NOAA Technical Memorandum NMFS-F INEC-1

This TM series is used lor documentation and timely communication 01 preliminary results. mterim reports. or special purpose information: and has nol received complete formal rel/iew. editorial control. or detailed editing.

Northeast Fishery Management Task Force

Overview Document of the

Northeast Fishery Management Task Force,

Phase I

Richard C. Hennemuthl, Brian J. Rothschild 2 ,

Lee G. Anderson J , and William A. Lund, Jr.4

1 Woods Hole Laboratory, National Marine Fisheries Service, Woods Hole, MA 02543 2 Chesapeake Biological Laboratory, Univ. of Maryland, Box 38, Solomons, MD 20688 3 Coli. of Marine Studies, Univ. of Delaware, Robinson Hall, Newark, DE 19711 4 Marine Research Laboratory, Univ. of Connecticut, Box 278, Noank, CT 06340

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE Philip M KlutZnick Secretary

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration Richard A. Frank. Administrator

National Marine Fisheries Service Terry L. Leltzell. ASSistant Administrator for Fisheries

Northeast Fisheries Center Woods Hole, Massachusetts

October 1980

PREFACE

This document is the result of studies originating within the North­east Fishery 1\1anagement Task Force. The Task Force, organized in 1979 by the New England and Nlid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council" and funded by the NMFS, seeks to promote discussion and dialogue on the major issues of fishery management and to explore the effects of various fishery management alternatives.

Composed of representatives from the fishing industry, Regional Fishery Management Councils, federal and state agencies, academic in­stitutions, and general public, the Task Force will operate in three phases. The first phase will assemble background information for identifying and analyzing management options. The second phase will examine this background information to determine the data requirements, regulatory measures, administrative procedures, and enforcement methods associated with each management option. The third phase will critically review the various options for application to specific fisheries, particularly the Atlantic demersal finfish fishery.

This document is one of eight developed under Phase I operations. It was issued in March 1980 as a separate publication, but is being reissued in the NOAA Technical Memorandum N.lvlFS-F/NEC series, as are the seven other Phase I documents, since it lays the groundwork for them.

Jon A. Gibson, Coordinator NOAA Technical Memorandum N2'dFS-F !lVEC series

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1

The rv1anagement Process. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 1

Management Objectives. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 3

The Management Environment .................................... 4 The Ecological Basis of Fisheries ..................................... 5 The Social Basis of Fisheries Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 6 The Technical Basis of Management ............... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7

Methods of Management .......................................... 7 Nlanagement Units . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 7 Regulatory Measures ............................................. 8 Timing, Monitoring, and Enforcement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. 11

Benefits ......................................................... 12

BACKGROUND

The waters off the northeastern coast of the United States :'iupport some of the richest fisheries in the world. Estahlishment of the 200 mile limit in 1976 under the Fisheries Conservation and Management Act for the first time gave the 11 and its fishing industry the oppor­tl!nity to ensure that these fisheries yield the greatest possible henefit to the public and the industry that serves it. not merely in the short run, but for the future, The :\ortheast Fisheries Management Task Force was organized in 1979 to provide a forum for discussion of the major issue:; which management, government, and in­dustry must resolve. The Task Force is made up of representatives from the fishing industry, from the <1CUdClllic sphere, and from d1e f~egi()nal Fisheries :\];:n"st'llwnt Councils. Its joh will llt: tl) ,:ddress the ran~,· ot alternative:'> available, to assess the benefits to be expected from each, to translate these alternatives into specific ohjectives, and to show, by way of example, how the alternatives might apply to particular fisheries.

The idea of management is not new. Local rules, for example. on the taking of anadromous spawning fish ,;uch a,.; alewives .. rules that set catch limits at so many harrels per householder or that restrict fishing to alternate days of the week ... are virtually as old as the colonial settlement of America.

But management can he controversial. This is not sur­prising. since it may hring into focus conflicts between ,.;hort·term henefit" to those who use the fishery resources. and henefits to accrue in the future. If the prohlem:'i were as simple, say, as the problem that con­fronts a farmer: the balance between the quantity and \'alue of crop yields versus the costs of land, working that land. and maintaining its fertility, any conflicts might be readily resolved. But fishery management is not that ,.;imple. The resource, unlike the farmer's, is common property'. Yields are difficult to determine. The pop­ulations of fishes that yield the "crop" move from place to place intermingling with other populations so that the con,;equences of different fishing practices become dif· ficult to evaluate. The effect of a rise or fall in numbers ()f one species upon the numbers of another. that is the interaction between populations, must also be con­;;idered, These are technical prohlems addressed mainly hy' fishery biologists and managers.

At bottom. management is addressed to social and enmomic goals which mayor may not be served by such t radirional approaches as maintaining maximum yields of \'adous species over many years. These economic a;;pet'ts may include price-maintenance, distribution of henefits among various localities and classes of fishermen. consumer prices. and yield of critically­!lveded protein I this last is of course less crucial in the !l()ft heastern l'. than in some nther countries l. Most modern tisherieii are capital-intensive: natural fluc­tuutions in fish populations, let alone those brought on bv mi,..;judgment of the fishing pressure those pop-

ulations can sustain, can be disastrous for those who in­vest in these fisheries and for the future climate in which they can prosper.

Perceptions of management's effectiveness have often heen negative: "the regulatory regime is confusing"; "statistics and stock assessment are inadequate"; "en­forcement is perfunctory". The Task Force has under­taken to address these problems and to improve com· munications hetween fisheries scientists and managers, and members of the fishing industry. Its work has heen divided into three phases.

The first phase, which is covered in the present report. \,,,'as carried out by eight working groups, each concerned with a different major aspect of fishery management. The group,; included members of the fishing industry, t h p :VI anagemen t Counci Is, sta t e and federa \ ~')\·8rnments. and universities. Phd:;e I was generally concerned with assemhling hackground information for identification and analysis of management options.

In the second phase, to follow later, management op­tions potentially applicable to fishery management in the ~ortheast will be identified, Data requirements. regulatory measures. administration, and enforcement methods will he examined in relation to management all ernati ves.

Finally, in Phase III. the options developed in Phase II will he critically reviewed with respect to actual fisheries. in particular the 0l'ortheast demersal fin fishery. Government agencies, the Councils. and the public will participate. so that all concerned may better understand the management rationale,

In the pages that follow, we will first describe the process of management. :"-Jext we will take up its objec· tives and the social, ecological. and technical en vironments in which these objectives are to be achieved. We then di,;cu:-" the methods of management, and final· ly. the types (If benefits which are sought from the proces,.;.

THE MANAGEMENT PROCESS

:'vIanagement should be viewed as a comprehensive process or system. Often, in practice. what is considered to he management is only a fragment of the process we discuss here. Enforcement, for example. or stock assess­ment might be emphasized, while the context in which these elements can have an effect i" more or less ignored. Regulation and management are not equi\"alent: regula· ti()n is one of the tools availahle to management. hut c\

system of management might be devised in which re;.!;ulation plavs no part.

The workings of the proposed management process are diagrammed in Figure 1. It may he seen as a continullus c\de by which the present state of affairs is described: oi)ject i ves are e:'>ta blished toget her wit h a plan tnr achie\'ing them and reviewing them by those concerned:

THE FISHFRIES MANAGEMENT PROCESS

Determine if aoals ha ve been met:

(1; ~--~ ~------------~

Measure benefits.

~lonitor eff-ects; social and resource.

Implement specific regulations or controls.

Federal and public review.

Prepare specific management pl an.

Evaluate feasibility. Technical ana pol ky cons iderat ions.

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Evaluate states of industry and resource. Determine needs and desires.

Defi ne obj ecti ves.

Devise management strategies for achieving objectives.

Determine measurable quantities to evaluate success in meetina objectives. -

Policy analysis.

the necessary data for monitoring effects and benefits of management are gathered; and the success of the program is judged preparatory to revising it.

Management is in a real sense experimental. Lessons are learned from the process and incorporated in the form of revisions. The whole cycle need not run its course for this to happen, as the "feedback" arrows at various points in the diagram show. The quality of management decisions depends on the information available, and on decision-making skill. Because information is often lacking, incomplete, or questionable, such skill is crucial. While uncertainties about the natural or social environment will always be with us, uncertainties arising from vaguely-articulated management processes can and should be identifieq and rooted out.

The iterative (If "feedhack" process of management may lead to change" in objectives if, for example, they were formulated incorrectly in the first place, or if the social purposes they were originally intended to serve should change. Changing objectives because an existing management approach does not achieve them is quite a different matter, since this undermines the structure of rational decision.

Obviously, testing each potentially useful manage­ment option by means of the iterative, experimental process is impractical. Alternatives may be tested by modelling or "bench" analysis, which. though it may be imperfect, will help to sort out the best option to try in practice. Such analysis would be brought to bear on the earlier steps (2 through 6) illustrated in Figure 1.

lYIANAGEMENT OBJECTIVES

The management process (see Figure 1) starts by describing the present state of fishery resources and the industry that exploits them. and then. in social, economic, and biological terms, determines future objec­tives. How these objectives are defined is crucial to the management process. To be useful, objectives must be clearly stated, practically attainable, of measurable benefit. and based upon an understanding of all aspects of the problem they address, rather than fragments of the problem.

Experience teaches us that the way in which manage­ment ohjectives have been framed in the past may make them difficult to translate into action. Often, they are stated in excessively general terms; "maximize social welfare", for example, or "catch all underutilized species in C waters", Such statements may be unarguable as general goals. but they need to be supplemented by more specific subobjectives whose attainment can be measured with data and techniques that are either at hand or practically obtainable.

In setting subobjectives. however, one must keep the broader purpose in mind. Objectives which focus only on part of a problem must be linked together in a com-

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prehensive approach, to reduce the risk of achieving one goal by unwittingly defeating others. In a multi-species fishery, for example, management concentrating upon one or two principal species and ignoring the complex of species making up the by-catch may indeed approach optimal catch levels for the species selected but in so doing reduce catches for the fishery as a whole to subop­timal levels.

Fully as important as defining the objectives themselves is specifying the process for attaining them. For instance, regulating a fishery to achieve "optimal stock size" is of little use as an objective if optimal stock size cannot be established, or indeed, if stock size cannot be measured at all with sufficient precision. Specific ohjectives require specific information from the ecological and s()('ill'E'('n~hlmic environments fOf

assessing the impact of the management system. Objec­tives should be framed in terms of definahle events and measurable benefits, recognizing that severe mis­matches may exist between time-spans of social and ecological processes, the latter commonly being slower. This implies a nested set of objectives and subobjectives with opportunity for feedback in the process, as in­dicated in Figure l.

The problem of defining objectives and the pathways for achieving them raises a number of issues which are discussed in turn below:

Reactive vs. predictive management. When cause and effect are fully understood, management can be predic­tive. a state of affairs that is only rarely completely achievable in practice. Where the choice of objectives, the nature of benefits. or the consequences of interven­tion are uncertain, or the ecological responses of the resources imperfectly known, management may have to be more or less reactive, incorporating what is learned in the process of management in revisions of technique and perhaps in redefinitions of objectives, when experience shows the original definition to have been unsatisfactory. This "feedback" approach will be particularly necessary when objectives are long-term, or when techniques are untried. Reactive management is not necessarily "unplanned"; provision for reactive steps can be part of the planning. The greater the uncertainty in the system, the more reactive must be the management approach taken. with a proportionately greater need for timely monitoring of events, It is important that changes observed which lead to "course corrections" be evident not only to the managers but also to those affected by the management policy.

Objectives implicit in the choice of method. A given objective may be approached by a variety of methods, each of which may facilitate. or frustrate. achievement of "ome other objectives in ways which mayor may not be foreseen. For example, "limited entry" might be aimed at reducing fishing effort. but in choosing this method, one implies that the social or economic con-

sequences of employing it are also objectives of the plan. Identifying any "hidden" or implicit objectives in a spec­trum of alternative methods will help in choosing among those methods. The distinction between methods and objectives must at all times be borne in mind; a method is a means of achieving an objective, which should be clearly articulated: it is not an end in itself.

Biological objectives. Maintaining a resource in some particular state may be set forth as a management objec­tive. but this often begs the question of why such a state is desirable. There are certainly biological constraints on objectives. However. the purposes of management are social. and objectives of management, assuming they are realistic in ecological terms, should be established with reference to the social consequences they are intended to produce.

Public and private objectives. The Fishery Conserva­tion and Management Act sets forth objectives which are desirable as a matter of national policy, but not necessarily from' the individual fisherman's, businessman's, or community's perspective. The Regional Fishery Management Councils must reconcile any conflict.

The Act's first purpose, to establish a fishery conserva­tion zone under C.S. controL has been achieved (except for some uncertainties about U.S. and Canadian jurisdictions}; domestic objectives take precedence over foreign objectives.

A system of conservation and domestic management, a second purpose of the Act, has also been started, byes­tablishing the Regional Fishery Management Councils, but "conservation and management", which are stated as joint goals. have not so far been given equal weight by the public and its legislatures. Conservation (i.e. preven­tion of "overfishing and depletion") has been initially emphasized as a separate and overriding objective, whereas management is addressed to optimum yield and domestic fishery development, to which ends conserva-tion may be directed. .

Integration of public objectives with private objectives (t he diverse desires of individuals, firms, local com­munities and other organizations may, of course, also c'J!lilit! among themselves) Idl often require trial-and­t~rror. Even the interests d.:,·lared by individuals may generRt.e multiple, conflicting objectives. Common in­terests and those which are peculiar to specific in­dividuals or groups must be sorted out. The latter may be served by appropriate selection of management units and expressed in terms of a series of subobjectives tailored to individual needs which nevertheless are con­sistent with a long-term, common goal.

Overfishing and depletion are nebulous terms if their "prevention" is considered outside of the context of op­timum yield. A depleted stock is sometimes defined as one which has fallen below the maximum point on yield or stock-recruitment curves. However, the observed variability in productivity of fish stocks is often too large

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to apply the underlying theoretical models on which such definitions are based. Overfishing, therefore, would better be evaluated in terms of management, that is. social. objectives. If it is seen that a population, in the course of pursuing such objectives, is becoming unac­ceptably low (in the national sense), then the objectives should be revised. since it is probably possible to fish a stock to the point (hal it will no longer support a con­tinuing fishery.

Full utilization is an FCMA objective which implies that any surplus in excess of domestic capacity may be allocated to foreign fishermen. if public and domestic management ohjectives are thereby served. At issue are questions of competition between domestic and foreign fishermen. availability of stocks that might be jointly fished. and interspecific relationships between stocks that might be independently fished by foreign and domestic neets. Since one objective of the Act is domestic fishery development, economic interactions and direct resource competitivn must be taken into ac­count. If predictions of the effects of foreign fishing are imprecise (for instance, due to competition), a reactive mode of management may be best.

Starting point for management. In principle, objec­tives can he developed without regard to present prac­tices, but as a practical matter, these practices and their relation to the current state of the resources will in­fluence the approach to be taken, particularly for the shorter term. There is often strong pressure for main­t aining the status quo, particularly if management has not yet been much developed. I\1anagement might start with rather general objectives which minimize disrup­tion of traditional practices, reserving those that require more stringent regulation for later, if these should be required. Setting general objectives need not imply a lack of purpose. For example, objectives addressed to the resource as a whole rather than to individual species or stocks of fish might prove to be more beneficial than a species- or stock-specific approach.

THE MANAGEMENT

ENVIRONMENT

Fisheries are based on a natural resource. The ecology of this resource is only to a limited extent alterable by human intervention, and the consequences of such in­ter\'ention may be difficult to foresee or to control. :vianagement, then, must first of all collaborate with the natural wor~ings of the environment. Management's purposes are sociaL It is the social environment which determines which goals are desirable, and the most accepta ble ways of achieving them. Finally, manage­ment is limited by the techniques available for its pur­poses. These topics are explored further below.

The Ecological Basis of Fisheries

Intelligent fishery management requires an understanding of the relationships between the living and non-living elements of the natural environment, and the impact of fishing upon them. Ecology is the study of such relationships.

Ecologists may focus upon individual organisms, pop­ulations of organisms, or the relationships between pop­ulations. Since the health of a fishery depends upon whole populations of animals rather than individuals, the ecology of populations and the interaction between them is emphasized for purposes of fishery management.

Populations ... many individuals of the same species living and reproducing among themselves in a definable space .. , have at any moment certain attributes which an' of fundamental importance tr, fisheries science and management: birth rate, death rate, growth rate, and age (or size) distribution (that is, the population will have a characteristic percentage of its members in each of several age or size categories; this may change markedly with time),

The classical growth modeL According to this model, a population of animals finding itself in an environment where food and living-space are ample will increase slow­ly at first, then more rapidly as the many surviving young grow to reproduce themselves, much as capital in­vested at compound interest grows as the interest is added to the principal.

Unlike invested capital, however, the animal popula­tion, according to this model, eventually will cease growing as its size becomes balanced with the supply of food, space, or some other factor necessary to support it. It has reached its "equilibrium density".

Growth of this sort is called density-dependent. The population size at this point reflects the "carrying capacity" of the environment for that particular species at that particular time. (Population growth is not always limited by density-dependent factors however; sometimes alteration of the physical environment or in­trusion of a competing species better-adapted. to the en­vironment will bring it to a halt; these are density­independent factors).

The density-dependent growth model underlies one of the traditional concepts of fishery management. If we were able to remove from a population a tonnage of fish each year equal to the natural annual increase, the pop­ulation abundance would remain the same . .'Moreover, if that "parent" population were of a size where annual in­crease was most rapid (that is, not at the early stage of expansion, described above. or approaching the tapering-off point), the amount that could be cropped would be at its greatest. the so-called "maximum sustainable yield".

Regrettably from the point of view of practical management this model does not describe what often happens in nature. It assumes that the numbers of young added to a population are proportional to the numbers of

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adults, while practical experience with most fish pop­ulations has shown this to be untrue, Many major fisheries either began or were expanded on the strength of one or two good year-classes which supported these fi:,;heries for a number of years; additions to the popula­tion were not directly proportional to the numbers of spawning adult:; (though the quantity and quality of the spawning stock is one among several important factors in year-class success).

System dynamics. What is wrong, then, with the simple model underlying the concept of maximum sustainable yield? In general. it is deficient in that it treats the pop­ulation's environment as fixed. whereas in fact natural environments are dynamic, that is to say, in a state of constant Lux, Quantity 3nd qualitv of food varies with time, and food requirements m2:,\ Lt' quite different for different life-stages. ~loreover, genetically unrelated populations do not exist in a vacuum but interact with one another: positively, as when increases in a prey pop­ulation favors its predator, or negatively, when two predators compete for limited numbers of prey, The relationships between species may be exceedingly com­plex. Animals which are prey at one life sta'ge may become predators at another, while competition can be quite indirect. Such relationships may be quite difficult to decipher. and even more so to predict.

The interactions among organisms in a natural assemhlage in[uence the growth rates and abundance in a dynamic fashion, If a population is not fished, all growth is ultimately balanced by natural mortality (although owing to the dynamic interactions, this does not insure that populations will be stable in size). When fishing starts, there are greater removals from the pop­ulation than additions. Though these removals may to some extent be offset by increased survival and growth among the remaining fishes, they my be so extensive that a new balance is established between fishing mor­tality and recruitment; a point may even be reached where fishing is no longer economical.

Recruitment is the process by which new individuals are added to the exploitable portion of a population; it is in­t1uenced by the processes of spawning, hatching, growth, and survivaL and in turn recruitment influences popula­tion density and fishing success. Prior knowledge of expected recruitment is desirable for management. Three approaches may be taken to predict it.

1. A historical type of predictive model is based on observed relative strengths of past year classes. The frequency of occurrence of various year-class sizes in the past are piotted, and the probability of future year-class sizes predicted. assuming that future conditions will be the same as in the past and that they will inr1uence year-class success in the same way,

2. The prerecruit portion of the population may be sampled by special ;mrveys or from fishermen's

records to provide prerecruit indices. Relative strengths of prerecruit year classes may be com­pared, and the number of prerecruits in past year classes may be related to the number of fish suo­sequently recruited. This method provides year-to­year information to the manager.

3. By developing a basic knowledge of the en­vironmental and population factors which deter­mine successful year classes, a more reliable means of prediction could be formulated. This method (like prerecruit indices) might permit prediction of year-class strength before recruitment is com­plet.ed, and at the same time furnish insight into long-term trend o . Far more knowledge of the ecology of fish populations is needed for this method to become feasible.

While estimates of future recruitment are essential for any management plan whose objectives are based on population size, attempting to influence recruitment by manipulating population size is an uncertain endeavor, since the effect of spawning upon recruitment is itself uncertain. It is particularly difficult to adjust plans to compensate for year-to-year changes in recruitment for short-lived species such as squid: the time for reacting to observed recruitment is simply too short.

Multi-species approaches. In \'iew of the dynamic in­teractions in nature, a single-species approach to management is inadequate, particularly for multi­species fisheri~s, or fisheries where the by-catch is significant.

To avoid the deficiencies of a single-species approach, management might address itself to the productivity and harvest potential of an entire ecosystem, since the ecosystem in the long run has greater stability than any of its components. However, to be practical, manage­ment must recognize the social fact that some species are more desirable than others, and in some measure direct the fisheries to certain species. This suggests a multi­species scheme of management: individual species, groups of species, or particular fisheries (defined by area or gear) would be regulated to control the relative balance of the species mix.

The Social Basis of Fisheries Manag,mi\:';ll

Fish stocks are managed not for their own sake but to achieve social objectives, and this takes place in a social context. Exploitation for short-run advantage at this expense of future generations is obviously irresponsible, so time is an important dimension in management plan­ning; if maximum social benefit over time is set as a goal, the survival of the fish stocks is assured. But the success of managem'ent is to be measured, finally. in social terms.

A clear statement of social objectives must precede formulation of a management strategy, but this is dif­ficult because the perception of what is beneficial may

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\'ary from fishery to fishery. and from one social group or region to another.

Tile fir!'! consequence of a particular management op­tion and the means used to implement it is upon the composition of the fleet for a given fishery and the fi"hing method" used. These. in turn. may affect:

• the number of fish caught and the cost­effectiveness of catching them.

• distribution of income and employment among geographic areas. social groups, large and small firms. vessel types, etc.

• efficiencY and income in the processmg and marketing sectors.

• cultural life and community structure in the area" concerned.

• international balance of trade and, depending on the level of foreign participation in a fishery, international relations.

Different management options can affect such aspects or social well-being in different and sometimes conflict­ing ways. It \\'ill be necessary. therefore, to rank the good and bad potential consequences of various options, and to secure some consensus on which are most important. Where conflicts exist. they mllst be directly addressed in setting management objectives.

There is a social basis to fishery management, but also a social context consisting of the participants in manage­ment and fishing and the social institutions in which they operate. To make the distinction more clear, con­sider Figure 1. in which a technical plan is devised, and then subjected to various processes of review. It may be that. abstractly speaking, a single administrative authority would be most effective for a particular fishery. In the existing social context, however. this may be impractical; given the existing body of law and the responsibilities and interests of governmental, trade, en­vironmental, and consumer groups, all may have to be accommodated if management is to succeed. In par­ticular. to be well-understood are the internal workings of the Coast Guard and the Departments of Commerce and State and the relations between them, for they are re;-ponsible for approving. im;)lementing, and enforcing management plcl:1C,

The indi\'iduab \Vh\l"C inclu~try' is being managed have a most urgent interest in the process and their cooperative response can be crucial to success. For exam­ple. if management dictates a closed fishing season, fishermen may obser\'e this season but react by building bigger boats, with the unfortunate result (demonstrated from past experience) that the catch and its cost in­crease.

Clearly, the needs and possible reactions of the in­dustry must be contemplated in choosing management options. and the industry must realize that its needs are being considered. This points toward maximum public participation in the management process.

As a practical matter, the needs and desires of all con­cerned cannot always be met; their reactions should be anticipated and the consequences of these reactions weighed in advance. For example, if a certain manage­ment option is likely to lead to litigation, the question should be asked, is the objecth-e worth the trouble and expense of defending it?

The social basis of management is implicit in the con­cept of "optimum yield". When judging what that op­timum might be, biological and technical facts-of-life must be given full weight, but managers must always have before them the principle that management is in­tended to serve social ends.

The Technical Basis of Management

The technology availahle to the fishing industry and i(J

those charged with enforcing management plan;,; must be considered in developing those plans. Technical prac­ticality is one aspect; another is cost.

Fixed or passive gears, for example, may favor development of a self-regulating fishery, providing a practical means of achieving a fixed exploitation rate, but such gears may be too costly in present cir­cumstances for certain species or fishing grounds.

Other gears may be cost-effective in t he short run, but may adversely alter the enyironment or cause excessive damage to the prerecruit "tock.

Processing and marketing may be limiting facto!"s as well. In New England. the danger of declining catches resulting from increasing capacity of the fleet might be in some measure offset by developing fisheries for un­exploited species, but this makes it essential to include processors and marketers in the management program, and to give them technical assistance in preparing and selling the catch.

Enforcement may be constrained by the physical dimensions of the area under surveillance. For some types of regulation such as effort limitation by fishing days, remote sensing or telemetry, or perhaps satellite surveillance, may offer solutions.

The ability technically to monitor the effects of management on both the stocks and the social sector may greatly affect assessments of management's value. Improvements are needed both in hardware (sampling tools) and in statistical and survey design.

METHODS OF MANAGEMENT

Management Units

The Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976 states that "to the extent practicable, an individual stock of fish shall be managed as a unit throughout its range and interrelated stocks of fish shall be managed as a unit or in close coordination". How these units are defined is of fundamental practical importance to

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successful management. For example, a single manage­ment unit encompassing the entire east coast might be justifiable on genetic grounds for certain migratory species, but a regulation based on such a unit could prove to be inappropriate for particular regions of the coast for a number of biological, social, or economic reasons. On the other hand, a multiplicity of small management units could become impossible to coor­dinate. Some middle ground is indicated.

Management units are defined by the nature and dis­tribution of the resources themselves, by social and economic factors, and by fishery technology.

The fishery resources to be found in the U.S. Fishery Conservation Zone off the New England and ~Iiddle Atlantic states contain some :200 species, but [Ire dominated by perhaps twt) dozen species of finfish ~1nd mollusks which form the basis of the commercia! catch.

Basic biological knowledge about these species: their seasonal and geographical distribution, identification of separate stocks, their reproductive patterns, and their ecological response to their environment, including in­teractions with other species, is fundamental to the definition of management units. .

But a knowledge of how they are caught and marketed is essential as well. A few of the species mentioned are the targets of a pelagic fishery (pelagic trawl and purse seine) in which, by and large, only the species sought is captured. Most species, however, are taken on or near the bottom by otter trawl; this gear, though it selects more or less for the size of fish caught, does not select for species, resulting in a by-catch of non-target species which may be substantial. In fact, the annual landings of certain species, including many commercially important ones, may be predominantly, or almost entirely, as by­catch.

Preoccupation with "target" species of a fishery, without due attention to the effect of management on the fishes composing the by-catch, could lead to unplanned-for, and possibly adverse. effects on the con­dition of the by-catch stocks.

There is another kind of interaction between species at the harvesting level. Fishermen switch their effort from species to species seasonally and according to abundance and price, in order to maximize their profit" . .Ylanagers must b€' alert to the dIect that regulatory measures directeri at on€' species may have upon t his seasonal switching by fishermen and upon their annual income.

The economic interactions hetween species can be tra.ed further. to the murketplace. The fisherman's pn, e tur one species may depend directl:,; on the landings of anot her. and where markets are regional in nature. the fish need not he tanried in the same port or nearby ports. For example. sea-scallop prices may be affected hy landings throughout the :\ew England and :Ylid-Atlnnuc regions, by imports, and by the price of such competitive species as lobsters. It follows that the perspective of management must be wide enough to include the multi­species nature of fisheries throughout a region.

The geographic distribution. and in many cases the migrate,r\" habits. of fish stocks. and the economic in­teraction::: between species at the harvesting and n:arketin;.: le\·els. point towards broad definitions of management units. Management units defined in biolng-ical and economic terms can be expected to cut aero,.:" existing jurisdictional boundaries. For manage­men: to succeed. jurisdictions must cooperate.

To sum up. management units must:

1. com prehend seasonal and geographical distribu­tion Oil he fishery resources.

2. addres", the multiple species nature of most ~ew England and Mid-Atlantic fisheries in terms of the b~-catch. which makes LIp a substantial part of IOtal landings. and in terms of the seasonal pattern of switching from one species to another in man~' fleetl'. a pattern which has e\"oived to generate maximum returns from resources who"e abundance \'arib over the ~·ear.

3. transcend. where ne~essary. jurisdictional bound­aries. incorporating institutional agreements to in"ure effecti\'€' implementation.

Regulatory Measures

Fishery management is intended to increase social benefits from the resource. Thus. choice of management techniques requires clear statements of social objectives. Each technique must be weighed against its alternatives (including the alternative of doing nothing) in terms of a n um her of biologicaL social. and economic criteria, to (:\'1011l1int' how 1 he llndt'rlying social object lves mig ht best be served. The criteria for judging alternat ive techniques are described brief1y as follows:

1. Control of fishing mortality. \Vhen fish stocks decrease to low lewis from intense fishing mortality, ad­ditional effort is required to maintain catches, which may lead to economiC' waste. An efficient fishery implies control of fishing mortality.

2. Biological impacts other than control of fishing mortality. Techniques may affect specific components of the resource, such as small fish. spawners, or fish of a p:Hti('ular species. with implications fur recruitment and 1utuli.' yidds. or the avaiiability I)f a giwn species to a pnrticular user group.

3. Relation to the natural functioning of the fishery s~'stem. System productivity is ultimately traceable to such natural factors as radiation from the sun. The in­n uence of management practices on large natural systems. and on the socio-economic environment in which the fisheries take place, is limited. Recognizing this, techniques should be chosen which enhance the operation of these mechanisms rather than interfering with it.

4. Relation to harvesting efficiency. Efficiency of a fi"hery may be expressed in several ways: proportion of

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potential productivit~· actually used. cost per unit of catch. income per unit of catch. catch per unit of energy expended. etc. The efficiency measure used depends on the objective of the plan and must be appropriate to it.

5. Historical precedence for the technique. Success m;IY depend on the credibility of the approach among those affected: past perceived success or failure of a par­ticular method must be considered (though in no wa~' should this preclude new techniques)

6. Costs of enforcement and administration. Calcula­tion of net benefits must include costs of administration and enforcement. and these costs must be justified in terms of potential returns.

7. Impact on non-target components of a system. Objectives of management are often specific for a par­ticular species. user-group. or processing segment of the industry. Impact on other system components must be considered to avoid unwanted consequences (for exam­ple. on existing. flexible patterns of response to changes in resource abundance or price I.

S. Impact on distribution of benefits. In an un­re~ulated fishery. distribution of benefib evolves 11111 urally. some groups benefiting more than others. I\Lmagement techniques may affect this natural dis­trihut ion in desirable or unwanted W(l~7S.

9. Relation of a technique to its scientific basis_ The impact of a management technique is usually assessed b~' scientific means. The cost and feasibility of such a:-.sessment varies between techniques. Further. the "robustness" of the scientific basis, that is to sa~', its ability to yield useful results despite imperfections in the method or the data, varies also.

The fishing industry (like any industry) has an input side and an output side. In the fishery, inputs are defined in terms of effort (number of boats, area fished, time spent fishing, power of the gear L Outputs are defined by landings. The input and output sides of the fishery are represented diagrammatically in Figure 2. on t he left and right respectively. The input side has a direct effect on fishing mortality, and from this, any measures that are aimed at the harvesting ~ector itself may he considered "direct" regula~i()ns in lprms of their ('treet on fishing mortality. Direct regulations are (,Iassified as "active" or "passiw"; the former are con­cerned with total catch or effort. while the latter restrict t he location and time of fishing. type of gear used, and t he size-selectivity of the catch. The dist inct ion between active and passive is important because the effects of passive regulation, in the absence of direct controls on catch or effort, cannot be explicitly estimated; without catch and lor effort limits, mortality is theoretically un· bounded.

Measures aimed at the output side of the industry are classified as "indirect": such measures seek to affect the behavior of the harvesting sector (and hence fishing mor-

<..0

OJ rec L ~~n!:!ilJ~

Open fishing

Qua rlerly quo til

1 rill limits

Vessel c1asslfi cation limit

I nd Iv idua I quota

Cl.ASSIFICATlOU OF IIEGUlA10ilY t1EASURES

Indirect Controls ---_._---_. "" - -----_.

Tax on effort f-·-·---J . ____ ._._... . .. -.- Hfor-t

(2) Tax on components I j .. - 1- -... --. C

~·-----·-·-···-- 1 (1) landil19s

Tax on land ings

of effort:

E:~ fished --I Lj~p~:~~_:~

_._ .. _-] .. -o t J ..... -......... -. ulpu s .. _ .. __ _

-_. ---. time f I shed

I. ~~~~x_ on s Ile (3) Size selectivity

Tax 011 relative size

-{ (I) T~~::I;tf"t I _r-;-----·- } l (1 ) ------- LHf_~I'~_ T-

--.----.--- . -.. __ . ____ . ____ 1 I r~~~i-~J (2) Restrict Ions all -- .. ----

Total

Open fishing

Quarterly Iinilt

Trip IlInlt cOlllponent s of efforl: [ --. .- [J :~:: (I icenses) ._~n~ut_sJ QUANTITY L~I~~~~_ts_.

:l~I~: [ ____ L - Illfldividual

_ ~Ize select _ (3) _s~~~~ectlv Ity __ ._vessel 111It1t

[~~i~~_~~~~-~:~-;~t~~.IJ--. - [{~ 1~~~-iPiIt

Vessel classifi­C1l liOfl limit

tality itself! by manipulations in the social and economic (that is to say, shore-based) spheres.

In the upper portion of Figure 2, controls on inputs and outputs (i.e. direct and indirect controls) are in terms of price. in the lower portion in terms of quantities caught or landed.

There are :w() ways in which price controls may be applied t () in put,: (effort i, First. if a useful measure of ef­j mi I Lg, 1 on -clay" I can he est a blished. a unit tax can be ]('\]t'c1 In term:' of such a measure, Alt.ernatively. where :-1]('11 d mt'a;;ure does not exist. one or more components p1 efi(1rt ('an he laxed (taxes on ;!ear or fishing time, for {<xample I, II different sizes of fish can be selectively nwg-hL a tax can be devised to discourage taking of ~mall fish, A 1 ax on small-meshed nets would serve this purpose.

Turning to price controls on outputs. taxes on land­ings. which mRy or may not be scaled to different sizes of fi"h, can modil\' fishing activity and fishing mortality in roughlY the sanw manner as a direct tax on effort, a,..."uming that there are not di"cards at sea (i.e, that land ing;,; are equivalent to the catch). The treatment and control of discard" may he critical to the effectiveness of lilany of the alternative management techniques; measures that do nol minimize discards will probably prm'e rplat iyc;,ly ineffC'ctiw. hut the problem of discards will not easil~' be overcome hecause of their low value at the d()ck,

Direct controls on quantities caught are an alternative t<1 taxe" in altae-kin;! the prohlem of effort limitation. Total eifnrt mil." he limited if a suitable measure of effort can he defined. Lacking such a measure, components of eff{Jrt can he controlled in ways analogous to the applica­tion of price controls described above. Size-selectivity can be influenced by mesh-size regulations (though there are technical and biological constraints).

Indirect quantitati\'e controls on effort (that is, con­trois applied on the output side) consist of some form of lilncl'in~ quota. Such quotas can have a size-selective structure.

Some general ohservations can be made on the claSF-ltication shown in Figure 2.

l. Output controls (price and quantity) control the 2l~;"\Int and "i7.(" of fish aClual1.\' landed; input (J]]trols aflt.,t! 11w alI1{)Ullf and size of the catch via tht: Hmount and type of fishing activity.

2. Controls designated as item ''1'' in the diagram are 1 heoretically interchangeable, if jandings are completely determined by effort. In such cases, if a tax could be de\'ised to achieve a certain level of effort, an analogous tax on landings could produce the same result, or a catch restriction could be substituted for an effort restriction. In pract ice, unfortunately, it is difficult to relate raw ef­fort to catch, with the result that the different ap­proaches \'ar~' \,.,idely in effectiveness.

3. Restrictions on components of effort (item "2" on the input side of the diagram) are not reflected on the

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output side; there is no way to control landings produced by particuiar components of effort. Limits on total effort (item "1") on the input side are absolute. but limitations hased on components of effort become so only if all com­ponents are included in the regulatory scheme. If only a few components are controlled. fishermen may increase the other components of effort to compensate. if it is profitable to do ,,0.

4. Restrictions on size-selecti\"it~' may be used in­dependently of restrictions on effort or landings but this will not control total effort in a precise manner, However. if size-selective controls are effective. mortali­tv of smaller fish which results from a given level of effort will be limited. Both size and mortalit~· must be con­trolled to achieve maximum yield per recruit.

5. All of the management techniques shown in the diag-ram are associated with implicit income distribution patterns. In the absence of controls. the patterns evolve from the nature of the fish stock and the characteristics of t he fleet exploiting it. This will again become the case if controls are simply in the form of total effort restric­tions, or total landings quotas. The "natural" distribu­I i()n of henefits. however. may he altered by resort to the techniques listed at the extreme right and left of the diagram. By using quarterly quotas, trip limits, vessel classification limits. or individual vessel quotas or effort allotments, certain groups within the fleet may be assured of a share in the catch that they might not otherwise get, or the catch may be distributed more evenly over the year, To achieve the overall objectives of management, the various techniques for redistributing benefits must be used in a context of total effort or total quota limitations,

6. Fishery management techniques may be judged by their ability to achieve desired levels of fishing mortality or size-selectivity, and by the relative harvesting ef­ficiency that results from their applications. General conclusions about the various approaches listed in the diagram are difficult to draw. Quotas are designed to produce a given catch level; whether they also produce target levels of fishing mortality depends on changes in size of the fish population. Effort limits, on the other hand, depend "!l detl'lmining accurately the relationship between effort and fishing mortality and on reducing effort effectively when necessary. For financial controls to be effective, one must know the relationship between amount of tax and the resulting restriction on effort or landings. This may be difficult to predict in a multi-species fishery where various species compete in the marketplace.

7. More definite conclusions may be stated about the influence of management techniques upon the cost of harvest. Four such techniques lead to minimal cost. These are: taxes on landings, taxes on effort. a total quota with individual vessel allotments, and a total ef­fort limit with individual effort allotments. Other

techniques either directly or indirectly cause harvesting costs to be greater than necessary.

Timing, lVlonitoring, and Enforcement

Timing: I' nder the requirements of the Fishery Conservation and ~lanagement Act, and associated statutes. it takes a minimum of 2:")0 days to process a fishery management plan, or a major amendment to such a plan. following its submission by a Fishery Management ('ouncil. The plans must be reviewed each year, and usually, to date, the plans cover one year, .'\I1H'IHIII1I:'I1I.; an.' required tl) extend the plans into sub­sequent years. and generally. sin\"~ these amendments im"he quota" and optimum yields. they are considered major amendments, The result is that Councils must prepare such amendments before the effects of the plan currently in force can be known.

:v1ulti-year plans and "framework" plans are alter­nati\'es til the one year plan, Multi-year plans establish management regimes. including target quotas, that re­main in effect for periods of time that mayor may not be specified. Framework plans establish criteria for various changes. including quotas, by regulation rather than amendment. Framework plans take only 95 days, not 2.')0, for amendment, but they have a disadvantage from the Council's point of view: under these plans, Councils may recommend changes, but may not make them directly. Thus they delegate some of their authority to the).; ational :'\larine Fisheries Service.

Because of this, the Councils must be careful, in set· ting up framework plans. to limit the role of the ~ational Marine Fisheries Service; the :\MFS should be allowed to react to various anticipated conditions in the fishery. but it should not be allowed to initiate actions without the full public participation which is intrinsic to the function of the Councils. Such participation is essen­tial in securing the cooperation of the fishing industry,

Present experience with the Fishery Conservation and ~lanagement Act indicates that flexibility in the development, amendment. and implementation of management plans must be increased if these plans are to be responsive to the dynamic nature of the fisheries. Plans must be responsive to changing stocks and fishery conditions and to unforeseen consequences of the management plans themselves. Excessive flexibility, however, constant tinkering with a given management regime. is to be guarded against; a regime should be applied long enough for its effects to be evaluated_ Experience with existing plans suggests that the limits within which flexible response may be allowed should be more rigorously defined than they have been to date.

Phasing of fishery management plans to conform with traditional or evolving seasonal patterns in the fishery may he beneficial. though a difficulty may arise in reallocating resources in cases where both foreign and

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domestic fleets are involved and their respective seasons differ.

Monitoring: Assessing the effectiveness of a manage­ment plan depends on a regular now uf accurate biological, economic, and social data and an orderly system for interpreting those data. Much of the informa­tion which is of direct use to the Councils has been sy~tematically accumulated over many \'ears. but a" their work proceeds. additional requirements have he{'onH,' plain, Tht· li"t 01 thl'se reqlliremellt:-; is quitt' long, and need not he reviewed here. I

Two points "hould he brought out, howe\'er. The first is that the' Councils me bound h~' certain t imt' {'on­st I'Clints, such as legi"lated hearing and review schedule", clll,l I r'" l):ganizat jllll of m:·lIl:l;.;ernent plans in tl'tms of ri:,hill~ years. whi,"h may not tit com'enient' the existing schedule,.; of data gathering and analysis of such agencies as the ~ational Marine Fisheries ~ervice. In order for the Councils to ha\e information when they need it. it is nece;;saf\' for them to project their rt'quireml'llts well in advance. to permit the suppliers of dn ta to sr hed ule t heir work accordingly. .

The sl'cond point concerns required reporting by fishermen and processors, Councils shoulrl keep chanl!;es in the"e reporting procedures to a minimum. recognizing that the quality of data supplied will prohahly decrea:,e fa" tht' complexity and scope of I'eporting requirt'ments increases. The quality of reports from these "ectors almost certainly will reflect their satisfaction with the management process.

Enforcement: Fishery management plans have been developed, approved. and implemented more rapidly than the enforcement program:- necessary to support them. and frequently with little regard for the resources available for enforcement or the cost·henefit aspects of enforcement. Enforcement agencies have not always allocated their resources to fit the requirements of the management plans. In choosing- methods of controL those that are more or less self-enforcing should be given the closest attention.

It is essential that fishermen and processors perceive enforcement to be regularly carried out. violations resulting in certain penalties. A fixed schedule of penalties (similar to those applied in motor vehicle cases) which increase with repeated offenses may serve as a deterrent. since consequences of conviction will be known beforehand. Such a plan. moreover. may expedite the legal process. This approach has been recommended hy the Mid-Atlantic Council for the surf clam and ocean quahog fisheries: if successful. it may serve as a model for ot her fisheries.

,-\ \' ,mpretwnH\ e inventorv of available and recommended data WIll he found in an Appendix to the present document: f<:cI)rlr;mfC and Hiulu;.;!caf [)ala .Veed.'-1' fur Fl',\'U!TU?S .\t{nna~rmt:'n{ u ith Particular Reierencp tf) thl' Sr'(' Enuialld and .Hiri, :\ tlanl!(' ,Ir('a.'

BENEFITS

Fisheries management is intended to improve social linduding economic) benefits to those involved directly and indire('tl~' in the fishing industry. and to those who consume its product. These benefits are measured by yanouo' indices of change. Because there is a cost aSi'()ciated with management. and because management programs which result in improved benefits for one sec­ltJr ma\, dr· so to some extent at the expense of another sector. it i" net benefit which must be weighed before un­dertaking a management scheme. Due to uncertainties inherent in the process. opportunities for feedback which may lead to re\'isions or even abandonment of a manage­ment approach. must be huilt into the program. ~1anagement may affect social well-being in ways that

are not contemplated in the objectives set forth. Positive eirecto' are of course welcome: unforeseen negative effects become a cost of management. Obviously, every effort shoula be made to anticipate all consequences of a com­prehensive management program, keeping surprises, whether pleasant or otherwise, to a minimum.

Both the magnitude ornet benefits, and their distribu­tion (who gets the benefits and who bears the cost) must be addressed in framing the objectives.

The nat me of benefits to be expected from a particular management plan will vary with it.s objectives. General. h. though. they will accrue to one or more of the following groups:

1. Commercial harvesters. Benefit.s for this group uo'uall\ are measured in termi' of profit, but may include such social aspects as economic security and way of life.

2. Recreational harvesters. The benefit might be measured b~' the number of days fished. The value of each day can vary, hut depends partly on the number and type of fish caught, which can be influenced by management .

3. Processors. Benefits are measured in term~ of profil;'. and employment. Economic security and way of life may also be factors.

4. Consumers. Benefits take the form of increased ~lIpplies. lower prices. and better quality' of the product. Ill!'TeaSeS in harvesting efficiency ma~' make a surplus of e('onomic inputs available for production of new fishery products or for other economic sectors.

Some of t.he indices for measuring benefits are dis­cussed in Appendices to this document. Social benefits include many hard-to-quantify elements. such as way of life, community structure, or work satisfaction of processors and harvesters. Some related index is usually employed. The point to be made here is that indices must be developed and data gathered so that management's effectiveness can be objectively judged. It should be recognized, however, that many types of benefits cannot presently be measured very well (an ap­proach based on uncertainty theory may prove useful herel so that changes in management based on measured benefits should be made cautiously.

·~·U.s. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE, 1981-700'915/369

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