Outline Table of Contents General Introduction Glossary

Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 15 June 2010 for the

Report of the Bloody Sunday InquiryThe Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman) The Hon William Hoyt OC The Hon John Toohey AC

Volume I Outline Table of ContentsGeneral IntroductionGlossaryPrincipal Conclusions and Overall AssessmentThe Background to Bloody Sunday

This volume is accompanied by a DVD containing the full text of the report

Report of the B

loody Sunday Inquiry – Volume I

Published by TSO (The Stationery Office) and available from:

Onlinewww.tsoshop.co.uk

Mail, Telephone, Fax & E-mailTSOPO Box 29, Norwich NR3 1GNTelephone orders/General enquiries: 0870 600 5522Order through the Parliamentary Hotline Lo-Call: 0845 7 023474Fax orders: 0870 600 5533E-mail: [email protected]: 0870 240 3701

The Parliamentary Bookshop12 Bridge Street, Parliament Square,London SW1A 2JXTelephone orders/General enquiries: 020 7219 3890Fax orders: 020 7219 3866Email: [email protected]: www.bookshop.parliament.uk

TSO@Blackwell and other Accredited Agents

Customers can also order publications fromTSO Ireland16 Arthur Street, Belfast BT1 4GDTelephone: 028 9023 8451 Fax: 028 9023 5401 HC29-I

£572.00 10 volumes not sold separately

Return to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons dated 15 June 2010 for the

Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman) The Hon William Hoyt OC The Hon John Toohey AC

Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 15 June 2010

Volume I Outline Table of Contents General Introduction Glossary Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment

The Background to Bloody Sunday

This volume is accompanied by a DVD containing the full text of the report

HC29-I London: The Stationery Office £572.00 10 volumes not sold separately

Original content of the report © Controller of HMSO 2010�

The original content may be reproduced free of charge in any format or medium

provided that it is used accurately and not in a misleading context, and provided that the

title of the source publication is given and the copyright acknowledged.

Third parties may hold copyright in quotations and images which have been reproduced

in the report under section 46 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 and it

should not be assumed that any permission has been given for the further reproduction

of such material.

Lord Saville of Newdigate, William L Hoyt and John L Toohey have asserted, in

accordance with section 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, their right

to be identified as the authors of this work.�

ISBN: 9780102964608

Printed in the UK for The Stationery Office Limited

on behalf of the Controller of Her Majesty’s Stationery Office�

ID 2354501 06/10�

Printed on paper containing 75% recycled fibre content minimum�

Report of the Bloody Sunday Inquiry The Rt Hon The Lord Saville of Newdigate (Chairman) The Hon William Hoyt OC The Hon John Toohey AC

VOLUME I�

Page�

Outline Table of Contents 1�

General Introduction 15�

Glossary 19�

Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment 43�

The Background to Bloody Sunday 101�

1

Outline Table of Contents Thisoutlinetableofcontentssetsoutthevolumesandpartsintowhichthereportisdivided,withthechapter

numbersandtitleswithinthoseparts,andalsoliststheappendices.Inthecaseswhereitisnecessary,the

partsandchaptersthemselvescontainfurther,moredetailed,tablesofcontents.Theelectronicversionofthe

reportcontainsasearchfacility,enablingthereporttobesearchedforwordsandphrases.

VOLUME I�

General Introduction 15�

Glossary 19�

Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment 43�

Chapter1: Introduction 45

48

52

Chapter2: Outlineofeventsbeforetheday

Chapter3: Theeventsoftheday

Chapter4: Thequestionofresponsibilityforthedeathsandinjurieson

BloodySunday 90

Chapter5: Theoverallassessment 99

The Background to Bloody Sunday 101�


Chapter7: TheperioduptoJuly1971 105

Chapter8: TheperiodfromAugusttoDecember1971 142

Chapter9: TheweeksbeforeBloodySunday 214

2 THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY VOLUME I

VOLUME II

The Division into Sectors 1

Chapter10: Thefivesectors 1

Sector 1: Military Dispositions, the Civil Rights March and Events in William Street

Chapter11:

Chapter12:

Chapter13:

Chapter14:

Chapter15:

Chapter16:

Chapter17:

Chapter18:

Chapter19:

Chapter20:

Chapter21:

VOLUME III

3

Thelayoutofthispartofthecity 7

Militarydispositions 38

Theorganisationofthecivilrightsmarch 72

Thebeginningofthemarch 74

RiotingatBarrier14 81

Riotingatotherlocations 111

MachineGunPlatoonandAbbeyTaxis 129

TheshootingofDamienDonagheyandJohnJohnston 138

OthershootinginSector1 204

Armyordersrelatingtothearrestoperation 255

Sectors2to5 347

Sector 2: The Launch of the Arrest Operation and Events in the Area of the Rossville Flats (Chapters 22–54) 1

Chapter22: Generalintroduction 7

Chapter23: Thelayoutofthisareaofthecity 8

..\BSI_Report\BSI_VOLUME_II.pdf

..\BSI_Report\BSI_VOLUME_III.pdf

BSI_VOLUME_II.pdf#page=5














BSI_VOLUME_III.pdf#page=5



3 OutlineTableofContents

Chapter24: ThemovementofMortarPlatoonArmouredPersonnelCarriersinto

27theBogside

Chapter25: ThearrivalofLieutenantN’sArmouredPersonnelCarrier 50

Chapter26: TheevidenceofthesoldiersinLieutenantN’sArmoured

PersonnelCarrier 53

Chapter27: TheuseofbatongunsbyPrivate013andPrivate019 73

Chapter34: ThemovementofothersoldierswhodisembarkedfromSergeantO’s

Chapter36: Summaryofthemovementsofthesoldierswhodisembarkedfrom

Chapter28: TheincidentconcerningRosemaryDoyle 74

Chapter29: TheincidentconcerningPatrick“Barman”Duffy 85

Chapter30: SoldiersattheentrancetotheEdenPlacealleyway 91

Chapter31: OtherincidentsontheEdenPlacewasteground 131

Chapter32: ThearrivalofSergeantO’sArmouredPersonnelCarrier 137

Chapter33: ThearrestofWilliamJohnDillon 140

ArmouredPersonnelCarrierinRossvilleStreet 160

Chapter35: ThearrestofCharlesCanning 163

SergeantO’sArmouredPersonnelCarrierinRossvilleStreet 170

Chapter37: TheremainingsoldiersinSergeantO’sArmouredPersonnelCarrier 171

Chapter38: TheincidentconcerningAlanaBurke 180

Chapter39: TheincidentconcerningThomasHarkin 186

Chapter40: ThearrestofWilliamJohnDoherty 193

Chapter41: TheincidentconcerningPatCashman 204

Chapter42: ThearrestofJamesCharlesDoherty 207

Chapter43: ThetreatmentofDuncanClarkandWilliamJohnDohertyafterarrest 216






















Chapter44:

Chapter45:

ConclusionsonthetreatmentofthosearrestedinSector2 229

ThesituationintheEdenPlacewastegroundandthecarparkofthe

RossvilleFlats 230

Chapter46:

Chapter47:

Chapter48:

Chapter49:

Chapter50:

RiotingintheRossvilleFlatscarpark 233

Thequestionofnailandblastbombexplosions 255

ThecockingofriflesbyMortarPlatoonsoldiers 269

Thequestionofgunfiredirectedatthesoldiers 277

ThequestionoflowvelocitygunfiredirectedatMajorLoden

andothers 305

Chapter51:

Chapter52:

FiringbythesoldiersinSector2 340

Summaryoftheshotsandtargetsclaimedbythesoldiersof

MortarPlatoon 484

Chapter53:

Chapter54:

Summaryofthefiringsoldiers’evidenceofincomingfire 490

Generalsummaryandconsiderationoftheevidenceofthesoldiers

ofMortarPlatooninSector2 497

VOLUME IV�

Sector 2: The Launch of the Arrest Operation and Events in the Area of the Rossville Flats (Chapters 55–66)

Chapter55:

Chapter56: TheorderandpositionoftheknowncasualtiesinSector2

Chapter57: Evidencefromthesoldiersconcerningtheknowncasualties

Chapter58: OtherevidenceofparamilitarygunmeninSector2

Chapter59: WhentheSupportCompanyvehiclesmovedforward

ThecasualtiesinSector2

1

5

122

125

134

192

..\BSI_Report\BSI_VOLUME_IV.pdf












BSI_VOLUME_IV.pdf#page=5







Chapter60: Thequestionofunidentifiedcasualties 196

Chapter61: FiringbyasoldierinSector2observedbyCorporalINQ444 209

Chapter62: TheshootingpostureofthesoldierswhofiredinSector2 210

Chapter63: Civilianevidencerelatingtothepositiononthegroundofthe

soldierswhoshotthosehitbygunfire 220

Chapter64: ThesoldiersresponsiblefortheSector2casualties 249

Chapter65: CCompany 284

Chapter66: Arrestsat33ChamberlainStreet 360

VOLUME V

Sector 3: Events in Rossville Street 1


Chapter68: Thelayoutofthispartofthecity 7

Chapter69: Themovementofthesoldiers 33

Chapter70: TheactionsofciviliansinRossvilleStreetonandafterthearrival

oftheArmyvehicles 60

Chapter71: RioterscomingfromtheColumbcilleCourtalleyway 69

Chapter72: ThehighvelocityshotsheardbyCorporalPandPrivate017 73

Chapter73: TheinitialfiringbyCorporalP 74

Chapter74: Private017’sgunman 92

Chapter75: OtherevidenceofamanwithahandguninRossvilleStreet 97

Chapter76: OtherfiringofbatonroundsinSector3 108

Chapter77: TheinjurytoSeamusLiddy 113

..\BSI_Report\BSI_VOLUME_V.pdf








BSI_VOLUME_V.pdf#page=5













Chapter78:

Chapter79:

Chapter80:

Chapter81:

Chapter82:

Chapter83:

Chapter84:

Chapter85:

Chapter86:

Chapter87:

Chapter88:

Chapter89:

VOLUME VI�

TheinjurytoMarySmith 116

JosephLynnandtheincidentinthederelictbuilding 122

TheinitialmovementsofthesoldiersinSector3 131

FiringbyAnti-TankPlatoonsoldiersfromthelowwallsofthe

KellsWalkramp 137

Evidenceofsoldiersofgunmenatorfiringfromtherubblebarricade 169

Nailandpetrolbombs 196

FiringbyCompositePlatoonsoldiersfromthelowwallsofthe

KellsWalkramp 199

OthershootingbysoldiersinSector3 271

ThecasualtiesinSector3 311

ThequestionofunidentifiedgunfirecasualtiesinSector3 537

ThedamagetothesouthendoftheeasternblockofGlenfada

ParkNorth 604

ThesoldiersresponsiblefortheSector3casualties 625

Sector 4: Events in Glenfada Park North and Abbey Park

Chapter90:

Chapter91:

Chapter92:

Chapter93:

Chapter94:

Introduction 7

Thelayoutofthispartofthecity 12

Civilianevidenceofthesituationimmediatelybeforeandassoldiers

enteredGlenfadaParkNorth 18

ThemovementofsoldiersintoGlenfadaParkNorth 32

TherouteofthesoldiersintoGlenfadaParkNorth 47

1

..\BSI_Report\BSI_VOLUME_VI.pdf













BSI_VOLUME_VI.pdf#page=5







Chapter95: ThearrivalofCorporalE,LanceCorporalF,PrivateGandPrivateH

inGlenfadaParkNorth 61

Chapter96: ThemovementsandactionsofothermembersofAnti-TankPlatoon 63

Chapter97: ThesituationinGlenfadaParkNorthonthearrivalofthesoldiers 69

Chapter98: OthermilitaryevidenceoffiringinGlenfadaParkNorth 96

Chapter99: Summaryofthemilitaryevidence 102

Chapter100: Considerationofthesoldiers’evidence 105

Chapter101: CivilianevidenceofthesituationinGlenfadaParkNorthasthe

soldiersarrivedandopenedfire 112

Chapter102: CivilianevidenceofsoldiersfiringinGlenfadaParkNorth 145

Chapter103: Considerationofcivilianevidence 161

Chapter104: ThecasualtiesinGlenfadaParkNorth 166

Chapter105: Themovementsofthesoldiersaftertheinitialshooting 334

Chapter106: AbbeyPark–thelayoutofthispartofthecity 353

Chapter107: TheshootingandcasualtiesinAbbeyPark 356

Chapter108:EventsfollowingtheshootinginGlenfadaParkNorthandAbbeyPark 402

Chapter109: AccountsofothershootingatciviliansintheareaofSector4 445

Chapter110: ThequestionofunidentifiedcasualtiesintheareaofSector4 455

Chapter111: ParamilitaryactivityinSector4 491

Chapter112: ThesoldiersresponsiblefortheSector4casualties 573

Chapter113: ArrestsinSector4 591

Chapter114: PatrickO’DonnellandtheincidentatCityCabs 617






















VOLUME VII�

Sector 5: Events in the Area South of the Rossville Flats 1�


Chapter116: Thelayoutofthispartofthecity 5

Chapter117: ThemovementofpeoplethroughthegapbetweenBlocks2and3

oftheRossvilleFlats 30

Chapter118: ThecasualtiesinSector5 50

Chapter119: TheshootingfromGlenfadaParkNorth 162

Chapter120: ConclusionsontheshootingofthecasualtiesinSector5 267

Later Events in Sector 3 273�


Chapter122: ThebodiesofMichaelMcDaid,JohnYoungandWilliamNash 276

Chapter123: FurtherfiringinSector3 357

Chapter124: Thearrivaloftheambulancesandotherfiring 458

Gerald Donaghey and the Nail Bombs 511�


Chapter126: GeraldDonaghey’sbackground 523

Chapter127: GeraldDonaghey’smovementsontheday 525

Chapter128: Thesightingofnailbombs 534

Chapter129: Civilianevidenceabouttheaftermathoftheshootingof

GeraldDonaghey 540

..\BSI_Report\BSI_VOLUME_VII.pdf

BSI_VOLUME_VII.pdf#page=5



















Chapter130: Barrier20inBarrackStreet 555

Chapter131: TheRegimentalAidPostatCraigavonBridge 566

Chapter132: ThearrivalofCorporal150andGeraldDonagheyattheRegimental

AidPost 568

Chapter133: EventsafterthearrivalofCorporal150andGeraldDonagheyat

theRegimentalAidPost 570

Chapter134: EvidencefromRoyalUlsterConstabularyofficers 579

Chapter135: TheAmmunitionTechnicalOfficer,Captain127 607

Chapter136: RoyalUlsterConstabularyandRoyalMilitaryPolicephotographers 612

Chapter137: Otherwitnesses 617

Chapter138: Scientificevidence 621

Chapter139: Theexplosives 627

Chapter140: Thefeaturesofthenailbombs 631

Chapter141: ThebulletholeinGeraldDonaghey’sleftjacketpocket 639

Chapter142: Meansofignitingthenailbombs 645

Chapter143: ThestockinghoseinGeraldDonaghey’sjeanspocket 646

Chapter144: Otherallegedindicationsthatthenailbombshadbeenplanted 647

Chapter145: Conclusions 652

VOLUME VIII�

1Paramilitary Organisations and Activities on Bloody Sunday�


Chapter147: TheProvisionalIRA 27

















BSI_VOLUME_VIII.pdf

BSI_VOLUME_VIII.pdf#page=5




Chapter148: TheOfficialIRA 136

Chapter149: TheFianna 202

Chapter150: Paramilitaryfiring 252

Chapter151: Otherincidentsofparamilitaryfiringandtheresponseofsoldiers 253

Chapter152: Otherevidencesaidtoshowparamilitaryfiringwithinthefivesectors 322

Chapter153: Thequestionofautomaticgunfire 328

Chapter154: ConclusionsonparamilitaryactivitiesonBloodySunday 360

Fort George 361�


Chapter160: ThetreatmentofthearresteesescortedtoFortGeorgebythe

Chapter161: ThetreatmentofthearresteesescortedtoFortGeorgebymembers

Chapter156: ThedetentioncentreatFortGeorge 365

Chapter157: ThearresteestakentoFortGeorge 370

Chapter158: TheWilliamStreetarrests 375

Chapter159: ThetransferofarresteesfromtheBogsidetoFortGeorge 387

ProvostDetachment 399

ofCCompany 453

Chapter162: IdentificationofarresteesbysoldiersatFortGeorge 465

Chapter163: AllegationsofcomplicityonthepartoftheRoyalUlsterConstabulary 467

Chapter164:Conclusions 468



















OutlineTableofContents 11

Other Events and Matters 469

Chapter165: TheLodenListofEngagements 471

Chapter166: Theliveammunitioncount,spareroundsandmodifiedrounds 483

Chapter167: FiringfromtheCityWalls 522

Chapter168: ThefiringincidentconcerningGunnerINQ1255 539

The Senior Officers 541

Chapter169: MajorGeneralFord 543

Chapter170: BrigadierMacLellan 556

Chapter171: LieutenantColonelWilford 558

Chapter172: MajorLoden 580

VOLUME IX

Evidential Matters 1

Chapter173: TheRoyalMilitaryPolicestatementsandmaps 3

Chapter174: Thetrajectoryphotographs 67

Chapter175: Missingphotographsandothermaterials 86

Chapter176:TheprovenanceofthephotographofthesceneinGlenfadaParkNorth 100

Chapter177: TheNorthernIrelandCivilRightsAssociationstatementsandthe

Kevilletapes 105

Chapter178: Psyopsandmilitaryinformationactivity 117

Chapter179: Private027 137











BSI_VOLUME_IX.pdf

BSI_VOLUME_IX.pdf#page=5









Army and Police Communications 147�


Chapter181: ThehierarchicalnatureofArmycommunications 150

Chapter182: Signalinstructions 157

Chapter183: RadionetsoperatedbytheArmyinLondonderry 160

Chapter184: Observersonthe8thInfantryBrigadeneton30thJanuary1972 164

Chapter185: TheArmymonitoringofradionetson30thJanuary1972 166

Chapter186: CivilianmonitoringofArmyandRoyalUlsterConstabularyradio

transmissionson30thJanuary1972 176

Chapter187: Callsigns 181

Chapter188: Codewordsandnicknames 189

Chapter189: TheBID150radiolink 190

Chapter190: OthermeansofcommunicationusedbytheArmy 196

Chapter191: InterceptionofArmycommunicationsrecordedonBloodySunday 200

Chapter192: RoyalUlsterConstabularycommunications 205

The Constitutional and Legal Position of the Army in Northern Ireland 209�

Chapter193: TheconstitutionalpositionoftheArmyinNorthernIreland 211

Chapter194: ThelegalpositionofsoldiersinNorthernIreland 231

Chapter195: Thevalidityofregulationsconcerningsoldiersmadeunderthe

NorthernIrelandSpecialPowerslegislation 237

Chapter196: ThelawfulnessofthearrestsonBloodySunday 247




















OutlineTableofContents 13

VOLUME X

Appendix 1: Matters Relating to the Inquiry 1

A1.1: TheconductoftheInquiry 3

A1.2: RepresentationbeforetheInquiry 27

Appendix 2: Opening Statement, Principal Rulings of the Tribunal and the Decisions of Various Courts 37

Bibliography 539

BSI_VOLUME_X.pdf

BSI_VOLUME_X.pdf#page=5





15

General Introduction�On29thJanuary1998theHouseofCommonsresolvedthatitwasexpedientthatatribunalbe

establishedforinquiringintoadefinitematterofurgentpublicimportance,namely “the events on

Sunday, 30 January 1972 which led to loss of life in connection with the procession in Londonderry

on that day, taking account of any new information relevant to events on that day”.On2ndFebruary

1998theHouseofLordsalsopassedthisresolution.Withtheexceptionofthelast12words,these

termsofreferencearevirtuallyidenticaltothoseforapreviousInquiryheldbyLordWidgery(then

theLordChiefJustice)in1972.BothinquirieswereconductedundertheprovisionsoftheTribunals

ofInquiry(Evidence)Act1921.

InhisstatementtotheHouseofCommonson29thJanuary1998thePrimeMinister(TheRtHon

TonyBlairMP)saidthatthetimescalewithinwhichLordWidgeryproducedhisreportmeantthathe

wasnotabletoconsideralltheevidencethatmighthavebeenavailable.Headdedthatsincethat

reportmuchnewmaterialhadcometolightabouttheeventsoftheday.Inthosecircumstances,

heannounced:

“We believe that the weight of material now available is such that the events require re-examination.

We believe that the only course that will lead to public confidence in the results of any further

investigation is to set up a full-scale judicial inquiry into Bloody Sunday.”

ThePrimeMinistermadeclearthattheInquiryshouldbeallowedthetimenecessarytocover

thoroughlyandcompletelyalltheevidencenowavailable.Thecollection,analysis,hearingand

considerationofthisevidence(whichisvoluminous)havenecessarilyrequiredasubstantialperiod

oftime.

TheTribunaloriginallyconsistedofTheRtHontheLordSavilleofNewdigate,aLordofAppealin

Ordinary,TheHonWilliamHoytOC,formerlytheChiefJusticeofNewBrunswick,Canada,and

TheRtHonSirEdwardSomers,formerlyamemberoftheNewZealandCourtofAppeal.Before

theTribunalbeganhearingoralevidence,SirEdwardSomersretiredthroughillhealth.TheHon

JohnTooheyAC,formerlyaJusticeoftheHighCourtofAustralia,tookhisplace.LordSavilleacted

throughoutastheChairmanoftheInquiry.


The footnotes

Thefootnotesprovide,amongothermatters,referencestotheevidenceandsubmissionson

whichwehavebasedourviewsandfindings.Intheelectronicversionofthisreport,references

arehypertext-linked,sothatbyclickingonareferencethereadercanreferdirectlytotheevidence

orsubmissionunderconsideration.Wherephotographsarereproducedinthereport,wehavein

mostinstancesconsidereditunnecessarytogivethereference.Thereferencingsystemisthe

sameasthatusedduringthecourseoftheInquirytoidentifytheparticularmatterinquestion

fromthematerialsthatwerecollected,consideredandpublished,sothatthereadercanfollow

thereferencescontainedinthatmaterial.TheTribunalisoftheviewthatwithfewexceptionsthe

evidenceandsubmissionsrelatingtoBloodySundaythatweremadepubliclyavailableduringthe

courseoftheInquiryshouldcontinuetobeavailable,sothatthereportcanbereadinconjunction

withthosematerials,whichtothatendformpartofthisreport.Theelectronicversionofthereport

providesdirectaccesstothesematerials,whicharealsoavailablethroughtheInquirywebsite.1

Cross-referenceswithinthereporttootherpartsofthereportarealsofootnotedandhypertext-

linked.Cross-referencesaretochaptersortoparagraphswithinchapters.Thus,forexample,a

cross-referencetoparagraphs75–100inChapter9appearsasparagraphs9.75–100.

1 www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org

The ranks and titles of witnesses

ItshouldbenotedthatmanyofthesoldierswhogaveevidencetothisInquiryhadachievedoverthe

yearshigherrankthanthatwhichtheyhadheldinJanuary1972.Anumberofcivilians(forexample,

BishopDalyandSirEdwardHeath)werealsoknownatthetimeoftheInquirybydifferenttitlesfrom

thosebywhichtheyhadbeenknownin1972.DuringthecourseoftheInquiry,allwitnesseswere

addressedbythetitlesthattheyheldatthetimeatwhichtheygavetheirevidence.However,inthis

reportwerefertoallsuchwitnessesbytherankthattheyheldorthetitlebywhichtheywereknown

inJanuary1972.

Forthereasonsthatwegivebelow,manywitnessesweregivenciphersinordertopreservetheir

anonymityandthatoftheirfamilies.Wehavepreservedthatanonymityinthisreport.

http://www.bloody-sunday-inquiry.org

GeneralIntroduction 17

Legal representatives

InthecourseoftheInquiry,thefamiliesofthosewhowerekilled,thesurvivingcasualties,and

thefamiliesofthoseinjuredonBloodySundaywhohavesincediedwererepresentedbyvarious

differentcombinationsofcounselandsolicitors.Separateteamsofcounselinstructedbythe

TreasurySolicitorappearedonbehalfofonelargegroupandthreesmallergroupsofformer

andservingofficersandsoldiers,whileothermilitarywitnesseschosenottoberepresented.In

ordertoavoidunduecomplication,wehaveoftenreferredinthisreporttosubmissionsmadeby

“representativesofthefamilies”or“representativesofsoldiers”,withoutdistinguishingbetween

thedifferentgroups,althoughwherenecessarywehavebeenmorespecific.Furtherdetailsofthe

families,survivingcasualties,militarywitnessesandotherpartiesrepresentedintheInquiry,andof

theircounselandsolicitors,aregiveninAppendix1.

Anonymity

Withtheexceptionofanumberofseniorofficerswhogaveevidenceundertheirownnames,

militarywitnesseswhogaveevidencetotheWidgeryInquiryweregrantedanonymityinorderto

protectthemandtheirfamilies.Theygavetheirevidenceunderciphers,whichwerealphabetical

forthosewhosaidthattheyhadfiredliveroundsonBloodySunday(the“letteredsoldiers”),and

numericalfortheothers(the“numberedsoldiers”).Somepolicewitnesseswerealsogranted

anonymityforthepurposesoftheWidgeryInquiry.

AttheoutsetofthisInquirytherewascontroversyoverwhethermilitarywitnesses,otherthanthose

whoseidentitieswerealreadyinthepublicdomain,shouldbegrantedanonymity.Rulingsofthe

Tribunalthatingeneraltheyshouldnot,savewherespecialreasonsapplied,werequashedon

judicialreview.TheCourtofAppealinLondonheldthattheTribunalwasobligedtograntanonymity

tothosewhohadfiredliverounds.TheTribunalconsideredthattheCourt’sreasoningappliedalso

toothermilitarywitnesses,unlesstheiridentitieswerealreadyclearlyinthepublicdomain,and

ruledaccordingly.Whereappropriate,theciphersusedintheWidgeryInquirywereretained,with

theadditionofthesoldier’srankatthetimeofBloodySunday(forexample,CorporalAorSergeant

001).Militarywitnesseswhohadbeengivennocipherin1972wereidentifiedbyanumber

precededbytheirrankandthelettersINQ(forexample,SergeantINQ1).Militarywitnesses

sometimesreferredintheirstatementstoanothersoldierbyanincompletename,anickname,or

anamethatotherwisecouldnotbematchedtoanindividualidentifiablefromofficialrecords.In

thesecasestheInquiryreplacedthenamewithanumericalcipherprecededbythelettersUNK

(forexample,UNK1).

../BSI_Report/BSI_Appendix1.pdf


Someofthemilitarywitnessesin1972weregivenmorethanonecipher.Whilethishadthe

potentialtocauseconfusion,thisInquiryhadaccesstounredactedcopiesofthewitnessstatements

andwasabletoensurethattheywereallattributedtothecorrectwitness.

NopoliceofficersweregrantedanonymityinthisInquiry,althoughsomewerepermittedtogivetheir

evidencescreenedfromtheviewofallbuttheTribunalandthelawyersparticipatinginthehearings.

Successfulapplicationsforanonymitywerealsomadeonbehalfofanumberofotherwitnesses,

includingcertainSecurityServiceandArmyintelligenceofficers,whosecipherswerealphabetical

(forexample,OfficerA),andcertainwitnesseswhohadformerlybeenmembersoftheOfficialor

ProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy(OIRAorPIRA)orotherwisehadconnectionswiththerepublican

movement,whoseciphersconsistedofnumbersprecededbythelettersOIRA,PIRAorRMas

appropriate(forexample,OIRA1,PIRA1orRM1).

TheTribunalhadaccessinallcasestothenamesofthewitnesseswhogaveevidenceto

thisInquiry.

19

Glossary�Inthisglossaryweprovidebriefexplanationsofsomeoftheabbreviationsandterminologyusedin

thereport,orwhichappearinsomeofthedocumentsandotherevidencetowhichwerefer.Where

necessary,inthereportitselfweprovidefurtherdetailsof,inparticular,someofthesourcesof

evidenceandtheissuestowhichtheygaverise.Attheendoftheglossarywesetoutalistshowing

thehierarchyofArmyranksandtheabbreviationssometimesusedforthem.Cross-references

withintheglossarytootherentriesintheglossaryappearinitalics.

Acid bombs

Thesewerebottlesfilledwithacidoranothercorrosivesubstance,usedasanti-personnelweapons.

Actuality footage

WehaveusedthisexpressiontorefertofilmfootagetakenwhiletheeventsofBloodySunday

wereinprogress.TheactualityfootageavailabletotheInquiryincludesmaterialfilmedbytwo

cameramenfromtheBritishBroadcastingCorporation(BBC),twofromIndependentTelevision

News(ITN),onefromtheAmericanBroadcastingCompany(ABC)andonefromColumbia

BroadcastingSystem(CBS),aswellasafilmtakenfromanArmyhelicopter.Thereisalsoasmall

quantityofactualityfootagetakenbyamateurcameramen,includingWilliamMcKinney,whowas

shotdeadonBloodySunday.Someofthefilmfootagewaseditedforbroadcastingpurposes,

withtheresultthatthesurvivingmaterialisnotcompleteanddoesnotnecessarilyshoweventsin

chronologicalorder.

Aggro Corner

Thiswasaslangname,usedmainlybytheArmy,whichreferredtothejunctionofWilliamStreet,

RossvilleStreetandLittleJamesStreet,wheretroublehadoftenoccurredinthepast.

Anti-riot gun

SeeBaton gun.


APC

ArmouredPersonnelCarrier.TheHumberarmouredcarwasemployedroutinelyasanAPCby

theArmyinNorthernIreland.SeveralofthesevehicleswereusedonBloodySunday.Theywere

oftencalled“Pigs”,mainlybysoldiers,eitheronaccountoftheirappearanceorbecausetheywere

awkwardtodriveanduncomfortabletositin.Theywerealsofrequentlydescribed,usuallyby

civilians,as“Saracens”.However,thattermwasappliedinaccurately,sinceaSaracenwasanother

typeofmilitaryvehicle,whichwasnotusedonBloodySunday.

Thefollowingphotograph,takenbyRobertWhiteonBloodySunday,showsaHumberAPC.

Thefollowingphotograph,takenfromDavidBarzilay,The British Army in Ulster (Belfast:Century

Books,1978reprint),showsaSaracen.

Glossary 21

Army units

8 Inf Bde

8thInfantryBrigade.

39 Inf Bde

39thInfantryBrigade.

1 CG

1stBattalion,TheColdstreamGuards.

1 PARA

1stBattalion,TheParachuteRegiment.

1 R ANGLIAN

1stBattalion,TheRoyalAnglianRegiment.


2 RGJ

2ndBattalion,TheRoyalGreenJackets.

22 Lt AD Regt

22ndLightAirDefenceRegiment,RoyalArtillery.

Arrest report forms

WhenacivilianwhohadbeenarrestedbyasoldiercameintothecustodyoftheRoyalMilitary

Police(RMP),detailsofthearrest,includingthenamesofthesoldier,thearrestedcivilianandany

witnesses,andthenatureoftheoffenceallegedtohavebeencommitted,wererecordedonwhat

wasknownasanarrestreportform.Theformalsoincludedspaceinwhichtorecordthedate,time

andplaceatwhichthearrestedpersonwashandedovertotheRoyalUlsterConstabulary(RUC),

andfortheRUCtorecord,whereappropriate,thedateandtimeatwhichthearrestedpersonwas

chargedandwhetherheorshewaskeptincustodyorreleasedonbail.

Barry interviews

SeeSunday Timesinterviews.

Baton gun

Abatongunwasaweaponusedtofirebatonrounds,otherwiseknownasrubberbullets,forriot

controlpurposes.OnBloodySundaymanyofthesoldierswereequippedwithbatonguns.The

batongunwasalsoknownbyavarietyofothernames,including“anti-riotgun”,“RUCgun”,“rubber

bulletgun”and“Greenergun”.

Glossary 23

Thefollowingphotographsshowabatongun.

BID 150

In1972theArmyinNorthernIrelandhadaccesstoasecureradiosystem.Securecommunications

betweenabrigadeandabattalionunderitscommandcouldbeachievedusinganadaptedmilitary

radiotogetherwithapieceofencryptionequipmentcalledaBID150.InthisInquirytheterm“BID

150”wasoftenusedtorefertotheradioandtheencryptiondevicetogether.WhetheraBID150link

wasinusebetweenBrigadeHQandtheTacticalHeadquartersof1PARAonBloodySundaywasa

matterofdispute,whichweconsiderinthecourseofthereport.

Blast bombs

Blastbombswereimproviseddevicesthatconsistedofadetonatorandexplosivematerial.They

weredescribedbysomewitnessesasbeingcrudeanti-personneldevicesandlikelargefireworks

ornail bombsbutwithoutthenails.Wealsoheardevidencethattheycouldbemadewithalarger

quantityofexplosivesinordertobeusedtodamagebuildings.


Bloody Sunday Inquiry statements

InthecourseofthisInquiry,writtenstatementswereobtainedfromalargenumberofwitnesses,

includingcivilians,formerandservingsoldiers,priests,journalists,civilservants,politicians

andformermembersoftheIRA.Thevastmajorityofthesestatements(sometimescalled“BSI

statements”)weretakenbythesolicitorsEversheds,whowereretainedbythisInquiryforthis

purpose.Forthisreasonsomearealsosometimesreferredtoas“Evershedsstatements”.The

SolicitortotheInquiryandhisassistantsalsotookanumberofwrittenstatements,andafewwere

submittedbywitnessesortheirsolicitors.

Brigade HQ

Theheadquartersof8thInfantryBrigade,locatedatEbringtonBarracks,Londonderry.

Brigade net

ThiswastheradionetworkusedtoprovidecommunicationsbetweenBrigade HQandthe

headquartersofthebattalionsandotherunitsunderitscommand.Separateradionetworkswere

usedforcommunicationsbetweentheheadquartersofeachbattalionanditsconstituentcompanies.

Seealso Ulsternet.

Capper tapes

DavidCapperwasaBBCRadioreporterwhocoveredthemarchonBloodySunday.Hecarried

areel-to-reeltaperecorderonwhichherecordedhiscommentaryonthemarch.Othervoices

andsoundsarealsoaudibleontherecording.TheInquiryobtainedacopyoftherecordingand

arrangedforatranscripttobemade.

CS gas

Thisisatypeofteargas,whichcouldbefiredingrenadesorcartridgesasariotcontrolagent.

Glossary 25

DIFS

TheDepartmentofIndustrialandForensicScience.Thisdepartment,whichformedpartofthe

MinistryofCommerceoftheGovernmentofNorthernIreland,wasresponsiblefortheforensictests

carriedoutshortlyafterBloodySundayonhandswabsandclothingobtainedfromthosewhohad

beenkilled.Itwasalsoresponsibleformatchingtwobullets,recoveredfromthebodiesofGerald

DonagheyandMichaelKelly,toriflesfiredbysoldiersonthatday.

Donagh Place

Theseventh,eighthandninthfloorsoftheRossvilleFlatswereknownasDonaghPlace.

Embassy Ballroom

TheEmbassyBallroomwaslocatedonthewestsideofStrandRoad,closetothenorthern

cornerofWaterlooPlace.InJanuary1972theArmyoccupiedthetopfloorofthebuilding.Two

ObservationPosts(OPs)weresitedontheroof.OPEchogaveviewsofWilliamStreet,Little

JamesStreet,ChamberlainStreet,thewastegroundnorthoftheRossvilleFlats,andtheRossville

Flatsthemselves,includingtheroofs.OPFoxtrotoverlookedStrandRoadandWaterlooPlace.

OnBloodySundaymembersof11Battery22LtADRegtmannedboththeseOPs.

Eversheds statements

SeeBloody Sunday Inquiry statements.

Ferguson and Thomson interviews

LenaFergusonandAlexanderThomsonwereITNjournalistswhointerviewedanumberofformer

soldiersforthepurposesofaChannel4NewsinvestigationofBloodySunday,whichresultedina

seriesofbroadcaststransmittedin1997and1998.

Ferret scout car

TheFerretwasalightlyarmouredscoutcarwhichhadatwo-mancrew.OnBloodySunday,Support

Company,1PARAusedoneFerretscoutcar,onwhichaBrowningmachinegunwasmounted.

ThisweaponwasnotusedonBloodySunday.

Thephotographbelow,takenbyColmanDoyleonBloodySunday,showstheFerretscoutcarused

onthatday.


Garvan Place

Thefirst,secondandthirdfloorsoftheRossvilleFlatswereknownasGarvanPlace.

Gin Palace

Thevehicleinwhichthetacticalheadquartersof1PARAwaslocatedwascolloquiallyknown

astheGinPalace.

Greener gun

SeeBaton gun.

Grimaldi tape

SeeNorth tape.

Glossary 27

HQNI

HeadquartersoftheArmyinNorthernIreland,locatedinLisburn,CountyAntrim.

Humber armoured car

SeeAPC.

IRA

IrishRepublicanArmy.By1972thishadsplitintotwoseparateorganisations,theOfficialIRAand

theProvisionalIRA.InmanycaseswitnessesanddocumentsreferredsimplytotheIRA,without

differentiatingbetweenthesetwoorganisations.

Jacobson interviews

SeeSunday Times interviews.

Keville interviews

KathleenKevillewasinLondonderryinJanuary1972asaresearcherforafilmcrewmakinga

documentaryaboutNorthernIreland.Shehadmetmembersofthelocalcivilrightsorganisationon

apreviousvisittothecity.Shetookpartinthemarchon30thJanuary1972.Ontheeveningofthat

dayandintothenext,sherecordedtheaccountsofanumberofcivilianwitnessesonaudiotape.

Manyoftheserecordingswereusedtopreparetypedstatements,whichwerenotalwaysverbatim

transcriptsoftherecordingsandwerenotgenerallysignedbythewitnesses.TheInquiryreceived

alltheoriginaltaperecordingsfromKathleenKevilleandarrangedforthemtobefullytranscribed.

Inthisreport,whenreferringtowhatawitnesssaidasrecordedbyKathleenKeville,weusually

describethisasthewitness’s“Kevilleinterview”.

Keville tapes

SeeKeville interviews.


Knights of Malta

TheOrderofMaltaAmbulanceCorpsisanambulanceandfirstaidorganisationadministeredbythe

IrishAssociationoftheSovereignMilitaryOrderofMalta.SeveralmembersoftheDerryUnitofthe

AmbulanceCorpswereondutyatthemarchon30thJanuary1972andprovidedfirstaidservices.

TheywerereadilyidentifiableinthattheyworeeitherthedressuniformoftheAmbulanceCorps

(agreycoatandtrouserswithcap)oritsmedicaluniform(awhitecoat).Theywereoften,although

inaccurately,describedbywitnessesasKnightsofMalta.

L1A1

Thiswasthetechnicaldesignationforthe7.62mmself-loadingrifle.SeeSLR.

L42A1

Thiswasthetechnicaldesignationforthebolt-action.303inrifleconvertedtotake7.62mm

ammunition.SeeSniper rifle.

L2A2

Thiswasthetechnicaldesignationforstandardissue7.62mmNATOballammunition,whichwas

usedintheL1A1 SLRandtheL42A1 sniper rifle.

M1 carbine

TheM1carbineisasemi-automaticorself-loadingweaponthat,initsstandardform,comeswith

afixedwoodenstock.Itwascalibratedfora.30incartridge.Theweaponissometimesdescribed

asbeingofmediumvelocityalthoughsomewitnessestotheInquiryreferredtoitasahighvelocity

weapon.ThereisevidencebeforetheInquirytosuggestthatinLondonderryon30thJanuary

1972theOfficialIRApossessedatleastoneM1carbineandtheProvisionalIRAatleasttwo.

Theweaponwasnotissuedtoanysoldiers.

Glossary 29

ThefollowingphotographsshowanM1carbine.

Mahon interviews

PaulMahonisaformermemberofLiverpoolCityCouncilwhocompletedanacademicdissertation

ontheeventsofBloodySundayin1997.Thereafterheundertookfurthersubstantialresearchinto

thesubjectwiththebenefitoffundingfromanEnglishbusinessman.Inthecourseofthisresearch

heconductedalargenumberofrecordedinterviewsofwitnesses.Healsoco-operatedwithsome

ofthesolicitorsactingforthefamiliesofthedeceasedandforthewounded,andforatimewas

employedbythoseactingfortwoofthewounded,MichaelBradleyandMichaelBridge.Thegreat

majorityofthoseinterviewedbyPaulMahonwerecivilianwitnesses.

PaulMahonprovidedtheInquirywithbothaudiotapesandvideorecordings.TheInquiryarranged

forthetranscriptionoftheserecordedinterviews.


McGovern interviews

Jimmy(James)McGovernwasthescriptwriterofSunday,adramatisationofsomeoftheevents

ofBloodySunday.Theprogrammewasco-producedbyGaslightProductionsLtdandBoxTVLtd.

ItwasbroadcastonChannel4on28thJanuary2002tomarkthe30thanniversaryofBloody

Sunday.Inpreparingfortheprogramme,JimmyMcGovernandStephenGarganofGaslight

ProductionsLtdconductedaseriesofinterviewswithcivilianwitnessestotheeventsofBloody

Sunday.Theseinterviewswererecordedonaudiotape.Weweresuppliedwithtranscriptsofthese

interviewstogetherwiththerecordings.Inaddition,membersoftheproductionteamconducteda

numberofinterviewswithciviliansandformersoldiers,whichwerenotrecorded.Thenotesofthese

interviews,whereavailable,werealsoprovidedtotheInquiry.

Mura Place

Thefourth,fifthandsixthfloorsoftheRossvilleFlatswereknownasMuraPlace.

Nail bombs

Thesewereimprovisedexplosivedevicescontainingnailsasshrapnel.InNorthernIrelandinthe

early1970s,theuseofnailbombswasassociatedparticularlywiththeProvisionalIRA.Thetypical

nailbombusedatthattimewasasmallcylindricalanti-personneldevice,designedtobethrown

byhand,whichcontainedafuse,ahighexplosivechargeandaquantityofnails.Thesewere

sometimesinsertedintoanemptyfoodordrinkcan,butby1972ithadbecomemorecommonfor

thecomponentstobeboundtogetherwithadhesivetapethanforacantobeused.

Thephotographbelow,whichwasobtainedfromtheRegimentalHeadquartersoftheParachute

Regiment,showsanunexplodednailbombrecoveredduringorafterariotin1971.

Glossary 31

NCCL

NationalCouncilforCivilLiberties.NCCL,nowknownasLiberty,isacivilrightsorganisationbased

inLondon,towhichNICRAwasaffiliated.

NICRA

NorthernIrelandCivilRightsAssociation.NICRAwasfoundedin1967.Theorganisation

campaignedforcivilrightsandsocialjustice.

NICRA statements

OveraperiodthatbeganontheeveningofBloodySundayandcontinuedforseveraldays

thereafter,statementsweretakenfromalargenumberofcivilianwitnessesinaprocessco-

ordinatedbyNCCLandNICRA.Thestatementtakerswerevolunteers.Theyinterviewedwitnesses

andpreparedhandwrittenstatements,whichwereusuallysignedbyboththewitnessandthe

statementtaker.Typedversionsofthesestatementswerethenproduced.Thestatementsgathered


byNICRAandNCCLalsoincludedunsignedtypedstatementspreparedfromtherecordingsmade

byKathleenKeville(seeKeville interviews).WehavereferredtothestatementscollectedbyNICRA

andNCCLeitheras“NICRAstatements”,thetermbywhichtheyweregenerallyknownduringthe

Inquiry,or,whereappropriate,as“Kevilleinterviews”.

North tape

SusanNorthwastheassistantofFulvioGrimaldi,anItalianphotographerandjournalist.Sheand

FulvioGrimaldibothtookpartinthecivilrightsmarchonBloodySunday.SusanNorthcarrieda

taperecorder,whichsheusedtorecordsomeoftheeventsthatoccurredonthatday.TheInquiry

obtainedacopyofherrecordingandarrangedforittobetranscribed.Thetapeissometimes

referredtoasthe“Grimalditape”.

Observer galley proofs

TheObservernewspaperhadintendedtopublishasubstantialarticleaboutBloodySundayinits

editionof6thFebruary1972,butdidnotproceedbecauseofaconcernthatpublicationmightbe

regardedascontemptoftheWidgery Inquiry.However,thearticleexistedindraftformandthe

galleyproofshavesurvived.

OIRA

OfficialIrishRepublicanArmy.SeeIRA.

OP

ObservationPost.

Petrol bombs

Thesewereimproviseddevicesconsistingofabottlefilledwithpetrol(gasoline),withafuseofcloth

orsimilarmaterial,whichwaslitbeforethebottlewasthrown.

Pig

SeeAPC.

Glossary 33

PIRA

ProvisionalIrishRepublicanArmy.SeeIRA.

Porter tapes

JamesPorterwasanelectricalengineerandradioenthusiastwhohadbeenrecordingArmyand

RoyalUlsterConstabulary(RUC)radiocommunicationsinLondonderrysince1969.Heprovided

theInquirywithcopiesofanumberofhistapes,includinghisrecordingsoftransmissionsonthe

Brigade netandontheRUCradionetworkonBloodySunday.TheInquirymadetranscriptsofthese

recordings.

Praxis interviews

PraxisFilmsLtd,afilmandtelevisionproductioncompany,madeadocumentaryentitledBloody

SundaywhichwasbroadcastaspartofChannel4’sSecretHistoryserieson5thDecember

1991,afewweeksbeforethe20thanniversaryofBloodySunday.Inthecourseofresearching

andmakingtheprogramme,theproducerJohnGoddard,thedirectorandscriptwriterTonyStark

andtheresearcherNeilDaviesinterviewedalargenumberofcivilianandmilitarywitnesses.Neil

DaviesisaformermemberofSupportCompany,1PARA,althoughhelefttheArmyin1969and

neverservedinNorthernIreland.Itappearsthatnotalloftheresearchmaterialfortheprogramme

survived,buttheInquiryobtainednotesandtranscriptsofmanyoftheinterviews.

Pringle interviews

SeeSunday Times interviews.

RMP

RoyalMilitaryPolice.TheRMParetheArmy’sspecialistsininvestigationsandpolicingandare

responsibleforpolicingtheUnitedKingdommilitarycommunityworldwide.

RMP maps

The RMP statementstakenfromeachofthesoldierswhofiredliveammunitiononBloodySunday

wereaccompaniedbyamapmarkedintypescripttoshowthepositionofthatsoldieratthetimehe

firedandthelocationofhistargetortargets.InsomecasestheRMPstatementsofsoldierswho

didnotfireliveammunitionwerealsoaccompaniedbymapsmarkedtoshowrelevantlocations.


ItappearsthattheRMPmapswerepreparedafterthestatementsweretaken,fromtheinformation

giveninthestatements.ItalsoappearsthattheRMPmapswereneithercheckednorsignedbythe

soldiersmakingthestatements.

RMP statements

Itwasnormalprocedurein1972fortheRMPtoconductaninvestigationfollowinganincidentin

whichasoldierhadfiredliveammunition.BeginningontheeveningofBloodySunday,statements

weretakenfromthosesoldierswhoadmittedfiringshots.Inadditionanumberofstatementswere

takenfromothersoldiers.ThesestatementsweretakenpredominantlybymembersoftheSpecial

InvestigationBranch(SIB)oftheRMP.Thestatementswerehandwrittenonstandardstatement

formsfromwhichtypedversionswerethenmade.

Rodgers film

MichaelRodgers,anamateurcameraman,tookpartinthemarchon30thJanuary1972andused

acinecameratofilmsomeoftheeventsthatoccurredonthatday.Hisfilmfootagewaslater

transferredtoavideorecording,acopyofwhichwasprovidedtotheInquiry.

Rubber bullet gun

SeeBaton gun.

RUC

RoyalUlsterConstabulary.ThiswasthecivilianpoliceforceinNorthernIreland.Thepresentpolice

forceiscalledthePoliceServiceofNorthernIreland(PSNI).

RUC gun

SeeBaton gun.

RUC statements

OnandafterBloodySunday,RUCofficerstookstatementsfromanumberofwitnesses,including

severalofthosewhohadbeenwounded.RUCofficerswhohadbeenondutyinLondonderryalso

submittedreportstotheirsuperiorsofwhattheyhadthemselvesseenandheard.

Glossary 35

Saracen

SeeAPC.

Sayle Report

HaroldEvanswaseditoroftheSunday TimesnewspaperinJanuary1972.HeinformedthisInquiry

thatimmediatelyaftertheeventsofBloodySundayhesentgeneralreportersMurraySayleand

DerekHumphry,alongwithPeterPringleoftheSunday TimesInsightTeam,toLondonderry.At

somestagethatweekMurraySayle,DerekHumphryand(hethought)PeterPringletelephoned

intheirfindings.HaroldEvanstoldusthatthesefindingsranintotwodifficulties.Inthefirstplace,

thoseinchargeoftheInsightTeamwereconcernedastowhetherthesourceshadbeenexposed

tocloseenoughscrutiny.Theywerestronglyagainstpublishingwhatcametobeknownasthe

SayleReportasitstood.ThesecondconsiderationinHaroldEvans’mindregardingtheSayle

ReportwasthatLordWidgery,theLordChiefJustice,hadmadeitclearthathewouldregard

publicationduringhisinquiryasaserioushandicap,somuchsothathewouldregardsuch

publicationasacontemptofcourt.ThesetwoconsiderationsIedHaroldEvanstodecidenotto

publishthearticle,buttoconductanotherinvestigation,usingtheSunday TimesInsightTeam,led

byJohnBarry.TheSunday TimesprovidedthisInquirywithacopyoftheSayleReport.Seealso

Sunday Times interviews.

SLR

TheL1A1self-loadingrifle(SLR)wasthestandardissuehighvelocityrifleingeneralinfantryservice

intheArmyin1972.Itwasusedwith7.62mmL2A2ammunition.OnBloodySundaythemajorityof

soldierscarriedSLRs.

ThefollowingphotographsshowanSLR.


SMG

Sub-machinegun.SeeSterling sub-machine gunandThompson sub-machine gun.

Sniper rifle

TheL42A1sniperriflewasaboltaction.303inrifleconvertedtotake7.62mmL2A2ammunition.

OnBloodySundayasmallnumberofsoldierscarriedsniperrifles.

Thephotographsbelowshowasniperrifle.

Sterling sub-machine gun

TheSterlingwasalowvelocity9mmSMG.AsmallnumberofsoldierscarriedSterlingSMGson

BloodySunday.TheDerryBrigadeoftheOfficialIRAmayalsohavepossessedaSterlingSMG.

Glossary 37

ThefollowingphotographsshowaSterlingSMG.

Sunday Times interviews

IntheweekfollowingBloodySunday,journalistsfromtheInsightTeamoftheSunday Times

newspaperbeganamajorinvestigationoftheeventsofthatday.Theinvestigationcontinued

whiletheWidgery Inquirywassitting,andculminatedinthepublicationofasubstantialarticlein

theSunday Timeson23rdApril1972,fourdaysafterthereportoftheWidgeryInquiryhadbeen

presentedtoParliament.TheInsighteditor,JohnBarry,ledtheinvestigation.Heandtwoother

Insightjournalists,PhilipJacobsonandPeterPringle,interviewedalargenumberofwitnesses

inLondonderry,includingmembersoftheOfficialIRAandProvisionalIRA.TheSunday Times

providedthisInquirywithsuchmaterialfromtheInsightinvestigation,includingnotesandtranscripts

oftheinterviewsconductedbyJohnBarryandhiscolleagues,ashassurvivedinthenewspaper’s

archive.

Taylor interviews

PeterTaylorisabroadcasterandauthorwhohasmademanydocumentariesandwrittenseveral

booksabouttheconflictinNorthernIrelandsincehisfirstvisitthereonBloodySunday.He

conductedon-the-recordfilmedinterviewsofanumberofcivilianandmilitarywitnessesinthe


courseofmakingadocumentaryentitledRemember Bloody Sunday,whichwasbroadcastbythe

BBCon28thJanuary1992tomarkthe20thanniversaryofBloodySunday.Transcriptsofthese

interviewsweresuppliedtotheInquiry.

Thompson sub-machine gun

TheThompsonSMG isalowvelocityautomaticweaponalsocapableoffiringsingleshots.There

isevidencebeforetheInquirytosuggestthaton30thJanuary1972theOfficialIRAinLondonderry

possessedatleastoneThompsonSMGandtheProvisionalIRAatleasttwo.Theweaponwasnot

issuedtoanysoldiers.

ThephotographbelowshowsaThompsonSMG.

Trajectory photographs

AttherequestoftheWidgery Inquiry,aseriesofaerialphotographsoftherelevantareaof

LondonderrywascreatedinFebruary1972toillustratethetrajectoriesoftheshotsthatsoldiers

claimedtohavefiredonBloodySunday.Eachphotographwasmarkedtoshowthepositionsofthe

soldierandofhistarget,asthesoldierhaddescribedthem;thelineoffirebetweenthosepositions;

andinsomecasesthenumberofshotsthatthesoldierclaimedtohavefired.Oneormoreofthese

photographswascreatedforeachsoldierof1 PARAwhoacknowledgedthathehadfiredhisrifle

onBloodySunday.

Ulsternet

TheUlsternetwasaradionetworkusedbytheArmythroughoutNorthernIrelandatthetimeof

BloodySunday.Itprovidedthemainradiolinkbetweentheheadquartersofeachbrigadeand

theunitsunderitscommand.TransmissionsontheUlsternetcouldbemonitoredatHQNIbutthe

systemwasnotusedastheprimarymeansofcommunicationbetweenHQNIand8thInfantry

39 Glossary

Brigade headquarters. The Ulsternet was in use on Bloody Sunday as the Brigade net, providing

communications between 8th Infantry Brigade Headquarters at Ebrington Barracks and the units

under its command, including 1 PARA.

Virtual reality model

This was a computer simulation of the Bogside as it was in 1972, which was developed for use by

this Inquiry in order to assist witnesses in giving their accounts of what they had heard and seen on

Bloody Sunday. This was of particular assistance because the area has changed since 1972.

Widgery Inquiry

Following resolutions passed on 1st February 1972 in both Houses of Parliament at Westminster

and in both Houses of the Parliament of Northern Ireland, the Lord Chief Justice of England, Lord

Widgery, was appointed to conduct an Inquiry under the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act 1921

into “the events on Sunday, 30th January which led to loss of life in connection with the procession

in Londonderry on that day”. Lord Widgery was the sole member of the Tribunal. He sat at the

County Hall, Coleraine, for a preliminary hearing on 14th February 1972 and for the main hearings

from 21st February 1972 to 14th March 1972. He heard closing speeches on 16th, 17th and 20th

March 1972 at the Royal Courts of Justice in London. The Report of the Widgery Inquiry was

presented to Parliament on 19th April 1972.

Widgery statements

The Deputy Treasury Solicitor, Basil Hall (later Sir Basil Hall), was appointed as the Solicitor to the

Widgery Inquiry. For the purposes of that Inquiry, he and his assistants interviewed a large number

of witnesses and prepared written statements from the interviews. A smaller number of witnesses

submitted their own statements to the Widgery Inquiry, either directly or through solicitors. This

Inquiry obtained copies of all the Widgery Inquiry statements.

Widgery transcripts

Transcripts are available of all the oral hearings of the Widgery Inquiry. During those hearings,

witnesses were often asked to illustrate their evidence by reference to a model of the Bogside area

which had been made for that purpose. It is occasionally not possible to follow the explanation

recorded in the transcripts without knowing to which part of the model the witness was pointing.


ThisInquirytriedunsuccessfullytolocatethemodelusedattheWidgeryInquiry.Althoughthe

originalmodelappearsnottohavesurvived,itcanbeseeninthefollowingphotograph.

Widgery Tribunal

SeeWidgery Inquiry.

Yellow Card

EverysoldierservinginNorthernIrelandwasissuedwithacopyofacard,entitled“Instructionsby

theDirectorofOperationsforOpeningFireinNorthernIreland”,whichdefinedthecircumstances

inwhichhewaspermittedtoopenfire.ThiscardwasknownastheYellowCard.Allsoldierswere

expectedtobefamiliarwith,andtoobey,therulescontainedinit.TheYellowCardwasfirstissued

inSeptember1969andwasrevisedperiodicallythereafter.ThefourtheditionoftheYellowCard,

issuedinNovember1971,wascurrenton30thJanuary1972.

List of Army ranks

Thelistbelowshows,inorderofseniority,theArmyrankstowhichwereferinthisreport,together

withtheabbreviationssometimesusedforthem.LieutenantGeneralsandMajorGeneralsare

bothcommonlyreferredtoandaddressedsimplyasGeneral,andsimilarlyLieutenantColonelsas

Colonel.

Glossary 41�

Officers

FieldMarshal FM

General Gen

LieutenantGeneral LtGen

MajorGeneral

Brigadier

Colonel

MajGen

Brig

Col

LieutenantColonel LtCol

Major

Captain

Lieutenant

Maj

Capt

Lt

SecondLieutenant 2Lt

Warrant Officers

WarrantOfficerClassI WOI

WarrantOfficerClassII WOII

Senior non-commissioned officers Equivalent ranks

ColourSergeant C/Sgt StaffSergeant S/Sgt

Sergeant Sgt

Junior non-commissioned officers Equivalent ranks

Corporal Cpl LanceSergeant L/Sgt

Bombardier Bdr

LanceCorporal L/Cpl LanceBombardier L/Bdr

Soldiers

Private Pte

Equivalent ranks

Guardsman Gdsm

Gunner Gnr

Rifleman Rfn

43

Principal Conclusions and Overall Assessment

Contents Page

Chapter 1: Introduction 45

Chapter 2: Outline of events before the day 48

Chapter 3: The events of the day 52 Paragraph

Eventsbeforethearrestoperation 3.1

Thearrestoperation 3.14

ThecasualtiesintheBogside 3.27

Thesoldierswhoshotthecasualties 3.43

Whythesoldiersshotthecasualties 3.67

OtherfiringbysoldiersonBloodySunday 3.114

Thearrestofcivilians 3.120

Chapter 4: The question of responsibility for the deaths and injuries on Bloody Sunday 90

Paragraph

TheUnitedKingdomandNorthernIrelandGovernmentsandtheArmy 4.2

MajorGeneralFord 4.8

BrigadierMacLellan 4.13

LieutenantColonelWilford 4.15

MajorLoden 4.26

LieutenantN 4.30

Lieutenant119 4.31

Captain200andSergeantINQ441 4.32

TheNorthernIrelandCivilRightsAssociation 4.33

Chapter 5: The overall assessment 99

45

Chapter 1: Introduction�1.1

1.2

1.3

1.4

1.5

TheobjectoftheInquirywastoexaminethecircumstancesthatledtolossoflifein

connectionwiththecivilrightsmarchinLondonderryon30thJanuary1972.Thirteen

civilianswerekilledbyArmygunfireontheday.Thedayhasbecomegenerallyknown

asBloodySunday,whichiswhyattheoutsetwecalledthisInquirytheBloodySunday

Inquiry.In1972LordWidgery,thentheLordChiefJusticeofEngland,heldaninquiry

intothesesameevents.

Intheseopeningchaptersofthereportweprovideanoutlineofeventsbeforeandduring

30thJanuary1972;andcollecttogetherforconveniencetheprincipalconclusionsthatwe

havereachedontheeventsofthatday.Wealsoprovideouroverallassessmentofwhat

happenedonBloodySunday.Thisoutline,ourprincipalconclusionsandouroverall

assessmentarebasedonadetailedexaminationandevaluationoftheevidence,which

canbefoundelsewhereinthisreport.Thesechaptersshouldbereadinconjunctionwith

thatdetailedexaminationandevaluation,sincetherearemanyimportantdetails,

includingourreasonsfortheconclusionsthatwehavereached,whichwedonot

includehere,inordertoavoidunduerepetition.

TheInquiryinvolvedanexaminationofacomplexsetofevents.Inrelationtotheday

itself,mostoftheseeventswerefastmovingandmanyoccurredmoreorless

simultaneously.Inordertocarryoutathoroughinvestigationintoeventsthathavegiven

risetogreatcontroversyovermanyyears,ourexaminationnecessarilyinvolvedtheclose

considerationandanalysisofaverylargeamountofevidence.

Inadditiontothosekilled,peoplewerealsoinjuredbyArmygunfireonBloodySunday.

Wetooktheviewattheoutsetthatitwouldbeartificialintheextremetoignorethe

injured,sincethoseshootingincidentsinthemaintookplaceinthesamecircumstances,

atthesametimesandinthesameplacesasthosecausingfatalinjuries.

Wefounditnecessarynottoconfineourinvestigationsonlytowhathappenedonthe

day.WithoutexaminingwhatleduptoBloodySunday,itwouldbeimpossibletoreacha

properlyinformedviewofwhathappened,letaloneofwhyithappened.Anexamination

ofwhatprecededBloodySundaywasparticularlyimportantbecausetherehadbeen

allegationsthatmembersoftheUnitedKingdomandNorthernIrelandGovernments,

aswellasthesecurityforces,hadsoconductedthemselvesintheperioduptoBloody

Sundaythattheyboreaheavyresponsibilityforwhathappenedonthatday.


1.6� Manyofthesoldiers(includingallthosewhoseshotskilledandinjuredpeopleonBloody

Sunday)weregrantedanonymityattheInquiry,afterrulingsbytheCourtofAppealin

London.Wealsograntedotherindividualsanonymity,onthebasisoftheprincipleslaid

downbytheCourtofAppeal.Thosegrantedanonymityweregivenciphersinplaceof

theirnames.Wehavepreservedtheiranonymityinthisreport.

1.7� LondonderryisthesecondlargestcityinNorthernIreland.Itliesinthenorth-west,close

totheborderwiththecountryofIreland.TheRiverFoyleflowsthroughthecity.Thearea

ofthecitywithwhichthisreportisprincipallyconcernedliesonthewesternsideofthis

river,asdoestheoldwalledpartofthecity.Weshowthewesternpartofthecityand

certainimportantfeaturesastheywerein1972inthefollowingphotographandmap.

William Street

Rossville Flats

City Walls

Rossville Street

Glenfada Park North

Free Derry

Corner

Guildhall Square

Chapter1:Introduction 47

William Street

Rossville Flats

City Walls

Glenfada Park North

Free Derry

Corner

Rossville Street

Chapter 2: Outline of events before the day

48

2.1

2.2

2.3

2.4

LondonderryinJanuary1972wasatroubledcitywithadividedsociety,inatroubled

anddividedcountry.ThroughoutmuchofNorthernIrelandthereweredeepand

seeminglyirreconcilabledivisionsbetweennationalists(predominantlyRomanCatholic

andamajorityinthecity)andunionists(generallyProtestantandamajorityinNorthern

Irelandasawhole).IngeneraltermstheformerwantedNorthernIrelandtoleavethe

UnitedKingdomandunitewiththerestofIreland,whilethelatterwantedittoremainpart

oftheUnitedKingdom.

Thissectariandivide,asitwascalled,hadexistedforalongtime.Amongotherthings,

ithadledintheyearsprecedingBloodySundaytomanyviolentclashesbetweenthetwo

communitiesandwiththepolice,thentheRoyalUlsterConstabulary(RUC).Thepolice

hadbecomeregardedbymanyinthenationalistcommunitynotasimpartialkeepersof

thepeaceandupholdersofthelaw,butratherasagentsoftheunionistNorthernIreland

Government,employedintheirviewtokeepthenationalistcommunitysubjugated,often

bytheuseofunjustifiableandbrutalforce.

On14thAugust1969,aftertherehadbeenparticularlyviolentclashesbetweencivilians

andthepoliceinLondonderry,theauthoritiesbroughtintothecityunitsoftheBritish

Armyasanaidtothecivilpower,inotherwordstorestorelawandorder.TheBritish

ArmywasinthecityinthisroleonBloodySunday.

Therewasafurtherdimensionintheformofparamilitaryorganisations.Bythebeginning

ofthe1970stheIrishRepublicanArmy(IRA)hadsplitintotwoorganisationsknown

respectivelyastheProvisionalIRAandtheOfficialIRA.Theseparamilitaryorganisations

(oftenreferredtosimplyastheIRA,thoughtheyweredistinctorganisations)had

restartedacampaignofarmedviolence,inthebeliefthatonlybysuchmeanscould

NorthernIrelandbefreedfromwhattheyregardedastheyokeofBritishcolonial

dominationandbecomepartofaunitedIreland.Therewerealsothoseontheunionist

sideofthesectariandividewhoorganisedandusedarmedviolenceinthebeliefthatthis

wasrequiredtomaintaintheunionwiththeUnitedKingdom.

Thisfurtherdimensionmeantthatthesecurityforces,inadditiontotheirother

responsibilities,hadtodealwiththoseusingarmedviolence.

2.5

Chapter2:Outlineofeventsbeforetheday 49

2.6� ThesituationinLondonderryinJanuary1972wasserious.Bythisstagethenationalist

communityhadlargelyturnedagainstthesoldiers,manybelievingthattheArmy,aswell

astheRUC,wereagentsofanoppressiveregime.Partsofthecitytothewestofthe

Foylelayinruins,astheresultoftheactivitiesoftheIRAandofriotingyoungmen(some

membersoftheIRAoritsjuniorwing,theFianna)knowntosoldiersandsomeothersas

the“DerryYoungHooligans”.Alargepartofthenationalistareaofthecitywasa“nogo”

area,whichwasdominatedbytheIRA,whereordinarypolicingcouldnotbeconducted

andwhereeventheArmyventuredonlybyusinglargenumbersofsoldiers.

2.7� Thearmedviolencehadledtomanycasualties.Therehadbeennumerousclashes

betweenthesecurityforcesandtheIRAinwhichfirearmshadbeenusedonbothsides

andinwhichtheIRAhadthrownnailandpetrolbombs.Overthemonthsandyears

beforeBloodySundaycivilians,soldiers,policemenandIRAgunmenandbombershad

beenkilledandwounded;andatleastinLondonderry,inJanuary1972theviolence

showedfewsignsofabating.

2.8� InAugust1971theNorthernIrelandGovernment(withtheagreementoftheUnited

KingdomGovernment)hadintroducedinternmentwithouttrialofsuspectedterrorists;and

atthesametimehadimposedabanonmarchesandprocessions,givingasthereason

thattheformerwouldassistindealingwitharmedviolenceandthatthelatterwould

reducetheopportunityforviolentconfrontationsbetweennationalistsandunionists.

2.9� Thenationalistcommunityinparticularregardedinternmentwithouttrialwithabhorrence,

consideringityetanotherillegitimatemeansemployedbytheunionistGovernment.Both

nationalistsandunionistsexpressedoppositiontothebanonmarchesandprocessions.

2.10� Manypeoplewereinternedwithouttrial,almostwithoutexceptionCatholicsfromthe

nationalistcommunity.Overthefollowingmonthstherewereallegationsthatthoseheld

hadbeenmistreated,allegationsthatinsignificantrespectswereeventuallyfoundto

havesubstance.

2.11� ByJanuary1972theNorthernIrelandCivilRightsAssociationhaddecidedtodefythe

banonmarches.InparticulartheyorganisedamarchinLondonderrytoprotestagainst

internmentwithouttrial.ThiswasthemarchthattookplaceonBloodySunday.

2.12� Theauthoritiesknewoftheproposedmarchandthattheorganisershadplannedaroute

toGuildhallSquare(alsoknownasShipquayPlace),outsidethecityGuildhall,where

prominentpeoplewouldaddressthemarchers.Theauthoritiestooktheviewthatthe

securityforcesshouldpreventthemarchfromproceedingasplanned,fearingthatthis


floutingofthebanwouldunderminelawandorderandwouldbelikelytoleadtoaviolent

reactionfromunionists.Thisviewprevailed,notwithstandingacontraryviewexpressed

byChiefSuperintendentFrankLagan,theseniorpoliceofficerinchargeofthe

Londonderryarea,whoadvisedthatthemarchshouldbeallowedtoproceed.Themarch

wasexpectedtobetoolargeforthepolicetobeabletocontrolitthemselves,sothe

Armyshoulderedthemainburdenofdealingwithit.Theplanthatemergedwastoallow

themarchtoproceedinthenationalistareasofthecity,buttostopitfromreaching

GuildhallSquarebyerectingbarriersontheroadsleadingtoGuildhallSquare,manned

bysoldierswhowerestationedinthearea.Inthecircumstancesthatobtainedatthetime,

anddespitetheviewexpressedbyChiefSuperintendentLagan,itwasnotunreasonable

oftheauthoritiestoseektodealwiththemarchinthisway.

2.13 AtthebeginningofJanuary1972,MajorGeneralRobertFord,thenCommanderof

LandForcesinNorthernIreland,hadvisitedLondonderry.Hewroteaconfidential

memorandumtoLieutenantGeneralSirHarryTuzo,hisseniorandtheGeneralOfficer

CommandingNorthernIreland,inwhichheexpressedhimselfdisturbedbytheattitude

oftheofficerscommandingtheresidenttroopsandthatofChiefSuperintendentLagan.

Herecordedthattheyhadtoldhimthattheareaofdamageinthecitywasextending

andthateventhemajorshoppingcentrewouldbedestroyedinthecomingmonths.

Hereferredinparticulartothe“DerryYoungHooligans”asafactorinthecontinued

destructionofthecity,andexpressedtheviewthattheArmywas“virtually incapable”

ofdealingwiththem.Healsoexpressedtheviewthathewascomingtotheconclusion

thattheminimumforcerequiredtodealwiththe“DerryYoungHooligans”was,afterclear

warnings,toshootselectedringleaders.

2.14 Thesuggestionthatselectedringleadersshouldbeshotwasnotputforwardasameans

ofdealingwiththeforthcomingcivilrightsmarchoranyriotingthatmightaccompanyit.

2.15 Aspartoftheplanfordealingwiththemarch,whatGeneralForddiddowastoorderthat

anadditionalArmybattalionbesenttothecitytobeusedtoarrestriotersif,whichwas

expectedtohappen,themarchwasfollowedbyrioting.Initiallyheexpressedtheview

thatsuchaforcemightbeabletoarrestalargenumberofriotersandbythatmeans

significantlydecreasetheactivitiesofthe“DerryYoungHooligans”.

2.16 TothatendGeneralFordorderedthat1stBattalion,TheParachuteRegiment(1PARA),

whichwasstationednearBelfast,shouldtraveltoLondonderryandbeusedasthe

arrestforce.

Chapter2:Outlineofeventsbeforetheday 51

2.17� ThedetailedplanforcontrollingthemarchwastheresponsibilityofBrigadierPatrick

MacLellan,theCommanderof8thInfantryBrigade,whichwastheArmybrigadein

chargeoftheLondonderryarea.TheOperationOrder(forwhatwascalledOperation

Forecast)setouttheplanthatBrigadierMacLellanandhisstaffhadprepared.The

OperationOrderprovidedfortheuseof1PARAasthearrestforce,butalsomadeclear

inexpresstermsthatanyarrestoperationwastobemountedonlyontheordersofthe

Brigadier.

52

Chapter 3: The events of the day Contents

Paragraph

Eventsbeforethearrestoperation 3.1

Thearrestoperation 3.14

ThecasualtiesintheBogside 3.27

Thesoldierswhoshotthecasualties 3.43

Whythesoldiersshotthecasualties 3.67

OtherfiringbysoldiersonBloodySunday 3.114

Thearrestofcivilians 3.120

Events before the arrest operation

3.1� 1PARAarrivedinLondonderryonthemorningofSunday30thJanuary1972.Duringthe

morningandearlyafternoonLieutenantColonelDerekWilford,theCommandingOfficer

of1PARA,organisedthedispositionofhissoldiersinthecity.Inaddition,thesoldiers

stationedintheareaerectedbarricadesonthestreetsleadingtoGuildhallSquareand

mannedthosebarriers.

3.2� Wesetoutbelowamapshowingsomesignificantbuildings,thepositionofthethree

mostimportantofthebarriersandthenumbersthatweregiventothem.

Chapter3:Theeventsoftheday 53

North

Presbyterian church

Derelict building

(Abbey Taxis)

Barrier 12

Barrier 13

Barrier 14

Guildhall Square

(Shipquay Place)

3.3 ColonelWilfordplacedSupportCompany,oneofthecompaniesof1PARA,nearthe

PresbyterianchurchinGreatJamesStreet.Hisinitialplanwastosendsoldiersfrom

theredirectlysouthintoWilliamStreetifriotingbrokeoutintheareaandBrigadier

MacLellanorderedanarrestoperation.However,ColonelWilfordthenrealisedthatthere

werewallsthatmadeitdifficultforsoldierstomoveatanyspeedfromGreatJames

StreetintoWilliamStreet,soinordertoreducethisdrawbackheorderedtheCommander

ofSupportCompany(MajorEdwardLoden)tobereadytolocateoneofhisplatoonsina

derelictbuilding(oftencalled“AbbeyTaxis”afterataxifirmthatonceoperatedfrom

there)ontheWilliamStreetsideofthePresbyterianchurch.MajorLodenselected

MachineGunPlatoonforthistaskandsentthisplatoonforward.Weshowbelowa

photographinwhichwehaveidentifiedWilliamStreet,thePresbyterianchurchandthe

derelictbuilding.


William Street

Derelict building

(Abbey Taxis)

Presbyterian church

3.4� Meanwhilethecivilrightsmarch,manythousandsstrong,hadstartedintheCreggan

areaofthecityandmadeitswaybyacircuitousroutethroughthenationalistpartofthe

cityandintoWilliamStreet.Theorganisershadplannedforandadvertisedthemarchto

gotoGuildhallSquare,butatthelastmoment,knowingthatthesecurityforceswere

goingtopreventthemarchfromreachingthisdestination,theydecidedinsteadona

differentroute;sothatwhenthemarchreachedthejunctionofWilliamStreetand

RossvilleStreet,itwouldturnrightandgoalongRossvilleStreettoFreeDerryCorner

intheBogside,wheretherewouldbespeeches.Wesetoutbelowamapthatindicates

theoriginalandchangedroutesofthemarchandaphotographshowingthemarch

proceedingdownWilliamStreet.

Chapter3:Theeventsoftheday 55�

William Street

Central Drive

To the Guildhall

Rossville Street

Lecky Road

Original route of marchSouthway

Free Derry

Corner

Changed route of march


3.5 WhenthemarchreachedthejunctionofWilliamStreet,andRossvilleStreet,many

people,includingthosewhowereeagerforaconfrontationwiththesecurityforces,

insteadofturningrightintoRossvilleStreettogotoFreeDerryCorner,continuedalong

WilliamStreettotheArmybarrierthere,Barrier14.

To Barrier 14

Junction of

William Street and

Rossville Street

3.6� ShortlyafterthearrivalofpeopleatBarrier14,riotingbrokeoutthere,intheformof

membersofthecrowdthrowingstonesandsimilarmissilesatthesoldiers.Inaddition,

furtherback,similarriotingbrokeoutatthebarriersclosingLittleJamesStreetand

SackvilleStreet,Barriers12and13.Ascanbeseenfromthemapshownatparagraph3.2

above,LittleJamesStreetlednorthfromthejunctionofWilliamStreetandRossville

Street,ajunctionknowntosoldiersandsomeothersatthetimeas“AggroCorner”,

becauseithadfrequentlybeenanareaforriots.SackvilleStreetledeastfromLittle

JamesStreet.TherewasalsoriotingofasimilarkindfurtherwestalongWilliamStreet,

intheareawhereMachineGunPlatoonwaslocated.

3.7� Thesoldiersatthebarriersrespondedtotheriotingbyfiringbatonrounds(oftencalled

rubberbullets)andatBarrier12(andperhapsBarrier13)byfiringCSgas.AtBarrier14,

riotersthemselvesthrewacanisterofCSgasatthesoldiers,whilethesoldiersthere,in

additiontofiringbatonrounds,deployedawatercannonandsprayedtherioters(and

otherswhowerethere)inanattempttodispersethem.ThesoldiersatBarrier14(who

werefrom2ndBattalion,TheRoyalGreenJackets)actedwithrestraintinthefaceofthe

riotingatthisbarrieranddeployednomorethanproperlyproportionateforceinseeking

todealwithit.

3.8


Whilethisriotingwastakingplaceandatjustafter1555hours,ColonelWilford,whohad

takenupapositionclosetothePresbyterianchurch,sentaradiomessagetoBrigade

Headquarters(stationedatEbringtonBarracksontheothersideoftheRiverFoyle)in

whichhesuggestedsendingoneofhiscompaniesthroughBarrier14(thebarrieron

WilliamStreet)intotheareaofWilliamStreetandLittleJamesStreet(ietheareaofand

tothenorthofAggroCorner)onthegroundsthatbydoingsohemightbeabletoarrest

anumberofrioters.Wesetoutbelowamaponwhichweshowthisarea.

Aggro Corner

Little James Street

William Street

3.9� BrigadierMacLellan,whowasatBrigadeHeadquarters,didnotgiveanorderforan

arrestoperationuntilsomeminuteslater.

3.10� AtaboutthesametimeasColonelWilfordsentthismessage,twosoldiersofMachine

GunPlatoonfiredbetweenthemfiveshotsfromthederelictbuildingonWilliamStreet,

shownonthemapbelow.TheirtargetwasDamienDonaghey(aged15),whowasonthe

othersideofWilliamStreetandwhowaswoundedinthethigh.Unknowntothesoldiers

JohnJohnston(aged55),whowasalittledistancebehindDamienDonaghey,wasalso

hitandinjuredbyfragmentsfromthisgunfire.


3.11� ShortlyafterthisincidentamemberoftheOfficialIRA(giventhecipherOIRA1)fireda

rifleatsoldierswhowereonawallonthesideofthePresbyterianchurch.Theshotwas

firedfromapositionacrossWilliamStreet.Wesetoutbelowamapshowingtheareain

whichthesecasualtiesoccurredandthepositionfromwhichOIRA1fired.

Presbyterian church

Position from which Official IRA man fired

Derelict building

(Abbey Taxis) from

where the soldiers shot

Waste ground where

Damien Donaghey and John Johnston were shot

3.12� TheshotfiredbyOIRA1missedsoldiersandhitadrainpiperunningdownthesideofthe

Presbyterianchurch.OIRA1andanotherOfficialIRAmanwithhim(OIRA2)insistedthat

thisshothadbeenfiredasareprisalfortheshootingofDamienDonagheyandJohn

Johnston.Wewerenotconvincedofthis,althoughweconsideredonbalancethatthe

IRAshotwasfiredafterthewoundingofDamienDonagheyandJohnJohnston.Inour

viewthesetwoOfficialIRAmembershadgonetoapre-arrangedsnipingpositioninorder

tofireatthesoldiers;andprobablydidsowhenanopportunitypresenteditselfrather

thanbecausetwocivilianshadbeeninjured.

3.13

3.14

3.15

3.16

3.17

3.18

The arrest operation�


AtaroundthetimeoftheseincidentsColonelWilfordabandonedhisinitialplantosend

SupportCompanysoldiersfromGreatJamesStreetdirectlysouthintoWilliamStreetif

hegottheordertomountanarrestoperation;andinsteadtoldSupportCompanytobe

preparedtogoinvehiclesthroughBarrier12,thebarrierinLittleJamesStreet.

At1607hoursBrigadierMacLellangave1PARAordersbyradiotomountanarrest

operationbysendingonecompanyof1PARAthroughBarrier14inWilliamStreet,but

nottoconductarunningbattledownRossvilleStreet.Initscontext,theprohibitionon

conductingarunningbattledownRossvilleStreetmeantthatthesoldierswerenotto

chasepeopledownthatstreet.

BrigadierMacLellanhaddelayedgivinganorderforanarrestoperationbecause

hewascorrectlyconcernedthatthereshouldbeseparationbetweenriotersandpeaceful

marchersbeforelaunchinganoperationtoarresttheformer.Hegavetheorderwhenhe

hadreasonablegroundsforbelievingthattherewassuchseparationintheareafor

arreststhatColonelWilfordhadpreviouslyidentified.

ThisorderwasresponsivetotherequestmadebyColonelWilfordsome12minutes

earlier.Inotherwords,BrigadierMacLellanauthorisedthearrestoperationsuggestedby

ColonelWilford.ThesecondpartofthisorderreflectedBrigadierMacLellan’sanxietythat

thesoldiersshouldnotbecomemixedupwiththepeacefulmarchersfurtheralong

RossvilleStreet.

ThearrestoperationorderedbytheBrigadierwasaccordinglylimitedtosendingone

companythroughBarrier14inWilliamStreet,inanattempttoarrestriotersinthearea

ofandtothenorthofAggroCorner.

ColonelWilforddidnotcomplywithBrigadierMacLellan’sorder.Hedeployedone

companythroughBarrier14ashewasauthorisedtodo,butinadditionandwithout

authorityhedeployedSupportCompanyinvehiclesthroughBarrier12inLittleJames

Street.Aswedescribebelow,thevehiclestravelledalongRossvilleStreetandintothe

Bogside,wherethesoldiersdisembarked.TheeffectwasthatsoldiersofSupport

CompanydidchasepeopledownRossvilleStreet.Someofthosepeoplehadbeen

riotingbutmanywerepeacefulmarchers.Therewasthusnoseparationbetween

peacefulmarchersandthosewhohadbeenriotingandnomeanswherebysoldiers

couldidentifyandarrestonlythelatter.


3.19 ColonelWilfordeitherdeliberatelydisobeyedBrigadierMacLellan’sorderorfailedforno

goodreasontoappreciatetheclearlimitsonwhathehadbeenauthorisedtodo.Hewas

disturbedbythedelayinrespondingtohisrequesttomountanarrestoperationandhad

concludedthat,byreasonofthedelay,theonlywaytoeffectasignificantnumberof

arrestswastodeploySupportCompanyinvehiclesintotheBogside.Hedidnotinform

Brigadeofthisconclusion.Hadhedoneso,BrigadierMacLellanmightwellhavecalled

offthearrestoperationaltogether,onthegroundsthatthisdeploymentwouldnothave

providedsufficientseparationbetweenriotersandcivilrightsmarchers.

3.20 ColonelWilforddidnotpassontoMajorLoden(theCommanderofSupportCompany)

theBrigadier’sinjunctiononchasingpeopledownRossvilleStreet,nordidheimposeany

limitsonhowfarthesoldiersofSupportCompanyshouldgo.ColonelWilford’sevidence

wasthatitwasnotnecessarytodoeitherofthesethings,asheunderstoodtheinjunction

asprohibitinghissoldiersfromchasingriotersdowntoFreeDerryCornerorbeyondand

becausehissoldiersalreadyknewthattheyshouldnotgofurtherthanabout200or250

yardsfromtheirstartingpoint.ColonelWilfordshouldhaveunderstoodthathewasbeing

orderednottochaseriotersanydistancedownRossvilleStreet.

3.21 ThevehiclesofSupportCompanywentthroughBarrier12.Thetwoleadingvehicles,

whichwereArmouredPersonnelCarriers(APCs),heldsoldiersofMortarPlatoon.The

firstofthesevehicles(whichcarriedtheCommanderofMortarPlatoon,LieutenantN,and

othersoldiers)wentalongRossvilleStreetandthenturnedleftontoanareaofwaste

groundcalledtheEdenPlacewasteground,wherethesoldiersdisembarked.Beyond

thewastegroundwerethreehighblocksofflatsknownastheRossvilleFlats.Inthearea

partlysurroundedbytheseblockstherewasacarpark.Thesecondvehicle(underthe

commandofSergeantO,thePlatoonSergeantofMortarPlatoon)wentfurtheralong

RossvilleStreetthanthefirstvehicle,stoppedbrieflyonthatstreetwheresomeofthe

soldiersdisembarked,andthenturnedleftandstoppedintheentrancetothecarparkof

theRossvilleFlats,wheretheremainingsoldiersdisembarked.Thiswasabout230yards

fromBarrier12.Wesetoutbelowamapshowingtheroutethesevehiclestookand

photographsshowingthepositionstheyreached,whichwereinthatpartofthe“nogo”

areaofthecitycalledtheBogside.


Approximate point at which Sergeant O’s APC stopped

briefly on Rossville Street

Route of Lieutenant N’s APC

Route of Sergeant O’s APC


Lieutenant N’s APC

Rossville Street

Block 1 of the

Rossville Flats

Sergeant O’s APC


3.22� ManycivilianswereintheareaoftheEdenPlacewastegroundandthecarparkofthe

RossvilleFlatswhenthevehiclesofSupportCompanydroveintotheBogside.Onseeing

theArmyvehiclesthesepeoplestartedtorunaway.Shortlybeforeitstoppedinthecar

parkoftheRossvilleFlatsthevehicleunderthecommandofSergeantOstrucktwo

people,AlanaBurkeandThomasHarkin.Thiswasnotdonedeliberately.

3.23� Ondisembarkingsoldiersfiredbatonroundsandsomesoughttomakearrests.Only

sixarrestsweremadeinthisareaasthepeopletherewhenthevehiclesarrived

rapidlydispersed.

3.24� AfterdisembarkingLieutenantNwenttowardsanalleywaythatledfromtheEdenPlace

wastegroundintoChamberlainStreet,whichwasastreettotheeastoftheEdenPlace

wastegroundthatranparalleltoRossvilleStreet.Thealleywayisshowninthefollowing

photograph.

Alleyway leading from the Eden Place waste ground into Chamberlain Street

Chamberlain Street

Site of road known as

Eden Place

Eden Place waste ground

3.25� Shortlyafterarrivingattheentrancetothealleyway,LieutenantNfiredtworoundsfrom

hisrifleovertheheadsofpeoplewhowereinthealleywayorinChamberlainStreetat

theendofthealleywayandsoonafterwardsfiredathirdroundinthesamedirection.

ThesepeoplehadcomefromtheareaaroundBarrier14inWilliamStreet.Someofthem

hadbeenattemptingtorescueamanwhohadbeenarrestedbyoneofthesoldierswith

LieutenantNandsomewerethrowingstonesandsimilarmissilesatthesoldiers.


3.26� TheshotsfiredbyLieutenantNhitbuildings,butinjuredno-one.Thesewerethefirstrifle

shotsfiredintheareaaftersoldiershadgoneintotheBogside.LieutenantN’sevidence

wasthathebelievedthathisshotsweretheonlywayofpreventingthecrowdfrom

attackinghimandthesoldierswithhim.Wedonotacceptthatevidence.Inourview

LieutenantNprobablyfiredtheseshotsbecausehedecidedthatthiswouldbean

effectivewayoffrighteningthepeopleandmovingthemon,andnotbecausehe

consideredthattheyposedsuchathreattohimortheothersoldiersthatfiringhisrifle

wastheonlyoptionopentohim.Inourviewthisuseofhisweaponcannotbejustified.

The casualties in the Bogside

3.27� SoonafterLieutenantNhadfiredhisshotsupthealleyway,soldiersofMortarPlatoon

openedfirewiththeirriflesintheareaofthecarparkoftheRossvilleFlats.Inthatcar

parkJackieDuddy(aged17)wasshotandmortallywounded,whileMargaretDeery

(aged38),MichaelBridge(aged25)andMichaelBradley(aged22)werewounded,allby

Armyriflefire.InadditionPiusMcCarron(agedabout30)andPatrickMcDaid(aged24)

sufferedinjuriesfromflyingdebriscausedbyArmyriflefire.PatrickBrolly(aged40)was

inoneoftheRossvilleFlatsandwasprobablyinjuredbyorastheresultofArmyriflefire.

3.28� Wesetoutbelowadiagramshowingwherethesecasualtiesoccurred.

4

6


1

Casualty who was killed or mortally wounded in the car park of the Rossville Flats

Jackie Duddy

2

3

4

Margaret Deery

Patrick Brolly

Michael Bridge

5 Michael Bradley

6 Pius McCarron

7 Patrick McDaid

Casualties who were wounded in this area

3.29� VehiclescarryingtheCommanderofSupportCompany,MajorLoden,andtwoplatoons,

Anti-TankPlatoonandCompositePlatoon,hadfollowedMortarPlatoonofSupport

CompanyintotheBogside.Anti-TankPlatoonwasoneoftheregularplatoonsofSupport

CompanyandwascommandedbyLieutenant119.CompositePlatoonwasaplatoon

thatwasonthedayattachedtoSupportCompanyandwasunderthecommandof

Captain200.


3.30 ThesesoldiersdisembarkedinRossvilleStreet.MostofthesoldiersofMachineGun

PlatoonremainedatthisstageinthederelictbuildingonWilliamStreet.

3.31 Ashorttimeafterdisembarking,andwhileeventswereunfoldinginthecarparkofthe

RossvilleFlats,soldiersofAnti-TankPlatoonreachedthelowwallsofarampatthe

southernendofablockofflatsnamedKellsWalk,onthewesternsideofRossville

Street.Soldiersatthatrampthenopenedfirewiththeirrifles.Oneoftheseshotshitand

mortallywoundedMichaelKelly(aged17)whowassome80yardsfurthersouthbehinda

rubblebarricadethathadbeenerectedbyciviliansacrossRossvilleStreetbeforeBloody

Sunday.Wesetoutbelowamapshowingthesepositions.

Glenfada Park North

Low walls of Kells Walk pramramp

Rubble barricade

3.32� SoonaftercivilianshadcarriedMichaelKellyawayfromtherubblebarricade,soldiersin

RossvilleStreetfiredatandmortallywoundedfivemorepeopleatorinthevicinityofthat

barricade.TheywereHughGilmour(aged17),WilliamNash(aged19),JohnYoung

(aged17),MichaelMcDaid(aged20)andKevinMcElhinney(aged17).Inaddition

AlexanderNash(aged52)washitandinjuredbyArmygunfireafterhehadgonetothe

rubblebarricadetotendhissonWilliamNash.Wesetoutbelowamapshowingthe

positionswhereitappearsthatthesecasualtiesoccurred.Themapalsoshowswhere

MichaelKellyhadbeenshotearlier.

2

3

6

1

1

54


Casualties who were killed or mortally wounded in the area of the rubble barricade

1 Michael Kelly

2 Hugh Gilmour. The precise position at which this casualty was shot is unknown.

3, 4 and 5 Michael McDaid, William Nash and John Young. William Nash was in the middle of the three but the precis e position of these casualties at the rubble barricade is not known.

6 Kevin McElhinney

Casualty who was wounded in this area

1 Alexander Nash

3.33� Afterthisfiringhadbegun,soldiersofAnti-TankPlatoonmovedforwardfromthelow

wallsoftheKellsWalkrampandfourofthemwentintoGlenfadaParkNorth,aresidential

buildingcomplexthatlaytothewestofRossvilleStreet,whichisalsoshownonthismap.


3.34 InGlenfadaParkNorthwereanumberofcivilians,manyfleeingandseekingrefugefrom

thesoldiers.

3.35 Withinafewsecondsafterarriving,thefoursoldierswhohadgoneintoGlenfadaPark

NorthbetweenthemshotandmortallywoundedWilliamMcKinney(aged26)andJim

Wray(aged22);andshotandinjuredJoeFriel(aged20),MichaelQuinn(aged17),Joe

Mahon(aged16)andPatrickO’Donnell(aged41).JimWraywasshottwice,thesecond

timeprobablyashelaymortallywoundedontheground.Wesetoutbelowtwodiagrams

showingtheareaofGlenfadaParkNorthwherethesecasualtiesoccurred.Acivilian,

DanielGillespie(aged32),mayalsohavebeenslightlyinjuredbyorastheresultofArmy

riflefireinGlenfadaParkNorth,butthisisfarfromcertain.

1

2

Casualties who were killed or mortally wounded in Glenfada Park North

1 Jim Wray

2 William McKinney

1 2

3 4


Casualties who were wounded in Glenfada Park North

1 Michael Quinn 3 Joe Mahon

2 Joe Friel 4 Patrick O'Donnell

3.36� OneofthesesoldiersthenwentfromGlenfadaParkNorthtoAbbeyPark,another

residentialareawhichliestothewestofGlenfadaParkNorth,asshowninthe

followingphotograph.


Abbey Park

Glenfada Park South

Glenfada Park North

Rossville Street

3.37� InAbbeyParkthissoldiershotandmortallywoundedGerardMcKinney(aged35).His

shotpassedthroughthiscasualtyandalsomortallywoundedGeraldDonaghey(aged

17).WesetoutbelowamapshowingtheareaofAbbeyParkwherethesecasualties

occurred.

2

1

Abbey Park


Casualties who were killed or mortally wounded in Abbey Park

1 Gerard McKinney

2 Gerald Donaghey

3.38� SoonaftertheshootingsinRossvilleStreet,GlenfadaParkNorthandAbbeyPark,some

ofthesoldierswhohadbeeninGlenfadaParkNorthwenttoitssouth-eastcorner,where

therewasaroadentrancetoRossvilleStreet,asshowninthefollowingphotograph.


Glenfada Park North

Entrance to Rossville

Street

3.39� FromthispositionandagainoveraveryshortperiodoftimetherewasArmygunfire

acrossRossvilleStreet.ThisgunfirehitBernardMcGuigan(aged41)andPatrickDoherty

(aged32),instantlykillingtheformerandmortallywoundingthelatter.InadditionPatrick

Campbell(aged53)andDanielMcGowan(aged37)werewounded.Allthesecasualties

occurredinapedestrianisedareabetweentheJosephPlaceflatsandthefront(southern)

sideofBlock2oftheRossvilleFlats,asshownonthefollowingmap.

1

1

2

2


1

2

Casualties who were killed or mortally wounded between Joseph Place and the Rossville Flats Patrick Doherty

Bernard McGuigan

1

2

Casualties who were wounded in this area Patrick Campbell

Daniel McGowan

3.40� AlthoughtherewaslaterfiringbysoldiersinRossvilleStreet,thepeopleshotonthefront

(southern)sideoftheRossvilleFlatswerethelastcivilianstobeshotbythesoldierswho

hadgoneintotheBogside.

3.41� Onlysometenminuteselapsedbetweenthetimesoldiersmovedinvehiclesintothe

Bogsideandthetimethelastofthecivilianswasshot.


3.42� TherewasotherfiringbythesoldiersofSupportCompany(includingsoldiersof

CompositePlatoon)aftertheyhadgoneintotheBogside,whichdidnotresultindeathor

injury;butwhichformedanimportantpartoftheeventsofthedayandwhichweconsider

inthisreport.Inall,soldiersofSupportCompanyfiredover100roundsaftertheyhad

goneintotheBogside.

The soldiers who shot the casualties

3.43� WehavenodoubtthatsoldiersofSupportCompanywereresponsibleforallthegunfire

casualtiesthatwehavedescribedabove,usingtheirhighvelocityself-loading7.62mm

Armyrifles,knownasSLRs.Aswillbeseen,insomecaseswearesureoftheidentityof

thesoldierorsoldiersconcerned,whileinothercasesouridentificationsarelesscertain.

3.44� ThefirstgunfirecasualtyofthedaywasDamienDonaghey,whowasonapatchofwaste

groundimmediatelysouthofWilliamStreet.Hewashitinthethigh,eitherbyoneoftwo

shotsfiredbyCorporalAoroneofthreeshotsfiredbyPrivateB,bothsoldiersof

MachineGunPlatoon.Thetwosoldiersfiredtheirshotsfromthederelictbuildingmore

orlesssimultaneouslyinasingleburstoffire.Alltheseshotswereaimedandfiredat

DamienDonaghey.

3.45� UnknowntoCorporalAorPrivateB,fragmentsfromoneormoreoftheseshotshitand

injuredJohnJohnston,whowasonthesamepatchofwasteground.

3.46� ThefirstcasualtyofgunfireaftersoldiershadgoneintotheBogsidewasJackieDuddy,

whowasshotandmortallywoundedonthewesternsideoftheRossvilleFlatscarpark.

3.47� InourviewPrivateRofMortarPlatoonwasprobablythesoldierwhoaimedatandshot

JackieDuddy.ThissoldierhaddisembarkedfromSergeantO’sAPCinRossvilleStreet,

butthenranafterthisvehicleasitcontinuedintotheentrancetothecarparkofthe

RossvilleFlats,beforehefiredatJackieDuddy.

3.48� SoonafterJackieDuddywasshotLanceCorporalVofMortarPlatoon,whohadmoved

towardsthecarparkoftheRossvilleFlatsafterdisembarkingfromLieutenantN’sAPC,

firedhisrifle.ThisshotwasprobablytheonethathitMargaretDeeryinthethigh.Atthe

timethiscasualtywasnearthesouthernendofthewallatthebackofthegardensofthe

housesonthewesternsideofChamberlainStreet.

3.49� MichaelBridgewasinjuredafterMargaretDeery.Hewasshotinthethighwhenhewas

ashortdistancefromSergeantO’svehicleinthecarparkoftheRossvilleFlats.


3.50 ItisprobablethatitwasLieutenantN,theCommanderofMortarPlatoon,whoaimedat

andshotMichaelBridge.ThisofficerhadmovedtowardsthecarparkoftheRossville

FlatsfromhisAPCintheEdenPlacewastegroundbeforehefired.

3.51 MichaelBradleywasshotwhenhewasonthesouthernsideoftheRossvilleFlats

carpark.ItisprobablethatitwasPrivateQofMortarPlatoonwhoaimedatandshot

MichaelBradley,fromapositionneartothenorthernendofBlock1oftheRossvilleFlats.

3.52 PatrickMcDaidandPiusMcCarronwereinjuredbydebrissentflyingbyshotsfired

astheywereattemptingtorunawayfromthesouth-easternareaoftheRossvilleFlats

carpark.

3.53 Wecannotdeterminepreciselywhichsoldierorsoldiersfiredtheseshotsbeyondsaying

thatitwasoneormoreofSergeantO,PrivateRandPrivateS,allofMortarPlatoon.

3.54 AlthoughhedidnotaimatPatrickBrolly,PrivateTofMortarPlatoonwasprobably

responsiblefortheshotthatdirectlyorindirectlyinjuredthiscasualty,whowasinBlock1

oftheRossvilleFlats.However,wecannoteliminatethepossibilitythatPrivateSrather

thanPrivateTwasresponsible.PatrickBrollywasinjuredafterJackieDuddywasshot

butbeforethelatterhadbeencarriedfromthecarpark.

3.55 Wearesurethatshortlyafterhedisembarkedfromhisvehicleandwhileeventswere

unfoldinginthecarparkoftheRossvilleFlats,LanceCorporalFofAnti-TankPlatoon

firedfromthelowwallsoftheKellsWalkrampandmortallyinjuredMichaelKelly,who

wasbehindtherubblebarricadeinRossvilleStreet.

3.56 AfterMichaelKellyhadbeenshot,WilliamNash,JohnYoungandMichaelMcDaidwere

shotandkilledattherubblebarricade.WearesurethatCorporalPofMortarPlatoon,

whohaddisembarkedfromSergeantO’sAPCinRossvilleStreet,shotatleastoneof

thesecasualtiesandmayhavebeenresponsibleforallthree,thoughLanceCorporalJ

ofAnti-TankPlatoonmayhaveshotoneofthemandwecannoteliminatethepossibility

thatCorporalEwasresponsibleforanother.CorporalPfiredfromapositioninRossville

StreetnorthoftherubblebarricadeandsouthofthelowwallsoftheKellsWalkramp;

whileLanceCorporalJandCorporalEfiredfromapositionatthatramp.

3.57 WearesurethatPrivateU,amemberofMortarPlatoonwhohadtakenupapositionat

thenorthernendofBlock1oftheRossvilleFlats,firedatandmortallywoundedHugh

Gilmourasthelatterwasrunningsouth(ieawayfromthesoldiers)alongtheRossville

StreetsideofBlock1oftheRossvilleFlats.


3.58 WearesurethateitherPrivateLorPrivateM,membersofCompositePlatoonwhohad

takenuppositionsatthelowwallsoftheKellsWalkramp,shotKevinMcElhinneyashe

wascrawlingsouthfromtherubblebarricadeawayfromthesoldiers.Bothprobablyfired

athimontheordersofoneorperhapstwonearbynon-commissionedofficers,Colour

Sergeant002andCorporal039.

3.59 ItispossiblethateitherCorporalPorLanceCorporalJwasresponsibleforfiringatand

injuringAlexanderNash.Thesesoldierswereinpositionssomewherenorthoftherubble

barricadeandsouthofthelowwallsoftheKellsWalkramp.However,thereisinsufficient

evidencetomakeanyfindingagainsteitherofthesesoldiersonthismatter.

3.60 ThefoursoldierswhomovedfromthelowwallsoftheKellsWalkrampintoGlenfada

ParkNorthwereCorporalE,LanceCorporalF,PrivateGandPrivateH.Allwere

membersofAnti-TankPlatoonandallfiredtheirriflesinGlenfadaParkNorth.

3.61 Wearesurethatthesefoursoldierswerebetweenthemresponsibleforthecasualties

inGlenfadaParkNorth.ItisprobablethatCorporalEwasresponsiblefortheshotthat

injuredPatrickO’Donnell.Itisnotpossibletoidentifywhichparticularsoldiersshotthe

othercasualties.However,weconsideritmorelikelythannotthateitherLanceCorporalF

orPrivateHfiredtheshotthatmortallywoundedWilliamMcKinney;thatoneorotherof

thesesoldierswasresponsiblefortheshotthatwoundedJoeMahon;thateitherPrivateG

orPrivateHfiredtheshotthatwoundedMichaelQuinn;thateitherLanceCorporalF

orPrivateGfiredtheshotthatwoundedJoeFriel;andthateitherPrivateGorPrivateH

firedthefirstshottohitJimWray.JoeMahonwasprobablywoundedbyashotthathad

firsthitWilliamMcKinney.ItisnotclearwhetherJoeFrielandMichaelQuinnwere

specificallytargeted,orwerehitbyshotsfiredindiscriminatelyatthepeoplewhowere

inthesouth-westcornerofGlenfadaParkNorth.Alltheseshotswerefiredfromthe

northernsideofGlenfadaParkNorthwithinaveryshorttimeofeachother.Allthe

casualtieswereonthesouthernsideofGlenfadaParkNorth,about40yardsfrom

thesoldiers.

3.62 ThecircumstancesinwhichDanielGillespiewasinjuredaresoconfusedthatitisnot

possibletoidentifythesoldierorsoldierswhomighthavebeenresponsibleforhisinjury,

whichwasslight.

3.63 Aswehavesaid,JimWraywasshottwice,thesecondtimeprobablywhenhewaslying

mortallywoundedontheground.ItisprobablethateitherPrivateGorPrivateHfiredthis

secondshot.

3.64

3.65

3.66

3.67

3.68

3.69

Why the soldiers shot the casualties�


ThereisnodoubtthatPrivateGwasthesoldierwhoatarangeofonlyafewyardsfired

atandmortallywoundedGerardMcKinneyinAbbeyPark.Hisshotpassedthrough

GerardMcKinney’sbodyandalsomortallywoundedGeraldDonaghey.

ThelastgunfirecasualtieswereBernardMcGuigan,PatrickDoherty,PatrickCampbell

andDanielMcGowan,allshotintheareatothesouthofBlock2oftheRossvilleFlats

withinaveryshorttimeofeachother.WearesurethatLanceCorporalFfiredatand

shotBernardMcGuiganandPatrickDohertyanditishighlyprobablethathewasalso

responsibleforshootingtheothertwocasualties.ThissoldierfiredacrossRossville

StreetfromtheRossvilleStreetentrancewayintoGlenfadaParkNorth.

Weshouldnoteatthispointthatwehaveconsideredthepossibilitythatoneormore

ofthecasualtiesmighthaveoccurredfromsoldiersfiringbyaccident,inthesenseof

dischargingtheirriflesbymistakeandwithoutintendingtodoso.Wehavefoundno

evidencethatsuggeststousthatthiswasormighthavebeenthecase.

EverysoldierservinginNorthernIrelandwasissuedwithacardentitledInstructions by

the Director of Operations for Opening Fire in Northern Ireland. Thiswasknownasthe

YellowCard,andcontainedinstructionsastowhenasoldiercouldopenfire.

TheYellowCardinforceonBloodySundaycontainedinstructionstothesoldiersthat

theyshouldneverusemoreforcethantheminimumnecessarytoenablethemtocarry

outtheirduties,andshouldalwaysfirsttrytohandlethesituationbymeansotherthan

openingfire.TheYellowCardprovidedthatthesoldiershouldonlyfireaimedshotsand

thatsaveintwocases,ifasoldierhadtoopenfire,awarningwastobegivenbefore

doingso.Thewarningtobegivenhadtoincludeastatementthatfirewouldbeopenedif

thesoldier’sorderwasnotobeyed.

Thefirstofthetwocasesinwhichasoldiercouldopenfirewithoutwarningwaswhen

hostilefiringwastakingplaceinhisareaandawarningwasimpracticable,orwhenany

delaycouldleadtodeathorseriousinjurytopeoplewhomitwasthesoldier’sdutyto

protectortothesoldierhimself;andineitherofthesesituationsthesoldierwasonly

permittedtoopenfireagainstapersonusingafirearmagainstmembersofthesecurity

forcesorpeoplewhomitwasthesoldier’sdutytoprotect;oragainstapersoncarryinga

firearmifthesoldierhadreasontothinkthatthatpersonwasabouttousethefirearmfor


offensivepurposes.TheYellowCarddefined“firearm”asincludingagrenade,nailbomb

orgelignite-typebomb.Thesecondcaseinwhichasoldiercouldopenfirewithout

warningconcernedfiringatvehiclesandhasnorelevancetothefiringonBloodySunday.

3.70 NoneofthecasualtiesshotbysoldiersofSupportCompanywasarmedwithafirearmor

(withtheprobableexceptionofGeraldDonaghey)abombofanydescription.Nonewas

posinganythreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.Innocasewasanywarninggiven

beforesoldiersopenedfire.

3.71 Itwassubmittedonbehalfofmanyoftherepresentedsoldiersthatitwaspossiblethat

someofthecasualtieswereaccidental,inthesensethatthesoldierconcernedfiredat

someoneposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury,butmissedandhita

bystanderinstead.Itwasalsosubmittedthatsoldiersfiredatandkilledorinjuredother

peoplewhowereposingsuchathreat,butthattheexistenceofthesecasualtieshad

beenkeptsecretbythosecivilianswhoknewthatthishadhappened,inordertodeprive

thesoldiersofevidencethattheirfiringwasjustified.

3.72 ApartfromthefiringbyPrivateT,wehavefoundnosubstanceineitherofthese

submissions.

3.73 Astothefirst,althoughJohnJohnstonwashitaccidentallyfromfragmentsoftheshots

firedatDamienDonagheyinWilliamStreet,DamienDonagheywasnotposingathreatof

causingdeathorseriousinjury.MargaretDeery,whowasshotandseriouslywoundedin

theRossvilleFlatscarpark,wasprobablynottheintendedtargetandwashitbyaccident,

butagainthesoldierconcernedwasnotfiringatsomeoneposingathreatofcausing

deathorseriousinjury.ThesameistrueoftheshotsthatindirectlycausedinjurytoPius

McCarronandPatrickMcDaid.InGlenfadaParkNorth,JoeMahonwashitandwounded

byabulletthatwasaimedatandprobablyinitiallyhitWilliamMcKinney.InAbbeyPark,

GeraldDonagheywashitandmortallywoundedbythebulletthathadfirstmortally

woundedGerardMcKinney,butneitherWilliamMcKinneynorGerardMcKinneywas

posingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.ApartfromtheseandPatrickBrolly,

allthecasualtieswereeithertheintendedtargetsofthesoldiersortheresultofshots

firedindiscriminatelyatpeople.Noneofthesoldiersadmittedmissinghistargetand

hittingsomeoneelsebymistake.

3.74 AstoPatrickBrolly,ifPrivateTwasresponsiblefortheshotthatinjuredthiscasualty,

thiswasoneofthetwoshotsthatPrivateTfiredatamanwhohadbeenthrowing

downbottlescontainingacidorasimilarcorrosivesubstancefromtheRossvilleFlats.


Suchconductprobablydidposeathreatofcausingseriousinjury.PrivateT(ifhewas

responsible)neitherintendedtohitPatrickBrollynorfiredhisrifleindiscriminatelyat

people.IfitwasPrivateSwhofiredandinjuredPatrickBrolly,hedidnotaimatthis

casualtybutfiredindiscriminatelyattheRossvilleFlats.

3.75 Astothesecondsubmission,wearesurethatno-oneotherthanthecasualtiesthat

wehavedescribedabovewaskilledorseriouslyinjuredbyfiringbySupportCompany

soldiers.Hadtherebeensuchcasualties,wehavenodoubtthatthiswouldhavecome

tolightmanyyearsago.Wehavefoundnoevidencethatsuggeststousthattherewere

otherlessseriouscasualtiesofSupportCompanygunfire.

3.76 Despitethecontraryevidencegivenbysoldiers,wehaveconcludedthatnoneofthem

firedinresponsetoattacksorthreatenedattacksbynailorpetrolbombers.No-onethrew

orthreatenedtothrowanailorpetrolbombatthesoldiersonBloodySunday.Therewas

somefiringbyrepublicanparamilitaries(thoughnothingapproachingthatclaimedby

somesoldiers)whichwediscussindetailinthisreport,butinourviewnoneofthisfiring

providedanyjustificationfortheshootingoftheciviliancasualties.NosoldierofSupport

CompanywasinjuredbygunfireonBloodySunday.Twosufferedslightinjuriesfromacid

orasimilarcorrosivesubstancethrowndownontheminbottlesfromtheRossvilleFlats.

3.77 ApartfromPrivateT(whoclaimedtohavefiredatsomeonethrowingdownacidbombs

fromtheRossvilleFlats),allthesoldierswhoinourviewwereresponsibleforthe

casualtiesonBloodySundaysoughttojustifytheirshootingonthegroundsthatthey

weresurewhentheyfiredthattheyhadtargetedandhitsomeonewhowasarmed

withafirearmoranailorpetrolbombandwhowasposingorabouttoposeathreatof

causingdeathorseriousinjury.

3.78 Inotherwords,allthesoldiers(apartfromPrivateT)whowereinourviewresponsible

forthecasualtiesinsistedthattheyhadshotatgunmenorbombers,whichtheyhadnot,

and(withthepossibleexceptionofLanceCorporalF’sbelatedadmissionwithregardto

MichaelKelly)didnotacceptthattheyhadshottheknowncasualties,whichtheyhad.

Toourmindsitinevitablyfollowedthatthismateriallyunderminedthecredibilityofthe

accountsgivenbythesoldierswhofired.

3.79 Aswehavesaid,noneofthecasualtieswasposingathreatofcausingdeathorserious

injury,orindeedwasdoinganythingelsethatcouldonanyviewjustifytheirshooting.

However,thequestionremainsastowhetherwhentheyfired,thesoldiersnevertheless

mistakenlybelievedthattheywerejustifiedindoingso.


3.80 Weappreciatethatsoldiersoninternalsecurityduties,facingasituationinwhichtheyor

theircolleaguesmayatanymomentcomeunderlethalattack,havelittletimetodecide

whethertheyhaveidentifiedapersonposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury;

andmayhavetomakethatdecisioninastateoftensionorfear.Itisawell-known

phenomenonthat,particularlywhenunderstressorwheneventsaremovingfast,people

oftenerroneouslycometobelievethattheyareormightbehearingorseeingwhatthey

wereexpectingtohearorsee.Wehavebornethisinmindwhenassessingthestateof

mindofthesoldiersresponsibleforthecasualties.

3.81 Itisalsopossiblethatinthesortofcircumstancesoutlinedinthepreviousparagraph,a

soldiermightfireinfearorpanic,withoutgivingproperthoughttowhetherhistargetwas

posingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.

3.82 Inthecourseofthereportwehaveconsideredindetailtheaccountsofthesoldiers

whosefiringcausedthecasualties,inthelightofmuchotherevidence.Wehave

concluded,forthereasonswegive,thatapartfromPrivateTmanyofthesesoldiershave

knowinglyputforwardfalseaccountsinordertoseektojustifytheirfiring.However,we

havealsoborneinmindthatthefactthatasoldierafterwardsliedaboutwhathad

happeneddoesnotnecessarilyentailthathefiredwithoutbelievingthathehadidentified

apersonposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury,sinceitispossiblethathe

wasatthetimeconvincedthathewasjustifiedinfiring,butlaterinventeddetailsinan

attempttobolsterhisaccountandmakeitmorecredibletoothers.Wehavebornethis

possibilityinmindwhenseekingtodecidewhetherornoteachofthesoldiersofSupport

Companywhofiredandwhoseshotskilledorinjuredciviliansbelieved,whenhedidso,

thathewasjustifiedinfiring.

3.83 Withtheseconsiderationsinmind,weturntoconsidertheindividualsoldiersconcerned.

Inaccordancewithourrulingof11thOctober2004,1weexpresswhereappropriatethe

degreeofconfidenceorcertaintywithwhichwereachourconclusions.

1 A2.41

3.84 Asnotedabove,thefirstcasualtiesofArmygunfireonthedaywereinWilliamStreet,

someminutesbeforesoldierswentintotheBogside.

3.85 Thesoldiersconcernedinthisincident,CorporalAandPrivateB,unlikethosewholater

wentintotheBogside,werenotinanopenarea,butinaderelictbuildingonWilliam

Street.Atthesametime,theyweremembersofaplatoonthathadbeensenttoaposition

isolatedfromothersoldiers,closetotheriotinginWilliamStreetandadjacenttothe

../BSI_Report/BSI_Appendix2.pdf#page=262


Bogside,thelatterbeingpartofthe“nogo”areaofthecityandknowntobedangerous

forthesecurityforces.Theyaccordinglyperceivedthemselvestobeinadangerous

situationinwhichatanytimetheymightbetargetedbyrepublicanparamilitarieswith

lethalweapons.Ifnotfrightened,theywouldhavebeenhighlyapprehensive.

3.86 TheevidenceofCorporalAandPrivateBwasthatthepersontheyshotwasaboutto

throwanailbombintheirdirection.Thiswasnotthecase,thoughDamienDonagheyhad

previouslybeenthrowingstonesatthesoldiersandmighthavebeenabouttodoso

again.ItwassubmittedonbehalfofDamienDonagheythatthesesoldiersfiredwithout

anybeliefthattheyhadidentifiedsomeoneposingathreatofcausingdeathorserious

injury.Weconcludedthatthiswasnotthecaseandthatitwasprobablethateachsoldier

eithermistakenlybelievedthatDamienDonagheywasabouttothrowanailbombor

suspected(albeitincorrectly)thathemightbeabouttodoso.Itispossiblethatoneor

bothofthesesoldiersfiredinpanicorfear,withoutgivingproperthoughtastowhether

histargetwasposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.

3.87 Thenextfiringbysoldiersthatresultedincasualtiesoccurredaftersoldiershadgoneinto

theBogside.SoldiersofSupportCompanyhadbeentoldbyofficersandbelievedthatthis

wasaparticularlydangerousareaforthesecurityforces,withanyincursionrunningtherisk

ofmeetingattacksbyparamilitariesusingbombsandfirearms.Inthemindsofsome

soldiersthatbeliefwasreinforcedbytheshotfiredbyamemberoftheOfficialIRA(OIRA1)

someminutesearlieratsoldiersbythePresbyterianchurchinGreatJamesStreet.When

theydisembarkedintheBogsidethesoldierswereinanopenareawheretheyhadnever

previouslybeenandwhichwasoverlookedbythelargeandhighblocksoftheRossville

Flats,believedbythemtobeaplacefromwhichrepublicanparamilitariesoperated.

Theywereinthesecircumstanceshighlyalerttotheriskofcomingunderlethalattackfrom

republicanparamilitarieseitherinorneartothoseflats.Mostofthesoldierswerearmed

withriflestoguardagainstanysuchattacksandinmanycases(inbreachoftheYellow

Card)hadcockedtheirweaponsinordertofirewithoutdelayshouldoccasionarise.

3.88 Inshort,soldiersofSupportCompanywentintowhattheyperceivedtobeadangerous

areainwhichtheyrantheriskofcomingunderlethalattackatanytime.Again,ifthese

soldierswerenotfrightened,theymustatleasthavebeenhighlyapprehensive.

3.89 SincetheEdenPlacewastegroundwasanopenarea,manyofthesoldiersofMortar

Platoon,andsoldiersoftheotherplatoonsthathadfollowedMortarPlatoonintothe

Bogside,musthaveheardtheshotsfiredbyLieutenantNuptheEdenPlacealleyway

andovertheheadsofthepeoplethere.Theeffectwastoleadatleastanumberof


soldierstobelieveeitherthatrepublicanparamilitarieshadopenedfireorthrownbombs

orthatasoldierorsoldierswererespondingtotheimminentuseoffirearmsorbombsby

paramilitaries;andthusnotonlytoreinforcewhattheyhadbeentoldandbelievedabout

thelikelypresenceofrepublicanparamilitariesinthearea,butalsotomakethemeven

morereadytorespond.If,asweconsiderwasthecase,LieutenantNdecidedtofire

theseshotsovertheheadsofthepeopleotherwisethanasalastresorttoprotecthimself

orothersoldiers,hecaninourviewfairlybecriticised,notonlyforfiring,butalsofor

failingtorealisetheeffectthathisfiringwouldbelikelytohaveontheothersoldiers

whohadcomeintotheBogside.

3.90 Whenshootingbreaksoutinanurbanarea,asitthendid,itisoftendifficultorimpossible

toestablishwhoisfiring,fromwherethefiringhascome,inwhatdirectionitisgoing,and

thetypeofweaponbeingused.Thesameappliestoexplosionsandwehavelittledoubt

thatthesoundofthefiringofbatonroundscouldinsomecircumstanceshavebeen

mistakenfortheexplosionofbombs.InLondonderrythesefactorsweremagnifiedby

whatwasknownas“theDerrysound”,whichwastheechoingeffectcreatedbytheCity

Wallsandadjacentbuildings(includingthehighRossvilleFlats)andwhichcouldmultiply

thesoundofgunfireandexplosionsandcreatefalseimpressionsofthedirectionfrom

whichthesesoundswerecoming.

3.91 Incircumstancessuchaswehavedescribed,thereisariskthatsoldiers,mistakenly

believingthemselvesortheircolleaguestobeunderlethalattack,losetheirself-control,

forgetorignoretheirtrainingandfirewithoutbeingsatisfiedthattheyhaveidentifieda

personposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.

3.92 AstothesoldierswhowentintotheBogside,wehavereachedthefollowingconclusions.

3.93 Aswehavesaid,thefirstcasualtytobeshotafterthesoldiersenteredtheBogsidewas

JackieDuddy,whoinourviewwasprobablyshotbyPrivateR.Accordingtothissoldier’s

accounts,asheapproachedSergeantO’sAPChesawandshotamanwhowasaboutto

throwanailbomb.

3.94 JackieDuddywasrunningawayfromthesoldierswhenhewasshot.Heprobablyhada

stoneinhishandatthetime.PrivateRmayhavethoughtthatJackieDuddymighthave

beenabouttothrowabombandshothimforthisreason,butwearesurethathecould

nothavebeensufficientlyconfidentaboutthistoconcludethathewasjustifiedinfiring.

ItispossiblethatPrivateRfiredinastateoffearorpanic,givingnoproperthoughtto

whetherhistargetwasposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.


3.95� ThesecondcasualtywasMargaretDeery,shot(probablybyLanceCorporalV)asshe

stoodwithagroupofpeopleatornearthesouthernendofthewallofthegardensofthe

housesonthewesternsideofChamberlainStreet.LanceCorporalVhadapproachedthe

carparkoftheRossvilleFlatsfromLieutenantN’sAPC.LanceCorporalV’sevidence

wasthathefiredatandhitsomeonewhohadthrownorwasinthecourseofthrowinga

petrolbomb,evidencethatwerejected.MargaretDeerywasprobablynothisintended

target.LanceCorporalVprobablyfiredintheknowledgethathehadnotidentified

someonewhowasposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.Itispossiblethat

hefiredinastateoffearorpanic,withoutgivingproperthoughttowhetherhistargetwas

posingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.

3.96� MichaelBridgewasshotashewalkedtowardsthesoldiersnearSergeantO’svehicle

inthecarparkoftheRossvilleFlats,shoutingattheminprotestagainsttheshooting

ofJackieDuddyandinhisangerinvitingthesoldierstoshoothim.

3.97� ItwasprobablyLieutenantNwhoshotMichaelBridge.Afterfiringhisrifleupthealleyway

leadingtoChamberlainStreet,LieutenantNhadreturnedtohisvehicleandthenmoved

acrosstheEdenPlacewastegroundtowardsthecarparkoftheRossvilleFlats.Itwasat

thisstagethathefiredatandwoundedMichaelBridge.Hisevidencewasthathefiredat

amanhewassure,atthetime,wasabouttothrowanailbombathissoldiers.Inour

viewLieutenantNfired,probablyeitherinthemistakenbeliefthathistargetwasaboutto

throwanailbomb,butwithoutanyadequategroundsforthatbelief;orinthemistaken

beliefthathistargetmighthavebeenabouttothrowanailbomb,butwithoutbeing

confidentthatthatwasso.ItispossiblethatLieutenantNfiredinastateoffearorpanic,

withoutgivingproperthoughttowhetherhistargetwasposingathreatofcausingdeath

orseriousinjury.

3.98� ItwasprobablyPrivateQwhoshotMichaelBradley.Thiscasualtywasonthesouthern

sideoftheRossvilleFlatscarparkandwasprobablyabouttothrowastoneatthe

soldierswhenhewasshot.PrivateQfalselymaintainedthatshortlybeforehefiredhis

shotanailbombhadbeenthrownandhadexplodedinthecarparkandthathewassure

thatthepersonheshotwasabouttothrowanothernailbomb,butwearesurethat

PrivateQdidnotbelievewhenhefiredthathehadidentifiedanailbomber.Itispossible

thathemistakenlythoughtthatMichaelBradleymighthavebeenabouttothrowabomb,

butinourview,evenifthiswasso,hecouldnothavebeensufficientlyconfidentabout

thistoconcludethathewasjustifiedinfiring.ItispossiblethatPrivateQfiredinastate

offearorpanic,givingnoproperthoughttowhetherhistargetwasposingathreatof

causingdeathorseriousinjury.


3.99 OneormoreofSergeantO,PrivateRandPrivateSfiredtheshotsthatindirectlyinjured

PatrickMcDaidandPiusMcCarron.Allthesesoldiersclaimedtohavefiredatgunmenat

groundlevel,aclaimwedonotaccept.WhiletheydidnotaimateitherPatrickMcDaidor

PiusMcCarron,wearesurethatthesoldierorsoldierswhoseshotsresultedinthese

casualtiesfiredwithoutjustificationandwithoutanyoranyproperregardtotheriskto

peopleinthearea.

3.100 PrivateTwasprobablyresponsiblefortheshotthatdirectlyorindirectlyinjuredPatrick

Brolly,whowasinBlock1oftheRossvilleFlats,thoughitispossiblethatPrivateSwas

responsible.ThesoldierconcerneddidnotaimatPatrickBrolly.IfitwasashotbyPrivateS

(whofired12shotsintheareaoftheRossvilleFlatscarpark)wearesurethatitwasfired

fornogoodreasonandwithoutanyregardtotherisktopeopleintheflats.IfitwasPrivateT,

itwasoneoftwoshotsthatthissoldierfiredatamanonabalconyofBlock1ofthe

RossvilleFlats,whohadthrowndownatthesoldiersbelowabottleorbottlescontaining

acidorasimilarcorrosivesubstance,whichhadcausedminorinjuriestoPrivateTand

PrivateR.Theseshotswerefiredwithoutapreviouswarningandthusinourview

contravenedtheinstructionsgiventothesoldiersastowhentheycouldopenfire,

containedintheYellowCard.SergeantOhadtoldPrivateTtoshootifthemansoughtto

throwanotherbottle.BothheandPrivateTbelievedthatthepersonconcernedwasposing

athreatofcausingseriousinjury.Thesecondshotwasfiredafterthemanhadthrowna

furtherbottleandthusatatimewhenhewasposingnothreattothesoldiers.Bothshots

missedtheintendedtarget.

3.101 InRossvilleStreet,LanceCorporalFfiredfromthelowwallsoftheKellsWalkramp

andkilledMichaelKellywhowasbehindtherubblebarricadeonRossvilleStreet,some

80yardsaway.InitiallyLanceCorporalFsaidnothingaboutthisshotbutlaterhe

admittedthathehadfired,falselyclaimingthatthiswasatanailbomber.Inourview

LanceCorporalFdidnotfireinpanicorfear,withoutgivingproperthoughttowhether

hehadidentifiedapersonposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.Wearesure

thatinsteadhefiredeitherinthebeliefthatno-oneattherubblebarricadewasposinga

threatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury,ornotcaringwhetherornotanyoneattherubble

barricadewasposingsuchathreat.

3.102 AstothefurthershootinginRossvilleStreet,whichcausedthedeathsofWilliamNash,

JohnYoungandMichaelMcDaid,CorporalPclaimedthathefiredatamanwithapistol;

LanceCorporalJclaimedthathefiredatanailbomber;andCorporalEclaimedthathe

firedatamanwithapistolintheRossvilleFlats.Werejecteachoftheseclaimsas

knowinglyuntrue.Wearesurethatthesesoldiersfiredeitherinthebeliefthatno-one


intheareastowardswhichtheyrespectivelyfiredwasposingathreatofcausingdeath

orseriousinjury,ornotcaringwhetherornotanyonetherewasposingsuchathreat.

Intheircasesweconsiderthattheydidnotfireinastateoffearorpanic.

3.103 WetakethesameviewoftheshotthatwearesurePrivateUfiredatHughGilmour,

mortallywoundingthiscasualtyashewasrunningawayfromthesoldiers.Wereject

asknowinglyuntruePrivateU’saccountoffiringatamanwithahandgun.

3.104 Aswehaveexplained,eitherPrivateLorPrivateMshotandmortallywoundedKevin

McElhinneyashewascrawlingawayfromthesoldiers.Theyprobablydidsoontheorders

ofColourSergeant002orCorporal039orperhapsboththesenon-commissionedofficers.

3.105 Thesesoldiersandofficersgaveevidencethattheyhadseentwopeople,oneorboth

withrifles,crawlingawayfromtherubblebarricade.Theyprobablybelievedthatthey

mighthaveidentifiedagunmanorgunmen,butnoneofthemcouldhavebeensatisfied

thattheyhaddoneso.Theirtargetswerecrawlingawayandnotposinganimmediate

threatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.Thesoldiers’evidencewasthattheyfired,not

becausethecrawlingmenwereposingatthatmomentanimmediatethreatofcausing

deathorseriousinjury,butbecausetheybelievedthatthecrawlingmenwouldormight

usetheirweaponsoncetheyhadreachedcover,althoughPrivateLexpressedtheview

thathewasentitledtofireatsomeonewithaweapon,whateverthatindividualwasdoing.

Theseshotswerenotfiredinfearorpanic.Weareoftheviewthatthesoldiers

concernedprobablybelievedthatthecrawlingmenmightposeathreatofcausingdeath

orseriousinjuryoncetheyhadreachedcover,thoughitispossiblethatPrivateLdidnot

carewhetherornottheywouldposesuchathreat.

3.106 WearesurethatthesoldierwhoshotandinjuredAlexanderNashwhilehewastending

hisdeadordyingsonWilliamattherubblebarricadecouldnothavebelievedthathehad

ormighthaveidentifiedsomeoneposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.

3.107 WehaveaboveidentifiedCorporalE,LanceCorporalF,PrivateGandPrivateHasthe

soldierswhowentintoGlenfadaParkNorth,betweenthemkillingWilliamMcKinneyand

JimWray,injuringJoeMahon,JoeFriel,MichaelQuinnandPatrickO’Donnell,and

possiblyinjuringDanielGillespie.Allclaimedthattheyhadidentifiedandshotatpeople

inpossessionoforseekingtousebombsorfirearms.

3.108 Inourviewnoneofthesesoldiersfiredinthebeliefthathehadormighthaveidentified

apersoninpossessionoforusingorabouttousebombsorfirearms.WilliamMcKinney

andJimWraywerebothshotinthebackandnoneoftheothercasualties(withthe


possibleexceptionofDanielGillespie)appearstohavebeenfacingthesoldierswhen

shot.Wearesurethatthesesoldiersfiredeitherinthebeliefthatno-oneintheareas

towardswhichtheyrespectivelyfiredwasposingathreatofcausingdeathorserious

injury,ornotcaringwhetherornotanyonetherewasposingsuchathreat.Intheircases

(withthepossibleexceptionofPrivateH),itisunlikelythattheyfiredinastateoffear

orpanic.

3.109 Allfoursoldiersdeniedshootinganyoneontheground.However,JimWraywasshot

forasecondtimeintheback,probablyashelaymortallywoundedinthesouth-western

cornerofGlenfadaParkNorth.Whicheversoldierwasresponsibleforfiringthesecond

shot,wearesurethathemusthaveknownthattherewasnopossiblejustificationfor

shootingJimWrayashelayontheground.

3.110 PrivateGshotGerardMcKinneyinAbbeyPark.Aswehavealreadynoted,hisshot

passedthroughthiscasualtyandmortallywoundedGeraldDonaghey.PrivateGmaynot

havebeenawarethathisshothadhadthisadditionaleffect.PrivateGfalselydeniedthat

hehadfiredinAbbeyPark.Hedidnotfireinfearorpanicandwearesurethathemust

havefiredknowingthatGerardMcKinneywasnotposingathreatofcausingdeathor

seriousinjury.

3.111 GeraldDonagheywastakenbycartotheRegimentalAidPostof1stBattalion,The

RoyalAnglianRegiment,whichwasatthewesternendofCraigavonBridge,whichspans

theRiverFoyle.Therefournailbombswerefoundinhispockets.Thequestionaroseas

towhetherthenailbombswereinhispocketswhenhewasshot,orhadbeenplantedon

himlaterbythesecurityforces.Wehaveconsideredthesubstantialamountofevidence

relatingtothisquestionandhaveconcluded,forreasonsthatwegive,thatthenailbombs

wereprobablyonGeraldDonagheywhenhewasshot.However,wearesurethatGerald

Donagheywasnotpreparingorattemptingtothrowanailbombwhenhewasshot;and

weareequallysurethathewasnotshotbecauseofhispossessionofnailbombs.

Hewasshotwhiletryingtoescapefromthesoldiers.

3.112 Aswehavesaid,thelastgunfirecasualtieswereBernardMcGuigan,PatrickDoherty,

PatrickCampbellandDanielMcGowan,allshotintheareatothesouthofBlock2ofthe

RossvilleFlatswithinaveryshorttimeofeachother.BernardMcGuiganwasshotinthe

headandkilledinstantlyashewaswavingapieceofclothandmovingoutfromthecover

affordedbythesouthernendwallofBlock1oftheRossvilleFlats.Furthertotheeast

PatrickDohertywasshotinthebuttockandmortallywoundedashewasattemptingto

crawltosafetyacrosstheareathatlayonthesouthernsideofBlock2oftheRossville

3.113


Flats.PatrickCampbellwasshotinthebackandinjuredasheranawayfromthe

southernendofBlock1oftheRossvilleFlatsalongthesouthernsideofBlock2.Daniel

McGowanwasshotandinjuredinthelegwhenhewasinaboutthesameareaaswhere

PatrickDohertywasshot.

WehavenodoubtthatLanceCorporalFshotPatrickDohertyandBernardMcGuigan,

anditishighlyprobablethathealsoshotPatrickCampbellandDanielMcGowan.In1972

LanceCorporalFinitiallysaidnothingaboutfiringalongthepedestrianisedareaonthe

southernsideofBlock2oftheRossvilleFlats,butlateradmittedthathehaddoneso.

Noothersoldierclaimedoradmittedtofiringintothisarea.LanceCorporalF’sclaimthat

hehadfiredatamanwhohad(or,inoneaccount,wasfiring)apistolwastohis

knowledgefalse.LanceCorporalFdidnotfireinastateoffearorpanic.Wearesurethat

hefiredeitherinthebeliefthatno-oneintheareaintowhichhefiredwasposingathreat

ofcausingdeathorseriousinjury,ornotcaringwhetherornotanyonetherewasposing

suchathreat.

Other firing by soldiers on Bloody Sunday�

3.114 SoldiersofSupportCompanyfiredinallover100rifleroundsonBloodySunday

aftertheyhadgoneintotheBogside.Inthisreportwedescribeindetailnotonly

thecircumstancesinwhichsoldiersfiredandkilledorinjuredcivilians,butalsothe

circumstancesinwhichtheothershootingoccurred.Astothelatter,withtheprobable

exceptionofshotsfiredbySergeantOatwhathedescribedasagunmanonabalconyof

Block3oftheRossvilleFlats,wefoundnoinstanceswhereitappearedtousthatsoldiers

eitherwereormighthavebeenjustifiedinfiring.Inmanycasesthesoldiersconcerned

firedeitherinthebeliefthatno-oneintheareasintowhichtheyfiredwasposingathreat

ofcausingdeathorseriousinjury,ornotcaringwhetherornotanyonetherewasposing

suchathreat;whileinothercasesweconsiderthatwhenthesoldiersfiredtheymay

havemistakenlysuspected,withoutbeingsatisfied,thattheymighthaveidentified

someoneposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.

3.115 ApartfromthefiringbysoldiersofSupportCompany,therewasnootherfiringby

membersof1PARAonBloodySunday.Inparticular,therewasnofiringbymembersof

CCompany,whohadalsogoneintotheBogside(onfootthroughBarrier14)soonafter

SupportCompanyhadgonethroughBarrier12.


3.116� TherewereotherincidentsofArmyfiringonBloodySunday,bymembersofotherArmy

units.Thisfiringwasinresponsetorepublicanparamilitaryfiringthatwasdirectedat

soldiers,butnotatthosewhohadgoneintotheBogside.Weconsidertheseincidents

indetailinthisreport.Inoneoftheseincidents(some600yardsfromtheareawherethe

civilianswerekilledandinjuredbysoldiersofSupportCompany)asoldier(inourview

justifiably)shotatandinjuredanarmedmemberoftheOfficialIRA,“Red”Mickey

Doherty,whohadimmediatelybeforefiredatsoldiers.

3.117� AtonestageitwassuggestedthatasoldierorsoldiersstationedontheCityWalls

abovetheareaintowhichSupportCompanyof1PARAdeployedmighthavebeen

responsibleforsomeoftheciviliancasualtiesattherubblebarricadeinRossvilleStreet.

Weconsideredthispossibilitybutaresure,forthereasonswegiveinthereport,thatthis

wasnotthecase;andbytheendoftheInquiryno-onetakingpartintheInquiry

suggestedotherwise.

3.118� Aswillbeseenfromthisreport,aspartofourinvestigationweexaminedindetailthe

organisationoftheProvisionalandOfficialIRAandtheactivitiesofmembersofthose

organisationsontheday,sinceitwassubmittedonbehalfofsoldiersthat,ineffect,these

activitiesjustifiedthesoldiersopeningfire.WiththeexceptionofGeraldDonaghey,who

wasamemberoftheProvisionalIRA’syouthwing,theFianna,noneofthosekilledor

woundedbysoldiersofSupportCompanybelongedtoeithertheProvisionalorthe

OfficialIRA.

3.119� InthecourseofinvestigatingtheactivitiesoftheProvisionalandOfficialIRAonthe

day,weconsideredatsomelengthallegationsthatMartinMcGuinness,atthattime

theAdjutantoftheDerryBrigadeorCommandoftheProvisionalIRA,hadengaged

inparamilitaryactivityduringtheday.Intheendwewereleftinsomedoubtastohis

movementsontheday.BeforethesoldiersofSupportCompanywentintotheBogside

hewasprobablyarmedwithaThompsonsub-machinegun,andthoughitispossiblethat

hefiredthisweapon,thereisinsufficientevidencetomakeanyfindingonthis,savethat

wearesurethathedidnotengageinanyactivitythatprovidedanyofthesoldierswith

anyjustificationforopeningfire.

The arrest of civilians

3.120� SoldiersofSupportCompany,1PARAarrestedanumberofciviliansonBloodySunday.

OnlysixwerearrestedintheareaofRossvilleStreetorintheEdenPlacewasteground

wherethesoldiershadinitiallydeployed,mostoftheothersbeingarrestedeitherina


houseinChamberlainStreetorwheretheyhadtakenshelterbehindawallatthe

south-easterncornerofGlenfadaParkNorth.Inthisreport,wehaveexaminedthe

circumstancesofthesearrestsandwhathappenedtothosewhowerearrested,notonly

becausetheyformedanimportantpartoftheeventsoftheday,butbecausetheway

inwhichsomeweretreatedprovidedanindicationoftheattitudethatsomesoldiersof

1PARAadoptedtowardsthepeopletheyencounteredonBloodySunday.Therewerea

numberofincidentsinwhichsoldiersgaveknowinglyfalseaccountsofthecircumstances

inwhicharrestsweremade.Intheendnoproceedingswerepursuedagainstanyof

thosewhohadbeenarrested.

90

Chapter 4: The question of responsibility for the deaths and injuries on Bloody Sunday Contents

Paragraph

TheUnitedKingdomandNorthernIrelandGovernmentsandtheArmy 4.2

MajorGeneralFord 4.8

BrigadierMacLellan 4.13

LieutenantColonelWilford 4.15

MajorLoden 4.26

LieutenantN 4.30

Lieutenant119 4.31

Captain200andSergeantINQ441 4.32

TheNorthernIrelandCivilRightsAssociation 4.33

4.1� TheimmediateresponsibilityforthedeathsandinjuriesonBloodySundaylieswiththose

membersofSupportCompanywhoseunjustifiablefiringwasthecauseofthosedeaths

andinjuries.Thequestionremains,however,astowhetherothersalsobeardirector

indirectresponsibilityforwhathappened.

The United Kingdom and Northern Ireland Governments and the Army

4.2 DuringthecourseoftheInquiry,allegationsweremadebysomeofthoserepresenting

thefamiliesofthosewhodiedonBloodySundayandthosewounded,thatthepoliticians

inboththeUnitedKingdomandNorthernIrelandGovernments,aswellasthemilitary

authorities,hadplannednotsimplytostopthecivilrightsmarchandtomountanarrest

operationagainstriotersassetoutintheordersforOperationForecast(theoperationto

containthemarchanddealwithanyrioting),butrathertouse1PARAforthepurposeof

carryingoutsomeaction,whichtheyknewwouldinvolvethedeliberateuseof

Chapter4:ThequestionofresponsibilityforthedeathsandinjuriesonBloodySunday 91

unwarrantedlethalforceorwhichtheysanctionedwithrecklessdisregardastowhether

suchforcewasused.Onthisbasisitwassubmittedthatthecivilandmilitaryauthorities

boreresponsibilityforthedeathsandinjuriesonBloodySunday.

4.3� Theseallegationswerebasedononeoftwopropositions,eitherthatwhathappenedon

BloodySundaywasintendedandplannedbytheauthorities,orthatitwasforeseenby

theauthoritiesaslikelytohappen.Weareoftheviewthatneitherofthesepropositions

canbesustained.

4.4� Inordertoconsidertheseallegationswelookedindetailatwhattheauthoritieswere

planninganddoingintheweeksandmonthsprecedingBloodySunday;aswellaswhat

happenedonBloodySundaybeforesoldiersweresentintotheBogside.Wefoundno

evidencetosubstantiatetheseallegations.SofarastheUnitedKingdomGovernment

wasconcerned,whattheevidencedidestablishwasthatinthemonthsbeforeBloody

Sunday,genuineandseriousattemptswerebeingmadeatthehighestleveltowork

towardsapeacefulpoliticalsettlementinNorthernIreland.Anyactioninvolvingtheuseor

likelyuseofunwarrantedlethalforceagainstnationalistsontheoccasionofthemarch(or

otherwise)wouldhavebeenentirelycounterproductivetotheplansforapeaceful

settlement;andwasneithercontemplatednorforeseenbytheUnitedKingdom

Government.SofarastheNorthernIrelandGovernmentwasconcerned,althoughithad

beenpressingtheUnitedKingdomGovernmentandtheArmytostepuptheireffortsto

counterrepublicanparamilitariesandtodealwithbannedmarches,wefoundno

evidencethatsuggestedtousthatitadvocatedtheuseofunwarrantedlethalforce

orwasindifferenttoitsuseontheoccasionofthemarch.

4.5� ItwasalsosubmittedthatindealingwiththesecuritysituationinNorthernIreland

generally,theauthorities(theUnitedKingdomandNorthernIrelandGovernmentsandthe

Army)toleratedifnotencouragedtheuseofunjustifiedlethalforce;andthatthiswasthe

causeoracontributorycauseofwhathappenedonBloodySunday.Wefoundno

evidenceofsuchtolerationorencouragement.

4.6� Therewasafurthersubmissiontotheeffectthatitwascriticaltoanunderstandingof

whylethalforcewasusedbytheArmyagainstunarmedciviliansonBloodySunday,to

appreciatethatbythistimetheroleofthepoliceinsecuritymattershadbeenerodedand

thattheArmyhadillegallytakencontroloverthepolicingofsecuritysituationsfromthe

police.ThoughbytheperiodinquestionthesituationwassuchthattheRUChadneither

themanpowernortheresourcestodealeffectivelywithallsecurityissuesandwasin

92

4.7

THE BLOODY SUNDAY INQUIRY VOLUME I

manycasesdependentuponthemilitary,wedonotacceptthattheArmyhadillegally

takenovercontrolofsecurityfromthepolice.TheArmyandthepoliceworkedtogether

indecidinghowtodealwithmattersofsecurity.

Astotheactionsofthesoldiersthemselves,itwassubmittedthatthosewhofireddidso

becauseofa“culture”thathadgrownupamongsoldiersatthetimeinNorthernIreland,

totheeffectthattheycouldfirewithimpunity,secureintheknowledgethatthe

arrangementstheninforce(arrangementslatercriticisedbytheLordChiefJusticeof

NorthernIreland)meantthattheiractionswouldnotbeinvestigatedbytheRUC,butby

theRoyalMilitaryPolice(theArmy’sownpoliceforce),whowouldbesympathetictothe

soldiersandwhowouldnotconductaproperinvestigation.Insupportofthissubmission

itwasallegedthatbeforeBloodySundaythereweremanypreviousunjustifiedshooting

incidentsbysoldiersinNorthernIreland.AswepointedoutinthecourseoftheInquiry,

itwassimplynotpossibletotakethissubmissionofanestablished“culture”forward,

forthiscouldonlybedonebyexamininginthesamedetailasBloodySundaythe

circumstancesofeachofthoseincidents,inordertodecide,amongotherthings,whether

ornottheyinvolvedunjustifiedfiringbysoldiers.Inourviewthiswouldhavebeena

whollyimpracticablecourseforustotake,addingimmeasurablytowhatwasalready

averylongandcomplexinquiry.Inthesecircumstances,wearenotinapositionto

expressavieweitherastowhetherornotsuchacultureexistedamongsoldiersbefore

BloodySundayor,ifitdid,whetherithadanyinfluenceonthosewhofiredunjustifiably

onthatday.

Major General Ford�

4.8 InthelightofthesituationthatobtainedinLondonderryinearly1972(whichwediscuss

indetailinthisreport),wedonotcriticiseGeneralFordfordecidingtodeploysoldiersto

arrestrioters,thoughinourviewhisdecisiontouse1PARAasthearrestforceisopento

criticism,onthegroundthat1PARAwasaforcewithareputationforusingexcessive

physicalviolence,whichthusrantheriskofexacerbatingthetensionsbetweentheArmy

andnationalistsinLondonderry.However,thereistoourmindsasignificantdifference

betweentheriskofsoldiersusingexcessivephysicalviolencewhendispersingcrowdsor

tryingtoarrestriotersandtheriskthattheywoulduselethalweaponswithoutjustification.

WehaveconcludedthatGeneralFordhadnoreasontobelieveanddidnotbelievethat

theriskofsoldiersof1PARAfiringunjustifiablyduringthecourseofanarrestoperation

wassuchthatitwasinappropriateforthatreasonforhimtousethemforsuchan

operation.

4.9

4.10

4.11

4.12


GeneralForddenied,bothtotheWidgeryInquiryandtothepresentInquiry,thatthe

Armyplanfor30thJanuary1972wastocauseaconfrontationwiththeIRA,Official,

Provisionalorboth.Weaccepthisdenial.Wearesurethattherewasnosuchplan.

AstoGeneralFord’smemorandum,wherehesuggestedshootingselectedringleaders

ofriotersafterwarning,wearesurprisedthatanofficerofhisseniorityshouldseriously

considerthatthiswassomethingthatcouldbedone,notwithstandingthathe

acknowledgedthattotakethiscoursewouldrequireauthorisationfromabove.Weare

sure,forthereasonsgiveninthereport,thatthisideawasnotadoptedandthatthe

shootingsonBloodySundaywerenottheresultofanyplantoshootselectedringleaders.

IntheeventGeneralForddecidedtouseanadditionalbattalion(1PARA)asthemeans

ofseekingtodealwithrioters.Wefoundnoevidencetosuggestthattheuseoflethal

forceagainstunarmedrioters,whowerenotposingathreatofcausingdeathorserious

injury,wascontemplatedbyGeneralFordorthoseseniortohimasapossiblemeansof

dealingwithanyriotingthatmightaccompanythethenforthcomingcivilrightsmarch.

GeneralForddidnothimselfplayanyroleinorderingthearrestoperationtobelaunched

orindeterminingtheformeitherinwhichBrigadeordereditorwhichitactuallytook.He

didnotseektointerferewithortoinfluencewhathappenedtoanysignificantextentand

wasrightnottodoso,sincethedecisionwhethertolaunchanarrestoperationandthe

formthatitwastotakeweremattersforBrigadierMacLellan.

GeneralFordwasresponsiblefordecidingthatinthelikelyeventofrioting,Brigade

shouldemploy1PARAasanarrestforceon30thJanuary1972.Butheneitherknewnor

hadreasontoknowatanystagethathisdecisionwouldorwaslikelytoresultinsoldiers

firingunjustifiablyonthatday.

Brigadier MacLellan�

4.13 Aswehavenotedabove,thepowertoorderanarrestoperationdidnotrestwithGeneral

Ford,butwithBrigadierMacLellan.WedonotcriticiseBrigadierMacLellanforgivingsuch

anorder.Aswehavepointedout,hedidnotdosountilhewasreasonablysatisfiedthat

therewassufficientseparationbetweenriotersandpeacefulmarcherstosanctionthe

limitedarrestoperationthathadbeeninitiallysuggestedbyColonelWilford.HadColonel

Wilfordinformedhimthatthesituationhadchangedandthatasthecommanderofthe

arrestforcehenowconsideredthatitwasnecessarytoorderanadditionalcompanytogo

invehiclesalongRossvilleStreetinordertoarrestrioters,BrigadierMacLellanmightwell

haveabandonedthearrestoperationaltogether,onthegroundthatsuchanoperation


wouldnotallowsufficientseparationbetweenmarchersandrioters.BrigadierMacLellan

hadnoreasontobelieveanddidnotbelievethatthelimitedarrestoperationheordered

rantheriskofdeathsorinjuriesfromunjustifiablefiringbysoldiers.

4.14� WeshouldaddatthispointthatinourviewBrigadierMacLellancannotfairlybecriticised

eitherfornotimposingadditionalrestrictionsonwhensoldierscouldopenfire,overand

abovethoseintheYellowCard;orforfailingtoordersoldiersengagedinanarrest

operationtodisengageratherthanrespondiftheywereorbelievedthattheywereunder

attackfromrepublicanparamilitaries,soastominimisetheriskthatinnocentcivilians

wouldbekilledorinjured.Inhiscasesuggestionstothecontraryincorrectlyassumethat

hebearsresponsibilityforsendingsoldiersintotheBogside.Thearrestoperation

BrigadierMacLellanorderedwaslimitedinscopeandwouldnothaveinvolvedsoldiers

goingintotheBogsidetoanyoranysignificantextent;andinourviewtherisktocivilians

fromsuchanoperationdidnotcallforanysuchspecialrestrictionsorspecialorders.

WehaveconcludedthatBrigadierMacLellandoesnotbearanyresponsibilityforthe

deathsandinjuriesfromtheunjustifiablefiringbysoldiersonBloodySunday.

Lieutenant Colonel Wilford

4.15� WhatdidhappenwasnotwhatColonelWilfordhadinitiallysuggestedandBrigadier

MacLellanhadthenordered.ColonelWilfordshouldhaveorderedhissoldierstostayin

andaroundWilliamStreetandthenorthernendofRossvilleStreet.Instead,hesentthem

intotheBogside,wheretheychasedpeopledownRossvilleStreet,intothecarparkof

theRossvilleFlats,intoGlenfadaParkNorthandasfarasAbbeyPark.

4.16� InourviewColonelWilforddecidedtosendSupportCompanyintotheBogsidebecause

atthetimehegavetheorderhehadconcluded(withoutinformingBrigadierMacLellan)

thattherewasnownoprospectofmakinganyoranysignificantarrestsintheareahe

hadoriginallysuggested,astheriotingwasdyingdownandpeopleweremovingaway.

Inadditionitappearstousthathewantedtodemonstratethatthewaytodealwithrioters

inLondonderrywasnotforsoldierstoshelterbehindbarricadeslike(asheputit)“Aunt

Sallies”whilebeingstoned,asheperceivedthelocaltroopshadbeendoing,butinstead

togoaggressivelyafterrioters,asheandhissoldiershadbeendoinginBelfast.

4.17� WhatColonelWilfordfailedtoappreciate,orregardedasoflittleconsequence,wasthat

hissoldiers,whohadnotbeeninapositiontoobservetheriotingthathadbeengoingon

attheArmybarriers,wouldalmostcertainlybeunabletoidentifyanyoneasarioter,save

where,whentheyarrived,theyweremetbypeoplewhowereriotingatthattime.


4.18� ColonelWilfordfailedtoinformBrigadethatinhisviewthesituationhadchangedand

thattheonlyprospectofmakinganyarrestswastosendhissoldiersinvehiclesintothe

Bogside.HethenfailedtoobeytheorderthatBrigadierMacLellangave,whichprohibited

anysuchmovement.Hethuscreatedasituationinwhichsoldierschasedpeopledown

RossvilleStreetandbeyond,incircumstanceswhereitwasnotpossibletodistinguish

betweenthosewhohadmerelybeenmarchingandthosewhohadbeenrioting.His

failuretocomplywithhisorders,insteadsettingintraintheverythinghisBrigadier

hadprohibitedhimfromdoing,cannotbejustified.

4.19� InourviewColonelWilfordcanalsobecriticisedonanotherground.Hesenthissoldiers

intoanareawhichheregardedasdangerousandwhichhehadtoldhissoldierswas

dangerous;anareawhichhissoldiersdidnotknowandwheretheymightcomeunder

lethalattackfromrepublicanparamilitaries,whodominatedthatpartofthecity.Heknew

thathissoldierswouldaccordinglybeverymuchontheirguard,readytorespond

instantlywithgunfireatidentifiedtargets,astheyweretrainedtorespond,iftheydid

comeundersuchattack.Heknewthathissoldierswouldnotwithdrawiftheycameunder

lethalattackbutweretrainednotjusttotakecover,butinsteadtomoveforwardand,

ashehimselfputit,seekoutthe“enemy ”.

4.20� Inthesecircumstances,onhisownestimationofthedangeroflethalattacksby

republicanparamilitaries,ColonelWilfordmusthaveappreciatedthattherewasa

significantriskthatsendinghissoldiersintotheBogsideonanarrestoperationcouldlead

toanarmedengagementwithrepublicanparamilitaries.Heshouldhaveappreciatedthat

ifthisdidhappen,thentherewasalso,inviewofthenumbersofpeoplearound,a

significantriskthatpeopleotherthansoldiers’justifiabletargetswouldbekilledorinjured,

albeitbyaccident,fromArmygunfire.ToourmindsthiswasanotherreasonwhyColonel

WilfordshouldnothavelaunchedanincursionintotheBogside.

4.21� ThefactthatwhatintheeventhappenedonBloodySundaywhenthesoldiersentered

theBogsidewasnotajustifiableresponsetoalethalattackbyrepublicanparamilitaries,

butinsteadsoldiersopeningfireunjustifiably,cannotprovideananswertothiscriticism,

whichisbasednotonwhathappened,butwhatatthetimeColonelWilfordthought

mighthappen.

4.22� WehavefoundnothingthatsuggeststousthatColonelWilfordcanbeblamedforthe

incidentinwhichsoldiersfiredfromthederelictbuildinginWilliamStreetandinjured

DamienDonagheyandJohnJohnston.However,thequestionremainsastowhetherhe


realised,orshouldhaverealised,thattheriskofunjustifiablefiringbysoldiersifhesent

themintotheBogsidewassuchthatforthisreasonheshouldnothaveorderedthemto

goin.

4.23� Asoneoftheofficers(giventhecipherCaptain128),whowasamemberof2nd

Battalion,TheRoyalGreenJacketsandwaspresentontheday,toldus,whenasoldier

hearsshotsandbelievesthatheisunderfire,hisautomaticreactionistofirehimself,

whichisadifficultreactiontostop;andwhenfiringbreaksoutinatensesituationitcan

spreadveryquicklyandisverydifficulttocontrol.ItcouldthusbesaidthatColonel

Wilfordshouldhaveappreciatedthatbysendingsoldiersintoanunfamiliararea,which

theyhadbeentoldwasandwhichtheyperceivedtobeadangerousarea,therewasa

riskthattheymightmistakenlybelievethattheyhadcomeunderattackfromrepublican

paramilitariesandinthatbeliefopenfirewithoutbeingsatisfiedthattheyhadidentified

peoplewhowereposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury;andthatbecauseof

thatrisk,heshouldnothavesentsoldiersintotheBogside.Intheend,however,we

considerthatonthisspecificgroundColonelWilfordcannotfairlybecriticisedforgiving

theordershedid.WetaketheviewthatColonelWilfordcannotbeblamedforfailingto

foreseethattheriskofhissoldiersfiringunjustifiablywassuchthatheshouldnothave

giventheordershedid.

4.24� Insummary,therefore,inourviewColonelWilfordshouldnothavesentsoldiersof

SupportCompanyintotheBogsideforthefollowingreasons:

• becauseindoingsohedisobeyedtheordersgivenbyBrigadierMacLellan;

• becausehissoldiers,whosejobwastoarrestrioters,wouldhavenoorvirtuallyno

meansofidentifyingthosewhohadbeenriotingfromthosewhohadsimplybeen

takingpartinthecivilrightsmarch;and

• becauseheshouldnothavesenthissoldiersintoanunfamiliarareawhichheand

theyregardedasadangerousarea,wherethesoldiersmightcomeunderattackfrom

republicanparamilitaries,incircumstanceswherethesoldiers’responsewouldrun

asignificantriskthatpeopleotherthanthoseengagingthesoldierswithlethalforce

wouldbekilledorinjuredbyArmygunfire.

4.25� ThereremainsthesuggestionthatColonelWilford’ssoldiersshouldhavebeeninstructed

thatinordertominimisetherisktoinnocentpeople,ifongoingintotheBogsidethey

cameunderattackfromparamilitaries,orbelievedthatthishadhappened,theyshould

disengageandwithdrawratherthanreturnfire.Inourviewthisisahypotheticalquestion,

sinceforthefirsttwoofthereasonswehavegivenaboveColonelWilfordshouldnot

havesentsoldiersintotheBogside,withorwithoutspecialinstructions.

Major Loden�


4.26

4.27

4.28

4.29

ThoserepresentingthefamiliesofthedeceasedandthewoundedcriticisedMajorLoden,

theCommanderofSupportCompany,onthegroundthathefailedtoexerciseanyproper

controloverhissoldiersortheirfiring.

Inourview,eventsmovedsofastafterthesoldiershaddisembarkedintheBogsidethat

MajorLodenhadnoideawhatwasactuallygoingon;heassumedthathissoldiershad

comeunderattackfromrepublicanparamilitariesandwereresponding.Itcouldbesaid

thatanotherofficerinMajorLoden’spositionmighthaveappreciatedearlierthat,inview

oftheamountofArmygunfire,somethingseemedtobegoingseriouslywrong;

republicanparamilitarieswerenotknowntotakeontroopsinforce,butusuallysniped

atindividualsfrompositionsofcover.Inconsequencesuchanofficermighthavemade

greatereffortstocontrolthesituation.

MajorLodenwassurprisedbytheamountoffiring.However,hedidnotinitially

appreciatethatsomethingwaswronganddidnotorderaceasefireorgiveanyother

instructionstohissoldiersuntilafterallthecasualtieshadbeensustained.Weconsider

thatitwasnotunreasonableforhiminitiallytobelieve,ashedid,thathissoldiers,by

goingintoanareadominatedbyparamilitaries,hadforonceencounteredparamilitary

resistanceinstrength,towhichtheywereresponding.Weaccepthisevidencethatin

thisbelief,itwasnotforhimtocontrolorstophissoldiers’firing,buttoleavethistothe

platoonandsectioncommanders.Wealsoaccept,forthereasonshegave,thathecould

notseethetargetsthathissoldierswereengagingandthuscouldnottellwhetherornot

thefiringwasunjustified.

Inourview,atthetimethecasualtieswerebeingsustained,MajorLodenneitherrealised

norshouldhaverealisedthathissoldierswereormightbefiringatpeoplewhowerenot

posingorabouttoposeathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.However,weconsider

thatatthetimewhenhedidtellhissoldiersnottofirebackunlesstheyhadidentified

positivetargets,heprobablydidrealisethatthefiringthatwastakingplacethenwas,or

mightbe,unjustified.Bythisstageallthecasualtieshadbeensustainedandtherehad

beenapauseinthefiring.


Lieutenant N

4.30� LieutenantN,theCommanderofMortarPlatoon,failedtoappreciate,asheshouldhave

done,thatfiringunjustifiedshotsovertheheadsofpeopleinthealleywayleadinginto

ChamberlainStreetwaslikelytoleadothersoldiersmistakenlytobelieve,assome

probablydid,thatSupportCompanywasatthattimecomingunderattackorthethreatof

attackfromrepublicanparamilitaries.Aswehavesaid,hewasprobablyresponsiblefor

shootingMichaelBridge.However,wetaketheviewthattherewasinthecircumstances

(andbearingparticularlyinmindthespeedofevents)nothing(apartfromrefrainingfrom

firinghisunjustifiedshotsovertheheadsofpeople)thathecouldorshouldhavedoneto

averttheshootingbyothermembersofhisplatoon.Wearenotpersuadedthatheshould

haverealisedatthetimethathissoldierswerefiringunjustifiably.

Lieutenant 119

4.31� Lieutenant119wastheCommanderofAnti-TankPlatoon.Wecriticisethisofficerfor

allowingfourmembersofhisplatoontogointoGlenfadaParkNorth,outofhissightand

control.Beforethishappenedheappearstohavebeenlabouringunderthemistaken

beliefthathissoldiersatthelowwallsoftheKellsWalkrampwererespondingto

paramilitaryattacks.Wearenotpersuadedthatheshouldhaverealisedthatthese

soldierswerefiringunjustifiably.

Captain 200 and Sergeant INQ 441

4.32� Captain200wastheCommanderofCompositePlatoon.Thereisnothingtosuggestthat

he,orSergeantINQ441,theCommanderofMachineGunPlatoon,wasresponsiblefor

anyoftheunjustifiablefiringbyhissoldiers.

The Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association

4.33� Inourviewtheorganisersofthecivilrightsmarchbearnoresponsibilityforthedeaths

andinjuriesonBloodySunday.Althoughthosewhoorganisedthemarchmusthave

realisedthattherewasprobablygoingtobetroublefromrioters,theyhadnoreasonto

believeanddidnotbelievethatthiswaslikelytoresultindeathorinjuryfromunjustified

firingbysoldiers.

99

Chapter 5: The overall assessment 5.1

5.2

5.3

5.4

TheearlyfiringinWilliamStreetresultedintwowoundedcasualties,neitherofwhom

wasdoinganythingthatjustifiedeitherofthembeingshot.Itispossiblethatthesoldiers

concernedmistakenlybelievedthattheyhadidentifiedsomeoneposingathreatof

causingdeathorseriousinjury.Equally,eachofthosesoldiersmayhavefired,not

believingthathistargetwasposingathreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury,butonly

suspectingthatthismighthavebeenthecase.

ThesoldiersofSupportCompanywhowentintotheBogsidedidsoastheresultofan

orderbyColonelWilford,whichshouldnothavebeengivenandwhichwascontraryto

theordersthathehadreceivedfromBrigadierMacLellan.

WiththeexceptionofPrivateTandwiththeprobableexceptionofshotsSergeantO

saidthathefiredatsomeoneonabalconyofBlock3oftheRossvilleFlatsandwhich,

(despitehisassertiontothecontrary)didnothitanyone,noneofthefiringbythe

soldiersofSupportCompanywasaimedatpeopleposingathreatofcausingdeath

orseriousinjury.

WehaveconcludedthattheexplanationforsuchfiringbySupportCompanysoldiers

aftertheyhadgoneintotheBogsidewasinmostcasesprobablythemistakenbelief

amongthemthatrepublicanparamilitarieswererespondinginforcetotheirarrivalinthe

Bogside.ThisbeliefwasinitiatedbythefirstshotsfiredbyLieutenantNandreinforcedby

thefurthershotsthatfollowedsoonafter.Inthisbeliefsoldiersreactedbylosingtheir

self-controlandfiringthemselves,forgettingorignoringtheirinstructionsandtrainingand

failingtosatisfythemselvesthattheyhadidentifiedtargetsposingathreatofcausing

deathorseriousinjury.Inthecaseofthosesoldierswhofiredineithertheknowledgeor

beliefthatno-oneintheareasintowhichtheyfiredwasposingathreatofcausingdeath

orseriousinjury,ornotcaringwhetherornotanyonetherewasposingsuchathreat,itis

atleastpossiblethattheydidsointheindefensiblebeliefthatallthecivilianstheyfiredat

wereprobablyeithermembersoftheProvisionalorOfficialIRAorweresupportersofone

orotheroftheseparamilitaryorganisations;andsodeservedtobeshotnotwithstanding

thattheywerenotarmedorposinganythreatofcausingdeathorseriousinjury.Our

overallconclusionisthattherewasaseriousandwidespreadlossoffirediscipline

amongthesoldiersofSupportCompany.


5.5 Thefiringbysoldiersof1PARAonBloodySundaycausedthedeathsof13peopleand

injurytoasimilarnumber,noneofwhomwasposingathreatofcausingdeathorserious

injury.WhathappenedonBloodySundaystrengthenedtheProvisionalIRA,increased

nationalistresentmentandhostilitytowardstheArmyandexacerbatedtheviolentconflict

oftheyearsthatfollowed.BloodySundaywasatragedyforthebereavedandthe

wounded,andacatastropheforthepeopleofNorthernIreland.

Documents

Outline Table of Contents General Introduction Glossary