing an active and significant

part. CPEC also scientifically combines the early harvest projects with medium to long-term planning. The

two sides have set up a framework that includes the Gwadar Port, energy, infrastructure building and industrial cooperation as the four pillars in

building the CPEC. From these aspects, CPEC could serve as a pilot project under the OBOR initiative . CPEC

could also create favorable conditions for the OBOR initiative and strengthen the unparalleled

partnerships between China and Pakistan.

OBOR is key to China-EU Relations

Yan 15- Shaohua Yan PhD- University of Hong Kong, Researcher for the EU, Translator and Editor for

Outlook China, Communication Officer at the Foreign Affairs Office at Nankai University, “Why the

‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative Matters for the EU: China’s grand initiative represents all sorts of

opportunities for Europe.” http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/why-the-one-belt-one-road-initiative-matters-

for-the-eu/ TMY 7/5/16

Trade and commerce have been at the core of EU-China relationship. The EU has been China’s largest trading partner since 2004,

and China is the EU’s second largest trading partner. Two-way trade reached $615.1 billion in 2014. This trade

interdependence should be a major incentive for the EU to pay close attention to and engage in the OBOR

project. As trade is highly reliant on transport infrastructure, the OBOR project is sure to have implications for

EU-China trade. For centuries, the long distance between Europe and China has been a natural obstacle to

strengthening bilateral trade relations . As the OBOR project concentrates on enhancing connectivity and

transport infrastructure, there is huge potential to enlarge and accelerate the movements of goods between

China and Europe. This is evidenced by the existing Trans-Eurasia railroad that connects the City of Chongqing in southwestern China to the German city

of Duisburg. According to a CNN report, this rail route takes only 16 days, making it much faster than the lengthier shipping routes. Since its opening in 2011, China

has transported $2.5 billion worth of goods to Europe via this route. China, of course, is not the only beneficiary from this improved connectivity. It is estimated that

using this rail line, the delivery of a European car to China could be reduced to 25 days, comparing to two months by sea, thus reducing the time cost of shipping.

Similar trading benefits could also extend to the countries along the line. In addition to the potential benefits of the accelerated movement of goods, Europe

could also benefit from participating in the OBOR initiative itself. Although the OBOR is a Chinese

initiative, China will not be able to do it all alone, but will require international contributions and

cooperation. In this regard, EU countries have an important role to play as well as much to gain. According to

international strategist Farzam Kamalabadi, Europe could cooperate with China in this sweeping initiative by taking

advantage of its advanced technology, capital, and management experience. The decision of several EU countries

(U.K., Germany, France, and Italy) to join the AIIB may be a step in this direction. European countries would also benefit from Chinese

investment in the OBOR project, which is expected to reach $1.6 trillion. As China has huge capacity in manufacturing and infrastructure building

backed by abundant foreign reserves, there is also an opportunity for Europe to update and reinforce its own

infrastructure, something that would be conducive to its economic recovery and growth in the long run. A recent example is that during the 2nd China-Central

and Eastern Europe summit in 2013, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang announced plans to jointly build a railway between Serbia and Hungary.

China-EU relations solve world peace.

Yang 2/4/2015 (Yani, Ambassador to China, “China-EU Relations: Broader, Higher and Stronger”

Accessed 7/12/16 https://euobserver.com/stakeholders/127497 JJH)

To pursue common development of China, the EU and the rest of the world, we will continue to

implement the China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, advancing in particular negotiations

over a bilateral investment agreement. We will strengthen cooperation in travel facilitation, high-tech,

infrastructure, energy, transportation and business in an effort to build a Eurasia market. We will enhance

our communication and coordination in G20, IMF, World Bank and other multilateral fora. By greater

and better cooperation, we will offer each other more opportunities for development and drive economic

growth on the Eurasian continent and globally. To uphold world peace and development as well as

international justice and post-WWII order, China will work with the EU and the wider international

community to firmly oppose any attempts to whitewash history. We will work together to shape the post-

2015 development agenda that serves the interests of all, particularly developing countries. We will

intensify communication and coordination as we address terrorism, proliferation and climate change.

Confucius says, at the age of 40, one will no longer suffer from perplexities. After 40 years, China-EU

relations have grown more mature and vibrant with broad prospects. I am confident that with our

concerted efforts, the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership will deliver even greater success

and contribute more to world peace, stability and prosperity.

Ext. CPEC Key OBOR

CPEC is vital foundation for OBOR

APP 16 - The Express Tribune ‘CPEC has set foundation for industrial cooperation’-

http://tribune.com.pk/story/1094917/cpec-has-set-foundation-for-industrial-cooperation/ May 1, 2016,

TMY 7/9/16

The momentum generated by the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) has opened a world of

opportunities and is fast putting fundamentals of industrial cooperation between the two countries in

place, Federal Minister for Planning, Development and Reform Ahsan Iqbal said. Speaking at a seminar

titled “Industrial Parks in Pakistan” held in Beijing, Iqbal said the CPEC – the flagship project of One

Belt One Road – had made tremendous progress so far in terms of infrastructure and energy projects.

Chinese imports hurt Pakistan’s men of steel “Time is ripe for businesses from both sides to further

develop the foundations laid by the two governments and for business-to-business cooperation,” Iqbal

said. Chinese investment and technology along with Pakistan’s location and low production cost has

made a winning combination. The minister said through various projects, energy shortage would be

overcome, which was the first prerequisite for industrial development. The second requirement is a strong

infrastructure and in the next two years, Gwadar port will have improved infrastructure with new roads

and a modern airport. Talking about peace and security, Iqbal said the government had taken solid steps

not only to improve security situation in the country but was also working with China to improve the

situation in the region. Discussing the plan of establishing industrial parks in Pakistan, he outlined the

available opportunities in various sectors. China bank lending rebounds strongly in March Highlighting

their potential to create employment, Iqbal asked Chinese businessmen to form joint ventures to develop

and maintain a partnership-based relationship. The seminar was attended by representatives of Chinese

enterprises and government functionaries from both sides.

Ext. OBOR Key to EU Relation

OBOR key to EU relations

Yan 15- Shaohua Yan PhD- University of Hong Kong, Researcher for the EU, Translator and Editor for

Outlook China, Communication Officer at the Foreign Affairs Office at Nankai University, “Why the

‘One Belt One Road’ Initiative Matters for the EU: China’s grand initiative represents all sorts of

opportunities for Europe.” http://thediplomat.com/2015/04/why-the-one-belt-one-road-initiative-matters-

for-the-eu/ TMY 7/5/16

Development and security are closely linked, and the OBOR Initiative has positive implications for peace and

security, in addition to the potential to reinforce economic exchange and intensify trade relations between

the EU and China. On its way to Europe, the OBOR initiative encompasses some of the most unstable countries

and regions in the world, including Central Asia and the Middle East, areas that constitute the EU’s “extended neighborhood” and have

significance for European security. One of the EU’s foreign policy objectives is to further engage China in

the international community and encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder. Meanwhile, in responding to

the criticism that China has been “free-rider” in international society, the Chinese President Xi Jinping made it clear that China is willing to share development

opportunities. Since China is determined to carry out the OBOR project, it also means that China is willing to

align itself with the destiny of other countries, as the OBOR aspires to forge a “community of shared

interests, destiny and responsibility.” The OBOR initiative could thus serve as an opportunity for the EU to

deepen cooperation with China in terms of both development and security. As the OBOR project unfolds, it is likely

to encounter multifarious security challenges, requiring China to cooperate with Europe to protect its own interests. The

current crises in the Middle East and Ukraine are cases in point. The Iran nuclear crisis and continuing

conflict in Ukraine raise questions about the feasibility of China’s OBOR initiative, but this common challenge could provide an

opportunity for the EU and China to bolster their security cooperation.

China Terror Addon

2ac China Terror

Squo ensures terrorist attacks against China.

Small, 2015 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He has

worked on Chinese foreign policy issues in Beijing, Brussels, London, and Washington DC., The China-

Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics pg 209-210)

The most obvious security issues that Beijing faces are to its east. Strategic competition with the United

States largely plays out in the Asia Pacific. China’s historical rivalries are with its East Asian neighbours.

The greatest risk of China becoming embroiled in a war is over its maritime disputes in the South China

and East China Seas. These are the main testing grounds for China’s capacity and intentions as a great

power. But they are also contests of choice, typically occurring at a time and manner of Beijing’s

choosing. Shifts in the economic and military balance of power in the Asia Pacific have so far moved

inexorably in China’s favour. It is Beijing’s impatience, its assertiveness, that is the greatest risk to

China’s rising power. In China’s western neighbourhood, by contrast, it has been Beijing’s caution and its

unwillingness to try to steer developments in a direction consonant with Chinese interest, that pose the

greater problem. Xinjiang looks more and more like an Achilles heel, a vulnerability that is growing

increasingly exposed as China’s rise continues. Even if the Pakistani army’s campaign succeeds in the

narrow objective of displacing Uighur and IMU fighters from Pakistan itself, the problems for China in

this respect continue to mount. Attacks in Xinjiang have become virtually a weekly occurrence. And

Uighur militants, by now well networked across the jihadi world during their years in North Waziristan,

have been appearing as far afield as Iraq and Syria fighting with the so-called Islamic State. Where

Osama Bin Laden and Mullah Omar judiciously weighed the risks of taking China on as an enemy, the

newer generation of militants, whether the TTP or ISIS, have had no such qualms. And unlike Beijing’s

carefully calibrated escalations in East Asia, the threats emerging in its west have caught it looking

seriously unprepared.

Terrorists attacks cause counter-terrorism leads to repression in Xinjaing – Xi spins

terrorism as a state power issue.

Clarke 16 Michael Clarke, writer at CNN, 2016 (“How China uses fear of terrorism to justify increased

state power,” CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2016/06/08/asia/china-xinjiang-terrorism-clarke/, June 8th,

accessed 7/14/16) WP

The NSC has made "national security" synonymous with state or regime security, while the new legislation

provides legal basis for security services to identify and suppress individuals or groups deemed to be

"terrorists," and requires internet providers and tech companies to provide assistance, including encryption keys, during counter-terrorism

operations. While official pronouncements stress that the law's primary purpose is to strengthen Beijing's

ability to ensure the security and safety of the country's citizenry and interests at home and abroad, a

closer examination suggests that ensuring the security of the state lies at its heart. Since coming to power, President

Xi Jinping has focused on two core domestic security issues: Xinjiang and wenwei, or "stability

maintenance," campaigns. Under Xi, the threat of terrorism in Xinjiang has been instrumentalized

nationwide to assist in Communist Party efforts to maintain "stability." "The mobilization of the Uyghur

terror threat," as Tom Cliff has recently argued, is "not simply about preventing terror attacks on Han civilians—it is

primarily about rapidly or even pre-emptively 'harmonizing' potentially unstable elements of the Han

population itself." Two of the Communist Party's core interests -- the security of the one-party state, and "stability" in Xinjiang -- have thus

become increasingly intersected.

Relations Adv.

Extensions of 1ac Args

Ext. US Key

CPEC will fail without additional investments – electricity generation is greater

than line capacity – US additions solve.

Ahmed, 1/24/2016 (Shahzada Irfan, “A question of capacity” The News on Sunday Accessed 7/8

http://tns.thenews.com.pk/question-capacity/#.V3wVZfkrLIU JJH)

However, he stresses on the need to improve business-government interface and Public Sector Development Programme (PSDP) governance, in

order to reap benefits of the CPEC and attract domestic and foreign investment from other sources.

“CPEC should not be considered as an alternative to domestic investment mobilisation, which is critically

low at the moment.” The CPEC project is not going to be executed in isolation and may need investment

by the government in creating a supporting environment. But where will this additional investment come from? Saeed Alam,

an economist, believes that the transmission line of KP and Balochistan will not be able to take the load of

electricity generated from power plants set up under the CPEC. “Who will invest in upgrading this

transmission line?” he asks. While the National Assembly has given a clean chit to the CPEC, the recent debate on it in the Senate hints at

several issues that have the potential to create disputes among different provinces in the near future. For example, there are concerns about

shifting of substandard coal-power production plants from China — a country which has pledged to shift to renewable sources of producing

energy.

Security is the ultimate spoiler – it can destroy CPEC

Abid and Ashfaq, 2015 (Massarrat, Professor and Dean of Pakistan Studies Centre @ University of

the Punjab and Ayesha, Assistant Professor of Communication @ University of the Punjab “CPEC:

Challenges and Opportunities for Pakistan” Pakistan Vision 16.2 Accessed 7/8/16

http://pu.edu.pk/images/journal/studies/PDF-FILES/Artical-7_v16_2_2015.pdf JJH)

Balochistan is one of the most important areas of Pakistan; a surprising location for what officials hope will become one of

the world’s great trade routes, linking the deepwater port of Gwadar with the city of Kashgar.22 This province has been dogged for

over a decade by a bloody separatist insurgency. Baloch insurgents, who oppose Balochistan specially Gwadar’s

development have blown up numerous gas pipelines and trains and have attacked Chinese engineers.23 They

do not want to see Balochistan to develop as an economic and trade hub unless it becomes independent. They fear that if Balochistan develops and Gwadar port becomes a thriving port, then outsiders would move in. That could weigh the province’s

demographic balance even further against the Balochs.24 Ethno-sectarian is another important cause of insurgency in Balochistan as if this was

not enough for keeping Balochistan tense, controversy over China Pakistan Economic Corridor project (CPEC) has

added more fuel to the blaze. Going by the history of the earlier Balochistan related mega projects, the CPEC is likely to

become increasingly contentious.25 Muhammad Ali Talpur in an article under the caption ‘A few questions answered’ wrote: “The

China Pakistan Economic Corridor is the center of interest for China, Pakistan and, naturally the world, as all perceive it according to the strategic

and economic advantages and disadvantages it holds for them, whatever importance it may hold for others, it is extremely important for the

Baloch whose lives it will destroy in the name of development.”26 Various separatist leaders of the Balochistan province are opposing the China-

Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). In this respect, Brahamdagh Bugti, the leader of the outlawed Baloch Republican Party (BRP), criticized

the CPEC and Gwadar port projects and called for an UNsponsored referendum in Balochistan to decide its future. He alleged the

military equipment and funds obtained by Pakistan from the US and other western countries for

combating terrorists and extremist groups were also being used against the democratic and political

struggle of the Baloch people.27 There have been occasional kidnappings and killings of Chinese workers in Balochistan. Baloch

separatists attacked tankers carrying fuel to a Chinese company working on a mining project. Gwadar port, which was recently put under the

management of a Chinese state-owned company, is a particular target. Militants do not want to see it developed.28 Siddiq Baloch, editor of the

Balochistan Express newspaper, said the rebels want to scare off investors and developers who are working with the Pakistani government —

such as the Chinese. He further said that there is the thinking that by doing this, they want to disrupt the working of the economy, disrupt the

administration and challenge the administration in the area.29 It is high time that concerns of Balochistan are addressed

prudently. For a project as big as the CPEC, which is potentially a game-changer for the economy of all

the provinces, the nation cannot afford to fall in the trap of spoilers.30

Ext. Plan Solves US-China Relations

Counter-terrorism interests align between China and the US-they’ll work together.

Wee 15 — Sui-Lee Wee, journalist for Reuters (international news agency headquartered in London),

December 15, 2015 (“China urges U.S. cooperation to battle terrorism financing” Reuters,

http://www.reuters.com/article/uk-china-usa-terrorism-idUSKBN0TY1GT20151215, accessed 7/1/16,

AEC)

A senior Chinese official urged the United States to work with China to combat terrorism financing,

China's central bank said on Tuesday, as the world's two largest economies step up efforts against a global

security threat. During two days of talks in New York last week, China and the United States discussed

combating terrorist financing, national risk assessments for money laundering and a Sino-U.S. anti-money

laundering pact, the People's Bank of China said in a statement on its website. The meeting is the latest

sign that China and the United States are improving bilateral cooperation to fight terrorism, despite major

disagreements on a host of other issues. Shared concern about Islamic State offers a rare convergence of

security interests for Beijing and Washington, and a break from their more typical enmity on sensitive

geopolitical issues, notably in the South China Sea and matters such as cyber spying. "The two sides

should, on the basis of mutual trust and mutual benefit, strengthen communication and coordination," the

statement quoted deputy central bank governor Guo Qingping as saying in his speech in New York. Other

aspects of cooperation he urged were safeguarding the interests of both countries' financial institutions

and actively promoting efforts against money laundering and terrorism financing, it added. China says

some Uighurs, a mainly Muslim people from its violence-prone far western region of Xinjiang, have

travelled to Syria and Iraq to fight with militant groups there. Last month, Islamic State said it had killed a

Chinese hostage, prompting outrage in Beijing. In September, the foreign ministry said China and the

United States would improve cooperation on fighting militancy, including intelligence exchanges, and

work together to bring peace to Afghanistan.

Plan Solves Relations Plan is key to cooperation – interest overlap

Clarke 15—Michael Clarke is Associate Professor at the National Security College, ANU. He is the

author of Xinjiang and China’s Rise in Central Asia – A History, 2015 (“Afghanistan: An Opportunity for

U.S.–China Cooperation?”, October 12, 2015, Accessed 7/5/16, Available Online at

http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/afghanistan-opportunity-us%E2%80%93china-cooperation-

14052, JRR)

The problem in the current climate of Sino–U.S. relations, however, is to identify areas in which those

interests overlap to “mutual benefit” more than they diverge. China’s “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR)

strategy is an area that holds potential. According to John Hudson, where U.S. officials see China’s

resurgence and ambition in the Asia–Pacific as the core driver of regional insecurity, in Eurasia they see a

“surprising convergence of U.S. and Chinese interests” that “boils down to one mutual goal: security.”

From this perspective, Beijing shares Washington’s desires to see a stable and secure Afghanistan and

Pakistan due primarily to Beijing’s own concerns with Uyghur terrorism in Xinjiang. The strength of this

view is based on two major factors. First, the OBOR itself, while growing out of a decades-long agenda to

firmly integrate Xinjiang and overcome Uyghur separatism and terrorism through the delivery of

economic development, looks set to engage China more directly in the problems of the region. With its

focus on the development of trans-regional infrastructure links and investment, such as the “China-

Pakistan Economic Corridor,” the OBOR would give China a greater stake in the future security and

prosperity of Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan. Obama administration officials have approvingly

noted that China’s plan mirrors the intent of its own aborted “New Silk Road Initiative” of 2011. Indeed,

the logic of that effort suggests some complementarity between U.S. and Chinese interests. Second, the

increasing number of terrorist attacks in Xinjiang, which China has attributed to militants based in the Af-

Pak tribal areas, has arguably revealed to Beijing that it can no longer rely on the partial ‘outsourcing’ of

its security to the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan nor the Pakistani military along the Af-Pak

frontier. Instead, Beijing must revise its to-date largely ‘hands off’ approach to the security situation in

Afghanistan as it pursues the OBOR strategy.

Pakistan is the historical heart of US-China Relations

Small, 2015 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He has

worked on Chinese foreign policy issues in Beijing, Brussels, London, and Washington DC., The China-

Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics pg 175-176)

For veterans of the US-China relationship, any talk of Pakistan conjures up an almost nostalgic sense of

the two periods during which the country was at the heart of bilateral relations , and those relations

themselves were in their warmest phase. First, when Islamabad was playing its discreet and vital role as

matchmaker, in the secret diplomacy of the 1970s, to bring Washington and Beijing together, and second,

in the 1980s when the triumvirate were in their quasi-alliance against the Soviet Union. Across nearly two

decades, China and the United States shared an interest in Pakistan’s fate and believed that some degree of synchronization of messages and

support might be helpful. After the anxious efforts at coordination during the 1971 war, detailed in the first chapter, Chinese officials consistently

urged their US counterparts to give Pakistan more aid and better weapons than China could provide itself, and even weighed in on Pakistani

politics. American and Chinese leaders compared notes on the messages the two sides were sending to Zia ul-Haq about the situation of Zulfiqar

Ali Bhutto, whom neither side wanted to see executed, and even whether China might offer him asylum (Deng: “If he wants to come, then we

will be prepared to receive him”. Brzezinski: “He could use the same villa as Sihanouk did!” Deng: “I think he has a better place.”).22 But in

subsequent decades, the China-Pakistan relationship would disappear into a secretive space from which it

has still not fully emerged.

US China Coop on Counterterrorism key to Relations

Jia 01- Jia Qingguo, professor & Associate Dean, School of International Studies, Peking University, is

now a visiting fellow at the Center for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at The Brookings Institution- US-

China Relations after Sept. 11: Time for a Change, 2002 Pub. Rev.

http://www.china.org.cn/english/china-us/26340.htm TMY 7/7/16

Second, the attacks are likely to moderate Washington's foreign policy in a way that gives greater favor to

multilateralism. Before Sept. 11, Washington was increasingly on the path of unilateralism as a means to

address international and security issues. After Sept. 11, Washington has given more attention to

international cooperation as its efforts to rally international support for the war against terrorism

demonstrate. Terrorism is an international phenomenon and no country can fight it effectively without the

help of other countries. More important, this multilateral effort over the long run will need to address the

sources of terrorism: polarization of the world, religious and ethnic conflicts, inadequate international law

enforcement cooperation, and weak international organizations. So long as these and other problems

remain unresolved, terrorism will pose a security threat to the US and other countries. In developing

multilateral coalitions to fight both the causes and symptoms of international terrorism, the US will find

China a useful and cooperative partner. Finally, in the aftermath of the attacks, we will see less focus on

China as a strategic competitor or a potential enemy. The Sept. 11 attacks illustrated that the real threat to

American freedom and way of life does not come from China but from international terrorism. Obviously,

this threat is capable of changing American life - greater restrictions on freedoms, more inconveniences,

and continued threats of terrorist attack - in a way no country in the world was capable of doing even if it

had wanted to. As long as Washington does not focus on Beijing as a potential enemy, it can examine US-

China relations in a more objective way and reduce unnecessary confrontation. The same is true for

China. Those persons in both countries who wish to see a confrontation between the US and China will be

constrained from doing so. Moreover, given their shared interests in countering terrorism, Washington

and Beijing are likely to be more pragmatic and cooperative in dealing with each other. It goes without

saying that the two countries will have many problems in the years ahead. They will continue to differ on

what constitutes protection of human rights in China, the pace of democratization in China, the meaning

of free and fair trade, the role of international organizations, and the resolution of differences across the

Taiwan Strait. However, united by the common cause of anti-terrorism, the two countries are in a better

position to find more constructive ways to deal with these problems than before. Dedicated students of the

United States understand that one of its greatest strengths is its ability to reflect on its vulnerabilities and

weaknesses and constantly improve itself. It has done so time and time again, and became greater and

stronger as a result. One has good reason to believe that Americans and their leaders will do so again. If

so, we can hope the day will come when Washington and Beijing can celebrate victories against

international terrorism while realizing a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship between these

two great countries.

US-Sino coop on counterterror key to bilateral relations [Sketchy Card]

Glaser 01- Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Adviser for Asia and Director, China Power Project, Posted May

30, 2016, October, 2001.US.-China Relations: Terrorist Strikes Give U.S.-China Ties a Boost,

https://www.hitpages.com/doc/5662193798348800/1 TMY 7/7/16

Enhanced Prospects for Sino-U.S. Cooperation The terrorist attacks on the United States have injected

new momentum into Sino-U.S. relations and raised the prospects for closer bilateral cooperation. To a

significant degree, American and Chinese interests converge in fighting terrorism and Islamic extremism.

Thus far, however, it is unclear what forms of assistance the Bush administration will ask China to

provide and what Beijing can offer. As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council,

China’s vote on any future UN resolutions will be important. In addition, Beijing can urge Pakistan to

remain steadfast in its support of U.S. actions. In the final analysis, however, China has only limited

resources to contribute to the counterterrorism war and will not likely be a major player. Nevertheless,

Chinese leaders will likely seek to utilize their cooperation and common interests with the U.S. in

fighting terrorism to strengthen the bilateral relationship . Ever since the collapse of the Soviet

Union, China has searched for a new strategic basis on which cooperative ties with the U.S. could be

founded. It hopes that Beijing’s willingness to join with the U.S. in the war on terrorism will raise the

value of Sino-U.S. relations in the minds of Bush administration officials and improve China’s image in

the eyes of the American public. It is also in America’s interest to seize this opportunity to put Sino-U.S.

relations on firmer footing. The early hawkishness of the Bush administration toward China has

unnecessarily unnerved U.S. allies and friends in the region. While there are important differences

between Beijing and Washington that require attention, there are also significant shared security interests

and concerns. Both the U.S. and China would benefit from greater stability in East Asia, Central Asia, and

South Asia. Chinese support for a U.S. military presence and influence in Asia and elsewhere will be

difficult if not impossible to obtain if Bush administration policies convince China that it is the target of a

revamped U.S. military strategy.

Ext. Pakistan Terror Causes Indo-Pak War

Terror attacks on India escalate to nuclear war

Iqbal 15- Anwar Iqbal, writer for the Dawn, Correspondent based in Washington DC, quoting George

Perkovich and Ashley Tellis, George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment

for International Peace. He works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues, and on South

Asian security. Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. While on assignment to the U.S.

Department of State as senior adviser to the under secretary of state for political affairs, he was intimately

involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India.- http://www.dawn.com/news/1166399

@yangtri 7/14/16

WASHINGTON: A major terrorist attack in India might lead to a large-scale military assault on Pakistan, which

then could lead to a nuclear war in one of the world’s most populous regions, the US Congress was told. Two US experts on South

Asian affairs — George Perkovich and Ashley Tellis — presented the doom’s day scenario before a Senate panel

earlier this week. The US Senate and the House of Representatives held a series of hearings this week to consider the Obama administration’s budget proposals for

2016. While debating the US State Department’s proposals for foreign aid, lawmakers invited senior US officials — including Secretary of State John Kerry — and

think-tank experts to explain the administration’s foreign policy. During one of these hearings, the two experts argued that Pakistan might use nuclear

weapons against India if the latter launched a large-scale military assault in retaliation for a major terror

attack from across the border. “South Asia is the most likely place nuclear weapons could be detonated in

the foreseeable future. This risk derives from the unusual dynamic of the India-Pakistan competition,” said Mr

Perkovich, of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Mr Tellis of the same institute urged the United States

to use its influence to preventing a terrorist attack. “Other than this, there is little that the United States can do to

preserve deterrence stability between two asymmetrically-sized states where the gap in power promises to

become even wider tomorrow than it is today,” he said.

Terrorist attack on India escalates to nuclear war

Economic Times 15- The Economic Times, Part of The Times of India, quoting George Perkovich

and Ashley Tellis, George Perkovich is vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace. He works primarily on nuclear strategy and nonproliferation issues, and on South

Asian security. Ashley J. Tellis is a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

specializing in international security, defense, and Asian strategic issues. While on assignment to the U.S.

Department of State as senior adviser to the under secretary of state for political affairs, he was intimately

involved in negotiating the civil nuclear agreement with India.- Major terror attack against India could

trigger nuclear war: Experts, Feb. 26, 2015, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2015-02-

26/news/59541526_1_india-and-pakistan-terror-attack-islamabad @yangtri 7/14/16

WASHINGTON: Pakistan may use nuclear weapons against India if the latter goes for a large scale military

assault against it in retaliation for a major terror attack emanating from across the border, two top

American experts have warned US lawmakers. Given the presence of a strong government in New Delhi

and the pressure on it from Indian citizens in the event of a repeat of 26/11 type terror attack, the ties

between the two neighbours have greater danger of escalating towards a devastating nuclear warfare, in

particular from Pakistan. Such a dangerous scenario can only be avoided by the US working with

Islamabad to ensure that there is no further large scale terror attack on India emanating from

Pakistan, two top American experts - George Perkovich and Ashley Tellis - told members of the powerful Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on

Strategic Forces during a hearing yesterday. "South Asia is the most likely place nuclear weapons could be detonated in the

foreseeable future. This risk derives from the unusual dynamic of the India-Pakistan competition," said Perkovich, vice

president for Studies Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. "The next major terrorist attack in India, emanating from

Pakistan, may trigger an Indian conventional military riposte that could in turn prompt Pakistan

to use battlefield nuclear weapons to repel an Indian incursion . India, for its part, has declared that it

would inflict massive retaliation in response to any nuclear use against its territory or troops," he said.

"Obviously, this threatening dynamic - whereby terrorism may prompt conventional conflict which may prompt nuclear war

- challenges Indian and Pakistan policy-makers. India and Pakistan both tend to downplay or dismiss the potential for

escalation, but our own history of close nuclear calls should make US officials more alert to these

dangers. The US is the only outside power that could intervene diplomatically and forcefully to de-

escalate a crisis," Perkovich said. Tellis said the most useful US contribution towards preventing a Pakistani use of nuclear weapons in such a scenario --

and the Indian nuclear retribution that would result thereafter -- would be to press Pakistan to exit the terrorism business or risk being left alone (or, even worse, the

object of sanctions) if a major Indian military response ensues in the aftermath of any pernicious terrorist attack. "Other than this, there is little that the United States

can do to preserve deterrence stability between two asymmetrically-sized states where the gap in power promises to become even wider tomorrow than it is today," he

said.

A Pakistani-based terrorist attack on India makes war and escalation likely

Markey 10 – Daniel Markey, senior research professor at Johns Hopkins University’s School of

Advanced International Studies (SAIS) and the academic director for the SAIS Global Policy Program;

from 2007-2015, Daniel Markey was senior fellow for India, Pakistan, and South Asia at the Council on

Foreign Relations, 2010, (“Terrorism and Indo-Pakistani Escalation,” Council on Foreign Relations,

January, Available online at file:///C:/Users/USER/Downloads/CPA_contingencymemo_6-1.pdf,

Accessed 7-9-2016, SAA)

The threat of another Mumbai-type attack is undeniable; numerous Pakistan-based groups remain

motivated and able to strike Indian targets. Many of these groups have incentives to act as spoilers,

whether to disrupt efforts to improve Indo-Pakistani relations or to distract Islamabad from counterterror

crackdowns at home. Thus the immediate risk of terrorism may actually increase if New Delhi and

Islamabad make progress on resolving their differences or if Pakistan-based terrorists are effectively

backed into a corner. Pakistan-based Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammed are the two terrorists

groups that have proven themselves the most capable and motivated to carry out attacks in India. Al-

Qaeda has historically focused its efforts outside India, but if the group’s leadership feels threatened in

the Pakistan/Afghanistan border areas, it might direct and assist regional proxies to attack India as a way

to ignite a distracting Indo-Pakistani confrontation. Other regional terrorist groups, including those based

in India, are improving their capacity to inflict mass-casualty violence, but because these groups lack

clear-cut connections to Pakistan-based organizations, their attacks are far less likely to spark another

crisis between India and Pakistan. The more clearly a terrorist attack can be identified as having

originated in Pakistan, the more likely India is to retaliate militarily. Groups that India perceives to have

closer links with Pakistan’s military and intelligence establishment—especially LeT—are more likely to

inspire retaliation against official Pakistani state targets than those that are perceived as more

autonomous, such as al-Qaeda. In addition to the identity of the terrorists, several other factors are likely

to influence India’s response. The two most important factors are the death toll and the terrorists’ choice

of target. Three types of targets would plausibly elicit a significant Indian military reprisal. Listed in

descending order of likelihood, they include: (1) India’s national political leadership, as exemplified by

the December 2001 attack on parliament; (2) major urban centers, especially if radiological, chemical, or

biological weapons are used to kill or injure a large number of civilians; and (3) symbols of national unity

and strength, such as religious/cultural sites or centers of scientific/economic achievement. The context of

the attacks will also help to determine the potential for escalation. The perception in India that Islamabad

has responded inadequately to the Mumbai attacks—trials of accused plotters are moving slowly and LeT

ideologue Hafiz Muhammad Saeed is not in custody—strengthens Indian advocates for unilateral military

retaliation. Should multiple attacks occur in quick succession, the 2 cumulative effect would further

diminish India’s inclination for restraint. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh has been a strong voice

against Indian military retaliation, but his voice could be silenced by a future attack or otherwise drowned

out by domestic political pressures. India’s policies will also hinge upon its calculations regarding the

efficacy of military action as a counterterror tool and a means to compel Pakistan to take more aggressive

action against terrorists on its own soil. After the attacks in Mumbai, India’s leadership doubted its

military options in both respects. Instead, New Delhi placed greater stock in an indirect approach; by

showing restraint, India sought to induce the United States to pressure Pakistan. This gamble has not yet

paid off to India’s satisfaction. Unless it does, New Delhi will be less likely to place a similar bet the next

time around. India’s retaliatory capabilities span a wide spectrum. If New Delhi determines that its

assailants acted with little or indirect assistance from Pakistan’s military or intelligence agencies, its most

likely response would be to conduct airstrikes against suspected terrorist training camps in Pakistan.

During these operations, India would attempt to limit civilian casualties and direct combat with the

Pakistani military to reduce the prospects for escalation. Such an attack would not significantly curtail the

terrorist threat, but it might satisfy India’s domestic compulsions to punish the perpetrators. The more

egregious the terrorist attack and the more India’s leadership is convinced that members of the Pakistani

state sponsored it, the more it will be treated as an act of war. Under these conditions, New Delhi would

consider a wider range of options, including, for instance, a large ground-force mobilization of the sort

India conducted in 2001 2002 in the wake of the terrorist attack on the Indian parliament or a naval

blockade. Unless the initial terrorist attack is nuclear—which is implausible for now because Pakistani

terrorists do not appear to have access to nuclear materials or the capacity to utilize them—India would

refrain from using its nuclear weapons in retaliation. Pakistan’s leaders would come under tremendous

domestic pressure (and for the most part would be inclined) to counter nearly any sort of Indian military

retaliation. Even the least invasive of India’s possible military options, such as a resumption of artillery

shelling across the Line of Control—the de facto border between Indian- and Pakistani-controlled

Kashmir—Pakistan’s military and civilian leadership would be consumed by the crisis and distracted

from other issues. Pakistan’s military response could be intentionally disproportionate to the initial Indian

attack so as to compel the international community to force a ceasefire. That said, Pakistan’s present

government and military command also have meaningful incentives to calibrate their actions from the

start, not least the desire to limit international pressure and to retain ties with partners in Beijing, Riyadh,

and Washington. A military exchange between India and Pakistan sparked by a terrorist attack in India is

not likely to cross the nuclear threshold. Several conceivable circumstances could alter this conclusion,

but two stand out: (1) India suffers additional catastrophic terrorist attacks in the midst of the crisis,

driving it to intensify the conflict to a point where Pakistan’s army determines it cannot defend the state

by conventional means, and (2) Pakistan’s nuclear command, as yet untested by major conventional

attacks, is blinded or confused to the point that it authorizes a first strike.

Terrorists can escalate Indo-Pak war

Phillips 12 – Andrew Phillips, Senior Lecturer in the School of Political Science and International

Studies at the University of Queensland, research focuses on the global state system’s evolution from

1500 to the present, and on the challenges that religiously motivated terrorism, the spread of Weapons of

Mass Destruction and state failure pose to the contemporary international order, 2012, (“Horsemen of the

apocalypse? Jihadist strategy and nuclear instability in South Asia,” International Politics, March 16,

Available online at

http://download.springer.com/static/pdf/544/art%253A10.1057%252Fip.2012.1.pdf?originUrl=http%3A

%2F%2Flink.springer.com%2Farticle%2F10.1057%2Fip.2012.1&token2=exp=1468091308~acl=%2Fsta

tic%2Fpdf%2F544%2Fart%25253A10.1057%25252Fip.2012.1.pdf%3ForiginUrl%3Dhttp%253A%252F

%252Flink.springer.com%252Farticle%252F10.1057%252Fip.2012.1*~hmac=24e36d5949f162d4f68e92

b110fe4d0ce67537b7ee6f7e4888660ab01394995b, Accessed 7-9-2016, SAA)

A jihadist-inspired Indo–Pakistani nuclear exchange would conceivably promote jihadist goals at both the

regional and global levels. Within South Asia, even a limited nuclear confrontation between India and

Pakistan would be catastrophically destabilising for both countries, and would potentially permanently

solidify estrangement between the two nations while radically amplifying communal tensions throughout

the sub-continent. Since the deposition of the last Mughal emperor in 1857 and concomitant dissolution

of Muslims’ nominal political supremacy in the sub-continent, local Islamists have consistently lamented

their demographic inferiority and perceived marginalisation vis-a`-vis India’s Hindu majority (Kepel,

2006, p. 35). Following the 1971 Indo–Pakistani war and the ensuing separation of Bangladesh (formerly

east Pakistan) from Islamabad, fears of Indian sub-continental supremacy further strengthened, and have

informed Pakistan’s subsequent efforts to exacerbate India’s internal divisions through its covert

sponsorship of insurgencies throughout the country (Zahab and Roy, 2003, p. 54). Many of the radical

Islamists that have enjoyed Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) sponsorship since that time retain a desire to

dismember India, and have worked consistently to stoke communal tensions in the country through resort

to acts of terrorism, as well as efforts to propagate radical Islamist ideas throughout India’s Muslim

communities (Ganguly and Kapur, 2010, p. 54). Besides the enormous human toll of an Indo–Pakistani

nuclear exchange, a disaster of this magnitude would significantly strain India’s fragile social fabric,

thereby assisting jihadists’ goals of destabilising India and promoting its potential balkanisation.

Although the potential destabilisation of India following an Indo–Pakistani nuclear exchange would serve

jihadist goals, the impact of such a conflict on Pakistan’s domestic stability would be of even greater

import for the jihadists. From 2007 onwards, local jihadists have waged an escalating campaign against

the Pakistani state, but while they have partially succeeded in consolidating their presence across swathes

of the Pashtun tribal heartland, they have thus far failed to seize power nationally. Alarmist predictions of

Pakistan’s imminent descent into state failure notwithstanding, the Pakistani military has succeeded in

containing the local jihadist threat. Before the August 2010 floods, the military had even been making

solid progress in rolling back the Pakistani Taliban’s influence in the tribal areas, further jeopardising

jihadist aspirations for national political power (Mullick, 2010, p. 8). Although it is impossible to predict

Pakistan’s resilience in the aftermath of a limited nuclear war with India, such a disaster would

profoundly strain the Pakistani state. This could potentially pave the way for the jihadists’ direct seizure

of state power, along with any remaining elements of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal. At the very least, the

immense humanitarian consequences of such a catastrophe would likely overwhelm the management

capacities of an already depleted military, opening up further governance vacuums in the country for

jihadist elements to exploit. The destabilisation of India and the potentially fatal weakening of the

Pakistani state would each advance jihadist interests at a regional level. However, perhaps the greatest

strategic dividend for the jihadists might come from the systemic destabilisation that an Indo–Pakistani

nuclear exchange would bring in its train. Speculating on the likely ‘catalytic effects’ of a terrorist

detonation of a nuclear device in South Asia, Robert Ayson has convincingly argued that such a scenario

could rapidly lead to an uncontrollable escalation in Indo–Pakistani tensions culminating in nuclear war

between the two states, a conflict that might even witness the involvement of external powers such as

China and the United States (Ayson, 2010, pp. 586–587). Ayson confines his speculation to a crisis

arising from an act of nuclear terrorism, and expresses confidence that the Indo–Pakistani strategic

relationship will continue to remain robust in the face of conventional terrorist challenges. The restraint

Indian authorities have previous exercised in 2001 and 2008 to terrorist provocations originating from

Pakistan obviously lends some credence to this view. Conversely, however, Indo–Pakistani crisis

stability in the face of future conventional terrorist mass-casualty attacks cannot be assured .

Moreover, the systemic chaos that would potentially be unleashed by an Indo–Pakistani nuclear war could

provide jihadist terrorists with a powerful rationale for attempting to spark such a catastrophe in the hope

of leveraging its catalytic effects to further their revolutionary agenda. At the global level, an Indo–

Pakistani nuclear exchange would severely strain the conflict-managing capacities of the liberal

international order, with the ensuing turmoil potentially creating political opportunities for the jihadists

that would otherwise remain elusive. In the wake of even a very limited Indo– Pakistani nuclear war,

outside powers’ existing concerns regarding the fragility of the Pakistani state would intensify, inviting

the prospect of highly destabilising foreign interventions in the country as these powers sought to shore

up their interests in the face of a possible collapse of civil order in Pakistan. In Washington in particular,

fears over the security of Pakistan’s remaining nuclear stockpile would loom large in the aftermath of an

Indo– Pakistani war, and the option of unilaterally seizing control over Pakistan’s remaining warheads

would inevitably be canvassed (Lamb, 2010). Given the operational complexity of such an intervention,

there is no guarantee that US forces could be certain of success. However, it is certain that were such an

operation to proceed, jihadists would seize the opportunity to mobilise domestic opinion against both the

United States and a Pakistani government they would decry as too weak to have deterred such an

intervention in the first place. China’s reaction to the incipient fragmentation of its prote´ge´ and the

confiscation of its remaining nuclear arsenal could further complicate the situation, potentially portending

a further deterioration in China’s relations with both the United States and India. Finally, even assuming

that Washington opted for restraint in the aftermath of an Indo–Pakistani nuclear war, a failure to

adequately reassure Islamabad of its commitment to restraint could itself lead elements of the Pakistani

military to attempt to pre-emptively disperse Pakistan’s remaining arsenal throughout country to avoid

their confiscation. This would in turn increase the risk of a nuclear weapon falling into the jihadists’

possession, providing them with the means to further destabilise international order, either through an

attack on India designed to rekindle Indo–Pakistani hostilities or alternatively against a major Western

city so as to trigger a renewed global confrontation between the West and the Islamic world. In either

instance, the immediate result would be to radically intensify global insecurity and religious qua

civilisational tensions, potentially providing the jihadists with the political space necessary to revive their

campaign to overthrow the present global order.

Alternate Impacts

Cooperation Solves Central Asia

US-China cooperation over Pakistan is key to regional stability.

Smith, 2011 (Paul J., Prof. of National Security Affairs @ US Naval War College “The China–

Pakistan–United States Strategic Triangle: From Cold War to the “War on Terrorism”” Asian Affairs: An

American Review 38:4 Taylor and Francis

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/00927678.2011.604291 JJH)

For Pakistan, terrorism continues to pose a long-term threat to the country’s political and economic

viability, as well as to regional security. The United States and China have the greatest potential to

constructively influence Pakistan’s counterterrorism posture . However, if the countries choose

competition and rivalry over cooperation, the range and extent of cooperation that both countries could

employ vis-a-vis Pakistan will likely be circumscribed. If, for example, the United ` States strengthens

ties with India with designs on containing China, this action will most likely contribute to Pakistan’s

“neuralgic security concerns regarding India’s intentions and capabilities.”115 In turn, Islamabad’s old

habits might be revived, such as turning to nonstate actor proxy groups to launch small-scale attacks

against India or other countries. Indeed, possession of a nuclear deterrent has apparently emboldened

Pakistan to continue pursuing such a proxy war strategy.116 On the other hand, if the United States and

China can find and cultivate areas of common interest in terms of counterterrorism and stability in

Pakistan (and, by extension, Afghanistan), their combined influence may help mitigate or contain regional

violence, terrorism, and weapons proliferation. Under such circumstances, the China-Pakistan-U.S.

strategic triangle may provide an alternative power structure that constrains the worst proclivities of the

Pakistani state. However, before such goals can be realized, Beijing and Washington must

acknowledge their common interests and recognize the indispensable and symbiotic role that the

other plays in this triangular power dynamic .

Cooperation Solves Afghanistan

US-China cooperation key to building broader international support for peace in

Afghanistan

Mellbin, 2015 - European Union’s Special Representative in Afghanistan (Franz-Michael, “In

Afghanistan, an Opportunity for the United States to Work with China and Iran,” Atlantic Council,

October 20, 2015, http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/in-afghanistan-an-opportunity-for-

the-united-states-to-work-with-china-and-iran#top)

Q: What must the United States be doing to capitalize on the opportunity created by the emergence of the IS/Daesh in Afghanistan to engage with

Iran and China on the future of Afghanistan? Mellbin: It is very clear that China seeks a close cooperation with the US

on Afghanistan and sees a merit in pursuing that. It is not an easy equation because there is a wider, more complex relationship

between the US and China that could get in the way if it is not managed. I think the two sides should see this as a positive

opportunity and pursue it diligently, and certainly the EU and myself will try to support that because we believe that the US

and China acting together will be very powerful to convince other regional partners to engage in a

positive way when it comes to finding solutions in Afghanistan. The Iranians have also sent clear signals that

they want to work together with the US and China on Afghanistan, but of course the domestic situation in the US makes

it very difficult for the US currently to engage. The EU has, and will continue to have, increasingly close discussions with

Iran on Afghanistan and we will continue to share the content and direction of those conversations with

the US side so that can bridge part of the gap. Ideally, once domestic politics allows it in both Iran and the US for the

two countries to have a discussion on Afghanistan, it is the foreign policy issue where the two countries are

most likely to be able to find common ground because the key objective of both countries is short-term peace and stability in

Afghanistan. Q: Do you see a role for Europe as an interlocutor between the United States and Iran on Afghanistan? Mellbin: We can be

helpful. We have already been helpful because we have different strengths that we bring to the table on different issues, not only when it comes

to Iran. Afghanistan is a good example of how through close cooperation we allow both the US and the

European side to maximize our ability to influence the situation. We have a very like-minded approach to

Afghanistan and that helps us work closely together in partnership and let those who have either the

largest influence or the best opportunities bring these highly aligned policies to the table either through

bilateral contacts or a multilateral forum. Sometimes the US can engage in a way that the European side

cannot; sometimes the European side can also engage in a way that the US is not able to because it simply has another policy implication when

the same things are said from the US side. Q: Here in Washington, as we go deeper into an election cycle, do you see either the political space or

the will to engage with Iran and China on Afghanistan? Mellbin: With China there is a will, but there is also some uncertainty on how to gain

results from such cooperation. China can be intriguing to work together with and it may be a learning process for everyone,

especially because it is the first time that the Chinese are trying to work a security issue the way they are trying

to deal with using their soft power. So it’s a learning experience for the Chinese also. We need to be patient and

understand that it will take work to create results out of that cooperation, but I also think that the potential

rewards are so high that it is worth focusing on and using some energy on.

Answers To

A2: Terror Coop Now

US-China cooperation over terrorism is small and can be expanded on

Cordesman and Fite 11 (Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at

CSIS, “US AND CHINESE COOPERATION IN COUNTERTERRORISM IN THE MIDDLE EAST

AND CENTRAL ASIA”, August 29, 2011, Accessed 7/5/16, Available Online at https://csis-

prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/legacy_files/files/publication/110829_US_China_Coop.pdf, JRR)

While the US and China already cooperate in some aspects of counterterrorism, there is still much to be

done. Both states have shown that even a limited partnership against violent extremism serves their

greater interests, but US and Chinese conceptions of counterterrorism are unique and sometimes

conflicting. The US focuses on an international collection of wellfinanced enemies with a broad, long-

term agenda of hostility; China focuses more on threats to its domestic stability from minority

separatists.14 The complimentary aspects of both countries‘ CT missions are significant enough to elicit

diplomatic and institutional support on both sides. China ties its internal security programs and

international counterterrorism activities to the broader War on Terrorism (WOT), but it has been cautious

of US activities in the WOT such as the US military presence in Central Asia. The US seeks to expand

China‘s role in the larger international campaign against terrorism and as a contributing partner for South

Asian stability, but some US officials are concerned that China‘s use of counterterrorism is a cover for

domestic repression. Intelligence Cooperation Over the past ten years, China and the US have engaged in

limited sharing of intelligence on counterterrorism. It is not possible to determine the level of such

cooperation, but it seems clear that better dialogue on both sides could expand the scope of such

exchanges on both a bilateral level and in various international forums and UN bodies. This does not

require that China and the US agree on who is a terrorist or share deeply sensitive data, but it does require

clear guidance from both governments to their respective intelligence and security communities. Russia

could be another critical partner in this struggle. The US, China, and Russia all have unique intelligence

assets to bring to a partnership in fighting terrorism in given countries in the Middle East and Central

Asia. They cannot freely share sensitive data, or cooperate in every area. They do, however, have a

common definition of terrorist in many areas, and they have a common interest in preventing any form of

terrorism that involves weapons of mass destruction or a threat to critical facilities and infrastructure.

Diplomatic Cooperation The main area of US and Chinese cooperation has been through diplomatic

means. To show its support for the WOT, China has supported several US-led international

counterterrorism agreements, restrained its critiques of Japanese participation in the WOT, and has

contributed aid for reconstruction in Afghanistan. China and the US have both begun to address the threat

of maritime terrorism in critical areas like the Gulf of Aden and the Strait of Malacca, but their efforts still

remain largely uncoordinated. These are all areas where both nations can strengthen their existing efforts

in ways that serve their strategic interests, and provide for focused intelligence cooperation, aid efforts,

and common security efforts. Steadily evolving stronger relationships where both countries alternate or

share the lead, carry out common planning and coordination efforts, and increase their level of

governmental and expert dialogue can all have important effects.

A2: Indo Pak War Won’t Happen

Growing divide makes indo-pak war likely.

Khalid and Hussain 2014 (Iram, Prof of Political Science @ Punjab University and S. Shahbaz,

PhD in Political Science @ Punjab University “Challenges and Opportunities for Pak-China Security

Environment in the perspective of United States India Strategic Partnership”)Journal of Political Studies,

Summer, Proquest.

Pakistan and India are two atomic powers in South Asia. Both nations have different perspective on all

diverse issues in the regional and international power politics. They have different stands on all political

issues and defense issues. One of the major bones of contention between Pakistan and India is the long

standing Kashmir issue which could not be solved through United Nations resolutions, third party

mediations and even through bilateral talks between India and Pakistan. Because of the complex and

complicated relations of both the atomic powers of the regions, the South Asia is most insecure and

capricious regions in the world. Both atomic Powers Pakistan and India have political antagonism

lasted for more than sixty years and there is possibility in future a potential nuclear clatter between the

two nations. In order to maintain a balance of power in the region Pakistan conducted its 1st nuclear test

in response of Indian nuclear tests in May, 1998. After 9/11, the United States has originated an anti-

terrorism war. The main focus of war against terrorism is on this region which made the Kashmir issue

more complicated. These momentous changes in regional politics scenario has increased the distance

between Pakistan and India which may lead to one more conflict between the two countries of South

Asia. The security situation is more dangerous because of the Nuclear Proliferation in the region and this

make Kashmir dispute more treacherous. An assessment made by the Institute for Science and

International Security about the nuclear warheads of Pakistan and India. It was assessed that Indian

capacity of production of warheads is 45-95and on the other hand Pakistan's production capacity is 30-50

(http://www.isis-online.org?). According to the report published in The New Scientist,10 minor warheads

would exterminate more than three million individuals if Pakistan and India has a partial nuclear war in

the region (www.newscientist.com?). So there is a great concern in the nations of the world that India and

Pakistan nuclear war can lead to a possible first nuclear war.

Solvency

General

China Say Yes

China will say yes – strategic interests in the region.

Tanzeem, 6/2/2016 (Ayesha, “China Remains Afghanistan's Hope for a Secure Future” VOA News

Accessed 7/1/2016 http://www.voanews.com/content/china-afghanistan-hope-security-

pakistan/3359246.html JJH)

When Afghan President Ashraf Ghani took over in late 2014 and talk of peace and reconciliation with the

Taliban gained momentum, skeptics derived hope from China's newfound interest in the process. China

could succeed, many thought, where the United States had failed — in convincing Pakistan to change its

behavior toward the Afghan Taliban. Both the U.S. and Afghanistan accuse Pakistan of providing a safe

haven to the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan has so far resisted any pressure. At the heart of Chinese interest in

stability in Afghanistan are two major factors. One is fear that religious militancy in Afghanistan will

further fuel Islamist insurgency in China's own Xinjiang province bordering Afghanistan. Militants from

the Uighur Muslim minority in Xinjiang have occasionally received support and training in Afghanistan.

The second is hope of extending the One Belt, One Road initiative through the region to Central Asia.

China is willing to join the fight against terrorism.

Hundman 15 – Eric Hundman, Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science and a Toyota

Dissertation Fellow in the Center for East Asian Studies at the University of Chicago, November 24,

2015, “ Terrorist violence has rocked cities across China, but Beijing’s motives for cracking down remain

opaque” Foreign Policy , http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/11/24/china-islamic-state-terrorism-war-beijing-

paris-us/, accessed 6/30/16, AEC)

Nonetheless, there is no question that China increasingly is the victim of serious terrorist attacks, both at

home and abroad. These are not just attacks on Chinese state institutions but atrocities against Chinese

civilians, exemplified by the Kunming attack in 2014. A number of the incidents also have the hallmarks of jihadi methods, implying some

degree of external influence even if not direct support. Although their numbers are small and their capacity to act on the Chinese mainland is

limited, there are active militant groups such as the Turkistan Islamic Party that have had a visible presence in Pakistan, Afghanistan,

and now Syria. And after a long period in which Al Qaeda and its affiliates, for tactical reasons, largely considered it inadvisable to make China a

target, the Islamic State, by contrast, has been very explicit about the fact that it sees China as an enemy. This

is a completely different landscape for Beijing from the one it faced ten years ago. It already has prompted more serious efforts

on China’s part to help stabilize Afghanistan, which it fears becoming a safe haven for Uighur militants. Beijing is now

one of the leading actors in trying to bring about a political settlement between the Taliban and the

Afghan government. Many of its economic initiatives in the region are motivated as much by security

considerations as commercial ones. China believes that the conditions in which militancy has thrived really only can be addressed

through a transformation of the economic situation in these countries, including Pakistan. In many of these efforts — particularly the

reconciliation push in Afghanistan — Beijing is working already with the United States as a close partner. Syria is a more complicated case,

where China’s antipathy towards the Islamic State coexists with its aversion to regime change, its backing of Russia’s position, and its caution

about the sectarian dimensions of the conflicts underway there. China already has shown tacit support of anti-Islamic State

measures though, including military strikes, and if the political pieces fall into place, it is not impossible

to imagine a larger Chinese role. Conceived solely through the prism of Xinjiang and Beijing’s domestic counter-terrorism practices,

there is good cause to be skeptical about China’s credibility as partner. There are forms of direct counter-terrorism

cooperation with Beijing that will be limited, necessarily and rightly. But looking more broadly at

stabilizing the whole arc running from Xinjiang to the Middle East, China’s economic and political role is

likely to be a crucial one, and aspects of that partnership already are underway.

Major incentives for China to cooperate

Tanzeem, 6/2/2016 (Ayesha, “China Remains Afghanistan's Hope for a Secure Future” VOA News

Accessed 7/1/2016 http://www.voanews.com/content/china-afghanistan-hope-security-

pakistan/3359246.html JJH)

Nonetheless, China sees stability in the region as being in its own long-term interest. Shahmahmood

Miakhel, the country head for the Washington-based United States Institute for Peace, said China has

made significant investments in Afghanistan, particularly in the mining sector. These are not short- or

medium-term investments, he added, but long-term ones that require a secure regional environment.

Which was why Afghanistan is still pinning its hopes on China. "China has to work with Pakistan on how

to cooperate with Afghanistan," Miakhel said. China, Sabori said, is waiting to see how the U.S. and other

major players are going to act. Still, it is aware of the danger of continued long-term instability.

"Terrorism is not something that can be confined to a border, so it will finally, at some time, penetrate

their border and it will become a major issue for China," he said.

China will say yes and no DA’s to pressuring China

Beckley 12 — Michael Beckley, Michael Beckley is a research fellow in the International Security

Program at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, March 2012

(“China and Pakistan: Fair-Weather Friends” Yale Journal, http://yalejournal.org/wp-

content/uploads/2012/04/Article-Michael-Beckley.pdf, accessed 7/1/16, AEC)

This conclusion has implications for US foreign policy toward Pakistan. Some experts argue that China’s interests in Pakistan are

expanding and that “the time is ripe for the United States and the PRC to add the stability of Pakistan to

the top of their bilateral agenda.”50 Most proposals suggest that the United States should urge China to participate

in multilateral efforts to “fix Pakistan,” mediate Indo-Pakistani border negotiations, and develop energy,

trade, and transportation corridors. Indeed, a central aim of current US policy is to coax Chinese

cooperation out of a “basic framework of largely coincident objectives,” 51 objectives that were spelled out

between the two sides in 2009 as the mutual desire for “peace, stability, and development in South Asia.”

51 It is true that many of China’s interests in Pakistan—political stability, economic development, reduction

of Islamic terrorism, peace with India—mirror those of the United States . And there may be little harm

in pressuring China to play a larger role in accomplishing these objectives . But the United States should not

expect too much from China. Most of China’s most pressing problems—maintaining economic growth, maritime security in South China Sea,

Taiwan—have little to do with Pakistan. Chinese leaders, therefore, are unlikely to embrace costly proposals to buttress Pakistan’s political

institutions or to mediate Pakistan’s conflict with India. On the other hand, China’s lack of interest in an alliance with Pakistan

frees the United States to pursue its own interests in South Asia without fear of damaging US-China

relations. Chinese leaders may not be excited about the prospect of democratic consolidation in Pakistan,

but they would welcome the stability that such an outcome would bring . While some Chinese analysts will

characterize US security and nuclear cooperation with India as an attempt to encircle China, Chinese leaders are unlikely to react by forming an

alliance with Pakistan, which in their eyes is as much of a security liability as an asset.

China Has Clout

China must push to reign in the Haqqani network and Pakistan will say yes.

Small 16—Andrew Small, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States,

research focused on U.S.-China relations, EU-China relations, Chinese policy in South and South-West

Asia, and broader developments in Chinese foreign and economic policies, 2016. (“Author's Response:

Beyond India-Centricity-China and Pakistan Look West,” Asia Policy, Issue 21, January, Available

Online http://search.proquest.com/docview/1764649042?pq-origsite=summon&accountid=11091,

Accessed 07-01-2016, p. 167-173, aqp)

I think we at least have preliminary answers, some of which also touch on the critique raised by Meena

Singh Roy that "China's argument that its huge economic package for infrastructure development could

bring about change in Pakistan's social and economic makeup does not sound very convincing, given the

past failures of large-scale U.S. and Western financial and military aid to the country." Such comparisons

between the levels of Western and Chinese economic support seem misplaced. Direct financial support,

the bulk of which was provided to the Pakistani army, coupled with smaller volumes of aid focused on

social development, is not the same as infrastructure investment. If the latter fails, it will fail for different

reasons than the West's efforts. The same is true politically. Chinese demands have been limited, and are

likely to remain so. Beijing will press for a peace settlement in Afghanistan, which many in Pakistan and

in the Taliban itself favor, rather than pushing Pakistan to rein in the Haqqani network or change its

education system. The tendency is still to go with the grain rather than make demands that are liable to

elicit a backlash. This is at times disappointing for the powers that would like to see China doing more,

but keeping the relationship with Pakistan in decent working order is a higher-order objective for Beijing

than any of these individual goals. In addition, even when there are aspects of discomfort, Pakistan

gains far more from having its closest partner as the rising heavyweight power in the region than

from any plausible alternative . The presence of a $46 billion carrot helps too. China is laying out-all at

once-the package of benefits that can accrue to Pakistan if it is able to ensure a domestic and international

situation that is sufficiently stable to make the investments possible. There is some degree of political

consensus in Pakistan that this opportunity should be seized, despite concerns about whether the country

has the capacity to do so quite as quickly as China would like. But if there are problems with specific

projects, or the conditions for the investment do not obtain, the initiative will simply be scaled down.

Either way, many of the principal beneficiaries of the supposed largesse will be Chinese companies. As

risks go, CPEC is not especially egregious.

Pakistan will cooperate with China

Khan 13— Dr Rashid Ahmad Khan is Chairman, Department of International Relations & Political

Science, Dean, Faculty of Arts, Social Sciences & Law, University of Sargodha, Sargodha, 2013

(“Pakistan and China: cooperation in counter-terrorism” Strategic Studies 4.1, March 31, 2013, Accessed

7/1/16, Available online at http://search.proquest.com/docview/1446361143?pq-

origsite=summon&accountid=11091, JRR)

Pakistan-China cooperation in countering terrorism can be, from Pakistani perspective, beneficial and

more productive in a number of ways. Pakistan-China relations are free from any friction and there is

complete trust between the two. The Chinese involvement in Pakistan’s counter-terrorism strategy,

therefore, would not invoke the kind of suspicion and resentment that has been in the case of Pakistan-US

cooperation against terrorism. The people of Pakistan would fully own the war against terrorism in

association with China because it would be a help from a friend in whom the people of Pakistan have

complete faith. China follows a pragmatic and innovative approach in its counter-terrorism strategy-

relying more on development and consultation with friendly countries. In its province of Xinjiang, the

Chinese are trying to isolate the militant groups by accelerating development works and addressing the

pressing problems of the people. Pakistan can learn from the Chinese experience on countering militancy

on its soil. Similarly, Pakistani experience can be valuable assistance to China in similar ways. Pakistan

has a critical role to play in clearing the FATA region from militants and their foreign accomplices. Being

Muslim country, Pakistani government and its political parties, especially religious parties can play a

positive and constructive role in reaching out to Muslim separatists in Xinjiang and persuading them to

shun their separatist plans. The visits by the chief of Jamiatul Ulema-i-Islam-Fazl (JUI-F), Maulana

Fazlur Rehman and Amir Jamaat-i-Islami (JI), Qazi Husain Ahmad to China at the invitation of the

Chinese government can be viewed as efforts in this direction.11 There are, therefore, strong imperatives

for strengthening cooperation between Pakistan and China to jointly fight terrorism, extremism and

separatism. This cooperation has the prospects of being more effective and more productive, because the

two countries have unanimity of views on the issues relating to the security and stability of the region.

The two countries also have similar perspectives on the issue of terrorism. They perceive terrorism not

only as a threat to regional peace, security and stability; they are also concerned about the spread of

foreign influence in the region because of terrorism.

China has clout – but US push is key.

Small, 2015 (Andrew, transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. He has

worked on Chinese foreign policy issues in Beijing, Brussels, London, and Washington DC., The China-

Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics pg 210-211)

The coming years present a potent constellation of threats but also an opportunity to shift the balance of

incentives in the region to ensure that they don’t recur. One part of the task is economic: the grand trade

and infrastructure projects that can integrate the region more closely with the East Asian growth

phenomenon. Beijing hopes to unleash forces of trade, finance, and economic opportunity that have never

had the chance to compete with the seemingly ineluctable logic of the region’s security rivalries. Yet the

politics rely on Pakistan . Beijing needs a political settlement in Afghanistan, a stable relationship

between Pakistan and India, and a settled security situation in Pakistan itself. China can dangle very large

financial carrots that might help to persuade different actors there that the strategic trade-offs are

worthwhile. It can invest its considerable diplomatic capacities. But the crucial decisions will be made in

Islamabad and Rawalpindi—and it is already clear that they will require some pushing from Beijing if

they are going to come out the way it would like.

China has clout with Pakistan

Felbab-Brown and William 1/27/2016 (Vanda, senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century

Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, and Jennifer, Deputy Foreign

Editor of Vox and former senior researcher at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings

Institution, “"They are riding a tiger that they cannot control": Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan”

Brookings Interview Accessed 7/1/2016 http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2016/01/27-

pakistan-afghanistan-future-felbabbrown-williams JJH)

So they have been hosting these four-way talks that involve them, the US government, the Afghan

government, and the Chinese government. The Afghan government is desperate to achieve some sort of

negotiated deal with the Taliban. It feels under tremendous pressure, the military is taking a pounding

from the Taliban, and the government lacks legitimacy. The US has similar views on the notion that the

way out of the predicament in Afghanistan is a negotiated deal. The Chinese also like the idea. They have

their own influence in Pakistan. China would very much like to say that they finally achieved what the US

failed to do over the past decade, that they will bring peace to Afghanistan, and that they will do it by

enabling the negotiations. Pakistan is responsive to China. Their relationship with China is much stronger

than their relationship with the United States. They often tell the US that China is their old friend, that

China is the country that hasn't betrayed them, unlike the United States. China has promised massive

economic development in Pakistan at $40 billion. The Pakistanis often say to the US that the Pakistan-

China relationship is "greater than the Himalayas and deeper than the ocean." Very flowery.

China has Clout

Notezai, 11/19/2015 (Muhammad Akbar, “Interview: Andrew Small on China-Pakistan Ties” The

Diplomat Accessed 7/1/16 http://thediplomat.com/2015/11/interview-andrew-small-on-china-pakistan-

ties/)

Can China play a critical role in reconciliation in Afghanistan?

Its good relationship with all parties to the conflict, and its special relationship with Pakistan, means that

China has been uniquely placed to play an important role in Afghanistan’s political reconciliation process,

and the fact that talks even started owed a fair bit to Beijing’s involvement. China certainly exerted

pressure on both Pakistan and the Taliban directly to get the process underway, which they duly started in

Murree in July. The confirmation of Mullah Omar’s death, and the tensions between Afghanistan and

Pakistan over the Taliban’s escalating activities have put this on ice though. There is no doubt that Kabul

was hoping for more decisive pressure from China, but Beijing has instead been willing to give Pakistan

the space to consolidate the Taliban’s leadership under Mullah Mansour. That won’t last indefinitely

though, and they will still expect talks to resume over the course of the coming year.

ISIS creates a new opportunity Pakistan to take a stand.

Felbab-Brown and William 1/27/2016 (Vanda, senior fellow in the Center for 21st Century

Security and Intelligence in the Foreign Policy program at Brookings, and Jennifer, Deputy Foreign

Editor of Vox and former senior researcher at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings

Institution, “"They are riding a tiger that they cannot control": Pakistan and the future of Afghanistan”

Brookings Interview Accessed 7/1/2016 http://www.brookings.edu/research/interviews/2016/01/27-

pakistan-afghanistan-future-felbabbrown-williams JJH)

JW: How does Pakistan fit into the rise of ISIS in Afghanistan? What's the relationship there? And how

might this affect the peace negotiations?

VFB: The rise of ISIS-Khorasan is one of the most interesting developments. It complicates the

negotiations for the Taliban. They oppose the negotiations, and they're a big problem for Mullah Mansour

and those who want to negotiate. They enable defections, make them easy, and make them costly. At the

same time, it is interesting because ISIS does not have the same linkages to Pakistan that the Afghan Taliban

had, even though ISIS includes many defectors from the Taliban. They quite specifically reject what they call the "yoke"

that Pakistan has put on the Afghan Taliban, and they call the Afghan Taliban leadership traitors because of the close relationship with Pakistan.

Moreover, ISIS-Khorasan also has quite a few members of various Pakistani extremist groups like Lashkar-e

Taiba and members of TTP [Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan]. So there is also a lot of resentment and hostility toward

Pakistan. I think the rise of ISIS might make Pakistan be cooperative to some extent, but on the other

hand, I think it will also reinforce in the mind of many Pakistan security controllers that it's important to

cultivate the Afghan Taliban as friends against the bigger danger of ISIS.

US Support of CPEC Good

The plans cooperation in Pakistan creates momentum for deepened cooperation in

Afghanistan.

Zhou, 3/16/2016 (Andi, Program Assistant for the China, East Asia and United States Program,

working out of the EastWest Institute’s New York Center. “Can China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Save the

US in Afghanistan?” The Diplomat Accessed 6/30/2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/can-chinas-

one-belt-one-road-save-the-us-in-afghanistan/ JJH)

In short, China viewing Afghanistan as an extension of its Uyghur concerns limits both U.S. and Chinese willingness to cooperate in Afghanistan.

The United States would balk at involving China in any way that helps China shore up its domestic position against Uyghur discontent, and China

would be loath to lend a hand in any way that doesn’t. For the United States and China to get on the same page about

Afghanistan, China must be convinced that its interest in Afghanistan goes beyond its domestic concerns.

It happens that the time is ripe for the United States to do just that. There is no doubt that China is looking

west, and looking hard. On the vanguard of China’s “March West” are two major international economic initiatives: the

Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, collectively known as “One Belt, One Road” (OBOR), which

envision a vast infrastructure network built using Chinese capital that will connect China to Western

Europe via the Eurasian heartland, including Afghanistan. For policymakers struggling to prop up

Afghanistan’s economic and governance capacity, the promise of a flood of capital from the east is a

godsend. China is already a major investor in Afghanistan, having poured billions of dollars into Afghan mining and energy enterprises. But

aside from being another potential fount of investment, OBOR also presents a prime opportunity for the United States to

diversify China’s interests in Afghanistan. Through active and targeted offers of cooperation, the United

States can shape specific projects within the OBOR framework to tie China more closely to Afghanistan’s

rise or fall. One place to start is the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), a proposed transportation

and energy infrastructure network that will link northwestern China to the Arabian Sea via Pakistan, and one

of few specific OBOR projects articulated so far. The planned routes traverse some of Pakistan’s most volatile border

regions adjacent to Afghanistan; with $46 billion USD in OBOR funds at stake, the project

undoubtedly gives China a direct interest in Afghanistan’s security . The U.S. can up China’s

Afghanistan ante by exploring linkages between the CPEC and the United States’ own “New Silk

Road Initiative.” Launched in 2011 to revitalize Afghanistan by forging economic connections with the country’s Central and South

Asian neighbors, the New Silk Road Initiative has faltered due to low political will in the U.S. to commit the

necessary resources and a lack of desire among the Central Asian states to expand regional cooperation,

particularly with Afghanistan. If coordinated properly, the CPEC and the New Silk Road could each boost

the other’s chances of success . In particular, the New Silk Road’s Central Asia South Asia Electricity Transmission and Trade

Project (CASA-1000), a transmission grid that would allow the Central Asian states to sell electricity to Afghanistan and Pakistan, dovetails with

the CPEC’s proposed upgrades to Pakistan’s electricity infrastructure. Giving China a stake in the success of CASA-1000 and the

New Silk Road more generally would be a promising step toward getting China to see more in

Afghanistan than its Uyghur concerns. Expanding China’s direct interests in Afghanistan would open

new avenues for U.S.-China cooperation there. It would motivate both sides to boost coordination

on Afghan security , while shifting the focus of this cooperation away from the fraught issues of

counterterrorism and China’s domestic concerns. A China that is willing to contribute more toward

military assistance, political mediation, counternarcotics, and border security in Afghanistan would be a

huge boon for both Afghanistan and the United States. As growing threats thwart a smooth U.S. withdrawal from its longest-

ever war, now is the time for the U.S. to seize any opportunity to build a robust partnership with China on Afghanistan.

US has plans to implement to support CPEC in the squo.

Bhutta 15 – Zafar Bhutta, journalist covering Pakistani affairs, 2015 (Zafar, “US keen to invest in

economic corridor projects,” October 16, The Express Tribune, Available online at

http://tribune.com.pk/story/973738/us-keen-to-invest-in-economic-corridor-projects/, Accessed 7-1-2016,

SAA)

In a major development, the United States has expressed interest in investing in energy projects under the

multibillion-dollar China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) to bring stability and prosperity to the

region. “If the corridor proceeds according to plan, it will be in the interest of Pakistan, China and the US

as well. We support the corridor,” said USAID-Pakistan Mission Director John Groarke while talking to a

group of journalists on Thursday. Pakistan and China had signed an agreement on April 20 this year to

commence work on CPEC development projects worth over $46 billion, which comes to roughly 20 per

cent of Pakistan’s annual GDP. The corridor aims to connect Gwadar port in Balochistan to China’s

Xinjiang region via a network of highways, railways and pipelines spread over 3,000km. Work on several

sections has already started but the entire project is expected to take several years to complete. “While

Pakistan would benefit immensely from the corridor, the USAID will have a possibility of investing in the

energy sector if everything moves in the direction the Chinese are pursuing,” he said. The top priority of

the US, Groarke said, is to invest in the energy sector and the rehabilitation of people displaced owing to

floods, earthquake and military operations. Wary of the Chinese getting strategic access to the Arabian

Sea and its presence in the region, the US has reportedly tried several times to persuade Pakistan against

involving China in its development process. Groarke believed the power sector is moving on the right

track and this is the reason power distribution companies are earning additional revenue. He, however,

stressed that power consumers should pay the full cost of electricity. Electricity is highly subsidised in

Pakistan. “Privatisation is the best solution for a viable energy sector,” the USAID country head said.

“The US government is committed to helping Pakistan enhance its power generation.” Responding to a

question, he said the US had already invested in making the technical, financial and environmental

feasibilities of Diamer-Bhasha dam. The dam is likely to cost around $14 billion with the bulk of funding

coming in primarily from the private sector and multilateral donors like Asian Development Bank. About

financing coal-based power plants in Pakistan, Groarke said the US had a policy not to invest in coal-

based power generation. “Our policy is to invest in renewable energy like solar and more importantly

energy conservation,” he added. He also said the US supported the Pakistani government’s efforts to

increase tax revenue collection. The USAID official said the US was also investing in the health sector

especially in Sindh. “We have provided scholarships to 7,000 students in Pakistani schools,” he said,

adding that Washington wanted more enrolment of children in schools. Appreciating the government’s

recent investments in the education sector, Groarke said the prime minister’s decision to invest 4 per cent

of the GDP in education reflected the priorities of his government.

US projects in development would help Pakistan infrastructure for CPEC

Zimmerman 15 – Thomas Zimmerman, Master’s Candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and

Diplomacy, served as a Senior Program Officer at CIC and as a Visiting Scholar at the Shanghai

Academy of Social Sciences (SASS), also worked on the National Security Council staff and at the U.S.

Department of Defense, 2015, (“The New Silk Roads: China, the U.S., and the Future of Central Asia,”

October, Available online at http://cic.nyu.edu/sites/default/files/zimmerman_new_silk_road_final_2.pdf,

Accessed 7-7-2016, SAA)

It is also in the U.S. interest to engage China in its planning around the NSRI. China has laid out plans for

significant investment in Central Asia. As the U.S. has voiced concerns about entrenching corruption, bad

governance, and weakened environmental standards, it must ensure open lines of communication with

Beijing to discourage policies that undermine standards. The U.S. has encouraged China’s growing role in

Afghanistan, and cooperation there between both countries has been one of the highlights of their bilateral

relationship in recent years. It is of mutual benefit to connect Afghanistan to Beijing’s broader regional

efforts. One of the most advanced U.S.-supported NSRI initiatives is the Central Asia South Asia

Electricity Transmission and Trade Project, or CASA-1000, a $1.2 billion electricity transmission grid

that will allow Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan to sell hydropower to Afghanistan and Pakistan. This project

presents a potentially interesting area for U.S. engagement with China. The World Bank and the Islamic

Development Bank are leading the project, with significant funding from USAID. An Inter-Government

Council (IGC) is coordinating planning with representatives from the four participating countries. After

years of political wrangling, in April 2015, Afghanistan, Pakistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan signed

general and power purchase agreements at an IGC meeting in Istanbul. The agreement outlines plans for a

transmission line that would originate in Kyrgyzstan, run through Tajikistan and Afghanistan, and

terminate in Pakistan. The line would be capable of transmitting 1,000 MW to Pakistan and 300 MW to

Afghanistan. If fully implemented, the project would contribute to addressing Pakistan’s persistent energy

shortages, providing power during the summer months when Pakistan’s power demand surges.

Afghanistan is expected to receive roughly $45 million per year in transit revenues. The project is

currently scheduled to be completed in 2018. CASA-1000 potentially complements China’s own plans to

invest significantly in Pakistan’s electrical infrastructure. China has already made initial inquires into

playing a role in the development of CASA-1000. In 2011, China participated in the Intergovernmental

Council meeting in Bishkek on the project. Additionally, the State Grid Corporation of China, China’s

largest state-owned electric utility company, expressed early interest in participation and sent a

representative to the 2013 Bidders Conference in Almaty.53 If CASA-1000 continues to advance, the

U.S. State Department will be understandably eager to tout the initiative, which is currently the highest

profile NSRI project in progress. The multilateral nature of the project and the World Bank’s leading role

may make China more amenable to collaboration. The President of the World Bank has voiced his

enthusiasm for cooperation with the AIIB, a fact that was publicized by China’s state media.54 The

project is very much in line with the AIIB’s core mission and would provide an opportunity for the kind

of collaborative engagement both sides profess to seek. Beijing remains sensitive about the Obama

Administration’s efforts to discourage its allies from joining the Chinese-led development bank. President

Obama denied that the U.S. opposed the establishment of the AIIB,55 instead framing U.S. concerns as

being about transparency and environmental protection. Chinese experts, however, believe the episode

illustrates Washington’s reflexive opposition to expanding China’s role in multilateral institutions. While

there is certainly a degree of schadenfreude in Beijing over the U.S. being rebuffed by allies who did join

the new bank, there is also a desire to see the U.S. engage with the AIIB. Pursuing opportunities for the

AIIB and World Bank to co-finance projects would be in the interest of both governments.

Pakistan Has Clout with the Taliban

Pakistan has sufficient clout if pushed.

Jamal, 3/12/2016 (Umair, “Pakistan May Have Jeopardized the Latest Afghan Peace Talks” The

Diplomat Accessed 7/1/2016 http://thediplomat.com/2016/03/pakistan-may-have-jeopardized-the-latest-

afghan-peace-talks/ JJH)

In a way, Pakistan may have jeopardized the latest round of talks. The Afghan Taliban’s announcement

came only a few days after Pakistani Foreign Affairs Advisor Sartaj Aziz, in a rare admission, said that

Pakistan still had significant influence over the Afghan Taliban because the group’s leadership is based in

Pakistan. Previously, Pakistan has always denied any such claims. Speaking at the Council on Foreign

Relations, he said, “I think people who have dealt with this issue recognize that Taliban in the best of

times … did not listen to Pakistan always … and now we have some influence on them because their

leadership is in Pakistan and they get some medical facilities, their families are here. So we can use those

levers to pressurize them to say ‘come to the table.’”

Past gains prove that Pakistan can fight terror.

Washington Post 16 (“The Easter bombing is the latest reminder that Pakistan must stop tolerating

terrorism”, March 30th, Accessed 7/1/16, Available Online at

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-easter-bombing-is-the-latest-reminder-that-pakistan-must-

stop-tolerating-terrorism/2016/03/30/0e5dbc34-f693-11e5-8b23-538270a1ca31_story.html, JRR)

PAKISTAN HAS made progress in fighting terrorism in the past two years, but a horrific suicide bombing in

one of its heartland cities on Sunday showed how serious the threat remains. A militant dispatched by an offshoot of

the Pakistani Taliban attacked a crowd of families in Lahore who were peacefully strolling in a park on Easter; the group later said Christians

were its target. In the end, more than 70 people were killed, the majority of them Muslim, including some 30 children. Since a 2014 attack on a

school that left more than 150 dead, the Pakistani government — and more importantly, its military — has finally

begun to fight in earnest against domestic jihadists. But the latest attack exposes the gaps in the

campaign. A long-overdue army offensive destroyed Taliban bases in the western frontier territories, forcing many of the militants into

eastern Afghanistan. Progress was also made in combating terrorists in the southern city of Karachi. Last year saw a noticeable reduction in

successful attacks. Pakistani authorities largely neglected militant groups deployed in other parts of the

country, however, including in populous Punjab province, where Lahore is located. They have also shrunk from measures needed to protect

religious minorities, including Pakistani Christians, who number more than 2 million. A poisonous blasphemy law, which provides the death

penalty for perceived insults to Islam, remains in force and is regularly used to target Christians. Pakistan’s failings are hardly unique: Christians

are in danger of being eliminated as a significant minority community across the Middle East. Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State, like the Taliban,

have adopted the genocidal aim of killing all non-Muslims, a departure from Islamic law as well as centuries of practical coexistence. Christians

are being systematically driven out of Iraq, and communities in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt and the Palestinian territories are shrinking as refugees flee

to the West. Even as President Obama and responsible leaders in Europe try to fight prejudice against Muslims, Muslim governments are fueling

demagogues such as Donald Trump by failing to protect Christians. Following the attack in Lahore, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif

vowed in a televised address to fight terrorism “until it is rooted out from our society,” and authorities arrested hundreds of suspected militants.

But the government faces formidable opposition: In Islamabad, thousands of demonstrators this week protested the execution of an extremist

convicted of assassinating a governor who criticized the blasphemy law. The best approach, as Pakistan should have

learned by now, is not to tolerate or negotiate with such extremists, but to forcefully confront them.

Exceptions cannot be made for jihadists who fight for causes favored by the Pakistani elite, such as the

“liberation” of Kashmir from Indian rule, or Taliban battling the Afghan government. While Mr. Sharif and the military

leadership have come a long way toward accepting those tenets, they have not yet fully embraced them.

That means terrorism will remain a threat to Pakistan for the foreseeable future.

Plan makes reconciliation possible – pressure from both sides key.

Curtis, 5/23/2016 (Lisa, Senior Research Fellow at The Heritage Foundation, “Killing of Taliban

Leader in Pakistan Demonstrates Shift in US Strategy” The Daily Signal Accessed 7/7/2016

http://dailysignal.com/2016/05/23/killing-of-taliban-leader-in-pakistan-demonstrates-shift-in-us-strategy/

JJH)

The killing of Akhtar Mansour on Pakistani territory shows the U.S. also is making welcome changes to

its Afghan strategy. It is unlikely the U.S. coordinated the drone strike with Pakistani officials, given

Pakistan’s close links with Mansour. Pakistan has not yet officially responded to the strike, which almost

certainly came as a major surprise. The U.S. has sought to take advantage of possible openings for a

Taliban reconciliation process but the wildcard has always been whether Pakistan would be willing to

pressure Taliban leaders that shelter on its territory. Without Pakistani willingness to crack down on

Taliban elements on its side of the border, there is little reason to believe a reconciliation process is

possible. Only when the Taliban are under military pressure in both Afghanistan and Pakistan will

there be any realistic hope for a peace settlement .

Pakistan can cut terrorist funding off.

Bhattacharya 13 – Sanchita Bhattacharya is a New Delhi-based researcher working on political Islam

in the Indian sub-continent, 2013, (“Can Pakistan stop its people funding terrorism?,” East Asia Forum,

November 16, Available online at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2013/11/16/can-pakistan-stop-its-people-

funding-terrorism/, Accessed 7-5-2016, SAA)

In October, as Muslims observed the holy festival of Eid-ul-Adha, Pakistani terrorist groups made profits. People are encouraged to

make ‘religious donations’, which often make their way to terror outfits like Lashkar-e-Taiba and its front organisation Jamaat-ud-Dawa.

Terrorist groups in Pakistan use Eid to connect with people and take advantage of their religious sentiment, and government authorities

often make no effort to stop the transactions, despite the fact that donations to terrorists are officially

banned. Through these activities terror groups gain resources for attacks and for social programs that are attractive to the common people. A

recent report suggested, for example, that in the Model Town area of Lahore, Lashkar-e-Taiba affiliates are planning to launch a free public

transport service. Pakistan’s attitude to terror groups could be described as almost two-faced. On the one hand, terrorists are criminalised; on the

other, the Pakistani government provides them with support. The attitude of the international community, by contrast, is not in doubt. On

December 11, 2008, following the 26/11 attacks in Mumbai, the United Nations Security Council declared Jamaat-ud-Dawa to be a terrorist

group as part of Resolution 1267, which is also known as the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committee. Under the same resolution the Security

Council listed two groups — Al Akhtar Trust and Al Rashid Trust — as financing Lashkar-e-Taiba. Pakistan reportedly took similar action that

same day, and it has taken some steps to criminalise terror funding — but little has come of it. The Anti-Terrorism (Amendment) Bill 2013

creates offences relating to financing of terror, and empowers government authorities to take action against elements involved in financing. It also

provides, among other things, for the confiscation of property owned by those involved in such activities. These are all worthwhile measures. But

the bill stays on paper — it doesn’t get enforced. The problem is that Pakistan’s government can appear duplicitous when it comes to terror

control. The Pakistan Muslim League-led Punjab state government continues to provide financial support to Jamaat-ud-Dawa for ‘welfare’

activities, announcing a grant-in-aid of PKR61.35 million for the administrator of the group’s training camp Markaz-e-Taiba in its budget for the

fiscal year 2013–14. The budget also includes an allocation of PKR350 million for a knowledge park at Muridkey and various other development

initiatives across Punjab. Earlier, in 2009–10, the federal government provided more than PKR80.2 million for the administration of Jamaat-ud-

Dawa facilities. And in 2010–11 two separate grants of PKR79.8 million were given to six organisations at Markaz-e-Taiba and a special grant-

in-aid of PKR3 million was awarded to Jamaat-ud-Dawa’s Al-Dawa School System in seven districts of Punjab. In order to appease and

legitimise its non-state actors, the government is shelling out its own resources, which in turn will be used

against it. The appeasement, therefore, is counterproductive, but Pakistan has a long legacy of consecutive

governments that have willingly or unwillingly appeased terrorists in order to survive in the short term.

What’s more, Pakistan’s inability to control terror activities damages its international reputation. The

world’s leading financial standards body, Financial Action Task Force, declared in June that Pakistan and

11 other countries have failed to make sufficient progress in preventing money laundering and terrorist

financing. This complex web of illegal financial transactions needs to be taken seriously. Pakistan must

restrict and disown regional terror activities, as the country itself is internally crippled and has been one of

the worst victims of terrorist violence. It may be that, finally, Pakistan has reached a point of no return in

terms of terror regulation.

Pakistan is key in the fight against the Taliban

Zakaria 15 — Fareed Zakaria writes a foreign affairs column for The Post. He is also the host of

CNN’s Fareed Zakaria GPS and a contributing editor for The Atlantic. , 2015 (“The key to solving the

puzzle of Afghanistan is Pakistan”, October 8th, Accessed 7/7/16, Available Online at

https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-key-to-solving-the-puzzle-of-

afghanistan/2015/10/08/1ebfa63a-6df1-11e5-aa5b-f78a98956699_story.html, JRR)

Recent setbacks in Afghanistan — from the fall of Kunduz to the errant U.S. bombing of a hospital in that

city — again raise a question. Why, after 14 years of American military efforts, is Afghanistan still so

fragile? The country has a democratically elected government widely viewed as legitimate. Poll after poll

suggests that the Taliban are unpopular. The Afghan army fights fiercely and loyally. And yet, the

Taliban always come back. The answer to this puzzle can be found in a profile of the Taliban’s new

leader, Akhtar Mohammad Mansour. It turns out that Mansour lives part time in Quetta, the New York

Times reports, “in an enclave where he and some other Taliban leaders . . . have built homes.” His

predecessor, Mohammad Omar, we now know, died a while ago in Karachi. And of course, we remember

that Osama bin Laden lived for many years in a compound in Abbottabad. All three of these cities are in

Pakistan. We cannot solve the problem of Afghanistan without recognizing that the insurgency against

that government is shaped, aided and armed from across the border by one of the world’s most powerful

armies. Periodically, someone inside or outside the U.S. government points this out. Yet no one knows

quite what to do, so it is swept under the carpet and policy stays the same. But this is not an incidental

fact. It is fundamental, and unless it is confronted, the Taliban will never be defeated. It is an old adage

that no counterinsurgency has ever succeeded when the rebels have had a haven. In this case, the rebels

have a nuclear-armed sponsor. Pakistan has mastered the art of pretending to help the United States while

actually supporting its most deadly foes. Take the many efforts that U.S. officials have recently made to

start talks with the Taliban. It turns out that we were talking to ghosts. Omar has been dead for two years,

while Pakistani officials have been facilitating “contacts” and “talks” with him. This is part of a pattern.

Pakistani officials, from former president Pervez Musharraf down, categorically denied that bin Laden or

Omar was living in Pakistan — despite the fact that former Afghan president Hamid Karzai repeatedly

pointed this out publicly. “I do not believe Omar has ever been to Pakistan,” Musharraf said in 2007. The

Pakistani army has been described as the “godfather” of the Taliban. That might understate its influence.

Pakistan was the base for the U.S.-supported mujahideen as they battled the Soviet Union in the 1980s.

After the Soviets retreated from Afghanistan in 1989, the United States withdrew almost as quickly, and

Pakistan entered that strategic void. It pushed forward the Taliban, a group of young Pashtun jihadis

schooled in radical Islam at Pakistani madrasas. (“Talib” means student.) Now history is repeating itself.

As the United States draws down its forces, Pakistan again seeks to expand its influence through its long-

standing proxy. Why does Pakistan support the Taliban? Pakistan’s former ambassador to the United

States, Husain Haqqani, whose book “Magnificent Delusions” is an essential guide, says that “Pakistan

has always worried that the natural order of things would be for Afghanistan to come under the sway of

India, the giant of the subcontinent. The Pakistani army came to believe that it could only gain leverage in

Afghanistan through religious zealots. Afghanistan’s secular groups and ethnic nationalists are all

suspicious of Pakistan, so the only path in is through those who see a common, religious ideology.” This

strategy is not new, Haqqani points out, noting that funding for such groups began in the mid-1970s,

before the Soviets invaded Afghanistan in 1979. What should the United States do? First, says Haqqani, it

needs to see reality for what it is: “When you are lied to and you don’t respond, you are encouraging more

lies.” He argues that Washington has to get much tougher with the Pakistani military and make

clear that its double-dealing must stop. To do this would be good for Afghanistan and stability in that

part of the world, but it would also be good for Pakistan.

Taliban Weak

Fractured Taliban is a weak Taliban. Even if it prevents short term peace.

Curtis, 1/5/2016 (Lisa, Senior Fellow @ CATO, “Afghanistan After America's War” The National

Interest Accessed 7/7/16 http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2016/1/afghanistan-after-

americas-war JJH)

The Taliban advances have come in the midst of a leadership crisis within the movement. That crisis

offers the U.S. an opportunity to weaken the insurgency and ultimately force its leaders into negotiations.

Some argue that it is easier to negotiate with a unified Taliban, and thus the U.S. should root for Mullah

Omar’s successor, Mullah Akhtar Mansour (who is close to Pakistani intelligence), to consolidate his

hold on the group. But a fractured Taliban is a weaker Taliban. And while the power jostling may disrupt

talks in the short-term, the split will almost certainly damage the credibility and effectiveness of the

movement over the long run. Like most Afghans, the dissident Taliban faction also is skeptical of

Pakistan’s role in Afghanistan. Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Rasool Noorzai rejected Akhtar

Mansour as the successor to Mullah Omar, accusing Mansour of lying about the circumstances

surrounding Omar’s death and of working too closely with Pakistani intelligence. Subsequent fighting

between the two Taliban factions in Zabul province reportedly killed over 100 insurgents, including

dissident Taliban leader Mullah Dadullah.

Fracturing pre-Mansour’s death means Pakistan has influence.

Khalilzad and Dobbins, 1/11/2016 (Zalmay, former American ambassador to Afghanistan and U.S.

permanent representative to the United Nations, is a counselor at the Center for Strategic and International

Studies., and James veteran diplomat who most recently served as the State Department's special

representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, is a senior fellow at RAND, “Pakistan Holds the Key to

Peace in Afghanistan” The RAND Blog Access 7/1/16 http://www.rand.org/blog/2016/01/pakistan-holds-

the-key-to-peace-in-afghanistan.html JJH)

Once the death two years earlier of the Taliban's founding leader Mullah Omar was revealed, Pakistan engineered the accession of

Mullah Akhtar Mansour to the leadership position. The head of the Haqqani network, a longstanding

surrogate of Pakistan, emerged as Mansour's deputy. This may have enhanced Pakistan's influence over the

dominant faction of the Taliban, but also exacerbated fault lines within the extremist movement when a

number of Taliban rejected Mansour's leadership. Pakistan may now be in a stronger position to

influence Mansour's followers—the largest Taliban faction—but probably cannot deliver all of the Taliban to any

peace process.

Fracturing is only increasing post Mansour’s Death.

Najafizada and Haider, 5/22/2016 (Eltaf and Kamran “Afghan Peace Still Far Away After U.S.

Kills Taliban Leader” Bloomberg Access 7/1/16 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-05-

22/afghan-peace-still-distant-after-u-s-attack-on-taliban-s-chief JJH)

"It will certainly help to push peace process," Rashid said of Mansour’s reported death. "There will be

fragmentation and more possibility that moderates come forward and take over from hardliners." That would

be a welcome development for the U.S., which pays about 75 percent of Afghanistan’s military budget. Last week the fifth round of peace talks

between representatives from the U.S., China, Afghanistan and Pakistan ended again with no prospect of Taliban participation. Just a day before

the strike, Sartaj Aziz, Pakistan’s de facto foreign minister, rebuffed accusations that his nation wasn’t doing enough to foster peace. "Vested

interests have often tried to create a perception that Pakistan actually controls the Taliban," Aziz said on Friday. "Such an impression breeds

unrealistic expectations from Pakistan." Mansour’s killing was intended to remove a roadblock to peace and also

show other militants that a political settlement is the only way forward, according to Omar Samad, a

former Afghan ambassador to Canada and France.

Answers To

A2: Pakistan Can’t Stop Terror

Pakistan is funding terrorism they could stop that.

Acharya et al 09 – Arabinda Acharyaa, research fellow and manager of strategic projects at the

International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research in the S. Rajaratnam School of

International Studies, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore; Syed Adnan Ali Shah Bukharia,

Associate Research Fellow and Team Leader of South and Central Asia Desk at the International Centre

for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), Rajaratnam School of International Studies

(RSIS), Nanyang Technological University (NTU), Singapore; & Sadia Sulaimana, research analyst in

World-Check's Terrorism and Insurgency Research Unit where she specializes on sub-state groups active

in South and Central Asia, 2009, (“Making Money in the Mayhem: Funding Taliban Insurrection in the

Tribal Areas of Pakistan,” June 20, Available online at

http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/10576100802628314, Accessed 7-15-2016, SAA)

Between 2004 and 2006, the government of Pakistan entered into a series of peace agreements with

various local Taliban factions belonging to Waziristani tribes: Shakai peace agreement with Ahmadzai

Wazir (April 2004), Sararogha peace agreement with Mahsud (February 2005); and North Waziristan

peace agreement with Uthmanzai Wazir (September 2006). The thrust of these agreements was to bind

the tribes to refuse sanctuary to the foreign militants, stop cross-border armed activity in Afghanistan and

incursions into the settled districts of NWFP, and accept the writ of the central government. On its own,

the government agreed to scale down its operations. From the government's perspective this was to stem

the growing tide of Talibanization in the tribal areas. 13 However, in each and every case the agreements

were openly flouted. Taking advantage of the lull in military operations, the Pakistan Taliban set up

parallel administration in tribal areas with de facto imposition of a Taliban system of law and order in

their respective areas. 14 They also began to extend their influence and activities in the settled districts of

NWFP. 15 The Pakistan Taliban belonging to various tribes of Waziristan divided their respective areas

into administrative zones and appointed military commanders over each region. These military

commanders are answerable to the supreme commander of the local Taliban and the Taliban Shura

(consultative council) of their respective tribe. Within each administrative zone, separate units are formed,

which are assigned specific responsibilities, such as intelligence collection and identification of “spies”

and their elimination, collection of revenue, and maintenance of law and order. 16 Collection of revenue

is very systematic and even more efficient than the government system. Revenue is collected in each

administrative zone and submitted to the central authority, which then distributes finances on a monthly

basis to various administrative zones. At the end of each month, the central authority conducts an audit

for the money spent by each zone during that month. The audit is for the purpose of discouraging corrupt

financial practices among the Taliban. 17 The central authority takes care of the surplus or deficit in the

monthly budget of each administrative zone. 18 This structured revenue collection encompasses a number

of activities. The local Taliban of North Waziristan Agency (NWA) have levied taxes and prescribed

harsh penalties for various offenses. The Shura issued a pamphlet listing out a “tax schedule,” which was

widely circulated throughout the Waziristan region. 19 Under the schedule, every 10-wheeler truck

entering the Waziristan region is required to pay Rs. 1,500 ($25) for allowing them six-month road

access, whereas six-wheeler trucks pay Rs. 1,000 ($17), twice a year. 20 This has traditionally been

known as the Rahdaari (corridor) system. Public transport and trucking are major businesses in the

Waziristan region. 21 These businesses pay the local Taliban hefty amounts for safe passage. 22

Similarly, Pakistan–Afghan border areas are famous for smuggling routes for shipment of contraband

including drugs. As per an estimate by Pakistan's Anti-Narcotics Force (ANF), as much as a quarter of the

unrefined, refined, and morphine-based opiates produced in Afghanistan pass through FATA, NWFP, and

Balochistan province, before exiting through points scattered along the Makran coast and the land frontier

with Iran. 23 The Taliban provide safe passage to the smugglers in return for regular payments. Similarly,

local petrol pump owners are required to pay Rs. 5,000 ($84) to the Pakistan Taliban on biannual basis.

24 This tax is mentioned as a “donation” in the pamphlet. However, it does not explain what this donation

is meant for. Pakistan Taliban is also collecting 6 percent as commission from government contractors

engaged in construction projects involving roads and communication infrastructure in the Waziristan

areas. At the same time, various local Taliban groups have debarred the local administration from

collecting taxes from the area. 25 These taxes include the amount levied by the government on timber

imports, trade and commerce and toll taxes being collected on the entry–exit points of the Agencies. 26

The Pakistan Taliban now collect all these taxes. The Pakistan Taliban also introduced Taliban-style

Sharia (Islamic Law) in the Waziristan region, involving punishments for various crimes and dereliction

from religious duties, which is similar to the system in Afghanistan during the Taliban regime before

September 2001. For instance, the local Taliban fixed Rs. 500,000 ($8,400) as penalty for crimes such as

robberies and thefts, as well as a two-month prison term for the offenders. 27 Various Taliban groups

have established special task forces in their areas to crack down on criminals and gangsters and maintain

order in their region. 28 It is believed that a portion of the Taliban finances is derived from the penalties

they impose on the non-conformists. At the same time, the Pakistan Taliban are collecting Rs. 100 ($2) on

a monthly basis from every family permanently domiciled in the Waziristan region on the grounds that

they will provide protection and justice to the local people. 29 According to Aslam Awan, a journalist

with Urdu Weekly Takbeer, the donations are some sort of “protection money” that the people give to

ensure law and order in their locality. 30 There are a total of 110,469 households in both South and North

Waziristan Agencies (South Waziristan: 61340; North Waziristan: 49,129) with an average household

size of 8.6 persons. 31 Given the number of households, the amount collected by the local Taliban groups

from their respective areas runs in the millions of rupees. Part of the money being collected is spent to

pay a salary to Taliban fighters and the members of the task force who enforce Taliban law in the

area . It is understood that a foot soldier gets Rs. 5000 ($84) per month as salary. 32 Money is also being

spent to purchase weapons . Interestingly, the Pakistan Taliban took into possession a huge cache of

arms and ammunition being stored and maintained by every clan/sub-clan and families living in the

Waziristan region. The Pakistan Taliban justified their action on the grounds that they are responsible for

maintaining law and order in the region as well as settling disputes among families, clans, and tribes and

hence the local tribesmen do not need to keep weapons themselves. This way, the Taliban were able to

secure a huge stockpile of weapons without spending money on it. 33 This is not to suggest that the

Pakistan Taliban are getting money from the area only through taxation or other coercive measures. The

local Taliban also organize fund- raising campaigns to raise money. For example, in October 2007, the

Pakistan Taliban organized a campaign to raise money in Koza Banda in Swat District of NWFP. Pictures

taken of the event show a banner reading “Donations for Mujahideen” placed in front of the Habib Bank,

while local Taliban militants were standing guard beside a makeshift collection center. Hundreds of local

tribesmen including even persons in their teens and foreigners donated money during the collection drive.

34 According to the legends that describe the pictures, local residents and militants gave cash, jewelry,

blankets, and foodstuffs in “support of the mujahideen who control the area.” 35 This suggests a level of

acceptance for the Pakistan Taliban who, many locals believe, are waging a “legitimate” war in

Afghanistan against ISAF–NATO troops to “liberate” the country, and have brought some sort of stability

in terms of maintaining law and order and dispensing speedy and cheap justice to the people. Donations

from Other Provinces of Pakistan Due to poor economic conditions and lack of development in the entire

FATA region, many residents from the South and North Waziristan Agencies have migrated and

permanently settled in the adjoining districts of NWFP as well as in Peshawar, Islamabad, Lahore, and

Karachi. 36 These Waziristani families nevertheless continue to maintain their links with their tribal

regions and visit them frequently. According to various reports, the Pakistan Taliban send individuals and

small teams to these Waziristan families to collect donations from them in the name of jihad in

Afghanistan. They also collect donations from the markets located in NWFP districts adjoining the FATA

region, as well as from mosques in the area during Friday prayers. 37 The contributions are either

voluntary, or collected through coercion, in which case the Pakistan Taliban use threats to the personal

safety of donors or those of their relatives. 38 The biggest chunk of revenue this way comes from

Karachi, which is the industrial hub of Pakistan and contributes nearly 25 percent to the GDP of the

country on an annual basis. According to some sources, the Pakistan Taliban are maintaining a number of

offices in Karachi through which they collect donations from Pushtuns working in Karachi. 39 While the

majority of the Pushtuns living in Karachi are daily toilers mostly engaged in small businesses, few are

leading businessmen. 40 They have a monopoly of the transport business in Karachi. Some of these rich

businessmen give large sums of money to the Pakistan Taliban every year. This ensures security for their

business operations. 41 If someone refuses to give donations, the Pakistan Taliban force him into

submission with threats to his family living in Waziristan, or to his personal safety if he comes to the area

to visit his ancestral home. 42

A2: Pakistan Counterterror Fails

Many Pakistani counterterror operations are working to root our militants now

Basit 6/27/16—Abdul Basit is an Associate Research Fellow at the International Center for Political

Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR) of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS),

Singapore, 2016 (“Pakistan’s Counterterrorism Operation: Myth vs. Reality”, June 27th, Accessed 7/1/16,

http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/pakistans-counterterrorism-operation-myth-vs-reality/, JRR)

June 15 marked the two year anniversary of Pakistan’s counterterrorism operation Zarb-e-Azb, which has now entered its final phase. To

commemorate the occasion, the director general (DG) of the Pakistani military’s Inter Services Public Relations (ISPR), General Asim Bajwa,

made an elaborate presentation in which he shared the military’s achievements and sacrifices against terrorists in the country. What is

crucial to remember, however, is that there are always two sides to a story – one that is told and one that

is not communicated clearly to the public. What has been told to the citizens of Pakistan regarding Zarb-

e-Azb – that is, its successes – appears to be straightforward. It is essential now to weed out the “untold” aspects of

Bajwa’s presser to understand the future challenges facing Pakistan’s war against home-grown extremism and terrorism. As far as the successes

are concerned, three achievements merit particular attention. First, Zarb-e-Azb has fully restored the writ of the

state and currently no area in Pakistan is under militant occupation, barring a few scattered pockets of

influence and sleeper cells. Pakistani territory has largely been retaken from militants. Second, the

operation has led to a significant change in Pakistan’s internal political discourse — namely, the conclusion that

appeasing militants through negotiations or reconciliation is futile. These practices alone cannot bring peace, unless initiated from a position of

strength. The third and most important achievement concerns the state garnering popular support in

countering terrorism. Operation Zarb-e-Azb, under General Raheel Sharif’s watch, has to an extent regained public trust in the state and

its institutions. It has revived a sense of confidence in the common man that the state has resolved to bring

peace by defeating terrorism. Having recognized the achievements of Zarb-e-Azb, however, it is important to look at the aspects that

didn’t feature in the ISPR press conference. By doing so, we can try to outline the challenges Pakistan may face in countering terrorism in the

future. First, Zarb-e-Azb has certainly dismantled and dislodged Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), but it has not yet been destroyed. TTP has

relocated to and resurrected its infrastructure in Afghanistan, enabling it to become a low-intensity long-term threat to Pakistan due to cross-

border support and sanctuaries. In other words, the terrorist threat to Pakistan is far from defeated—which has been one of the core objectives of

Operation Zarb-e-Azb. Second, as estimates independent of those presented in General Bajwa’s presser also suggest, there is no doubt

that terrorist violence is at an all-time low, but worryingly enough intolerance and extremism appear to have increased within

Pakistani society. The ever-widening gulf between Pakistan’s “secular-liberals” and the right-wing “Islamists” has been exacerbated alarmingly,

further shrinking the common space. The erosion of the middle ground is alarming; it will increase the already high level of polarization and

politico-religious fissures in society. Third, ambitious counterterrorism operations are good opportunities for states to

rebuild their image and correct negative public perceptions, both at home and abroad. Unfortunately, contrary to the fanfare

generated during Zarb-e-Azb’s launch, with it being termed as the “mother of all operations,” it has in fact failed to live up to the media hype

created by the ISPR. Beyond local consumption, it has not won Pakistan much recognition regionally and internationally. Poor strategic

communication and dull diplomacy are to be blamed for this failure; counting Pakistan’s sacrifices in the war on terror and playing victim to

international and domestic security dynamics have merely won hollow platitudes. Furthermore, prior to the launch of the operation, public

opinion favored rooting out radicalization and extremism from society’s midst, which could ultimately result in defeating militancy and terrorism

long-term. However, beyond tactical measures and cosmetic steps, no serious efforts seem to have been made to tackle the two-headed monster of

extremism and radicalization. Criminalization of hate speech and the ban on extremist literature were the most crucial steps to be taken in this

direction. However, there is still no concerted effort to devise a national counter-radicalization policy. Lacking this, the gains of Zarb-e-Azb are

fragile and possibly even reversible. Over time, terrorism has evolved and morphed from a security threat to an

ideological challenge. Consequentially, Pakistan’s battlefield has expanded from the literal physical space to the symbolic ideological

space. In the latter, the war of narratives is fought through ideas. However, Pakistan’s strategy in the war of ideas, the basis for countering an

ideological threat, appears to be missing. Without this, promoting moderation and inter-faith harmony are unachievable goals. Pakistan lacks a

coherent, forward-looking narrative, which should reflect the vision of its founding father Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who envisioned Pakistan to be

a moderate Muslim state. Finally, Zarb-e-Azb was an opportunity to revive the dysfunctional National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA),

which could meet the competing demands of different law enforcement and intelligence agencies through central coordination in countering

terrorism. However, NACTA remains low on the governments’ priorities as stakeholders from both military and civilian setups continue to fight

over its control and ownership. In addition, the present situation with the criminal justice system is no better. Similarly, the Anti-Terrorism

Courts’ performance remains less than ideal and leaves much to be desired. The military tried to overcome these gaps through ad hoc

arrangements of military courts and special policing powers granted to them under Article 245 of the Constitution. Much-needed institutional

reforms in the police and judiciary are still lacking. Hence, despite doing well against the terrorist threat on tactical levels, the institutional

capacity of counterterrorism with clearly demarcated and well-defined professional functions remains absent. From a strategic point of view, a

good operation is short, focused, and limited in its objectives. An unrealistically overambitious operation with vaguely defined objectives can turn

a timely victory into a prolonged defeat. Operation Zarb-e-Azb has achieved its military and security objectives and that is how it will be

remembered. It will also be remembered as the legacy of General Raheel Sharif, and it will be an illustrious one. Sharif has returned hope to the

people of Pakistan and now the operation should be taken to its logical conclusion by allowing displaced families to return to their homes

respectfully

Pakistan counterterror works.

Hussain, 2/8/2016 (Murtaza, journalist and political commentator, “AFTER YEARS OF VIOLENCE,

PAKISTAN IS WINNING ITS FIGHT AGAINST TERRORISM” The Intercept Accessed 7/10/16

https://theintercept.com/2016/02/08/after-years-of-violence-pakistan-is-winning-its-fight-against-

terrorism/ JJH)

ON JANUARY 20, a group of men from the militant Islamist group Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan infiltrated

the campus of Bacha Khan University in northwestern Pakistan. Armed with assault rifles and grenades,

they managed to kill over 20 students and faculty before they were gunned down by local security forces.

The attack managed to shock a country that for years has endured terrorist outrages. That the killings

occurred at a university, targeting innocent students and teachers, made them feel particularly heinous.

But the attack was also remarkable because Pakistan, for more than a year, had appeared to be on the way

to finally defeating its homegrown insurgency. And despite the horror of what happened at Bacha Khan,

that still seems to be the case. Last year saw precipitous decreases in both terrorist attacks and fatalities in

Pakistan. Though exact figures differ, statistics compiled by the South Asia Terrorism Portal, the research

arm of the New Delhi-based Institute for Conflict Management, as well as a study by the Islamabad-based

Center for Research and Security Studies, a pro-democracy think tank, showed significant decreases in

violence in the country. A CRSS study said terrorist incidents declined 56 percent in 2015 from 2014, and

the SATP, which conducts a running tally of terrorism figures, said that Pakistan in 2015 suffered the

lowest number of suicide attacks and deaths from terrorism since 2006. These reported declines follow

Pakistan’s initiation in 2014 of a large-scale military operation against Taliban sanctuaries in the

ungoverned tribal areas bordering Afghanistan. That effort, which is ongoing, has succeeded in

reclaiming most territory in the tribal areas. The seven years preceding this operation coincided with the

escalation of the American war in Afghanistan and were among the bloodiest in Pakistan’s history. Those

years saw a deluge of terrorist attacks that targeted markets, shrines, mosques, and major landmarks

throughout the country. Suicide bombings, once unprecedented in Pakistan, suddenly became a gruesome

regularity. Even widely revered religious sites were not immune. As a seemingly unstoppable wave of

attacks overtook the country, landmarks like Lahore’s Data Darbar complex and Karachi’s Abdullah Shah

Ghazi shrine, both popular destinations for Sufi pilgrims from across South Asia, were struck by suicide

bombings. The violence called into question the government’s ability to maintain domestic cohesion. By

2014, the situation had begun to look dire. The tipping point finally came on June 8, when a group of TTP

militants launched an attack against Karachi’s Muhammad Ali Jinnah International Airport, killing 28 and

threatening to sever the major transit link between Pakistan’s economic capital and the rest of the world.

The following week, the Pakistani military commenced the large-scale attack on Taliban sanctuaries,

known as Operation Zarb-e-Azb. In a public statement announcing the start of the campaign, the

government painted the battle in existential terms, saying that the militants had “waged a war against the

state of Pakistan” and that their terrorism was “disrupting our national life in all its dimensions, stunting

our economic growth and causing enormous loss of life and property.” Over a year and a half later,

Operation Zarb-e-Azb appears to have garnered results. In addition to sharp statistical declines in terror

attacks and casualties, locals in major urban centers like Karachi have also reported improvements in

basic law and order. According to figures compiled last year by the Human Rights Commission of

Pakistan, an independent nonprofit, sectarian violence and so-called target killings in Pakistan’s largest

city declined by 28 percent and 63 percent, respectively, from the previous year.

Off Case

India DA

Uniqueness Answers

India is breaking containment now.

Abbhi, 1/26/2015 (Ashay, Research Analyst based out of Noida, India and was a Lecturer at the

London School of Energy Studies, “String of Pearls: India and the Geopolitics of Chinese Foreign Policy”

E-International Relations Accessed 7/12/16 http://www.e-ir.info/2015/07/26/string-of-pearls-india-and-

the-geopolitics-of-chinese-foreign-policy/ JJH)

China and India are constantly looking for better energy pastures. In the process, the two global giants are

moving towards a diplomatic stand-off that could devastate the balance of peace in the Indian

subcontinent, which, as it is, hangs by a mere thread. Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Myanmar, that were

earlier thick with the Chinese are slowly embracing New Delhi’s reach out potentially becoming India’s

strength in the region. The near-equal influence exerted in these countries by India and China could result

in a neutral stance taken by them in the event of a war. However, China has the support of India’s western

neighbor, one that has so far been diplomatically deaf to India’s efforts. But to counter that, Vietnam is

rapidly becoming to India what Pakistan is to China. The US dynamic also plays a significant role here,

especially when considering the oil wealth of the Middle East that India’s strong US ties can get it access

to, countered by China only through its energy and diplomatic relations with Iran. While the ‘string of

pearls’ policy may give Chinese energy better security in the Indian Ocean, the reverse of it will give

India access to more oil and gas while countering Chinese military influence in the region and

diminishing the diplomatic threat to itself. At the cusp of military and energy security balances the

diplomatic battle is raging in the region, one that may not have a clear winner for years but has generated

enough interest for the world to watch the passive stand-offs keenly. China has been pursuing its ‘string

of pearls’ policy against India for more than a decade, but only now has the dynamic started to change,

with Modi driving his own ‘reverse string of pearls’ policy, snatching one pearl at a time until China

stands red-faced holding the mere string.

Link Turns

OBOR helps India

Saran 15- Shyam Saran, Indian career diplomat. He joined the Indian Foreign Service in 1970 and

rose to become the Foreign Secretary to the Government of India. Prior to his appointment as the Foreign

Secretary he served as India's ambassador to Myanmar, Indonesiaand Nepal and as High Commissioner

to Mauritius. Upon completion of his tenure as the Foreign Secretary he was appointed Prime Minister’s

Special Envoy for Indo-US civil nuclear issues and later as Special Envoy and Chief Negotiator on

Climate Change. EXTERNAL AFFAIRS, What China’s One Belt and One Road Strategy Means for

India, Asia and the World http://thewire.in/12532/what-chinas-one-belt-and-one-road-strategy-

means-for-india-asia-and-the-world/ TMY 7/5/16

What’s in this for India? Since India lacks the resources today to set up competing networks, it may be

worthwhile to participate in those components of the OBOR which might improve Indian connectivity to

major markets and resource supplies While looking at the emerging geo-political landscape, Saul Bernhard Cohen, in his book Geopolitics,

envisages the emergence of three strategic realms this century. One is the US-dominated maritime world of the North Atlantic and the North Pacific Basin; there is the

second realm of Maritime Europe, organised around the European Union, and a Continental Asia geo-strategic realm covering the Eurasia landmass with Russia as the

original core. But, as pointed out earlier, China has emerged as a separate Continental Maritime realm, shrinking the

space for Russia in Central Asia and for the US in the North Pacific. There is an incipient effort to co-opt Russia on the one

hand and Europe on the other to confine the US to the American hemisphere. The playing out of this story has major implications, because in case China

succeeds with the global strategy underlying OBOR, India may well be consigned to the margins of both

land and maritime Asia or become, by compulsion or by choice, a subordinate component of the Chinese-

dominated network that is, in the words of Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar, “hard-wiring” the new world.

Interestingly, Cohen foresaw a time when India, like China, could carve out a fourth geo-strategic realm also continental/maritime in nature. This it would do by

dominating the eastern and western reaches of the Indian Ocean and the sub-continental landmass, south of Eurasia but linked to it. If this were indeed possible then

India would have an opportunity to deal with the challenge of the Chinese geo-strategic realm on its doorstep with greater room for manoeuvre. I have argued before

and do so again: If there is one country which has the potential to catch up with China and even overtake it, it is

India. The current asymmetry is not riven in stone. What it will take India to achieve this long-term goal is well-known and I will not repeat it. Currently,

India has neither the resources nor the political and economic weight to put in place competitive and

alternative connectivity networks on a global scale. Therefore, for the time being, it may be worthwhile to

carefully evaluate those components of the OBOR which may, in fact, improve India’s own connectivity

to major markets and resource supplies and become participants in them just as we have chosen to do with

the AIIB and the NDB. For example, building a road/rail link to Central Asia through Iran using the port of Chahbahar could then use Chinese built

routes to access both Central Asian and Russian destinations as well as Europe. It may be more important to deploy our limited resources to build an Indian Ocean

network of ports, with connecting highways and rail routes such as exemplified by the planned Mekong-Ganga corridor and the Sittwe-Mizoram multi-modal

transport corridor. There have been longstanding plans to develop the deep water port on Sri Lanka’s eastern coast, Trincomalee, as a major energy and transport hub

and yet, despite the warning message in the shape of Chinea building the Hambantota port in southern Sri Lanka and expanding the Colombo port, virtually no work

has been undertaken since Indian Oil acquired the tank farm located at the port. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands lie at the very centre of the Bay of Bengal and

could be developed to serve as a regional shipping hub for the littoral states and beyond. And yet, India continues to treat these islands as a distant outpost rather than

leveraging their unique location at the very centre of one of the most strategic stretches of ocean space. There has been much talk about India launching a Spice Route,

a Cotton Route and even a Mausam project tying the countries around the Indian Ocean bound together by the monsoon winds. Instead of spreading our

limited resources thinly over these mostly rhetorical ripostes to China’s OBOR, it may be more prudent to

focus on limited but strategically key routes and ports along our adjacent seas and islands to safeguard our

most important equities. To recapitulate, the first priority would be developing our own Andaman and Nicobar Islands as a modern transport and

shipping hub for the Bay of Bengal Basin. At the next level would be Chahbahar port to the west with road/rail links to Central Asia; Trincomalee port to the east,

with shipping links to the Bay of Bengal littoral ports and beyond; the Mekong-Ganga corridor linking India’s east coast with Indo-China; and the Kaladan multi-

modal transport corridor in Myanmar’s Rakhine province, including the port of Sittwe. The proposed BCIM corridor could then become part of this broader network.

Once this primary circle has been secured one could move on to progressively expanding circles as resources become available. What is important to

note is that in this 21st century strategy, security and economics go together. Creating a dense web of

economic and trade relations itself becomes an assurance of security. It is fair to say that China, in

deploying the OBOR initiative, has demonstrated a level of ambition and imagination which is mostly

absent in India’s national discourse. It is time both scholars and practitioners started to think and act

strategically on issues such as OBOR which will have a significant impact on India’s vital interests.

No link and turn- India wants cooperation over terrorism in Pakistan and the plan

would increase India-China relations

Pant 12— Harsh V. Pant is Reader in International Relations at King’s College London in the

Department of Defense Studies. He is also an Associate with the King’s Centre for Science and Security

Studies and an Affiliate with the King’s India Institute, 2012 (“The Pakistan Thorn in China—India—

U.S. Relations”, Winter 2012, Accessed 7/5/16, Available online at

https://www.ciaonet.org/attachments/19515/uploads, JRR)

Some in the Indian strategic community have suggested that China shares a range of objectives with

India including a prosperous, sustainable, and secure Pakistan that does not remain a base for al-

Qaeda and its affiliates .16 The rapidly deteriorating situation in Pakistan and its long-term

consequences for regional stability might, some suggest, result in greater cooperation between Beijing

and New Delhi to stabilize the shared periphery between the two nations. Turbulence in Xinjiang, such as

the riots between Han Chinese and the Muslim Uighurs in 2009, is indeed forcing Beijing to pay greater

attention to the sources of international terrorism in Pakistan, given the prospect of Islamist extremism

spilling over from Afghanistan and Pakistan into the restive autonomous region of western China. China’s

concerns about Islamist militancy on its western border have been rising over the past few years and the

security environment in Afghanistan and the larger Central Asian region remains a huge worry. Yet,

China refuses to discuss Pakistan with India in order to ensure that its privileged relationship with

Pakistan remains intact, and U.S.—China cooperation on Pakistan has remained minimal. China and India

share a range of objectives in Pakistan, including preventing the rise and spread of extremism, fostering

economic development in Afghanistan and Pakistan, overall political stability and social cohesion in

Pakistan, and the safety of Pakistan’s nuclear assets. Of all the major powers, it is China that can

effectively leverage its growing economic profile in Pakistan to ensure Pakistan’s security establishment

cedes power to the civilians, allowing the Pakistani state to function effectively. Chinese workers and

assets have been targeted by extremists in Pakistan, and Chinese plans to emerge as a major investor in

Afghanistan would remain a fantasy without Pakistan reining in extremist groups in Afghanistan.

No Link

CPEC tensions won’t cause escalation

Adeel 15- Staff Writer at newPakistan, Cynthia Hall’s Nuclear Warning – Is It Worse Than It Seems?

http://new-pakistan.com/2015/06/01/cynthia-halls-nuclear-warning-is-it-worse-than-it-seems/ 7/12/16

@yangtri

We have been hearing a lot lately about RAW’s intentions against Pakistan and their fury over CPEC which has been termed

as a ‘game changer’ for the region. Supposedly, there are 35,000 RAW agents on the loose in Pakistan, though our

intelligence agencies have not been able to arrest a single one. We have been told that RAW is responsible for terrorism, though the actual terrorists who have been

arrested in connection continue to be either run-of-the-mill extremists or educated middle-class jihadis. Each time, though, the stakes keep getting made higher. Now,

the stakes have been taken to a truly terrifying level with claims that India is considering arming assets in

Pakistan with “small nuclear devices”. However, the source of this latest claim makes it even more terrifying that it seems. This latest statement

was allegedly made by a high ranking Indian intelligence officer and was reported by Cynthia Hall writing from Damascus. In case you are unfamiliar with this

journalist, don’t feel too bad. She is a complete bloody mystery. Nobody has ever heard of her, and nobody can find any information about her anywhere. Despite the

fact that she has never apparently written a report for any publication before, she somehow managed to travel into Syria and get an interview with high level

intelligence officers who were more than happy to reveal to this strange woman some nuclear secrets and India’s strategic plans to violate international law. If you

haven’t seen the article, I will post it below. The only known existence is this online picture that is shared on social media, so I can’t give you any link. Straight from

the horse's... As you can see, the important points are carefully highlighted in case you only have a few seconds to read before you email this to your friends and

relatives giving them the dire warning. In case you can’t tell from my tone, I am mostly being sarcastic. This is an obvious piece of very poorly made propaganda, and

I will continue to support that position until Cynthia Hall herself comes forward and explains what she was doing in Syria and how she had such incredible access to

Indian intelligence. There is one thing that I am not being sarcastic about, though, and that is that this piece of propaganda is terrifying to me. Not because I believe

that India is going to give terrorists “small nuclear devices”, but because I worry about what it means when propaganda escalates into the nuclear zone. It would

make no sense for India to give proxies small nuclear weapons to use against Pakistan. The first response

would obviously be a nuclear retaliation, which would mean that India was acting suicidally. India’s

paranoia may have brought it to a point where they are arresting small birds, but there’s no evidence

that they have become crazy enough to invite a nuclear war .

Note: RAWS The Research and Analysis Wing (R&AW or RAW) is the primary foreign intelligence

agency of India.

A2: China Expands to Indian Ocean

Pivot solves fears of China’s expansionism

Rakisits 6/9/2016 (Claude, Senior Fellow at the Center for Australian, New Zealand and Pacific

Studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service, “U.S.-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

REMAIN AS CRITICAL AS EVER” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs Accessed 7/4/16

http://journal.georgetown.edu/u-s-pakistan-relations-remain-as-critical-as-ever/ JJH)

CPEC is good news for Pakistan and should be welcomed by the United States for its potential to help

Islamabad address the country’s serious energy deficiencies and economic frailty. However, CPEC also

brings Pakistan even deeper into China’s geo-strategic orbit. Moreover, with China’s unimpeded access to

the port of Gwadar, which could possibly be upgraded into a Chinese naval facility, Pakistan’s role in

facilitating China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean could be critical. Needless to say, the

increasing naval competition in the Indian Ocean caused by China’s growing presence will have serious

ramifications on the region’s stability. As far as U.S. policy towards CPEC is concerned, it is critical that

the United States continues its rebalancing efforts in the Indo-Pacific region, which began with President

Obama’s “pivot” in 2011. Among other reasons, rebalancing will allow the United States to continue to

monitor China’s advancement in the region and to reassure its regional allies of its long-term security

commitment.

Impact Defense

China-India border is stable – no chance of escalation

MS 11 (“A Kargil-type attack by China is out of question: India,” Maritime Security: Asia, 11-3,

http://maritimesecurity.asia/free-2/south-china-sea-2/a-kargil-type-attack-by-china-is-out-of-question-

india/)

Summarily ruling out the possibility of China engineering a ‘Kargil-type’ misadventure along the Indian

border, government sources in New Delhi [ Images ] said on Wednesday that Chinese incursions into Indian territory have

progressively decreased over the last five years. “The Army says it (Kargil-type attack by China) is out of

the question and that it can handle it,” a top government source said. “Why would they make trouble? What will they gain

that substantially outweighs the losses they could incur? The capabilities of India and China have vastly

increased over time and no one is crazy enough to spark off a confrontation,” he said. He was speaking in the

backdrop of a report by strategic affairs think-tank Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses which suggested that it is conceivable that China

could do a Kargil [ Images ] on India ‘to teach India a lesson’ and that it could be a ‘limited war’. The report — titled ‘A Consideration of Sino

Indian Conflict’ — projected conflict scenarios between India and China. While admitting that India did have big issues with

China such as the boundary issue, et cetera, the fears of a full-fledged conflict were unfounded . “That is

actually our most peaceful border. Since October 10, 1975, no one has died on the border, not a single shot has been fired in anger. . .

so we can’t say there is tension along the Sino-Indian border,” the source said. On the decreasing Chinese incursions into the

Indian territory, the source said that there is a pattern to what happens. Both sides have different perceptions of where the line is, thus once a

year both go to the area, paint a rock, so to speak, and show their presence. Direct discussions with the Chinese have been on-

going and a process to find a peaceful solution to the vexed issues too is on. Touching upon the issue of ‘stapled

visas’, the source said that it was quite like ‘painting a rock’ for it offended one’s pride more than anything else, but “now we have found a

solution and regular visas are being issued”. Coming back to the border issue, which is the biggest issue that India and China have with

each other, he said that it is a long-term matter but the situation has been handled well. “The issue hasn’t been settled,

but is being managed well,” he said. In the recent past China has ‘warned’ New Delhi over energy-hungry India’s oil-exploration bids

along the Vietnamese coast and into the South China Sea claiming sovereignty on the waters. Dismissing China’s ‘threat’ over the issue, the

government source said, “We have been doing this since 1988 and will continue to do it. High seas should be open for navigation and as for

commercial explorations there is an international law and an international commission which will decide what is to be done.”

No Sino-India conflict

Merrington 12 -- PhD on India–China relations at the Department of Political and Social Change, the

Australia National University (Louise, 4/11/12, "The India–US–China–Pakistan strategic quadrilateral,"

www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/04/11/the-india-us-china-pakistan-strategic-quadrilateral/)

Although the disputed border between China and India is often highlighted as the major sticking point in Sino–Indian relations,

in reality it has remained relatively peaceful since the end of the 1962 war, and the potential for overt

military conflict in the region remains minimal .

No China-India war – economics and US deterrent

Tharoor 11 (Ishaan, Editor – Global Spin, “China and India at War: Study Contemplates Conflict

Between Asian Giants,” European Dialogue, 11-7, http://eurodialogue.org/China-and-India-at-War-

Study-Contemplates-Conflict-Between-Asian-Giants)

There are plenty of reasons why China and India won't go to war. The two Asian giants hope to reach

$100 billion in annual bilateral trade by 2015. Peace and stability are watchwords for both nations' rise

on the world stage. Yet tensions between the neighbors seem inescapable: they face each other across a heavily militarized nearly 4,000km-long border and are increasingly competing against each other in a

scramble for natural resources around the world. Indian fears over Chinese projects along the Indian Ocean rim were matched recently by Beijing's ire over growing Indian interests in the South China Sea, a body of water China

controversially claims as its exclusive territorial sphere of influence. Despite the sense of optimism and ambition that drives these two states, which comprise between them nearly a third of humanity, the legacy of the brief 1962 Sino-

Indian war (a humiliating blow for India) still smolders nearly five decades later. And it's alive on the pages of a new policy report issued by the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses in New Delhi, an independent think tank that

is affiliated with India's Ministry of Defense. "A Consideration of Sino-Indian Conflict" is hardly a hawkish tract — it advocates "war avoidance" — but, by spelling out a few concrete scenarios of how conflict may look between the

two countries, it reveals the palpable lack of trust on the part of strategists both in New Delhi and Beijing. The report applauds long-term Indian efforts underway to beef up defenses along the Chinese border, but warns that Beijing

may still take action: In future, India could be subject to China's hegemonic attention. Since India would be better prepared by then, China may instead wish to set India back now by a preventive war. This means current day

preparedness is as essential as preparation for the future. A [defeat] now will have as severe political costs, internally and externally, as it had back in 1962; for, as then, India is yet again contemplating a global role. While a lot of

recent media attention has focused on the likelihood of Sino-Indian clashes at sea, the IDSA report keeps its scope trained along the traditional, glacial Himalayan land boundary, referred to in wonkish parlance as the LAC, the Line of

Actual Control. Since the 1962 war, China and India have yet to formally resolve longstanding disputes over vast stretches of territory along this line. Those disputes have resurfaced noticeably in recent years, with China making

unprecedented noises, much to the alarm of New Delhi, over its historical claims to the entirety of the northeastern Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh — what the Chinese deem "Southern Tibet." The Chinese even rebuked Indian

Prime Minister Manmohan Singh for having the audacity of visiting the Indian state during local elections in 2009. Not surprisingly, it's in this remote corner of the world that many suspect a war could kick off, particularly around the

historic Tibetan monastery town of Tawang. India has reinforced its position in Arunachal with more boots on the ground, new missile defenses and some of the Indian air force's best strike craft, new Russian-made Su-30 fighters.

After decades of focusing its army west against perennial threat Pakistan, India is tacitly realigning its military east to face the long-term challenge of China. The report speculates that China

could make a targeted territorial grab, "for example, a bid to take Tawang." Further west along the LAC, another flashpoint lies in

Kashmir. China controls a piece of largely uninhabited territory known as Aksai Chin that it captured during

the 1962 war. Indian press frequently publish alarmist stories about Chinese incursions from Aksai Chin and

elsewhere, playing up the scale of Chinese investment in strategic infrastructure on its side of the border in stark contrast to the seeming lethargy

of Indian planners. Part of what fuels the anxiety in New Delhi, as the report notes, is the threat of coordinated action between China and Pakistan

— an alliance built largely out of years of mutual antipathy toward India. In one mooted scenario, Pakistan, either with its own forces or terrorist,

insurgent proxies, would "make diversionary moves" across the blood-stained Siachen glacier or Kargil, site of the last Indo-Pakistani war in

1999, while a Chinese offensive strikes further east along the border. Of course, such table-top board game maneuvers have

little purchase in present geo-politics. Direct, provocative action suits no player in the region, particularly

when there's the specter of American power — a curious absence in the IDSA report — hovering on the

sidelines. Intriguingly, the report seems to dismiss the notion that China and India would clash in what others would consider obvious hotspots

for rivalry; it says the landlocked Himalayan kingdom of Bhutan would likely be treated as a neutral "Switzerland", while Nepal, a country of 40

million that entertains both Beijing and New Delhi's patronage, is more or less assured that neither of its big neighbors would risk violating its

sovereignty in the event of war.

Impact Turn (Wait for India DA)

Attempts at Containment of India bolster US-India relations

Roy, 2013 (Dennis, Senior Fellow and Supervisor of POSCO Fellowship Program, and PhD in Political

Science. Return of the Dragon: Rising China and Regional Security pg. 109-110 JJH)

China has a strong interest in limiting Indian strategic cooperation with countries outside South Asia. This could be interpreted as an offensive

policy by Beijing: holding India down and restricting its freedom of action. It could also be interpreted as a defensive Chinese policy stemming

from Beijing’s own fear of encirclement. Sometimes Beijing sends hostile signals to India to punish New Delhi for

getting too close to the United States or another potential Chinese adversary. This, however, is something of a

catch-22 for the Chinese. They risk accelerating the same anti-China cooperation they want to preclude, because a

perceived rise in hostility from China increases support within India. In defense partnerships with the

other major democracies. India attempts to counter what it perceives as Chinese encirclement by

marshalling its own strength and by seeking defense cooperation with other states. India doubled its defense

spending during the first decade of the twenty-first century. New Delhi recently announced a major military platforms such as advanced aircraft

and aircraft carriers. The number of Indian Navy ships will increase by 25 percent. In 2010 India announced an unprecedented upgrade of its

forces along the border with China and the assignment of a squadron of aircraft to the Assam region adjacent to the disputed area of Arunachal

Pradesh. In mid-2011 India’s air force began a major reorganization of its forces to shift emphasis away from Pakistan and toward countering the

capabilities of an improved PLA Air Force. In April 2012 India successfully tested a new missile capable of carrying a one-ton nuclear warhead

to any city China. These adjustments will not necessarily bring the Indians a sense of security anytime soon, and indeed they may fall further

behind the PLA over time. India’s defense industries suffer deep structural problems and have underperformed for decades. An additional

problem is efforts by India’s civilian government to limit the influence of the armed forces because of fear of military coup d’état. Indian’s forces

have struggled in conflicts with smaller opponents such as Pakistan, the “Tamil Tigers” of Sri Lanka, and various domestic insurgent groups.

Clear upgrades are visible in Indian strategic cooperation with other countries that share India’s

apprehension about rising Chinese strength . This decade has seen New Delhi seek a deeper and

broader relationship with the United States after a long period of reticence. The Indians have taken this path despite

PRC attempts to both woo and coerce them. A critical mass of the Indian elite has accepted the idea that India needs a

strategic partnership with the United States to offset China’s growing power. The George W. Bush administration

talked up the potential of such a partnership. Washington moved from economic sanctions against India in 1998 in retaliation for India’s nuclear

weapons program to significant defense cooperation and even an offer of partnership on nuclear energy, less than a decade later. Not surprisingly,

China criticized this deal as indicative of an American double standard on nuclear nonproliferation (i.e. its okay for countries friendly to the

United State such as Israel and India but not for countries such as Iran and North Korea). The bilateral 2005 defense agreement opened the way

for U.S. weapons technology transfers to India, joint training, and Indian participation in the anti-ballistic missile defense program. The United

States assented to Israel selling Phalcon AWACs aircraft to India after blocking a similar proposed sale to China in 2000. Whether this

partnership can meet high expectation is questionable. India has a proud tradition of nonalignment and many Indians remain wary of closely

cooperating with Washington. During the Obama administration, India opposed U.S. positions on climate change and international trade, resisted

implementing a proposed deal for U.S.-Indian cooperation on nuclear energy, and passed on an opportunity to buy U.S. warplanes.

Other

A2: Russia-China DA

Doesn’t link

Li, 2016 (Siyao, “The New Silk Road: Assessing Prospects for "Win-Win" Cooperation in Central

Asia” CORNELL INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS REVIEW Vol. 9 No. 1 Accessed 7/5/16

http://www.inquiriesjournal.com/articles/1319/the-new-silk-road-assessing-prospects-for-win-win-

cooperation-in-central-asia JJH)

Although China is entering Russia's traditional sphere of geopolitical influence and deepening its economic presence

in Central Asia, Russia's official reactions have been largely mild. One key reason for this is that China offers

Russia a substantial piece of its domestic energy market, thus achieving a "win-win" in this area. According

to British Petroleum data, Russia produced 12.9 percent of the world's total production of oil in 2013.25 China (including Hong Kong), on the

other hand, was responsible for 12.5 percent of world total oil consumption.26 As the world's largest energy consumer and still

a fast-growing emerging economy, China seems to have few problems offering energy contracts to both

Russia and Central Asian countries. As Jane Nakano and Edward C. Chow of the Center for Strategic and International Studies

observe, China and Russia have grounds for mutual benefit in the energy sector. China needs to expand its

energy imports to meet domestic demand and improve its environment, while Russia needs to diversify

exports in its natural gas market and sustain its economy.27 Revenue from energy exports comprises over 70 percent of

Russia's total export revenues; however, this revenue has been jeopardized by Russia's economic crisis and the fall of oil prices.28 Due to

these complementary needs, a score of bilateral energy deals were signed in 2014. In May 2014, China and Russia

concluded a landmark $400 billion natural gas supply contract. Gazprom and China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) signed a deal on

supplying 38 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year from West Siberia to China, starting from 2018.29

A2: Pressure CP

US Pressure fails – multiple reasons

Dhume, 9/27/2011 (Sadanand, resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute, “Is Pakistan Too

Big to Fail?” Wall Street Journal Accessed 7/15/16

http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052970204422404576594841278196676 JJH

To the average onlooker, such bluster from a country with an economy about the size of Romania's may

be baffling. To understand it, one has to see how Pakistan's ruling elites, in particular the generals who

call the shots on foreign policy and national security, have come to view their country: as the geopolitical

equivalent of a giant bank that's too big to fail. After all, which other country houses 180 million

Muslims, the world's fastest-growing nuclear arsenal, a plethora of jihadist groups in proximity to those

weapons, an "all-weather" friendship with China, and a choke-hold on supplies to NATO forces in

Afghanistan? By this logic, the U.S., scarred by its experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, can do little more

than mouth disapproval and threaten to cut off aid. The generals might have a point in seeing the world

this way. There's little reason to believe that Washington would have shown such forbearance toward its

putative ally—the ISI's relationships with the Haqqanis and the Afghan Taliban have hardly been secret—

if Pakistan didn't have nuclear weapons or control major supply lines into Afghanistan. As long as they

possess this leverage, they think they can keep up their brinksmanship.