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Ownership Change, Incentives and Plant Efficiency: The Divestiture of U.S. Electric Generation Plants. James Bushnell UC Energy Institute Catherine Wolfram UC Berkeley. The Economics of Electricity Markets June 2-3, 2005 Toulouse, France. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Ownership Change, Incentives and Plant Efficiency:
The Divestiture of U.S. Electric Generation Plants
James BushnellUC Energy Institute
Catherine WolframUC Berkeley
The Economics of Electricity MarketsJune 2-3, 2005 Toulouse, France
Electric generating plant divestitures in the U.S.
• The ownership of electric generating plants in the U.S. changed dramatically between 1998 and 2001.
- Over 300 plants, representing nearly 20% of U.S. installed generating capacity, changed ownership.
• Divestitures were encouraged by state regulators as part of the industry restructuring.
- Easy measure of stranded costs.
- Addressed concerns about the ability of a firm that was vertically integrated into transmission to exercise market power.
• Old owners (investor owned utilities) faced cost-of-service regulation; new owners face market incentives.
Electricity industry restructuring and economic efficiency
• There is heated debate in academic and policy circles about how to design restructured markets.
• All of this should be moot if restructuring doesn’t improve economic efficiency.
• Several academic and policy studies have examined the effects of restructuring on cost efficiencies:
- Top down: DOE (2003), SEARUC (2003), CAEM (2004).
- Bottom up: Markiewicz, Rose and Wolfram (2004) looks at changes in operating efficiency at IOU plants facing new incentives; Kleit and Reitzes (2005) looks at dispatch efficiency.
Measuring the effects of divestitures on plant efficiency
• Ideally, we would like to evaluate changes in each plant’s total factor productivity after divestiture.
• Unfortunately, data on employment, maintenance and capital inputs is not publicly available after divestiture.
- We’re exploring data availability from various sources.
• For now, we’re analyzing whether fuel efficiency changed at plants that were divested.
- Rich data are available from the Environmental Protection Agency.
- Implicit assumption that production is Leontief in fuel and other inputs.
There may be no effect of divestiture on fuel efficiency,
- A generating unit’s fuel efficiency is an immutable technological characteristic.
- IOUs may have made poor investment decisions, but at least they knew how to operate their own plants.
…or there may be either positive or negative net effects.
• Heat rates could go up following divestiture.
- It will take the new owners some time to master the idiosyncrasies of the plant.
- New owners may cycle the plants more (e.g. to exercise market power) at the cost of higher heat rates.
• Heat rates could go down following divestiture.
- IOUs had fuel adjustment clauses, so they didn’t do everything possible to minimize heat rates.
- New owners might be able to renegotiate union contracts so they can promote good operators.
Data set
• We are analyzing electric generating units that are:
- Fossil-fuel fired (i.e. not nuclear or hydroelectric).
- Included in the EPA Continuous Emissions Monitoring System data base.
- In regions where divestitures were prominent (this excludes, for instance, all the plants in Florida).
• We have hourly fuel input and output data on ~1000 generating units for 7 years (1997-2003).
We analyze plants in the shaded states.
Empirical specification
• To analyze divestitures, we estimate versions of the following equation:
• for unit i in time period t, where
- HR is the unit’s heat rate (inverse of fuel efficiency),
- t is either monthly or hourly,
- Divestiture = 1 after divestiture (if applicable),
t are month dummies, θi are unit dummies, and
- we specify the relationship between HR and Gross Load with care.
ituniti
monthtititit GrossLoadeDivestiturfHR ,,),ln(,)ln(
Example of what we’re labeling a Divestiture effect.
Unit
Year
Divested Not divested
1997 14 11
2003 12 10
Our Divestiture effect:
(12-14) – (10 -11) = -1
Average Heat Rates for 2 units across 2 years
Our estimates control for:
- differences in average heat rate levels across
divested and not-divested units.
- general trends in heat rates.
Our Divestiture effect in logs:
(ln(12)-ln(14)) –
(ln(10) –ln(11)) -.05
The basic Divestiture effect: 2% reduction in Heat Rate
Dependent Variable: ln(Heat Rate)
OLS IV
Only Divested
UnitsWith
Controls
Only Divested
UnitsWith
Controls
Divestiture -0.022** -0.021** -0.022** -0.013
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
ln(Q) -0.405*** -0.364*** -0.380*** -0.106
(0.024) (0.018) (0.068) (0.120)
Month-Year Fixed Effects No Yes No Yes
Unit or Unit-Interval Fixed Effects Unit Unit Unit Unit
R2 .56 .54
N 22,506 75,066 19,501 64,882
See Table 4 in the paper.
Why do we see lower heat rates after divestitures?
• Utilities only sold plants that were ripe for improvements.
• Utilities deferred maintenance before they sold the plants; merchant firms have been regaining lost ground.
• Merchant firms faced new incentives—incentive effect.
• New owners shook things up—ownership effect.
In states with major divestitures, IOUs sold nearly all their thermal capacity.
StateTotal Fossil
Fuel MW IOU % in 2003
CA 36600 2%
CT 5750 0%
DC 590 0%
DE 3084 0%
IL 32486 5%
MA 11983 0%
MD 10373 1%
ME 2860 0%
MT 2448 6%
NJ 15258 4%
NY 28196 19%
PA 33424 5%
StateTotal Fossil
Fuel MW IOU % in 2003
IN 26342 71%
KY 19482 49%
NH 2523 43%
OH 32782 55%
VA 16501 63%
Table 7: evidence on incentive and ownership effects
IOU plants showed improvements in states with rate freezes,
suggesting incentives matter.
Evidence on effects of ownership transfers less clear.
Dependent Variable: ln(Heat Rate)
OLS
All Units
All Units
Divestiture -0.024** (0.011) External Only -0.003 (0.013) External Both -0.023 (0.018) Internal Subsidiary -0.067*** (0.024) Incentive Regulation -0.019** -0.019* (0.010) (0.010) ln(Q) -0.364*** -0.364*** (0.018) (0.018) Month-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes R2 0.54 0.54 N 75066 75066
What is being done differently at divested plants?
• Are merchant firms operating at the “sweet spot” more?
• Are merchant firms changing other aspects of operations (combustion optimization software, fuel switching, etc.)?
Unit heat rate profiles
5
7
9
11
13
15
17
19
21
23
25
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 22
Capacity Interval
Ave
rag
e H
eat
Rat
e (m
mB
tu/M
Wh
)Overall < 100 MW > 100 MW
Implied magnitude
• Our estimates suggest that plants have ~2% lower heat rates after the divestiture.
• At current fuel prices, this amounts to about $0.6/MWh.
- At the plants that were divested, this adds up to savings of nearly $500 million per year.
- Scaling this up to all thermal plants nationwide, this could add up to almost $1.5 billion per year.
• Improving fuel efficiency helps achieve environmental goals,
especially with respect to CO2.
Conclusions
• In light of the California electricity crisis, it is useful to remind ourselves about the potential efficiency gains of restructuring.
• This paper focuses on fuel efficiency at existing generating plants.
• Evidence is positive—owners respond to incentives.
• Additional efficiency gains possible through:
- More efficient long-term (capital) investment.
- Incentive regulation for transmission and distribution.
- Reallocating output across plants.