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"OUR PRINCIPAL LOSS WAS IN THIS PLACE"

Action at the Slaughter Pen and at the South End of Houck's Ridge

2 July 1863

Kathleen R. Georg LGettysburg National Military Park

18 March 1984

PLEASE RETURN .0:

,ECHNICI\L INfOR!?AlION CEN1ER !JF\,!VER S£1l~1CE CENTER Ni\'nONAL PAR!t SERVICE

Devil's Den. The Round Tops. Slaughter Pen. Few words evoke instant

recognition of the,lfighting at Gettysburg in 1863 as these do. Perhaps only

the Angle and the Wheatfield rival them for instant association to the battle

and the battlefield. The proximity of the four former sites to each other in­

fluenced the flow and events of the battle on 2 July 1863, and neither can

necessarily be treated by narrative or physical development without considering

the relationships and impacts to the integral parts. At various times the renown

of each of the four sites has ebbed or magnified. The Round Tops and Slaughter

Pen were photographed by those early chroniclers of the battlefield before the

month of July 1863 dissipated---O'Sullivan, Gibson, Gardner, and Brady. Devil's

Den was not. Hhile Little Round Top retained its prominence because of the

very nature of its visibly tactical importance, the Slaughter Pen slipped

• into virtual obsurity, aided by annual growth of foliage which occlUded it::

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as little more than part of Big Round Top's natural environment. The group

of boul ders at Devil' s Den, on the other hand, ~las and has been ass i gned more

significance than its battle relationship accorded it, and has become a premiere

battlefield stop because of its geological attractions and stories of swarms

of sharpshooters. Who could resist walking and clambering about the maze of

immense boulders on a summer afternoon; who could not appreciate those legends

of venerable American ancestors, plying their frontier trade with the squirrel

ri fl es?

Yet the history of this small segment of the 5attlefield will ShO~1

that the Devil 's Den proved to be more of a hindrance to movement and position

and was not an asset to either Union or Confederate armi~s at Gettysburg. The

tide of the battle flowed around this bulwark, and any who stood on its huge

boulders too long 5ecame an eventual target. The southwest end of Houck's Ridge,

above Devil's Den, and not Devil's Den itself, was the anchor of the Federal

defense by the Third Corps. The position of Smith's Battery, and of those

infantrymen of the 124th New York and the 99th Pennsylvania should be heralded

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as the defensive rock and not relegated to a supporting role for the granitic

rock beneath them to their 1 eft. The strewn boul ders of Pl urn Run and the

Slaughter Pen should be cleared of vegetation and made visible to the visitor

as in 1863, when the site became a vast graveyard for Confederates from

Alabama and Georgia, cut down by artillery and musketry fire from the Valley

of Death. It was not Union dead in this valley which gave Plum Run the appel~­

hUon of Bloody Run;'it was the lifeblood of Lee's army that reddened the

waters in their desperate attempt to turn the left flank of their enemy at

Gettysburg.

The significance of the fighting in this area, the foot of Round Top

(~alled Slaughter Pen, once again because of the numbers of Confederate dead

vlho seemed to be literally slaughtered in that gorgeL and the fields below

the crest of Houck's Ridge, as well as its deadly character has heretofore

not been compiled except tn general terms. In most instances, the history

of the area and the battle h.as not been site-related. The General Management

Plan for Gettysburg National Military Park recommended the obliteration of

• a portion of Sickles Avenue and the constructfon of a Devil's Den by-pass,

following the route of tne old electric trolley bed through Slaughter pen

and Il.elow Houck's Ridge •. This study is designed to record the battle events

in the area of the proposed changes in the tour route so as to mitigate

any impacts and to provi.de an interpretive base fa r the new by-pass route .

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Before the two armies marched to Gettysburg from their different compass

hmdings there was a Devil's Den. Although an early local resident never recol­

lected hearing the name in his youth, he had heard stort~s about the place. He

remembllred the folks of the immediate farming community calling it "The Big

Rocks" and "Raccoon Den" in the early decades of tne nineteenth century. But

he surely remembered stories of the den itself, a cave where once a bear dwelt

before its encounter witn a passing Indian. [Emmanuel Busnman in Gettysburg

Compile'r,19 August 1884.] But others of the area had apparently called it

Devil's Den since at least the 1840s, and the name was perpetuated in publications

by Michael JacoDs shortly after the battle. [Gettysburg Compiler, 12 July 1887.J

The earliest official Dattle-related reference to Devil's Den appears in Captain

James Smith's report of the action of his New York Battery, filed 20 July 1863,

in which he refers to his position on the hill at "Devil's Cave." IOfficial

• Records, vol. 27, part 1, p. 588.J According to John B. Bachelder, later

acknowledged as the Government Historian of tne battle because of long study of

the conflict (dating from 5 July 18631., the name Devil's Den was a local d~signa­

tion antedating the battle. Indeed, the specific name "Devil's Den" was not a

general terminology for the cluster of boulders at the southeast end of Houck's

Ridge. The name itself referred 1 Herally to a den or cave within the rocks,

which exists to this day. Bachelder stated; wi.th as much truth for the 1890s

as for the 19805, that:

" ... there is not one in one hundred who go there that ever go near it. The Devil's Den is seldom visited, and very few people know what it is .••• The Devil's Den is a hole under ledges in whicn there 1.s a spring. Tile front of it is masked by a big bowl der, and you cannot see it until you get ~Iithin ten feet of it. You see the rocks about there, and people go horne and say they have seen the Devi l' s Den, but they have not De en wi thin a hundred yards of it. The Devi.l's Den is seldom visited by anyone . • . . The Devil' s Den is not a new name; it was a name 9iven to the locallty before the battle. It is a gorge, or rather it

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is a hole in th~ ground, and it is very diffi~u1t 'to get- into ~._,: ......... _ ...... _ ,11.· There .isa sprin~ atttsmouth, but those'bigrocks that

. sta,nd(ipthereare not the Devi.l 's·Den, •.•. The whole gorge . fsthe region of the Devi 1'5 Den,·and. the .ri.dge J~nfront of it, ' •

.• ' west,.O.fi;t, Or .ra1)lertl:1e. ridge .which commEinci'ngat ·'the .Dev·i]' s ....... . . Den.exterids . nprthward, I' have called in. 1ii:s to ry the Rocky Rfdge: .. ,. "

[Testlmony ·in·.thec<l~eof the USvs;·a.:Cert.ainTract of lal)d }n :'~ .... Cumber,land Iownship;Adams couri(y;·Stii£eofPehnsylvania; Ci.rcuit .. Court for the Eastern Dis,tr;ct of PennsYlva~ia, 3rd Ci'rcuit:.·

Tipton Stereo View. "The Spring at Devil's Den"

October Sesston, 1894; pp;'289~290;J

The spring mentioned by Bachelder appears in the aoo've stereo photograph, .

but it has either been filled i:n or'altered by avenue con'struction as it no

longer flows. The black recesses of the small den, however, still summon up

visions of a threatening demon dwelling wi~hin the caverns of th.is ancient stone format ion ..

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The other sites and areas;" the' vicinity showed the effects of human

use and development at that time in,lS63witti the exception of Big Round Top.

The woods of Bfg Round Top were~atural in growth, tneo~mer atone time publicly . . .". . ; .. : -..:

forbidding by fine any cutting of wood on his portion of tile s.ummit. )LHHe.

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• Round Top, on th.e other hand, had been subjected to the continuing pioneer

spirit of taming a wndernes:s. Only a year or two Defore tn.e battle the

western face of it was cleared of marketable or usable ti.mo.er by its owner .

. The steep eastern face was owned by Jacob Weikert in 186.3; but the western

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face was. owned by Epli]"aim HanavlaY.

ward down the slope of little Round

Hanaway owned the

Top to Plum Run.

acreage extending vlest­

John Houck had purchased

th.e 47 acres west of P1 um Run with a business partner fifteen years before the

battle, and apparently had cleared the area from Vlheatfie1d Road southward to

Devil's Den and the 51 augllter Pen and from P1 um Run to his western boundary at

Rose Woods and the l~heatfie1d. Almost the entfretyof liis 47 acres was. c1ear-

cut at the time of the D.att1e. Houck, like Hanaway, lived in the borough of

Gettysburg and liad no i.mprovements on thIs townslli p property, He apparently

leased it during the growing months to other Gettysburg residents for pasture

use of their animals. Another visibleindicatfon of man'·s purposeful hand

in this area owned by Bouck was the "Trough Rock~·. A trough. to accumulate

rain water was cut Qr blasted 1.nto the ledge of a large boulder by someone

previous to the battle. Th.i.s. large boulder, just north of the comfort station

at the present trolley lied appeared 1.n an 1863 O'Sulllvan photograph, with the

1 ine of the trough clearly yisib1e therein. Perliaps Houck had the trough cut

for the animals in the pa?ture to trap rain water when Plum Run was low or dry,

The morning of 2 July 1863 most 1 ikely dawned over these four sites with

1 ittle indfcati.on of the furIous acti.vity tnat would occur there. before the , .

same sun set. The pr.evious day, a battle. b.etween advance elements of the , Southern Army of Northern Virgi ni.a and the Nortnern Almn'y of th.e Potom"c took

place some distance nortn. and northwest of the Plum Run area. Hhen the impetus

of and flank.ing attacks' of Lee's Southern army dislodged the Union line, the

s.ury;vors fell back to the heights just south of the town of Gettysburg. During

the nigl1t, after the conflict ende.d, more. men from b.oth armies approached and

took positi.on on th.e b.att1efi.e1d. On thl:l',Union Side, cavalry was thrown out as

pickets guarding the len flank along the Emmits5urg Road extending from about

th.e Klinge.l Farm soutfiwa,rd to the Rose Farm. The reinforcements from Hancock's

Second Corps and parts of th.e retreated Ffrst Corps filled in aline from the

Cemetery HJll soutlil'lard along Cemetery Ridge to the area of Patterson Woods.

Sick] es' Thl rd Corps fUrther extended the 1 tne to tlie 1 eft and parts of th.e

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Twelfth Corps held the northern slope of Li.ttle Round Top that night. ~Jhen

the Twelfth Corps vacated the position in the morning to protect the threatened

Union right flank at Culp's Hill, it was assumed that the Third Corps would

continue to occupy the left, including th.e aforementioned north slope of Little

Round Top. Indeed, General Geary stated later that he never would have aban­

doned so strategi~ a position as Little Round Top, as ordered, had he not

expected to be replaced in line.

The Third Corps line, however. did not replace the Twelfth Corps line!

but remained in th.e extension of the lowlands of the Valley of Death, between

Patterson Woods and near the George Weikert Farm. As morning wore on, Sickles

became more concerned aoout the defensabil ity of his. position, because of th.e

elevate.d grounds to hi's front and west along the Emmitsb.urg Road ridge, where

enemy artillery could take advantage of his position. Since a heavy force of

his skirmishers were. already out in that area, ne authorized a reconnoisance

in force into the woods opposite the Emmitsburg Road ridge to ascertain whether

or not the enemy was indeed intending to extend the line. in that direction and

threaten Sickles' position. W.nen the skirmfsh.ers dtscovered the approach of

a Confederate division moving southward, it w.as enough to convince Sickles to

abandon his weaker position and move to the elevated grounds to his front.

After noon, Sickles ordered a new line for his corps: the right along

the EmmitsDurg Road and ·then turning eastward at Sherfy's Peach Orchard, through

the Hheatfi el d and Rose I~oods witb the 1 eft resti ng at the southern termi nus of

Houck's Ridge. Almos.t 11,000 Union troops. manne.d this mile-and-a-hal f front;

i.n s.ome places there was no infantry at all, as at the Vlh.eatfteld Road, where

artillery fi.lled the line .•

Th.e 1 eft was defende.d by troops of Hobart Hard's Bri gade---the 20th Indi ana,

th.e 4th tlaine, the 86th and 124th. New York, and the 99th Pennsylvania Regiments,

as well as the sharpshooters under Berdan. The de.ployment of regimental skir-

m; shers and the sha rpshooters woul d prove to be essentfa 1 ; n the defense of

Sickles' line. Tne sharpshooters themselves consisted of fewer than 200 men,

but they were effectively strengthened by skirmishers from almost every br; gade

i.n S; ck.l es' 1 i ne. and they were thrown out as much as 300. to 500 yards in advance A

of the main 1 ine, using th.e stone walls of the Rose, Snyder, and Slyder Farms

as breastwork. defences. In the i.nterval li.etween these skirmishers and the 1 ine

• of the extreme left at Dev'll's Den, were the fields of the Snyder and G. W.

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Wei kert (Timbers) farms as well as tile swampy woodlot of tlie Sherfy Farm.

Most of this low area w.as swampy and drained into Plum Run. which ran in a

north-south direction from the Devi'l's Den area, and made a gorge ot valley

at its northern junction at Devfl's Den because of the slopes of Bi gRound

Top rising above it to the east.

The anchor of Si ckl es' 1 eft was Smith's 4th New York Battery. composed

of six la-pounder Parrott rifles. The chief of tile corps artillery. Captain G.

E. Randolph. personally led th.e New Yorkers' to this end of Houck's Ridge. and

ordered Smith. to "find location thereon." From the distance created by the huge

boulders at the Den to Rose Woods. Smith felt he had insufficient room to locate

tile ent iTe battery. Th.erefore. he placed two sect ions only "on the crest" and

the remaining two guns in th.e rear. Since the four front guns could not be de­

pressed enough to cover any Confederate advance through tlie Pl urn Run gorge

between Round Top and the ridge. the two rear guns were trained on the run's

passage through the gorge. totne south and below thes?uthern crest of Houck's

Ridge. IJames E. Smfth.A Famous Battery andfts Campaigns. 1861-'64.

Washington: Ii. H. Lowdermilk. and. Co .• 1892. pp. 10.1-.102.) The Union chief of

artillery himself. General Hunt. visited the important position after the guns

were deployed to order the front sections of open fire immediately on the guns

of Cabell's Battalion. whicft had been pummell ing the Peach. Orchard position of

Sickles' line. and to draw off some of that fire. Hunt's post-battle assessment

was that these shots from Smith's ParrotJts,"very much interfered with the enemy's

batteries. and reli,eved our riglit a great deal from their fire." .rCommittee on .. . ... ," .. ,'. ,

tile Conduct of the War. Army of the. Potomac. p. 450.] The post-battle report

from Cahell' s If,ft'fa'1'i:on ref] ected tne effectiveness of Smith's fire. in that

it was supposed by the Confederates that there was more than one battery oppos­

ing their fire from the dtrection of the "mountain." Since Smith's Battery was

the. only Union battery on this end of th.e Hne during the artillery duel. there

caul d have been only one battery occupyi n9 tn.e "mounta tn." or hei ghts. at the

left of Sickles' Hne. and only one oattery opposing Cabe.ll 's guns. Cabell.

however. reported th.at th.e "enemy occupied a rocky mountai n with several bat­

teries .• " and because of th.eir respective positions he was exposed to "a flanking

fire from the enemy's mountai.n batteries." The deadliness and extent of this

duel oetwe.en Caliell's. B.attaHon arid the batteri.es along the Third Corps front

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was reported by this Confederate battalion chief:

"The Dattalion. being first to 9pen fire, received for a short time a concentrated fi re from the enemy's batteri es. The fi re from our 1 ines' and from the enemy became incessant, renderi ng it necessary for us sometimes to pause and anow the smoke to clear away, in order to enable the gunners to take aim. During the same time, two guns were ordered to play upon the batteries on the stony inountain---I have reason to believe with great effect •

. "he loss of my battal ion was very heavy during this cannonading. Captain Fraser, who had always in previous engagements, as in this, set an example of the hi'ghest courage, coolness, and gal­lantry, fell, dangerously wounded by the bursting of a shell. The same sllellkilled 2 sergeants <lndl man.. " IOfficial Records, vo1. 27, part 2, p. 375.J

However, Smith's gunners arid hi.s infantry supports were subjected to the return

fire, which Smith assessed as "astonishing" 1'n accurac-y. ISmith, pp. lQl-102.J

In support of Smitll was the left of Ward's. Brigade of infantry. Im­

mediately to his rear were the "Orange Blossoms" of tn.e 124th New York Infantry

and the 4th Mai ne Infantry regiments. The 4th Maine originally occupi ed a

place which.,put tfie b.atte.ry to their "front and centre", out Hey would later

be removed to a pos i ti on to the 1 eft as the battl e pro gressed. IMa i ne at Gettys­

~, pp. 180-181.J Vlhile Smith was later pleased with the performance of

his own gunners throughout this "trial of skill between artillerists" .rSmith,

p. 102J, ohservers of the handi.work. from the New York Battery were equally posi­

tive with their prais.e. In fact, it is from infantry accountso,f Smith's

supports that moS.t of the battle liistory of the battery can D.e found.

The infantry supports, however; .did not nave sucn a glorious record

previous to or during thts cannonadi.rig.·· Both regiments s.upporting Smith's

Battery admitted neg1 igence on their part of not strengthening their position

before a potential attack. The 4th Maine came into position 5enind Smith and

spent its time satisfying a ravenous appetite:

" "It was now 3 o'·clock. and my men were nungry, haying drank water for supper, breakfast and dinner. Fires were kindled, a heifer was found near by and slaughtered, coffee was steeped and beef lmpa1ed .on sticks and Itarmed over tne blaze. He drank our coffee and ate the ve.ry rare and thorough 1y smokEid meat, s pri nk] i ng i:t wi th sa 1t, of whi ch condtment every soldier carried a little 11i his pocket." IMaine at GettysD.urg, p. 181.J

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The heifer may hilve come from one of three pl aces i.n theyi cinity---the pasture

• at the lovler end of the Wheatfield to their right, Ute G. W. ~leikert (Jimberst

Farm to their front, or' perhaps from the Houck's Ridge area itself, which was

used as pasture. Indeed, the 99th Pennsyl vania. twho woul d eventually be moved

into the same position of the 4th. Maine after that regiment was relocatedl

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sent out a detail while on duty in ·this general vicinity during the early hours

of their occupation, to satisfy "the great deman for rations". This detail found

a beef and had it killed, out the men never got a chance to eat this one, since

the fi ght began before it coul d be di stributed.[Penns:tl vania at Gettys15urg,

volume 1, p. 537.]

The 124tfi New York, with its ri ght extendi ng just into Rose Hoods

behind Smith, spent its time 5.efore the battle opened conserving its energies

for the fight:

"~!e had not yet learned the inestimable value of 5reastworks, and instead of spending our time rolling loose stones into a Dull et-proof line, w.e lounged about on the grass qnd rocks, . quietly awai:ti'ng the coming shock, which many decl ared them-sel yes ready and anxfousto receiVe.. B.ut there we.re undouDt­edly those among us wh.o ardently w.ished and perhaps secretly prayed that wn.en the battl e opened, it mi'ght rage tlie most furiously along some other portion of the 1 fne." INew YorK. at Gettyshurg, volume 2, p. 868.]

It seems rather astonishing to reaHze that troops that were assi gned to

guard the left of Meade's army were not preparing for a possible attack or

flanking movement. It is most likely that, since there was no evidence of

Confederate' infantry concentration on thei'r front untn Cabell's Battalion

opened, the men on this part of tile Third Corps Hne !lad reason to believe

the fury of the attack would Indeed rage "along some other portion of tl1e

line."

Hhen the 124th New York was subjected to the pre-attack artillery

duel, however, the lounging on the ground ceased. The proximity of the

New York infantry regiment to th.e battery drew fire on these foot soldiers

as well. Accordi n9 to a member of the regiment. the 1 eft company (B) was

within about "two rods" of the battery, which was slightly to the left and

front of the regiment. Hh.en Smith. took position in front of them, the 124th

was in position to witness their actions:

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" •• It was where we coul d see every movement and near every order. It had hardly taken position before a rebel battery on the Emmitsburg Road opened on it. Smith's bat­tery responded in gallant style. The rebels then brought two more batteries of six guns each. in position, nearly in front of our regiment and not half a mile distant. Their efforts to silence Smith's battery made our position almost untenable. Our Colonel (Ellis) moved us by the right-flank into the woods on whicn our right rested,

"I judge he thought a fter he had got us in there that instead of the woods being a protection they made our new position more hazardous Ulan the one we had just abandoned. He \,ere soon moved by the 1 eft fl ank back to our 01 d posi-t ion, Co. Brest i ng withi n a few feet of Smith's battery. During all this time the cannonading was going on incessantly from 100 pieces along the lines on each side. It lasted for about an fiour. There were several casualties in our regiment from the enemy's shells." IA. W. Tucker, "Orange Blossoms," National Tribune.(21 January 1886).J

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According to both Captain Smith and members of the 124th New York, the

firing ended at aoout 3 p.m. "as by mutual consent." ITucker, "Orange Blossoms.']

A "breathing spell" of almost half an hour elapsed before additional activity

on the part of the Confederates evidenced the attack.. On the Confederate side,

Hood's DIvision had barely established position before they commenced the at­

tack. La\,'s Brigade, ar;Jong the last to arri.ve at its line of battle, had

marched over 25 miles witnout rest to reach the field. Immediately upon

getting into po~ition the pioneer corps of Law's Brigade passed to the front

of the 4th Alabma and proceeded to fell the timber there with their axes.

The activity drew Smith's fire, which killed several men in the 5th Texas,

just to the left of Law's B.rigade. ~'However, one of the batteries of Henry's

Battalion, probably Reilly's Rowan Artillery, immediately occupied tne newly

cleared space and returned fire. {Captain H. C. Hard, "Incidents and Personal

Experiences on the Battl efi el d of Gettysburg," Confederate Veteran Ma gazi ne

(August 1900), ? 347.J

Hhile the supporting brigades of Benning and Anderson were deployed in

rear to support Law and Robertson respectively, the weary Alabamians were

permitted about one-half hour to relax. 10ffi.cial Records, volume 27,

part 2, p • .395.J This would correspond with the. half-hour lull witnessed

across the valley by the men in blue on Houck's Ridge between 3:00 and 3:30 .

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During that time, the regimental commanders of (at least) Law's Brigade

were informed that they would not be permitted to undertake the attack

on horseback, but would have to go in on foot. At least one objected in

later years to the wisdom of this decree, believing that he at least would

have been more effective had he been permitted to ride until the "rugged

ground lSeyond the valley was reached." Colonel Perry of the 44th Alabama

believed that three out of the five regimental commanders in Law's Brigade

were prcstrated by exhaustion and fatigue before the oattle closed, rWilliam

F. Perry, "The Devil's Den," Confederate Veteran Magazi ne CApri 1 19011,

p. 161.J

Before long, Law's adjutant general, Lee Terrell. rode to the front

of the 4th Alabama Regiment and gave them the order to come to attention.

According to a member of the regiment:

"The men sprang to their feet. thefr guns at an order. The thought that passed through the mi nd of the sol dfer ~Ias: '0 God. just for a hal f hour's rest!' As soon as we ~rere at attention, the command was, 'Slioulder arms!' and then, 'flight shoulder; shift arms!' and then. ''Forward; guide center; march.!' Then arose tnat wl'ld. indescribaole battle yell that no' one having heard ever forgot. The men sprang forward as i'f at a game of ball. The air was full of sound. A long 1 ine of Federal skirmishers, protected by a stone wall, immediately opened fire. Grape and canister from the Federal battery h.urtled over us as we descended tile hill into the valley. We rushed tllrough our own battery wllil e it was firfng and recei'ving the fire from the enemy's guns. t1en ~Iere falling, stricken to death .•. Hie younger officers made themselves conspicuous 5y rushing to the 'front;' commandi ng and urging the men to come on, while Adjutant General Terrell was doing what Ile could to restrai.n the impetuosi'ty of the Fourth Ala5ama, calling on tfiemen to oli.serve the Fifth Texas---now orderly they were marching to the charge. In the din of Dattle we coul d near the charges of canister pass ing over us with the noise of partridges in flight. Imme.diatelyto.the right.:, Taylor Darwfn. Orderly Sergeant of Company I. sud­denly stopped, quivered, and sank. to th.e earth dead, a ball flaving passed through his brain. There was RUDe Franks, of the same company, just returned from his home in Ala5ama, ni's new uniform briglit wHh color, the envy of all his comrades, his gladsome face Beaming as if his seetneart's kis.s had materialized on his lips. calling to his comrades: "Come on boys; come onl The Fifth Texas \~ill get there before the Fourtn! Come on boys; come onl~' He

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shortly afterwards met the fatal shot. There was Billy Marshall, running neck and neck with th.is private soldier, each striving to be tt:he first at the stone fence, behind which lay protected tne Federal line of sldrmisners, firing into the faces of the advanci'ng Confederates." . IWard, p. 347.]

10

On the l'eft of the 4th A 1 aliama was the 5th Texas of Robertson's Bri gade,

an ODvi ous ri val in prowess on the battl efiel d. Yet Adj utant Terrell poi nted

out how orderly the Texans were marchi ng in comparison to Scrugg' s 4th

Alabamians, wno were tearing down the slopes from the ridge towards the

Bushman and Slyder Farm buildings. The difference was al so noted by General

J. B. Robertson, commandfng the left !lrigade of Hood's front line. Since

Robertson's orders were to keep his left regiment, the 3rd Arkansas, "on

th.e Emmi'tsburg Road" and not to leave it unless i't was necessary due to the

progression of the battle, he was concentrating on keeping his brigade

properly all i gned to coordinate with th.e attack by the next div.iSion to the

left, that of IlcLaws. As it turned out, the 3rd Arkansas did hold to the.

Emmitsburg Road for quite some distance, with tfte 1st Texas clinging to

its right flank, as required by their particular orders'. Unfortunately,

i.n order to keep touch witn Law, the two ri ght regiments drifted off to

the right, in the direction of Law's attack.

Years afterward, Robertson compl'ained to Bachelder that he thought

Law started charging too prematurely. I,J; B. Robertson to John B. Bachelder,

11 Hay 1882. New Hampshire Histori'cal Society.J One can only speculate as

to why and how the attack.by successivebrig.ades. o.roli.e down at the very out­

set. Law pulled Roberts.on off of the Emmitsburg Road anchor oy his movements

toward Big Round Top; hi's s\'leeping arc was obviously \'Iider than anticipated

by Lee and as ordered by Hood. Yet La\'l had insisted before the attack that

the Round Tops were. the key and shoul d be taken; one wonders whether La\'l

stretched the meaning of orders, or ;>ernaps disobeyed his instructions, to pur­

sue his individual campaign. In any case, Hood \'las wounded and disabl ed

almost i.mmediately after the charge Degan while with the left of Robertson's

Brigade., and there was no one but the individual brigade commanders in the

division to correct any problems with alignment or coordination. It was

prob.aEily not until Law's forces approached the very threshold of the Union

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1 i ne that di vi si on command was turned oyer to Law. At that poi nt H was too

'. late to rectify the battle lines to comply with General Lee's intended order

of battle. The entire attack. of 2 July as planned by Lee was thus disjointed

at the i nit faHon of tn.e attack.

•

•

As Law and Roliertson advanced from Bushman Ridge, through the. plowed

and fanned fields of tile Bushman and Slyder Farms, they made easy targets

for the four rifled guns of Smith's Battery and for the sharpshooters and

skirmishers at the stone wall in the valley. The captain of the NevI York

battery rememliered now his cannon were used to "oppose and cri pple this

attack and check it as far as possible." He could not remember when his

men served thei.r pi.eces s,o effecti vely as during thjs advance by Hood's

Division, ISmitn, p. 1Q3J the first h.int of whom was the "clouds of Con-­

federate skirmishers" emergfngfrom Bushman Woods, followed by the heavy

lines of infantry. IMaine atGettsyburg,p. 161.J Elis infantry support

witnessed the attack and the defensive measures taken by the New York bat­

tery .. General Ward vlould remember the Confederate skirmisliers, the first

heavy line of infantry of Law and Rollertson ma,rching to oppose his line,

and then tile massed col umns of Benning and Anderson in support emerging

from Bushman Woods. It must have been unnerving to know that four guns

(~lus the bronze guns of Winslow in the Wheatfieldl and a single line of

infantry were all Ii,e Ilad'to oppose them. The 7000 Southerners massed

for attack on his front woul d lie a ch,allenge to the 2000 defenders, but

the brigade w,as determined to h.ol d untn reHeved, \

The men of the 4th Maine saw Law on Ute right of the ConJed~'rate line

moving directly towards the Round~Tops, while Robertson's left was aiming

toward the apparent left of th.e Union line at the Devil's Den. [~laineat

Gettysburg. p. 160.] As the two enemy brigades swept thr.ought the Slyder

Farm, the sharpshooters under Homer Stoughton, who ini'tially checked the

enemy's advance, were falling back, IIbid., p. 181J th.rough the lines of

the 4t!i. Ma i ne.

The 124tll New YorK. also watched as the Confederate origades came at

them from the opposite slope. They also were mindful of the weakness of

•

•

•

12

their single line as th.ey watched the "overwnelming" display of superior

numbers by Hood. They deployed into "four distinct lines of battle" as they.

manfully came on under Smith's fire. {New York at GettysDurg, volume 1.

p. 869.] Law and Robertson's 4th arid 5th Texas made one of these lines;

the 3rd Arkansas and 1st Texas with Robertson himself made a second; and

the two supporting brigades of Benning and Anderson the remaining two lines

of battle. The men of the Orange Blossoms recalled the "splendid service"

of Smith during this advance, while they lay 1'n line of battle, with guns loaded and ready:

"The guns were worked to their utmost. The heroic Captain gave every order in a clear, distinct tone, tnat could be heard above the tumult .. r heard him tell h.is gunners to give them five and six-second fuse, and wh.enthe gunners told lii'm the',case shot and shrapnel were all' gone, ne said,

'Give,tliemsheH; gi've them solid shot; d--n tnem, give them any tiling! '" {Tucker. "6range Blossoms. "]

A sergeant of tl1e regiment recalled the servtce of Smith's Battery

as it changed from shell to cani'ster. tearing "gap after gap throughi:the

ranks of the advancing foe,," whil e Smith and his men were exposed to the

increasing fire of the Confederate sllarpshooters and from the front infantry

line as it advanced. Since the limber chests were at the base of Houck's

Ridge, 5eliind Devil 's Den and his battery Csince Smith. could not find a suit­

abl e locatIon for them on the crowded crestl. every round of ammunition had

to be carried from tllere to the guns. "Han after man went down, but still

the exhausting work went steadi1y on, the officers tirelessly falling in to

fill out and work. detail for the guns, and keeping up a well-directed f1re~" , . .

unti.l the Confederates reached the base of Ute hei gnts, and the 4th New York

coul d not depress the guns enough to reach them. {Thomas H. Bradl ey, ,~',!l.t Gettysb'urg, t· Ni\tional Tri5une (4 February 1886)"J

Because of the nature of the Confederate advance. Smith 11as ri ghtly

concerned for the protection of his guns. It was quite apparent that Law's

Brigade would overlap their positton on tile left, and Smith implored Colonel

Halker of the 4th Maine to move to the left and take a position to protect

the b'attery and the remai nder of Hard's Bri gade from being turned. Ha lker

had already sent out about 7Q men to assist the sharpshooters and the other

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skirmishers of the brigade i.n the direction of the Slyder Farm, and felt

that they were helping delay Hood's advance sufficiently until supports

from the Fifth Corps could corne up on Walker's left. [Maine at Gettysburg,

p. 161. J Indeed, he pOinted to a force, prooably that of Vincent's Brigade,

coming up on his left, which he surmised would form a junction with his line

at the Devil's Oen. He also had no desire to move to tne low ground of Plum

Run gorge, wnere he could be exposed to a flanking fire from cover of the

wooded heights of lower Big Round Top. He felt he could more effectively

defend the battery from the hei ghts of Houck's Ri dge, overlooki ng the Pl um

Run gorge, than by attempting to face a frontal attack by superior numbers

within the gorge itseH. He was adamant in refusing "to go into that den

unless ooliged to," and Captain Smitli went personally to General Hard to

get Halker's 4th Maine to comply. Ward ordered Walker to the left, oelow

Devil's Den, througfi his adjutant general Captain John Moore Cooney, while

Halker continued to remonstrate "with all the power of speech" he could

SUr.Illlon. But he was forced to obey because it \1aS a mi litary order, and

he so stated to Cooney. IElijan ~Jalker to John B. Bachelder, 6 January 1886,

New Hampshire Historical Society.]

Somehow, HalKer was able to leave one company cn on the crest of Houck's

Ridge near SmUll's guns. while the rest of the 4th Maine Regiment moved down

into the ravine beside the massive boul ders of tile Oevil's Den. [Official

Records, vol ume' 27, part 1, p. 509.J He fmmediately sent out scouts to

his 1 eft to keep lii;m abreast of every movement of the enemy from that di rec­

tion, where the woods obscured his view. But fie ~Ioulci soon learn more from

the retreating sharpshooters in his front than he could from his scouts, as

the related that Law was advancing on the wooded hill of the "Devil's Kitchen"

to outflank him. Hal k.er's suspicions were confirmed.

At the same time that the 4th t·\ai ne was deploying tnto the gorge

Cnear the present parking area and comfort stationL the 99th Pennsylvania

was being summoned from Ward's rIght, in Rose Hoods near the Hheatfield; to

take the place of the New England regiment in support of Smith.

And at the base of the hill in front of Smith, where a stone wall enclqsed

the western si.de of the triangular field of G. W. HeikertUater Tim5ersL

Confederates prepared to attack Smith. Captain Smith, who had ordered Halker

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to the left and assured hicm be coul d take care of his own front without the

assistance of the Maine infantrymen, must have regretted his choice of words.

For now he had only the 124th New York "in his rear, with the few men of the

F Company which. remained from Walker's command, and his guns could not be

used to fire down so steep a slope.

These Confederates were with Robertson---the 1st Texas and the 3rd

Arkansas. The Arkansas regiment, however, was having its own problems

and could not devote any attention to the taking of Smith's Battery. The

advance had exposed the left flank of the regiment to the concentrated

fire from the right of Ward's Brigade (the 20th Indiana, 86th New York, arid

99th PennsylvaniaI as well as from the 17th Maine in tlie lower end of the

11heatfield. The 3rd Arkansas was forced to retire 'to a point almost a hundred

yards to He rear in order to "preserve and protect its 1 eft flank," and thus

uncovered and exposed tfie 1 eft of the 1st Texas • Lieutenant-Colonel Hork

dispatclied Company G of h.i's Texas regiment to assist tlie Arkansas force in

driving fiack the enemy from "their threatening ps.oition" on the 1 eft .

. Robertson"s left was unsupported, Anderson and Benning being delayed in

their movements Laccording to Robertson, up to one nour). Hithout the

support of troops on his left, Robertson was forced to devote most of his

energies and all of those of the 3rd Arkansas to protecting his fl ank ..

IOfficial Records, volumne 27, part 2, p. 408.J

This took. the momentum out of Robertson's attack on the battery. Yet,

these preparations' were momentary, and to the Federals on the crest of the hill

it seemed as if th.e Texas. regiment had merely halted "a few seconds, as if

to catch i.ts breath," before rushing at them "with a fierce, charging yell."

INew York at Gettysburg~' volume 2, p. 869.]

Hhat followed tn the next h.our or hour and a half 11as one of the most

desperate encounters on the battlefield of Gettysburg, with close mortal

combat oetween participants for that entire duration. The lengthy but almost

bloodless delaying tactics of Buford on the first day of the Dattle have

gained histori.cal significance in th.e story of the battle; the dramatic

and drastic final assault by Lee on 3 July is known by every school chil d.

But neitlier of tliEise:heralded actions could possibly compare to the upcoming

15

• events at the southern end of Houck's Ridge and in the Slaughter Pen. The

tide of battle for Smith's Battery changed so often and so rapidly that this

action rivals that at the Wheatfield for not only drama and significance,

but in confusion of eyewitness accounts and sequential narrative. Hhereas

at the Hheatfield troops from three Union corps were needed to hold back

Anderson, Semmes, and Kershaw's Brigades, only Third Corps troops were used

to hold this vital point against portions of Law and Rooertson's Brigades,

and later Benning's Georgia Brigade. In total, sIx Union infantry regiments

alone would oe responsible for guanding the left of the line, assisted by

the companies of the U.S. Sharpshooters and Smith's gunners. The Union

line here never connected with that which. develpped on !little Round Top

to face Law's main force and that of tfJe 4th arid. 5th Texas. The Pl um Run

gorge became the soft underbelly of the Union line and the oest possible

place for the Confederates to exploit a breakthrough which could take

Smith's guns from the rear and completely outflank \'iard, and its defense

thus oecame a vital necessity if the Union Hne as advanced tly Sickles

was to remai.n intact.

• Of these six Union regimeJilts (86th New York, 124trt New York, 99th

•

Pennsylvania, 4th Maine, 6th New Jersey, and 40th. New York) one (86th

New York1 was primarily invol ved in fi ghting the 3rd Arkansas in Rose Hoods

and is not within tfte scope of the area of the study, although its con­

tributions must be mentioned in conjunction with the other five units be­

cause of its impact on the defense of Smith's guns in that they drew. the .' . ,

power of the 3rd Arkansas. from the attack. on the guns and caused Robertson

to call for assistance from Anderson on his left. It would De Ahderson

and the 3rd Arkansas that would initiate the spread of tlie D.attle all along

Sickles'line, beginning at the Hheatfield. The comoined Union force defend­

ing thi s original left of tfle 1 i ne totalled about 2300 men, and woul d face

over 3000. men from Al<\tlama, Texas, GeQrgia, and Arkansas. lJohn Busey and

David Martin; Re9imentalStrengthsatGettysburg (Baltimore: Gateway Press,

19.82L pp. 50, 51, 54, 55, 132, 134.J

SO intense was the defense that even the Confederates were impressed.

Robertson considered himself outnumbered by five or six times nis strength

on fLis own front, lOfficial Records, volumne 27, part 2, p. 405.1, when at

• 16

anyone time he probably faced nornore than equal his. numbers, and never

twi cie hi s strength •. Even after recei vi ng support from three of Benning's

regiments. Rooertson admitted his frustratfon at be.i ng unable to take the

position. He belfeved that as fast as he could break one line of the enemy,

"another fresh one would present itself. the enemy re-enforcing his lines

in our front from his reserves at the base of the mountain to our right and

front, and from bis lines to our left." [Ibid.] As we shall see, the only

"re-enforcements" thrown in on Robertson's front were these same four regiments

of Ward's Brigade (4th l1aine, 99th Pennsylvania, 124th New York, 86th New

York). Due to the confHcting post-battle reports and the post-Vlar memorial

addresses and Ilistories, it is now virtulaly impossible to ascertain an

unimpeacllaoly accurate p~cture of the events at Slaughter Pen and Houck's

Ridge/Weikert Field. Confederate accounts almost invari1cibly claim an

immediate loss By tne Third Corps of Smith's Battery---·almost everyone

of the Confederate regfments involved claimed its capture. On the other

hand, Union accounts depict the loss only after several repulses of the

• enemy, as well as intricate movements and counterattacks by themselves,

none of l'ihich are recorded oy the foe. In their eagerness to cover them­

selves with glory it appears th.at the soldiers of both sides conspired to

detract as little as possilile from any s.etbacks or failures and any poten~

•

tial agreement in sources is thereby confounded. tlonetheless, as t~e following

accounts of the battle fn this area are related, it is undeniab.le that the /

struggle for the Slaugnter Pen and the Houck's Ridge position rival all

other confl i cts on the 5att left el d of Gettysburg for importance, bitterness,

sheer indi vi dual heroism, and deadl iness. Smith's Battery 5ecame the key to the action in this area. This

gene.ral i.zation is all-encompassing, incl udi ng all six guns of the batte.ry-~­

the four at the crest of Houck's. Ridge and the two on the hillock behind

them near tile Wneatfield. Tlie four forward guns were loaded with carii.ster

and were used witl10ut sponging l'ihen the 1st Texas finally undertook its

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• advance. [Smith., p. 103.J The Texas regiment ·.merely reported after .the battle

that after driving back the ski.rmishers at the stone wall they then succeeded

in "driving back the regiment and silencing the enemy's guns, taking and

•

-.

holding position o,f the latter." [Official Records, volume 27, part 2, p. 408.]

But the defenders on the ridge saw the advance of the 1st Texas di fferently.

Hhen they got within 100 yards of the 124th New York (about 50 yards from

Smith's Battery). Colonel Ell is ordered the regiment to fi.x bayonets,

but not to fire a shot until he ordered so. Hhen the Texans reached to

within fifty feet of the Parrotts, Ellis ordered the regiment to "up and

fire." It was noted that this "crash of riflery perceptibly thinned their

ranks and brought them to a stand." In the opinion of a member of Company B,

on the extreme left of the 124th New York, "there was never a more destructive

volley fired. It seemed to paralyze their whole line." But the Texans were

recovering and determined to reach Smith's guns. They returned the fire and

"res umed thei r determi ned advan ce

volley, once again created a loss

headlong dash with a rebel yell .

gain "but a few feet at a time."

Tucker, Orange Blossoms."]

" But this firs,t opposition by an infantry

of momentum and th~re was no longer the

Thei radvance was such that they coul d

[New York at Gettysburg, volume;:2, p. 869;

Although neither the Texans nor Robertson mention the following events

the· memories of Captain Smith and survivors of the 124th were vivid. Company

F of Ualker's 4th 11aine and Colonel Ellis' 124th New York were needed to

save the guns, now approaching being captured. Major Cromwell went over

to Col one 1 Ell is and as red:Jpermi ss i on to counterattack and 1 ead the re giment

against the Texans before they overran the battery, but was denied permission

by Ellis, who believed that the defensive fire was sufficient to hold the

enemy. But as they approached to within thi rty feet or so of the guns at

the wall, the officers' horses were brought up. Cromwell mounted against

the objection of his friends, wanting to be an example to his Orange County

volunteers, knowing that eventually his colonel would order the attack. It

was not long after that Ell is gave the command to "Charge bayonets 1 Forward;

doub1e-quick---Marchl" [Tucker, "Orange Blossoms; another account contradicts

thisiri stating that Ellis' command to attack was indicated by a mere nod of

his head to Cromwell. [New York at Gettysburg, volume 2, p. 869.J

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The counterattack by the 124th New York was initially 1 ed by the im­

petuous Cromwell. mounted with waving sword, leading tne left of the regiment';

after riding around to the front of Company B. [Tucker, "Orange Blossoms."J

Hith their fixed bayonets, the men of the 124th ceased firing and rushed

after their major. Ellis sat still in the saddle above fiis large iron-gray

horse for a moment, as if in "admiration of both h:iJs"loved major and gallant

son!> of Orange," but joined the regiment shortly as it rushed "i nto the

thickest of the fray." Lieutenant-Colonel Cummins, the "old man" of the

regiment, went in on foot at the riglit of the 124th as they swept down the

western slope of Heikert's triangular field.

"The conflict at this point defied description. Roaring cannon, crash~ing rifles, screeching shots, 5.ursting shells, nissing bull ets, cheers, shouts, shrieks and groans were the notes of the song of death which greeted the grim reaper, as wftli migntysweeps lie leveled down the richest field of grain ever garnered on this continent.

"Tne enemy's line, unable to withstand our fierce onset, broke and fled, and Cromwell---his noble face flushed with victory, and his extended right arm waving his flashing saore---uttered a shout of triumph. But it had barely escaped his lips when the second line of the foe poured into us a terrible fire whicli seemed in an instant to bring down a quarter of our numbers." INew York at Gettysburg, volume 2, pp. 869-870.1

Up to this point the Confederate 1 i ne had "withered" before the charge; a

parti ci pant on the 1 eft with Cromwell caught the exuberance and assumed \

the Texans were 1 i k.e "fri ghtened sheep." They watched the Southern~l's·s ,J

fall back almost 200 yards to a "rail fence" vlhere the supports vlere just

coming up, and where they were rallied by their officers. This rail fence

would have been the Virginia worm fence forming tfJe boundary between

Sherfy's swampy woodlot and the cleared fields to the west of the Snyder

Farm, and the supports woul d have been the advance elements of Benning's

Georgia Brigade. According to A. l~. Tucker of Company S, at least the left

wing reached within 100 feet of this overwhelming comliined force at the

worm fence.

It was at thi s 1 i ne that the Confederates were reorgani zed and abl e to

effectively contest the advance of the New Yorkers. The fresh line of

Georgians combined with Robertson's Texans to pour a "deadly fire" into

•

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19

ranks of the 124th New York. [Tucker, "Orange Blossoms." J It was then that

the Union, regiment. s\lffered it greatest casualties.

Cromwell's shout of victory was quickly silenced by this "terrible fire

which seemed in an instant to bring down a full quarter" of the 124th.

Cromwell shouted again; one wonders what emotion the shout reflected---fear,

anger, encouragement, surprise? The chronicle does not shed any 1 ight on the

nature of the shout, but the witness remembered the form of his major "amid

the fire and smoke" yet waving his saber. Soon thereafter, however, Cromwell

fe11 with a bu11et through the heart, tumbl ing backwards out of his saddle

as the New Yorkers began their flight back towards the battery. Ellis called

to his volunteers, "My God! ~ly God, men! Your major's down; save him!

Save himl" The New Yorkers turned and rallied, causing the initial attack

by Benning and Robertson to waver and then reti,re slightly at its suddenness;

but they soon reformed and continued a frightful fire into the line of the

Orange Blossoms. This fire also inflicted casualties in Smith's Battery

to the rear, driving many from their guns. Lieutenant-Colonel Cummins, fearing

for the safety of the oattery which was entrusted to his regiment to protect,

went to the guns and attempted to get Smith to wiihdraw them rather than

suffer tile indignation of losing them to the enemy. But Cummins was injured

when a gun carriage was "hurled" against him when it was struck byarti11ery

she11 , and he left the fie.ld disabled. E11is was the only field officer left

after Cummins limped off, and his form was almost mystical to the men as

it could oe "seen in bold reI ief, now lost amid the d:]ouds of powder smoke."

Yet his inspiration was enough to cause them to stand their ground, somewhel'e

between Plum Run and the crest of Houck's Ridge, and once again obey his

directions to fire upon the threatening lines of Benning and the Texas

regiment. As thei r vo11 ey took effect, th.e advanci ng Confederates once

again wavered under its impact, and E11is rose in his stirrups to observe

the reaction. Jus.t as h.e upraised his sword to give a command he was

pierced by a ba11 through th.e forehead, and he toppled from his gray mount

amid the rocks as tile horse charged wil dly ina wounded fury of its own into

the ranks of th.e Confederates.' E11is fell by one of the last shots before

his enemy retired Dad to reform behind the ran fence. Toe Orange Blossoms,

now weakened by casualties and the duration of th~ conflict, without field

• 20

commanders, cannot purs ue the Confederates. They are content to struggl e

forward enougli. to recover the !iodi.es of Ell i.s and Cromwell, and "gatheri ng

up such as they can of the wounded, fall slowlyandmournfullyback. to the

main line" and the safety of Smith's guns. Hlew York. at ·Gettysburg, vol ume 2,

p. 870.]

So tenuous was Smith's hold on the crest that he ordered hi s gunners to

retire w.ith. their implements, in order to keep the Confederates from capturing

his men or from using the guns against them. The 124th New York returned to

the crest to find the 99.th Pennsylvania had arrived to replace the 4th Haine

ins upport of Smith, and ft was a we 1 come stght for tile depl eted force of

New. Yorkers, who had started tn.e conflict wtth oy'er 200 officers and men and

had barely 100. left when tney returned from the base oftne Weikert Held.

lIbid., p. 871.J

It was, fortunate. enough that tfJey coul d get away witti so few casualti.es.

since they were in danger of beIng outflanke.d and s:urrounded by:the enerny·:in:'."·::'

thei.r advanced position and could have been captured or annihilated had th.ey

not returned to Houck's Rtdge when they did. a position from which at least

• one beHeved they "never shoul d nave advanced." While in the Pl um Run vall ey

of Sherfy's sparse woodlot they almost suffered that fate as "vast numbers" of

th.e enemy poured onto thetr left flank from the gorge at Plum Run and delivered

an enfil adi'ngfire down their ranks. ITucker, "Orange Blossoms. "J This ftre

was proDably delivered 5y tlie right wing of Be.nning's Georgia Brigade., which

was greiltly overlapping th.e small Ne~1 York line, . . . . . ;

Meariw.htle, the 44th. and 48th. Alabama Regiments of Law's Brigade had been

detached duri'ng the march to take the annoying battery. Sometime after crossing

the stone fence (of Hie lane at Slyders?) the Alao.ama regiments were whe.eled

towards tIl.e left so as to "confront" the oattery posftion at the soutt) e.nd of

Houck's Ridge. The movement thus far was such thilt tn.e regiments would have.

passed to tile right of tlie hattery, and in a northerly direction up the Pl um Run

valley. After disengaging n:[mself from Law's main,)line, Colonel Perry of the

44tli Alilbama allow.ed them to pass by. th.en ordered bis direction 5y an oblique

march. (proba51y allowing the 4th.and 5th Texas to pass as well 1. After entering

the woods northeast of the Slyder buil dings, compri.sing tile lower slope of Si g

Round Top. called "Devil's KItchen," Perry whee.led ois force towards the sounds.

• of the liattery in Devil 's Den.

• 21

The movement of Perry's 44th Alabama was such. that it attracted the

attent ion of the retiring ski rmis hers and s.harpsliooters. and Vial ker' s 4th

Maine soon spotted tliem moving rapidly to their left. not fifty yards away

in tile woods (above and south of the present comfort station). Halker quickly

real i gned his men to engage the 44th Al abama [Official Records. vol ume 27.

part 1. pp. 509-510J. Dut Perry. still within tile woods. was apparently aware

of his presence. As. the Alati.amians emerged from the woods into the open space

between Round Top and Devi l' s Den (Sl aughter Pen 1 "a sheet of fl ame burst from

the rocks less than a hundred yards away." deHvered by Halker's Maine force.

Perry. however. received a 1 ucky break in that "a few scattering shots in the

beginning" of the volley warned him in tlme to allow most of his men to fall

flat against the granittc soil and cause the main effects of -the volley to

sail harmlessly overhead and snip off the twigs and leaves of Round Top's trees.

Perry attested tll.at most of his men thus escaped the effect of this volley. and

assumed that Walker proEiably thought he had kill ed great numb.ers because of the

silence and the number who felT to the ground. IPerry. "The Devil's Den." p. 161.J

Indeed. Vlalker later reported that his 4th Haine fired anotner four or s.even

• rounds toward the 44th Al atiama witbout receiv;;ng a return fi"re. But here the

plucky Alabamians surprised Halk.er l'iith their i"nitial return volley on his

front and left flank. The fighting between the 44th Alabama and the 4th Maine

continue.d for perhaps· twenty mfnutes or more. since Vlalker claimed that his

men fired an average of 25 rounds apiece at this site.. (Official Records.

volume 27. part 1. p. 510..J

•

Walker. who had dearly not wante'd to he placed in tlits predicament. found

himself exposed to this. fi're from the fringes of ilig Round Top's woods. while

he suspected he would be outflanked by forces .advancing on th.e right of the

44th. Alabama. In reality. th.e 48tl1. Alabama. on Perry's rigl1t flank. was at­

tempting to do just that, continuing its advance on the wooded slopes above

the 44tli Regiment and toward th.e open ground just east of Pl urn Run at the

foot of Uttle Round Top. Halk.er's precaution to guard his own f1ank had

come to naught becaus·e h.e had misinterpreted the movements of Vi ncent' s

Brigade earlier and drew tn his flankers. assuming th.at Barnes· DiviSion

was. to connect at h.is left. Even before Vlalker espied the movement of

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• 22

the 44th on his left and front he suspected it to come momentarily. Scat­

tered shots up the slope to his left had already signalled the preface to

the battle for Little Round Top, as the 4th Alabama and the 4th and 5th Texas

struck Vincent's right f1ank. The fire from the "edge of the wood of

sma 11 pines" was "uncomfortably" nearer than vlalker waul d have anti ci pated,

however, and he was hard pressed to open his destructive fire on Perry before

the 44th realized the advantage of its position. The 4th Maine used the

intermittent boulders at the base of Devil's Den for protection, firing

across Plum Run at the Alabamians. Walker admitted tl1at Perry's Alabama

infantry "came on in a truly heroic manner" but was quick to point out the':

"equal firmness of the Maine men," who checked the Southern advance from , that quarter and drove tfiem back into the edges o' th~ woods, leaving their

dead behind.

When viewing the Gibson, Gardner, and O'Sullivan plates of Slaughter

Pen, taken before the Confederates were buried, it is possible that many

of the corpses depicted were those victims of Halker's desperate'vol1eys.

Indeed, the general O'Sullivan photograph of the many dead amongst the

• boulders opposi'te the Devil's Den is in the very region wliere the 44th

•

would have emerged from the woods in its attempt to gain the glory of taking

Smith's guns in reverse., Both Halker and Perry claiMed their greatest losses

occurred in this musketry duel across Plum Run. Vlalker reported his "principal

loss was in this place." [Official Records. volumne 27, part I, p. 510.] \

He emphatically repeated' over twenty years after tlie battle his objections ;

to bei ng ordered into the gorge, and regretted he obeyed the order brought

by Cooney oecause the position caused "his entire loss of prisoners and

most of tfue'other casualties." Ilvalker to Bachelder, 6 January 1886.J

Perry wrote that, notwithstanding the warning scattering shots before the

volley of Walker's men, within a "few seconds" he'lott one-quarter of his

men in ktlled and ~Iounded. IOfficial Records, volume 27, part 2, p. 394.]

Since hi:s later reminiscences, confirmed a total los,s of a little over one­

fourth, or 92 men ki 11 ed and wounded, during the entire batt 1 e. it is con­

ceivable that almost the whole of his casualtfeswere inflicted by the first

shots of Halker's Hai ne regiment at the Slaughter Pen. [Perry, "At Devil's

Den," p. 152.]

•

•

-----------,;:'

ii,

And, as the 4th f1aine and the 44th Alabama engaged in their own private

war, the fighting had extended towards Little Round Top and the Hheatfield,

so that "the wliole lfne was a1i.ve with burning pow,der.'" .[Maine at Gettysburg,

p. 164.J Benning had thrown the main force of his origade to the assistance

of the very left, coming in with Robertson's 1st Texas and the 3rd Arkansas

instead of supporting Law as intended. Benning had fol1ovled Robertson most

of the way from the Emmitsburg Road. all the time thinking him to be Law.

I n rea 1 ity, Law was drawn off into the woods a fter reach i ng the fi e 1 ds of

the Slyder Farm and never was seen by Benning. Rooertson, with his left

wing was about 400 yards in advance, and Benning endeavored to maintain

that distance, even "halting once or twice to preserve its interva1."

IOfficial Records, volume 27, part 2, p. 415 . .1 Hhtle Benning remained

in his supporting position, Robertson was hotly engaged in attemptfng to

not only tak.e. Smith's. guns But i.n protecting his le.ft from the rest of

Hard's Brigade in Rose Woods. Robertson had sent at least one courier to

Hood pleading for him to throw in some of tn.e supports on his left, to

protect him due to the absence of f1cLaws' Divi 5i.on coming up yet at that

point. But the courier returned, informfng R.obertson of the removal of

Hood from the field due to flis wound. Robertson immediately sent another

mess,enger to Longstreet, aski ng him to coordinate reenforcements and sent

other messengers to Benning and Anderson, who ~.ad oeen watching developments

from the rear, to hurry to his support. [Ibid .• p. 405.J Benning, in

the rueanti)ue, had percetved that Rooertson was: having di.fficulties in taking

Houck's Ridge tn his front and advanced lIbid., p. 415J, apparently coming

up just as the Texas' regiment was being hurled 5ack across Rose Run by the

bayonet charge of the 124th New York.

Benning's regiments consisted of two wings---the 2d and 17th Georgia

on th.e right and the 2Qth and 15th Georgian on the left of his line. The

left found itself at the bas.e of Houck"s Ridge where Rose spri ng poured into

Pl um Run, and saw the 1st Texas "struggling" to keep theIr assa ul tal ive.

The1 fell in with Utem, much to the consternation of Colonel \vork, who

would ratner have had B:ennfng on his. left to assis·t Manning's Arkansas

regiment in protecting the flank from the Union regiments in Rose \~oods

and the lower e.nd of the Hheatfield. Work oecame hopeless enj:angled with

• the 15tfl Georgia as B,ennfng's Brigade came into 1 i ne. After »several

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• 24

ineffectual efforts upon the part of both commanders .•. to separate the

men of tlie two regiments," it was decided the delay was not worth the price

of losing even more time~,arid momentum. [Official Records, vol ume 27, part

2, p. 408.J From the base of the hill at the stone wall, orders were

relayed to 50th regimetns to advance togetlier and take tile crest of Houck's

Ridge, "some 100 yards or more to the front." On their rtght was Colonel

John Jones' 20th~ Georgia Regiment, whose entire force woul d have to advance

up the cleared triangular field, whereas the 15th Georgi'a and .1st Texas

were sheltered 5y the "wooded, rocky hill" of Rose Woods to the immediate

left. The force of tlleir attack would carry the 15th Georgia and part of

the 1st Texas into the figfltfng fn Rose Woods for tile fJneatfield for the

rest of the eveni ng, but they were compell ed to fall back to the stone wall

at the 5ase of the \{eikert field at least twice to reorganize after suffering

casual ties in tlie woods and endangered by the fl an king attacks from Cross'

Brigade and, later, Ayres' Regulars. [Ibid.;.~p.A22.~]

Just as the 15th Georgia and the 1st Texas prepared to jump the wall

at the base of the Weikert field to initiate their first attack, they heard

... their comrades to the right become hotly engaged as they also began their

own advance. As the right ascended the hill towards Smith's Battery they

were unaware that the guns were to receive additional reinforcements before

they reached the crest. The 4th Maine, which had suffered severely from

•

the 44th Alabama, abandoned its position in the Plum Run gorge and came

back up the treacherous rocky slope to assist its brigade comrades. Walker

later recollected that he had ordered the movement after most of his skir­

mishers to the ri ght had 5een "swooped up" by the advance of the 2nd Georgi a

dO\~n Pl um Run toward the Devil's Den, and after the 44th Alabama joined the

attack by Benning's 2nd and 17th Georgia Regiments. [Maine at Gettysburg,

pp. 165-166.J

The gunners of Smith's battery were abandoning the rifles at this

point, bringing off the horses, caissons, and remaining ammunition, but

1 eavi ng the guns useless to the enemy. [Bradl ey, "At Gettysburg." 1 Smi th,

in a quandary, looking for more supports, saw the 4th flaine being forced

back (northwardl up the gOl1ge from his posi tion by the 44th Alabama and

the Georgi ans • He could see the enemy advancing on his front. Hunt had

25

• contacted Smith and told him to try to hold another tflirty minutes, but

Smith's supports were rapidly diminishing 5y the attrition of the gunfire.

Indeed the .124th. New York was now so small that they no longer were in line

as h'issupporting troops. By thelosses incurred In Heikert's field and

Sherfy's woodlot swamp the line had closed so much to the right in order

•

•

to preserve its alignment that at this point their present left flank was

where the rigllt flank had been at the opening of the battle (at the edge

of Rose \>loods), and almost 100 yards to the ri ght 0 f Smith' 5 guns. IA. H.

Tucker to J. E. Smith, "From Comrade Tucker," National Tribune (4 February

1886LJ Only the 99th Pennsylvania still had some semblance of strength

to it in his rear. Smith h.ad gambled tflat h.e could DUY more time 5y

keeping his guns 1'n pos1'tion witlil theE:e"few supports, than by withdrawing

them and proving to the Confederates how \1eak his position was. Tile very

fact that He guns remained could be a deterrent to an ovel"l'/helming stampede

by the shot-torn troops facing them. The men of Robertson's and Benning's

Bri gades nad felt the sti'ng and effective fire from the four Parrotts on

their long advance to tilTs pOint. Vihile eager to seek revenge and capture

th.e battery, the Confederates were understandably hesitant about ass uri ng

that that could De done wHhout incurring more artillery casualties. In

the end. Smith weighed the \:ienefits and the losses, and chose to 1 eave the

remaining three of hi's forward guns in positi.on Cone hav;:ng been withdrawn

shortly after the infantry conflict began because of its Deing partially

disa51edL Here they could mimic the "Quaker guns" and would at least;

present a "bold front" arid impel the Confederates to "approach it gingerly."

[Smith, p. 103.J

Capti~n Smith ran back to his two remaining pieces on the opposite

h.illock of Houck's Ridge Cat the north end), to'"rea~y. them to repel the

impending pursuit by the enemy. His guns were trained at the Plum Run

gorge lietween the Devi l' s Den and Bi g Round Top, through Ue Sl aughter Pen,

and he played h.is guns upon the soldiers of the 44th Alabama and 2nd,

Georgia who were just pressing the 4th Maine from fts position.

Walker's Maine troops were headi ng up the rear of Devil's Den to

see if they could De of 5.etter use in a better position. After they were

-----"'---- ----;-;- -----------------~--------- ------ -------:o_~-

26

• man-handled by Perry and the flanking movement of BennIng's right wing,

vlalker had di rected his regiment to fall back about 100 yards or more and fix

bayonets b.efore ascending Houck's Ridge. Walker related later that one of

his vivtd memories of the b.attle occurred at tll';s point, as he could "never

forget the 'cl i ck' that was made by the fi xi ng of oayonets, it was as one."

[Walker to Bachelder, 6 January 1886.J

•

•

The 44th Alabama continued in pursuit, inspired probably by the presence

of the 2nd Georgia coming down Plum Run gorge to the left, and crossed the

run at the command of Perry. Perry nimself would miss Ue glory of the chase,

hO\~ever, being fagged out oy the strenuous advance after so long a day and

seeki ng refuge wi. thin the b.oul ders along Pl urn Run. From his shelter, Perry

tried to recover from "h,eat and excessive exertion" and could do little more

than listen to the battle as ·ft surged. "The incessant roar of small arms,

the deadly hiSs of Minie 5alls, the shouts of the com5atants, the booming of

the cannon, the explosion of shells, and the crash of theIr fragments among

the rocks, a 11 51 ended in one dread chorus whose su5l im; ty and terror no

expressing could compass." [Perry, "At Devil 's Den," p.Hi1.1 His major,

George Cary, would ably represent the field command tn.at day in Perry's stead.

Leading his regiment with the colors in his own Ilands, Cary disappeared from

Perry's view into the smoke and rocks of Devil's Den. The next time

his colone.l saw him, 11ajor Cary would return with "an armful of swords as

trophies of Dis victory," lIbid., pp. 161-162,1 primarily from the right

wing of tn.e 4th Maine.' j

The troops on Houck's Ridge with SmHh'.s abandoned guns endeavored to

hold the position. Throughout the hour or so since their withdrawal from

the base of Wei kert 's fiel d, the shattered remnant of the 124th continued to

exchange shots with the Georgians and Texans who had taken their place at

the wall in tllllt valley. Th.e New Yorkers could see many of their casualti.es

in the open field over wbi.cfl they had advanced and retreated~--some dead,

like Captain Ni.coll, whos.e 50dy was \~edged oetween lioulders, and some wounded

and 51eeding 5etween the two lines. They also could see tne remains of their

heroic Ellis and Cronmell, wn.ich had been lain on a large boulder near their

line as a v1.Vid remi.nder of the cost they were paying for the pile of rocks

on HoucR's Ridge. The men had been defending Smith's guns since 3 p:m., but

•

•

•

27

for some time now they had been fi ghting to protect the bodies of these two

officers.· After Smith abandoned his guns the acting commander ordered a de­

tail to remove the remains of Ell is and Cromwell and see that they got safely

to friends, not wishing to unnecessar.Yly expose th.em to impending capture.

As the lifeless forms of the field officers were carried to the rear, the men

of the 12Ath New York saw the enemy finally advance from the wall in their

di rectton.

General Ward, during all this, was not idle. He had recognized the

detedorating condi.tion of his posHion by the time of Benning's arrival to

help the 1st Texas seal the doom of the Orange Blossoms. Be was ~ble to

obta in two regiments, which w.ere needed everywhere else In thi s s preadi ng

Confederate striRe on the TfLlrd Corps 1 ine, and had tflero dispatched to his

support. SUll convinced that Pl urn Run gorge was the key, the regiments

were directed to that place. If only th.ey could unite his left at Houck's

Ridge witn the troops on Little Round Top nefore a breach in flis line was

effected there might still tie a chance to contain and turn flack Hood's forces.

Unfortunately, the 4th Maine was unable to fiold out by ftself in this sHe,

exposed to a frontal and enfilading fire from Plum Run gorge and from the

woods and rocks on the edge of the Slaughter Pen, and had retreated to

the comparative safety of the rest of the bdgade atop the Den.

The first support to enter the fray was the 6th New Jersey of Burling's

Rrigad€, a brigade which was dIsasser.Jbled through@ut the conflict to 50lster

all parts of the line. Tne 6th New Jersey hurried through the \Jheatfield·

and advanced through the Rose Hoods before coming to the fence tha,i formed

the boundary separaUng th.e Rose Farm and fts VJIi.eatfield from Houck's Ri dge.

Not being guIded to any particular position Lieutenant-Colonel Gilkyson

began to fire from the fence down Into the valley at the 44th and 48th

Al abama Regiments and at Benning's ri ght. Scanning the s ituati on and the

relative positions of the opposing forces, Gilkyson decided to advance h.is

regi ment to a poi nt be.hfnd and to the 1 eft of Devil's Den, where he boped

he would form a junction with Hard's. Brigade, sInce the 4th Haine had just

retreated up that lieight. He moved his regiment almost 20.0 yards from the

fence across the expanse of Houck!'s Ridge in front of the last section of

Smith's Battery. lOffidal Records, volume 27, part 1, p. 577.J The move-

------~~----- -~- ---_._--_. __ ._--

28

• ment of the 6th New Jersey cuLoff the fire from Smith.'s guns [Smith, p. 104] I

which up to that moment !lad been most effective.

•

•

These two guns of Smith had proven as effective fn cutting down the

enemy as the other four had been during the developing stages of the

Confederate attack. ,Jhen ne<!first opened fi.re from these two reserve guns,

which were obcured from sight by the Devil's Den and thellorest of Houck's

Ridge, Smith took the enemy "by surprise." From the moment of his first

round Smith watched the battle flag of the Confederates coming up Pl um Run

gorge drop three times from the effect of his deadly charges of canister.

Three times he watched their line waver and forced into the slielter of the

woods. IIbid.]·). :

Benning nad been unaware th.at the guns were there until he "ascertained"

the fact a fter hi s ri ght recei ved "a terdol e fi re from tnem whi ch swept

down the gorge." [Official Records, volume 27, part 2, p. 414.] It was the

fate of the 2nd Georgia to be the troops to be baptized in the blood of

Plum Run, created by the tearing wounds from Smith's artillery fire. lJp

to the time they reached the gorge their advance had been "splendid," but

the nature of the terrai n in the gorge threw the regiment out of any semb.l ance

of alignement. But with "dauntless courage" the officers and men of the 2nd

Georgia continued advancing, notwithstanding the fire from the section Of

guns and then from the 6tli New Jersey, the rocks, of tne undergrowth.

Indeed, they did not h~lt until they advanced beyond Benning's other regiments . .' ~

and 5eyond tli.e "rock emi.nence on the left" (Devil's Den). Here the 2nd " ;

Georgia made a stand, near the present comfort statton and across Plum Run

to "the Devil's Den, wn.ere it "fought as gallantly as men could fight, and

did not yield an inch of ground." [Ibid., p. 420.]

Their first opponent was the men of the 6th New Jersey, who contended

fighting on this line for two hours! [Official Records, volume 27, part 1, p.

577.) The tJlatant error and exaggeration of the time can be proved by the

sequence of events after they entered the fray. By the time the regiment·

arrived it had to be about 5 p.m. For them to have fought in the Valley of

Death for two hours would mean that they were the only lJnion troops in this

end of the va 11 ey at 7 pLm • Only Crawford's attack on the northern line of

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Plum Run valley estaolished any kind of Union foothold in the vicinity that

evening. The 6th New Jersey would have been in Confederate-controlled

territory after two nours of fighting! At most, tfJe 6tfJ New Jersey could

have been engaged some fffteen to twenty mfnutes. The cas·ualty fi gures for

the regil)1ent.are disproportionately low, especially in comparison to the two

other Union regiments that occupied this same oasfc area below the rocks

of Devil's Den. The 6th New Jersey had only one man killed and a comoined

wounded and captured/missing total of forty others. On the other hand, the

4th t1aine lost 144 men near this same spot and thel.ast regirlent to occupy

the site (40th New Yorkl would lose 150 more. [Ibid" pp. 177-178.J Indeed,

the very battl e report of th.e 6th New Jersey stated that by 7 p.m. the regiment

had al ready retired, reported to General Ward at the rear, and rejoined its

own brigade. IIold., p. 578.J

Followfng the 6th Ne~{ Jersey into the whirlpQol was the 40th New York,

the "Mozart Regiment". It had lieen directed fly Captain J. B. Briscovi of

Birney's staff to move by the left flank in front of W.fnslow's Battery in

the Vlheatfield and lie detalled from DeTrooriand.'s Brigade. Mov;,ng thrillught

. • the point of woods, or northern finger of Rose Hoods oordering the eastern

edge of tile Vlehatfield, th.e 40th New York took their first position at "the

sh.ort piece of stone wall i.n front of the two guns of Smitll's 4th New York

Battery." The regiment was. met by Smith, who implored them to save h.is

battery. lIbid., p. 526.J The regiment responded oy firing a few volleys

Into the enemy towards Dev; l' s Den, and cnarging "down the meadow to the

•

rocky ravine5elow." IJohn B. Bachelder. (Notes on Services of Troops at

the 3.attle of GettysDurgt Cc. ]875). Hunti'ngtonLibrary, Mi.crofilm JlNI550.]

In their advance th.e 40th New York passed tftrough Smftft's park of horses and

carriages, [Smith, p. 1Q4.] and faded into ULe battle smoke as they ap­

proached Benning's Georgians and the 48th Alaliama. Their advance was par­

ticularly memora51e to the ~~ozart Regiment since they moved down Plum Run

itself, straddling the cre.ek 5.ed at a doun.le_qui'ck, many of the 11len "up to

thetr knees in mud and water." lOfficia 1 Records, volume 27, part 1, p. 526.J

Despite the onvious oDstructions to an orderly charge, the Impetuous attack

of the New. Yorkers created a sense of uneasiness in the Confederates in the

gorge, and tfiey fell·liac!( to the higher grounds of Devil·s Den and toe woods

•

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above Slaughter Pen, •. Their.lossesduring the advance wire severe, however,~: ... ':--.:':~' .. '-' .. :.':" ... " ... : ....... '--, '.',--'.:" .' .''-':'';:.'','"'''''-'''''''' -)',:, .)'" ',~

and they. cQulcinot di s1 qdge tfleConfederatescompl etely.Colone l'£gan 'hi mse 1f, .

1 e~din~:.the" 40thNe~Y6r'k~ w~s unhot~eci \ihen .h{s mpuntfeil ann~as'cbmpel1:ed to lead th~;egime~t:in6ri foot .. IFred':C.F16yd ,Histo;;ofthe40tidM6z~rti Regim~ntNew York' Volunteers(B~ston:F., H. ()i1s~~ Company,,1909), p~.202:]· .

,-- ,j -~----~-.. -

THE MOZART CHARGE AT GETTYSBURG.. '

-- ----------">. ... _- .~--- -~,

Smith, admittedly crestfaljen at the

and horses into Rose vloods aliout this time chain of events, sent his carri ages ~-

and prepared to abandon his .secohdary . positton. At his very front 11.i.sf6un'guns were being overrun by the final . concerted attack of Benning IS 15th ,17th, and 20th Georgia Regi ments and. the

'- . -. . .

survivors of the 1st Texas. ,I:t had been but moments since the men of the 124th '. ), .

•

•

•

31

New York saw the attack. beginimg on their front. They must have witnessed

the 1 ast desperate defense by the 99th pennsyl vania (of which so 1 ittl e has

5een written I. with its colors resting against one cif the unmanned yuns of

Smi th' s B.attery as a rallying poi nt. The 9.9.th. lost more than Orange County's

regiment th.at day--·-lQ.9. fall ing before the enemy's attack, but did not have

the pens to elahorate upon their heroism in the days and years that foHowed.

Perhaps the memory of that lone battle flag defi"antly planted at the yuns and

the rows of dead and wounded left atop the crest of Houck's Ridge are history

enough, as poignant testimony of the commitment of the 99th Pennsylvania to

carrying out its last full measure of devotion. The firepower concentrated

upon tile advanci'ng Confederates from these three depleted regimenns was not

proven by th.e casualties inflicted, but by the report of Lieutenant-·Colonel

J. D. Haddell of the 20th. Georgia. He counted 87 separate holes in his battle

flag after the action, 38 of which were due to Hinte balls'. Captain Smi.th

and Lieutenant Hazlett were res.·ponsilile for the other 49, which"from the

character of tile rents" were caused by "fragments of shell." {Official Records,

volume 27, part 2, p. 427.J

The only consolation for Captain Smith was that Il.e had forestalled the

Confederate advance workJng all six guns to his utmost. He had impeded

Confederate. progress and allowed his superiors the time to

along the li.ne and to take' possession of Little Round Top.

deploy reinforcements.

He told an officer

of Hazlett's Battery' D, 5th. U. S. after the D.attle that 6e kept looking over

to Little Round Top, w.ondering when the Federals would occupy it and relieve

him and that, whjle fi"ring tile fi.nal shots_reOlJl bts reserve section, .. lie heard

the first report from Hazlett's dfles on th.e summit of Li.ttle Round Top. At

the time, CaptaIn SmIth. consfdered the roar from the pieces the "sweetest music

. ever heard." [Benjamin Rittenhouse, "The Bqttle of Gettysburg as Seen

from Little Round Top," ;:n Kenneth Bandy, The"GettystiurgPa.pers, volume 2

(Dayton; Morningside B.ooks:hop, 1978},p, 522.J

It would tie Hazlett"s lot on th.e summit of Little Round Top to carry out

the duti.es as th.e artfllery anchor of the left. H.is regular army gunners were

up to the ask... Caming fnto position, the guns were immediately trqjned on

two targets.---the Oonfederate tiatteri es along Bus Ilman and VJa rfi e 1 d Ri dges

wh.icn were still contestfng the Union artillery and infantry at tn.e Peach.

Orchard, and upon the infqntry of Hood's DiviSion in the woods and fields below .

. - ------- --- -----:~--:-,------~~~~~~--:-~~~~-

• 32

The C()nfederates had as vivid a memory of the damage infl icted by Hazlett's .

Round Top battery as they h.ad of Smith's rocky ledge battery. Colonel Perry's

44th Alabama was among the first to feel its effect, wilen it was subjected

to "an enfilading fire of grape and spherical case shot," wfLich was lTlomentari:ly

deadly, but which was not as destructive later on because of the protection

"afforded by the rocks·." [Official Records, volume 27, part 2, p. 394.J

The inftial thrill of victory felt by Major Cary upon capturing so many offi.cers

and their swords atop Houck's Ridge was worn away quick.ly at the first salvos

from Hazl ett' s guns. When Ca ry reported to Perry wi th his armful of swords, he

complained tliat the. cannon were "playing on h.is position." Perry ordered the

regiment to wftlldraw from the crest and find sfielter on the sides of the hill

near Slaughter Pen where Ile was. IPerry, "At Devll's. Den, p. 162.J

Robertson's and Benning's Bri gades Hkewi sefe It tbis new firepower,

especially near and on the crest of Houck's Ridge. Coloriel John A. Jones,

commanding the 20th. Georgia i.n its attack. on He abandoned guns of Smi th' s

B.attery and the determined men of Ward's Brigade above him, was "instantly

kill ed at the post of duty by a fragment of sbell whe.nnearlyhalf way up

• the hill, and 5.ut a moment before i.t was carried."[OfficialRecords, volume

•

27, part 2, p. 426.J General Benning himself reported that the "shell s of

the enemy from the adjacent mountain were incessantly bursting along the

summft oii the peak, and every head that showed itsel f was the target for

a Minie ball." Hlitd., p. 415.J Robertson's. left, having secured the

crest of th.e lUll at Bouck's. Ridge with the Georgians, likewise did not have

much time. to celebrate fts victory since later throughout the rest of the

eveni,ng "several pieces of artillery was playing on and literally ploughing

up the ground in the meadow or flat immediately in the rear of lhis] position."

IRobertson to Racnelder, 11 May 1882.] The men of the 1st Texas suffered

considerab.ly i.n thei.r pos·Hion atop Devil's Den at the ridge after the fall

of SmHh's B·attery. Hazlett's Battery was determi."ned to keep the forces

on t6e. crest of Houck's Rfdge from supp.lementing thefr comrades in an )

attack on Little Round Top. and a "terrIfic fi"re of artille.ry was concen-

trate.d against the hjll occupied by ••• the First regiment." The

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33

commander of the Texans attested to the severe and nasty nature of this

concentrated fi re D,i' noting that "many were kill ed and wounded" by 'it,

"some losing tnei'r heads, and others so borrio1y rnuti'lated and mangled that

their identi'ty could scarcely De estab1 ished." That Hazlett succeeded i.n

keeping at least the 1st Texas from joining in with. its sister regiments

in the attack on Li ttl e Round Top can be seen i.n that Col one 1 Work was

proud that h.is men could (at least} "herolcally, and unflinchingly .••

maintain their position." IOfficia1 Records, volume 27, part 2, p. 40.9.J

Th.e fighUng i.n the area of the Sl aughter Pen and Heikert' s Fie1 d,

and at th.is southern crest of Houck's Ridge, ended with nightfall of 2 July.

That night, and early in tnemorning of the following day, most of Roberts.on's

and Law's forces moved to the south. and east, throwing up stone wa 11 breast­

works in the woods at the base of B.ig Round Top. Benning's Brigade of

Georgians stubbornly hel d tne Houck's Ridge area untfl removed in the evening

of the::third. Most of the bodies. that fell in the Slaugn.ter Pen and near the

Heikert Fiel d were too exposed to the deadly fire from Li ttl e Round Top to

he recovered, and tney remained where they fell unti:l after tne Confederate

• Army began i'ts retreat Dack. into Vi.rginia. It would De the lot of Union burial

details to inter the dead from Alabama, Georgia, and Texas who were scattered

aD.out the boulders. and bushes. The photographs of the dead at this end of

Held w.ere. recorde.d before these details reached these. areas, and provide

•

a striking tes.timony to tna Significance of Dattle action in tnis area. The

words wrHten 5y the commanders and survivors· of hoth s ides have .Deen used

tn thIs study to clarify and describe the nature of tne fighting, as well as

to its re1ati.ve importance, but the photographs are visible fiistoric evi'dence

that \~l1at tnese men endured was truly recorded tn tn.eir narratives .

-..

• COMMENT

Various conclusions came out of this brief study, which should be

used to better or more accurately interpret the battle at this area of

the field. Overpowering all others is the responsibility of clearing out

the over-extended vegetation in the Slaughter Pen, the Plum Run gorge, and

the Sherfy Woodlot. The movements and activities in this, one of the most

historic sites on the field. are obscured by vegetation to such an extent

that it is not only impossible to interpret what nappened there, but it is

ignoring the story of the men who fought and died there.

Secondly, it is apparent from the recorded history that all six guns

of Smith.'s Battery are presently in the wrong location, along with the monument

and marker adjacent to them. Smith's guns were in front of the infantry 1 ine

at the crest of Houck's Ridge, by some distance (perhaps 50 yards). The

monument and guns of this forward part of the battery are now at the LEFT of

the infantry 1 i ne of monuments. The infantry, which was suppoed to be in

• support of Smith, were logically behind him and not within the same line.

•

Indeed, the position of the monument and guns indicates that Smith's Battery

held tlie extreme left of the Third Corps linevJITHOUT supports. All accounts

of the battle correspond in stating that the guns were in front of the Union

infantry line. Ihthe ili1iantry monuments of Ward's Brigade are in the correct

location Land from the records of the regiments it appears that they are so)

then the monument and gun location- of the 4th New York is erroneous.

The section to th.e rear is presently on Crawford Avenue, in the Vall ey

of Death, instead of on Houck's Ridge as it was in 1863. The Bachelder troop

position maps 0863 and draft of 1880s) accurately portrayed the position of

these guns on the hi 11 ock. at the northern end of Houck's Ri dge, as di d the

map prepared for the court case against the trolley. The fact that the 40th

New York stopped in front of the section and then charged "DaVIN the meadow" to

the "rocky ravi.ne BELOW" i ndi cates that the guns were on a height and not

within the "rocky ravine" itself as they have been since put there by the War

Department in 190G. A visit to the site .itself (near the dfvision marker of

•

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•

Ayr.es) assured the doubtful that the northern hillock is a much more ad­

vantageous position than that in the valley along the avenue, and has a com­

manding view of the valley and Plum Run gorge (the target of the section):

It is an injustice to thfs, one of the most gallant and effective batteries

on both sides in th.is battle, that we continue to mark and interpret sites

on which it never stood and ignore those site where it did such deadly and

effective service and where i:t suffered its true losses .

j

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APPENDIX A

STRENGTHS AND CASUALTIES -- 2 JULY, 1863

UNION engaged "'caSualtieS'

t,ard's Brigade 4th /·laine 287 14 k, 54 w, 72.m 86th New York 287 ILk, 48 w, 4 m.

124th New York. 238 28 k, 57 w, 5 m 99th Pennsyl vania 277 18 k, 80 w, 11 m 1st U. S. Sh,arpshobters 169 1 k, 24 w, 15 m.

DeTrobriand's Brigade 40th New York 431 23 k ,c. 115 w, 7 'm

Burling's Brigade , 6tl1 New Jersey 207 1 k, 26 w, 8m

Artillery Brigade 4th New York Battery 12.6 2 k, 10 w, 1 m

(Busey and Martin, pp. 50-51, 54-55; Bachelder, Notes on Services of Troops; Offi.CialRecords, volume 27, part 1, pp. 177-178,512,519,527,578, 589.)

CONFEDERATE

Robertson "s Brigade 1st Texas 3rd Arkansas

Law's Bri gade 44th, Al abama 48th Alabama

Benning's Brigade , 2nd GeorgiC\

15th Georgia 17th Georgia 20th Georgia

engaged'

426 479

363 374

c. 348 368

c. 350. c. 350

casualties'

24 k, 59,w, 21 c, 1 m 13 k, 73 'If, 17 m

24 k, 66 w, 4m. 8 k, 67 w, 27 m.

25 k, 66 'If

8 k, 62 w 15 k, 75 'If

23 k, 77 W, 4 m

(Busey and Martin, pp. 132-134; Harold Simpson, Hood's Texas Bdgade: A 'Compendium, pp. 10-89, 253-321; Official Records, volume 27, part 2, pp. 330, 424, 394, 39,6.1

• APPENDIX B

PHOTOGRAPHS

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,"~b

.. ~. ---'-"--~' -

! .

\ . ,

1. The Spring at Devil's Den (Tipton #2471J---the den itseH is beneath the top boulder and behind the spring.

. . : .

J

J 'J

;j

. ,.J

r,

~ .. '

" .

, ..

. ,f:'';' . ...~ ~.!, .-::. 'I.; . "

N

::>

c V> ro =, = -=: ~,

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3. North end of Slaughter Pen and Plum Run Valley (O'Sullivan), 6 July 1863--­the large b_oulder wJth the trougb visible i.n it i.s encircled

',\,; + .. ~.-

.~

>~ ::::> o

~ ';,,-\p? '~.'~

'-.

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4. Dead Confederate soldier CGardner #229). 6 July 1863---this stereo view most likely portrays one of the infantrymen of the 2nd Georgia Infantry, since the photograph was obviously taken in the mass of rocks and boulders of Plum Run gorge, which was the route of attack of that regiment of Benning's Brigade.

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5. View in the Slaughter Pen at the foot of Big Round Top (O'Sullivan), 6 July 1863---the view is eastward from the Devil 's Den, and most 1i~ely depicts th.edeaa-bY HIe 44th. I\tab.awaand--perhaps ·som€ crf i:he 2nd GeOl"gia. The encircled body 1i.es immediately east of the trolley roadlied.

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I. I I

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!­

! ~ -,-fc i

~:

['

r

6. Confedenaue dead in the Slaughter Pen (Gardner #2651, 6 July 1863---

/".

< .,

this view shows two dead infantrymen, probably of the 44th Alabama Infantry, which suffered casualties fnom the rifles of the 4th Maine

,and from Smith's two guns on the hillock of Houck's Ridge. The trolley road bed is just to the right of the picture.

I ••

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I I , i • ,

7. Scene in the wMds. at the nQfthw.estern hi1se of Rtg llound Top (1Jibson #2521-. 6 July 1863---also tdenti.fied as "tn Slaugliter Pen. foot of Round Top", this pnotograpn probalily depicts more of the dead· of the 44th Alabama Ulled by the first volley from the 4th Maine, just at tlie edge of tli.e woods near tlie cleari'ng around Plum Run. The area would Be just aliove the present comfort station .

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(L

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8. Dead Confeder.ate soldier, Devil's Den (Gardner #277),6 July 1863--­this view portrays a victim of Ward's Brigade near the edge of the G.W. weikert Held, and is most likely a member of the 20th Georgia or the 1st Texas killed in the attack on Smith's Bat

f'«~! .? _ .... '- ~-~. .!ELlE .f. f~c:r;~-:

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Newspapers

Gettysburg Compiler

National Tribune

t1agazi nes

B1 BLIOGRAPHY

Confederate Veteran Magazine

Manuscri pts

John B. Bachelder Papers, New Hampshire Historical Society.

----- ----

John B. Bachelder. (Notes on Services of Troops at the Battle of Gettysburg) (c. 1875). f.luntington Library, IIi crofilm #NI550.

\J. S. vs a Certain Tract of Land in Cumberl and Township, Adams County, State of Pennsylvania, 3rd Circuit. October Session, 1894 .

Publ is hed \.Jorks

Bandy, Kenneth .• The Gettysburg Papers, 2 volumes. Dayton: Ilorningside Bookshop, 1978.

Busey, John and David ~1artin. Resimental Strengths at Gettysburg. Baltimore: Gateway Press, 1982.

Fox, Hilliam F. New York at Gettysburg, 3 volumes. Albany: J. B. Lyon Company, 1900.

Floyd, Fred C. History of the 40th (t10zart) Regiment New York Volunteers. Boston: F. H. Gilson Company, 1909.

Maine at Gettysburg. Portland: The Lakeside Press, 1898.

Nicholson, John P., ed. Pennsylvania at -Gettysburg, 2 volumes. Harrisburg: E. K. Ilyers, 1893.

Official Records of the (;ar of the Rebellion, Series I, volume 27.

Report of the Joint Committee on·the-CondQct of the War, at the Second Session ThirtY-hght Congress. Army of the PotOmac. Battle of peters­burg. Washington: Government Printing Office, 186.5.

• Smith, James E.· A Famous Battery and Its Campaigns; 1861-"64. Washington: W. H. Lowdermnk and Company, 1892.