4. Contemporary rational actor theories

Interest in the rational actor model of crime and criminal behaviour was revived both in the UK and the USA during the rise of the political new right – or populist conservatives – during the 1970s and 1980s. The second decade of that time period was to see the influential emergence of the ‘nothing works’ (Martinson, 1974) agenda at the British Home Office which seriously questioned the effectiveness of rehabilitation – proposed by the then dominant paradigmatic orthodoxy of the predestined actor model of crime and criminal behaviour – as a crime control strategy. This chapter considers three groups of contemporary rational choice theories that have come very much to prominence with that revival: (i) contemporary deterrence theories(ii) rational choice theories and (iii) routine activities theory.Contemporary deterrence theories

At the core of contemporary deterrence theories are the principles of certainty, severity and celerity of punishment, proportionality, specific and general deterrence (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Gibbs, 1975; Wright, 1993). The deterrence doctrine proposes that in order to deter, punishment must be both swift and certain, the notion of celerity concerns the swiftness with which sanctions are applied after the commission of a crime, while certainty refers to the probability of apprehension and punishment. If the punishment is severe, certain and swift, people will, it is proposed, rationally calculate that there is more to be lost than there is to be gained from committing crime. Moreover, it is argued that certainty is more effective in deterring crime than severity of punishment. The more severe the available punishment, the less likely it is to be applied. On the other hand, the less certain the punishment, the more severe it will need to be to deter crime (Akers, 1997).Nucleul teoriilor contemporane ale descurajarii este format din principiile certitudinii, severitatii si rapiditatii pedepsei, proportionalitatii si descurajarii specific si generale. (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973; Gibbs, 1975; Wright, 1993)doctrina descurajarii ppropune ca pentru a descuraja, pedeapsa trebuie sa fie atat rapida si sigura, notiunea de rapiditate priveste viteza cu care sanctiunile sunt applicate dupa comiterea unei crime, in timp ce certitudinea se refera la probailitatea detentiei si pedepsei. Daca pedeapsa este severa, sigura si rapida, oamenii vor calcula ca au mai multe de pierdut de pe urma comiterii unei crime. Adesea, este sustinut ca certitudinea este mai eficienta in descurajarea criminalitatii decat severitatea pedepsei. Cu cat mai severa este pedeapsa disponibila, cu atat este mai putin probabil ca fie aplicata. Pe de alta parte, cu cat mai putin sigura pedeapsa, cu atat mai sever ava trebui sa fie pentru

a descuraja crima. (Akers, 1997)Deterrence is said to operate in one of two ways. First, in the case

of ‘general deterrence’ the punishment of offenders by the state is seen to serve as an example to the general population who will be frightened into non- participation in criminal behaviour (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973). Second, in the case of ‘specific deterrence’, it is proposed that the apprehended and punished offender will refrain from repeat offending because they realise that they are certain to be caught and severely punished. The ultimate form of individual deterrence is considered to be the death penalty, although research evidence on the deterrent effectiveness of capital punishment has remained ambiguous.

Descurajarea opereaza in doua moduri. Primul, in cazul descurajarii generale, pedeapsa infractorilor de catre stat este vazuta ca oferind un exemplu populatiei generale care va speriata si nu va participa la comportamente criminale. (Zimring and Hawkins, 1973. al doilea, in cazul descurajarii specific, propune ca infractorul arestat si pedepsit se va abtine de la a repeat infractiunea pentru ca va realiza ca este sigur sa fie prins si pedepsit sever. Forma suprema de descurajare individuala este considerata a fi pedeapsa cu moartea, desi cerceterile asupra eficientei in prevenirea criminalitatii au avut rezultate ambigue.

Among the earliest studies of deterrence were examinations of murder rates in various geographical localities before and after the abolition of capital punishment. Ehrlich (1975) used a subsequently much criticised econometric version of rational choice theory to propose that every execution carried out in the USA deterred seven or eight other murders. His findings were nevertheless in contrast to those of studies previously conducted in that country and which had found that the availability of the death penalty in state legislation had no effect on the murder rate (Sellin, 1959; Bedau, 1964). Moreover, following the abolition of capital punishment for murder in England and Wales in 1965, research suggested no identifiable impact on the rate of homicide (Beyleveld, 1979; Morris and Blom Cooper, 1979).

Printre cele mai timpurii studii ale descurajarii s-au gasit examinarile ratelor omuciderilor in variate zone dupa si inainte de abolirea pedepsei capitale Ehrlich -1975 a folosit o metoda econometrica ulterior criticata a teoriei alegerii rationale care a propus ca pentru fiecare executie sunt prevenite sapte sau opt omucideri in Statele Unite. Rezultatele sale au fost opuse celor ale studiilor anterioare si care au descoperit ca prezenta pedepsei capitale in codurile penale nu are niciun efect asupra ratei omuciderilor. (Sellin, 1959; Bedau, 1964) mai mult, dupa abolirea pedepsei capitale in Anglia si Wales, cercetarile nu au identificat niciun impact asupra ratei omuciderilor. Beyleveld, 1979; Morris and Blom Cooper, 1979).

It has often been suggested that murder – particularly in a domestic context

– is a crime where the offender is highly unlikely to make a rational choice before committing the act. If that is the case, the potential consequences will be irrelevant and deterrence is unlikely. In this context Walker (1985) argues that capital punishment is no more effective a deterrent than a sentence of life imprisonment.1

We have seen that proponents of the rational actor model assume that potential offenders calculate the rewards and risks associated with crime and research supports the suppositions of the right realists – discussed in the previous chapter – which suggest that the likelihood of detection is a more important part of that calculus than the potential level of punishment (Beyleveld, 1978, 1979). Certainly the chances of being caught in the commission of an offence by a passing police patrol have been found to be extremely low in the UK (Bottomley and Coleman, 1981) while the detection rates for burglary, for example, vary between 9 per cent and 46 per cent depending on the locality. The extent to which people believe that they might be caught is therefore probably a more important variable. Gill and Matthews (1994, see also Matthews, 1996) conducted a study of convicted bank robbers and interestingly found that none of their research subjects had even considered the possibility that they would be caught before setting out on their criminal enterprises even though all had previous criminal convictions.

Even if punishment does deter effectively, a number of ethical objections can be raised to the use of sentences for this purpose. Beyleveld (1978) suggests that the types of punishment needed to deter a potential offender will vary substantially between different people, different crimes and different circumstances. Therefore, in order to deter crime, it might well be necessary to set sentences at a level totally out of all proportion to the seriousness of the offence (Wright, 1982). This is rather at odds with the central rational choice actor model concept that the punishment should fit the crime. Moreover, when a particular offender has not been deterred then he or she must receive thethreatened punishment. The consequences of such punishment may be simply counterproductive (Wright, 1982).Chiar daca pedeapsa descurajeaza in mod efficient, numeroase obiectii etice pot fi ridicate la folosirea sentintelor in acest scop. Beyleveld 1978 sugereaza ca tipurile de pedepse ce ar trebui sa descurajeze o infractiune potentiala variaza substantial la diferiti indivizi, in cazul diferitelor crime si a circumstantelor diferite. De aceea, pentru a descuraja crimele, ar trebui impuse pedepse la un nivel total disproportionat cu cel al gravitatii crimei. (Wright, 1982) aceasta gandire este in contradictie cu conceptul de model al actorului care face o alegere rationala potrivit caruia pedeapsa ar trebui sa fie pe masura crimei savarsite. Mai mult, cand un infractor specific nu a fost descurajat, atunci el sau ea va trebui sa primeasca pedepasa cu care a fost amenintat. Consecinta unei astfel de pedepse poate fi foarte usor contraproductiva. (Wright, 1982)

Martin and Webster (1971) have argued that conviction and punishment may simply push an individual into a situation where

he or she has little to lose from further offending. The opportunity to live by legitimate means may be reduced and the individual with previous convictions is pushed towards further illegitimate activity regardless of the consequences. This is an argument similar to that proposed by the labelling theorists working in the victimised actor model tradition that we will encounter in the third part of this book. Central to that perspective is the notion that being caught and stigmatised may lead to an offender becoming committed to further offending behaviour.

Martin si Webster au sustinut ca o condamnare si pedeapsa asociata pot impinge individual intr-o situatie in care mai are foarte putine de pierdut daca va comite alte infractiuni. Oportunitatea de a trai prin mijloace legitime poate fi redusa si individual cu condamanri anterioare este impins spre activitati viitoare ilicite, indifferent de consecinte. Essential pentru aceasta perspectiva este notiunea ca prinderea si stigmatizarea pot face ca un infractor sa devina implicat in diverse comportamente criminale pe viitor.

Wright (1982) suggests that the possibility of severe punishment encourages offenders to try harder to avoid detection and conviction and this can lead to violent escapes and to time being wasted by not guilty pleas in court that have no realistic chance of success. Moreover, child sex offenders who could benefit from treatment might be deterred from seeking it.

Wright 1982 a sugerat ca posibilitatea pedepsei severe incurajeaza infractorii sa incerce mai mult sa evite depistarea si condamnarea si astfel pot sa apara incercari violente de a scapa de urmare si in timp irosit in curti pentru judecarea recursurilor care nu au sanse realiste de reusita. Mai mult, pedofilii care ar putea beneficia de tratament pot fi descurajati de a-l cauta.

The use of punishment as a deterrent is based on the core rational actor model assumption that people choose to commit crime. Imposing deterrent sentences on those individuals who have little or no control over their impulses – or who break the law unwittingly – would appear to be morally indefensible although it can be legitimately argued that deterrence remains a valid option in the case of intentional calculating offenders (Walker, 1980) although there remains considerable debate as to the existence of such individuals. Critics of contemporary deterrence theories focus on this limited conception of human action on which this perspective is founded and argue the need to develop a considerably more sophisticated theory of human behaviour which explores the external and internal constraints on why people do or do not engage in criminal activity (see Piliavin et al., 1986; Klepper and Nagin, 1989; Grasmick and Bursik, 1990; Matravers, 1999).

f o l o s i rea pedeps e i ca desc u ra jan t es te baza ta pe p res upunerea c a oamen i i a l eg c omi te rea une i c r ime – mode l u l a c to ru lu i ra t i ona l . Impunerea une i pedeps e nu a r avea n i c i un e fec t a sup ra aces to r i nd i v i z i ca re

au p rea pu t in con t ro l a sup ra p rop i r i i l o r impu l s u r i sau ca re i nca l c a l egea fa ra vo ia l o r s i c a re pa r mora l impos ib i l de appa ra t des i s e poa te suge ra i n mod l eg i t im c a des cu ra j a rea ramane o op t i une va l i da i n cazu l i n f r ac to r i l o r c u i n ten t i i c a l cu la te – Wa lk e r 1 980 , des i ex i s t a o dezba te re c ons ide rab i l a p r i v i nd ex i s ten t unor a s t f e l de i nd i v i z i .