OSU JPIA Spring 2014 Edition

The Journal of Politicsand International AffairsVolume VII, Issue ISpring 2014

The Ohio State University

Allison GormanManaging Editor for Content

Marcus AndrewsCommunications Director

Sam WhippleMarketing Director

Holly YanaiRecruitment Chair

Jim SchirmerLayout Editor

JPIA Editorial StaffCormac Bloomfield

Will HeinrichsEmily NobleRobert Reed

Nima DahirCassidy Horton

Evan Rogers

Editors-in-Chief

Rosie Izzi Todd Ives

A special thanks to our faculty advisors, Dr. Paul A. Beck and Alicia Anzivine, and The Ohio State Department of Political Science Chair, Dr. Richard Herrmann, for guiding us and making this

journal possible.

The Journal of Politics

JPIAand International Affiars

Volume VII | Issue I | Spring 2014 | Print Edition

Contents

Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas RevolutionSaayee Arumugam, The Ohio State University

Producing (and Contesting) Gentrification in Mumbai: Urbanization, Displacement, and Resistance in a Global CityTimothy Adams, The Ohio State University

The Demographic Crisis in RussiaAnna Dean, The Ohio State University

Somali Development Crisis: The Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New SomaliaBradley Hinger, The Ohio State University

09

18

28

40

The Journal of Politics and Internaltional Affairs at The Ohio State University is published biannually through the Ohio State Department of Political Science at 2140 Derby Hall, 154 North Oval Mall, Columbus, OH 43210.

The JPIA was founded in the autumn of 2006 and reestablished in Winter 2011. For further information, or to submit questions or comments, please contact us at [email protected]

All rights reserved. No part of the publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrival system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the written permission of the Editors-in-Chief of the JPIA. The JPIA is copyrighted by the Ohio State Department of Political Science. The content of all papers is copyrighted by the respective authors.

All assertions of fact and statements of opinion are solely those of the authors. They do not necessarily represent or reflect the views of the JPIA Editorial Board, the Faculty Advisors, The Ohio State University, nor its faculty and administration.

COPYRIGHT 2014 THE OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF POLITICS AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

Editorial Foreword

Editors-in-Chief Rosie Izzi Todd Ives

Welcome,

It is our great pleasure as the new Co Editors-in-Chief to present our first edition of the Journal of Politics and International Affairs. This issue features the excellent work of a diverse set of Ohio State students, who have composed thorough, concise, unique, and well-written work to feature in our journal. The editorial staff must be commended for their exceptional work in selecting and editing papers, promoting the journal, and having patience as we navigate the learning curves of taking over as Editors-in-Chief.

For this edition, the Journal received many great submissions from across the country, but only four papers submitted by talented OSU students were chosen by our team of editors to be featured in this issue. As part of our goal of growing the Journals readership base and name across the country, we have increased our online presence on social media and worked with other organizations in the Political Science Department to increase outreach to students.

As always, we are forever indebted to our wonderful Political Science Department for their support and backing throughout JPIAs inception. We would particularly like to thank Dr. Rick Herrmann for his belief and encouragement of the Journal, Dr. Paul Beck for his role as advisor for the Journal, and Alicia Anzivine for her assistance and guidance in our work.

Finally, we would like to thank you, the reader for making this project meaningful. Our peers at Ohio State and across the country continue to produce extraordinary work that deserves to be showcased.

Rosie Izzi and Todd Ives

Editors-in-Chief

9Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas Revolution

Saayee Arumugam

ABSTRACT. Recent advancements in directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing have caused a boom in shale gas production. Simultaneously, environmental regulation has increased. Consequently, the coal industry is losing market share of the nations energy portfolio. Coal interests contend increased regulation is part of a greater war on coal waged by liberal political interests. While environmentalists overtly push for tighter regulations, the natural gas indus-try covertly provides charitable support to ensure regulations are implemented, through which competition from coal is limited. Environmentalists and gas interests have the same ends for very different reasons. This study applies the Bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation to discover the true driver behind the war on coal.

1. Introduction

The recent boom in natural gas production has redefined the energy industry. Simultaneously,

growing concern about climate change has fueled environmental policy debate. Economists, and the

public at large, have a vested interest in understanding the implications of these seemingly clashing

developments. While at face value it may seem that natural gas executives and environmentalists

are at odds, they may in fact share common ends. This paper will examine the relationship between

the regulatory policies sought by environmentalists and their impacts on the natural gas industry.

Do these seemingly opposing parties actually share a common end?

The question is a pressing one. Natural gas burns cleaner and more efficiently than coal, which

currently controls market share of the nations energy portfolio. As stricter emissions regulations

are enforced, coals grip on market share will slip. Then, intuitively, the natural gas industry has an

incentive to expedite this process. Are environmentalists providing politicians with a moral high

ground as the natural gas industry quietly pads political war chests and secretly reaps the economic

benefits of competition-limiting regulation? The natural gas industry and environmentalists may

fit the paradigm of the bootleggers and Baptists coalitiondifferent actors who want the same

ends for very different reasons (DeSombre 1995). I will apply Bruce Yandles bootleggers and

Bootleggers and Baptists in the Shale Gas Revolution

1110

The Journal of Politics and International Affairs | Spring 2014

Baptists theory of regulation to address the aforementioned question.

In Section 2-I, I discuss the significance of the recent shale gas boom by reviewing existing

literature. Later, Section 2-II delves into the bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation and

establishes grounds by which the theory could explain the relationship between the natural gas

industry and environmentalists. Section 3 provides a null hypothesis and empirical analysis

utilizing public statements from politicians, lobbying disclosures, and records of campaign

donations. Section 4 concludes.

2. Literature Review

I. Background on Shale Gas Development

Hydraulic fracturing, popularly known as fracking, has recently become an important and

contentious topic in the United States. The process of fracking is nothing new; it dates back to the

1940s. It is a process of natural gas extraction in which water, chemicals and sand are pumped into

a well at high pressures, which fractures the surrounding rock. These cracks are propped open by

the sand or other proppants, which frees up trapped natural gas to flow from the fractures and be

captured at the production well. In recent years, the advancement of directional horizontal drilling

has allowed production of oil and gas in deep, shale rock formations previously thought to be too

impermeable for commercial development (Kulander 2013). This set the stage for the modern day

shale gas revolution.

Natural gas production has soared in recent years, rising from approximately 16 trillion cubic

feet (tcf) in 1990 to over 22 tcf in 2010 (Tomain 2013). This has caused natural gas prices to

decline and converge with coal prices. With such a boom, natural gas is capturing greater market

share of the nations energy portfolio. In the electricity sector alone, natural gas has claimed about

30 percent of the market, while coal-fired electricity has declined from 50 percent to 42 percent

(Tomain 2013). Figure 1 and Figure 2 below documents this shift in market share (data collected

from United States Energy Information Administration):

Old coal plants are retiring, and new projects face extensive review. This decline in coal is

largely due to increased regulation and closer scrutiny by state regulators. States have become

reluctant to approve construction of new coal plants due to the risk of dramatically increased utility

rates that might result from national regulations and climate legislation (Powers 2010).

When natural gas combusts, the amount of carbon dioxide produced is half that produced

from coal combustion. Additionally, the externalities tied to coal combustion, including emissions

of mercury, sulfur, and nitrous oxides, are all absent in natural gas combustion (Rao 2012). As a

cleaner fuel, regulatory compliance costs for gas-fired power are lesser than costs for coal-fired

power. By extension, natural gas interests leverage regulations to limit market competition from

coal. Tighter emissions regulations enable natural gas to squeeze market share from coal.


1312


II. Bootleggers and Baptists Theory of Regulation

Yandle derived his bootleggers and Baptists theory of regulation from stories of states

attempts to regulate alcoholic beverages by banning legal vendors from selling on Sundays.

Baptists vehemently supported this policy to stop consumption of demon rum on Sundays. They

endorsed such regulation on moral high ground. Bootleggers sought to limit competition, and

thus tolerated the Baptists actions. Note it is not the broad Baptist principle, but the details of

regulation that win the covert endorsement of bootleggers. For instance, bootleggers would not

support limits on consumption, whereas Baptists would (Yandle 1983). A piece of regulation can

be crafted such that it limits competition, yet gives the impression that it serves the public interest

(Yandle 1983). Bootleggers who expect to profit from regulations sought by Baptists are vital to

the process as they grease the political machinery with expected proceeds (Yandle 1999).

The bootleggers and Baptists theory has often been applied to cases of environmental

regulation, especially emissions policies. The scrubber regulations in the 1977 Clean Air Act fit

the paradigm. All new coal-fired electric plants were required to be fitted with costly scrubbers,

whether or not the plant burned dirty coal. Environmentalists, representing the Baptists, provided

strong public support for such regulation, while interest groups tied to high-sulfur coal production

quietly supported the regulation. Low-sulfur coal interests and consumers of electricity suffered,

while high-sulfur coal interests captured positive returns from evening competition and claimed

market share (Yandle 1999). This example provides a framework for the bootleggers and Baptists

paradigm in the modern shale gas boom.

3. Hypothesis and Empirical Analysis

I. Hypothesis

The null hypothesis holds that no connection exists between the overt activities of

environmentalists and covert actions of the natural gas industry to secure a common end. The

alternative hypothesis supports the existence of the bootleggers and Baptists paradigm in which

a connection exists. This model assumes for all intents and purposes, environmentalists overtly

support policies reducing harmful emissions. In order to reject the null hypothesis, I must prove

that environmentalists provided the moral high ground for politicians to support regulation, while

the natural gas industry covertly greases the political machinery to ensure regulations are

implemented.

II. Empirical Analysis

On June 25, 2013, President Barack Obama delivered his first major speech, while in office

on climate change. He remarked:

So today, for the sake of our children, and the health and safety of all Americans, Im

directing the Environmental Protection Agency to put an end to the limitless dumping of

carbon pollution from our power plants, and complete new pollution standards for both

new and existing power plants. (Obama 2013)

The increase in emissions regulation is explicitly justified using rhetoric rooted in

environmentalism. This satisfies the first condition to reject the null hypothesispoliticians utilize

environmentalism to take up moral high ground in pushing regulations.

In Section 2-I, I have shown that the natural gas industry benefits from increased regulation

over carbon and toxic air emissions. As a cleaner burning fuel, natural gas interests bear fewer

compliance costs than coal interests. Thus, gas captures greater market share in the energy portfolio

(Rao 2012). Logically, natural gas interests would favor harsher restrictions on emissions.

Evidence suggests this holds true in practice. According to lobbying disclosures, the

Interstate Natural Gas Association of America (INGAA) spent $1,400,000 on lobbying 2013.

INGAA declared climate change mitigation among their listed focuses, spending $280,000 on

the issue. Additionally, the American Natural Gas Alliances third top recipient of funding was

the Democratic Governors Association, which received nearly $126,000 in 2012. Most strikingly,

fracking interests, mainly from Chesapeake Energy, donated $26 million to the Sierra Club for

the Beyond Coal campaign from 2007-2010. In that time, the Sierra Club engaged in political

lobbying and actively produced anti-coal literature and documentaries.

Table A below lists U.S. Senators heralded by the League of Conservation Voters as the most

pro-environment politicians in the 112th Congress. Table A also shows the amount of campaign

contributions these Senators received from pro-fracking interests in election cycles from 2004-

2012 (two cycles at most).


1514


Table A Most Pro-Environment Senators and Campaign Donations from Fracking Interests Senator State Party Campaign Donations 04-12 Boxer CA D $6,650 Feinstein CA D $74,800 Bennet CO D $103,895 Udall, M CO D $69,850 Carper DE D $25,800 Coons DE D $2,000 Nelson FL D $18,000 Durbin IL D $12,000 Harkin IA D $13,500 Cardin MD D $22,885 Mikulski MD D $2,000 Levin, C. MI D $29,000Franken MN D $3,000 Klobuchar MN D $7,000Reid, H. NV D $30,250 Shaheen NH D $4,750 Menendez NJ D $20,900Udall, T. NM D $19,800 Gillibrand NY D $23,500Schumer NY D $16,350 Brown OH D $12,000 Merkley OR D $1,000 Wyden OR D $16,050 Reed, J. RI D $2,000 Whitehouse RI D $5,300Johnson, Tim SD D $29,950Leahy VT D $0 Sanders VT I $1,500 Cantwell WA D $5,750 Murray WA D $8,250 Rockefeller WV D $47,400

TOTAL CAMPAIGN DONATIONS $635,130

It is evident that natural gas interests are, indeed, quietly supporting politicians who push for

increased environmental regulation, as documented in Table A.

III. Results

Two conditions were satisfied to reject the null hypothesis and suggest that the bootleggers

and Baptists theory of regulation is applicable to the shale gas boom. First, it is accepted truth that

environmentalists overtly lobby for stricter environmental regulations. As illustrated, politicians

use rhetoric evoking environmentalist themes in defending such regulation. Second, I have shown

that the natural gas industry covertly supports these regulations. The private lobbying activities

of the industry, including its campaign contributions to staunch environmentalists in the Senate,

support this claim. The environmentalists, fitting the Baptists role, provide the public justification

for politicians to sell to constituents. Meanwhile, the industry, fitting the bootleggers role, quietly

endorses these regulations and pads campaign war chests, thereby securing durable regulation and

private returns.

4. Conclusion

The environmentalists and natural gas industry have the same ends, but for very different

reasons. While the environmentalists are concerned with mitigating environmental concerns for

posteritys sake, the natural gas industry is concerned with the private benefits of capturing coals

market share in the US energy portfolio. The two actors, seemingly at odds like bootleggers

and Baptists, have formed an unexpected coalition that has been successful in securing durable

regulations benefiting both parties.

The bootleggers and Baptists model is a perpetual paradigm. In the long run, as natural

gas captures greater market share from coal, gas interests will face diminishing gains from the

bootleggers and Baptists relationship. Despite diminishing returns, bootleggers will continue their

rent-seeking in order to capture share within the gas market. Large firms can shoulder the burden

of high compliance costs unlike small firms. Hence, larger gas firms will seek competition-limiting

environmental regulation, capturing market share from smaller firms. The perpetual bootleggers

and Baptists paradigm will lead to economic consolidation among gas producers.

The bootleggers and Baptists coalition is, by nature, one that goes unnoticed. Scholars have

to look beyond what is easily seen. More often than not, durable regulation, as exemplified by the

standards on coal emissions, is belied by bootleggers and Baptists working in tandem.


1716


References

Americas Natural Gas Alliance. Opensecrets RSS. http://www.opensecrets.org/lobby/

clientsum.php?id=D000046794.

Database: Fracking Industry Contributions to 113th Congress. Citizens For Responsibility and

Ethics in Washington. http://www.citizensforethics.org/pages/database-fracking-industry-

contributions-to-113th-congress.

DeSombre, Elizabeth. 1995. Baptists and Bootleggers for the Environment: The Origins of

United States Unilateral Sanctions. The Journal of Environment and Development 4(1).

53-75.

Interstate Natural Gas Assn of America. 2014. Opensecrets RSS. http://www.opensecrets.org/

pacs/lookup2.php?strID=C00116145

Kulander, Christopher. 2013. Shale Oil and Gas State Regulatory Issues and Trends. Case

Western Reserve Law Review 63(4). 10001-1041.

League of Conservation Voters. 2012 National Environmental Scorecard. League of

Conservation Voters. http://scorecard.lcv.org/.

Obama, Barack. 2013. We Need to Act: Transcript of Obamas Climate Change Speech.

Bloomberg. 25 June. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-06-25/-we-need-to-act-

transcript-of-obama-s-climate-change-speech.html.

Powers, Melissa. 2010. The Cost of Coal: Climate Change and The End Of Coal As A Source

Of Cheap Electricity. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Business Law 12(2). 407-

436.

Rao, Vikram. 2012. Shale Gas: The Promise and the Peril. Research Triangle Park, NC: RTI.

Tomain, Joseph. 2013. Shale Gas and Clean Energy Policy. Case Western Reserve Law

Review 63(4). 1187-1215.

Yandle, Bruce. 1983. Bootleggers and Baptists - The Education of a Regulatory Economist.

Regulation 7(1). 12-16.

Yandle, Bruce. 1999. Bootleggers and Baptists in Retrospect. Regulation 22(1) 5-7.

Saayee Arumugam is a third year undergrad majoring in economics and political science.

As an ardent student of public choice theory and regulatory economics, he specifically applies

economic theory in the realm of politics. Arumugam aspires to enter the policymaking arena,

specializing in environmental and energy policy.

Producing (and Contesting) Gentrification in Mumbai: Urbanization, Displacement, and Resistance in a Global City

1918

Producing (and Contesting) Gentrification in Mumbai: Urbanization, Dislacement and Resistance in a Global

City

Timothy Adams

ABSTRACT. Mumbai, the rapidly growing hub of Indian finance capital, has been the locus of dramatic changes in urban governance over the last several decades. Once characterized by industrial production ad Indias mass working class movements, the state, private capital, and middle class residents of Mumbai are struggling to redefine the city in line with prevailing discourses of middle and upper-class conspicuous consumption and leisure. Practices of gentrifi-cation -- the class-based transformation of urban space--have been essential to this physical and discursive remaking of the city, involving the wide-scale demolition and redevelopment of miles of informal and low-income housing, re-ferred to derogatorily as slums, and displacement of countless thousands of desperately poor residents. However, far from being helpless victims of an impregnable neoliberal juggernaut, slum residents and allies have organized to resist gentrification and demand more equitable housing conditions. This interplay of contesting interests among varying social scales and across institutions has been a defining characteristic of gentrification in Mumbai. Studying this exam-ple can provide us with a greater understanding of displacement and strategies of resistance in our own communities.

Gentrification, or the class-based restructuring of urban space, has been transformed from a

relatively isolated phenomenon contained to the advanced capitalist countries of the Global North

to a generalized strategy of capital accumulation commonly utilized by the bourgeoning cities of

Asia, South America and Africa. In Mumbai, a newly emerging hub of global finance, gentrification

has involved the disruptive and violent appropriation of working class and slum communities and

a cultural struggle over the identity of the city itself. Although the urban state and private capital

have been key actors in producing gentrification, the formal and informal strategies of resistance

utilized by those facing displacement, in addition to the advocacy of the middle and upper-classes

who desire gentrification, have fundamentally shaped the changes that have taken place. As I will

show, the processes of gentrification in Mumbai have not been exclusively hierarchical or diffuse;

rather, it has been a heterarchical process, enrolling individuals at all social scales in both the

production and contestation of urban governance.

In 1964, urban sociologist Ruth Glass identified a peculiar spatial trend (Hackworth and

Smith 2001). Middle and upper-class individuals, who had previously been confined principally

to suburban communities, were purchasing and renovating houses in sites of severe poverty and

capital divestment, increasing property values and displacing the poor residents. She termed this

process gentrification, referring to transformation of city spaces by the landed gentry. Urban

scholars refer to this upgrading of poor neighborhoods through the individual renovation of houses

by wealthy individuals as second-wave gentrification (Smith 2002).

Many urban scholars have expanded their understanding of gentrification beyond the

limited set of second-wave practices identified by Glass nearly 70 years ago. They now recognize

gentrification to be a broad set of processes centering on the class-based transformation of urban

space (Hackworth and Smith 2001; Smith 2002). This includes not only the physical restructuring of

urban space the construction of new commercial buildings, hip sites of leisure and entertainment,

and high-quality housing but also a discursive reimagining of the culture of cities and those

who may legitimately reside within them (Hackworth and Smith 2001; Smith 2002; Fernandes

2004). This is clear in the development of the megacities of South Asia, especially Mumbai.

Located on a peninsula in the western coast of India, Mumbai is an incredibly large and populous

city, with over 16 million residents and a staggering population density of 24,000 people per square

kilometer (Nijman 2010). Mumbais immense population has resulted in significant and systematic

housing problems for more than a century (Nijman 2010). The most significant example of this

is the prevalence of slums, defined broadly as destitute communities characterized by informal

housing and employment.

Over the last few decades, Mumbai has attempted to reconstitute itself as a site of global

finance and culture, elite leisure, and urban modernity (Fernandes 2004). However, nearly half

of the citys population still lives in slums, while another quarter lives in low-quality housing

(Nijman 2010).

The intense density of the city, especially within slum areas, has practically guaranteed

premium prices for slum land. Desperate to disassociate itself with discourses of poverty and

slums and capitalize on the potential profitability of slums, the Mumbai state, along with major

private capital, has carried out systematic reorganizations of people and space.

The disruptive and often violent processes of urban transformation that characterizes

contemporary development and gentrification in Mumbai is not a total break from the practices


2120


and strategies utilized in the past but is, in some ways, their continuation. Situating contemporary

practices in a historical context illuminates the perpetuation of certain discourses and practices of

urban governance and also reveals the ways that these have changed in response to both resistance

and new developments in the broader socioeconomic context.

The contemporary housing problems of Mumbai stretch well back into the period of British

colonialism (Nijman, 2010). One example of this was the Native Town area of the city, reserved

for the native, and especially poor, Indians, which grew enormously without any clear plan for

ensuring the basic needs of residents. The 1872 census of Mumbai (then Bombay) stated, The

intense density of the city has practically guaranteed premium prices for land, which has made

slums an attractive target of redevelopment for the last several decades (Sundaram 1989:56, qtd.

in Nijman 2010). Despite this awareness, the British largely ignored problems of housing and

refused to undertake any serious efforts to address them.

Severe health problems became common in Native Town and elsewhere, due to overcrowding

and industrial pollution (Nijman 2010). As a result, the British shifted industrial production from

this central region of the city to its outskirts, such as the northern town of Dharavi (Nijman 2010).

Dharavi rapidly grew following independence until it became a site densely populated with poor

migrants and heavily polluting industries. Over time, Dharavi greatly expanded to the north and

northwest to occupy the heart of Greater Mumbai. Today, Dharavi has become a central target

of slum redevelopment efforts as a result of its economically and politically strategic location

(Nijman 2010).

Throughout most of the 20th century, industrial production especially textile manufacturing

served as the economic foundation of Mumbai (Anand and Rademacher 2011; Nijman 2010);

Fernandes, 2004). Most of this production was located in slum and working-class communities,

such as Dharavi and others. Industrial production in Mumbai was organized similarly to the Fordist

industrial production strategies, based on mass production on assembly lines, standardized inputs,

and strict divisions of labor, as seen in the United States (Fernandes 2004).

As Mumbai developed into a center of industrial production, the city desired to appropriate

and transform slum sites to foster the further development of industry (Anand and Rademacher

2011). However, also during this period, militant trade unions gained significant political and

economic power and influence throughout the city. Indeed, as Fernandes (2004) notes, through

militant struggle, the industrial worker became conceptualized to many as the archetypal citizen of

Mumbai, though this did not mean it was a site of worker-centered justice or leftism, as the policies

and practices of the citys state certainly did not always conform to this imagination. Still, the

relative power of trade unions during Mumbais manufacturing boom was significant in contesting

and shaping the citys slum clearance projects (Anand and Rademacher 2011).

The first major post-independence attempt to eliminate slums in Mumbai emerged with the

Slum Clearance Plan of 1956 (Anand and Rademacher 2011). The Plan utilized a strategy of direct

slum clearance, demolishing slum communities, displacing residents without any providing any

replacement housing, and establishing police surveillance in the razed sites. The purpose of the

slum clearance strategy was to eliminate sites of economic and social disorder and establish new

regulations to rationalize them. During the 1960s, the city began constructing public housing to

provide accommodation to some of the residents displaced by the demolition project. However,

there was not nearly enough public housing for the masses of people displaced by slum clearance

(Anand and Rademacher 2011).

The severe displacement and destruction wrought by the citys slum clearance programs

provoked strong resistance (Anand and Rademacher 2011). Working class and poor residents of

slum sites, often led by the renowned activist Mrinal Gore, known locally as water lady, organized

to demand basic utilities, such as water and sanitation, and an end to wide-scale demolition. To that

end, they organized morchas (protest marches) on the Bombay Municipal Corporation, which had

governed the slum clearance project. Residents of slums, following Gores lead, made it clear that

the problems of slums were the result of the failures of the state, rather than of the poor. They also

demanded that the city should focus on improving slum areas if it was not able to construct public

housing for all slum residents, (Anand and Rademacher 2011).

The protests during the 1960s were somewhat successful in contesting and reshaping the

citys housing programs, passing the Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Redevelopment)

Act in 1971 (Anand and Rademacher 2011). The program inaugurated a change in the policy

regime of urban governance that would continue until the early 1980s, although slum clearance

remained a central strategy of urban development. The program inaugurated a strategy of slum

improvement, as the slum residents had demanded. It created a Slum Improvement Board that

constructed some infrastructure to extend basic utilities to slum areas. The city also attempted to


2322


organize slums on the basis of private property rights. It conducted a census of many slums areas,

providing photopasses to residents deemed legitimate residents. These photopasses established

legitimate access to the utilities extended by the Act of 1971 and conferred some protection from

demolition.

While the Act of 1971 certainly represented real improvements for many residents of slum

communities, won through hard struggle, it ultimately perpetuated prevailing unequal and unjust

social relations. For example, the photopass system that conferred ownership rights to some

residents of slum communities also further marginalized and excluded those residents who were

deemed illegitimate. Residents who were not given photopasses did not gain access to these

utilities and faced the continual threat of displacement (Anand and Rademacher 2011).

The regime of urban governance characterizing the 1960s through the early 1980s experienced

a significant shock during the latter portion of the 20th century in response to changes in the broader

political-economic context. Especially important was the collapse of the manufacturing economy,

greatly disturbing the foundation of Mumbais economy (More and Whiteman 2007). Increasing

global competition, paired with falling prices, significantly reduced the profitability of textile

manufacturing This created serious demand among both private investors and city politicians for

alternative, and more profitable, sites of capital investment. The citys private landowners saw

the declining rent actualized through manufacturing and realized the potential for higher rents

following the reorganization of land. All of these developments drove capital into the elite service

sectors, especially finance and real-estate.

As Mumbais elite service sector has developed, the state and private capital have attempted

to reorganize the city to reflect and support the growth of its new economic orientation (Fernandes

2004; More and Whiteman 2007). This has involved the dismantling of working-class and poor

centers and the construction of high-end restaurants, retail, and entertainment centers to cater to

the middle and upper-class demands for hip leisure. This has also involved a renewed emphasis on

slum clearance to eliminate what is perceived to be an obstacle to the citys desire to reach world-

class status among the financial elite.

As the political-economic characteristics of Mumbai have changed, its approaches to slum

clearance have shifted significantly, utilizing strategies most representative of contemporary

gentrification (Anand and Rademacher 2011; Smith, 2002). In 1995, the city passed the Slum

Rehabilitation Scheme (SRS), establishing many of the practices of gentrification characterizing

contemporary Mumbai. The policy exclusively targeted regularized slums, recognized as

legitimate and endowed with some minimal property rights (Weinstein and Ren 2009). In contrast

to previous strategies, the SRS strategy established a market-based approach to slum clearance and

redevelopment . The purpose of this strategy was not only to remove the obstacle to profitability

and the accumulation of capital represented by slums but, more fundamentally, to make the act of

removal itself profitable.

Under the SRS, the city contracted with private developers to redevelop slum areas (Anand and

Rademacher 2011). In exchange for permits allowing the construction of luxury commercial and

residential properties, private developers would construct high-rise public housing developments on

the sites of demolished slums. The more units of public housing a developer constructed, the more

permits for luxury construction it would receive. Although this strategy was hailed as progressive

by policymakers, it provided assistance only to the small number of residents who were able to

prove that they had lived in the demolished slum for several years, a feat practically impossible

for many of them. Furthermore, by connecting public housing construction to the development of

elite centers, it brought especially precarious populations into an environment of surveillance and

control and directly linked slum clearance to the project of gentrifying Mumbai.

Gentrification in Mumbai has not only been produced by the desires of the state and private

capital but also through the demands of the middle and upper-classes. One example of this is the

attempt by the urban middle and upper-classes to criminalize hawkers and remove them from

public spaces (Anjaria 2006). Street hawkers, who set up informal businesses in city streets and

passages, have been a common site in Mumbai for many decades, and the practice has been an

important source of livelihood for countless people. More recently, NGOs and informal community

groups, comprised primarily of middle and upper-class individuals, have begun characterizing

hawkers as a nuisance that creates congestion, threatens public safety, and degrades the culture of

the city (Anjaria 2006; Fernandes 2004; Ghertner 2011). In response to public pressure from the

middle and upper-classes, the city ceased issuing the mandatory permits for street hawking. As a

result, over 90% of hawkers today are in violation of the law and face the threat of state repression

on a daily basis (Anjaria 2006).

In November, 2004, the state announced its plan to demolish unregularized slums


2524


throughout the city (Weinsten and Ren 2009). The demolition was so systematic that by February

over 90,000 homes had been destroyed. Because these slums were not recognized as legitimate,

the city made no provisions for replacement housing. In some cases, the speed at which demolition

was conducted resulted in the death of slum residents, whose houses were destroyed while they

were still in them. Echoing the struggles against slum clearance in the 1960s, working-class and

poor residents organized a massive protest movement to halt the demolitions. Thousands of slum

residents and others held numerous protests outside the state government building. By the end of

February, the state gave in to the movements demands and ceased demolitions (Weinstein and Ren

2009; Routledge 2010).

The preceding examples only begin to illuminate the broad array of practices and discourses,

strategies and policies of actors at all levels in society that characterize contemporary gentrification

in Mumbai. Gentrification is always a drawn-out yet hierarchical project, enrolling individuals far

beyond the state and private capital in the mission to reorganize urban spaces to accommodate the

needs of investment and profit. However, as the examples of resistance outlined here demonstrate,

gentrification is also highly contested and resisted, and the shape that it takes in a particular context

often depends on the form that resistance takes, if it emerges at all. Although the case of Mumbai

undoubtedly is unique, due to the immense size of the city and its slum communities, investigating

the dynamics at work within this particular example can provide a more full understanding of

gentrification and resistance elsewhere. Informed by this example, activists and scholars should

begin to develop their own strategies of resistance to assist the struggle for justice and housing

equity.

References

Anand, N., and Rademacher, A. 2011. Housing in the Urban Age: Inequality and Aspiration in

Mumbai. Antipode, 43(5): 1748-1772.

Fernandes, L. 2004. The Politics of Forgetting: Class Politics, State Power and the

Restructuring of Urban Space in India. Urban Studies, 41(12): 2415-2430.

Ghertner, D. A. 2012. Nuisance Talk and the Propriety of Property: Middle Class Discourses of

a Slum-Free Delhi. Antipode, 44(4): 1161-1187.

Hackworth, J., and Smith, N. 2001.The Changing State of Gentrification. Tijdschriftvoor

Economische en Sociale Geografie, 92(4): 464-477.

More, N., and Whitehead, J. 2007. Revanchism in Mumbai? Political Economy of Rent Gaps

and Urban Restructuring in a Global City. Economic and Political Weekly, 42(25):

2428-2434

Nijman, J. 2010. A Study of Space in Mumbais Slums. Tijdschriftvoor Economische en

Sociale Geografie. 101(1): 4-17.

Smith, N. 2002. New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as Global Urban Strategy.

Antipode, 34(3): 427-450.

Weinstein, L., and Xuefei, R. 2009. The Changing Right to the City: Urban Renewal and

Housing Rights in Globalizing Shanghai and Mumbai. City & Community, 8(4): 407-430.

26


Tim Adams graduated from Ohio State University with dual degrees in political science and

geography, and research distinction in geography. He completed an undergraduate research thesis

that examined a case of public housing demolition and redevelopment in the Near East Side of

Columbus, Ohio, and the role of OSU and other local institutions in organizing and effecting

gentrification and neighborhood transformation. He also has participated in community coalitions

for housing justice and equity.

27

The Demographic Crisis in Russia

2928


Anna Dean

ABSTRACT. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced a prolonged period of population de-cline. This widely acknowledged demographic trend could, in the foreseeable future, have some serious implications. In regards to economics, depopulation will yield a diminution of the labor force, which then depreciates the nations overall economic potential. Socially, population decline initiates a breakdown of the nuclear family, which then in turn triggers the deterioration or at least the remaking of society as a whole. Lastly, the political ramifications of Russian depopulation involve widespread civil unrest, fueled by extreme ethnic tensions between the shrinking Slavic population and the growing Muslim population. The culmination of all these factors bodes poorly for the future of Russia.

In 2005, Vladimir Putin famously called the collapse of the Soviet Union the greatest

geopolitical catastrophe of the twentieth century (Frizell 2014). In April 2014, Ukrainian interim

Prime Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk, pointing to the aforementioned quote and the recent events

in the Crimea, claimed that Putin hopes to rebuild the Soviet Union (Frizell 2014). Many voices

have articulated this concern, for Putins actions all tend to suggest that he wishes to restore Russia

to a position of global prominence. However, Putin faces a number of obstacles in attaining

this goal. One of the most significant obstacles lies in the nations demographics. Since the

collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has experienced a prolonged period of population decline.

This widely acknowledged demographic trend could, in the foreseeable future, overthrow all of

President Putins ambitions and spell disaster for Russia. The following paper seeks to expound

the argument that sustained Russian population decline inevitably precipitates a series of profound

economic, social, and political implications. Therefore, rather than witnessing Russias restoration

to all its former glory as President Putin hopes, the world will see a nation substantially weakened,

since the extensive depopulation within Russia will, in all probability, fuel an economic, political,

and social transformation of immense magnitude.

Before examining each of the underlying causes in greater depth, the statistics that illustrate

Russias demographic decline deserve some particular attention. In his book, Implosion, Ilan

Berman explains Russias demographic decline in terms of a formula known as the total fertility

rate or TFR (Berman 2013, 14). In order to sustain a stable population, countries require an

average TFR of 2.1 live births per woman (Berman 2013, 14). Berman then cites U.S. Census

Bureau statistics, stating:

[I]n the years between 2000 and 2008, Russias average annual fertility rate was 1.34, far

below the 2.1 necessary to maintain a population at its current size. Today, the situation

is a bit better. According to U.S. government estimates, Russia now ranks 178th in the

world, with a TFR of 1.61. (Berman 2013, 15)

Despite this increase in Russias total fertility rate, many experts remain far from optimistic.

For instance, the projections of the United Nations Population Division (UNPD) indicate that, in

the year of 2030, Russias population will range only from 133 million to 115 million (Eberstadt

2009). The Russian Federations current population is about 143 million (Berman 2013). Thus, the

UNPDs estimates appear quite daunting, revealing a decrease of 10 million people in seventeen years

as the best-case scenario. These dismal forecasts most likely stem from the observed intransience

of the underlying causes of Russias depopulation. Government officials, economists, and political

scientists have all named a wide range of reasons explaining Russias declining population; the

most commonly articulated explanations include tremendously high mortality rates, a culture of

abortion, an AIDS epidemic, and mass emigration. The abysmal and erratic mortality rates within

Russia enjoy long-standing historical precedence. Russias turbulent past, including World War

I, the Bolshevik Revolution, World War II, Joseph Stalins purges, and the collapse of the Soviet

Union, unsurprisingly yielded highly volatile mortality levels. Exploring Russias past and present

life expectancy estimates provides great insight into the future of the country, since the single

clearest and most comprehensible summary of a populations mortality prospects is its estimated

expectation of life at birth (Eberstadt 2009). After the demise of the Soviet Union, Russias life

expectancy estimates have remained noticeably low. Ilan Berman explains further, stating:

In 2004, Russia ranked 122nd in the world in life expectancy, placing it in the bottom third

of all nations and far out-side the norm for industrialized ones. By 2011, that number had


3130


plunged some twenty-two places, to 144th. The average life expectancy for Russian

citizens is now seventy years, putting them behind the citizens of Peru and Tongaand

only slightly ahead of those in countries such as Tuvalu, Mongolia, and North Korea.

(Berman, Implosion, 17)

These deplorable mortality rates arise from persistent societal problems within Russia.

Alcoholism is pervasive throughout Russia, and Russian scientists claim that twenty percent of

the male deaths in modern Russia are alcohol-related (Berman 2013, 18). Similarly, violence

remains highly problematic, considering that Russias patterns of death from injury and violence

(by whatever provenance) are so extreme and brutal that they invite comparison only with the

most tormented spots on the face of the planet today (Eberstadt 2009). The common culture of

abortion within Russia is another important cause of the current depopulation. In the times of

the Soviet Union, abortion was viewed as the best form of birth control; consequently, in 1965

the Health Ministry recorded 5.5 million abortions and only 2 million live births (Blyth 2013).

The statistics from 1997 are equally as dismal, for they indicate that about seventy percent of

Russian pregnancies ended in abortion (DaVanzo and Grammich 2001, 27). An article published

by Reuters seeks to assure readers that wider availability of contraception and a resurgence

of religion have reduced the numbers of abortions overall, but [the author must admit that]

termination remains the top method of birth control in Russia (Reuters 2011). To compound the

problems stemming from alcoholism, violence, and abortion, the Russian HIV/AIDS epidemic

only exacerbates demographic and social woes. In 2000, the number of HIV carriers and AIDS

patients is estimated to have increased fourfold, and this rapid spread of the disease is linked to

the increasing intravenous drug use within Russia (DaVanzo and Grammich 2001, 56-57). Some

2.5 million Russians are addicted to drugs, and 90 percent of them use the heroin that has flooded

into Russia from Afghanistan since the late 1990s (Mirovalev 2012). According to anti-drug

czar Viktor Ivanov, heroin kills 80 Russians each day or 30,000 a year (Mirovalev 2012). The

last commonly cited major cause of Russias dire depopulation problem is the fact that Russians

have been fleeing their homeland. More than two million people are believed to have left Russia

during the thirteen years that President Vladimir Putin has been in power[and m]any of those

who stay are thinking of leaving (Berman 2013, 23). The culmination of all of these factors casts

a shadow over Russias future.

The Malthusian theory of population, one of the most famous theories regarding both

population and economics, maintains that population growth inevitably creates shortages, poverty,

high unemployment, and all sorts of other economic ills. This disheartening notion, sometimes

called the Malthusian fallacy, manages to persist in the minds of many journalists, economists,

and political scientists today (Jacoby 2008). The persistence of this notion is unfortunate, since

it leads many to believe that population decline is desirable. Nevertheless, the Malthusian theory

of population proves false, for, as Jeff Jacoby argue in his article The Coming Population Bust,

this discouraging notion fails to account for the potential inherent in each human being. Jacoby

cogently states:

Like other prejudices, the belief that more humanity means more misery resists compelling

evidence to the contrary. In the past two centuries, the number of people living on earth

has nearly septupled, climbing from 980 million to 6.5 billion. And yet human beings

today are on the whole healthier, wealthier, longer-lived, better-fed, and better-educated

than ever before True, fewer human beings would mean fewer mouths to feed. It

would also mean fewer entrepreneurs, fewer pioneers, fewer problem-solvers. Which

is why it is not an increase but the coming decrease in human population that should

engender foreboding. (Jacoby 2008)

Thus, according to Jacobys logic, Russias looming demographic crisis strongly suggests

dire consequences for Russias economic prognostics. A shrinking labor force is likely to inflict

longstanding disadvantages on Russian economic potential, especially considering that Russias

youth will begin to account for less and less of the total population. RIA Novosti, Russias largest

news agency, reports that this trend is already coming to fruition; for, the Federal State Statistics

Service maintains that the age group ranging from 15 to 29 made up only twenty-two percent of the

total population in 2012, measuring 31.6 million people; whereas in 2009, it equaled twenty-four

percent totaling 33.7 million (Pettersen 2013). This observation has many officials worried. If this

trend continues the number of young people in the age group of 15-29 could go down to 25 million

in only ten years time, says Sergey Belokonev of the Federal Agency for Youth Affairs (Pettersen

2013). Even President Putin has addressed the issue, though many of his critics complain the

attention paid is both ephemeral and insignificant. Still, the government has not been silent on the

matter, and one article even claims that the Russian government has worked hard to foster a baby


3332


boom, honouring families at pomp-filled Kremlin events, offering subsidies to parents with more

than one child and even raffling off cars to women who give birth on the national holiday (Reuters

2011). Nonetheless, these efforts have done little in mitigating the impact of depopulation within

the country, and many economists foresee significant economic problems in Russias near future.

For example, in his book, Petrostate, Marshall Goldman contends that:

Russias population shrinkage makes it difficult to find enough young men to staff not only

the army but also the industrial and agricultural workforce. [Furthermore,]a declining

birth rate means that it will be harder and harder to support the increasing percentage of

the population who have reached retirement age. (Goldman 2010, 198).

Many economists regard youth as the safeguard for the future. Thus, when a countrys

youthful population is steadily dwindling, the countrys prospective security dwindles alongside

its people. In his article, Drunken Nation: Russias Depopulation Bomb, Nicholas Eberstadt

paints an even bleaker picture for Russias future:

Putins Kremlin made a fateful bet that natural resources oil, gas, and other extractive

saleable commodities would be the springboard for the restoration of Moscows

influence as a great power on the world stage. In this gamble, Russian authorities have

mainly ignored the nations human resource crisis. (Eberstadt 2009)

In short, the likelihood that Russia will manage to outrun its demographic realities appear

highly improbable. While natural resources are valuable, a thriving, innovative workforce remains

the most vital driver in an economy. Consequently, Russia will feel the constraints of intractable

population decline before long.

The nuclear family, which typically comprises of a father, a mother, and a number of children

born within wedlock, is the most basic unit of society. Historically, nuclear families have served

as the societal building blocks that hold communities, states, and nations together. Therefore, the

disintegration of this foundational unit of society, which coincides with sustained depopulation,

proves immensely problematic. Russia has already shown signs that the nuclear family is steadily

deteriorating. In 1980, Russias illegitimacy was relatively low, with less than one in nine newborns

reportedly born out of wedlock; by 2005, however, reports indicated that Russias illegitimacy ratio

almost tripled, approaching thirty percent (Eberstadt 2009). Additionally, marriage is increasingly

less common and less stable (Eberstadt 2009). Consequently, nuclear families are becoming more

and more rare, and those that persist tend to beget a noticeably smaller number of children. These

trends appear quite irreversible, as Eberstadt articulates below:

[T]his much is clear: to date, no European society that has embarked upon the same

demographic transition as Russias declining marriage with rising divorce, the spread

of cohabitation as alternative to marriage; delayed age at marriage and sub-replacement

fertility regimens has reverted to more traditional family patterns and higher levels of

completed family size. There is no reason to think that in Russia it will be any different.

(Eberstadt 2009)

If Eberstadt is correct, then Russia must contend with the constraints imposed by the changes

within the family structure. In a book which documents the proceedings of a seminar held by

the Council of Europe on the Implications of a Stationary or Declining Population, Max Wingen

addresses how a declining population impacts the basic structure of the family, which then in turn

reorganizes the entire structure of society. Wingen argues that long-term depopulation inevitably

leads to lasting structural changes in the composition of the parent-child community which is

one of the important elements of family socialization (Council of Europe 1976, 100-101). This

consideration leads Wingen to suggest that the tendency towards smaller families may modify

the capacities of the family in such a way as to render it largely powerless to fulfill its elementary

social, education and cultural functions (Council of Europe 1976, 101). Furthermore, [i]t is

often notedthat very small (one-child) families tend to form a milieu that is not conducive to

socialization; the same is true of two-child families where the children are widely spaced, so that in

practice two only-child situations occur (Council of Europe 1976, 101). These suppositions do

not bode well for Russia, since a large number of Russian families, whether traditional or otherwise,

are opting to have only one or two children. Since this is the case, many families will form the

aforementioned milieu that hinders the parents ability to socialize their children. Socialization is

the main mechanism through which families shape society. Thus, if families are rendered unable

to perform this function, then some other body must fill this void. As soon as some other social

organ assumes this role, the structure of society is fundamentally altered. This alteration could

occur in the following manner. Considering that the family is the smallest, most basic unit of

society, it is logical to infer that whichever social organ undertakes the task of socializing the


3534


nations youth will unavoidably be larger and more complex than its predecessor. Once power or

responsibility transfers to a more complex body, the significance of the family unit will most likely

decrease even more. In sum, generations of children will turn to the larger and more complex

social organ in order to receive elementary social, educational, and cultural instruction, and the

familys societal importance will diminish and perhaps become a merely nominal unit of society.

While these particular prognostications may never come to pass, the fact remains that Russias

demographic crisis will have serious social implications, and the future of Russias stability will

depend entirely on the reconstruction of the basic structures of Russian society.

The political implications of the prospective demographic changes within Russia similarly

indicate foreseeable complications to President Putins global ambitions for the nation. In addition

to the other consequences attending Russian depopulation, which are hardly trivial, the rising

Muslim population within Russia coinciding with the shrinking Slavic population sets the stage

for extensive civil unrest. The growth of Islam in Russia is indisputable, and some analysts warn

of the immensity of this trend, arguing:

The implications of Islams ascendance in Russia are hard to overstate. Russia is going

through a religious transformation that will be of greater consequence for the international

community than the collapse of the Soviet Union, Paul Globe, a leading expert on

Russias Muslims, has said. Russias religious transformation is still unfolding. At their

current rate of growth, Muslims will make up one-fifth of Russias population by 2020.

And by the middle of this century, officials in Moscow predict that the Russian Federation

might become majority Muslim. (Berman 2013, 30)

Such a profound transformation appears exceedingly probable. The Muslim community

continues to flourish, while the Slavic majority fails to meet the total fertility rate of 2.1 necessary

for replenishment. Furthermore, [e]xperts say only migration can help plug the demographic

black hole, but that is a solution with potential explosive side effects given the countrys ethnic

tensions (Reuters 2011). Russia has had a long history of ethic tensions stemming from religious

differences, which is only exacerbated by radical Islamic terrorism. These tensions, which are

especially noticeable in the North Caucasus, have received particular attention in the media due

to the Chechen involvement in the Boston Bombing terrorist attack and the security fears that

accompanied the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. Nevertheless, whether the media notices or

not, the tensions are real, and they will have momentous repercussions as the demographic shift

takes place. Today, the unrest is spreading from the North Caucasus to Russias heartland, and

ethnic violence is on the rise (Berman 2013). Perhaps unsurprisingly, the rise in ethnic violence in

Russia has been propelled by a surge in extreme right-wing nationalism (Berman 2013, 34). Even

so, Russian nationalism is not limited to the Far Right, as Berman illustrates below:

More and more, Russians from across the political spectrum are identifying with and

organizing around a nationalism that is increasingly tinged with racism. The level of

xenophobia today is rising among various social groups, Russias Civic Chamber, an

official civil society oversight body created by Vladimir Putinnoted in its 2012 annual

report. An especially sharp rise can be observed among the citizens of major cities and

among those people with high levels of education. Their phobias relate first and foremost

to migrants from the Caucasus and Central Asia, and are motivated by insurmountable

cultural differences. The result has been the creation of what one specialist has called a

fashion for xenophobia throughout the country. (Berman 2013, 35)

These observations dishearten many who wish to see Russia embrace a more tolerant culture,

since the political and cultural divisions between the shrinking Slavic majority and the growing

Muslim minority appear to be worsening. Prejudices among the Slavic population are reinforced

by brutal terrorist attacks, which occur with horrifying frequency. Russias most violent terrorist

organization, the Caucasus Emirate, carried out 511 terrorist attacks in 2009 alone, and by the

end of 2010, the number had jumped to 583 (Berman 2013, 45). To complicate matters further,

the local attitudes in Russias Muslim communities demonstrate a hardening of radical religious

beliefs. Berman describes these beliefs, saying:

A poll conducted in early 2011 by the regional journal Nations of Dagestan found that

30 percent of Dagestani youth, including members of Dagestans universities and police

schools, said they would choose to live under a Muslim-run religious regime. More

than a third of those polled indicated they would not turn in a friend or family member

responsible for terrorism to authorities. These findings mirror those of human rights

groups and NGOs active in the Caucasus, which have documented an upsurge in support

for Islamic extremism and adherence to radical religious ideas there. (Berman 2013, 45-


3736


46)

Evidently, the polarization between the Slavic and Muslim populations is currently a self-

perpetuating cycle. Islamic extremism is present in some of the Muslim communities within

Russia. This leads the Slavic majority to distrust the Muslim minority. This distrust angers the

Muslim minority and further alienates them from the Slavic majority. The alienation causes more

people in the Muslim minority to embrace Islamic extremism, which only restarts this destructive

cycle of polarization. Therefore, due to the increasing polarization between the Slavic majority and

the Muslim minority, Russias demographic transformation threatens its future political stability.

In conclusion, the looming demographic crisis in Russia is leading the nation down an

unsettling and unfamiliar path. While the future is by no means certain and predictions are wholly

speculative, the declining population within Russia undoubtedly raises substantial economic,

social, and political concerns. In summation, depopulation has the potential to decimate the labor

force, destroy the structure of the nuclear family, and generate civil unrest. The culmination of all

these factors casts a shadow of uncertainty over the future of Russia. Nevertheless, the Russian

government, led by President Putin, appears relatively unmoved by these prognostications, as

Eberstadt describes, stating:

Moscows leadership is advancing into this uncertain terrain not only with insouciance but

with highly ambitious goals. In late 2007, for example, the Kremlin outlined the objective

of achieving and maintaining an average annual pace of economic growth in the decades

ahead on the order of nearly 7 percent a year But history offers no examples of a society

that has demonstrated sustained material advance in the face of long-term population

decline. It seems highly unlikely that such an ambitious agenda can be achieved in the

face of Russias current demographic crisis. Sooner or later, Russian leadership will have

to acknowledge that these daunting long-term developments are shrinking their countrys

social and political potential. (Eberstadt 2009)

Thus, while Russias demise is far from inevitable, these daunting long-term developments

are hard to ignore. Furthermore, the longevity of the major causes of Russias declining population,

namely alcoholism, violence, abortion, drug abuse, an AIDS epidemic, and mass emigration,

solidify the presumption that Russia will not attain its former glory. Instead, the world will see a

fundamentally transformed Russia, since the extensive population decline will essentially remake

the nation, though probably not in accordance with President Putins ambitions.


3938


References

Berman, Ilan. 2013a. Implosion: The End of Russia and What It Means for America.

2013b. Russia, Poised for Failure: Column. USA Today. .

Blyth, Kristen. 2013. Abortion: A Matter of Life and Death. The Moscow News. http://

themoscownews.com/russia/20130813/191845415/Abortion:%20A-matter-of-life-and-

death.html.

DaVanzo, Julie, and Population Matters (Project). 2001. Dire Demographics: Population Trends

in the Russian Federation. Santa Monica, CA: Rand.

Eberstadt, Nicholas. 2009. Drunken Nation: Russias Depopulation Bomb. World Affairs

Journal. http://www.worldaffairsjournal.org/article/drunken-nation-russia%E2%80%99s-

depopulation-bomb (May 6, 2014).

Frizell, Sam. 2014. Ukraine PM: Putin Wants To Rebuild Soviet Union. TIME.com. http://

time.com/69161/ukraine-yatsenyuk-putin-soviet-union/ (May 6, 2014).

Goldman, Marshall I. 2010. Petrostate: Putin, Power, and the New Russia. New York: Oxford

University Press.

Jacoby, Jeff. 170AD. The Coming Population Bust. Boston.com. http://www.boston.com/

bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2008/06/18/the_coming_population_bust/ (May

6, 2014).

Mirovalev, Mansur. 2012. Russia Drug Abuse Top Problem, According To Poll. Huffington

Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/07/12/russia-drug-abuse_n_1667786.html (May

6, 2014).

Pettersen, Trude. 2013. Russias Youth Population in Steady Decline. Barentsobserver. http://

barentsobserver.com/en/society/2013/06/russias-youth-population-steady-decline-19-06

(May 6, 2014).

Reuters. 2011. Russia: Worlds Highest Rate of Abortions. Daily News. http://www.iol.co.za/

dailynews/lifestyle/russia-world-s-highest-rate-of-abortions-1.1176756#.U2h7e_ldWSp.

Seminar on the Implications of a Stationary or Declining Population, and Council of Europe.

1978. Population Decline in Europe: Implications of a Declining or Stationary Population.

New York: St. Martins Press.

Anna Dean graduated The Ohio State University in May of 2014 with a degree in Political

Science and International Relations summa cum laude with Honors Distinction. Next fall she will

be pursuing a Ph.D. in Political Philosophy at the University of Dallas.

41

Somali Development Crisis: The Neoliberal Subject and the Creation of a New Somalia

40


Bradley Hinger

ABSTRACT. Somalia still has a problem with ineffective central governance that began when colonial rule ended in the 1960s. Recently, a new democratic government has taken office vowing to bring an end to this troubling post-co-lonial legacy. Despite its promotion of a new vision for the country, Somalis continue to be plagued by violence, malnutrition, and political and economic instability. This paper argues that responsibility for this uphill struggle lies in Western redevelopment strategies that aim to liberalize the global south. Neoliberal discourses of entrepreneurialism and self-responsibility have allowed the new Somali government to disengage from enacting policies to change the harsh and unforgiving living environment that many Somalis experience every day. Neoliberal governmental failure to regulate and direct change in Somalia has affected two important populations, both committed to the development of the, in different ways. Grafting Western neoliberal values onto a previously illiberal nation has only exacerbated the inequality, contradictions, and dissonance that it set out to remedy.

As globalization allows for the easy transfer of ideas, neoliberalism has become especially

salient in governance frameworks. Strategies for the development of economically underperforming

cities and countries have been dominated by neoliberal thought. Discourse frames social and

political strategies in economic terms, using various techniques to get individuals, populations,

institutions, and spaces to act entrepreneurial (Spence 2012). These ideas of reliance on the

private sector and individual responsibility are very characteristic of what has been called roll

out neoliberalism. The downward rescaling of the states economic regulatory involvement has

been a recent occurrence over the past 30 years. During the 1980s, a dismantling or roll-back

of Fordist-Keyensian policies of capital accumulation led to a state withdrawal from its typically

welfarist regime (Coq-Huelva 2013). A decade later, in place of these policies, the state began

to encourage, or roll-out, policies onto the private sector, changing the structure of the system

entirely. Responsibility for socio-economic issues such as welfare, crime, unemployment, and

homelessness was then placed on the individual, and continues to be today. However, this is not

to say that the state has no role in controlling these issues. The emphasis has switched from direct

state involvement in correcting these problems to one of state regulation of private responses

(Peck and Tickell 2002). The mentality of neoliberalism with its promotion of self-responsibility

and competition has been quickly pushed by economically and politically stable countries upon

developing nations. However, little attention is paid to their historical context and institutional

performance. What allows this framework to be easily transferable is its use of the idea of the

expert. Politically and economically dominant countries have developed an expertise about

economic matters that these emerging nations lack. Expertise comes along with discourses of

truth and reason, using rational choice to get people to recognize and act on their (narrow)

self-interest problems and their solutions are taken out of the realm of politics traditionally

considered because they are viewed as being truthful and objective (Spence 2012). Developing

nations coopt these strategies, which appear to work so well in other contexts, and attempt to apply

them to the distinct situations in their countries. This has happened to many different countries, in

various states of development. Discourses of world class cit[ies] in India (Ghertner 2012; Ellis

2012), policies for economic recovery through housing in Brazil (Nuijten et al. 2012), and the

urbanization of China (He and Wu 2009) have blinded these governments and policy makers to the

realities of the lived environment which they intend to change.

Here, we will focus on how roll-out neoliberalism has been pushed on different groups

within Somalia with differing effects due to different experiences and identities. It will show that

neoliberal discourses of individual responsibility and competition continue to overshadow and

divert accountability of the Somali government for the poor living conditions in the country. First,

this paper will give a background to the Somali conflict and explain the roots of many of the social

and political problems that continue to plague the nation. Next, the paper will show the ways

the country has encouraged and reaped the benefits of the diaspora, Somalis displaced from the

country as a result of instability, as an ideal neoliberal subject. It will show how these discourses of

economic redevelopment and social progress have pushed individuals within the Somali diaspora

to prop up the poor and disadvantaged. This has helped the state disengage from the task of long

term change. Finally, it will show how attempts to harness the neoliberal subjects within Somalia

have failed despite the encouragement of self-responsibility and citizen involvement.

In a recent talk at The Ohio State University, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud

explained that Somalia was a young country, its history only going back 40 years (Mohamud

43


42


2013). He appealed to the sizable Somali audience, most of whom were members of the large

diaspora population in Columbus, to come back and use the skills and experiences that they had

gained in the United States to help shape and rebuild the country. He positioned them at the

forefront of a new Somalia, assuring them that the country was starting to turn itself around;

that there were institutions to support them in their business ventures. There was no talk of

state help for the starving or the unhealthy masses that still reside in the country. Instead, he

appealed to neoliberal ideas, asking the diaspora to bring their savings earned abroad back to the

country. Mohamuds speech is a clear example of roll-out neoliberalism in which the private

sector become[s] responsible for tasks formerly considered to be the responsibility of the state

(Nuijten et al. 2012). The Somali government has bought into the neoliberal mentality that has

been pushed onto it by Western governments as the ultimate strategy for redevelopment. The

Somali government is trying to use discourses of responsibility to spur on the Somali people to

rebuild the economy for them. However, these efforts have gone unheeded as the leaders have

been unable to harness the neoliberal subjects within the country to rebuild.

A Short Somali Political History

Pre-Colonial Somali political structure was a highly federalized system as it followed very

closely their clan based societal organization. These clans consist of people connected through

various levels of kinship and social classifications. They still exist today and continue to hold

power in times of central government instability. There are five levels: clan-group, clan, sub-clan,

primary lineage, and dia-paying group (Lewis 1982, 4). Each of these segments has different

functions and a decreasing number of members. The clan-family is the broadest and highest level

of the clan structure. There are four main nomadic clan families: the Darood historically centered

in the middle of the country, the Isaaq in the north, the Hawiye in the east and far south, and the Dir

in the far north as well as two historically agricultural clan families, the Digil and the Rahanweyn,

are historically based in the south along the coast (Lewis 1982, 9). These families can consist

of more than a million members and for that reason are not very politically coherent. However,

clan-family ties are very strong among individuals and can cause otherwise non-existent tensions

among people of differing clans. Usually, these clan ties are measured back approximately 30

generations to a common ancestor (Lewis 1982, 4).

Between the sixteenth to nineteenth centuries, Somalia was subject to various regimes of

European colonial power, with control passing from Portugal to Italy, France, and the United

Kingdom. These colonial powers composed illegitimate boundaries and different colonial

histories, languages, and political systems, which began to create new, previously nonexistent

cleavages within the country as well as solidify and institutionalize those already existing (Besteman

1999, 12). This practice is unremarkable as it was repeated time and time again by colonial powers

throughout the region and the globe. However, particularly in Somalia, it served to create very

definite geographical axis of difference, legitimizing and exacerbating these cleavages. In the

summer of 1960, both the British and what had been the Italian territories in Somalia gained their

independence and the first Somali Republic was established. This republic saw a well-functioning

democracy with multiparty elections for nine years (Adam 2008, 1). However, clans increasingly

fought for group dominance and the government was ripped apart by corruption and infighting.

In October 1969, Siyaad Barre successfully conducted a military coup, wresting control of the

country.

Barre aligned Somalia with the Soviet Union and it began to fund his increasingly powerful

army. The Soviet support came as a result of Barres adherence to scientific socialism (Adam

2008, 9). This socialism promoted a reliance on education, training, technical competence,

specialization, and experience in order to further support institutions that were functioning

reasonably well (Adam 2008, 10). However, socialism was short lived in Somalia and quickly

Barre began to shift his focus from objective qualifications for power to clan specific appointments.

This clan-based favoritism used trustworthy men selected by the ruler to be placed in positions

of power and control (Adam 2008, 10). Specifically, Barre favored members of the Darod clan-

family in his own sub-clan, Marehan, his mothers, Ogaden, and that of his son-in-law, Dulbahante

(Adam 2008, 11). Soon, rich or powerful members of other clan groups began to feel persecuted

under Barres rule. He began to arrest and exile any opposing clans in the Somali ruling class.

Eventually Somalia was cut off from Soviets and began to be funded by The United States, Italy,

and China. Barre began to incite wars between other threatening clans, arming some against others

and aggravating existing clan tensions to prolong his power. Eventually, the United States began to

question the Somali governments human rights record and withdrew both economic and military

aid by 1989 and in the beginning of 1991, the Barres regime came to an end (Adam 2008, 15).

45


44


In the years that followed Siyaad Barres fall from power, there was general lawlessness

resulting from an attempted power grab by many different clan leaders and warlords trying to fill

the political vacuum. The factional fighting eventually became a civil war reportedly costing the

lives of 300,000 people in 1992 (Shay 2008, 10). Operation Restore Hope, started by the UN with

the help of the United States, set out to provide nutritional aid to the thousands of people starving

due to the war, disarm fighting factions, and attempt to formulate a Western style government

(Shay 2008, 10). Despite its lofty goals, the UN quickly found itself in a much more precarious

situation as they came under heavy losses in battles against local militias. Additionally, these

militias began to see control of food distribution as an important means by which to gain control

over the country. For that reason, many of the different factions sought themselves to gain power

over UN relief dispersal and use it as they saw fit. This exacerbated the humanitarian crisis present

in Somalia even further (Shay 2008, 11).

After the fall of the Barre regime in 1991, informal Islamic courts were created to maintain

order in the country. The success of these courts is attributed to their ability to maintain order

through strict discipline under Sharia law (Shay 2008, 99). These informal groups eventually

evolved into a more centralized pseudo-government called the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which

was characterized by highly repressive governance and radical Islamic law. In the wake of 9/11,

the U.S. began to see the intensification of Islamic rule in Somalia as a possible breeding ground

for terrorist activity. It decided to take action and supported the Ethopian dismantling of the

ICU in 2006. The Ethiopian military rule of the capital was brutal and contributed to the further

crumbling of Somali society. Many Somalis saw the U.S.s participation in the overthrow of the

ICU as a power grab spurred only by fears of an increase in international terrorism stemming

from the country and became wary of Western involvement in Somali politics (Ibrahim 2010).

After Ethiopian troops took control of the south of Somalia, the Transitional Federal Government

(TFG), a government that had been founded in 2004 and ousted by the ICU in June of 2006, was

restored to power (Shay 2008, 121). The TFG was a Western style centralized democracy, and

many Somalis were wary of it due to its history of corruption and marginalization of large sections

of society (International Crisis Group 2011). Despite this, on Monday August 20, 2012, a selection

committee made up of clan elders selected 250 individuals for the 275 member parliament and in

early September of that year, Hassan Sheik Mohamud was elected president (Al-Jazeera 2012a,

Al-Jazeera 2012c). In the summer of 2012, a provisional constitution was drafted but it is still

awaiting endorsement by parliament (Al-Jazeera 2012d).

Responsibility and Development

In an opinion piece posted on Al-Jazeera, former Somali Prime Minister Abdi Farah Shirdon

wrote that Somalia has turned a corner and there is no going back (Shirdon 2013). He explained

that Somalia was seeing a return to normalcy as exemplified by extension of government into

outer regions, economic recovery, and the return of social organizations such as a new sports club.

In a similar article, Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud talked about the great progress

that has been made in the judicial and economic sectors, as well as the security of the nation.

(Mohamud 2013b) He acknowledged the gains that still must be made, however. He assured

readers that new political systems taking root and promotion of democratic values in the country

have and will continue to help the country rise above, what he called, merely being dealt a bad

hand. Through the optimistic outlooks of these political leaders, one would hardly expect there to

be the stagnation of solutions to extensive poverty, inequality, and lack of representation present

in Somalia. Still, however, it appears that their optimism may be unfounded. We must ask, what

is the function of these public statements in light of all of the negative press? These statements

play a role in persuading members of the Somali diaspora to bring their money and skills back to

Somalia. In this section I will examine how Somalis are asked to examine the environment in the

country as a place of investment for the individual entrepreneur. Little to nothing was said about

the diasporas distinct history in and away from Somalia, working on the assumption that theses

Somalis wanted to return to the country. Additionally, Somalia was not framed as a place to live

but instead to spend, thereby framing the country as a whole in a distinctly neoliberal manner.

In the Al-Jazeera article, former Prime Minister Shirdon is, without a doubt, attempting to

engage with would-be Somali investors. He explains the institutions that supposedly exist, as well

as those being built, promise the security of investments. Shirdon talks of Somalia having a bright

future being within touching distance (Shirdon 2013). Similarly, President Mohamud assures

partnersthat we are on the right path (Mohamud 2013b). This branding of Somalia as a stable

and secure country is just one discourse in a cacophony of chatter around what Somalia could be.

Like a new business in need of capital, Somalia is presenting itself as a land of possibility with

47


46


a

Documents

OSU JPIA Spring 2014 Edition