Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002

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Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002

Introduction Impetus: Green Paper in development, need

for overview of policy trends since the 1994 White Paper

New ‘team at the top’ Jali Commission has sparked public interest Identifying roads wrongly taken can

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Hopefully eliminate errors of the past Report does not tackle overcrowding issue:

(1) other initiatives are dealing with overcrowding(2) where sentences are increasing, remedy lies in comprehensive sentencing reform, not policy review

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(3) Court management (to reduce time spent awaiting trial) is a practice issue, policy review cannot add much.

(4) Overcrowding is also normal and to an extent predictable – the Green Paper will have to be developed within current level of serious (and worsening)overcrowding

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(5)The overcrowding refrain cannot excuse bad management, corruption, poor planning and so forth.

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Limitations Key policy areas were selected - the review

is not exhaustive Selection was based on significance, long

term implications, or importance for correctional practice

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Background The paper provides a brief overview of the

White Paper of 1994, concluding that it did not provide a coherent blueprint for transformation and development

Policy changes that have ensued cannot (mostly) be linked at all to the White Paper

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Key determinant was obviously role played by previous Minister, heavily influenced by USA trends

Also the strained relations between the Minister and the Portfolio Committee chair (separate study is being conducted on role of the Portfolio Committee for CSPRI)

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Series of Commissioners followed, after Sithole’s departure all in care taker positions, until appointment of Commissioner Mti in August 2001

Since 1994 prison conditions have worsened, and public is not convinced that a crisis situation has been reached

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1.Demilitarisation Occurred after grudging concession in the 1994

White Paper Badly communicated internally, and scant attention

paid to how it would take place Implementation was crude, caused turmoil Retraining and reskilling only commenced in 2001,

and has been of limited reach and scope

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Most agree demilitarisation has been responsible for a host of other ills in DCS: lax discipline, absenteeism, poor labour relations environment, corruption etc.

Portfolio Committee informed in May 2000 that uniforms would be reintroduced.

The design was already set, but the PC raised

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Concerns that it was too militaristic looking. Although the PC wanted further briefings on

this, it did not occur. uniforms were introduced from April 2002. They are arguably very reminiscent of

military uniforms (colour, insignia etc) Although denied, it does seem as if clock

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Has turned back. Conclusion: identifiable rank seems to be

very important for effective DCS management

However, response to the effects of demilitarisation was tardy (6 years), and new khakhi uniforms represent a lost opportunity

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2. New modes of prison governance: unit management and privatisation

Unit Management Concept entails that officers become actively

involved in day to day supervision – not merely responsible for physical needs, also “change agent”

Requires accommodation in smaller units

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Unit management not mentioned in the1994 White Paper, chosen after study tours to the USA in 1996

Not referred to in 1998 DSC Annual Report, but 1999-2000 report says unit management was to be piloted in 27 prisons

Next report more cautious- refers to introduction in the 2 new prisons (Malmesbury and Goodwood), decision taken to expand to 3 prisons in each province

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At face value, unit management seems more beneficial – ie positive development

But needs major re-orientation of staff, and question persists whether unit management can be implemented in old style “cattle sheds”

Also unclear if common understanding of the concept exists in DCS

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Not clear if proper research has underpinned the seemingly positive spin off’s from unit management

In 2000-2001, 550 officers trained in unit management – still very limited roll out, thus.

But “New Generation” prisons premised on unit management, so seems to be a permanent feature of DCS policy.

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Privatisation Originally explored as part of prison building

programme – overcrowding to be addressed through rapid acquisition of new facilities

Clearly influenced by Minister Mzimela’s affinity for USA practices

Fullest form of privatisation engaged (APOPS)

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Initially announced that 7 facilities would be procured, but 2 eventually built and commissioned in 2001 (Mangaung) and 2002 (Louis Trichardt)

Process was secretive, extremely rapid (contracts ready and tenders awarded before the legislation permitting private prisons had been tabled),

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And not clear why maximum prisons were selected, as opposed to juvenile or minimum facilities

Questions did come up in Parliament about the involvement of the ANC Youth League in one bid – raised serious doubts about the transparency of the process

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DCS officials involved in negotiations all left after tenders awarded to take up positions with the successful bidders – again suspicions exist about integrity of the process

Now, clear that the contracts are unaffordable – projected that by 2005/5 the APOPS prisons will cost R538 Million per annum, and budget for 2003 is 6% of total DCS budget (more than the entire allocation for rehabilitation of prisoners).

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Contractors are earning 29% and 25% return on capital respectively

Actual total projected costs over the 25 year term must still be calculated (billions?)

Task team (including DCS and treasury) has completed report and presented to the portfolio committee

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Conclusions: Contracts “unwise”, and treasury at the time

advised against transaction but was ignored Contracts must be renegotiated so that affordable

and unrealistic profits eliminated DSC spokesperson told PC directly that there was

illegality (ie corruption) in the tender process

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Although PC suggested corruption should be investigated when told of this, no evidence of such investigation has surfaced

Any corruption by officials or former officials (including the possibility of indirect benefits) should be investigated and pursued as a matter of national priority

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Further, the task team should report urgently on status of renegotiations, and expected timeline for completion

Finally, broader context of the recent privatisation of juvenile facilities (4 so far) should be born in mind if future privatised prisons are planned.

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(3) New models of prisons design: C Max, Kokstad and new generation prisons

1. C Max Influenced again by USA bias of previous

Minister Originally opened in Pretoria, but widely

publicised was intention to create more

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Attracted much publicity due to the harsh regime, and lack of clarity as to who “qualified” for C max classification

Also very expensive for DCS (very high staff requirements)

C Max programme was deprioritised by new Commissioner in 2001

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2. Kokstad (supermaximum prison) Obvious Ministerial involvement in the site

selection in rural KZN No impact analysis or land survey preceded

site/town selection: site is too steep to allow food to be served

The food is transported from a local prison (

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Newly built, with an extra large kitchen) 10 km away

Completion was seriously delayed as water system of Kokstad was insufficient to accommodate a prison with more than the total inhabitants of the town

Building costs were unusually high, and ran

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155% over budget (steep descending passages to accommodate the slope, and using vast quantities of bricks)

Very high tech – no keys, hugely expensive doors

Many rumours of corruption in the contractssurfaced

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Now, due to strict admission criteria, DCS is battling to find suitably “bad eggs” to fill prison (with accommodation for about 1400, as at August only 400 odd inmates)

Again, Kokstad was a questionable policy decision that did not pan out the way it was envisaged.

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3. “New generation prisons” Concept developed under the present

Minister, with his special advisor and an architect from abroad – taking ownership of prison building away from the Dept of Public Works

Expansion of 30 000 beds by 2005 planned

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New generation prison = prototype (smaller or bigger prisons can be built through adding on units

Significant local content brief, black economic empowerment objectives, low tech, people (not technology) focussed security, low maintenance were the requirements

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Costs of the prototype estimated at 1/3 of costs of a comparable new facility ( eg Empangeni prison, opened 2002)

Originally suggested first new generation prison would open in November 2002, but it is now predicted at November 2003 in Nigel

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Conclusions Welcome features of this policy:- (1) local content (2) low technology requirements (3) focus on the fate of the ordinary prisoner BUT The proof lies in the pudding!The jury must remain

out until implementation has been fully analysed.

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4.Non-custodial sentencing and issues relating to release of prisoners

4.1 Non-custodial sentencing In practice, low take up rate – currently proceeding

from a low base Suspicion from the bench Much correctional supervision is DCS initiated, not

imposed as an original sentence

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Concerns about lack of staff to monitor, inadequate management of Correctional supervision, widespread abscondment of persons under supervision

Previous commissioner told PC that Correctional supervision as a joke!

Conclusion: in policy and practice,

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Correctional supervision has played a backseat role in policy making and implementation; comprises smaller percentage of the budget than the 2 private prisons

One reason may be the pilot on electronic monitoring tested in 1997 – successfully reducing costs and improving monitoring evidently

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Recommendations in the full policy report include thorough research on the effectiveness of community corrections as sentences

Corruption must be avoided in any contracts related to electronic monitoring that may materialise

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4.2 Release Negative public responses to amnesties and

early releases have occurred The effect on prison overcrowding has been

very temporary Recommendation:the focus must remain on

long term transformation

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(5) Legislation and sentencing policy New Act approved in 1998, broad agreement

that it meets appropriate human rights needs for SA prisons

BUT Not yet in operation!

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Various reasons for the delay (approaching 5 years) have been adduced, including drafting regulations, some internal opposition to the Act, and “environmental accommodation” (eg serving meals three times a day).

PC played low key role. Regulations were evidently handed out to them in November 2002, but in March 2003, no one remembered or had read them

Now concluded, so process of promulgation must be pushed!!!

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Conclusions: (1)Regulations will play a powerful role in

fleshing out the human rights entitlements of prisoners and civil society should engage with their content

(2)All should lobby for the promulgation of the 1998 Act

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5.2 Sentencing policy Most significant development is increased use of

long term sentences – through increased jurisdiction given courts, introduction of minimum sentences, and ballooning “tariff” caused by community pressure.

SALC Report on Sentencing (2000) has no “Driver”, and lengthy periods elapse between releasing

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SALC reports and the finalisation of legislation anyway.

Conclusions: Sentencing reform is an urgent priority, but

must be dealt with sensitively by civil society The focus should, at present, be on promoting

effective alternative sentencing

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(6) Restorative Justice Introduced by Minister as a ‘key priority’ of DCS

in 2001 Links clearly to efforts to introduce rehabilitative

policy (as opposed to mine shafts) Unclear whether paradigm shift has had any

measurable impact internally or externally

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Most recent orientation focuses on the term “corrections” rather than restorative justice: are these co-terminous? Or in tension? Is there a common understanding of the theory(ies) of restorative justice?

No actual training in restorative justice techniques (eg victim- offender encounters) appears to have taken place

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Conclusions: If restorative justice is to be sustained, far

better communication (eg about it’s content) is needed (especially within DCS)

At present, seems to be yet another policy shift, feted and lauded without much substance

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DCS should also bolster their position by conducting/commissioning research to show whether restorative justice does address victim needs, and whether it promotes reintegration.

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(7) Overall role of DCS within government Corrections accorded minimalistic role in

1995 National Crime Prevention Strategy No mention in the 1996 Constitution Serious tension from the outset as a result of

the friction between the previous Minister and the PC Chairperson

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Vision for much of the 1990’s was focussed on security and preventing escapes

Thus, DCS appeared to have a marginal place in crime reduction and prevention (even restorative justice philosophy sets DCS apart from other govt department in the security cluster)

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Obvious break with the appointment of the new Commissioner in 2001.

New focus on “corrections” being heralded, and signs that DCS is going to attempt to shift responsibility for awaiting trial prisoners – powerless to rehabilitate them, difficult to release, and no control over intake.

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Conclusion: The Correctional system is integral to the

criminal justice system as a whole, unfortunate that for so long policy making has been isolated from criminal justice debates

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(8) Overall conclusions Initial policy making was personality driven

and eclectic Thereafter, DCS was for long periods

rudderless, officials left to their own devices Many much vaunted projects were

unsuccessful (eg C max, supermaximum)

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Efforts to implement the new legislation have been tardy

Electronic monitoring remained on hold Little of no transparency in policy processes PC has not held DCS effectively to account However, positive signs now include the Green

Paper process, the rooting out of corruption, emerging integration within criminal justice cluster

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However, these initial signs should be closely monitored by civil society to ensure that progress is maintained, and that the correctional system is transformed to serve SA’s needs for the next two decades at least.

Documents

Overview of prisons policy 1994-2002