Pacific Armies’ Management Pacific Armies’ Management Seminar 2004Seminar 2004

THE CONTEMPORARYTHE CONTEMPORARYCONFLICT CONFLICT

ENVIRONMENTENVIRONMENT

BRIG J. D. KellyBRIG J. D. Kelly

Australian ArmyAustralian Army

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Global War On Terror?Global War On Terror?

• War is politicsWar is politics

• Terrorism is merely a tactic

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How the Tactic WorksHow the Tactic Works

• Terrorism tries toTerrorism tries to

– Exhaust the will of those who would Exhaust the will of those who would resistresist

– Propagandise the populations that need to Propagandise the populations that need to be recruited to it.be recruited to it.• Propaganda of the wordPropaganda of the word

• Propaganda of the deedPropaganda of the deed

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Macro-PoliticsMacro-Politics

• De-colonialisationDe-colonialisation

• ModernisationModernisation

• GlobalisationGlobalisation

• Search for IdentitySearch for Identity

ProvidesProvidesRecruits Recruits

forforPolitical EndsPolitical Ends

Local Local

IssuesIssues

BeingBeingExploited toExploited to

PursuePursueGlobalGlobalEndsEnds

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‘‘Strategy Proposes but Tactics Strategy Proposes but Tactics Disposes’Disposes’

• US Forces dominate the conventional US Forces dominate the conventional warfighting battlespacewarfighting battlespace

• ‘‘Modern’ Forces are essentially invulnerable Modern’ Forces are essentially invulnerable and invincible in ‘conventional’ battleand invincible in ‘conventional’ battle

• This leads to tactics based on ‘avoidance This leads to tactics based on ‘avoidance behaviour’ - enemies seek other arenas than behaviour’ - enemies seek other arenas than conventional, force-on-force military conventional, force-on-force military confrontationconfrontation

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Conflict environmentConflict environment

• These factors generate a conflict These factors generate a conflict environment that is highlyenvironment that is highly

– complexcomplex

– diversediverse

– diffusediffuse

– lethallethal

7 Complex Environment - physical,

human, informational

ComplexityComplexity

Enemy armed forces

Organisedcrime

Insurgents

Terrorists

Militias

HostileIntelligence

Services

Intelligenceservices

Domesticopinion

Coalitionpartners

Police forces

Diplomaticagencies

Conventional

Regular

Forces

IrregularAuxiliaries

SpecialForces

Legalagencies

NGOs & Aid

Agencies

Media

World opinion

Hostile populace

Businessinterests

Neutralpopulace

Inter-national agencies (UN etc.)

Neutral forces

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Complex Human TerrainComplex Human Terrain

Militia

TradersCriminals

ADF

Police

Refugees

TNI UNMOs UNHCR UNTAET

IOM

NGOs

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Complex Human TerrainComplex Human Terrain

““Mogadishu was a bewilderingly complex web Mogadishu was a bewilderingly complex web of interlocking family and kin. It was of interlocking family and kin. It was protected not by any formal army or protected not by any formal army or battlements, but by hordes of gunmen. So battlements, but by hordes of gunmen. So anyone who came in after Aidid would pay anyone who came in after Aidid would pay an awful price. The general could vanish an awful price. The general could vanish deep into the thorny hollows of this nest for deep into the thorny hollows of this nest for a lifetime.”a lifetime.”

Mark Bowden, Mark Bowden, Blackhawk DownBlackhawk Down

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Complex Physical TerrainComplex Physical Terrain• Where people areWhere people are

• Urban terrainUrban terrain

• Urban/rural mosaicUrban/rural mosaic

• Littoral areasLittoral areas

• CultivationCultivation

• Swamps/estuariesSwamps/estuaries

• Jungles/MountainsJungles/Mountains

Typical engagementTypical engagement distance = 5-35 metresdistance = 5-35 metres

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Complex Informational TerrainComplex Informational Terrain

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DiversityDiversity

Enemy Regular Armed Forces

Tribal fighters

Mercenaries

Bandits

Local terrorists

Rural guerrillas

Enemy Irregulars

Looters

Rioters

Unarmed protesters

Urban guerrillas

Corporations

Hostile media

Issue Motivated

Groups

Militias

People smugglers

Intelligence services

Political factions

Armed factions

Drug traffickers

Environmental groups

Hostile alliances

Religious sects

Trans-national terrorists with WMD

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An Aspect of AsymmetryAn Aspect of Asymmetry

ARMIES

ENEMY

TACTICAL(ability to be win battles)

STRATEGIC(ability to win

protracted campaigns &

wars)

• Losses are strategic (even in victory)Losses are strategic (even in victory)

• Therefore: How we conduct ops is as Therefore: How we conduct ops is as important as winning individual battlesimportant as winning individual battles

DEFEAT THRESHOLD

ENEMY - LOW TACTICAL THRESHOLD (easily beaten in battle) but HIGH STRATEGIC THRESHOLD

STATES - HIGH TACTICAL THRESHOLD but LOW STRATEGIC THRESHOLD (vulnerable to political will and

public support)

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DiffusionDiffusion

• War / PeaceWar / Peace

• Levels of ConflictLevels of Conflict

• State/Non-state actorsState/Non-state actors

• Conventional / SpecialConventional / Special

• Home front/battle frontHome front/battle front

• Combatant/ Non-combatantCombatant/ Non-combatant

• Geography / TopographyGeography / Topography

• Virtual Theatres Virtual Theatres

• Disaggregated battlespaceDisaggregated battlespace

Result: Ambiguity, non-linearityResult: Ambiguity, non-linearity

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LethalityLethality

Conventional weapons

Biotoxins

Flameweapons

Handheldantitank weapons

MLRS

Improved conventional

munitions

Car bombs

Suicide bombers

UAVsDirected energy weapons

MANPADS

Rifle grenades

TanksGLATGMs

Landmines

Electronic warfare

Computer attack

Thermobarics

Radiological weapons

Nuclear weapons

Biological weaponsChemical

weapons

Eye damage

lasers

ASMs

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.

...almost every technological advance works to ...almost every technological advance works to the terrorists' advantage: an old-fashioned the terrorists' advantage: an old-fashioned European army – Belgium's, say – is European army – Belgium's, say – is incapable of projecting itself to Saudi Arabia; incapable of projecting itself to Saudi Arabia; but a terrorist group in Saudi Arabia, through but a terrorist group in Saudi Arabia, through now humdrum innovations like e-mail, cell now humdrum innovations like e-mail, cell phones, and automated bank machines, can phones, and automated bank machines, can easily project itself to Belgium.easily project itself to Belgium.

Mark Steyn, Mark Steyn, Jerusalem PostJerusalem Post, 12 Jul 04, 12 Jul 04

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Individualised LethalityIndividualised Lethality• Lethality (in the land environment) is becoming a Lethality (in the land environment) is becoming a

characteristic of characteristic of individualsindividuals not not platformsplatforms

• Lethality resides in weapons not forcesLethality resides in weapons not forces

• Carried, concealed, operated by one personCarried, concealed, operated by one person

• Individuals with high lethality occur in any operation Individuals with high lethality occur in any operation without warningwithout warning– ‘‘High lethality’ no longer means state actorsHigh lethality’ no longer means state actors

– High lethality no longer means detectable ‘tactical signature’ or High lethality no longer means detectable ‘tactical signature’ or large scale conflictlarge scale conflict

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Approaches to complexityApproaches to complexity

Deterrence

Major WarLimitedConflict

Counter-Insurgency

Counter-Terrorism

Military Government

HumanitarianOperations

Support toLaw Enforcement

‘CLASSICAL’ APPROACH: IGNORE ALL BUT WAR

COMPLEX WAR: SAME TIME, SAME PLACE

3-BLOCK WAR: SAME TIME, DIFFERENT PLACE

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Detection ThresholdDetection Threshold

Detection ThresholdDetection Threshold

ISR

GR

AN

ULA

RIT

YIS

R G

RA

NU

LAR

ITY

‘‘Deliberate’, ‘Pre-Planned’, ‘Stand-off’Deliberate’, ‘Pre-Planned’, ‘Stand-off’‘‘Precision’Precision’

Encounter BattlesEncounter Battles

KEY DEDUCTION

The enemy will hide from our stand-off weapons in complex terrain

Land forces will need to develop the battle from a start point already in close contact with the enemy.

Pre-planning ops, from standoff range, before contact, will be the exception, not the norm.

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FORCES-ON-FORCES

FORCES-ON-POPULATIONS

HYBRIDISTAR

HYBRIDISTAR

HUMANISTAR

TECHISTAR

Land Force Tasks:- DETECT- LOCATE- IDENTIFY- FIX- DESTROY

1990s ‘Network Centric Warfare’

Joint Land Manoeuvre

Land Force Tasks:- FIND- FIX - SHAPE- EXPLOIT

Network Supported Warfare:Land Force Tasks:

- FIND- DISCRIMINATE- APPLY EFFECTS

CONTROL OPSBROAD AREA SURVEILLANCE

COMPLEX ENVIRONMENTS SIMPLEX ENVIRONMENTSMARKETMARKETFORCESFORCES

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Close Combat Remains the Close Combat Remains the Core Business of ArmiesCore Business of Armies

• All Land Force outcomes ultimately rest All Land Force outcomes ultimately rest on the capability for sustained close on the capability for sustained close combatcombat

• Precision is not enough -discrimination is Precision is not enough -discrimination is necessarynecessary

• Close combat forces need to be Close combat forces need to be survivable, discriminate and jointly survivable, discriminate and jointly connectedconnected

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Deductions from the EnvironmentDeductions from the Environment• ComplexityComplexity - become better at orchestrating - become better at orchestrating

effects in an agile, whole of government mannereffects in an agile, whole of government manner

• DiversityDiversity - become more adaptable - become more adaptable

• LethalityLethality - joint connectivity, precision, - joint connectivity, precision, situational awareness, survivabilitysituational awareness, survivability

• DiffusionDiffusion - prepare individuals & small teams for - prepare individuals & small teams for the disaggregated, complex battlespacethe disaggregated, complex battlespace

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InsightsInsights not Conclusions not Conclusions• Nothing we used to do has gone awayNothing we used to do has gone away

– counter insurgencycounter insurgency

– conventional warconventional war

– peace making/ keepingpeace making/ keeping

• Some trends are making these traditional activities more complex Some trends are making these traditional activities more complex and pressing and pressing

• Tactical Excellence and close combat are the bedrock of successTactical Excellence and close combat are the bedrock of success

• We need to counter enemy propagandaWe need to counter enemy propaganda

• PeoplePeople

• PeoplePeople

• PeoplePeople

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““We know we're killing a lot, We know we're killing a lot, capturing a lot, collecting arms …capturing a lot, collecting arms …

We just don't know yet whether We just don't know yet whether that's the same as winning.”that's the same as winning.”

Donald Rumsfeld, US SecDefDonald Rumsfeld, US SecDef

There are limits to the utility There are limits to the utility of military forceof military force

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