Pakistan Military Final B

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An Introduction

to PakistansMilitary


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Bel er Center or Science and International AffairsHarvard Kennedy School79 JFK StreetCambridge, MA 02138Fax: (617) 495-8963

Email: bel [email protected]

Website: http://bel ercenter.org

Design and Layout im Duffy

Copyright 2011 President and Fellows o Harvard College

Printed in the United States o America


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Contents

I

P S C : T T N A

External Treats, Inconsistent Partners

Internal Treats

A S H P M

Indian Partition, Kashmir, and the Use o Proxies

US Military Aid, the First Military Regime, and the 1965 War

Te 1971 War and a Return to Civilian Rule

Islamization, the Mujahideen, and Nuclear Stumbling Blocks

A Return to Civilian Rule

Musharra and Kargil

Te Post-September 11 World

C C

Army

Air Force

Navy

Proxies

N S S

Command and Control

Nuclear Doctrine

Key Concerns About Pakistans Nuclear Program

C

A

A

E


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An Introduction to Pakistans Military 4

Introduction

Pakistans military is a central actor in many o todays most pressing security challenges, and ewinstitutions ace such extreme pressures rom such diverse orces. In recent years the military hasbeen asked to simultaneously combat a vicious internal insurgency, suppress international terror-

ist groups, and respond to Pakistans worst oods in eighty years, all while squaring off against amuch larger rival in one o the most strategically complex regions in the world.

Pakistans armed orces are not only an instrument o the states oreign policy, but also the mostinuential actor in the countrys internal politics. Tey are currently battling brutal domesticadversaries who have killed thousands o civilians and targeted the nations military and civil-

ian leadership. Tey additionally gure prominently in efforts to suppress international terroristgroups, and have, at the same time, been accused o tolerating or even supporting those sameorganizations. Furthermore, Pakistans armed orces oversee the worlds astest-growing nucleararsenal amidst great concerns about its security given an active domestic insurgency, strategiccompetition with its nuclear neighbor, and the A.Q. Khan networks legacy o proli eration.1 Finally, the Pakistan military participates in an ongoing strategic standoff with rival Indiaa sim-

mering conict that continues to threaten to explode into war or a fh time since 1947.

As this paper was going to press, the killing o Osama bin Laden in Abbottabad, Pakistan, re- o-cused the worlds attention on the Pakistani military. Tat bin Laden had reportedly been hiding

or several years near the Pakistani Military Academy (PMA)2 raised serious questions about the

possibility o complicity by the military and intelligence services. AsDawn, a leading PakistaniEnglish-language daily, put it, Te idea that the worlds most wanted criminal was spending hisdays there unnoticed by Pakistani intelligence requires either suspension o disbelie or the con-clusion that the authorities are guilty o a massive intelligence ailure.3 Te ensuing crisis broughtUS-Pakistani relations to their lowest point in years.

Despite its importance, Pakistans military remains an opaque entity, both inside and outside othe country. Few publicly available reports exist or those seeking to acquire a basic understand-ing o its leaders, its unctions, and its prime motivators.


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Bel er Center or Science and International Affairs| Harvard Kennedy School 5

Tis publicationthe rst o two Bel er Center reports examining Pakistans militarywillprovide a concise introduction to the nations armed orces. It will consider Pakistans:

Overall strategic security and threat environment; Military history since 1947; Conventional military capabilities; Nuclear strategy and security posture; and Current counterinsurgency (COIN) efforts (briey).

Te second report in this series will:

Explore in more detail Pakistans current counterinsurgency efforts; Evaluate threats to internal cohesion and ears o Islamist in iltration into the

Pakistani military; Assess the traits o current and uture Pakistani military leaders; and

Examine the relationship between the Pakistani military and the civilian government.

o assemble this report, the authors interviewed over two-dozen retired Pakistani military o -

cers. Tese interviews were primarily conducted in Pakistan in March and April 2010. Whileall three armed services were represented, the majority o officers interviewed had served in theArmy and were o brigadier rank or higher. In addition to Pakistani military personnel, research-ers conducted nearly orty additional interviews, including with Pakistani politicians, civil societyactors, journalists, and military experts, as well as with US and European military, diplomatic,and intelligence officers and analysts. Although most o these interviewees were willing to speak

on the record, some requested anonymity.

Due to the extreme sensitivity o the topic and the requent re usal o interviewees to discuss it,the internal and external role o the power ul Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) DirectoratethePakistani militarys semi-autonomous intelligence organizationwill not be extensively explored

in this report. Similarly, this reports analysis o the Pakistani nuclear program will be primarilybased on existing open-source in ormation because so many interviewees designated the subjectas off-limits or our discussions.

For more in ormation about the interview methodology, please see Appendix I.

Te authors would like to thank all those interviewed or this report or their time and patience;Eric Rosenbach at the Bel er Center or support and guidance on this project; Farha Faisal andAnirudh Suri or research and assistance; and Jake Ste anik and Carolina Aguilar or copy editing.All errors, o course, remain ours alone.


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Pakistans Strategic Challenges:

Traditional Threats and New adversaries

In less than seventy years, Pakistan ought our major wars, lost signicant territory to a seces-sionist movement, served as a rontline or a superpower proxy con rontation, and endured major militant insurgencies and terrorist campaigns. Natural disasters in 2010, continued extremist violence against the state and its citizens, and US demands to support operations in neighboringA ghanistan highlight the prominence o Pakistans armed orces in the li e o the country. Draw-ing even more attention, Pakistans engagement in a regional nuclear arms race tests the limits o

the global non-proli eration regime and signicantly raises the stakes in a uture war.

Tis grim security picture, along with periods o turbulent civilian rule and internal unrest, hashistorically empowered the military to take what it considered necessary action to de end thePakistani state.

E T , I P

India

India is Pakistans principal strategic competitor and has been the single largest actor in the development o the Pakistani militarys conventional and nuclear capabilities. Te two nations sharea 2,900 km (1800 mile) border and have oughtnumerous conicts or control o the disputed

territory o Kashmir and over the secession o EastPakistan (now Bangladesh).

While Pakistan is the 36th largest country in theworld in terms o total land area, it has numerousgeographic vulnerabilities. For example, it is so

narrow at its midpoint that an Indian advance o300-400 kilometersthe range o Indian tanks prior to re ueling4could effectively cut the coun-try (and its orces) in hal .5 Furthermore, Pakistans lines o communicationmost importantlythe highway that runs between Lahore and Karachirun perpendicular to a probable Indianadvance and could be easily severed i Indian orces gained ground. Many o Pakistans major

I India builds the Bomb, wewill eat grass or leaves, even gohungry. But we will get one oour own.

Prime Minister Zulqar Ali Bhutto, 1965


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population centers, like Lahore, also lie within relatively easy striking distance o the border.6

India is more powerful than Pakistan by almost every metric of military, economic, and po-

litical powerand the gap continues to grow.

Pakistans ragile economy increasingly plays a part in the countrys long-term strategic competi-tion with India.7 Te economic gap between India and Pakistan dramatically widened over thelast thirty years, allowing Indias de ense expenditures to rapidly outpace Pakistans, at a lower

and decreasing share o GDP. 8 At the same time, Indias economic rise has granted it increasingprominence on the world stage while Pakistan has been derided as an economic basket case.9

For a urther examination o Pakistans slow economic growth rate, please see Appendix II.

With 1.3 million men and women in uni orm, Indias armed orces are over twice the size oPakistans 617,000-strong armed orces.10 India also has an additional 1.1 million reservists,

MAP 1: Location map o Pakistan. Source: Te United States National Imagery and Mapping Agency data, Wikipedia,and cia.gov. Original map modied by both the German Kartenwerkstatt and im Duffy.


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compared to Pakistans 500,000.11 In practical terms, while Pakistans military could perhaps steman Indian offensive or a ew weeks or months, Indias ability to commit more men and resourcesto the ght would likely ultimately undermine Pakistans de enses in a prolonged conventional

engagement.12 From the Pakistani perspective,there ore, India remains indisputably its primaryconventional threat (any specic Indian plans toattack notwithstanding.) 13

For more on Pakistans conventional capabilities, see

pages 3033.

Te Pakistani military, realizing the danger o losing territory in a war against India, has devel-oped a Riposte strategy.14 Riposte calls or Pakistani strike corps to take the initiative in awar with India, pushing deep into Indian territory while other corps hold back the initial Indian

advance. Tis bold action against a numerically superior enemy relies upon initial momentumand the assumption that the international community will buttress their efforts by stepping inwithin a ew weeks to urge a ceasereeffectively halting both armies rom advancing artherinto each others territory. Under such a scenario, Pakistan could then trade territory gained orconcessions rom India.

We plan on adversaries

capabilities, not intentions.Chie o Army Staff General Ash aq Parvez KayaniFebruary 2010

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FIGURE 1: India vs. Pakistan GDP and Military Expenditure. Source: World Development Indicators 2011; SIPRIMilitary Expenditure Database 2011 http://milexdata.sipri.org

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Ideological extremists exacerbate this already tense relationship, threatening to drive the coun-tries to war. Afer Pakistan-based terrorist groups carried out deadly attacks on Indian soilin-cluding a suicide attack against the Indian Parliament in 2001the Indian government articu-lated an increasingly aggressive military doctrine. Under the Hindu-nationalist BJP government,

the Indian military in 2004 supposedly implemented a Cold Start doctrine, positioning quick-

strike military units near the Pakistani border. However, despite provocations by Pakistan-basedterrorist groups such as the Lashkar-e- aiba (Le ) attack in 2008 on Mumbai landmarks thatkilled over 160 people, India has not risked a large military campaign against Pakistan.

It remains unclear whether Cold Start indeed existed or exists as a viable plan, or was an elabo-

rate bluff by the Indian government.15 On the one hand, statements in late 2009 by ormer

Indian Army Chie Deepak Kapoor16 on Indias preparations to ght a two- ront war against

Pakistan and China uel Islamabads suspicions about Delhis intentions. On the other, lead-

ers like Indias Army Chie V.K. Singh denied its existence in December 2010, stating that wedont have anything called Cold Start.17

ests o nuclear weapons by both India and Pakistan in 1998 signicantly altered the strategic

calculus o the Pakistani military. Te impact o nuclearization on the likelihood o conven-

tional war between Pakistan and India has signicantly raised the potential costs o escalation.

Worryingly, a misinterpretation o the relatively muted Indian response to the 2008 Mumbai

attacks might encourage the belie held by some Pakistani policymakers that their nuclear

capabilities act as a deterrent rom massive retaliation in both border skirmishes and attacks

by Pakistan-based terrorist organizations.18 It remains unclear whether this belie is grounded

in a complete understanding o Indias strategic posture. At a minimum however, given con-

ventional military disparities, nuclear weapons and a willingness to use them remain Pakistans

primary deterrent against India.

For an elaboration o Pakistans nuclear capabilities, please see pages 3437.

China

Te Peoples Republic o China (PRC) plays a critical role in assisting Pakistan in a wide-rangingrelationship that encompasses conventional arms sales, nuclear assistance, and military exercises.Pakistani leaders routinely describe China as its closest oreign ally and its bilateral relationshipas an all-weather riendship and a comprehensive partnership.19


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Te Sino-Pakistan relationship dates back to the PRCs ounding, when Pakistan was one o therst countries to recognize Mao Zedongs government in Beijing afer the 1949 victory o Com-munist orces. Separate Chinese and Pakistani conicts with India in the 1960s urther cementedties between the two countries. Te Sino-Pakistan relationship is primarily anchored in a shared

wariness toward and history o war with India. Military ties remain deep, based on a shared

desire to ensure regional stability20prompting Indian concerns 21as well as Chinese com-mercial interests and Pakistani de ense requirements. For example, during the US suspension omilitary assistance in the 1990s, China was Pakistans largest supplier o conventional arms.22

Furthermore, China provided crucial assistance to Pakistans nuclear program. Beijing provided

technology and training to Islamabad, including the design and triggering mechanism it used inits own nuclear weapons test in 1966.23 In the early 1980s China sent scientists to Pakistans secretnuclear acilities and provided uranium hexauoride (UF6), a critical precursor to enrichinguranium, to jumpstart Pakistans uranium centri uge process.24 Illustrating this cooperation, USoperatives in the 1980s discovered blueprints o a Chinese-designed atomic weapon in Pakistaninuclear scientist A.Q. Khans luggage.25

Chinese arms trans ers have ofen lled the gaps26 during periods o sanctions by the UnitedStates. Recent years have seen an increase in arms trans ers between China and Pakistan; thetwo nations are currently jointly producing the JF-17 multi-role combat aircraf and the K-8

FIGURE 2: US and Chinese arms trans ers to Pakistan. Source:Stockholm International Peace ResearchInstitute , rend Indicator Values, 2008-200928

US and Chinese Arms Transfers to Pakistan

China USA

1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010$0M

$200M

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$1,200M

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Karakorum jet trainer. Pakistan also acquired the rst o our Chinese Airborne Warning andControl Systems (AWACS) in December 2009.27 In a landmark agreement, Pakistan will report-edly be Chinas rst customer in purchasing some thirty-six J-10sone o Chinas most advancedghter aircraf. 28 On the naval ront, Pakistan purchased our F-22 rigates rom China. Te

rst o three rigates was delivered in 2009; China will assist in building the others in Pakistan.30

Joint production also includes the al Khalid tankthe mainstay o the army. China also helpedbuild Heavy Industries axila, the center o the armys engineering industry. Tis emphasis on joint production and building indigenous capacity earned China considerable goodwill with thePakistani military.

Tat said, some analysts observe that Pakistans military leaders nd Chinese weapons generallyin erior to Western weapons systems. As Fazal-ur-Rahman, a China expert at the Institute orStrategic Studies in Islamabad, argued:

Teir technologies are not original technologies. Tey are borrowing rom othercountries. It is not state o the art. It is not the best option or Pakistan. You cant usetheir equipment as a orce multiplier.31

Western weapons systemsand not Chinese onesare considered much more use ul or ghting

India. A Pakistani analyst and a US official both note that the Pakistani military pre ers Ameri-can toys rather than Chinese weapons.32 Furthermore, some Chinese military systems also seemto have some dangerous aws. For example, the Pakistan Air Force was obliged to replace the

ejection seats in Chinese-manu actured jets because they were believed unreliable, not meetingPakistani sa ety standards.33 While a critical supporter and Pakistans best bet, China is notseen as a orce multiplier at the same level as is Western support.34

In addition to their conventional and nuclear relationship, China and Pakistans militaries haveconducted multiple joint military exercises. Te Peoples Liberation Army (PLA) and Pakistansarmy conducted major Friendship Exercises in 2004 and 2006.35 In October 2003, Chinaselected Pakistan to engage with in its rst-ever naval bi-national search-and-rescue exercise; inNovember 2005 both countries conducted another such exercise. In March 2007, China held

the Peace-2007 joint maritime training exercise in the Arabian Sea with seven other countries,including Pakistan.36

In recent years, Pakistans security situation and military operations in the tribal areas prominent-ly actored in bilateral discussions. Notably, China was concerned with militancy in its westernprovinces and with ensuring regional stability vital or its domestic economic development.


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Tus, in 2007, Pakistan and China signed an extradition treaty to make combating cross-bordermilitancy easier.37 Pakistan also recently sent Chinese nationals accused o extremist behaviorback to China or prosecution.38 In 2009, Pakistans main Islamist party, Jamaat-e-Islami, evensigned a Memorandum o Understanding (MOU) with the Chinese Communist Party, which,

among other issues, supported Chinas position on its Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region.39

Te leader o Jamaat-e-Islami went so ar as to travel to China three times to allay ears that Paki-stans Islamist parties were supporting Chinese militants.40

In short, Pakistans relationship with China across a range o security activities is strong, endur-ing, and central to its oreign policy. Te only comparable partnership is Pakistans turbulent

relationship with the United States.

Iran

Historically Pakistan and Iran have been relatively amicable neighbors; Iran was the rst countryto recognize the newly-created state o Pakistan in 1947. Economically, the two nations havemutually benetted rom the relationship; annual trade between Pakistan and Iran exceeds $1billion.41 Pakistan stated that it will purchase natural gas rom Iran despite the increasing sanc-tions on the regime in ehran; the two countries signed an agreement in 2009 to build a large gaspipeline together.42 In amously, Iran also received nuclear technology rom Pakistan through the

A.Q. Khan network during the 1980s and 1990s.43

However, several security issues complicate the relationship. Iranian President Mahmoud Ah-madinejad recently accused Pakistan o supporting Jundallah , the group believed responsible

or several suicide attacks against Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps officers and other Iraniansites in cities near the Iran-Pakistan border.44 According to Iranian officials, Jundallah carried out

a mid-December 2010 suicide bombing outside a mosque in the Iranian city o Chabahar thatkilled 39 people, and then ed across the Pakistan border to sa ety.45 Anti-Shia violence withinPakistan antagonizes the Shiite majority in Iran. Mutual suspicions also hamper opportunities

or Pakistan and Iran to jointly con ront the Baloch insurgencies aced by both nations.46

Prior to the September 11, 2001 attacks, Iran worked against Pakistani interests by supporting theNorthern Alliance aganst the Pakistan-backed aliban.47 In a surprising reversal, both crude andsophisticated Iranian weapons were ound headed or the aliban in A ghanistan, raising concernsabout Iranian support or that group.48Finally, given the contentious relationship between SaudiArabia and Iran, the close historical ties between Riyadh and Islamabad continue to irritate ehran.


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Afghanistan

Pakistan has three interests in A ghanistan primar-

ily shaped by its preoccupation with the threat

rom India. First Pakistans geography limits its

militarys ability to strategically retreat in the evento a ull-scale Indian invasion, but maintaining a

riendly regime in Kabul gives Pakistan the poten-

tial to achieve strategic depth.49 Tis allback option is an openly acknowledged element o

Pakistani strategy.50 However, while rhetorically the concept o strategic depth is an option, it

seems unrealistic that the Pakistani army, i completely chased rom Pakistan territory, would

have the strength or logistical capability to mount an effective counterattack.51 Rather, the term

strategic depth is shorthand or ensuring that A ghanistan does not pose a threat to Pakistan

on its western border in the event o a war on the subcontinent, reeing much-needed orces tomatch India on its eastern border.

Second, worse than an un riendly regime in A ghanistan would be a pro-Indian government,

which could, rom the Pakistani military perspective, allow the state to be encircled by its

enemies.52 Indias diplomatic and humanitarian efforts in A ghanistan since 2001 have ed mul-

tiple conspiracy theories in Pakistan, including one that describes tens o billions o dollars

spent and hundreds o Indian consulates being established within the country.53 In reality,

India has only one embassy and our consulates in A ghanistan54 and describes its activities as

ocused on development projects, publicly pledging $1.2 billion in aid to help rebuild the

war-shattered country. 55 Still, even this scale o Indian activity stokes the suspicions o the

Pakistani military and public.

A peace ul and riendlyA ghanistan can providePakistan a strategic depth.Chie o Army Staff General Ash aq Kayani, February 2010.

Nobody puts $1.3 billion in dollars in A ghanistan unless there is somemischie that he intends Te West must realize that Pakistan willcounter any Indian move in A ghanistan.Brigadier Saad Mohammed (ret.),De ense Attach to A ghanistan 2003-2006, interview by authors April 1, 2010.


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Finally, A ghanistan presents Pakistan with a historic challenge as it never officially accepted the

Durand Line, the border between A ghanistan and British India drawn during the 1890s by the

British colonial government. Tis ongoing dispute, along with A ghan claims on Pashtun and

Baloch regions within Pakistan proper, are a source o concern to a Pakistani military shamed by

the loss o signicant portions o the country in 1971.56

Pakistan has attempted to manage the strategic risks in A ghanistan by backing groups aligned

with Pakistans interests. Under Benazir Bhuttos government in the 1990s, Pakistan supported

the alibana Pashtun group that satised Pakistans basic security needs in A ghanistan anddid not make aggressive claims to leadership over Pashtuns in Pakistan.57 Afer the September

11, 2001 al Qaeda attacks against New York City and Washington DC, this strategic calculus

changed. Te United States applied signicant pressure on Islamabad, and Pakistans public

and direct support or the aliban in A ghanistan dropped off sharply. Te rapid victory by the

US-backed Northern Alliance came at the cost, however, o upsetting the balance between the

MAP 2: Te Durand Line. Source: Te United States National Imagery and Mapping Agency data, Wikipedia, andcia.gov. Original map modied by the German Kartenwerkstatt and im Duffy.


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Pashtuns in the south o A ghanistan and the northern communities that came to dominate

Hamid Karzais government.58

Tis perceived imbalance, combined with the a orementioned concerns about retaining inuenceand strategic depth in A ghanistan, allegedly led elements within the Pakistani security estab-

lishment to provide some level o support to groups like the Haqqani network 59 and militantscommanded by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. 60 While this report contains no direct evidence to either

conrm or deny these allegations, it should be noted that support or insurgent groups would beconsistent with an attempt by Pakistan to secure its interests in A ghanistan long afer US orceswithdraw rom the region.

Te United States

Although the United States does not share a border with Pakistan, it remains a central actor

in Pakistans external relations and domestic political debates. Pakistans relationship with theUS and with its military, in particular, has uctuated signicantly since the 1950s. Tis has ledmany in the Pakistani militaryand many more in Pakistani societyto consider the US at bestas an unreliable, transactional air weather riend. Te complexity o the relationship can be

summed up in two statistics: First, Pakistan is one o the largest recipients o US military andnon-military aid in recent years, including the $7.5 billion in development unding committed

Pakistani soldiers unload humanitarian relie supplies rom a U.S. Army CH-47D Chinook helicopter in Nardjan,Pakistan, on Dec. 10, 2005, ollowing the earthquake that struck Pakistan. DoD photo by Airman 1st Class BarryLoo, U.S. Air Force.


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in the Kerry-Lugar-Berman bill,61 and one o the largest purchasers o US weaponry, signing

sales agreements worth some $3.5 billion in 2006.62 At the same time, however, almost 60 per-

cent o Pakistanis view the US as an enemy o their country according to a Pew Global At-

titudes poll conducted in mid-2010. Furthermore, 65 percent are concerned that the US could

become a military threat to Pakistan.63 While on average less anti-American than the general

population, many in the Pakistani military remain skeptical o US intentions and concerned

about the level o US activity within their borders. Tis skepticism was dramatically exacerbated

by the US raid on Osama bin Ladens compound in Abbottabad, Pakistan.64

Since 2001, the US has provided Pakistan with more than $11 billion in military aid, mainly

intended to ght terrorism. 65 However, most US weapons sold to Pakistan could easily be used in

a uture conict with India. Advanced F-16 aircraf, Harpoon anti-ship missiles,66 and P-3 Orion

anti-submarine aircraf provide Pakistan with a means o countering some o Indias signicant

military advantage. Furthermore, US-provided OW anti-armor missiles, Sidewinder air-to-

air missiles, and 155mm howitzers67 could be employed against India should large-scale conict

erupt. In addition, much o the arms relationship between the US and Pakistan has involved

maintenance and upgrades on equipment bought in the past, such as older F-16s.68 Some ana-

lysts even suggest that A.Q. Khans black market network was initially created in part to supply

the Pakistani military with spare parts or its American equipment during periods o sanctions.69

Pakistans access to US weapons systems is nonetheless bounded by the US desire to maintain

good relations with India. Tis position is urther complicated by Pakistans nuclear program

outside the Non-Proli eration reaty (NP ). Americas recent cooperation with India on its

civilian nuclear program particularly upset many Pakistanis, especially since no similar deal is

likely to be orthcoming or Pakistan in the oreseeable uture. Other more direct US actions,

such as drone strikes against suspected militants, even when tacitly approved by Pakistans

military establishment, are extremely unpopular with the Pakistani public.70 Te perceived

unreliability o the US to supply weapons and spare parts over the long term has pushed

Pakistan to increase its domestic capacity, diversi y its arms suppliers, and develop a closer

relationship with China.

Te US-Pakistan relationship continues to be contentious because o conicting regional inter-

ests. In 2010, the US pressed Pakistan to move more robustly against extremist elements in North

Waziristan and other areas o Pakistan, despite the armys stated desire to tackle this militancy on


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its own timeline. Tis pressure increased in the wake o a ailed 2010 bombing in New York Citys

imes Squarea plot with links back to the region.71

Te January 2011 shooting o two unarmed men in Lahore by CIA contractor Raymond Davis

deepened tensions between the US and Pakistan. Following the killings, Chie o Army Staff

(COAS) General Ash aq Parvez Kayani demanded that the US withdraw approximately 335

CIA officers and contractors and Special Operations orces rom the country, as well as halt

CIA drone strikes in the Federally Administered ribal Areas (FA A).72

Te US killing o Osama bin Laden strained US-Pakistani relations even urther. Te raid sul-

lied the reputation o the military within Pakistan and raised ears that India could exploit the

same types o vulnerabilities that allowed the US orces to enter the country undetected.73 Te

operation also stoked anti-Americanism within the military and undermined condence in the

leadership o a (COAS) believed to be too close to the US.74 Te consequences o this action

were still un olding as this report went to press.

I

Secessionists

Separatist movements have long threatened the Pakistani state and held a special signicance or

the armed orces. Te secession o East Pakistan (modern-day Bangladesh) in 1971 was trau-

matic or Pakistans armed orces and cemented the militarys identity as the guardian o national

unity. Many recently-retired senior military officials and COAS Kayani himsel 75 served as junior

officers during this conict, including Pervez Musharra , who called it the saddest episode in

Pakistans history.76 In the afermath o the 1971 experience, the military ound its state torn in

hal , its army shamed be ore its archri-

val, and its inuence within Pakistani

society challenged by a viable and asser-

tive civilian political movement.

Te 1971 experience, as well as the long-

simmering insurgency in Balochistan,

heightened the militarys sensitivity to separatist movements. Consequently, A ghanistans claims

to territory across the Durand Line have been particularly inammatory to Pakistans military.

In Balochistan, the Indians areactively involvedno matter what theAmericans saywe have proo !Anonymous Lt. Colonel March 2010


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Pakistans support o themujahideen and its early backing o the aliban were, in part, motivated

by Pakistans desire to support Pashtun leaders whose aspirations were limited to A ghanistan, in

contrast to those who call or a so-called greater Pashtunistan in uniting tribes divided by the

current borders. Similarly, calls or Baloch independence have been met with stern responses by

the military. Tis is particularly true because o a persistent suspicion by Pakistani officers that

India and Iran seek to weaken Pakistan by empowering these separatist movements.

Internal Cohesion

Conict within Pakistan is not limited to political separatist movements. Pakistan is an economi-

cally, ethnically, and politically diverse nation, with all o the attendant tensions that can be ound

when a relatively new political structure is built on top o complex societal ssures. ensions

along these divisions have at times led to violence and intervention by the military. For example,

during the 1990s the Mohajir-Sindhi rivalry turned violent in Karachi, and the Army was dis-patched to stop the ghting.77 In mid-2010, the Mohajirs and Pashtuns in Karachi began ghting

each other, necessitating the deployment o Sindh Rangers to quell the bloodshed.78

Religious conict also poses a signicant challenge within Pakistan. Assassins killed the gover-

nor o Punjab in January 2011 and a cabinet minister in March 2011, both o whom spoke out

against Pakistans controversial blasphemy laws. Tere were a series o politically motivated at-

tacks against the Shia minority over the past decade, particularly around the holiday o Ashura.79

Other conicts over Islamic identity include laws enacted during the Zulkar Ali Bhutto era thatprevent the Ahmadi religious community rom describing itsel as Muslim.80 However, perhaps

the broadest religious divide is between a largely secular political elite and an increasingly reli-

gious and conservative public. Particularly since the Zia period, the military has sought to nd

the proper balance between the relatively secular demands o its role as de ender o the Pakistani

state and the Islamic identity o the orce and its members.81

Te latter point signicantly concerns policymakers in the US and elsewhere. 82 Nonetheless,

the officers interviewed or this report held that their personal religious convictions are sepa-rate rom their roles and responsibilities as members o the military. While these opinions are

not conclusive, these interviews rein orce the argument made by many Pakistani officers that

Western observers consistently misunderstand the role o Islam in the armed orces.Te ques-

tion o religious radicalization in the Pakistani military is addressed more comprehensively in the

second report in this series.


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Militant Islam

A relatively new threatin terms o its methods, goals, and ideologyto the Pakistani state has

been the rise o domestically- ocused militant Islamic groups, particularly theehrik-e- aliban

( P). While other militant groups have similarly attacked military personnel, the erceness othe strikes carried out by the P raised their prole in the eyes o senior leaders. Te P has

carried out suicide attacks not only on the Pakistani state, but also against the Pakistani military.

Perhaps the most shocking o these episodes were the October 10, 2009, assault on the Army

General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi,83 the deadly attack on officers and their amilies at

a mosque, and the May 2011 attack on the Pakistan Naval Station Mehran in Karachi.

Other groups also threaten military personnel. In November 2008, an al Qaeda/Harkat-ul Jihad

Islami leader murdered a ormer head o Pakistans elite Special Service Group (SSG), and inOctober and November 2009 other militants tried to kill three serving brigadiers.84 Suicide at-

tackers also targeted regional headquarters o the Directorate or Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)

in Lahore and Peshawar in May and November 2009, respectively.Te P will be discussed in

greater detail in the second report in this series.

-------------------------

Te complex set o threats and series o conicts Pakistan has aced is ofen cited by the military

as an explanation or its prominent role in Pakistani society. Troughout its history, Pakistan has

been surrounded by power ul rivals and unstable neighbors, at the center o major-power poli-

tics, and internally divided along economic, religious, and ethnic lines. Tis backdrop has given

the Pakistan Army what one analyst describes as a sense o guardianship85 o the Pakistani state.


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A Short History of Pakistans Military

Te military ocuses its external capabilities on ghting India, its primary rival. Internally, themilitary sees its role as a pro essional, disciplined sa eguard against ineffective or corrupt civil-ian governmentsor against civilian rule that threatens the militarys autonomy and inuence in

oreign policy. Te ollowing section briey describes the history o Pakistans ghting orces.

I P , K , U P

Te 1947 Partition o British India divided the British Indian Army into two unequal compo-nents; East and West Pakistan received approximately one-third o the ormer British Indian

orces while India received the other two-thirds.86 Because Muslim-majority Pakistan had asmaller military, and because Hindu-majority India called or the reunication o the ormerBritish Indian territories, Pakistani leaders immediately saw India as the nations most signicant

military threat.87

Much o the acrimony between Pakistan and India stems rom the decision o a minor poten-tate to side with India over Pakistan around the time o Partition. When the 550 Princely Stateso British India were given the choice to join the newly ormed countries o India or Pakistan,

the Hindu maharaja o Jammu and Kashmir decided to join his Muslim-majority territory withIndia. Te details o this deal, including the intrigues o the last viceroy o India, Lord LouisMountbatten, remain contentious; the political leadership rom both countries strongly believedthat the territory was right ully theirs.

At the time, Pakistans nascent military orces could not take the territory by orce. Equally

important, the Pakistani military was still under the command o British officers who would nothave led their troops into Kashmir.88 Tus, Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, alongwith lower-level Pakistani military leaders, approved a plan to use irregular orces to ght or

Pakistani interests in the region.89 Tese militias rom the North West Frontier Province, calledlashkars , crossed the border on October 21, 1947. Afer a ew days o battle, these irregular orcesnearly captured Srinagar, the capital o Kashmir. Indian orcesdeployed on October 27even-

tually pushed them back.90


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In this conict, Pakistan gained some territory within Kashmir. Te resulting ceasere line,with minor changes, became ormalized as the Line o Control (LOC) during negotiations withIndia ollowing the 1971 war.91 Nonetheless, the combination o Pakistans weaker conventionalmilitary abilities and continued competing claims over Kashmir set the oundation that dened

Pakistani military thinking.

US M A , F M R , W

Te looming threat o India led Pakistani leaders to look to the US or military assistance. In1950 Liaquat Ali Khan amously turned down an invitation to visit Moscow, choosing to visit theUnited States instead. Te US viewed Pakistan as a new Cold War ally, and between 1953 and1961 $508 million o US military aid owed to Pakistan.92

During this time, the Pakistani military remained a relatively stable pro essional institution. Incontrast, the 1950s were a decade o extreme domestic political turbulence. Seven Pakistani

MAP 3: Te Boundary o British India (1939). Source: cia.gov.


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rebels, and in early December 1971 launched a ull-scale invasion o East Pakistan. By Decem-ber 16, East Pakistan was no longer under Islamabads control.

On December 20, 1971, as a result o pressure rom an officer corps shamed by de eat, Yahya

stepped down and handed over power to Bhutto. Under Bhuttos leadership, India and Pakistan

ormalized the LOC, the Army suppressed an insurgency in Balochistan, and a new constitutionwas ratied. Pakistan also launched its clandestine nuclear weapons program as a hedge againstIndias conventional numerical military advantage.101

However, the economy suffered under Bhuttos nationalization schemes, and many, particularly

in the army and business community, increasingly viewed him as a dictator.102 Rigged electionsin 1977 led to a general strike o religiously conservative Pakistanis and a declaration o mar-tial law.103 On July 4, 1977, Chie o Army Staff Zia ul-Haqhandpicked by Bhutto or the topmilitary positionoverthrew Bhutto and declared himsel CMLA. wo years later, afer a trialwidely viewed as un air and despite the objections and appeals o international leaders, Bhuttowas executed by hanging.104

I , M ,

Te US resumed providing limited military aid to Pakistan in 1975, but then suspended it againin 1979 when Washington discovered the Pakistani nuclear program. Afer the Soviet invasion

o A ghanistan at the end o 1979, however, the US reconsidered its position and began support-ing (along with generous nancing rom Saudi Arabia) Pakistani and A ghanmujahideen in their

ght against the Soviet Union. In 1981 the US provided Pakistan with a $3.2 billion ve-yearmilitary and economic aid package.105

Under Zia the military not only supported the mujahideen but also actively encouraged Islam-ization in its own ranks. Zia made Islamic teachings a regular part o military training andchanged the motto o the army to Faith, Obedience o God, and Struggle in the path o Allah.106

Several officers interviewed claimed that Zia also placed spies within the army to monitor un-Islamic behavior.107 Finally, throughout much o the 1980s, Zia based an armor brigade in SaudiArabia, strengthening the militarys ties to the rest o the Muslim world and building connectionswith the Middle East.108

In an effort to discourage Pakistan rom continuing work on its nuclear program, in 1985 the

US Senate adopted the Pressler Amendment to the 1961 Foreign Assistance Act. Tis legislation


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banned most economic and military assistance to Pakistan unless the President o the UnitedStates could annually certi y that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device. BecausePakistan was a critical player in Americas proxy war against the Soviet Union in A ghanistan,however Presidents Reagan and Bush certied that Pakistan did not have nuclear weapons, de-

spite mounting intelligence to the contrary 109 and pressure rom anti-proli eration advocates.110

Afer the Soviets withdrew rom A ghanistan in 1989, the United States dramatically reduced itssupport to Pakistan as well as its presence in the region.111 Ten, in October 1990, President Bushre used to certi y that Pakistan did not possess a nuclear explosive device, triggering the PresslerAmendment sanctions. Te US cut off all military aid, including the nal delivery o 28 F-16

military jets that Pakistan had purchased, the sale o spare parts or Pakistani military equip-ment, and International Military Education and raining (IME ) unding to Pakistan. Tis aidresumed only afer the September 11, 2001 attacks.

A R C R

In 1988, Zia died in a mysterious plane crash and Pakistan returned to civilian rule. BenazirBhutto and Nawaz Shari alternated in power or the majority o the 1990s, and the army chie swho ollowed Zia undid many o his Islamization efforts. Tey did not, however, reduce the mili-tarys support or militant Islamist groups.112 Weakened by the suspension o US aid, the military

increasingly saw nonconventional operations as one o the ew ways it could stymie Indias rulein Kashmir and secure its interests in A ghanistan. Tus, the ISI supported numerous Kashmir-oriented militant groups 113 as well as the aliban in A ghanistan.114

Pakistan also put the nishing touches on its nuclear program. Afer India tested nuclear weap-ons in May 1998, Pakistan responded by testing its own weapons later that month. Fearing in-

creased US sanctions, COAS Jehangir Karamat initially resisted testing and encouraged urther

America is under no obligation to make it any easier or a nationto acquire or enhance such a [nuclear] capabilityI Pakistanultimately decides that its bomb is worth the hardships o acquiringand possessing it, then that is Pakistans choice to make and we mustrespond accordingly.US Senator John Glenn, July 30 1992


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discussion be ore proceeding. He was, however, overruled by Prime Minister Nawaz Shari .115

Several months later, Karamat gave a speech advocating or the creation o a deliberative bodythat would give the military a ormal role in government decision-making. Karamat elt this wasnecessary because Shari s style o governance had ostered instability and numerous crises.116

Shari rejected this direct challenge to his authority; consequently, Karamat was obliged to retireseveral months ahead o schedule. As Karamats replacement, Shari chose Pervez Musharra ,then Corps Commander at Mangla. Musharra , Shari believed, would be more pliant than someo the more senior generals he could have otherwise chosen.117

M K

Within a ew weeks o Musharra s appointment as COAS in 1998, he was presented with a plan

to straighten the LOC by taking over the uninhabited but strategically-located Kargil Heightsin Kashmir during the winter, when India lef the area unoccupied. Tis plan called or Paki-stani troops to pretend to be irregular orces and occupy the abandoned outposts. When Indiansdiscovered the Pakistani occupying orces in mid-1999, the subsequent diplomatic and militarycon rontation grew to such an extent that US President Clinton personally intervened to end thecrisis. Under intense US pressure, as well as the increasing possibility o a nuclear exchange, ahumiliated Shari agreed to withdraw Pakistani troops back to the LOC.118

Afer the Kargil Crisis in 1999, a chastened Shari attempted to pin the blame on the army and

tried to replace COAS Musharra . In response, the X Corps Commander and Chie o General Staff(CGS) led a coup and detained Shari . Musharra , who was ying back rom Sri Lanka and wascircling in an aircraf above Karachi or hours, touched down and assumed control o the country.119

T P -S W

Afer the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York City and Washington DC, Musharra acqui-esced to US demands to renounce ormal Pakistani support o the aliban and agreed to be a ullpartner in the so-called Global War on error. In exchange, the US resumed aid to the Pakistanimilitary. As US and Northern Alliance orces drove the aliban and al Qaeda rom A ghanistan,

many militants ed into Pakistans tribal areas. Te US-Pakistan relationship was ar rom per-

ect, and some analysts claim that the A ghanistan aliban beneted rom ISI assistance afer the

September 11, 2001 attacks, allowing the organization to reestablish itsel as a ghting orce.120


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At the same time that US orces were driving the aliban and al Qaeda across Pakistans western

border, militants launched a series o attacks in Kashmir. Ten, on December 13, 2001, ve Pak-istan-based terrorists attacked the Indian Parliament, killing several people in a brazen daylight

suicide attack.121 Because the ISI supported Kashmir-oriented militant groups, India suspected

Pakistan o backing the strike. President Musharra renounced the use o militants in Kashmir

afer the attack, but a ten-month military standoff between the two countries nevertheless ensued,

with the US again intervening to help de use the situation.122

Under Musharra s rule, militants gained increased control o the Federally Administered ribal

Areas on Pakistans western border,123 the aliban regrouped in Quetta, 124 and, according to ana-

lysts in Pakistan and abroad, Kashmir-oriented terrorist groups such as Lashkar-e- aiba contin-

ued to operate on Pakistani soil despite an official ban.125

Under pressure rom the US to attack al Qaeda and prevent the aliban rom conducting cross-

border raids into A ghanistan, in 2004 the Pakistani military engaged in anti-terrorism opera-

Pakistan President Pervez Musharra and US President George W. Bush walk together to their joint news con erenceat Aiwan-e-Sadr in Islamabad, Pakistan, March 4, 2006. White House photo by Shealah Craighead.


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Conventional Capabilities

Again, Pakistans conventional military strategy centers on countering the threat rom its power ulneighbor India. Other resources in the public domain provide extensive technical discussions oPakistani conventional resources and strategy (including a range o Indian estimates); in con-

trast, this section o the report will provide a high-level and brie discussion o the key issuesconcerning Pakistans conventional posture.

A

Te Pakistani army orms the bulk o Pakistans armed orces, andis the key player in its offensive and de ensive capabilities. Pakistanhas nine army corps. Six are deployed close to the Indian border inanticipation o conventional conict with India, although some were

temporarily dispatched to support operations in the tribal areas. 132 Iand II Corps are armored strike corps designed to penetrate Indianterritory in a conict as part o the Riposte doctrine.133 XI and XIICorps have had principal responsibility or counterinsurgency inKhyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan.134 Te remaining corps are positioned to counter

potential Indian offensives.

Te armys main battle tank (MB ), the al Khalid, was developed with Chinese cooperation ordomestic production. 135 Al Khalid tanks are ully equipped or night war are and are armed witha 125mm primary cannon.136 Te Pakistani military can additionally deploy over 1,500 Chinese-built ype-59, ype-69, and ype-85 tanks, as well as Ukrainian -80UDs, Soviet era -54s and

-55s, and US-produced Vietnam-era M48A5s.137

In addition to its MB s, the Pakistani army has armored personnel carriers or troop move-

ments and a limited medium and heavy artillery capability.138 Te US sold Pakistan Cobra attackhelicopters,139 ostensibly or counterinsurgency operations, but it is probable that these could beused as air support in a conventional conict. In January 2010, the US reportedly agreed to sell

Pakistan surveillance-only unmanned aerial vehicles, again with the stated goal o support orcounterinsurgency operations,140but with possible application or other uses.


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A F

Te objective o the Air Force is to establish theater air superiority and

close air support or the Army. However, as conrmed by a retiredAir Marshall, with the exception o recent internal security operations,the air orce has generally been poorly integrated into overall militaryplanning. 141 Given Indias signicant air assets, this lack o attention tothe role o air power may be a signicant area o weakness in Pakistaniconventional strategy.

Te most controversial equipment in the Air Force arsenal, and a requent topic o conversationeven among Pakistanis outside the military, is the US-manu actured F-16Fighting Falcon. Inthe hands o an able pilot, the F-16 is one o the premier multi-role ghters in the world and is asource o national pride or Pakistanis. Te sale o the aircraf became a major point o conten-

tion between the US and Pakistan afer 1990, when planned sales were canceled due to sanc-tions over Pakistans nuclear program. Afer 2001, with increased cooperation between the twocountries and with the lifing o sanctions, F-16s were delivered to Pakistanover strong Indianobjections142 because they can be modied to carry tactical nuclear weapons, among other rea-

An F-16D Block 52+ Fighting Falcon undergoes testing in the U.S. prior to delivery to the Pakistan Air Force. 13October 2009. Source: US Air orce.


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sons.143 Te Air Force, as o 2010, has orty-seven F-16s, most o them older A and B variants,although some received Mid-Li e Updates.144

Pakistans Air Force also owns a mix o French Mirages and Chinese-built ghters, including the

JF-17, or which Pakistan will be Chinas rst major customer.145

N

Due to Pakistans long land border with India, the Navy is unlikely to playa primary role in initial hostilities. o stress the degree to which the Navydid not gure centrally in Pakistani military planning, several interview-ees and a range o sources re erred to the claim that in the 1971 war theNavy Chie learned about the outbreak o hostilities while listening to the

radio.146 However, the Navy would likely be important in a prolongedconict in order to maintain Pakistans access to crucial sea-lanes.

A naval contest with India would be an asymmetric conict; India has the worlds fh-largestnavy, including one operational aircraf carrier. 147 Pakistans Navy is ar smaller and thus wouldlikely rely on hit-and-run tactics, utilizing its largely French-built submarine orce and US-sup-

plied Harpoon anti-ship missiles.148

A concern among Pakistani naval officers and analysts is that India might develop a sea-based

nuclear ability, allowing it a second-strike capability that could upset the nuclear deterrent bal-ance between India and Pakistan.149

P

Te most controversial aspect o Pakistani non-nuclear strategy is its reliance on proxy ght-ers. As previously discussed, Pakistan employedlashkars since its rst war in Kashmir and wascentral in coordinating the efforts o themujahideen in their campaign against Soviet occupationin A ghanistan.

More disputed is the degree to which Pakistan continues to support militant proxies like Lashkar-

e- aiba (Le ) and Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), among others, to pressure India over Kashmir andother disputed areas.150 India accuses Pakistan o actively supporting the Le and LeJ, or, at aminimum, tolerating their political wings. Pakistan denies these accusations and has officiallydeclared many o these organizations terrorist organizations.


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Tis report cannot provide sufficient evidence to prove ongoing official support or proxies; how-ever, multiple press reports suggest that the Pakistani intelligence services continue to supportsome groups such as Le ,151 the A ghan aliban,152 and the Haqqani network. In addition, rom

Pakistans perspective, utilizing these groups in Kashmir and elsewhere might appear strategi-

cally use ul, as these militant organizations keep the Indian army preoccupied with waging acostly counterinsurgency/counterterrorism campaign within its own borders instead o ready-ing themselves or a conventional war with Pakistan.153 However, the risks o supporting thesegroups have increased signicantly as some o these organizations have turned their weapons onthe Pakistani state.


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Nuclear Strategy and Security

Pakistan considers its nuclear posture and stockpile its chie deterrent rom an Indian attack.As o early 2011, estimates o Pakistans nuclear arsenal ranged rom approximately 95 to 110

weapons.154 Pakistan relies upon two delivery plat ormsmissiles rom Air Force aircraf and

sur ace-to-sur ace missiles rom the relevant army units.155

Tis section briey outlines Pakistans weapons program, the command and control structure to

oversee these weapons, Pakistans nuclear doctrine, and key areas o concern related to regional

stability, nuclear proli eration, and nuclear security.

Pakistans nuclear activities began in 1955 as part o the Eisenhower Administrations Atoms or

Peace program, which sought to provide nuclear assistance and training or civilian purposes.

Under this program, over three dozen Pakistani scientists received training at US atomic acili-

ties. With American assistance, Pakistan established a small civilian research acility under the

auspices o the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).156

Following the disastrous end to the 1971 war, Pakistan under Bhutto decided to pursue a nuclear

deterrent to blunt Indias conventional military advantages. Bhutto had long desired to acquirenuclear capabilities, amously declaring I India builds the Bomb, we will eat grass or leaves, even

go hungry. But we will get one o our own.157

In early 1972, Bhutto convened a secret meeting with top Pakistani scientists and government

officials, ordering them to design a nuclear bomb within ve years.158 PAEC began to research

and develop a plutonium-based weapon, and would continue to do so or the next two decades.

In 1974, Pakistan established a parallel uranium-based program.159 Tis project operated under

the auspices o A.Q. Khan, the Pakistani metallurgist with experience abroad who had secretlysmuggled uranium centri uge technology data rom the Netherlands to Pakistan.

o achieve their nuclear goals, Pakistan also established a network o ront companies to pur-

chase nuclear components, codenaming the effort Operation Butter Factory .160 A British security

report rom 2005 identied almost a hundred Pakistani organizations, including the Pakistani


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High Commission in London, that assisted Islamabad in its nuclear quest.161 In May 1998, two

decades afer the program began and two weeks afer India conducted its nuclear tests, Paki-

stan responded with a series o ve nuclear tests, moving its program rom the shadows onto

the world stage.

C C

Musharra established Pakistans overall nuclear command and control system in 1999, creatingthe Strategic Plans Division (SPD) in the Joint Staffs Headquarters to manage nuclear-relatedmatters. In February 2002, Pakistan established the National Command Authority (NCA) to

ormulate policy and exercise employment and development control over all strategic nuclearorces and organizations.162 Retired Brigadier Feroz Hassan Khan argued that Despite widely

known limitations, Pakistan has done remarkably well in establishing a nuclear security regime

and an evolving nuclear security culture that requires encouragement and support.163

Group Responsibility

National Command Authority (NCA) Makes decisions on nuclear deployment.

Strategic Plans Division (SPD)Te secretariat or the NCA; headed bythe Director General rom the army andcomprises officers rom the three services.

Develops and manages all nuclear capability and exercises day-to-day control.

SPD Director General is responsible for the operational securityo Pakistans nuclear arsenal.

SPD manages its 10,000 troops to ensure security at nuclearsites. Each nuclear acility has an SPD security division asthe inner perimeter (the outer perimeter is the ence withelectronic sensors).

Conducts security clearances with the ISI for employees underthe Personnel Reliability Programme (PRP) and Human Reli-ability Programme (HRP).

Strategic Forces Commands Te Army, Navy, and Air Force each has its respective strategicorce command, but operational control theoretically remains

with the NCA. Each service exercises administrative control over the strategic

delivery systems. Pakistans Army controls the surface-to-surface missiles used as

delivery vehicles or nuclear weapons. Pakistans Air Force controls the aircra used as delivery vehicles

or nuclear weapons; protects several o the nuclear acilitiesthrough air de ense (those sites are designated as no-y zones).

ABLE 1: Pakistans nuclear command and control system.


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Musharra , in December 2007, ormally articulated the NCAs composition and unctions:164 thePresident as chairman, the Prime Minister as Vice Chairman, the Foreign Minister, the De enseMinister, the Finance Minister, the Interior Minister, the Chairman, Joint Chie s o Staff Com-mittee, the Chie o Army Staff (COAS), the Chie o Naval Staff, and the Chie o Air Staff.When Musharra lef office in April 2008, Asi Ali Zardari became the nominal head o the NCA,

though actual control over Pakistans nuclear weapons remained with the military. In November2009, however, President Zardari handed over his NCA powers to Prime Minister Yousu RazaGilani, who chaired its 16th meeting on January 13, 2010.165

N D

While Pakistan has not ormally articulated a nuclear doctrine, the senior military officer respon-sible or the Pakistani nuclear arsenal, General Khalid Kidwai (who is now retired rom the mili-tary but remains Director General, Strategic Plans Division), outlined in a January 2002 interviewthe contours o a possible Pakistani nuclear weapons use strategy. He said Pakistan would launchnuclear weapons only i the very existence o Pakistan as a state is at stake.166 Kidwai went on tosay, Nuclear weapons are aimed solely at India. Explaining that i usual deterrence ails, nuclearweapons would be unleashed under the ollowing circumstances:

India attacks Pakistan and conquers a large part o its territory; India destroys a large part o either Pakistans land or air orces; India attempts the economic strangulation o Pakistan; India pushes Pakistan into political destabilization or creates large-scale internal

subversion in Pakistan.167

Pakistan re uses to adopt a no-rst-use doctrinesuggesting that Pakistan might use its nuclearweapons even i India did not use them rst. Some analysts believe that i Indian orces crossedthe N-5 highway connecting Lahore to Karachi, Pakistan might escalate a conventional conictinto a nuclear one.168

K C A P N

Since a conict with India would be a high-stakes challenge or Pakistan, observers remain con-cerned with Pakistans nuclear program due to the possibility o a nuclear con rontation. Afer all,India and Pakistan are willing to engage in limited conict with each other despite the possibilityo nuclear war. Indian leaders are acutely aware o this precarious position as well. Indias ormerChie o Army Staff in November 2009 stated that, the possibility o a limited war under a nuclearoverhang is still a reality, at least in the Indian subcontinent.169 Concerns about an Indian attackon vulnerable Pakistani command-and-control systems might lead Pakistans military to decentral-


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ize nuclear launch authority to enable a response in the event o a surprise rst-strike. Such a movewould also increase the chances o inadvertent escalation during times o military uncertainty.

o reduce nuclear dangers, Pakistan and India in 1999 agreed to a number o nuclear condence-building measures such as notication prior to the testing o ballistic missiles and the annual

exchange o a list o nuclear acilities that are not to be attacked during a war.170 Yet the risk oa wider conicttriggered, perhaps, by a terrorist attacksuggests that a nuclear war in SouthAsia remains a calamitous possibility.

Despite the militarys extensive vetting system, the insider threat perhaps rom low-levelpersonnel working on nuclear sitesis an ongoing challenge to Pakistans nuclear security. Anassault and takeover o even a single nuclear device or acility, a ear heightened by recent suicidebomb attacks on Air Force bases reportedly serving as nuclear weapons storage sites, also remainsa persistent threat to the nation and to neighboring countries. 171 It is believed that as a response

to the threat o an Indian attack, Pakistan dispersed its weapons to several low-prole sites,thereby increasing the challenge o securing these weapons. Similarly, the imperative to protectits weapons would likely lead the Pakistani military to transport these in small, secret convoyspotentially at greater risk o capture rom an insider.172 Te insider threat is discussed in moredetail in the second report in this series.

Furthermore, Pakistani scientists have sold off-the-shel nuclear technologies to the highest bid-der in the past, raising signicant proli eration worries. It remains unclear whether the Pakistanimilitary leadership was aware or truly ignorant o the trans ers carried out by A.Q. Khan to Iran,

North Korea, and Libya. Te act that such a robust network existed over the course o sometwenty years and was run rom within the countrys nuclear program nonetheless indicate thatPakistans nuclear weaponry may not be as secure as its leaders claim.

Finally, many in Pakistan believe the US intends to seize Pakistans nuclear acilities and weaponssystems or a variety o political or religious reasons. Tis issue colors public perceptions o Ameri-can behavior so much so that during a January 2010 visit to Pakistan, US Secretary o De enseRobert Gates elt it necessary to state at Pakistans National De ence University that the US has nodesire to control Pakistans nuclear weapons.173 However, US plans to provide added security or

the Pakistani arsenal in case o a crisis, as one American journalist wrote, only exacerbated suchears.174 Paradoxically, in his memoirs, Musharra argued that not cooperating with the US against

al Qaeda would jeopardize Pakistans nuclear weapons even more: It is no secret that the US hasnever been com ortable with a Muslim country acquiring nuclear weapons and the Americans un-doubtedly would have taken the opportunity o an invasion to destroy such weapons.175


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Counterinsurgency

As this report noted, the Pakistani military has primarily directed its resources towards counter-ing the threat o its strategic nemesis, India. As a result, it was less prepared to quell the insurgen-cies that developed in Pakistans FA A ollowing the all o the aliban in A ghanistan. Although

Pakistan has a long history o rontier war are and low-level conict in its tribal regions, theknowledge gleaned rom that experience was not prioritized or disseminated in military training.Many o the rst units going into the FA A and Swat Valley had difficulty shifing rom a ocuson large-scale mechanized war are to one that emphasized smaller units, more precise air and ar-tillery support, greater concern or civilian casualties and in rastructural damage, and a dominantand persistent military and government presence.

Since 2008, however, the militarys effectiveness in counterinsurgency operations has improvedsignicantly. Te process by which the military increased its counterinsurgency capacity hasbeen an adaptive one in which lessons learned on the battleeld gradually evolved into a seto standard practices taught at the training acilities that prepare Pakistani units or tribal areaoperations. Tese tactics, techniques, and procedures continue to evolve. However, insurgent or-

ganizations in the tribal agencies have adapted their tactics as well. As it stands today, both sidesofen claim victory be ore their gains are ully secured. Military units are effective in battle and

capable o executing their missions tactically; the problem lies in the larger issues o governance,re orm, and civilian aid and reconstruction.

Te Pakistani militarys dominant presence in Pakistani society is ofen matched by an equallyunderdeveloped civilian government. In the tribal areas, this is mani ested in the difficultiesPakistan has had in bringing economic and in rastructural development to the region. AlthoughPakistans military ollows its own distinct brand o counterinsurgent doctrine, it does recognizethe value o securing civilian populations, providing better governance, and developing the localeconomy; yet the inability o the civilian government to accomplish these goals hinders the mili-

tarys ability to end its counterinsurgent campaigns.

As a result, the Pakistani military has been orced to continuously recapture territory it hasalready held. It has also been reticent to move into North Waziristan, a bastion o insurgentorganizations that operate in both Pakistan and A ghanistan. Although the Pakistani military isnow a relatively effective counterinsurgent-capable organization, the lack o civilian government


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capacity continues to prevent any long-term re orm rom occurring in the tribal areas. Until civil-

ians are able to govern effectively, the stalemate between the Pakistani military and the organiza-tions it ghts on a daily basis will likely continue.

Te second report in this two-part series will discuss in greater detail how the Pakistani militaryscounterinsurgency tactics have changed, and highlight how counterinsurgency is one o many ar-

eas in which Pakistan and its military would benet rom a capable and credible civilian partner.

------------------------- -------------------------

Tis report explored Pakistans strategic context, the history o the Pakistan military, and thecapabilities the Pakistan military developed in order to respond to the threats it aces. Tesecond part o this two-part Bel er Center series,Te Pakistan Military: Te Paradox o Power ,explores how Pakistan and its military could better address the countrys challenges. Tat report

nds that, paradoxically, improving Pakistans overall strategic position and its internal stabil-ity requires that the military empower Pakistans civilian institutions and ocus more upon coresecurity missions.

Col. Daniel S. Roper, director, U.S. Army and Marine Corps Counterinsurgency Center, discusses lessons learned in

counterinsurgency with Brigadier Farhat Abbas Sani, Pakistan Military Air De ense brigade commander, during theTird Army/U.S. Army Centrals counterinsurgency seminar. July 2009. Photo Credit: Tird Army.


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Appendices

A I: MPakistani Military Officer Interviews

Interviews by Rank Pakistan Canada United States otal

Army Lt. General 4 0 0 4

Major General 1 0 0 1

Brigadier 10 2 1 13

Colonel 0 1 0 1

Lt. Colonel 2 0 0 2

Major 1 2 1 4

Navy Vice Admiral 1 0 0 1

Captain 0 2 0 2

Air Force Air Marshall 1 0 0 1

otal 20 7 2 29

ABLE 2: Methodology, Pakistani military officer interviews.

A II: S C

India

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

R e a

l G D P , C u r r e n t

U S D

( $ M

)

FIGURE 3: Pakistan GDP has Stagnated relative to regional powers. Source:World Development Indicators.Te World Bank Group. http://data.worldbank.org/

Pakistans strategic position in terms of GDP has eroded relative to regional powers

Pakistan

Iran

China

4500

5000

1960 1972 1984 1996 20081966 1978 1990 2002


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Acronyms

IMET International Military Educationand raining

AWAC Airborne Warnings and Control System

C4I Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence

CGS Chie o General Staff

CIA Central Intelligence Agency

CJCSC Chairman, Joint Chie s o Staff

Committee

CMLA Chie Martial Law Administrator

COAS Chie o Army Staff

DGMO Director General o Military Operations

ERRA Earthquake Reconstruction andRehabilitation Authority

FATA Federally Administered ribal Areas

GDP Gross Domestic Product

GHQ Army General Headquarters

HRP Human Reliability Program

IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency

IDP Internally Displaced Persons

ISI Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate

ISSB Inter Services Selection Board

KP Khyber Pakhtunkhwa

LeJ Lashkar-e-Jhangvi

LeT Lashkar-e- aiba

LOC Line o Control

MBT Main Battle ank

MI Military Intelligence Directorate

MOU Memorandum o Understanding

NCA National Command Authority

NCO Non-Commissioned Officer

NDU National De ence University

NPT Non-Proli eration reaty

NWFP North West Frontier Province

PAEC Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission

PLA Peoples Liberation Army

PMA Pakistan Military Academy

PML-N Pakistan Muslim League

PPP Pakistan Peoples Party

PRC Peoples Republic o China

PRP Personnel Reliability Program

SPD Strategic Plans Division

SSG Special Services Group

TOW ube-launched, Optically-tracked,Wire guided missile

TTP ehrik-e- aliban

UF6 Uranium Hexauoride

UN United Nations

US United States


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Endnotes

1. Tom Shanker and David E. Sanger, Pakistan is Rapidly Adding Nuclear Arms, U.S. Says,Te New York imes , May17, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/world/asia/18nuke.html

2. Jane Perlez, Pakistan Is Seeking Inquiry On U.S. Raid,Te New York imes , May 11, 2011, http://www.nytimes.

com/2011/05/12/world/asia/12pakistan.html

3. Osama bin Laden,Dawn, May 3, 2011, http://www.dawn.com/2011/05/03/osama-bin-laden.html

4. Te Main Battle anks o the Indian army are the -90 and Arjun, which have a range o 550KM and 450KM, respec-tively. India: Arjun tank inducted, -55 retiring,UPI.com, March 18, 2011,http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/03/18/India-Arjun-tank-inducted- -55-retiring/UPI-90761300443480/ ; James M. War ord,

Te Russian -90s: Coming Into Focus, Armor (September-October 1997): 26-28.

5. Central Intelligence Agency, PakistanCIA World Factbook, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-

actbook/geos/pk.html6. Anthony H. Cordesman, Te India-Pakistan Military Balance (Washington, DC: Center or Strategic and International

Studies, 2002) 3, http://csis.org/publication/india-pakistan-military-balance

7. Graeme Smith, As Pakistan Nears Bankruptcy, Patience o Foreign lenders Wears Tin,Te Globe and Mail , Decem-ber 28, 2010.

8. Ashley ellis et al., Reviewing raditional Approaches to Measuring National Power in Measuring National Power

in the Post-Industrial Age. (Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation, 2000), 5;World Development Indicators , Te WorldBank Group, http://data.worldbank.org/ (accessed May 11, 2010); SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2011http://milexdata.sipri.org (accessed June 1, 2011).

9. Pakistans loyalty may rest on its economy,USA oday , October 5, 2001, http://www.usatoday.com/money/covers/2001-10-05-bcov ri.htm

10. International Institute or Strategic Studies,Te Military Balance 2010 (London: International Institute or Strategic

Studies, 2010), 464.

11. Ibid.

12. Paul S. Kapur, India and Pakistans Unstable Peace: Why Nuclear South Asia Is Not Like Cold War Europe,Interna-tional Security 30, no. 2 (Fall 2005): 139.

13. Cyril Almeida, Kayani Spells Out Treat Posed by Indian Doctrine,Dawn, February 4, 2010,http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/ ront-page/12-kayani-spells-out-threat-posed-by-indian-doctrine-420--bi-08

14. India-Pakistan ConictGlobalSecurity.Org , http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak.htm (ac-

cessed April 27, 2010).

15. Manu Pubby, No Cold Start Doctrine, India ells US,Te Indian Express , September 9, 2009, http://www.indianex-

press.com/news/no-cold-start-doctrine-india-tells-us/679273/

16. Rajat Pandit, Army Reworks War Doctrine or Pakistan, China,Te imes o India , December 30, 2009, http://articles.timesondia.indiatimes.com/2009-12-30/india/28104699_1_war-doctrine-new-doctrine-entire-western- ront

17. India has no Cold Start Doctrine: Army Chie ,Te Economic imes , December 2, 2010, http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-12-02/news/28400780_1_indian-army-doctrine-army-chie ; Walter C. Ladwig III, A Cold Start or

Hot Wars? Te Indian Armys New Limited War Doctrine, International Security 32, no. 3 (Winter 2007/08): 158-190.
http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/03/18/India-Arjun-tank-inducted-T-55-retiring/UPI-90761300443480/http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/03/18/India-Arjun-tank-inducted-T-55-retiring/UPI-90761300443480/http://data.worldbank.org/http://milexdata.sipri.org/http://milexdata.sipri.org/http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/12-kayani-spells-out-threat-posed-by-indian-doctrine-420--bi-08http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/12-kayani-spells-out-threat-posed-by-indian-doctrine-420--bi-08http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/12-kayani-spells-out-threat-posed-by-indian-doctrine-420--bi-08http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak.htmhttp://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/indo-pak.htmhttp://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/12-kayani-spells-out-threat-posed-by-indian-doctrine-420--bi-08http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/12-kayani-spells-out-threat-posed-by-indian-doctrine-420--bi-08http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/the-newspaper/front-page/12-kayani-spells-out-threat-posed-by-indian-doctrine-420--bi-08http://milexdata.sipri.org/http://milexdata.sipri.org/http://data.worldbank.org/http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/03/18/India-Arjun-tank-inducted-T-55-retiring/UPI-90761300443480/http://www.upi.com/Business_News/Security-Industry/2011/03/18/India-Arjun-tank-inducted-T-55-retiring/UPI-90761300443480/


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18. Kapur, 141.

19. Asi Ali Zardari, Sino-Pakistan Relations Higher than Himalayas,China Daily , August 17, 2009, http://www.china-daily.com.cn/opinion/2009-02/23/content_7501675.htm; Joint Statement between China and Pakistan, October 2008,

http://www.c r.org/publication/17543/joint_statement_between_china_and_pakistan_october_2008.html (accessedJanuary 3, 2011).

20. CJCSC terms Pak-China partnership bedrock o regions stability, Te News, January 10, 2010,http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=95761

21. China-Pak military nexus a matter o serious concern: Antony,Indian Express, November 27, 2009,http://www.indi-

anexpress.com/news/chinapak-military-nexus-a-matter-o -serious-concern-antony/546972/

22. SIPRI Arms rans er Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/databases/

armstrans ers (accessed May 20, 2011).

23. William Burrows and Robert Windrem,Critical Mass: Te Dangerous Race or Superweapons in a Fragmenting World (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), 68.

24. Ibid.

25. Aki Peritz, A.Q. Khan, Nuclear Proli eration and the US Response (Cambridge, MA: Te Bel er Center, Harvard Univer-sity, August 2009), 16.

26. SIPRI Arms rans er Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstrans ers (accessed May 20, 2011).

27. Pakistani Air orce gets rst early warning aircraf, Xinhua , December 29, 2009, http://news.xinhuanet.com/eng-

lish/2009-12/29/content_12723640.htm

28. Pakistan in Chinese ghter jet deal,Financial imes, November 10, 2009, http://www.f.com/intl/cms/s/0/c42d66b0-cdd0-11de-95e7-00144 eabdc0.html#axzz1MfflFYr6

29. Note that SIPRI rend Indicator Values represent total volumes o arms trans ers as measured in 1990 $USD, but donot represent the nancial value o such trans ers. For more in ormation, see:http://www.sipri.org/databases/arm-strans ers/background/explanations2_de ault

30. Pakistan rst F-22 rigate arrives in Karachi,Nation , September 12, 2009, http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-

newspaper-daily-english-online/Karachi/12-Sep-2009/Pakistan-rst-F22- rigate-arrives-in-Karachi; InternationalInstitute or Strategic Studies, 2010, 355.

31. Fazal-ur-Rahman, interview by authors, Islamabad, Pakistan, April 1, 2010.

32. Islamabad analyst, interview by authors, Cambridge, MA, February 22, 2010; US Official, interview by authors, Islam-abad, Pakistan, April 1, 2010.

33. US Official, interview by authors, Islamabad, Pakistan, April 1, 2010.

34. Fazal-ur-Rahman, interview by authors, April 1, 2010, Islamabad, Pakistan.

35. Pakistan-China military exercise concludes, Embassy o the Peoples Republic o China in the Islamic Republic oPakistan, http://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t284215.htm (accessed June 21, 2011).

36. PLA oreign military exercises since 2000,China Military Online , February 13, 2008,http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2008-02/13/content_1122067.htm

37. Pak, China Sign Extradition reaty,Daily imes, December 12, 2007,http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/de ault.

asp?page=2007/12/12/story_12-12-2007_pg7_17

38. Amir Mir, 10 terror suspects extradited to China,Te News International , June 6, 2009, http://www.thenews.com.pk/odaysPrintDetail.aspx?ID=22569&Cat=13&dt=6/6/2009

39. Jamaat-e-Islami, Chinese Communist Party ink MoU,Te News International , February 17, 2009,http://www.the-news.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=163116
http://www.cfr.org/publication/17543/joint_statement_between_china_and_pakistan_october_2008.htmlhttp://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=95761http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=95761http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinapak-military-nexus-a-matter-of-serious-concern-antony/546972/http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinapak-military-nexus-a-matter-of-serious-concern-antony/546972/http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinapak-military-nexus-a-matter-of-serious-concern-antony/546972/http://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/explanations2_defaulthttp://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/explanations2_defaulthttp://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t284215.htmhttp://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2008-02/13/content_1122067.htmhttp://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2008-02/13/content_1122067.htmhttp://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007/12/12/story_12-12-2007_pg7_17http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007/12/12/story_12-12-2007_pg7_17http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=163116http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=163116http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=163116http://www.thenews.com.pk/daily_detail.asp?id=163116http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007/12/12/story_12-12-2007_pg7_17http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2007/12/12/story_12-12-2007_pg7_17http://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2008-02/13/content_1122067.htmhttp://english.chinamil.com.cn/site2/special-reports/2008-02/13/content_1122067.htmhttp://pk.chineseembassy.org/eng/zbgx/t284215.htmhttp://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/explanations2_defaulthttp://www.sipri.org/databases/armstransfers/background/explanations2_defaulthttp://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinapak-military-nexus-a-matter-of-serious-concern-antony/546972/http://www.indianexpress.com/news/chinapak-military-nexus-a-matter-of-serious-concern-antony/546972/http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=95761http://www.thenews.com.pk/updates.asp?id=95761http://www.cfr.org/publication/17543/joint_statement_between_china_and_pakistan_october_2008.html


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Bel er Center or Science and International Affairs| Harvard Kennedy Scho

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Pakistan Military Final B