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WHEN WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS A Backgrounder on Government Surveillance in Massachusetts I. OVERVIEW: SUNLIGHT ON SURVEILLANCE Americans increasingly are aware that the massive US intelligence system that had failed to prevent the 9/11 a-acks remains prone to what President Obama terms a “systemic failure.” 1 The 2009 Christmas Day plot to bomb an airplane bound for Detroit was not, the President said, “a failure to collect intelligence. It was a failure to integrate and understand the intelligence that we already had.” 2 The false assumption that the nation can be kept safe by applying “advanced technology” to massive databases, sharing the information with a wide range of partners, and “integrating all instruments of national power to ensure unity of effort” (to quote from the National Counter‑ Terrorism Center’s mission statement) has fostered the emergence of a national security surveillance state. This complex involves federal, state, and local law‑enforcement agencies, as well as private entities and foreign governments. Today, some 800,000 local and state operatives are dispersed throughout American cities and towns, filing reports on even the most common everyday behaviors and feeding this information into state, local and regional “fusion centers” under the auspices of a National Strategy for Information Sharing or ISE. 3 This initiative facilitates near real‑time sharing of information from a variety of databases among law enforcement officials and others. A new “homeland security” industry is flourishing, with lucrative gains going to Lockheed Martin, Raytheon, Boeing, Northrop Grumman and other major defense contractors, despite their reportedly inadequate performance. 4 The loss to civil liberties and potential for abuse is far‑reaching. With virtually no public discussion about the growing domestic surveillance apparatus and its methodology, we are in danger of losing such core values as the presumption of innocence and the right to privacy. Where intelligence used to mean gathering information for discreet criminal investigations, the definition of intelligence has been re‑wri-en to include the broad collection of information about everyday activities in hopes of detecting (and preventing) future behavior. Algorithms detect “pre‑crime” in a world in which we are all potential suspects. 5 This report focuses on the contours and implications of the new domestic intelligence paradigm for the Commonwealth of Massachuse-s. Massachuse-s, which played such a primary role in a-aining the “blessings of liberty” enshrined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights, must again exercise leadership to ensure that liberty and security can co‑exist in the 21 st century. As the hubs and practices of the new surveillance network get established across the state, we urgently need sunlight to expose what is taking shape in the shadows, a public debate about the kind of society we want to be and remedial legislative action.

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Page 1: our report, "When We Are All Suspects." - Why ?

WHEN WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS

A Backgrounder on Government Surveillance in Massachusetts

I. OVERVIEW: SUNLIGHT ON SURVEILLANCE

AmericansincreasinglyareawarethatthemassiveUSintelligencesystemthathadfailedtopreventthe9/11a-acksremainspronetowhatPresidentObamatermsa“systemicfailure.”1The2009ChristmasDayplottobombanairplaneboundforDetroitwasnot,thePresidentsaid,“afailuretocollectintelligence.Itwasafailuretointegrateandunderstandtheintelligencethatwealreadyhad.”2

Thefalseassumptionthatthenationcanbekeptsafebyapplying“advancedtechnology”tomassivedatabases,sharingtheinformationwithawiderangeofpartners,and“integratingallinstrumentsofnationalpowertoensureunityofeffort”(toquotefromtheNationalCounter‑TerrorismCenter’smissionstatement)hasfosteredtheemergenceofanationalsecuritysurveillancestate.Thiscomplexinvolvesfederal,state,andlocallaw‑enforcementagencies,aswellasprivateentitiesandforeigngovernments.Today,some800,000localandstateoperativesaredispersedthroughoutAmericancitiesandtowns,filingreportsoneventhemostcommoneverydaybehaviorsandfeedingthisinformationintostate,localandregional“fusioncenters”undertheauspicesofaNationalStrategyforInformationSharingorISE.3Thisinitiativefacilitatesnearreal‑timesharingofinformationfromavarietyofdatabasesamonglawenforcementofficialsandothers.Anew“homelandsecurity”industryisflourishing,withlucrativegainsgoingtoLockheedMartin,Raytheon,Boeing,NorthropGrummanandothermajordefensecontractors,despitetheirreportedlyinadequateperformance.4

Thelosstocivillibertiesandpotentialforabuseisfar‑reaching.Withvirtuallynopublicdiscussionaboutthegrowingdomesticsurveillanceapparatusanditsmethodology,weareindangeroflosingsuchcorevaluesasthepresumptionofinnocenceandtherighttoprivacy.Whereintelligenceusedtomeangatheringinformationfordiscreetcriminalinvestigations,thedefinitionofintelligencehasbeenre‑wri-entoincludethebroadcollectionofinformationabouteverydayactivitiesinhopesofdetecting(andpreventing)futurebehavior.Algorithmsdetect“pre‑crime”inaworldinwhichweareallpotentialsuspects.5

ThisreportfocusesonthecontoursandimplicationsofthenewdomesticintelligenceparadigmfortheCommonwealthofMassachuse-s.Massachuse-s,whichplayedsuchaprimaryroleina-ainingthe“blessingsofliberty”enshrinedintheConstitutionandBillofRights,mustagainexerciseleadershiptoensurethatlibertyandsecuritycanco‑existinthe21stcentury.Asthehubsandpracticesofthenewsurveillancenetworkgetestablishedacrossthestate,weurgentlyneedsunlighttoexposewhatistakingshapeintheshadows,apublicdebateaboutthekindofsocietywewanttobeandremediallegislativeaction.

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II. LESSONS OF 9/11 AND THE CHRISTMAS DAY PLOT: WHY MORE DATA DOESN’T MAKE US SAFE

President’sObama’swarninga^erthe2009ChristmasDayPlotthatmoreintelligencedatadoesn’tnecessarilykeepussafeechoesstatementsfromthemultiplereportsintotheintelligencefailurethatledtothe9/11terrorista-acks.Thentoo,theproblemwasnotlackofinformation.Rather,intelligenceagenciesweredrowningininformation.Accordingtoonesource,thehighlysecretiveEchelonspynetworkrunbytheNationalSecurityAgencyprocessed3millionelectroniccommunicationsaminute.6Then,asnow,theUSintelligencecommunityfailedtotranslateandanalyzeintelligenceinterceptsinatimelyfashionanddowhatwasneededto“connectthedots.”Theresultwasthelitanyofbureaucraticblunders,missedopportunities,turfwars,poortraining,ineptitude,andsystemicweaknessdetailedinthe900‑pagereportfromtheHouseandSenateIntelligenceCommi-ees.7

Initsreviewofhowa23‑year‑oldNigeriannationalUmarFaroukAbdulmutallabmanagedtoevadethepost9/11USintelligencenetworkandboardaplanecarryinganexplosivedevice,theWhiteHousereportedthatthesecurityfailurewasnotcausedbytheentrenchedresistancetosharinginformationthatprecededthe9/11a-acks.8Ratheritwasafailureof“intelligenceanalysis”forwhichtheCIAandtheNationalCounterterrorismCenterwerechieflyresponsible.9

Fiveyearsa^eranextraordinarynewlayerofbureaucracywasestablishedandheavilyfundedtopromoteeffectiveintelligencesharing,integration,evaluationanddissemination,theNationalCounterterrorismCenter(NCTC)hasbeenfoundseriouslywanting.Encompassingadozen“partneragencies”fromwithinthefederalgovernmentaswellasnumerous“foreignpartners,”itmaintainstheNationalCounterterrorismCenter’sTerroristIdentitiesDatamartEnvironment(TIDE)system.

WellbeforeAbdulmutallabtookhisseatonaplane,theTIDEsystemwasseentobesufferingfromwhatoneMemberofCongresscalled“serious,longstandingtechnicalproblems,”andthea-empttofixitwasa$300millionfailure.10ThatiswhereAbdulmutallab’snameandbiographicaldataweredepositeda^erhisfatherinNovember2009toldtheUSEmbassyinAbujaaswellasCIAofficialsabouthisson’spossibletiestoextremistsinYemen.Therethatinformationremained,alongwitharisingtideofinformationaboutsome550,000otheridentities.DespitethefactthatAbdulmutallabhadbeenlistedonaUKwatchlistinMay2009,anddespiteintelligenceaboutaplotinvolvinga“Nigerian”trainedinYemen,hisnamewasnevermovedfromtheTIDEsystemtothemasterwatchlistintheTerroristScreeningCenter,maintainedbytheFBI,aNCTCpartnerorganization.

IfTIDEishuge,theFBI’sTerroristScreeningDatabaseisabehemoth,containingtheidentitiesof400,000peopleandwelloveramillionnames,includingaliases.11TheFBIdecidesonadailybasiswhoshouldbeincludedonthemasterwatchlist,addedtothe4,000strong“NoFly”listorputonthelistofabout14,000peopletargetedforadditionalairportscreening.12Therateatwhichnamesareenteredontothemasterwatchlisthasbeensteadilygrowing.TheFBIreportedtotheSenateJudiciaryCommi-eeinthefallof2009that1,600peoplearebeingnominatedforinclusioneveryday13‑morethandoublethenumbersenteredinSeptember2007.

TwoweeksbeforeAbdulmutallab’sflight,TimothyHealy,theDirectoroftheTerroristScreening

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Center,toldtheSenateCommi-eeonHomelandSecuritythat“ourinteragencywatchlistingandscreeningeffortshavematuredintoatrueinformationsharingsuccess,”andthatthenumbersonthewatchlistswillcontinuetoincrease“asnewscreeningpartnersjoinournationalandinternationalenterprise.”14AccordingtoHealy,thosepartnersnowinclude17foreigngovernmentsandall72stateandlocalfusioncenterswithintheUnitedStates.

Asthenamesof“suspects”rapidlymultiply,sodothecounterterrorismwiretapsthattheFBIhasfailedtoreviewandsharewithitspartneragencies.TheJusticeDepartment’sInspectorGeneralreportedtoCongressthat47,000hoursoftapeshadnotbeenprocessed‑theequivalentofarecordinglastingfiveandone‑halfyears(representingaquarteroftherecordingsmadesince2003).FBIDeputyDirectorJohnPistolerespondedthatthebacklogwasnotinfactoverwhelming,sincetheFBIhadtheassistanceof“advancedtechnology”toidentifyspecifictapestoreview.15

Asforthebacklogof7.2millionelectronicfileswaitingforreview,theFBIhasmaintainedthistoowasnotabigproblemsince“itsanalystsincreasinglyusedsophisticatedcomputersearchesofdatabasestofindhighpriorityfilesratherthanopeningeachindividualfilebyhand.”16Itwasnotclearwhethertheagencyexpectscomputersalsotodotheworkoftranslators.Havingfailedtomeetitshiringgoalsforlinguistsinallbuttwoof14targetedlanguages,theFBInowhasfewertranslatorsonstafftodaythanitdidafewyearsago,accordingtotheJusticeDepartment’sInspectorGeneral.

III. THE RISE, FALL AND RISE AGAIN OF TOTAL INFORMATION AWARENESS

“[O]urgoalistotalinformationawareness...”JohnPoindexter,SpeechtoDefenseTechnologyConference,2002.17

Thepastdecadehaswitnessedaradicalshi^intheworkofbothnationalandlocalintelligenceandlawenforcementcommunitiesinreactiontothefailuresof9/11.Ratherthaninsistonholdingindividualsandinstitutionsaccountable,the9/11Commission,abipartisangroupsetupbyCongress,recommendedtheestablishmentoftheNationalCounter‑TerrorismCenterunderaNationalIntelligenceDirectortopromoteafundamentalchangeinhowintelligenceagenciescarriedouttheirbusiness.“Stovepipes”thatseparatedagenciesandinformationhadtobedismantledasa“unityofeffort”wasbuiltacrossgovernment:“Thesystemof‘needtoknow’shouldbereplacedbyasystemof‘needtoshare’.”18

Beforethe9/11Commissionreportappearedin2004,buildingthat“unityofeffort”hadalreadybeenbegunwiththemergingof22governmentofficesintothemassiveDepartmentofHomelandSecurity(DHS)andtheactionsofaresearcharmoftheDepartmentofDefenseknownastheDefenseAdvancedResearchProjectsAgency(DARPA).Latein2002,TheNewYorkTimesrevealedthatDARPA’sOfficeofInformationAwarenessundertheleadershipofAdmiralJohnPoindexter,formerNationalSecurityAdvisortoPresidentReagan,wasplanningto“breakdownthestovepipes”separatingcommercialandgovernmentdatabases,sothatallelectronicdatacouldbesearchedbypowerfulcomputersinthehuntforhiddenpa-ernsindicatingterroristactivity.19Under“TotalInformationAwareness”(TIA),intelligenceandlawenforcementofficialswouldhave“instantaccesstoinformationfromInternetmailandcallingrecordstocreditcardandbankingtransactionsand

WHEN WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS 3

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traveldocuments,withoutasearchwarrant.”20Thenamereflectedthegrowingbeliefthatinordertopreventanothera-ack,thegovernmentneededtoknoweverythingtakingplaceintheUnitedStatesandglobally–everythingaboutordinarycommercialtransactionsandpersonalinformation,inadditiontotraditionalintelligencerelatedtonationalsecurityandcriminalactivity. OnceTIAwaspubliclyunmasked,itfacedintenseopposition.Awidespectrumofgroupsfearedthiswouldbetheendofthe“righttobeletalone,”whichJusticeLouisBrandeisreferredtoasthe“mostcomprehensiveofrightsandtherightmostvaluedbyallcivilizedmen.”21Specifically,groupsbalkedatthenotionthatTIAwouldaccess“everyAmerican’spastaddresses,personalmedicalrecords,bankdealings,travelitineraries,mentalhealthhistories,creditcardpurchasesandotherso‑called‘transactional’data.”22TheCatoInstitutewarnedthatthis“powertogenerateacomprehensivedataprofileonanyU.S.citizen”invoked“thespecteroftheEastGermansecretpoliceandcommunistCuba’sblockwatchsystem.”23

AstheformerCIAemployeeandRepublicanCongressmanfromGeorgiaBobBarrandtheACLU’sLegislativeDirectorLauraMurphywrotejointlyin2003:

“Rarely,ifever,dogroupsasfarapartontheideologicalspectrumastheAmericanCivilLibertiesUnionandEagleForumcomedownonthesamesideofanissue.Butapparently,whenitcomestopreservingthosecoreAmericanideals,thereisrarecommongroundtobefound.”24

Inresponsetothisstrongpopularopposition,Congressappearedtoreversecourse,strikingTIAfromtheDepartmentofDefenseAppropriationsActforfiscalyear2004.ButtheendoftheTIAprojectinnamedidnotmeantheendofthe“totalinformationawareness”approach.Rather,legislatorssecretlywroteaclassifiedannextotheappropriationsbillthatpreservedfundingforTIA’scomponenttechnologies,aslongastheyweretransferredtoothergovernmentagenciesandwereusedformilitaryorforeignintelligencepurposesagainstnon‑U.S.citizens.25

AccordingtolaterreportingbytheNationalJournal,researchunderTIA“wasmovedfromthePentagon’sresearch‑and‑developmentagencytoanothergroup,whichbuildstechnologiesprimarilyfortheNationalSecurityAgency...Thenamesofkeyprojectswerechanged,apparentlytoconcealtheiridentities,buttheirfundingremainedintact,o^enunderthesamecontracts.”26DespitetheofficialdemiseofTIA,itsdomesticintelligence‑gatheringapparatuscontinuedtobeexpandedandenhancedunderdifferentprogramsandstructures.

TheFBIhasamassedsome1.5billionrecordsinitsNationalSecurityBranchAnalysisCenterinCrystalCity,Virginia–includingtravelrecords,rentalcompanyrecords,creditcardrecords,databrokerrecords,telephonenumbers,recordsofpilotsanddriversofhazardousmaterialinordertosubjectthemtoDARPA‑styledatamining.27ItisalsodevelopingSTAR(“TheSystemtoAssessRisk”)whichassignsscorestoindividualsbasedoninformationcompiledfromgovernmentandcommercialdatabases.28Inaddition,itisbuildingamassivedatabaseinClarksburg,WestVirginiathatcontainsfingerprints,palmpa-erns,facialrecognitionimagesandirisscansofmillionsofterroristsuspectsandcriminals.29

WhiletheFBIhasissuedhundredsofthousandsofNationalSecurityLe-erstocollectpersonalinformationfromInternetServiceProviders,phonecompaniesandfinancialinstitutions,theNational

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SecurityAgency(NSA)hasfundedresearchintothe“massharvestingoftheinformationthatpeoplepostaboutthemselvesonsocialnetworks,”andhowtodo“automatedintelligenceprofiling”ofthisinformationcombinedwithawealthofotherpersonaldata.30AccordingtoTheWallStreetJournal,by2008theNSA“nowmonitorshugevolumesofrecordsofdomesticemailsandInternetsearchesaswellasbanktransfers,creditcardtransactions,travelandtelephonerecords”andsearchesfor“suspiciouspa-erns.”ItworksinpartnershipwiththeFBItocastawidenetofassociationsthrough“social‑networkanalysis.”31

NotallTIA‑styleprojectshavecometofruition.MATRIX(the“Multi‑StateAnti‑TerrorismInformationExchange”),aprototypedatabasecombiningstatelawenforcementandprivateinformationa-ractedtoomuchoppositionforstatestobuyintoit.ThePentagon’s“threat‑tracking”Talondatabasewasshutdowna^eritwasrevealedthatitwasretaininginformationaboutpeacefulanti‑warprotests.TheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity’sADVISE(“Analysis,Dissemination,Visualization,InsightandSemanticEnhancement”)plannedtotrollavastamountofdata“toidentifysuspiciouspeople,places,andotherelementsbasedontheirlinksandbehavioralpa-erns.”Itwasreportedlyabandoneda^eritspilotprojectwasfoundtohavebeenviolatingprivacyguidelines.32

Butthesearchfor“suspiciouspa-erns”throughtheaggregationofdataanduseofdataminingtechniquesappearsheretostay,inspiteofthefindingsoftheexhaustive352‑pagereportproducedinOctober2008bytheNationalResearchCouncil.Basedonseveralyearsofresearch,thereportconcludesthatthea-emptstofindterroriststhroughdatamining“isneitherfeasibleasanobjectivenordesirableasagoaloftechnologydevelopmentefforts”andthatitwillresultin“ordinary,law‑abidingcitizensandbusinesses”beingwronglytreatedassuspects.33

ThatassessmenthasnotstoppedtheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityandotherfederalagenciesfrompushingaheadwithplanstoensure“unityofeffort”byenlistingstateandlocallaw‑enforcementagenciesinthecollection,analysisanddisseminationofinformation.Theyareseenasthe“’eyesandears’oftheextendednationalsecuritycommunity.”34Asaresult,bothintelligence‑gatheringandpolicingareevolvinginradicallynewdirectionswithfewrulesinplaceandli-lediscussionoftheimplicationsfor“wethepeople.”

IV LITTLE BROTHER IS WATCHING: THE DECENTRALIZATION OF SURVEILLANCE AND THE RISE OF FUSION CENTERS

“Ienvisionatrulyseamlesscommunityofintelligenceprofessionalsstretchingoutacrossthenation

inclusiveoftraditionalintelligenceprofessionals,oflawenforcementintelligenceprofessionals,andof

State,localandprivatesectorintelligenceprofessionals.”

CharlesE.AllentotheSubcommi-eeonIntelligence,InformationSharingandTerrorismRiskAssessment,February4,2007.35

Thefederalgovernmenthasaggressivelypromotedthisnewsurveillancenetworkbydirectingrestrictedresourcestothestatesandlargeurbanareastobuildthetoolsforever‑broadercollectionofinformationaboutordinaryAmericans.In2007,CongresscodifiedthisnewapproachbymandatingthecreationofanInformationSharingEnvironment(“ISE”)to“combinepolicies,procedures,andtechnologiesthatlinkpeople,systems,andinformationamongallappropriatefederal,state,localandtribalentitiesandtheprivatesector.”36

WHEN WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS 5

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6 WHEN WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS

Thehubsforthismulti‑sourceinformationcollectionaretheregionalandstate“fusioncenters.”Since2003,withtheassistanceofDepartmentofHomelandSecurityfunding,thesenewdata‑collectioninstitutionshavebeendevelopedalloverthecountryfortheexpresspurposeof“fusing”andanalyzinginformationfromlawenforcement,othergovernmententities,andprivatecompanies,ostensiblytocombatterrorism.Nownumbering72,fusioncentersareintendedtobe“thecornerstoneofinformationsharingwithstateandlocalgovernments.”37Operatingonthestateandlocallevel,theseinstitutionshavebeenestablishedtofeedarapidlydevelopingnationalintelligencenetwork,eachoneservingasanodewithinthelargerinformation‑sharingweb. Fusioncentersrepresentasignificantdeparturefromtraditionallawenforcementobjectivesandmethods.Therearefewlegallimitsonwhattheycanandcannotdo.Theyerasejurisdictionalboundariesandblurlinesofauthorityandaccountability.Theyexpandwhatinformationmaybecollectedandwithwhomitmaybeshared.Theyempowerlocalandstateofficials,includingundercoveroperatives,toengageindomesticintelligencecollectionandmonitoreverydaybehaviorthathasnothingtodowithcriminalinvestigations.Tofeedfusioncenterdatabases,stateandlocalpoliceareencouragedtocollectandreportonnon‑criminal“suspicious”behaviorsuchastakingphotographs,writingnotesandespousing“radical”beliefs.Theyinvitenon‑lawenforcementparticipants,includingprivatesectorcompaniesandtheU.S.military,intolocalandstateintelligenceoperations.38Andtheyhavebecomearepositoryfor“tips”about“suspicious”behaviorphonedinbymembersofthepublic.

FormerA-orneyGeneralJohnAshcro^’splantotraincitizenstoreportsuspiciousactivitythroughaprogramknownasOperationTIPS(“TerrorismInformationandPreventionSystem”)causedsuchapublicoutcrythatitwasofficiallycancelledbyCongressinNovember2002.Butnowthefederalgovernmentandlocalpolicearereachingouttolocalcommunitygroupsinaneffortto“engagetheircommunitiestopreventcrimeandterrorism”andto“reaffirmtheircommitmenttoworkingtogethertoimprovetheutilityoffusioncenters.”39

Makingintelligenceoperationsmoreeffectivebyimprovingthesharingofinformationmaterialtocriminalinvestigationsisalegitimatelawenforcementgoal.However,increasinglawenforcement’scapacityandincentivetocollectandshareinformationwithoutaconnectiontosuspectedcriminalactivityisneithereffectivenorwise.Historyshowsthatregardlessofgoodintentions,creatingthemeanstosecretlygather,store,accessandusepersonalinformationofmillionsofAmericanswithoutadequatecontrolsislikelytodistractlawenforcementfromitspublicsafetymissionandleadtoabusesofindividuallibertiesandcivilrights.

Spying on Protected Political Activity

Therecentdramaticexpansionofintelligencecollectionatthelocalandstatelevelraisesprofoundcivillibertiesconcernsregardingindividualprivacy,freedomofspeech,freedomofassociation,andfreedomofreligion.Thequantityofdatathatlawenforcementandfederalintelligenceagenciesarenewlyableandencouragedtocollect,shareandstoreindefinitelyopensthedoortoidentitythe^,violationsofprivacyandtheveryrealpossibilitythatinnocentpeoplewillbeconsideredsuspectswithouthavingdoneanythingwrong.

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WHEN WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS 7

Withtheemphasisonge-ingmoreinformationabouteveryoneandeverythingthatcould,howeverremotely,beconnectedto“suspicious”activity,itisnotsurprisingthattheACLUhasdocumentedinstancesofimproperspyingonprotectedFirstAmendmentspeechandrightsofassociationinmorethanhalfthestates.Examplesinclude:

•AMay7,2008reportpreparedfortheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityentitled“UniversalAdversaryDynamicThreatAssessment”thatlabeledenvironmentalorganizationsliketheSierraClub,theHumaneSocietyandtheAudubonSocietyas“mainstreamorganizationswithknownorpossiblelinkstoeco‑terrorism.”40

•Thefactthatanimalrightsrallies,environmentaldemonstrations,anti‑warprotests,studentprotestsagainstmilitaryrecruitingoncampus,laborunionorganizing,anddemonstrationsagainstpolicebrutalityhaveallfoundtheirwayintogovernmentdatabasesattheCaliforniaAnti‑TerrorismCenter,theCaliforniaOfficeofHomelandSecurityandtheLACountyTerroristEarlyWarningCenter(LACTEW).41

•TheinfiltrationofandmonitoringbytheMarylandStatePoliceofnon‑violentpeacegroups,deathpenaltygroups,AmnestyInternationalandtheChesapeakeClimateActionNetwork.Blatantlyincorrectinformationaboutpeaceactivistshasbeenenteredintothelocalfusioncenterandothergovernmentdatabases,bearinglabelssuchas“Terrorism‑anti‑government,”accordingtodocumentsobtainedthroughanACLUpublicrecordsrequest.42

•AdocumentleakedfromtheVirginiaFusionCenterthatcitedvarioushistoricallyBlackcollegesanduniversitiesaspotential“radicalizationnodes”forterrorists.TheNationofIslam,NewBlackPantherPartyandEarthFirst!areamongthe33groupslistedaspotentialterroristthreats.43

•A“PreventionAwarenessBulletin”leakedfromaTexasfusioncenterthatflaggedformerGeorgiaCongresswomanCynthiaMcKinneyandformerU.S.A-orneyGeneralRamseyClarkforsurveillance,aswellasgroupssuchastheCouncilonAmericanIslamicRelations,ANSWERandtheInternationalActionCenter.44

•Areportonthe“modernmilitiamovement”thatwasleakedfromtheMissouriInformationAnalysisCenter,thestate’sfusioncenter.Itstatedthatmilitiamembersare“usuallysupporters”ofpresidentialcandidatesRonPaul,ChuckBaldwinandBobBarr,andinstructedtheMissouripolicetobeonthelookoutforpeopledisplayingbumperstickersandparaphernaliaassociatedwiththeConstitutional,CampaignforLiberty,andLibertarianparties.45

Theveryfederalagenciesthathavechampionedthenewapproachhavealsoraisedseriousconcerns.In2008,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityPrivacyOfficeconductedareviewoffusioncenterprogramsandidentifiedanumberofriskstoprivacypresentedbythefusioncenterprogram,including:(1)AmbiguousLinesofAuthority,Rules,andOversight;(2)ParticipationoftheMilitaryandthePrivateSector;(3)DataMining;(4)ExcessiveSecrecy;(5)InaccurateorIncompleteInformation;and(6)MissionCreep.46

Nonetheless,thisDHSreportofferedpreciousli-lehelpfromthefederalgovernmentinaddressingtheseissues.Instead,itplacedtheburdenofsafeguardingcivillibertiessquarelyonlocal

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8 WHEN WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS

jurisdictionsthemselves,statingthatit“presumesthattheStatesareinterestedinpreservingandcompetenttoprotecttherightsoftheirowncitizens,andoffersnoopinionastotheirmethods.”47

HasMassachuse-sshownitselftobeinterestedinpreservingandcompetenttoprotecttherightsofitsresidents?Itistotheintelligence‑gatheringnetworkthatistakingshapeintheCommonwealththatwenowturn.

IV. UNTANGLING THE SURVEILLANCE WEB IN MASSACHUSETTS

“Arewewiretapping,arewefollowingwhat’sgoingon,areweseeingwho’scomingin,who’scoming

out,areweeavesdropping,carryingoutsurveillanceonthoseindividualsthatarecomingfromplacesthat

havesponsoreddomesticterror?”

GovernorMi-Romney,SpeechtotheHeritageFoundation,September14,2005

Mi-RomneyservedasGovernorofMassachuse-sduring2003–2007,theyearswhenthenewintelligenceapparatuswasbeingerectedaroundthecountry.AsleadgovernoronhomelandsecurityissuesattheNationalGovernorsAssociationandamemberoftheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity’sAdvisoryCouncil,hewasanardentbackerofwhathecalleda“newintelligencenetwork”whichwouldbebuiltatthestateandlocalleveltosi^throughcrimereportsinordertodiscloseterroristplots.48AndhehopedtoreviveOperationTIPS,whichhadalreadybeencancelledbyCongress:“Theeyesandearswhichgatherintelligenceneedtobeasdevelopedinourcountryastheywereinforeigncountriesduringthecoldwar…Meterreaders,EMSdrivers,lawenforcement,privatesectorpersonnelneedtobeonthelookoutforinformationwhichmaybeuseful.”49

NosoonerdidRomneybecomegovernorthantheMassachuse-s‑FBIJointTerrorismTaskForce(JTTF)wasexpanded.Whatstartedin1979asaninformalcollaborationbetweentheFBIandtheNewYorkPoliceDepartmenttofightbankrobberiesbecameaformalarrangementin1996whenFBIofficesbegantoenterintoagreementswithlocalandstatepolicetocreateJTTFs.Underthisformofcross‑jurisdictionalcooperation,stateandlocallawenforcementofficialsremainonthelocalpayrollbutaredeputizedbytheFBIandgivenclearancetoaccessinformationandworkunderthedirectionoftheFBIagentincharge.Today,everyFBIfieldofficeinthecountryhasaJTTFandmorethan5,000lawenforcement,intelligence,militaryandcivilianmembersareinvolvedin“fieldinvestigationsofactualorpotentialterrorismthreats.”50

TheMassachuse-sStatePolice,BostonPoliceDepartment,LowellPoliceDepartment,MBTAPoliceDepartmentandtheU.S.PostalServiceareallpartofa2003JTTFagreementwiththeFBIandworktogetherwithmembersofthemilitaryandthefederalgovernment.ThestatedpurposeoftheMassachuse-sJTTFisthe“prevention,preemption,deterrenceandinvestigationofterrorismandactivitiesrelatedtoterrorism,bothactualandpotential.”51Ineffect,theFBI’sJTTFturnslocalandstatepoliceofficersintofederaldomesticintelligenceagentswhocarryoutoperationsandshareinformationwithmanyotheragenciesandentities.

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WHEN WE ARE ALL SUSPECTS 9

Ayeara^ertheMassachuse-sJTTFwasconstituted,GovernorRomneybroughtthefusioncenterconcepttoMassachuse-s.In2004,thegroundworkwaslaidfortheCommonwealthFusionCenter(CFC)withoutanypublicnoticeorlegislativeprocess.Afewyearslater,theCommonwealthFusionCenterwascodifiedbyExecutiveOrder–againwithoutanypublicinvolvement.52

TheCommonwealthFusionCenterwasjoinedbyasecondfusioncenterin2005,theBostonRegionalIntelligenceCenter(BRIC).Asamajorurbanareawithavulnerableportandanairportinvolvedinthe9/11a-acks,Boston–andbyextensionallofMassachuse-s–haveservedasanationalmodelforintelligencecooperationandinformation‑sharingamongfederal,state,localandprivatepartners.

Althoughthesurveillanceandinformation‑sharingmechanismsbeingdevelopedandemployedinMassachuse-sremainlargelysecret,theACLUofMassachuse-shasbeenabletouncoversomefactsthatshedlightonwhatishappening–andraisemanymorequestions.

First,theACLUofMassachuse-shasmadeandcontinuestomakerequestsforinformationundertheMassachuse-spublicrecordslawsandthefederalFreedomofInformationAct(FOIA).Theinformationwereceiveduncoveredinconsistenciesandareasthatareopenforabuse.

Second,a-orneysfromtheACLUofMassachuse-smetwithofficialsfromtheCommonwealthFusionCenterandtouredthefacility.Whilethegovernmentofficialswereforthcomingwithinformationandansweredmanyofourquestions,moreremain.ThefollowingisasynopsisofwhatwehavelearnedthroughourFOIAworkandthroughpubliclyavailableinformation.

The Commonwealth Fusion Center

BecauseofthelackofpubliclyavailableinformationabouttheCFC,theACLUofMassachuse-swrotetotheSecretaryofthestateExecutiveOfficeofPublicSafety(“EOPS”)inDecember2007requestinginformationundertheMassachuse-spublicrecordslaws.Wereceivedaninformativereply.However,becauseofitsinherentlysecretnature,manyquestionsremainaboutthestructureandfunctioningoftheCFC.

HereiswhatwedoknowabouttheCFC,whichiscurrentlybasedinMaynard,Massachuse-s.TheFusionCenterwasfirstmentionedintheStateHomelandSecurityStrategyissuedbytheExecutiveOfficeofPublicSafetyinFebruary2004,whichreportedthat“theoperationalandorganizational‘hub’ofthecommonwealth’shomelandsecurityeffortswillbea14/7informationfusioncentermaintainedbytheMassachuse-sStatePoliceCriminalIntelligenceSection”whichwouldworkcloselywiththenewJointTerrorismTaskForce,theUSA-orney’sOfficeandotherkeystate,regionalandlocalentitiestocollectandshareintelligence.

TheCFCwassubsequentlysetupasamulti‑agencydatacollectioncenterunderthesupervisionoftheMassachuse-sStatePolice.Federal,state,localandprivateofficialsofvariousagenciesandcompaniesweresoonembeddedwithinit,providingtheCFCwithaccesstotheirdatabasesandhavingaccesstotheinformationstoredandanalyzedintheCFChub.TheseagenciesincludetheFBI,BureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,FirearmsandExplosives,theMassachuse-sNationalGuard,theDepartmentofCorrection,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityOfficeofIntelligenceAnalysis,

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theGeographicInformationSystemsandtheU.S.ArmyCivilSupportTeam.53Inaddition,apoliceofficerfromCSXRailroad,aprivateentity,wasalsoembeddedintheCFC.54 TheFusionCenterhasenteredintodata‑sharingagreementswithlocalpolicedepartmentsinMassachuse-s,statepoliceinotherstatesandwithanumberofstateagencies.ThroughthenationalInformationSharingEnvironment,theFusionCenterislinkedtootherfederalandstateagencies,andthedataitcollectscaneasilybeshared.Theinformationapparentlyissharedbothways:inadditiontofederalagentshavingaccesstolocalinformation,localpersonnelhavebeengrantedclearancebyDHSandFBItoaccessclassifiedinformation.55

Whatisthefocusofallthisintelligencegathering?TheoriginalmandateoftheCFCwasto“detect,protectagainst,prevent,respondto,andrecoverfromterrorista-acksandothercriticalincidents,”andto“allowfortheseamlessexchangeofhomelandsecurityinformation,terrorisminformation,andlawenforcementinformationrelatedtoterrorism.”56Butfromthebeginning,ithadabroadervisionofitsmission,undertakingtoemployan“allhazards,”“allthreats,”and“allcrimes”approachtohomelandsecurityandtocollectinformationthatwasunrelatedtoterrorism.57

Crucially,thelinebetweentraditionalcrimefightingandterrorismdetectionwasblurred,ostensiblybecauseterroristsincreasinglyreliedoncrimetofinancetheiractivities.Buttherewereotherreasons.AccordingtoareportbytheCongressionalResearchService,“Itwasimpossibletocreate‘buyin’amongstlocallawenforcementagenciesandotherpublicsectorsifafusioncenterwassolelyfocusedoncounterterrorism,asthecenter’spartnerso^endidn’tfeelthreatenedbyterrorism,nordidtheythinkthattheircommunitywouldproducewould‑beterrorists”58 Createdasterrorism‑fightingtools,soonmostfusioncentersinthecountrychangedthefocusoftheirdatacollectiontoan“allcrimes”and“allhazards”missionthatissubstantiallybroaderthanthelawsthatcreatedthemenvisioned.59Thisbroaderapproachenabledthemtoapplyforawiderrangeofgrantstofundthework.60Bytheendof2007,asurveyof36fusioncentersfoundthatonly15percentofthemsaidtheirfocuswassolelycounterterrorism.61

TheCFC,likeotherfusioncentersaroundthecountrythatlaterexpandedtheirmission,cancollectinformationthatgoeswellbeyondcriminalintelligence.Thisincludesinformationobtainedfrom“medicalexaminers(una-endeddeath),publichealthentities,emergencyrooms(informationsimilartotheDrugAbuseWarningNetworkprogram),environmentalregulatoryinspectors,transportationentities,housinginspectors,healthinspectors,buildingcodeinspectors,etc.”62

AccordingtotheMassachuse-sExecutiveOfficeofPublicSafety,whichisresponsibleupthechainofcommandfortheCFC:

“TheCFCactuallyhasseveralcorefunctions.Theseincludeitsroleastherepositoryoftraditionalcriminalinformationsothatlocalitiesandregionscanworktogethertosharecriminalinformationaboutspecificinvestigations,arrests,warrantsandtrends.Italsoincludesissuesinvolvingcriticalinfrastructureassessments(i.e.managingastatewidedatabase,knownasACAMS,whichassessesvulnerabilities),servesasamissingchildreninformationclearinghouse,andpromotesuniformcrimereportingandguntracing.”63

InMassachuse-s,FusionCenterofficialshavetoldusthattheCFCdoesnothaveitsownoperatives,butthatitinsteadreliesoninformationgatheredbyparticipatingentities.64However,theCFCguidelinesanticipatethattheCFCwillnotjustrelyoninformationsenttothembylocallawenforcement,butthatCFCpersonnelwillthemselvesperformsurveillanceduties–whichcanbedoneundercover.

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TheCFCguidelinesmakespecificprovisionforCFCundercoveroperatives.Forexample,theguidelinessuggestthatCFCundercoveroperativesmayengageincheckingleadsandconductingpreliminaryinquiriesinresponsetoanyallegationorinformationreceivedorcollectedbytheFusionCenter,evenwhenthereisnoreasonablesuspicionofunlawfulactivity.CFCundercoveroperativesareauthorizedto“a-endmeetingsthatareopentothepublicforpurposeofobservinganddocumentingevents”andarenotrequiredtoidentifythemselvesorleaveagatheringifitisrequestedthatpoliceofficersleaveoridentifythemselves.”65Theguidelinesfurtherstatethat“themerepresenceoflegalcounselatameetingdoesnotrequireanundercovertomissorleavethemeeting.”

EventhoughtheCFCpurportsto“voluntarily”66complywith28CFR23,afederalregulationthatmandatesthatanyprojectreceivingfederalmoney“shallcollectandmaintaincriminalintelligenceinformationconcerninganindividualonlyifthereisreasonablesuspicionthattheindividualisinvolvedincriminalconductoractivityandtheinformationisrelevanttothatcriminalconductoractivity,”theCFC’sownprocedurescontradictthis.

CFCStandardOperatingProcedureallowsofficerstoconduct“preliminaryinquiries”andcheckleadsbeforeestablishingreasonablesuspicionthatatargetisinvolvedincriminalactivity.Duringpreliminaryinquiries,“alllawfulinvestigativetechniquesmaybeused.”67Asaresult,suchpreliminaryinquiriescaneveninvolveundercoveroperativesorknowninformants.68 Whilecontinuingtorelyontheflowofcounter‑terrorismfundingfromthefederalgovernmentandthepublic’ssupportofbroadpowersintheanti‑terrorismfield,theCFCandfusioncentersacrossthecountrynowcollectdatathathasli-leornorelationtoterrorism,andinmanycases,norelationtoactualcrimes. Intheprocess,somethingnewhasbeenborn,againwiththehelpoffederalgrants:aconceptofpolicingthatisnolongerprimarilyreactiveandfocusedonsolvingcrimesthathavebeencommi-ed,orcollectingconcreteevidencethatacrimemaybeabouttobecommi-ed.In“intelligence‑ledpolicing,”officersonthebeatareseenas“anexcellentresourceforgatheringinformationonallkindsofpotentialthreatsandvulnerabilities.”69“Predictivepolicing”involvesstrategiesandtactics“thatimprovethesituationalawarenessoflawenforcementconcerningindividualsandlocationsbeforecriminalactivityoccurs….Thesemethodsmayincludecontemporaryapproachestodynamicsystemsmodelingandforecastingsuchasalgorithmicmethods,machineorstatisticallearning,orensemblemethods.Predictioncanfocusonanumberofvariablesincludingplaces,individuals,groups,orincidents.”70

Thehuntfor“precrime”istakenupbylocalpolicewhonolongerareentirely“local.”WhenlocalpoliceareassignedtoJTTFstheybecomefederalofficersandarenolongerunderthesupervisionofandaccountabletotheirlocaldepartmentsandcommunities.Whentheyparticipatewithfusioncentersinthecollectionandsharingofinformation,theyareintegratedintoanationaldomesticsurveillancenetworkforlawenforcementandintelligenceagencieswherelinesofauthoritybetweenlocal,stateandfederalagenciesareblurredandthereisnomeaningfullocalcontrol.TheCityofBostonhasbeenaleadplayerintheconstructionofthisnewpoliceparadigm.

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The Boston Regional Intelligence Center and the Rise of “Suspicious Activity Reporting”

In2005,theBostonPoliceDepartmentunveileditsownintelligence‑sharingcenter,knownastheBostonRegionalIntelligenceCenter(BRIC).AccordingtotheBostonPolice,BRIC“wasconceivedasawaytofurtherintegratetheintelligencecapabilitiesofBoston,local,state,andfederallawenforcementpartnersandrepresentsastrategicoverhaultothedepartment’straditionalintelligenceoperation.”71

LiketheFusionCenter,BRICenteredintodata‑sharingagreementswithlocalpolicedepartmentsinMassachuse-s,statepoliceinotherstatesandwithanumberofstateagencies.72AndliketheFusionCenter,BRIChasembeddedinitrepresentativesfromotherlawenforcementagencies,includingtheMassachuse-sStatePolice,theMBTATransitPolice,theMassachuse-sDepartmentofCorrection,theSuffolkCountySheriff’sOffice,theBrooklineandCambridgePoliceDepartmentsandarepresentativefromtheprivatesectorwhoservesasaliaisonbetweenlawenforcementandthebusinesscommunity.73BRICalsosharesinformationwiththeFusionCenterandtheJointTerrorismTaskForce.

In2009,theCityofBostonreceivednearly$2millioninfederalstimulusfundingfromtheAmericanRecoveryandReinvestmentActfortwograntspresentedtotheBostonPoliceDepartment(BPD)andtheBostonPublicHealthCommission(BPHC).74ThegranttotheBPDwillbeusedfor10newpositionsinsidetheBRIC,includingthreeReal‑TimeCrimeCenterIntelligenceanalystpositionsandtwoSocialNetworkAnalysisIntelligencepositions.Inaddition,BostonwasoneofsevencitiestoreceiveaPredictivePolicingDemonstrationandEvaluationProgramawardof$200,000inFY2009.

Suspicious Activity Reports (SARS)

Boston,alongwithLosAngeles,ChicagoandMiami‑Dade,isalsoparticipatinginapilotprogramknownasthe“NationwideSARInitiative.”AsrolledoutbytheLosAngelesPoliceDepartment(LAPD)in2007,theprogramrequiresofficerstoreport“suspiciousbehaviors”inadditiontotheirotherduties–creatingastreamof“intelligence”aboutarangeofeverydayactivitiesthatwillbefedintothelocalfusioncenter.75TheLAPDprogramdefinesas“suspiciousbehaviors”arangeofactivitiessuchasusingbinoculars,takingmeasurements,takingpicturesorvideofootage,takingnotes,andespousing“extremistviews.”76

TheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligencetoutedtheLAPDasa“nationalmodel,”andtheDepartmentsofJusticeandHomelandSecurityrecentlyteamedwiththeMajorCityChiefsAssociationtoexpandthe“SuspiciousActivityReporting”tothreeothercities,includingBoston.77AccordingtoTheWallStreetJournal,thenextstageisge-ingthepublicinvolved“inaneducationprogram,callediWATCH,whichwillinstructcitizensonspecificbehaviorstoreporttoauthorities.”78Withinthreeyears,thefederalgovernmentplanstoexpanditto72citiesandtownnationwide.79

Inanefforttodocumentandmakeavailableasmuchinformationaspossibleregardingactivitiesthataremerelypotentialindicatorsofcrime,SuspiciousActivityReportingrequiresthatincidentsinvolvingarangeofeverydayactivities–suchatakingpicturesofbuildings–arewri-enupinreportsthatarefedintothenationwideInformationSharingEnvironmentthroughfusioncenters,the

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JTTFsoramassiveFBIdatabasecalledeGuardian.ThroughtheInformationSharingEnvironment,participantsfrommyriadagenciesaroundthecountrywouldhaveaccesstothereports.

TheoriginalpurposeforfilingSuspiciousActivityReportswastohelppreventactsofterrorism,andthefederalagenciespurporttousethisexpansiveinformation‑gatheringmethodonlyinconnectiontoterrorism.However,underthegovernment’sdefinition,aSuspiciousActivityReportis“officialdocumentationofobservedbehaviorthatmaybeindicativeofintelligencegatheringorpreoperationalplanningrelatedtoterrorism,criminal,orotherillicitintention.”80Notethattheactivitycouldberelatedtoanyillicitintention,andthattheactivitymayormaynotbelinkedtoacrimeatall.Thisstandardiswellbelowthatof“reasonablesuspicion”setoutin28CFRPart23,whichgovernsmuchgatheringofcriminalintelligence. Accordingtothegovernment’sownrules,SARs“arenotintendedtobeusedtotrackorrecordongoingenforcement,intelligence,orinvestigatoryoperationsalthoughtheycanprovideinformationtotheseactivities.”81Instead,SARsareawaytodocumentandshareinformationaboutpotentialcrimesbeforetheyhappen.Assuch,thesedata‑gatheringcenterscancompilefilesonpeoplethatarefullofinformationonactivitiesthatmaybeinnocent,andinsomecases,constitutionallyprotected.

Domesticlawenforcementisnottheonlysectorthatcandra^andfileSARs.Inadditiontogovernmentagencies,“privatesectororganizationsresponsibleforCriticalInfrastructure/KeyResources(CI/KR)andforeignpartnersarealsopotentialsourcesforterrorism‑relatedSARs.”82

An Expanding Web of Surveillance Databases

WhenSARSarefiled,theyendupinadatamountainthatisgrowingeverlargerinsizeandreach.Agenciesthatenterintoinformation‑sharingagreementshaveaccesstoavarietyofdifferentdatabases,bothgovernment‑runandprivate.Theaccessingentitieshavenocontroloverorknowledgeaboutthekindandqualityofinformationthatisenteredintothedatabases,yettheymayrelyontheinformationtheyretrieveinordertobeginorcontinueaninvestigation.

Forexample,the“MassGangs”databaseintheCommonwealthFusionCentercollectsavastrangeofpersonalandassociationalinformationon“gangs,”definedbroadlyas“[a]nidentifiableorganization,associationorgroupoftwoormorepersons,whetherformalorinformal,whosemembersorassociatesengage,eitherindividuallyorcollectively,incriminalactivity.”83Basedonthisbroaddefinition,a“gangmember”couldincludeanypersonwhomerelyassociatesinformallywithanotherpersonwhoisengagedincriminalactivity.YetMassGangsisdesignedtocollectpersonaldataonanyonewhofitsthisbroaddefinitionandtosharethispersonalinformationwiththeFusionCenter,includingnames,characteristics,primaryactivities,pictures,electronicdocuments,associations,scarsormarks,physicaldetails,addresses,employers,vehicles,andmotorvehicleinformation.84

Massachuse-sisdevelopingseveralotherdatabasesthatwillmakeinformation‑sharingeasier.In2008,theCommonwealthunveiledSWISS,theStatewideInformationSharingSystem–a“criminalincidentdatacollectionandwarehousingsystemthatforthefirsttimeenableslawenforcemententitiesfromacrossthestatetoseamlesslysharecriminalincidentdata.”85SWISSallowsmultipleagenciestocontributepolicereportsinreal‑timetoastaterepositoryandthenaccessandsearchthese

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reportsremotelythroughadesktopormobilecomputer.86Suchadatabasewillcreateapermanentrecordnotonlyofarrests,butofallincidents–fromfightingneighborstoabarkingdog,becauseitisbasedonall“callstoservice.”Inaddition,thedatabasewillincludeeachtimeapoliceofficerstopssomeoneonthestreetandmakesasearch.87

Gatheredinformationwillalsobeputintoanotherdatabaseknownas“COPLINK,”88aprojectindevelopmentjointlybytheFusionCenterandtheMassachuse-sCriminalHistorySystemsBoard,which,accordingtothegovernment,isa“powerfulanalyticaltoolthatprovidesofficers,investigators,analysts,andpoliceexecutiveswithnewmethodstogenerateleads,performcrimeanalysis,mapdataandtrends,andsupportdecision‑making.”89

Technology-Driven Surveillance

Informationthatwasoncecontainedonlyinpaperrecordssituatedindispersedandremotelocationsisincreasinglyavailableindigitalformthatcanbesharedinstantly.Intelligenceagencieshavetheabilitytogather,analyze,storeindefinitelyandsharevastquantitiesofdata,includingpersonallyidentifiableinformation,whichisavailableinthousandsofpublicandprivatedatabasesatlightningspeed.

Moderntechnologyhasfaroutpacedourlaws’abilitytoprotectcivilliberties.Theinformationthatcanbelearnedaboutapersontodaybearsli-leresemblancetothedossiersandfilesthatgovernmentcouldcompileaboutcitizensatthetimeprivacyandcivillibertiesprotectionsweredra^ed.Today,thegovernmentcanlearnaboutanybody’sphysicallocation,buyingpreferences,health,politicalviewsandmorethroughamyriadofavailabletechnologiesthatareconstantlyincreasingandimproving.

Someexamples:

FACIAL RECOGNITION SOFTWARERaytheon,basedinWaltham,Massachuse-s,isatopproviderofsurveillancetechnologytolaw

enforcement.Ithasdeveloped“customizedfacialrecognitionsolutions,”thatallowcomputerstorecognizehumanfacesinrealtime.90

BIOMETRICS TheFBIbiometricdatabasenowcontainsover56millionrecordsandtheDepartmentof

HomelandSecurityholdsoveronehundredmillionrecords.91

GPS LOCATION THROUGH CELLULAR PHONES Thegovernmentcangainaccesstoanycellphone’slocationthroughcellphoneproviders.An

automatedsystemcansendoutapingtoaphone,whichcomesbackwiththephone’slatitudeandlongitude.ArecentreportrevealedthatSprintNextel“pinged”itscustomersmorethaneightmilliontimesbetweenSeptember2008and2009onbehalfoflawenforcement.92

RADIO FREQUENCY IDENTIFICATION (RFID): Thesetinychipssendoutradiosignalsthatcanbereadwirelesslyfromseveralyardsawayand

withouttheknowledgeoftheholder.U.S.passportsnowcontainthesechips,asdotheMBTA’sCharliecards,somecellularphonesandcountlessothercommercialproducts.

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SURVEILLANCE CAMERAS Moderncamerashavethecapabilityoffacialrecognition,detailedzoom,nightvisioncapabilities,

“X‑Ray”vision,andtrackingin3‑D.ThenetworkofDHS‑fundedsurveillancecamerasthathasbeeninstalledintheninecitiesandtownsoftheGreaterBoston“UrbanAreaSecurityInitiative”couldeventuallybefi-edwithfacialrecognitionso^ware,eyescans,radiofrequencyidentificationtagsandotherformsofso^wareandconnectedtolargelawenforcementdatabases.93

Imagineadatabase,accessibleviaawebbrowserfromhandheldmobilesandlaptopsinpolicecruisers,thatcontainsbillionsofdataentriesonmillionsofpeopleincludingbutnotlimitedtobankandtelephonerecords,emailcorrespondence,webhabits,imagesandtravelpa-erns.Inearly2003,theMassachuse-sStatePolice(MSP)putoutarequestforproposalsforanInformationManagementSystem(IMS)thatwoulddojustthat.94

Theso^waresoughtbyMSPwould:“Automatethecollection,collationandprocessingofintelligencedata;AutomatethedisseminationofintelligenceinformationtolawenforcementpersonnelbothinternalandexternaltotheStatePolice;Manageintelligencedatacollectedfromdisparatesources(paperreports,electronicreports/documents,existingdatabases,email,fax);Providethetechnologytoolsnecessarytoanalyzecollectedintelligencedata;[and]Provideareportingpackagethatallowsthecollecteddatatobeutilizedtoproducemeaningfulintelligencereports.”

InMay2005,theMassachuse-sStatePoliceawardedRaytheona$2.2millioncontracttobuild,install,troubleshootandmaintaintheInformationManagementSystem.95

V. TOTAL SURVEILLANCE SOCIETY: A PRICE WORTH PAYING?

It’sapre*ysimpleconcept:webringtogetherpeoplefromeveryU.S.agencythatcollectsandprocessesintelligence;weputtheminoneroomandhookthemintotheirownandintoourFBIintelligence

databases;andallofasuddenwehavetheuniverseofterroristintelligenceonthetable.”

KenLove,ActingChiefoftheNationalJointTerrorismTaskForce96

WhatappearedsimpletoMr.Lovebackin2004seemsmuchmorecomplicatedtoday–andmoretroubling.Muchremainsunknownabouttheemergingnationalintelligencesystem,includingtheCommonwealthFusionCenter,BRIC,andtheimplementationofaggressivenewlawenforcementstrategiesinMassachuse-s.Whatwedoknow,however,iscauseforseriousconcernforavarietyofreasons.

First,thesenewstrategiesarelesseffectivethantraditionalintelligenceeffortsandwastefulofpreciousresources.

Second,FusionCenterpoliciesandtheSuspiciousActivityReportingprogram,respectively,permitandencourageinvestigationoftotallylawfulFirstAmendmentactivities–includingcreativeexpression,politicalexpression,politicalandreligiousassociation,andcommunalworship–without

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reasonablesuspicionofcriminalwrongdoing.

Third,theFusionCenter’slackofverificationoftheaccuracyoftheinformationcollectedanddisseminated,togetherwithgapsinstateandfederallaw,threatentoproduceincurablyflawedfilesandundermineprivacyrights.

Finally,thesenewintelligencedatacentersremainfrighteninglyopaqueandunaccountable.

Total Surveillance Doesn’t Keep us Safe

AccordingtoMikeGerman,aformerFBIagentwhoinfiltratedterroristgroupsandnowworksasanACLUPolicyCounsel,“Investigatingpeoplewhoaren’tbreakingthelawisawasteoflawenforcementtimeandfinitesecurityresources,aswellasanunnecessaryviolationofprivacy.”97

Moreinformationisnotnecessarilybe-erinformation.Intelligenceagencieshavebeendrowninginatsunamiofdata,muchofitflawedwhenitwasenteredintodatabases,andmuchofitirretrievablebecauseofthebiggerflawsintechnologysystemsthataresupposedtomakeit“simple”todeliveractionableintelligence.AccordingtotheGovernmentAccountabilityOffice,“413governmentITprojectstotalingmorethan$25billioninFY2008alonewere‘poorlyplanned,poorlyperforming,orboth.’”98Thenumbergrewbyafurther238projectsand$13billioninFY2009.99

Insteadoffocusinglawenforcementresourcesanda-entiononidentifyingandinvestigatingthreats,billionsofdollarshavebeenputintogatheringasmuchinformationaspossibleaboutasmanypeople,situationsandfactsaspossible,inthehopesofusingautomatedsystemstocreatelinksthatwillpreventterrorista-acksandcatchcriminals.Valuabletimeiswastedinthea-empttobroadenaccesstosecurecomputersystemsthatmaynotbecompatible,tomakesurethatthosewhohaveaccesshaveproperclearancesandbackgroundchecks,andtofigureoutwaystorestrictunauthorizedaccesswithoutimpedingtheflowofdataandtostoredatasecurely.Onekeystrokecanmeanthatanamewillnotberetrieved,asreportedlyhappenedwhentheStateDepartmenta-emptedtoseeifthe2009ChristmasDaybomber,UmarFaroukAbdulmutallab,possessedavalidUSvisa.

However,whenthenumberandtypeofintelligencesourcesissovastthatweareallpotentialsuspects,itbecomesimpossibletovalidateorgiveappropriateweighttodifferentpiecesofinformationthatarebeingfedintothesystem.Withreportsindifferentformsandwithdifferentsetsofdatafromlocalpoliceofficers,banks,surveillancecameras,publictransportationsystems,healthsystemsandmore,datasi^ingreplacestraditionalsleuthinganditbecomesdifficulttoseparatethewheatofusefulinformationfromthechaffofendlessdata.Afocusondataminingandgatheringanever‑increasingquantityofdatarunstheriskofdistractinglawenforcementfromtried‑and‑trueinvestigativetechniquesthatfocusonindicationsofspecificcriminalwrongdoingandyieldhighqualityintelligence.

Feeding the Surveillance Monster; Undermining Community Policing

AstheNationalResearchCouncilfounda^eryearsofstudyingthesubject,dataminingisnotaneffectivewaytopreventterrorism.Yetthearchitecturehasbeenbuiltandneedsfundingandfeeding.Pressureonlocalofficialstoobtainfederalhomelandsecuritygrantmoneyisleading

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thestatedownthewrongpath,awayfromeffectiveintelligenceandpublicsafety.Asaresult,Massachuse-sandotherstateshaveadoptedanti‑terrorismplansthathaveli-leornorelationshiptoactualthreatsorhazards.Toqualifyforitsfullallotmentoffederalmoney,forexample,Massachuse-shadtocomeupwithaplantoprotectthestatefromimprovisedexplosivedevices,althoughtherewasnointelligencetoindicatethatsuchdeviceswereorwereabouttobeadomesticthreatwithintheCommonwealth.100

TheMBTAisoneagencythatappearstohaveprioritizedintelligencegatheringoversuchcommonsensepublicsafetyma-ersaskeepingitsinfrastructureingoodrepair.101In2005,itreportedthatithadestablishedanintelligenceunitmonitoringtransit‑relatedterrorismworldwide.102Thisunit,whichwaspartneredwiththeJTTF,BostonPolice,StatePolice,ICE,DHS,DEA,theMTAInteragencyCounterterrorismTaskForceinNewYorkCityandtheCommonwealthFusionCenter,maintained14standalonedatabasesandenteredinformationaboutsuspiciousactivityandcrimeandforwardedittoitspartners.Italsocompiledaweeklybulletin,“ReportingonTerrorism‑RelatedActivity,”whichitdistributednationally.

Whenthenetiscastsowide,everythingandanythingbeginstolookandsoundlike“terrorism‑relatedactivity,”forcingpoliceofficerstowastetheirtimecheckingoutdeadendtipsInvariably,innocentpeoplearecaughtinthenet.PeterWatchorn,aninternationally‑knownharpsichordist,andafellowmusicianwerepulledofftheMBTAonMarch13,2008,whentheywereontheirwaytotheairport.Eightstatetrooperssubjectedthemtoasearchandinterrogationfor30minutesbecausetheywere,asonetrooperallegedlyputit,“havingconversationswewerenotsupposedtobehaving”whichtriggeredananonymoustip.Onthebasisofthistip‑whichMr.Watchornassumeswasahoax‑theMBTApolicedecidedtheyrepresenteda“crediblethreat,”broughtthesubwaylinetoahalt,searcheditwithsnifferdogs,andforcedthemtomisstheirplane.103

Furthermore,so‑called“intelligence‑led”and“predictive”policingwithoutquality‑controlsafeguardsunderminescommunitytrust,onwhichcrime‑preventionandcrime‑solvingeffortsrely.Lawenforcementofficialsmustcreatetheconditionsoftrustunderwhicheverydaycitizenswillfeelfreetocallthepoliceandreportsuspiciousactivities.Increasedsurveillancecannottaketheplaceofeffectivecommunity‑basedpolicing,inwhichresidentstrusttheuniformedmenandwomenwhoprotectthem.

WithlocallawenforcementagenciesincreasinglynolongeraccountabletolocalcommunitiesbecausetheyhavebeenfederalizedthroughtheirworkwiththeJTTFsandFusionCentersandhaveotheragendas,itisdifficulttoseehowtheserelationshipsoftrustcanbepreserved.

InMassachuse-s,manycommunitieslacktrustinlawenforcementbecauseofahistoryofmisconduct,andthefailureofpolicetorespondinatimelymannerwhentheyaremostneeded.Trusthasbeenfurthererodedbecausetheyarenowseenasworkinghandinhandwithfederalagencies,includingImmigrationandCustomsEnforcement(ICE)andtheFBI,whoserevised2008guidelinespermitittousereligionorethnicityasafactorindecidingwhatpeopletointerviewandtoinfiltrateorganizationsandreligiousgroupswhenopening“assessments.”TheMuslim,ArabandSouthAsiancommunitiesfeelparticularlyvulnerableandarefrequentlyreluctanttoengagewithlawenforcement.

Whatiscalled“intelligence‑ledpolicing”iserodingtherelationshipsoftrustthathave

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traditionallydefinedeffective“communitypolicing.”“Intelligence‑ledpolicing”cametotheUnitedStatesfromGreatBritain,where,amongotherthings,it“de‑emphasizedresponsestoservicecallsbyprioritizingcalls”andreferringlessseriousonestootheragenciessothatpolicecouldfocusonbroadcriminaltrends.104Butarethepolicemorelikelytowincommunitytrustiftheyspendtheirtimechasingdownvague“tips”anda-emptingtokeepabreastofmassiveamountsofdata,insteadofrespondingtocallsforassistancethatmaynotseem“priorities”buthelpthemforgeclosecommunityties?Relationshipsoftrustareunlikelytoflourishaslongaslocalpolicehaveaseparatefederalagendawithnoaccountabilitytooroversightfromthecommunity.

Excessive Surveillance and the Threat to Freedom

Whenthegovernmenttargetsanever‑increasinglistofactivitiesforsurveillance,itisinevitablethatprotectedspeechandconductwillbecaughtupinthatweb.WithprofoundimplicationsfortheabilityofallpersonsintheUnitedStatestoexercisetheirconstitutionally‑protectedrights,thiskindoftargetinghashadadisproportionateimpactonArab,MuslimandSouthAsiancommunities,aswellaspeaceactivists,environmentaladvocates,celebrities,andanyonewhoopposescurrentgovernmentpolicy.

Forexample,ithasbeenreportedtotheACLUofMassachuse-sthattherehasbeenadeclineina-endanceatlocalmosquesbecauseoftheconfirmedFBIsurveillanceoftheseplacesofworship,anddeploymentofinformants.Whentheoverly‑broadcollectionofinformationleadsinnocentindividualstofeelthattheyarenotsafetoworshipfreely,suchpolicieshavegonetoofar.

OthercommunitymembershavereportedthattheynolongerspeakinArabicorotherforeignlanguagesonthetelephoneforfearthatthegovernmentcouldbelisteningandcouldmisinterpretsomethingsaidinthatlanguage.StillothersreportnotwearingreligiousformsofdressandsymbolsorpossessingArabictextsinpublic,andespeciallyatairports,forfearofbeingsingledoutforquestioningandhavingtroubleclearingsecurity.

Whenthebreadthofpossibleinvestigationsissolarge,protectedactivitiescaneasilybemadetoseem“suspicious.”Initspolicyspecificallyaddressingthecollectionofinformationaboutexpressiveactivity,theCFCassertsthatitdoesnotgatherinformationbasedsolelyonFirstAmendmentactivity.

However,itisunclearwhenandtowhomthispolicyactuallyapplies,astheexceptionsmakethepolicylargelymeaningless.Theguidelinesstatethatthey“specificallydonotapplytoinvestigationsfocusedonsolvingcrimesthathavealreadybeencommi-ed.TheseguidelinesalsodonotapplytoinvestigationsunderthecontroloftheJointTerrorismTaskForceorotherfederal,stateorlocaltaskforcesthatmembersoftheCFCmaybeassignedto.”105

Thepolicygoesontodeclarethat“forthepurposeofdetectingorpreventingunlawfulactivities,aswellastoassesstheneedforpoliceplanningrelatedtolawfulactivities,CFCmembersareauthorizedtovisitanyplace,a-endanyevent,andvisitanywebsitethatisopentothepublic,onthesametermsandconditionsasmembersofthepublicgenerally.”106

ButCFCandotherlawenforcementagentsarenotsimplymembersofthepublic.Theirpresenceatplacesofworshipandtheiractivesurveillancehaveanimpactontheabilityofordinarypeopleto

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exercisetheirconstitutionalrights.

BecausetheFusionCenterandBRICoperatelargelyinsecretandwithoutindependentoversight,itisdifficulttodeterminetheextenttowhichthecivillibertiesofMassachuse-sresidentsmayhavebeenviolatedasaresultofthecreationofthislocalandstatedomesticsurveillancesystem.

Butsince9/11,therehavebeennumerousreportsintheCommonwealthofpoliceinvadingpeople’sprivacy,andstopping,questioningandevenarrestingindividualsbasedonnothingmorethanperfectlylawfulactivities,suchastakingphotographs,participatinginpoliticalrallies,andspeakingcriticallyoftheFBI.107

AccordingtoascathingauditrecentlyreleasedbytheMassachuse-sstateAuditorA.JosephDeNucci,policefromcommunitiesacrossthestatehaverepeatedlytappedintothestate’scriminalrecordssystemtoimproperlyaccessinformationoncelebritiesandhigh‑profilecitizens,suchasactorMa-Damon,singerJamesTaylorandfootballstarTomBrady.Theyear‑longreviewdepictedasystemaccessedbyusers“withoutanyapparentwork‑relatedjustification.”108Itisunclearhowmanyotherprivatecitizensmightalsohavehadtheirprivacyviolatedbytheseimpropersearches.

InDecember2002,apoliceofficerattheUniversityofMassachuse-scampusatAmherstwasrecruitedbytheFBItospendseveraldaysaweekworkingexclusivelyforitsAnti‑TerrorismTaskForce.Thearrangementcametolighta^erFBIagents,actingonthebasisofinformationprovidedbythecampusofficer,questionedafacultymemberandanorganizerforacampusunion.ThefacultymemberisofIraqidescentandtheunionorganizerisfromSriLanka.109

AplainclothesHarvardUniversitydetectivewascaughtphotographingpeopleatapeacefulprotestfor“intelligencegathering”purposes.HarvardUniversityPoliceDepartment(“HUPD”)officersareswornspecialStatePoliceofficersando^enwork“inconjunctionwithotheragencies,includingtheMassachuse-sStatePolice,BostonPolice,CambridgePolice,SomervillePolice,andmanyfederalagencies.”AuniversityspokesmanrefusedtosaywhattheHUPDdoeswiththephotographsittakesfor“intelligencegathering”purposes,soitisunknownwhetherthisinformationwasshared.110

A“ProtectiveIntelligenceBulletin”issuedbytheDHSIntelligenceBranchoftheThreatManagementDivisionoftheFederalProtectiveServiceimproperlycollectedanddisseminatedinformationregardingpoliticaldemonstrationsandinappropriatelylabeledpeacefuladvocacygroupsandotheractivistsas“extremists.”IncludedinthisreportwasaneventorganizedinBostononMarch18,2006onthetopic,“Stoptheviolence,stopthewarathomeandabroad.”111

Inadequate Privacy Protections Threaten Fundamental Freedoms

BRICandtheFusionCenterhavesteadilyexpandedthenumberofpublicandprivatesourcesfromwhichtheycollectinformation.TheCFCbeganwithaccesstotheconsiderabledataavailablethroughstateandnationalcriminaljusticeinformationsystems.Ithassincesecureddirectaccesstoscoresoffederalandstategovernmentdatabasesandhascontractedwithmajorcommercialdataaggregatorsandinvestigativeservices.112

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Thisaggressivecollectionofpersonaldatabythestate,madenewlypossiblewiththedevelopmentof21stcenturyinformationtechnology,representsanunprecedentedgovernmentintrusionintotheminutiaeofthelivesofordinaryMassachuse-sresidents.Assuch,italsorepresentsanenormousthreattopersonalprivacy.Apartfrommostmedicalhistoryinformation,thereisnowvirtuallynothingthataFusionCenterinvestigatorcouldnotdeduceaboutanindividual’slivingarrangements,employmenthistory,financialcondition,personalrelationships,andinsomecases,personalviews.113

Thistroublinginvasionofprivacyismagnifiedfurtherbyatotallackofqualitycontrols–standardsforaccuracyandreliability–toensurethattheinformationgatherediscorrectandappropriatelyclassified,orthatitevenpertainstotheidentifiedindividual.Withoutadequatesafeguards,itisalltooeasyforwronginformationtobedisseminatednationwide,andallbutimpossibletoreinitinlater.

TheCommonwealthFusionCenter’streatmentofdataaccuracyandprivacyprovidesparticularcauseforconcern.TheFusionCenterPrivacyPolicyisastudyincontradictionanddouble‑speakwhichdoesmoretoshielditsoperationsfrompublicscrutinythanitdoestoprotectindividualprivacy.114Indeed,thepolicydisclaimsanyresponsibilityfortheaccuracyofdataitmaycollect,insteadpassingthebucktotheagencieswheretheinformationoriginated,stating:“Participatingagenciesremain...responsibleforthequalityandaccuracyofthedataaccessedbytheCFC.”115And,whenanerrorisreported,itpushesresponsibilityevenfurtheraway:“Participatingagencieswillrefercitizenstotheoriginalcollectorofthedataastheappropriateentitytoaddressanyconcernaboutdataaccuracyandquality.”116

Compoundingtheproblem,becausetheFusionCentercontractswithprivatedataaggregatorstogatherpersonalandcommercialinformationaboutMassachuse-sresidents,the“originalcollector”maynotbeagovernmentagencyatall,andthereforewouldnotbesubjecttostateopengovernmentlawsthatexisttoensuretheintegrityofpersonalinformationheldbythegovernmentaboutindividuals.Yettheinformationdoesmakeitswayintoagovernmentdatabaseandisusedbylawenforcementofficials.

Intheend,thePrivacyPolicyoftheCommonwealthFusionCentercreatesnoenforceablerights.117Itdependsforitseffectivenessonacombinationofinternalself‑regulationandunwarrantedtrustintheintegrityofotherentities’dataqualitycontrols.

Current Privacy Law Lags Behind the Surveillance System

Unfortunately,statelawmaynotadequatelyprovideprotectionswheretheFusionCenterPrivacyPolicyfails.Massachuse-s’FairInformationPracticesAct(FIPA)118“wasintendedtocorrectabusesinthewayinwhichpersonaldataaboutindividuals,collectedbyStateagencies,wasmaintainedanddisseminated.”119Thelawprovidesthatpersonalinformationheldbystateagenciesaboutanidentifiableindividualmaynotbedisclosedtootheragenciesorindividualswithoutexpresslegalauthorization.Italsoprovidesindividualswithaccesstotheinformationaboutthemmaintainedbythegovernmentandanopportunitytocontestitsaccuracy.120

YettheutilityofFIPAasacheckontheFusionCenterremainsopentoquestion.The“personal

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data”subjecttotheprovisionsofFIPAdoesnotinclude“intelligenceinformation,”whichisdefinedinG.L.c.6,§167asdata“compiledbyacriminaljusticeagencyforpurposesofcriminalinvestigation,includingreportsofinformants,investigatorsorotherpersons,orfromanytypeofsurveillanceassociatedwithanidentifiableindividual.”WiththeunprecedentedexpansionoftheintelligenceactivitiesoftheStatePolice,thisexemptionislikelytobeusedtothwarteffortstoensuretheaccuracyoftheinformationthatisbeingcollectedortopreventitswidespreaddissemination.

In1968,Congresscreatedafederalregulation,28C.F.R.Part23,toensuretheprivacyofindividualsinthecontextofmulti‑jurisdictionalcriminalinvestigations.Reasoningthat“becausethecollectionandexchangeofintelligencedatanecessarytosupportcontrolofseriouscriminalactivitymayrepresentpotentialthreatstotheprivacyofindividualstowhomsuchdatarelates,”Congressmandatedthatanycriminalintelligencesystemreceivingfederalfundingadheretotheregulation’s“reasonablesuspicion”standardforthegatheringofdata.

However,thisregulationhasnoenforcementmechanism.Meanwhile,thefusioncentersthatshouldbesubjecttoitarecollectingmoreinformationthantheregulationallows.Becausethefocusofthesecentersisonpreventingcrimesthatmayoccurinthefuture,andnotsolvingcrimesthathavehappenedinthepast,muchinformationisgathered,analyzedandsharedlongbeforeofficialshavedeterminedthatthereisreasonablesuspicionofcriminalactivity.Asaresult,theFourthAmendmentstandardforsearchesandseizureshasbeenrenderedallbutmeaningless.

TheCommonwealthFusionCenter’sStandardOperatingProcedure(SOP),forexample,givesitsofficerstheabilitytoconductpreliminaryandthenfullinvestigationsintopeopleandorganizationsbeforeestablishingreasonablesuspicion.AccordingtotheSOP,thestandardforopeningafullinvestigationis“satisfiedwherethereisnotyetacurrentsubstantiveorpreparatoryunlawfulact,butfactsandcircumstancesreasonablyindicatethatsuchunlawfulconductwilloccurinthefuture.”121

Apparentprotectionsatthefederallevelaresimilarlyillusory.DepartmentofJusticeregulationsapplicabletostateintelligenceactivitiesthatreceivefederalfundsostensiblylimitthecollectionanddisseminationofpersonalinformation.122Theviabilityofthefederalguidelines,however,dependsentirelyonmonitoringbythesamefederalagenciesthatarepressingthestatestoexpandtheirintelligence‑gatheringactivities.Stateofficialshavepledgedtoadheretotherequirementsofthesefederalregulationsandtobeguidedbynationalbestpracticesforintelligenceandinformation‑sharing.However,withoutfederalenforcementorothermethodsofaccountability,theFusionCenterisregulatedexclusivelybygoodintentions.

Who Watches the Watchers?

TheonlyostensiblecheckontherulesbywhichtheFusionCenteroperatesisanappointedbodywithoutanyrealpowers.InAugustof2008,KevinBurke,Massachuse-sSecretaryofPublicSafetyandSecurity,establisheda“PrivacyWorkingGroup”(PWG)toadvisehimon“programmatic,technological,andpolicyissueswithin[theExecutiveOfficeofPublicSafetyandSecurity]astheyrelatetoinformationsecurity,individualprivacy,dataintegrity,andotherprivacyrelatedma-ers.”123Presumably,becauseEOPSShasauthorityovertheFusionCenter,thePWG’spurviewincludestheFusionCenter.However,thePWGprovidesnoindependentoversightorenforcementofprivacystandards,andoffersnopublicaccountabilityvis‑à‑vistheFusionCenterorBRIC.124

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BecausethePWGlacksindependenceitcannotbeaneffectiveoversightmechanism.PWGmembersareappointedbytheSecretaryofPublicSafetyandSecurity,andthePWGcarriesoncurrentandfutureoperationsathisdiscretion.Moreover,thePWG’smissionistorespondtospecificassignmentsfromtheSecretary,nottosetitsownagendaforinvestigation,analysisandpolicyrecommendation.

Giventhesedynamics,itisunlikelythatthePWGwillconductarigorousanalysisoftheFusionCenter’soperationsastheyrelatetoprivacyandcivilliberties.Moreover,eventhemostrobustrecommendationsfromthePWGregardingprivacyandlibertyprotectionswouldbemerelyhortatory,lackingtheforceoflawnecessarytoensureappropriateimplementationandenforcement.

Garbage In/Garbage Out: Absence of Quality Controls Imperils Data Integrity

Anintelligencesystemthatfailstoputapremiumontheaccuracyandreliabilityofitsinformationislikelynotonlytoundermineitsowngoals,buttoharminnocentpeopleintheprocess.Whenthesystempicksupwhispersfromunreliablesourcesandbroadcaststheminanationalintelligenceechochamber,theresultingreverberationsappeartogiveadditionalcredibilitytoinaccurateinformation.Evenwhenthedisseminationofsuchinaccurateinformationadverselyimpactsitssubject–aswhenthelateSenatorTedKennedy’snameappearedonthefederal“nofly”list–ithasbecomedecentralizedandnexttoimpossibletofix.

Thegovernmentitselfdoesnothaveagoodtrackrecordofensuringtheaccuracyofitsdata.Whenitcomestoterrorism,thegovernmentcannotevengetthenumberscorrect.In2007,theDepartmentofJustice’sOfficeofInspectorGeneralconductedastudyoftheaccuracyinthedepartment’sreportingofterrorism‑relatedstatistics.Thesestatisticsincludethenumberofindividualschargedasaresultofterrorisminvestigations,thenumberofterrorismconvictionsandthenumberterrorism‑relatedthreats.TheInspectorGeneralfoundthattheFBIinaccuratelyreported8outof10statisticsandthattheUSA-orney’sOfficeincorrectlyreportedallthe11outof11statisticsrandomlysurveyed.125

Howlongisbadinformationstored?TheFBI’se‑Guardiansystem,whichtakesinsuspiciousactivityreportsfrommultipleagencies,claimsthatitpurgesreportsthathavebeendeemedtohavenoprobablelinktoterrorism.However,reportsthataredeemed“inconclusive”–inotherwords,reportsthatmayormaynothavealinktoterrorism–arekeptineGuardianforuptofiveyears.

Excessive Secrecy Hinders Public Accountability

PerhapsthemostproblematicaspectofthenewintelligencedatacentersinMassachuse-sistheirlackoftransparencyandaccountability.Theseinstitutionswerecreatedwithoutanypublicprocess,soresidentsoftheCommonwealthknownexttonothingaboutthem.Moreover,theiroperationsremainresolutelyopaque,fortwocriticalreasons.First,theirorganizationalstructureentanglesfederal,state,andlocallawenforcement,creatingambiguouslinesofauthorityandaccountability.Second,theirpoliciesservetoimpede,ratherthanencourage,transparency.

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AmbiguityoverwhoisinchargeofandresponsibleforFusionCenteroperationscanleadtoapracticeof“policyshopping,”inwhichofficialspickandchoosefromoverlappingsetsoflawssothattheycancollectandusepersonalinformationasfreelyaspossible,whileavoidingprivacylaws,open‑recordsstatutesandcivilliability.

ThoughtheFusionCenteroperatesunderachainofcommandthat“endswiththeColonelofStatePolice,whoisundertheauthorityoftheSecretaryofPublicSafetyandSecurityandultimatelytheGovernor,”126italsotakes“strategicguidance”fromthefederalDepartmentofHomelandSecurity.Similarly,thoughitisprimarilystaffedbyMassachuse-sStatePoliceofficerswhoreporttotheStatePoliceDepartment,others,assignedtotheFBIJointTerrorismTaskForce(JTTF),areunderthedirectcommandoftheFusionCenter.127

InadditiontotheFBI,theFusionCenteralsoincludesrepresentativesfromotherfederalagencies,includingtheBureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,FirearmsandExplosives,theNationalGuard,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurity,andtheUSArmy.128ItisnotclearwhethereachoftheserepresentativesreportstotheFusionCentercentralcommand,totheirrespectiveagencyheads,orboth.

ThevariousagenciesthathavearepresentativeembeddedintheFusionCentereachhaveaseparateMemorandumofUnderstandingwiththeCFC,includingaseparateagreementabouthowthatpersonwillbesupervised.Forexample,mostagenciesagreethattheembeddedpersonwillbe“directedbythedecisionsoftheCommandingOfficeroftheCFCforallma-ersoccurringinthenormalcourseofbusinessoftheCFC,”butthatadministrative,personnel,salaryandbenefitsissuesareunderthecontroloftheirsupervisorattheagency.129

Butthisagreementdoesnotapplytoallembeddedpersonnel.TheMassachuse-sNationalGuard’sMOUhassetupastructurewheretheembeddedpersonisresponsibleupthechainofcommandandcanonlyreceive“guidance”fromtheCFCCommandingOfficer.130ThissetsupasituationinwhichtheCFCCommanderhasdifferentlevelsofcontroloverthepersonsworkingthere.

Thiscomplicatedwebofaffiliationsandallegiancesmakesitdifficulttoknowwhoisinchargeofthevariousstaffmembers,providingguidance,directionanddisciplinewhennecessary.Withoutclearlinesofauthority,itisimpossibletoensureproperstaffaccountabilityformaintainingtheprivacyandcivillibertiesofMassachuse-sresidents.Theseconcernsareparticularlyacuteinviewoftheactiveinvolvementofrepresentativesfromthemilitaryandaprivate,commercialrailroadcompany(CSXCorporation)inFusionCenteroperations.

Asforthequestionoftransparency,goodopengovernmentpracticestypicallyincludereasonableaccessbyindividualstoinformationthegovernmentholdsaboutthem,aswellaspublicoversightandreportingongovernmentactivities.Tothatend,wehavelawsthatpromoteopennessandaccountability,includingpublicrecordslaws,independentauditing,andexternalreviewprocesses.Unfortunately,theFusionCenter’srecordsandoperationsenjoyunwarrantedfreedomfrompublicscrutiny,eitherbecausetheycanhidebehindoverbroadexemptionsinotherwiseapplicablelaws,orbecausetheFusionCenter’spoliciesdeliberatelysidestepthelaw.TheoperationsoftheFusionCenterarebeingplacedoutsidetheMassachuse-slawsrestrictinggovernmentsecrecy.

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Inthecaseofthestate’sFairInformationPracticesAct,agapingexemptionforall“intelligenceinformation”meansthatresidentswhoareconcernedaboutwhatinformationMassachuse-sintelligencedatacentersholdaboutthemhavenowayoffindingout.UnlikeitscounterpartinthefederalFreedomofInformationAct,thisexemptionfromFIPAisnottailoredtoachievereasonable,specificgoals,suchasprotectingongoingcriminalinvestigationsorlawenforcementproceedings,preventingunwarrantedinvasionsofpersonalprivacy,orprotectingidentifiablepeoplefromharmsthatmightresultfromdisclosure.Instead,itcontainsnoexceptionsandmakesitimpossibleforanindividualtolearnaboutandcorrectinaccuraciesinany“intelligence”thegovernmenthasgatheredabouthimorher.

TheFusionCenterhastakenasimilarapproachtothepublic’srighttoknowaboutitsoperations,generally.Massachuse-s’publicrecordslawbroadlydefinesapublicrecordtoincludeallrecordsordata“madeorreceivedbyanyofficeroremployeeofanyagency,executiveoffice[or]department...ofthecommonwealth.”131Suchrecordsmustbedisclosedonrequestunlessexemptedbyoneofseveralspecificstatutoryexceptions.However,privilegingsecrecyovergoodgovernment,theFusionCenterdisavowsresponsibilityunderthestatepublicrecordslaw. EventhoughdataaccessedbytheFusionCenterisclearly“madeorreceived”byit,theFusionCenterhasindicateditwillnotrespondtorequestsfrommembersofthepublicforinformationobtainedfromothersources,directingtheminsteadto“theagencyorentitythatisthesourceofthedatainquestion.”132Consistentwiththispolicy,theFusionCenterhasincorporatedintoitsagreementswiththirdpartyagenciesaspecificprovisionthatsharedinformationobtainedfromanyotheragencywillnotbedisclosedinresponsetoapublicrecordsrequest.Theseagreementsalmostcertainlyviolatestatelaw,133buttheywill,withequalcertainty,beusedtoobstructthereleaseofinformationnecessarytoensureeffectivepublicscrutinyoftheFusionCenter’sactivities.

Withoutanyindependentoversightmechanismorpublicreporting,thegeneralpublicremainsinthedark.Fusioncentersarele^topolicethemselves,eventhoughtheyhaveeveryincentive–aswellasthestatedintention–tosidesteplawstheyfindinconvenient.Goodlawenforcementmakesitsoperationstransparent,evenwhilemaintainingconfidentialityaboutongoinginvestigationsandprotectingwitnessesandconfidentialsourcesfromharm.Massachuse-sshouldexpectthismuchfromintelligencedatacentersoperatingwithinitsborders.

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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS

Massachuse-s,thecradleofliberty,hasneverbeenpassivewhenitcomestooverzealousgovernmentintrusion.Wedemandoursayintheinstitutionsthatdirectlyimpactourlives.

InlightofthesecretivedevelopmentofthenewdomesticsurveillanceapparatusintheCommonwealthandthefederalgovernment’sunwillingnesstoestablishsimplesafeguardsforourfundamentalfreedoms,wemustshinealightonthisshadowygovernmentactivity,examineitcarefully,andconsideritsefficacyandimpact.Wemustdecideforourselvesiftheseaggressive“intelligence”programsarerightforMassachuse-s,andmakesurethatanydomesticsurveillanceoperationsintheCommonwealthconformtolong‑standingprinciplesofliberty,insteadofunderminingthem.

A COST/BENEFIT ANALYSIS SHOULD BE UNDERTAKEN. TheMassachuse-sexecutivebranchandlegislatureshouldaskdifficultquestionsaboutwhetherthefusioncentersinthestateandrelatedlawenforcementdataprogramsaccomplishworthwhileobjectives.Dofusioncentersmakeademonstrablepositiveimpactonlawenforcementefficacy?Ifso,atwhatcosttothecivillibertiesandprivacyofMassachuse-sresidents?Dothepurportedbenefitsoutweighthedamagetocommunityrelationshipsthatwillinevitablyoccurwhenresidentsperceive–correctly–thattheirlocalpolice,whetherdirectlyorindirectly,nowplayaconsiderablylargerroleinfederallawandimmigrationenforcement?

Inaddition,thestateshouldconductafiscalanalysis.TheCommonwealthFusionCenterandBRICareexpensivetooperate.AlthoughtheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityspentmorethan$250milliontoprovide“startup”fundingforstatefusioncenters134andcontinuestomakesustaininggrantsavailabletothestates,itisunclearifthefederalgovernmentwillcontinuetofundthesemassiveprojectsindefinitely.AccordingtoarecentGAOreport,“thefederalgovernmenthasnotclearlyarticulatedthelong‑termroleitexpectstoplayinsustainingfusioncenters.”Ifweanticipatethatthefinancialburdenforfusioncenterswillshi^tothestates,isthatacostthatisworthMassachuse-sshouldering?

THE STATE LEGISATURE SHOULD REGULATE “INTELLIGENCE” OPERATIONS.ThenewdomesticsurveillanceapparatusinMassachuse-swasbuiltwithoutlegislativeinput,

butitshouldcertainlynotcontinuethatway.Thefiscalimplicationsoffusioncentersandrelatedlawenforcementdataprograms,theconsequencesforpublicsafety,andtheimpactoncivillibertiesdemandlegislativeparticipation.TheMassachuse-slegislaturemustnotabdicateitsresponsibilitytoregulatesuchimportantstateinstitutionsandensurethattheyoperateinkeepingwithestablishedconstitutionalandgoodgovernmentnormsintheCommonwealth.SenateBill931,AnActRegardingtheCommonwealthFusionCenterandOtherIntelligenceDataCenters,filedinthe2009‑2010legislativesession,isonevehicleforsuchregulation,andwouldaccomplishmanyofthefollowinggoals.

Prohibit Investigation of First Amendment Activity1.

Massachuse-sshouldensurethatstatelawrobustlyprotectsresidents’firstamendmentrightsbyexplicitlyprohibitinglawenforcementagenciesfromcollectinginformationaboutindividuals’politicalandreligiousviews,associations,oractivities,unlessthatinformationdirectlyrelatestoaninvestigationthatisbasedonreasonablesuspicionofcriminalconduct.Unlessweinsistuponthis

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familiarstandardforinvestigations,thefundamentalrightsuponwhichourCommonwealthwasfounded–therighttoassemblewithlike‑mindedpeople,therighttoprotestgovernmentactivity,therighttoworshipfreelyaccordingtoone’sownconscience–willbedangerouslychilledandundermined.

Establish Independent Oversight, Auditing and Public Reporting2.

EffectiveoversightofexecutivebranchprogramsliketheCommonwealthFusionCentermustbeindependent,applyindependently‑developedstandards,andhavetheauthoritytoenforcethosestandardsorprovideanalysisandrecommendationstoanotherentitywithsuchauthority.Thelegislatureshouldcreateanoversightmechanismforintelligencedatacenteroperationsthroughoutthestate,eitherintheformofanewofficeempoweredtoauditandinvestigatetheactivitiesoftheFusionCenter,BRIC,andlikeentities,orbystatutorilyauthorizinganexistingindependentwatchdogoffice,suchastheOfficeoftheInspectorGeneral,toconductsuchinvestigations.

Suchanofficemustalsomakepublicreportsofitsfindingstothelegislatureorappropriatelegislativecommi-ees.Onlybypublicizingfindingsandgivingthelegislatureamonitoringrolecanmeaningfuloversighttakeplace.Investigativeauthoritymustbecoupledwithpublicreportingtoholdotherwiseunaccountableinstitutionstoagreed‑uponstandards.

Ensure Transparency for Individuals and The Public3.

Tofurtherensureaccountability,newintelligenceprogramsmustalsorespectthepublic’srighttoknowabouttheiroperations.Indeed,theDepartmentofHomelandSecurityhasendorsedtheapplicationoffairinformationprinciples–includingtransparency–tofusioncenters’collectionandmanagementofdatacontainingpersonallyidentifiableinformation.135Boththepoliciesofthenewintelligenceprogramsandthegenerallawsshouldclearlystatethatpublicrecordslawsapplytotheseinstitutions,sopeoplecanhaveaccesstoinformationabouttheirgovernment.

Furthermore,theexemptionforall“intelligenceinformation”underthestateFairInformationPracticesActshouldbeamendedsothatitisnotoverbroad.Ingeneral,individualsshouldbeabletolearnwhatinformationthegovernmentmaintainsaboutthem,andanyexemptionsshouldbenarrowlytailoredtoreflectspecificobjectives,suchasprotectingpeoplefromharmandmaintainingappropriatesecrecyaboutongoinginvestigations.

Develop Standards for Data Integrity, Security, and Privacy4.

Intelligenceoperationsareonlyaseffectiveastheirinformationisaccurateandreliable.Tothisend,thelegislatureshouldestablishcommonsensestandardsregardingdatacollection,validation,andaccuracy.Inaddition,itmustsafeguardresidents’privacybydevelopingstandardsfordatause,retention,anddisseminationtoensurethatintelligencedatacentersoperateinkeepingwithestablishedprinciplesregardingindividualrightsunderMassachuse-slaw.

Bytakingthesesteps,theMassachuse-slegislaturecancreateamodelforthenationtofollow,andhelpensurethatthenationalsurveillancesecuritycomplexbeingerectedintheCommonwealthandacrossthecountrydoesnotbecometheapparatusofapolicestate.Ourfundamentalfreedomshanginthebalance.

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1PeterBaker&CarlHulse,U.S.HadEarlySignalsofaTerrorPlot,ObamaSays,N.Y.T{|}~,Dec.30,2009.2JeffZeleny&HeleneCooper,ObamasaysPlotCouldHaveBeenDisrupted,N.Y.T{|}~,Jan.6,2010.3MikeGerman&JayStanley,FusionCenterUpdate,July2008,ACLUreportavailableath-p://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusion_update_20080729.pdf4Rep.BradMiller(D‑NC),chairmanoftheSubcommi-eeonInvestigationsandOversightoftheCommi-eeonScienceandTechnology,wroteale-eronAugust21,2008totheInspectorGeneraloftheOfficeoftheDirectorofNationalIntelligenceinwhichhestatesthat“asignificantportionoftheestimated$300milliondollarsspentonRailheadhasbeeninappropriatelyusedtorenovateabuildingofoneoftheprimecontractors,TheBoeingCompany”andcitesaGovernmentAccountabilityOfficereportonfederalinvestmentininformationtechnologyprograms:“413governmentITprojectstotalingmorethan$25billioninFY2008alonewere‘poorlyplanned,poorlyperforming,orboth.’”h-p://democrats.science.house.gov/Media/File/AdminLe-ers/bm_InspectorGeneralMaquire_terrorwatchlist_8.21.08.pdf5The2002filmMINORITYREPORTfeaturesaspecialized‘DepartmentofPreCrime,’wherepsychic‘precogs’discernwhich‘criminals’topursuebeforetheycommitcrimes.6AlanPerro-,Echelon:SpyingChain’sCoverBlown,THEINDEPENDENT(UK),July14,2001.7ReportoftheJointInquiryintotheTerroristA*acksofSeptember11,2001bytheHousePermanentSelectCommi*eeonIntelligenceandtheSenateSelectCommi*eeonIntelligence,July25,2003.ThereportwasdatedDecember2002andfinallyreleasedinredactedforma^ermonthsofwranglingwithintheBushAdministrationaboutwhichpartscouldbedeclassified.8SummaryoftheWhiteHouseReviewoftheDecember25,2009A*emptedTerroristA*ack,THEWHITEHOUSE,Jan.7,2010.9TheIntelligenceReformandTerrorismActof2004createdtheNationalCounterterrorismCentertointegrateandanalyzethreatinformationfromawidevarietyofgovernmentagenciesandnetworks.Seeitswebsiteh-p://www.nctc.gov/10Rep.BradMillerinhisAugust21,2008le-er(supranote4)detailedTIDE’stechnicalproblems:itsfailuretoproperlyprocesstensofthousandsof“potentiallyvitalCIAmessages,”fundamentaldesignflawsthatmakethedatainthesystemdifficultorevenimpossibletosearch,itstendencytocrash,thefact“thatthereisnofoolproofwaytoensurethatonlygooddatagetsintotheTIDEdatabaseandunqualifieddatastaysout,”thefactthatthea-empttofixitbydevelopingthefatallyflawed$300milliondollar‘Railhead’systemhasonlymadetheproblemsworse.11InaFollowUpAuditoftheTerroristScreeningCenter(September2007)theU.S.DepartmentofJustice’sInspectorGeneralfortheAuditDivisionreportedthattheFBI’sterrorismdatabasehadover700,000namesbyApril2007andwasgrowingatarateof20,000recordspermonth.12ThesearethenumberscitedinKevinWhitelaw,WatchingforTerrorists:ManyNames,ManyLists,NATIONALPUBLICRADIO,Jan.7,2010.Onthelistofthosemandatedforscreeningiseight‑year‑oldMikeyHicks,whohasfacedhasslesge-ingonplanessincehewasababy.HewasprofiledintheN.Y.TIMES(MeetMikey,8:U.S.HasHimOnWatchList,Jan.14,2010).Over80,000peoplehaveaskedtobetakenoffthelist.ThenumberofthoseslatedforextrascreeningatairportsballoonedwhentheObamaAdministrationinearly2010mandatedadditionalscrutinyforpassengersfrom14countries.Withinfourmonthsthispolicywasrescindedandanewpolicyintroducedthatfocuseda‘tailored’useofintelligencedata(SecurityChecksonFlightstoU.S.tobeRevamped:FocusonSiWingData,N.Y.TIMES,April2,2010).13 WalterPincus,1,600DailyareConsideredfortheFBI’sList,WASH.POST,Nov.1,2009.14StatementofTimothyHealy,Director,TerroristScreeningCenter,beforetheSenateHomelandSecurityandGovernmentalAffairsCommi*ee,Dec.9,2009.15AssociatedPress,F.B.I.HitforBackloginEvidenceReview,BOSTONGLOBE,Oct.27,2009.16CharlieSavage,F.B.I.SlowtoTranslateIntelligence,ReportSays,N.Y.TIMES,Oct.27,2009.

ENDNOTES

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17 RemarksaspreparedfordeliverybyDr.JohnPoindexter,Director,InformationAwarenessOfficeofDARPA,atDARPATech2002Conference,Anaheim,Calif.,Aug.2,2002,availableath-p://www.fas.org/irp/agency/dod/poindexter.html18 The9/11CommissionReport:FinalReportoftheNationalCommissiononTerroristA*acksUpontheUnitedStates,ExecutiveSummary,24(July2004).19JohnMarkoff,ThreatsandResponses:Intelligence:PentagonPlansaComputerSystemThatWouldPeekatPersonalDataofAmericans,N.Y.TIMES,Nov.9,2002.20Id.21JusticeLouisD.Brandeis,Olmsteadv.UnitedStates,277U.S.438,478(1928).22BobBarr&LauraMurphy,IdeologicalFoesAgree:PrivacyinDanger,ATLANTAJOURNALCONSTITUTION,May16,2003.23GeneHealy,BewareofTotalInformationAwareness,CATOINSTITUTE,Jan.20,2003.24Barr&Murphy,supranote22.25MarkWilliams,TheTotalInformationAwarenessProjectLivesOn,TECHNOLOGYREVIEW,April26,2006.26ShaneHarris,TIA.LivesOn,NATIONALJOURNAL,Feb.23,2006.27RyanSingel,NewlyDeclassifiedFilesDetailMassiveFBIData‑MiningProject,WIREDMAGAZINE,Sept.23,2008.28AnitaRamasastry,TheFBISTARTerroristRiskAssessmentProgramShouldRaiseRenewedConcernsaboutPrivateSectorDataMining,FINDLAW,July24,2007.29EllenNakashima,FBIPreparesVastDatabaseofBiometrics:$1BillionProjecttoIncludeImagesofIrisesandFaces,WASH.POST,Dec.22,2007.30PaulMarks,PentagonSetsitsSightsonSocialNetworkingWebsites,NEWSCIENTIST,June9,2006.31SiobhanGorman,NSA.’sDomesticSpyingGrowsasAgencySweepsUpData,WALLST.JOURNAL,March10,2008.32AnnBroache,Report:DHSKillsData‑miningProject,CNETNEWS,Sept.8,2007.33Commi-eeonTechnologyandPrivacyDimensionsofInformationforTerrorismPreventionandOtherNationalGoalsetal,ProtectingIndividualPrivacyintheStruggleAgainstTerrorists:AFrameworkforProgramAssessment,NATIONALRESEARCHCOUNCIL,Oct.2008.34JohnRollins,FusionCenters:IssuesandOptionsforCongress,CongressionalResearchServiceReportforCongress,7Jan.18,2008.35AformerC.I.A.DirectorofIntelligenceCollection,CharlesAllenservedastheDepartmentofHomelandSecurity’sUndersecretaryforIntelligenceandAnalysisandChiefIntelligenceOfficerfrom2005–2009.36StatementofEileenR.Larence,Director,HomelandSecurityandJusticeIssues,GAO‑07‑1214T,1‑2.37Id.Ofthe72currentfusioncenters,50arestate‑designatedcentersand20majorurbanareacenters.38InformationontheNationwideSARInitiativecanbefoundath-p://www.ise.gov/pages/sar‑initiative.aspx.SeealsoThomasCinco-a,PlatformforPrejudice:HowtheNationwideSuspiciousActivityReportingInitiativeInvitesRacialProfiling,ErodesCivilLiberties,andUnderminesSecurity,POLITICALRESEARCHASSOCIATES(2010);FinalReport:InformationSharingEnvironment(ISE)SuspiciousActivityReporting(SAR)EvaluationEnvironment,BUREAUOFJUSTICEASSISTANCE,Jan.2010.39BuildingCommunitiesofTrustProject,TheBureauofJusticeAssistance–inPartnershipwiththeProgramManagerfortheInformationSharingEnvironment,WhitePaperdistributedatameetinginBoston,Oct.7,2009.40h-p://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/39226prs20090401.html41SeeMikeGerman&JayStanley,What’sWrongwithFusionCenters?AMERICANCIVILLIBERTIESUNION,Dec.2007,h-p://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusioncenter_20071212.pdf;h-p://www.aclu.org/pdfs/privacy/fusion_update_20080729.pdf42FusionCenterUpdate,supranote3,at7‑8.43h-p://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/39501prs20090430.htmlandh-p://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/39333prs20090406.html44NORTHCENTRALTEXASFUSIONSYSTEMPREVENTIONAWARENESSBULLETIN,Feb.19,2009,availableath-p://www.baumbach.org/fusion/PAB_19Feb09.doc.45T.J.Greaney,FusionCenterDataDrawsFireoverAssertions,COLUMBIADAILYTRIBUNE,March14,2009.46PrivacyImpactAssessmentfortheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityState,Local,andRegionalFusionCenterInitiative,Dec.11,2008,h-p://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_pia_ia_slrfci.pdf

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47Id.48 BryanBender,Massachuse*sGovernorHopestoEnlistCitizensinAntiterrorismEffort,KNIGHTRIDDER/TRIBUNEBUSINESSNEWS,Sept.2003.49 PamBelluck,StatesandCitiesMustHuntTerrorPlots,Mass.GovernorSays,N.Y.TIMES,Dec.21,2004.50 DOJEvaluationandInspectionsReport1–2005‑007,June2005.In2005thebudgetforJTTFactivitieswas$375million.51 BostonJointTerrorismTaskMemorandumofAgreement,signedJanuary17,2003[onfilewiththeACLUofMassachuse-s].52 WhilegeneralauthorityforthecriminalinformationandintelligencecollectionfunctionsoftheMassachuse-sStatePolicewasprovidedbytheMassachuse-slegislatureinthe1991reorganizationofthestatepoliceforces,thetransformativeexpansionoftheCommonwealth’sinvestigativeandintelligenceactivitiesandtheirintegrationintoanationalintelligencenetworkwasaccomplishedthroughaseriesofexecutivedecisionsduringtheRomneyAdministration.53 Le*erfromJulie*eN.Kayyem,UndersecretaryforHomelandSecurity,E�}���{�}O��{�}��P���{�S��}��,March10,2008.54 Id.55 StatementofEillenR.Larence,supranote36,at9.56 RomneyExecutiveOrderNo.476,7. 57 Id.,8.58 ToddMasse,SiobhanO’Neil&JohnRollins,CRSReportforCongress:FusionCenters:IssuesandOptionsforCongress,CONGRESSIONALRESEARCHSERVICE,July6,2007,note2,21.59 PrivacyImpactAssessment,supranote46.60 Le*erfromJulie*eN.Kayyem,supranote53.61 BenBain,StrategyRefinesFusionCenter’sRole,FEDERALCOMPUTERWEEK,Nov.5,2007.62 HOMELANDSECURITYADVISORYCOUNCIL2005,4.63 Le*erfromJulie*eN.Kayyem,supranote53.64 InterviewwithCFCOfficials,Maynard,MA,April7,2009.65 StandardOperatingProcedure(SOP),COMMONWEALTHFUSIONCENTER,NumberCFC‑04,effectivedateMarch5,2008.GuidelinesforInvestigationsInvolvingFirstAmendmentActivity,4.66 Le*erfromJulie*eN.Kayyem,supranote53.67 FOIA Doc: CFCSOP,supranote65.68 Id.69 Intelligence‑LedPolicing:TheNewIntelligenceArchitecture,NewRealities:LawEnforcementinthePost9/11Era,BUREAUOFJUSTICEASSISTANCE,Sept.2005NCJ210681.70 Solicitation:PredictivePolicingDemonstrationandEvaluationProgram,CFDANo.16.560,U.S.DEPARTMENTOFJUSTICE,SL#000877.71 AnnualReport,BOSTONPOLICEDEPARTMENT,2005.72 Id.

73 Id.74 PressRelease,BOSTONPOLICEDEPARTMENT,Sept.11,2009,h-p://www.cityo�oston.gov/news/default.aspx?id=435075 SiobhanGorman,LAPDTerror‑TipPlanMayServeAsModel,WALLST.JOURNAL,April15,2008;JoshMeyer,LAPDLeadstheWayinLocalCounter‑Terrorism,LOSANGELESTIMES,April18,2008.76 OfficeoftheChiefofPolice,SpecialOrderNo.11,ReportingIncidentsPotentiallyRelatedtoForeignorDomesticTerrorism,LOSANGELESPOLICEDEPARTMENT,March5,2008[onfilewiththeACLU].77 GlobalInformationSharingInitiative,MajorCityChiefsAssociation&DepartmentofHomelandSecurity,FindingsandRecommendationsoftheSuspiciousActivityReportSupportandImplementationProject,DEPARTMENTOFJUSTICE,June2008,h-p://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/mccarecommendation‑06132008.pdf.78 SiobhanGorman,InCities,theFightagainstTerrorismWalkstheBeat,WALLST.JOURNAL,Nov.25,2008.79 TheSARInitiativewillbecoordinatedbythenation’s72fusioncenters.Seesupranote38.80InformationSharingEnvironment(ISE)‑SuspiciousActivityReporting(SAR),FunctionalStandard,Section5,g.

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81 Id. at v.1.5,ISE‑FS‑200.82 ISE‑SARFactsheeth-p://www.ise.gov/docs/sar/Fact_Sheet_NSI_‑_December_23_2008_Final.pdf83 MassGangs:ProjectOverview,Dra^ofDec.14,2007[onfilewiththeACLUofMassachuse-s].84 Id.85 TheStateofHomelandSecurityintheCommonwealth:TrendsandProcess,C�||���}������M�~~����~}��~Oct.2008,availableath-p://www.mass.gov/Eeops/docs/eops/hsd_oct_2_doc_final.pdf86 Id.87 MeetingwithCommonwealthFusionCenterofficials,April7,2009.88 Id.89 Id.90 BiometricsSolutions:SecureIdentityManagementSystems,R����}��brochure,www.raytheon.com/capabilities/.../rtn_iis_biometrics_datasheet.pdf.RaytheonSelectedasNetworkSystemsIntegratorforArmyExpeditionaryWarriorExperiment,R����}��pressrelease,Oct.23,2009.ElizabethWoyke,RaytheonSendsAndroidToBa*lefield,F���}~,Oct.19,2009.RaytheonDevelopsWorld’sLargestInfraredLight‑WaveDetector,R����}��pressrelease,Aug.17,2009.91DHSExhibit300PublicReleaseBY10/NPPD‑USVisit‑AutomatedBiometricIdentificationSystem,Theworld’slargestbiometricsdatabaseisbeingbuiltinWestVirginia,H�|}����S}���{��N}�~�{�},Nov.6,2009.92 KimZe-er,Feds‘Pinged’SprintGPSData8MillionTimesoveraYear,W{�}�.��|,Dec.1,2009.93 TheDHS‑fundedsurveillancecamerashavebeenvigorouslyopposedinCambridgeandSomerville,andboththeCambridgeCityCouncilandtheSomervilleTownMeetinghavedemandedthattheybedismantled.94 Massachuse-sStatePoliceRequestforInformationre:Databaseso^ware[onfilewithACLUofMassachuse-s].95 Id.96 ProtectingAmericafromTerroristA*ack:MeettheNationalJointTerrorismTaskForce,F.B.I.,July2,2005,www.�i.gov/page2/july04/nj-f070204.htm97 MichaelGerman,TestimonyinSupportofSenateBill931BeforetheJointCommi*eeonPublicSafetyandHomelandSecurity,Massachuse*sLegislature,Oct.21,2009[onfilewithACLUofMassachuse-s].98 InformationTechnology:OMBandAgenciesNeedtoImprovePlanning,Management,andOversightofProjectsTotalingBillionsofDollars,TestimonybyDavidA.Powner,Director,InformationTechnologyandManagementIssues,G��}��|}��A��������{�{��O��{�},GAO‑08‑105IT,July31,2008.99 Rep.Miller,supranote4.100 EricSchmi-&DavidJohnston,StatesChafingatU.S.FocusonTerrorism,N.Y.T{|}~,May26,2008.101 TheMBTAhascategorized51unfundedinfrastructureprojectsasrepresentingdangerto“lifeandlimb.”NoahBierman,ASystemunderStrain,B�~���G���},Dec.6,2009.102 Anti‑TerrorismAdvisoryCouncilMeeting,MoakleyCourthouse,Boston,May18,2005.103 PeterWatchorn,ACautionaryTale,March13,2008,evidencesubmi*edtotheJointCommi*eeonPublicSafetyandHomelandSecurity,Oct.21,2009[onfilewiththeACLUofMassachuse-s].104 Intelligence‑LedPolicing:TheNewIntelligenceArchitecture,NewRealities:LawEnforcementinthePost9/11Era,B��}����J�~�{�}A~~{~����},9(Sept.2005),NCJ210681.105 FOIA Doc: CFC‑SOP,supranote65(onFirstAmendment).106 Id.107 FusionCenterUpdate,supranote3,at6‑7.SeealsoMassImpact:TheDomesticWarAgainstTerrorisminMassachuse*s–AreWeOnTheRightTrack?,ACLU��M�~~����~}��~,May2004.108 AndreaEstes&PeterSchworm,PolicePryingintoStars’Data,B�~���G���},May6,2009.109 h-p://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17079prs20021212.html110 FusionCenterUpdate,supranote3.111 h-p://www.aclu.org/privacy/gen/39226prs20090401.html112 AmongthesystemsusedbytheFusionCenteristheAutotracksearchenginenowoperatedbyWestwhichprovidesaccesstobillionsofrecordsaboutindividuals.113 RobertO’Harrow,Jr.,CentersTapintoPersonalDatabases,W�~�.P�~�,April2,2008.

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114 FOIA Doc: CFC‑SOP,supranote65,CFC‑05,July1,2006(CFCPrivacyPolicy).Undertheheadingof“CollectionLimitation,”forexample,thepolicystatesthatitistheresponsibilityofthesourceagencyratherthantheFusionCentertoobservelimitsoncollectionofinformation.ParticipatingagenciesaresimilarlyresponsibleforthequalityandaccuracyofdataaccessedbytheFusionCenter.115 Id.(“DataQuality”),2.116 Id.(“Openness”),3.117 ThePrivacyWorkingGroup(PWG)oftheExecutiveOfficeofPublicSafetyandSecuritywasestablishedbytheSecretaryofPublicSafetyandSecurityonAugust7,2008toadvisetheSecretaryon“informationsecurity,individualprivacy,dataintegrityandotherprivacyrelatedma-ers.”ThemeetingsofthePWGarenotopentothepublic,andanyrecommendationsitmayhavemadeconcerningprivacyhavenotbeenincorporatedintheCFCPrivacyPolicy.118 G.L.c.66A,§§1etseq.119 Swartzv.DepartmentofBanking&Insurance,376Mass.593,597(1978),citingSpecialLegislativeCommissiononPrivacy—FirstInterimReport,1975HouseDoc.No.5417.120 G.L.c.66A,§§1‑2.“Personaldata”doesnotincludeinformationcontainedinapublicrecord,asdefinedbyG.L.c.4,§7cl.26,orinformationrelatingtospecificcriminalinvestigationsorprosecutions.121 FOIA Doc: CFC‑SOP,supranote65.122 28CFRPart23.123 MemorandumfromKevinM.Burke,Secretary,E�}���{�}O��{�}��P���{�S��}�����S}���{��,Aug.7,2008.124 MemorandumfromthePrivacyWorkingGroupMembers,E�}���{�}O��{�}��P���{�S��}��,2008.125 DepartmentofJusticeOfficeofInspectorGeneral,TheDepartmentofJustice’sInternalControlsOverTerrorismReportingAuditReport07‑20,February2007,h-p://www.justice.gov/oig/reports/plus/a0720/final.pdf126 Le*erfromJulie*eN.Kayyem,supranote53.127 Id.128 Id.129 FOIADocs:MOUSwithMBTAandothers.130 FOIADoc:MOUbetweenCFCandMassachuse-sNationalGuard.131 G.L.c.4,§7cl.26.132 FOIA Doc: CFCPrivacyPolicy,supranote114,at3.133 SeeEPICreportsdescribingchallengetoasimilaragreementbyVirginia’sfusioncenter,h-p://epic.org/privacy/virginia_fusion/134 CRSReportforCongress,IntelligenceandInformation‑SharingElementsofS.4andH.R.1,June26,2007.SeealsoDanOlson,Fusioncentersprotectus,butatwhatcost?M{��}~���P���{�R��{�,Dec.16,2008,availableath-p://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2008/12/16/fusion_centers_privacy/135 PrivacyImpactAssessmentfortheDepartmentofHomelandSecurityState,Local,andRegionalFusionCenterInitiative,Dec.11,2008.

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