Our knowledge of other minds

OUR KNOWLEDGE OF OTHER MINDS

THOMAS W. SMYTIIE

In this paper I want to give reason for accepting some form of the view that there is some logical, and not just contingent, connection between publicly observable (hereafter, O's) behavior and a person's psychological states (hereafter, PS's). I will call this view Logical Connectionism (LC). By PS's I mean such examples as feelings, thoughts, images, sensations, beliefs, desires, emotions, and the like. By O I mean that a suitably trained observer in appropriate circumstances can make reliable judgments as to the presence of O's on no basis than the use of his sense organs.

I shall begin by introducing the notion of an "analytic indicator" and a more precise formulation of LC.

1. 'O' is an analytic indicator of 'P' ~ff it is an indicator because of the meanings of 'O' and 'P'.

An indicator which is not analytic will be said to be synthetic. A noncontroversial example from outside the realm of psychological states would be this. 'x promptly obeyed orders O1,02 �9 �9 �9 from his parents' is an analytic indicator of 'x is obedient'. Whereas 'x has been to school S' (where S is well known for instilling obedience in children) is a synthetic indicator of the same predicate.

We can now formulat LC as the thesis that 2. PS predicates have analytic indicators among O predicates.

II

A.

In defending LC I shall rely chiefly on what I shall call the "Semantic Argument." This argument sets out to show that it is only on the assumption of LC that one can tell in what sense other people are using a given PS term. The basic contention is that I can

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test the hypothesis that another person, A, is using a given PS predicate, 'P', in a given sense, only if that sen~ conforms to the LC model) If this is granted, it follows that I can find out what the standard meaning of 'P' is in the language community (insofar as knowing what I mean by 'P' does not suffice for this) only if that standard meaning conforms to LC. For I can test a given hypothesis as to the stand.ard meaning only by determining, with respect to each member of the language community, or with respect to each memeber of some representative sample thereof, whether he attaches that meanihg to 'P'. And so if I can test only LC hypotheses for each person, I am limited in the same way as to the possibilities for the standard meaning that I can investigate.

B.

It will be insturctive to relate the Semantic Argument to a more familiar support for LC, what I shall call the Epistemological Argu- ment. According to this argument LC is a necessary condition of my ever coming to know what PS another person is in at a given moment. The argument can be put as follows: If we have any knowledge of the PS's of others, then mental predicates have analytic inidicators. We do have such knowledge. Threfore, mental predicates have analytic indicators, i.e., LC is true.

Apart from other possibilities, such as the tradition argument from analogy, one possibility this argument overlooks is the following. The most common way of finding out what PS another person is in is to ask him. Suppose my assurance that A feels relieved is based on his having told me that he feels relieved. Applying the Epistemological Argument to this case, I am justified in taking this as a basis only if either (1) it follows from the meaning 'feels relieved' that such a report is a reliable indication of feeling relieved, or (2) I have empirically established a correlation between such reports and something already established as an indication. But there seems to be a third alternative, viz., that I have a reasonable general assurance that A is to be trusted in what he tells about himself. This general assurance, which may have been based on an investigation of A's reports of matters quite other than feelings, then lends credibili- ty to his reporting feeling relieved. But having noted this, we must go on to note that I can know that he told me that he felt relieved only if I have reason to think that he uses 'feels relieved' (or whatever term in whatever language he was using instead) in the appropriate sense. If I don't know what he means by the PS term he used,

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then I don't know what he was telling me. Hence this third way is available only ff I have some way of f'mding out how A uses PS predicates.

This move has the effect of shifting emphasis from the question, "How can I know what another person is thinking and feeling?" to "How can I know what another means by thinking and feeling terms?". More specifically, it reveals the following about the Epistemological Argument. We cannot show that a given condition, Q, is a necessary condition of one person knowing the PS of another, unless we can show it to be a necessary condition of one person knowing in what sense another person uses PS predicates (or of his knowing that the other's reports are generally reliable). For ff I can find out the meaning you attach to PS predicates (and can find out that your reports are generally reliable) without Q holding, then the above argument shows that I can find out what your PS's are without Q holding, then the above argument shows that I can find out what your PS's are without Q holding. In this way the Semantic Argument is basic to the Epistemological Argument.

C.

To show that communality of meaning can be checked only on LC, it would be necessary to show not only that it can be checked given LC, but also that it cannot be checked given any other interpretation of PS predicates. Unfortunately I shall not be able to aim so high within this paper. I shall have to limit my attention to one alternative, and even there the argument will only be sketched in and, even if filled out, would fall short of being demonstrative. I have chosen as a foil to LC what is undoubted/y its most prominent alternative, the view that each person attaches meaning to a given PS term by reference to one or more paradigms of the denotata of that term within his private experience. Let us call this the Private Para- digm thesis (PP). According to PP, what I mean by ~feel fll at ease' is something like 'the way I remember feeling on such and such an occasion'; and you attach meaning to the term by a similar reference to some remembered experience of yours. I f this is what a given PS predicate means, it is clear that the meaning cannot in any way justify the claim that some O or other is an indicator of feeling ill at ease. The PS term is contingently related to any publicly observable state of affairs. It is logically conceivable that feeling ill at ease might be typically manifested by bodily relaxation, smiling, and fluent

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conversation, rather than by the way it is in fact manifested. We shall proceed by contrasting the possibilities for checking communality of meaning on the LC and PP interpretations.

III

A.

How might one go about determining in what sense someone else uses a PS predicate? The idea that I can find out just by asking him may seem so naive as not to be worth considering, but it will be instructive to bring out the weaknesses and strengths of this approach. It is clear that the use of this method does not presuppose LC, although results obtained from it might well support LC. Indeed if this approach would do the job, our earlier assumption that I can find out what A means by 'P' only by testing one or another hypothesis as to what he means by 'P', would have to be abandoned. For I do not need to be in possession of any hypotheses as to what A means to be able to ask him. I can approach the problem by that route with a completely open mind.

This appraoch is not sufficient to do the job for the following reasons. If A's explanations of what he means by 'P' involve category corssings into, eg., O predicates, then we are an area where semantic intuition is not reliable. On the other hand, if he explains 'P' solely in terms of other PS predicates, there is more reason to take seriously what he says. But this will enable us to check communality of meaning for 'P' only on the assumption that other PS terms are not in question. It will not provide us with a general test for all PS terms. It is a familiar point that two persons could be using a common system of terms, logically interrelated in the same ways, even though they mean quite different things by all the tetms.

But though the possibility of defining some PS predicate in terms of others does not provide by itself a device for testing communality of meaning for any PS predicates, it clearly can be integrated with some other device so as to do part of the job, so long as semantic statements of this order possess a significant degree of reliability. In other words, if I can by some other method contrive to show that A uses an appropriate subset of PS terms as I do, I can then proceed to determine whether he is prepared to define other PS predicates in terms of these in the same way as I. Thus if I have already determined that we use predicates of the form 'see an x' in the same way, I can test communality of meaning for 'see x in the mind's eye' by

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determining whether we would both be prepared to explain this phrase as meaning something like 'be in a state which is something like seeing an x except that all other indications are that no x is present'. And if I have already determined that we use 'pain' in the same way I can test communality of meaning for 'burning pain' by determining,whether we would both be prepared to explain the term as meaning something like 'pain of the sort one typically gets from being burned'. This possibility gives rise to a restriction on the extent of any conclusion that can be drawn from the Semantic Argument. The most the Semantic Argument can do for us is to show that LC holds for an appropriate subset of PS predicates. For if it enables us to establish communality of meaning for such a subset, interdef'mability can take over from there, regardless of whether LC holds for the remaining PS predicates or not. Henceforward we are able to be understood as directing our remarks to an appropriate subset of PS predicates.

It is fortunate that such possibilities exist, for its seems clear that over large stretches of the PS domain - thoughts, mental images, low intensity internal bodily sensations - there are no O indications of any significant strength other than the assertion by the person that he is in the PS in question, and obviously cannot be made use of it is his use of the relevant PS predicate which is in question. Thus if I were seriously setting out to investigate your use of PS terms, I would be forced to stratify the domain. I would have to begin with some terms and not others. Having established communality of meaning for those, I could investigate the others by a more indirect method. 2

B.

Insdfar as the problem is discussed at all in the literature we find only one serious candidate for a method of testing a hypothesis, S, that A uses a basic PS predicate, 'P', in sense s, in first person applications. The method is this. We take a number of occasions on which A applies or refuses to apply 'P' to himself. (These applications and refusals may, of course, be elicited by interrogation). On each of these occasions we note the presence or absence of O indicators of P, in sense s. If there is by and large correlation between A's application of 'P' to himself and the presence of these indicators, then we conclude that A is using 'P' in sense s. If there are no such by and alrge correlations, we conclude that A is not using ~P' in that sense, unless the failure of correlation can be better explained in some

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THOMAS W. SMYTHE

other way, eg., by supposing that A was deliberately trying to deceive us. Let us call this the "correlational method."

Actually the O's come into the picture only because they are taken to be reliable indications of the presence of P. It is a regular correlation between A's being P and A's willingness to apply 'P' to himself that furnishes the proximate basis for the conclusion that A is using 'P' in sense s. Hence a more general formulation of the correlation method would be this. We determine in a number of cases from O's whether or not A is in P, in sense s of T ' , and also whether of not A is prepared to apply 'P' to himself. If self-applications of 'P' are strongly correlated with being in P, this confirms S. If not, it disconfirms S.

In order to justify the claim that this method enables us to test a given S, we obviously have to show that we can determine drom the O's employed when A is in state P. We don not have to show that this can be determined infallibly or with final certainty or in every case, but at least we have to show that it can be determined by and large and with a reasonable degree of assurance. There is no problem here for LC, since for a given basic PS predicate, on that interpretation it will be analytic that certain O's are indicators. At least there will be no problem for any form of LC on which the analytic indicators are strong enough to do the job required. PP, on the other hand, will have to provide empirical justification for the use of O indicators. This justification will take the form of the traditional argument from analogy, which goes from the observation that there are certain PS-O correlations in my own case to the conclusion that such correlations hold also for other human beings. This argument has been frequently criticized, and I do not intend to add to the discussion, s Although the matter is controversial, it seems clear that there are many serious difficulties in the argument, and that therefore any otherwise plausible account of PS terms which would enable us to test communality of meaning without relying on the argument would be superior.

The correlational method, even if completely successful in its own terms, still leaves a gap between the evidence it provides and the conclusion of a communality in meaning. A successful amassing of positive evidence by this method shows us that generally A applies 'P' to himself when and only when he is in state P. We may take this as showing without more ado that 'P', as A uses it, is extensionally equivalent to 'P' in sense s. But it is a notorious fact that two terms can be extensionaUy equivalent while intensionally distinct. This general possibility can be seen to apply to the present case. Quite

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apart from other considerations, it is clear that a PS term with a PP meaning and one with an LC meaning might be extensionally equivalent. Thus 'feel ill at ease' in the sense of 'a state of consciousness leke the one I am in now' might be extensionally equivalent to 'feel ill at ease' in the sense of 'a state which typically issues in such behavior as tensing, squirming, and talking in a stilted manner'. In this case, even if A applies 'feels ill at ease' to himself when and only when he feels ill at ease in the first sense, it does not follow that he is using 'feels ill at ease' in that sense, for it would be equally ture that he applies 'feels ill at ease" to himself when and only when he feels ill at ease in the second sense. Hence we need additional grounds for the claim that he is using the term in one rather than another of the extensionally equivalent alternative senses.

On PP the argument would run as follows. We have already used the argument from analogy to justify the assumption that generally when the appropriate O predicates apply A is in P, i.e., A is in a state like the stae I am in when one of my private paradigms for 'P' occurs. Now t h e argument from analogy is called on for further duty. It is argued that when I apply 'P' to myself in the presence of P, I do so on the basis of certain features of my psychological state at the moment rather than others; therefore it is likely that when A applies 'P' to himself in those circumstances, he does so on the basis of the same features of his psychological state at the moment. That is, it is likely that what he is saying about himself is the same as what I am saying about myself when I apply 'P' to myself. It is important to recognize that the argument from analogy is called on to bear this extra burden when we use it "semantically" to justify a conclusion as to the meaning another attaches to a PS term, rather than "epis- temologically" to justify a conclusion as to what PS a person is in at a given moment. Even if the argument is strong enough to do the former job it may not be strong enough to do the latter. At least problems of a new order emerge when we attempt to evaluate its use for the latter task.

It may seem that the prospects for closing the gap between exten- sion and intension are worse on LC than on PP. For in view of the admitted fact that no one applies PS predicates to himself on the basis of any public indications at all, we are unable to show an inten- soinal equivalence with an LC interpretation of the term by the method available for other terms, viz., showing that the indicators on the basis of which the application was made were those which, on the meaning in question, are analytic indicators.

However things are not this bad. Although I cannot get anywhere

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THOMAS W. SMYTHE

by asking A on the basis of what indications he applied 'P' to himself, I can ask him what he would take as basic evidence for the evaluation (by someone else) of what he asserted in applying 'P' to himself. The possibility of this move is based on a consideration that seems to have escaped the notice of those who argue that the fact that PS predicates are applied on the basis of certain criteria in third person applications, but on the basis of no criteria in first person applications, is a prima facie reason for supposing that PS predicates are used in different senses in these contexts. What seems to have escaped ndtice is that what is crucial is not the basis on which application is actually made, but rather what considerations the person would recognize as relevant in determining the truth of what he has asserted. Thus on LC we can, in order to move from extensional to intensional coincidence, supplement the correlational method with what we may call the "epistemic method" viz., finding out, presum- ably by more or less direct interrogation, what A would take to be basic evidence for the evaluation (by others) of what he asserted in applying ~P' to himself.

We can work toward separating out what A takes as basic evidence for someone's being P, from what he takes as non-basic evidence, by asking him, for anything he takes to be evidence, why he does so, and noting the points at which he unable to give an empirical justification. The assumption is that those points we are likely to have something which A takes as an indicator of P just because of what he means by 'P'. Needless to say, these results yield that conclusion only with more of less probability. His inability to give an impirical justification for the evidential status of O, might be due to a lack of sensitivity to the real sources of his convictions, rather than to the fact that he takes O, to be an analytic indicator. And on the other side, his provision of an empirical justification for 'Or is evidence for the presence of P' might- mask the real status of this principle in his thought. (People can easily be brought to give empirical evidence for arithmetical propositions, even though otherwise they treat them as a priori). Nevertheless the indications of this method are not negligible; at the very least they provide a useful check on the results of the correlational method.

The epistemic method is not available on PP. If we construe 'P' on the PP model, no information concerning what A takes to be relevant public evidence will have any bearing on the question of whether A attaches that meaning to 'P'. Since on PP, 'P'is only contingently related, if at all, to O's, the features of A's use of the term which we have to discover to determine what meaning he attaches to

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it are quite independent of what he takes as relevant considerations for the public evaluation of what he is saying.

C.

Let us sum up this presentation of the Semantic Argument. If we assume an LC interpretation of basic PS predicates, we can employ both the correlational method and the epistemic method to investigate communality of meaning. Moreover, the two methods nicely complement each other. The correlational method, since it proceeds by uncovering de facto regularities, provides evidence which is quite unambiguous, but its bearing on the question of meaning is not unambiguous. Thist is, it leaves open a question as to just how the correlations it uncovers reflect features of the meaning A attaches to 'P'. The epistemic method at least partly f'dls this lacuna by investigating what A would take as basic evidence for the evaluation of a statement predicating 'P' of someone. Of course this evidence is subject to all the doubts one can raise about the reliability of one's reports of his own epistemological dispositions. But doubts of this sort can, in turn, be partially tested by determining whether the actual correlations between O's and self-applications of 'P' are such that they would be expected to be if A does give O's evidential status in the way he says he does. Thus suppose that we set out to determine whether A attaches a meaning to 'feels depressed' that makes lethargy and unresponsiveness to be analytic indicators of depression. Then correlational evidence to the effect that generally when A is prepared to paply 'feels depressed' to himself, he is rela- tively lethargic and unresponsive, and epistemic to the effect that A takes lethargic demeanor and unresponsive behavior to be basic considerations to use in evaluating someone's self-application of 'is depressed', can support each other in such a way that the combina- tion has more weight than the sum of the two taken separately.

Whereas on a PP interpretation, the epistemic method has no bearing on the question of meaning, while the correlational method depends on two applications of the argument from analogy, an argument which there is grave reason to doubt is capable of holding up under even one. Though this line of argument falls far short of a conclusive demonstration of LC, I feel that it does at least indicate enough attractiveness in LC to motivate the attempt to construct a version of that view which is not unplausible on other grounds.

I now turn to the task of constructing a form of LC which will have the virtues required by the Semantic Argument and yet cannot

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be disproved on other grounds. All the forms of LC we have in the literature seem to be mistaken. These include Logical Behaviorism (Carnap), and the Criteriological View (Malcolm-Wittgenstein), the vicissitudes of which have been amply chronicled. 4

IV A.

I will now attempt to construct a model which will satisfy the demands of the Semantic argument without flying in the face of the facts. To simplify the exposition I shall confine attention to PS's which have their most reliable indicators among the states of affairs to which they give rise (behavior), rather than among the states of affairs which give rise to them. We may take the following definition of 'feel ill at ease' as a basis for further discussion.

'A feels ill at ease' means 'A is in a psychological state which tends to manifest itself in such ways as tensing, squirming, fidgeting, failing to look others in the eye when talking to them, talking in a stilted manner, and so on.'

Two points are to be noted about this definition. (1) We can add the rider "in normal conditions" rather than just

sumply "manifests" because of the pervasive fact that whatever PS-0 pair is chosen, there are various things which can prevent the 0 from occurring, even though the PS is present. Some of these interfering factors can be handled under the heading of "abnormal conditions." Thus if feeling iU at ease does not manifest itself in any of the ways specified because of paralysis of the relevant musculature, we can dismiss the case as one which is abnormal, by reference to fairly clear cut standards of normal operation of the organism. But there are other possible interferences which cannot be so classified. These include deliberate inhibition of normal behavior, a strongly ingrained habit of supressing such behavior, and competition from other un- conneted psychological states with their built in tendencies (for example, even though I feel ill at ease I am also angry at someone present, and it is the anger which gets expressed rather than the feeling iU at ease). Deliberate or habitual suppression of emotional expression cannot be recognized as "abnormal" by reference to any recognized standards for the typical operations of the organism. To take care of possibilities like this in the most perspicuous manner, we shall have to think of any particular PS as existing in a system or field of PS's and other psychological factors, s The behavior at a given moment cannot be regarded as a function of one PS alone. Nor can we, with our existing concepts, analyze the behavior at a

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moment into elements or aspects, each of which is regularly connected with one of the effective PS's in the field at that moment. Things are not so simple in the world. The most we can do along this line is to find O predicates which will apply whenever a given PS predicate applies (in sufficient strength), provided we do not get interference from other psychological factors. This relationship can be usefully formulated by thinking of the PS as essentially involving a "tendency" to issue in the O's in question.

(2) The list of O's is an open-ended one. That is because I see no way of assuring ourselves that any given list is a complete enumera- tion of all the O's which could, with equal plausibility, be taken for analytic indicators of the PS in question. Our semantic instruments, intuitive or otherwise, are simply not sensitive enough to do that job. However, this is no pecularity of PS predicates. The same point can be made for that much discussed term, 'lemon'. If one sets one- self the task of enumerating characteristics which typically belongs to lemons - being yellow, having a bitter taste, being oval in shape, having a waxy texture, etc., - one has no way of ever being sure that he has completed the list.

B.

Our PS's all can be said to involve a tendency to all the behavior typical of them. In a given case some one or more of these tendencies will fail to be realized. I wish to show how a tendency version of LC makes possible the use of the correlational method. To show this is to show how, on the tendency conception of a PS, P. one can tell from O's whether or not a person is in P at a given moment. Now the tendency conception is clearly such that there is no simple inference in a given case from the O behavior specified in the definition of 'P ' (let's call them "P-behavior") to the existence of P. To determine whether A is in P at a given moment, we first determine whether or not P-behavior is present. But then if it is, we have to determine whether other factors are operative which could have produced this behavior without A being in P. If they are not present, we have to determine whether inhibiting factors are present which could prevent P-behavior even if P is present. This means that to show how the tendency conception makes possible the use of the correlational method, we have to show how one can spot these possible alternative sources (of P-behavior) and inhibiting forces.

It may be thought that we can avoid this task by falling back on a general principle to the effect that P gives rise to typical P-behavior

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in most cases, and that conversely the typical P-behavior are produced in most cases by P. If we could rely on such a principle, we could be assured that, in a sufficiently large sample of cases in which P-behavior is present, P is usually present, and that in a sufficiently large sample of cases in which P-behavior is absent, P is usually absent. This would be enough for the correlational method. One might try to justify the First part of this principle, that P usually does give rise to P-behavior, by claiming that something is not correctly called a "tnedency to x" unless it issues in x more often than not. ' Giving rise to s o m e probability of the occurrence of x would not be sufficient. This would make the first part of the principle analytic. But if we use 'tendency' with such a restriction, our definitions will become most dubious. It certainly seems to be logically possible that people succeed in suppressing natural expres- sions of a given feeling more than 50% of the time. Moreover, even if ' tendency' were so defined, this would do nothing to justify the second part of the principle. It would still remain an open question whether more than 50% of P-behavior is due to P.

An alternative would be to regard the general correlation of a given PS and its typical behavioral manifestations as a basic presup- position of our use of a common language for PS's, rather than building a correlation of this sort into the meaning of each PS term. There may be something to be said for such a position. However, even ff it were justified, it would not follow that the correlation holds for a given person whose semantics we are investigating. An overall positive correlation between P and O~ is compatible with a lack of correlation for any given person, and indeed, for any specified number of persons.

Nevertheless, even without such a principle we can see how a strong positive correlation of P-behavior with A's willingness to apply 'P' to himself would confirm hypothesis S, without our having to decide in each individual case whether A is P. Such correlation is naturally explained by supposing that A uses 'P' in sense s, and this explanation is on the face of it incomparably superior to any other. This is because it stands at the conjunction of two powerful presumptions. In giving this explanation we suppose that the P-behavior is, at least in most cases, manifestations of P and that, in all or most of these cases, A is prepared to apply 'P' to himself because he knows that he is P and is using 'P' in sense s. Now three is general presumption, because of the tendency definition of 'P', that P-behavior will stem from P; and there is the general presumption, based on strong pressures toward conformity in

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language communities, that any given pair of persons will agree in their use of any given term. When a natural explanation of empirical facts is supported by both of these presumptions, we have a very strong case indeed. Moreover a small number of discrepant cases (saying 'I am P' in the absence of P-behavior, or saying 'I am not P' in the presence of P-behavior) can easily be accommodated by this explanation. For we have a strong initial expectation that some P's will not issue in P-behavior, due to inhibition of one sort or another, and that some P-behavior will stem from other causes. Other explanations are conceivable. It is conceivable, eg., that all or most of the P-behavior was due to something other than P, and hence that the regularity of self-application of 'P' reflected a different use of the term. But such an explanation is supported by no prior presumptions, and hence, unless there are special features of these cases which strongly support it, its force is vanishingly small. There- fore with favorable data'like those under consideration, we can strongly confirm S without the necessity of reaching a decision on the presence or absence of P in each case.

When we ask ourselves what it would take to disconfirm S, the matter is different. If anything, along the lines of the correlational method, will disconftrm S it will be lack of any significant correlation between P-behavior and self-application of 'P', or more decisive, a negative correlation. And yet such evidence does not yield a clearcut conclusion without more ado, as the positive correlation did. To interpret it we shall have to determine for particular cases whether A is in P. This can be shown as follows.

Insignificant or negative correlations might (1) be due to a hetero- doxy in A's use of 'P', or they might (2) be due to the operation of factors which are preventing P-behavior when P is present and/or producing P-behavior when P is absent. If we accept (1) we are supposing that the presence (or absence) of P-behavior is due to the presence (or absence) of P; and if so the persistent self-application of 'P' in the absence of P-behavior, and vice versa, strongly sugggests a different use of the term. If we accept (2) we are supposing that the presence (or absence) of P-behavior is not a reliable indication of the presence (or absence) or P over this range of cases; and hence the evidence does not force us to consider A's use of the term idiosyn- cratic. Without further investigation of the facts of the case, neither of these explanations is markedly more acceptable than the other. This is because the prior presumptions which, vis-a-vis the positive evidence, combined in support of one explanation, are here ranged on opposite sides. The presumption that P-behavior will stem from P

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supports (1), whereas the presumption of semantic conformity supports (2). Hence the presumptions cancel each other out, and we cannot make a rational choice between the two explanations without further grounds. Clearly the question we must answer to provide such grounds is whether the presence (or absence) of P- behavior in these cases is, generally, to be explained otherwise than by the presence (or absence) of P. If that is answered in the affirm- ative, explanation (2) i s more acceptable; if it is answered in the negative, explanation (1) gets the nod. But that means that we cannot evaluate possible negative evidence without determining, case by case, whether A is in P. And that means that we are, after all, thrown back on the problem of identifying the alternative possible sources of P-behavior and the factors which can inhibit P from issuing in P-behavior.

Some of the possibilities can be specified in physical or physio- logical terms, particularly those which would count as abnormal conditions, e.g., that the stilted manner of talking or the squirming might be due to a drug, or that the absence of P-behavior might be due to paralysis. The identification of these poses no problems over and above those we encounter in any attempt to spot unobservable physical factors. What does pose special problems for the investigation of semantic communality for PS terms is the fact that other possibilities involve the operation of other PS's. Thus the absence of P-behavior when A applies 'P' to himself might be due to deliberate inhibition of P-behavior or to fear of the consequences of engaging in P-behavior; and the presence of P-behavior when A refuses to apply 'P' to himself might be due to the deliberate production of P-behavior. How do we check these possibilities? If we try to do so by the utilization of non-verbal indications built into the definition of these other PS terms, there is, first of all, the possibility that some of the terms may not belong to the basic subset and do not have any strong non-verbal indicators. And even for those which do, we run into the same problems with them that we did for 'P'. Consider, for example, ~intends to simulate P-behavior'. Whatever O's we take to be analytic indicators of this intention, other psychological factors can bring it about that we have the intention without the O's, or the O's without the intention. So that, in trying to use non-verbal indicators to spot that intention we may well be led into an attempt to determine whether members of another set of possible interfering factors are present, and so on ad infinitum.

This line of reasoning shows that the tendency conception does not guarantee the possibility of testing communality of meaning for

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PS predicates o n e a t a t ime by the correlational method. For which- ever we start with, 'P', if we run into negative or insignificant correlations we can interpret this evidence only if we are already able to tell when a certain other PS, D, is present; and the attempt do so is liable to run into analogous difficulties. On the other hand, if in testing 'P' I could presuppose communality of meaning for certain other PS terms, I could make use of A's explicit reports to determine whether the relevant other PS's are present when I run into negative evidence. This consideration suggests that for a general model of the correlational method (one which does not presuppose that we always or usually get strong positive correlations) we need something more systemic, a model in which we build up a system of hypotheses by successive approximations, each subject to revision in the light of further developments, rather than by definitively establishing the constituent hypothses one by one. Thinking of the matter in this way, we would investigate any particular term, 'feels ill at ease', against the background of a tentative assumption that A uses most PS terms in the standard way (except for those for which we have a lready reached a negative conclusion, if any). If we get strong positive correlations we can add this term to the list of those for which the general presumption has been strongly supported. If, on the other hand, we run into negative correlations, eg., by dis- covering that he frequently applies 'feels ill at ease' to himself in the absence of typical behavior, we will test various hypothses as to interfering forces, e.g., fear of acting ill at ease, by asking him whether he is so afraid. Of course, in relying on his answer we are assuming communality of meaning for 'is afraid of acting ill at ease', drawing on our general presumption for support, unless we already have strong positive evidence for this. We can then proceed to test that assumption~ If we get a strong positive correlation, we can add that term to the list of those certified on the basis of evidence. If not, we can repeat the above procedure, drawing once more on our general presumption for tentative assumptions. By persevering at this we will build up an ever increasing body of mutually supporting conclusions. It will no doubt happen that some conclusions tenta- tively supported at one stage will require revision in the light of further results. As we proceed, more and more basic PS terms will have been investigated and will have been decided on, and we will have to rely less and les~ on our general presumption of semantic conformity. It seems clear that by this method of successive approximations we can reasonably hope to approach indefinitely the ideal of a complete system of semantic hypotheses (regarding A's use of

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THOMAS W. SMYTHE

basic PS predicates) which is internally coherent and in terms of which all the correlational evidence can he .plausibly interpreted. Thus even though the tendency version of LC does not allow us to give a decisive test of communality of meaning for basic PS terms one by one, it does make it possible to find out what another person means by PS terms. For it enables us to build up a system of hypotheses as to what he means by various PS terms, which system is capable of being supported by empirical evidence to an indefinite extent. And this is the loftiest aspiration which is realistic, given the complexity of the subject matter.

V

It will be noted that our sample definition of a PS term involves other PS terms. It involves some overtly, in that the genus in the definiens is "psychological state," and in that the P.behavior is quali- fied as "spontaneous," a term which can only be understood as the opposite of "by deliberate intent," which is a PS term. Moreover, since, as we have just been emphasizing, we can use this definition to spot cases of feeling ill at ease, only against the background of notions as to what other factors, PS and otherwise, might be responsible for t h e presence or absence of the O's mentioned, it might well be held that our concept of feeling ill at ease involves the concepts of these other factors. One could resolve to understand meaning so that it did not include such things, but that would seem to be an artificial separation. If I define 'smallpox' as what is usually responsible for symptoms $1. . .Sn, then as a rough specification I can say that this meaning remains constant even though my ideas as to what other agents can produce these symptoms are in process of development. But it seems a be'tter reflection of the facts to say that our concept of smallpox (what we mearr by 'smallpox') is itself developing, becoming richer and more articulated, as we develop additional resources for applying or withholding the term in the prescence or absence of the symptoms, according as other conditions do or do not hold. Similarly, it would be most illuminating to think of a given PS term, 'P', as having the meaning it has only as fitting into a system of other terms, including other PS terms, whereby P is related to O's subject to the presence or absence of factors denoted by those other terms. Thus as we come to know more about this, the meaning we attach to any one PS term becomes more complex. A small child at first, no doubt, understands 'angry', 'wants food' , and 'unhappy', in such a way that there is a clearcut, independent

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connection between each of these and a certain set of O's. Indeed, such concepts are more adequate for him than for the adult as long as he is not yet capable of inhibiting or simulating P-behavior. Later, as he comes to learn about these things, it is natural to think of his psychological concepts growing in complexity as his procedures for applying them come to take account of possible mutual interferences. Thus we might think of any PS term as containing in its meaning the concepts of all those factors which could influence the occurrence of its analytic O indicators.

It would be prejudice to suppose that this analytic involvement of PS terms with each other is a bar to PS terms being analytically involved with O's. Nor is there any more basis for supposing that LC requires an invariable connection between a given PS and a precisely specifiable O or set of O's. Thought on this subject has been dominated by the model of each PS standing in isolation in some kind of logical relation of a simple sort with some particular O. It is to be hoped that our discussion will at least have revealed the existence of more complex alternatives.

VI

If the contentions of this paper are sound, they open the way to a fascinating enterprise, the delineation of a stratification of PS concepts. This will involve determining which concepts belong in the basic subset, how each of them are analytically related to O's, and how the other categories of PS's are specified on the basis of these. This project for mapping the logical geography of the mind is much more complex that those which have been popular in the past, whether dualistic or behavioristic, all of which have attempted to force mental concepts into a single mold. But it is almost certainly no more complex that the facts require.

109 VIRGINIA DRIVE CHAPEL HILL

NORTH CAROLINA 27514, USA

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THOMAS W. SMYTHE

NOTES

i I am asssuming that one can try to find what A means by a given term only by trying out various hypotheses as to what he means. Hence any condition on testing such hypotheses will also be a condition on finding out what he means.

2 Stratification" has been a prominent feature of all semantic theories which maintain that words get meaning through connection with experience, a type of view to which LC belongs. Locke, Hume, and Russell, who, in their several ways, maintained that words get meaning only through connection with sense experience, did not suppose that all words were equally closely connected with sense experience.

3 See John Wisdom, Other Minds, (Oxford, 1952) and Norman Malcolm, Knowledge and Certainty, (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1963).

4 For proponents of Logical Behaviorism see R. Carnap, "Psychology in Physical Language," in A.J. Ayer, ed., LogicalPosittvism (Glencoe, I l l . , 1959), and C.H. Hempel, "The Logical Analysis of Psychology," in H. Feigl and W. Sellars, eds., Readings in Philosophical Analysis, (New York, 1949). For discussion of the Criteriological View see N. Malcolm, "Witt- genstein's Philosophical Investigations," in V.C. Chappeli, ed., The Philos- ophy of Mind, (Engiewood Cliffs, N.J., 1962), and Drcam/ng, (London, 1959), and C.S. Chihara and J.A. Fodor, "Operationalism and Ordinary Language: A Critique of Wittgenstein," American Philosophical Quarterly, 2 (1965).

s In other words, most of the PS concepts we employ are such that they apply only to parts of the total psychological field of a person at a given moment, it is not difficult to see why this should be so. If one had a separate concept for each importantly different total psychological field, we would have an unmanageable plurality on our hands. The only hope lies in "analyzing" fields into components which can appear in varying com- binations with each other.

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