MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

illingtonl'Peninsular· rmy

Text b)!

JAMES LAWFORD

Colo r plates b)!

MICHAEL ROFFE

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIES

EDITOR: PHILIP WARNER

fIling/on!Peninsular rmy

-Textby JAMES LAWFORD

Colour plates by MICHAEL ROFFE

Research for uniforms and illustratiollS T _ A_ HE ATHe 0 T E

HIPPOCRENEBOOKS, INC.

© Copyright 1973 Osprey Publishing Ltd.

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First published in the United States 1973ISBN 0-88254-170-6

First published in Great Britain in 197 byOsprey Publishing Ltd, P.O. Box 25,707 Oxford Road, Reading, Berkshire

Printed in Great Britain

"J1JllingtonsPeninsularru'Irmy

During Marlborough's Wars at the beginning ofthe eighteen th century the muskets of the infantryand the guns of the artillery were smooth-bore andmuzzle-loading, cavalry relied on shock tacticsand the sabre, engineers based their fortificationson the principles of Vauban. When Wellingtontook the field nearly a hundred years laterweapons had barely altered; a few British infantrywere armed with the new-fangled rifle which theFrench had not thought worth adopting, and afew French or Polish/French cavalry regimentsused the lance as well as the sabre, guns fired pro­jectiles that were a little heavier than before andwere slightly more mobile, while the technique offortifications and sieges remained completelyunchanged. Over the century weapon technologyhad hardly advanced at all. But paradoxically,perhaps in part from the very fact that weaponshad al tered so Ii ttle permi tting their character­istics to be thoroughly understood, perhaps inpart because large regular armies remained con­tinuously in existence, during that century mili­tary theory, organizationally, tactically and strat­egically, made remarkable progress. After theforcing-house of the Napoleonic wars, Europeanarmies reached levels of technical excellencewhich have probably never been surpassed, per­haps never equalled. The theories of Clausewitz,which were to dominate military thought for thenext century and more, were almost entirely basedon the detailed analysis he and other militarythinkers made of the principles underlying thegreat battles of the Napoleonic period.

At the beginning of this period the record of theBritish army left something to be desired. Butduring the Peninsular War, 1808-14, Wellington

led and trained a British army that, fightingagainst the French, the masters of Europe, neverknew a major defeat in the field. Wellingtonhimself, whose terse unflattering comments onhis men have long been remembered, describedhis army as 'able to go anywhere or do anything.'

The staff by which he controlled his magnificentarmy reflected his own personality and the con­ditions of the time. Battlefields were small andregiments fought close together; generals couldassemble all their men in a single place and trans­mi t their orders by the power of their lungs; therewas no need for the elaborate staff organizationsof a later day. Napoleon it is true, co-ordinatingthe activities of a number of armies operating

Arthur Wellesley, Duke of Wellington. He was thirty-eightyears old when, in 1808, as Sir Arthur Wellesley, he first landedin the Peninsula and forced the French out of Portugal.

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The Battle ofFuentes de Onoro, British Headquarters. A staffofficer is galloping off with a ntessage. Wellington, wearinghis usual low cocked hat and plain frock-coat, is attended by

hundreds of miles apart, evolved the idea of achief-of-staff who could interpret and elaboratedirections from the commander and even pos­sibly assist him in his planning. Wellingtondesired nothing of this; he wanted advice orassistance from no one; modern planning staffswould have filled him with horror. In his view theformulating of plans and giving out of orders werethe responsibility of the commanders. Staffofficers were there to transmit these orders and tosmooth out minor administrative difficulties.

In consequence, in Wellington's headquartersthere was no eqivalent of the general staff. He hada small personal staff under a lieutenant-colonelto handle his military correspondence, but thecolonel was a secretary, nothing more. The mostimportant branch of the staff was the departmentof the Quarter-Master-General. It was headed bya major-general and initially consisted of a smallgroup of officers, perhaps twelve in number (as

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a light dragoon and other staff officers. In the backgroundRoyal Horse Artillery are changing ground (After St Clair)

the army grew bigger so their numbers increased) ;in addition an officer from the department servedin each division.

The duties of these officers extended to suchmatters as quartering, the moving of equipment,the layout of camps, duties differing little fromthose of the present day; but their duties also in­cluded some of those now discharged by thegeneral staff such as mapping, the compiling ofinformation about the countryside and its re­sources, the organizing of all forms of movementand the drafting of orders. The Quarter-MasterGeneral's department provided the executivestaffof the army, so far as such may be said to haveexisted.

The other great department was that of theAdjutant-General, also under a major-general.Initially this comprised fourteen officers but withthe passage of time this number too increased;again a staff officer from the department served

with each division. The responsibilities of theseofficers included such matters as discipline,statistics about unit strengths, reinforcementsetc., and differed little from those of the modern'A' staff.

The distinctions between the two departmentswere by no means rigid and an officer from onemight well find himself deputizing for an absenteefrom the other. But one thing Wellington madeabsolutely clear, the function of the staff officerwas to transmit the instructions of his commander,he had no right to arrogate to himself the authorityof his general.

Besides the staff proper, Wellington kept in hisheadquarters the field commanders of his en­gineers, artillery and medical services. In additionMarshal Beresford, the Commander-in-Chief ofthe Portuguese army, after one disastrous ex­perience commanding an army at Albuera,generally accompanied army headquarters, asdid Sir Stapleton Cotton, from 1812 onwards thecommander of the cavalry in the Peninsula. ThusWellington had with him two senior generalswhom he could send off at a moment's notice totake over an independent command or disentanglesome unfortunate situation; it gave him a flexi­bility that allowed him to dispense with thesystem of Army Corps originated by the French.

On the civil side there was an importantdepartment, the Commissariat, under a Com­missary General with assistants serving withevery division and brigade. These were respon­sible for the provision of rations and the procure­ment of all local produce. In the nature of thingsa thin or ill-provided commissary officer wasrarely seen, and they were apt to receive morekicks than credit.

Working direct to Army Headquarters werethe divisions; there was only an intermediateheadquarters when two or more were groupedtogether for an independent task. Here staffs werekept to the minimum. Leith Hay, an A.D.C. withthe 5th Division, records that at the Battle ofSalamanca the divisional staff consisted ofColonelBerkeley, probably Assistant-Quarter-Master­General, and Major Gomm, probably Deputy­Assistant-Adjutant-General, and four A.D.C.s,possibly one per brigade and one to look afterthe domestic arrangements of the headquarters.

Marshal Beresford in hand-to-hand cODlbat with a Polishlancer at Albuera. He was a Dlan of iDlDlense physicalstrength and the lancer had short shrift

The high sounding titles for staffofficers have beenretained to the present day, generally abbreviatedto the initials, thereby ensuring that the armystaff should be confusing to the other services andincomprehensible to other nations.

At the level of the infantry brigade, there was asingle staff officer, the major of brigade; he was acaptain or sometimes an able young subalterndrawn from one of its regiments. During the laterstages of the war, when regimental officers hadrecognized the wisdom of wearing the same typeof headdress as their men, staff officers could bedistinguished by their courageous refusal toabandon the traditional cocked hat.

7heI¢ntryWhen Wellington took the field in the Peninsulain 1808, Britain lagged behind France in thehigher organization of her armies, divisions hadyet to be formed, and Wellington dealt direct withindividual brigade commanders. In June 1809,however, he adopted the divisional organizationoriginated by the French, in which a number ofbrigades were grouped together under a single

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commander. Initially he formed four divisions,but by 1812 the number had risen to eightBritish and one Portuguese; he numbered hisBritish divisions consecutively from one to seven,the eighth, the most famous, was known simply asthe Light Division. Each was commanded by alieutenant-general and usually comprised threebrigades; two of which were British, each under amajor-general, and one foreign, often under aBritish brigadier-general - a rank otherwiseseldom encountered in the Peninsular Army.

There were some exceptions. All three brigadesof the 2nd Division were British, but since itnormally operated with General Hamilton'sPortuguese Division, both under the command ofWellington's most trusted subordinate, General'Daddy' Hill, the two together virtually amountedto the equivalent of a small Anglo-PortugueseArmy Corps. In the 1st Division the foreignbrigade was from the King's German Legionrecruited by George III from the remnants of hisHanoverian Army, in the remainder (except forthe Light Division which had a peculiar organiza­tion of its own) it came from the Portuguese Army

General Lord Hill, wearing the uniforDl of the post Napole­onic period

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which had been reorganized under the commandof Marshal Beresford and stiffened by Britishofficers who had transferred to the PortugueseserVIce.

The composition of the Light Division derivedfrom an essential feature of Wellington's tactics.He had served under the Duke ofYork in Flanderswhere he had noted how the French light troops,their Tirailleurs and Vol tigeurs, could harass andweaken a battle line, so that when the heavyFrench columns attacked it they often brokethrough. He resolved to counter this gambit bydeploying forward of his positions such a mass ofhis own light troops that the Tirailleurs andVoltigeurs would be held well short of his mainposition. As a first step towards achieving thisaim, he constituted the Light Division with thefunction of screening the army both at rest andon the move. It consisted of only two smallbrigades each containing a Ca~adore battalion(Portuguese Light Infantry) four companies ofriflemen from the 95th (later increased when the2nd and 3rd battalions of that regiment joinedhis army) and a British light infantry battalion(the role in which the 43rd and 52nd won im­mortal fame).

The 7th Division also was rather unusual;perhaps at first Wellington toyed with the ideaof producing another light infantry division: ithad two light infantry brigades, one containingtwo light battalions of the King's German Legionand nine rifle companies of the Brunswick OelJagers and the other two newly trained Britishlight infantry battalions, the 5 Ist and the 68th,and a battalion originally recruited from Frenchemigres and deserters, the Chasseurs Britannique,a regiment famous for the speed with which itsmen deserted; in addition there was the normalPortuguese brigade. This division, perhaps owingto its diversi ty of races, never won much renown;the malicious affected to disbelieve in its veryexistence, and in 18 I3 it reverted to a morenormal organization, the light infantry battalionsfrom the King's German Legion being transferredto the 1St Division.

In the British brigades there were generallythree line battalions. Occasionally a fourth mightbe added, and in Guards Brigades, since abattalion ofFoot Guards invariably outnumbered

by a considerable margin those of the line, therewere only two. On average a brigade numberedabout 2,000 men, but sickness and casualties, orthe arrival of a strong battalion, could cause widefluctuations. The Portuguese brigades followedthe continental model and embodied a Ca<;adorebattalion and two line regiments each of twobattalions; these had seven companies and anauthorized strength of 750, but rarely put morethan 500 in the field; even so, Portuguese brigadeson average numbered 2,500 and were almostalways larger than the British.

The organization of the British battalions re­mained remarkably constant throughout the war.Each was commanded by a lieutenant-coloneland consisted of a grenadier company, a lightcompany, and eight line companies, all com­manded by captains. The colonel had twomajors serving under him, nominally to com­mand the two wings into which the battalion was

customarily split; their main function, however,was to deputize for him when he was away and totake charge ofany large detachments the battalionmight be called upon to make; within the battaliontheir duties tended to depend on the particularwhims or eccentricities of their commanders.

In the companies, the captains had under themtwo junior officers, in theory a lieutenant and anensign, bu t there was no set proportion betweenthe two ranks. A full-strength battalion, therefore,would be commanded by a lieutenant-colonelwith under him two majors, ten captains, twentylieutenants or ensigns, the adjutant, (generally alieutenant), and the quarter-master; an assistantsurgeon was normally attached. Sir David Dundasshows the strength of a company as being threeofficers, two sergeants, three corporals, onedrummer, and thirty privates. This must havebeen at the peace-time establishment of oneplatoon. At war establishment, another platoon

Portuguese infantry at PeDJnacor .8 March .811. (St Clair)The mounted officers wearing the 'stove-pipe' shako arebelow field rank. The pioneers are wearing bearskin capsand leather aprons. Their axes are not visible. The drummers

carry their drums slung on their backs by means ofthe drumcords. (The length of the drum cord was governed by thisrequirement)

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was added without any increase in the numberofofficers. When going to the Peninsula com paniesmight number nearly 100 including a pay ser­geant, perhaps four other sergeants and sixcorporals. The 5znd went to the Peninsula with54 sergeants and about 850 rank and file. Butsickness and other casualties soon took their toll,and when in 1810 the znd battalion of the 52nddisbanded its total strength was zo sergeants, IZ

buglers, and 572 rank and file of whom· 10sergeants, 5 buglers, and 85 rank and file wereunfit for duty.

A battalion with 700 men present in the fieldwas looked on as strong, many fell well below thisfigure, and some had little more than 500. In abattalion of 700 men, deducting the musicians,the adjutant's batman, the clerks, the storemenand others of that ilk likely to find their way intoheadquarters - say forty men - there would be660 men serving with the companies; allowingagain for the various duties that inexorably sapthe strength ofa regiment such as baggage guards,storemen, menjust gone sick, absentees and so on,the company could probably put not much morethan fifty-five men into the line. Captain Shererremarked that at the Battle of Vitoria he hadeleven casualties out of a company of thirty-eightand does not comment that at this time his com­pany strength was abnormally low. The companyfor administrative purposes was divided into twoplatoons, but organizations were far from stan­dardized and commanding officers were oftenmen of character who liked to run their battalionsafter their own fashion and did not welcome inter­ference from the nincompoops of the s(aff. Theprivate soldier in the ranks carried sixty roundsof ball ammunition, a knapsack, a haversack,rolled blanket or great coat, a full waterbottle andprobably some other articles he had managed toacquire; his load might amount to nearly sixtypounds. At first the heavy camp-kettles forcooking were carried on a company mule, butwhen, in 181Z, Wellington managed to issue tents

to his men at a scale of three twelve-men bell-tentsper company, the tents were carried on the muleand a lighter type of camp-kettle was carried inturn by the men of the company.

Theirclothing and in particular that ofthe officersmight be curious and fanciful and be only remotelyrelated to the regulation pattern; Wellingtonhimself never worried over such matters so longas his men resembled soldiers and would not bemistaken for the French.

'BROWN BESS'

Officers were armed with the sword, andsergeants with halberds or short pikes, calledspontoons, rather to assist them in dressing theranks than as weapons of offence. Most of thesoldiers were armed with the musket, affection­ately known as Brown Bess, that the Duke ofMarlborough when Master-General of the Ord­nance was said to have introduced. Its barrel wasabout 42 inches long with a diameter of'75 of aninch; its firing n;lechanism was repu tedly the mostreliable in Europe, although at this time that wasnot necessarily a very great feat; its heavy' tri­angular bayonet, 17 inches long, fitted on thebarrel well clear of the muzzle. Each soldiercarried his 60 rounds of ball made up intocartridges, the propelling charge and the ballbeing sewn together in cartridge paper to make asmall cylindrical parcel. When the time came toload, the soldier bit the end of the cartridge, shooka little powder on his priming pan and emptiedthe rest down the barrel; he then used his ramrodto ram home his ball with the cartridge paper ontop to act as a wadding. When he pulled thetrigger a spark from the flint ignited the powderin the pan which in turn caused the powder in thebarrel to explode; the proportion of misfires,however, could be as high as one in six and, if thepowder became damp, the musket would not fireat all.

A Brown Bess, otherwise known as a Tower DlUsket, the principal firearm of the infantry during the war

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Loading and firing, from a manual of musketry exercises.The unifonn is that of an earlier period j the hat had beenreplaced by the 'stove-pipe' shako in 1796, and the coat by the

The ball was not always a very close fit in thebarrel, and the gases from the exploding chargemight escape around it making it spin and swervewildly in flight. Brown Bess had a certain feminine.capriciousness; at fifty yards it could be aimedwith some hope of success; up to two hundredyards it could be usefully fired at a group, theman actually aimed at being almost certain toescape harm; but over 200 yards, although theball could carry up to 700, its behaviour was soeccentric that the noise of the discharge was morelikely to excite terror than the ball. Rates of firedepended on how thoroughly the soldier per­formed his loading drills and the care that hetook when he aimed; he could fire up to five roundsa minute if he was satisfied with producing animposing number of bangs without worryingovermuch what happened to his ball; taking intoaccount battle conditions a well-trained soldiershould have been capable of firing nearly threeeffective rounds a minute.

single-breasted short-tailed coatee. White gaiters continuedto be worn only by the Foot Guards in full dress

Owing to the relative inaccuracy of themusket, the high number of misfires, and also themoral effect of a sudden blast of fire, a volley froma number of men was likely to produce a moreawe-inspiring result than a comparable numberof single shots, and the more concentrated the firethe more devastating it was likely to be; hence,throughout most of the eighteenth century,soldiers stood shoulder to shoulder in a line thatwas three ranks deep; the French experimen tedwith four but found that the fire of the fourth wasmore likely to endanger their comrades than theenemy. At this time the three-deep line was stillthe normal practice on the continent as it gavethe line a certain solidarity and catered for thereplacement of casualties.

TACTICS

During the War of American Independence,especially in wild country against irregular bodies

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POInbal, II March 1811 (St Clair). Infantry on the approachJnarch. COJnpany officers wearing shakos have disJnounted.The Colours, uncased, are in the Jniddle of the coluJnn. An

of riflemen, the British army had become accus­tomed to a looser order. Battalions frequentlyfought in only two ranks and these were notproperly closed up by European standards; thiswas beneficial in that it led Wellington to adopta two-rank line in the Peninsula, but with theloose order regiments had come to devise tacticalmanoeuvres of their own and drill had becomesloppy and haphazard; the results in Flanders hadnot always been happy. In 1792 the Duke ofYork, the Commander-in-Chief, decided that acommon tactical doctrine must be adopted bythe whole of the infantry and issued a manualentitled Rules and Regulations for the Field FormationExercise of Movements of His Majesty's Forces,which he proceeded rigorously to enforce. Themanual, written by Sir David Dundas, waslargely based on formations current in thePrussian army and has been reviled as intolerablyrigid in outlook; nevertheless it gave a soundtactical doctrine to the infantry and was the basis

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officer of the light cOJnpany (wings on his shoulders) istalking to one of the staff.

of the battle-drills used in the Peninsula.Dundas envisaged the men in a battalion

standing shoulder to shoulder in a line three ranksdeep. (As already mentioned, Wellington reducedthis to two.) The first part of his manual wasdevoted to the individual drills such as turning,marching and wheeling, that the soldier had tomaster before he was fit to take his place in hiscompany. In the remainder he laid down a seriesof drills which, while retaining the rigid, slow­moving line as the battle formation yet enabled abattalion to move swiftly and easily over thebattlefield. He divided the battalion into eighteq ual divisions; these roughly corresponded tothe eight line companies if the grenadier andlight companies were both excluded; if they werepresent he allowed the num ber of divisions to beincreased to ten; on the other hand if the battalionwas weak the number could be reduced propor­tionately. In practice it was rare for the lightcom pany to form part of the battle line; its

A brigade fording the Mondego, 1810 (St Clair). An exam.pleof a brigade advancing with its battalions in colum.n of

normal task was to screen the fron t or flanks of thebattalion or brigade. The grenadier company, nolonger specifically armed with grenades, wascomposed of the steadiest soldiers in the unit; itmight be used for some particularly dangerous ordifficult task, but the habit of brigading thegrenadier companies to make up ad hoc grenadierbattalions had largely disappeared. In someregiments the grenadier company was divided,half being placed on the right and half on the leftof the line. Dundas does not seem to have thoughtthat any specific provision was necessary for itsdeployment.

Although he described some eighteen man­oeuvres in detail, in essence his drills were basedon four key formations, column of route, columnof divisions, line and square. Column of route wasused for all movement when there was no im­mediate threat of contact with the enemy.Dundas laid down that this could be carried outin fours if the line formed two deep, sixes if three

divisions. The divisions seem. well closed up, probably tohasten the crossing.

deep. Since marching men required double thespace occupied by the men when stationary, thelength of a column of route should equal thefrontage of the same unit in line, and he em­phasized that this length should not be exceeded.March discipline much resembled that in forcein the British Army until the 1930S when thethreat from the air enforced a greater degree ofdispersion. Battalions started off from theircamping grounds with arms at the slope orshoulder and bands playing. After a shortdistance the men marched at ease and were per­mitted to break step. At every clock hour therewas a short halt to enable the men to rest andadjust their equipment. Before the hourly haltand immediately after it, men marched to atten­tion and in step for a few minutes, and the samedrill was observed when they arrived at theirdestination or were called upon to execute amanoeuvre.

When contact with the enemy became a possi-

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bility, column of route was changed to column ofdivisions, or if the company organization had been'preserved, column ofcompanies. In this formationeach division deployed in a two-deep line with thedivisions ranged one behind the other, No. I

Division leading; occasionally it might be con­venient to have No.8 in front. Here two ratherconfusing terms were apt to be used. IfNo. I led,the battalion was said to be 'right in front' if No. 8'left in front', the terms referring to their respec­tive positions when in line. In some circumstancesit was desirable to adopt a compromise betweencolumn and line. For this purpose Dundas hadenacted that besides being divided into eightdivisions, the battalion line should also be dividedinto four grand divisions, and column of granddivisions, generally formed by grouping in pairs,might be substituted for column of divisions.

Intervals might be varied. In close columnthere might be only seven paces between the frontrank of one division and the front rank of the oneimmediately behind it. On the move opencolumn was more usual; in this formation thedistance between divisions was equal to theirfront for an important reason; with these intervalsthe battalion could form line facing left or rightvery quickly indeed, as each division needed to dono more than execute a separate right or leftwheel for the whole to be in line. This was themanoeuvre so brilliantly executed by Pakenhamand the 3rd Division at the battle of Salamanca.Forming line to the front was a slower process.Each division came up in succession on the rightor left of the division in front of it, depending onthe flank ordered, until the line had been formed,while the leading division normally halted to

The Battle of Castalia. A British infantry battalion in linefaces an attack by French infantry in colunm. On the hill thecolonel rides in his correct position behind the Colours. Oneof the majors has been wounded and fallen off his horse; theother (cocked hat and dismounted) brings up a company onthe right. Company officers (shakos, straight swords) arein their positions on the flanks of their companies. In the

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right foreground a light infantry officer brings up his reservein close order to support his skirmishers. The light infantrybugler, one trusts, is sounding the advance while a Frenchdrummer is probably responding with the 'pas de charge'.(Light infantry, often working dispersed, used bugles notdrums for the passage of orders)

allow the others to catch up; the rear divisionmight therefore find it had some 200 yards to

. cover, and if, as sometimes happened, the wholebrigade was advancing in column of companiesor divisions this distance might be tripled.

Once in line, the colours took post in the centrewith the Colonel, mounted, six paces behind. Thesenior major and the adjutant, also mounted, tookpost respectively behind the 3rd and 6th Divisions;the company commanders, dismounted, took up aposition on the right of the front rank of theircompany or division with a sergeant coveringthem in the rear rank. The remaining officers andsergeants, the drummers, pioneers and any otherhangers-on formed a third supernumerary rankwith orders as Dundas phrased it to 'keep theothers closed up to the front during the attackand prevent any break beginning in the rear'. Thesecond-in-command of the left-hand division,however, covered by a sergeant, took post on theleft flank of that division.

When advancing in line the men on the flankskept their alignment by dressing on the coloursin the centre. If a brigade advanced in line it wasthe duty of the colour parties to align themselveson the colours of the particular battalion that hadbeen detailed to set pace and direction. In thisformation the senior battalion was on the rightthe next senior on the left and the junior in thecentre.

The last formation, that of square, Dundasshows as being formed from line. With No. I

Division on the right and No.8 on the left the pro­cedure was as follows. The 4th and 5th Divisionsstood fast, the 2nd and 3rd wheeled to their rightrear forming a line at right angles to the rightflank of No. 4 Division, while the 6th and 7thin a similar manner wheeled to their left rearforming a line at right angles to the left flank ofNO.5 Division. The 1st and 8th Divisions closedthe square and faced the rear; the officers andcolours took post in its centre, the officers wavingtheir swords exultantly in the air whenever avolley was fired.

There were many other drills for formingsquare; sometimes it was formed in two ranks,sometimes in four; on occasion two battalionsmight unite, as at Waterloo, to make up a singlesquare. When two or more squares were necessary,

A British infantry square being attacked by lancers

alternate ones would be echelonned back, so thatthe fire from one could sweep the face of the next.It is evident that if a square were to be formedquickly and without confusion, companies had tobe of eq ual strength, and that some system, suchas that of divisions, was probably unavoidable.Nevertheless, the advantages of the fighting unitand the administrative being identical, so thatofficers and N.C.O.s knew the men they led inaction, became more and more apparent, and thecustom of using the company as the tactical unitbecame steadily more widespread as the warprogressed.

To give still greater flexibility in manoeuvre,Dundas decreed that a division should be dividedinto two sub-divisions and four sections, but addedthat a section should never number less than fivefiles (fifteen men if the ranks were three deep);these would operate the same formations withina division as a division within a battalion. As thedivision was the smallest sub-unit under an officerit may be surmised that these smaller formationswere rarely used, unless a company was operatingindependently on its own.

As regards frontages, Dundas stated that a manshould occupy twenty-two inches. Two feet,however, would seem a more realistic figure,besides being easier to use for purposes of calcula­tion. A battalion 700 strong, su btracting the lightcompany, the musicians, and those in the super­numerary third rank, would probably musterabout 560 men actually in the battle line;assuming a front rank of 280, the fron tage for sucha battalion would be in the region of 200 yards.Since a brigade normally fought with all threebattalions in line its front would extend about

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.~'~+ .. O} ~

~-:-.-

~The Regimental Colour. The colour parties of the infantrycarried two flags each borne by an ensign or subaltern andknown as the First or Royal Colour and the RegimentalColour. The First Colour was a Union Jack with the regi­mental number in its centre; the Regimental was morecomplicated. Its background colour matched the facings ofthe regiment; in its right-hand corner there was a smallUnion Jack and in its centre a red shield containing the regi­mental number or emblem, normally surrounded by awreath of the union flowers, the rose, thistle and shamrock.Other honours might be painted on it. In the illustration theofficer has removed the staff from its socket and is carryingthe colour partially furled; its oilskin case can be seen overhis right shoulder. A sergeant in the party stands close to

...!!efend the nearly helpless officer with his spontoon

600 yards. Infantry divisions on the other handseldom had all three brigades in line. At theBattle of Salamanca the 4th Division did so withdisastrous resul ts; Wellington had, however, wi thcustomary prescience placed the 6th Divisionbehind it to give the attack depth, and Cole com­manding the 4th may well have taken this intoaccount when determining his formation.

When the manoeuvring had ended and thefighting had begun it was important that at notime should a battalion be discovered with all itsmuskets unloaded; if this should happen itwould be helpless before cavalry, and enemyinfantry would be able to close and blast it off thebattlefield with impunity. Dundas frowned on filefiring whereby each front rank and rear rank manfired immediately after the man on his right, andfavoured the firing of volleys. He stated: 'Line willfire by platoons, each battalion independent, and

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firing beginning from the centre of each.' In hisregulations Dundas uses the terms platoon andcompany as though they were the same, and pre­sumably meant here that firing would be bycompany or division; since there was only oneofficer in the front rank of each division, except forthe left flank one, it seems logical to suppose thatthese were the units of fire; on the other hand it islikely that battalions developed procedures oftheir own. After the first volley men almostcertainly fired independently as fast as possible,the initial method of opening fire ensuring thatfiring remained continuous. At close range thisfire could be murderous; after two or threeminutes one side would almost certainly begin tofall into disorder, and seeing this the other wouldprobably clinch matters with the bayonet. CaptainSherer describing his action at the Battle ofAlbuera gives some idea of what the reality musthave been like:

Just as our line had entirely cleared theSpaniards, the smoky shroud of battle was, bythe slackening of fire, for one minute blownaside, and gave to our view the French grena­dier caps, their arms, and the whole aspect oftheir frowning masses. I t was a momentary, buta grand sight; a heavy atmosphere of smokeagain enveloped us, and few objects could bediscerned at all, none distinctly. The murderouscontest of musketry lasted long. We were thewhole time advancing on and shaking theenemy. At the distance of about twenty yardsfrom them we received orders to charge. Weceased firing, cheered and had our bayonets inthe charging position ... The French infantrybroke and fled, abandoning some guns andhowitzers about sixty yards from us ... Todescribe my feelings throughout this wild scenewith fidelity would be impossible: at intervalsa shriek or a groan told that men were fallingabout me; but it was not always that the tumultof the contest suffered me to catch thesesounds. A constant feeling [i.e. closing] to thecentre of our line and the gradual diminutionof our front more truly bespoke the havoc ofdeath.

For a battalion the sequence of action might bean approach march in column of route, then a

The 57th Foot (West Middlesex Regilnent), 'the die-hards', atthe Battle of Albuera. Grenadier caps were cOfilfilonly wornby the drufilfilers and the colours of their coatees were the

halt at an assembly area where the battalion mightclose up in column of grand divisions, and standpoised ready to swing into action. Here colourswould be uncased and primings checked. Thenwould come the advance in open column, deploy­ment into line and finally trial by fire.

During the later stages of the advance the lightinfantry might well have been deployed in front;while capable of taking their place in the battleline, they generally had other more importantfunctions to perform. They were equipped with alighter version of the Brown Bess that had abarrel only thirty-nine inches long. They alwaysacted in pairs - from the time he joined his uniteach man had to choose a comrade from whom hewas separated neither in camp nor on the battle­field. When a light infantry company operatedon its own a few men would be kept in close orderas a reserve immediately under the hand of thecommander, the rest would be spread in pairsacross the front, one member of each a little infront of his comrade so that they could covereach other either advancing or retiring; the inter­vals between pairs would vary from two totwelve paces depending on the extent of the frontthey had to cover. These skirmishers, as they werecalled, preserved only the roughest of lines,selecting individual firing positions where thebest cover could be obtained. Being widely

reverse of those of their regifilents; in this case the coateewas yellow with red facings

separated, they worked to bugle calls like thecavalry, not the drums of the line. In an advancethey would close with the enemy's line and whilethemselves presenting an insignificant target, gallit unmercifully with their fire. In defence they hadto present an impenetrable front to the light troopsof the enemy; but, once attacked in force, theirtask was done and they were permitted to with­draw to a flank, taking the utmost care not tomask the fire of their own line as they went. Lightcompanies might work independently, but moreoften those in a brigade were grouped togetherunder a single commander to form a small lightinfantry unit, and in the Portuguese brigade allthe light companies were already concentrated inthe Ca<;:adore battalion.

In front of the light infantry the riflemen, theelite of the skirmishers, might be seen weavingtheir way forward. Initially Wellington had threerifle battalions, the 95th, the 5th/60th Rifles andthe Brunswick Oel Jagers. Later these were in­creased by the arrival of two more battalions ofthe 95th, and in addition a number of rifles weremade available to the Light Battalions of theKing's German Legion. (Oman has stated thatthe Ca<;:adore battalions were armed with riflesand a number of authorities agree with him.However, taking into account the total produc­tion of the Baker rifle in the U ni ted Kingdom, the

15

Riflemen of the 95th covering the right flank of the line. Theshort brass-hilted sword they carried in lieu ofa bayonet, and

contention is open to doubt. Possibly someCa<;adore battalions were so armed.) All werearmed with the Baker rifle, a muzzle-loader witha barrel go inches long and· 6 I 5 inches diameter;to load it the ball had to be forced home againstthe resistance of the rifling grooves, a serioushandicap which limited the rate offire to approxi­mately one round a minute. However, the riflewas sufficiently accurate for aimed fire to bepossible at ranges of up to 200 yards, four timesthe range of a musket, and effective fire at gooyards was by no means uncommon.

Wellington always allotted at least one com­pany of riflemen to each infantry division; theyoperated ahead of everyone, slinking from coverto cover like hunters or poachers, rather thanthe brightly-hued soldiers of the day, and theywere the first troops to wear an elementary formof camouflage clothing. The 60th having beenraised as the Royal American Regiment woregreen to match the forests where they had origi-

16

the powder hol'Jl under the right arm, show up clearly

nated and the 95th did the same; the BrunswickOel Jagers wore black, but this was partially tomourn for the rape of Brunswick by Napoleon,while the Ca<;adores, when not clothed by theBritish in rifle green, wore brown, perhaps theearliest use of a version of khaki.

Wellington looked to his infantry for his vic­tories and indeed initially with few guns and lesscavalry he was given little choice. Perhaps inconsequence, although in two of his greatestbattles, those of Vitoria and Salamanca, he wasthe attacker, he won his greatest renown as themaster of defence. When selecting his position fora defensive battle he selected a ridge, whereverpossible, deploying his troops below its crest andout of sight of the enemy. French commandersencountering such a position rarely saw more thana few scattered guns with small groups of lightinfantry dotting the forward slopes, who dis­couraged close reconnaissance by accurate fireat remarkably long ranges. When the French

B

came to launch their attack, their massed artillery,unable to see a true target, would be largely in­effective, while their skirmishers would fail todislodge Wellington's light infantry; then, whentheir heavy columns, groping their way un­certainly up the ridge through a swarm ofskirmishers, finally reached the crest they wouldsuddenly find in front of them a long steady scarletwall of infantry and their leading files would beblown away before they had recovered from theirsurprise. Even as late as the closing stages of theBattle of Waterloo, Napoleon's Imperial Guardthought they had broken through the British lineonly for the Foot Guards to emerge out of a corn­field, and drastically enlighten them. It isprobable that infantry have never been handledwith greater skill than under Wellington andequally that no general was better served by hisinfan try soldiers.

VteGavalryParadoxically enough, the basic organization of acavalry regiment bore a marked similarity to thatof an infantry battalion. It was commanded by alieutenant-colonel with two majors, ten captainsand twenty lieutenants or cornets under him; itconsisted of ten troops, each under a captain, andhad a war establishment of about eighty privates(the term trooper was not then used) and eightyhorses. From time to time there were minor varia­tions in the numbers, but substantially thesefigures held good for the whole period of the war.

The number of men actually present with theregiment, especially after a long period in thefield, was considerably less. In Rules and Regulationsfor the Cavalry, 1796 for instance, it was directedthat 'Each troop should be divided into twosquads when under forty, into three or more whenabove, according to the number, with an equalnumber of non-commissioned officers in each ...The squads must be as separate and distinct as

,.~ (,,~.;.•k:~;_,)r.Jv·,~~<>O"'-"

~\i,;;'::\"\l~

\-..:. .. .., ••.., r·,.\ ...,-

6th InniskilJing Dragoon officer, 1814, in review order. Theepaulette on the right shoulder is hidden but the crimsonwaist sash, a distinction of commissioned rank, is clearlyvisible. On active service overalls replaced boots andbreeches, and the ornate sabretache (the purse-like objecthanging down behind his left leg) was replaced by one ofblack leather

possible ... The squad is entirely in charge of itsown sergeant.' This seems to have relieved thejunior officers ofall ad ministrative responsibili ties.However, they were ordered to 'look in on themen at dinner hours', regrettably not so much tocheck the quality of the rations as to see that theirmen 'do not dispose of their meat for liq uor'. Inan optimistic vein the Regulations continued,'nor is any dragoon to give way to that blackguardpractice of sweari ng'. Officers too, had to preservea certain decorum and the Regulations empha­sized, 'on no account is an officer to wear his haton the back of his head'.

In some minor ways the cavalry organizationtook into account the differences of that arm fromthe infantry. The senior non-commissioned-officerin a troop was the troop quartermaster and inregimental headquarters there was a ridingmaster with rough riders under him to train horsesand men. As in the infantry there was an adjutantand a sergeant-major; the latter's duties included

17

Light cavalry pattern trooper's sabre carried by lightdragoons and hussars throughout the war; heavy dragoonscarried a straight sword

drilling the young officers and these had to payhim a guinea and a half for the privilege oflistening to his words of counsel couched, nodoubt, in traditional terms.

Cavalry regiments fell into two main categories,heavy and light. The distinction at this time hadlittle significance so far as their duties in the fieldwere concerned. Heavy cavalry might find them­selves on outpost duty, as did Le Marchant'sHeavy Cavalry Brigade during the siege ofCiudad Rodrigo, while the Light might executea fierce charge as they did at the cavalry combatat Villa-Garcia. The heavy cavalry tended to belarger men on larger horses and to carry heavierweapons, but unlike the French cuirassiers woreno body armour; in theory they were bettersui ted for shock action on the field of battle, whilethe nimbler and more agile light horsemen mightbe expected to excel at outpost duty, patrollingand the pursuit. Wellington himself paid littleattention to such niceties, using regiments asconvenient without much regard for their officialclassification.

The heavy cavalryman went into action with acut-down version of the Brown Bess musket,labelled a carbine, which has a barrel twenty-sixinches long; his main weapon was a long, heavy,badly balanced sword, according to some criticsthe worst weapon ever issued to the British Army.The light cavalryman was also armed with a car­bine, the Paget, which had an exceptionally shortbarrel, only sixteen inches, but again his mainweapon was his sabre about thirty-three incheslong and reputedly a light and handy weapon.

18

Officers carried a similar pattern sword to thatof their men, and all ranks carried pistols. It wasin their uniforms that the two types of cavalrymendiffered most distinctly. Historically, the regularcavalry had developed from regiments ofdragoonsand in origin the dragoon had been little morethan an infantryman on horseback. Marlborough,however, believed in shock action and the sword,limiting his cavalrymen to no more than three orfour rounds for their carbines in battIe, and thisview had become generally accepted. The heavycavalry regiments, still called dragoons or, moregrandiosely, dragoon guards, however, retained intheir uniform their old infantry connection, andat the beginning of the war were attired in redcoats and white breeches. The light cavalry, lightdragoons or more rarely, hussars, by now hadtotally renounced their origin. The colour of theirjackets was basically blue, but became so adornedwith wonderful and exotic additions that themodern Paris fashions would have had little tooffer the well-dressed light dragoon.

But here the differences largely ended; neitherin drills nor in composition does there appear tohave been any great distinction; however, amarked difference soon developed betweencavalry and infantry. Cavalry regiments had nobattalions or depots, and were responsible forrecruiting and training their own men; in addi­tion, with their imposing chargers and cuttingswords that could wound but seldom kill, theywere far better at controlling riotous mobs thanthe infantry with their deadlier firearms andvicious bayonets that could be used only for thefar more lethal thrust. Since the free-born Britonof the day was accustomed to voicing his viewswith no little force, the government made a habitof keeping a number of cavalry regiments in thecountry to help enforce its less popular decrees.For these reasons, cavalry regiments serving in thePeninsula normally left behind two troops to forma depot, going overseas with only eight, and latersome regiments left behind four.

When the loth Royal Hussars left England tojoin Wellington for his campaign of 1813, fourtroops under a major were sent to York to form adepot and keep an eye on the local populace,while according to its official history the regimentem barked six troops strong, with the following:

Hussars charging French cavalry. The ntetal chin-strapsshown here are unusual. The pelisses are slung over the leftshoulder to free the sword arnt, but even so it was a COntnton

lieutenant-colonels - I; majors - I; staff officers­4 (presumably these were officers in regimentalheadquarters and included the adjutant, thequartermaster, and perhaps a doctor and veterin­ary surgeon); captains - 6; subalterns - 12;

assistant adjutant - I; regimental sergeant-major- I; troop quartermasters - 2; troop sergeant­majors - 4; sergeants - 29; corporals - 24;trumpeters - 6; privates - 5 I 3; troop horses - 523.It is interesting to note that troop sergeant-majorsappear to have begun to take over from troopquartermasters.

Although the regiment had only six troops,with about 580 rank and file, it was considerablystronger than many of the eight-troop regimentsserving in the Peninsula at this time. Here thestrength of most regiments fluctuated between400 and 500; a number were considerably less.Yet in 1809 some of the cavalry regimen ts servingunder Sir John Moore had mustered as many as750 men. Even allowing for the wastage to be

criticisnt that the coats were cut too tight in the arnt. Plumesare not worn in the headdress; these were generally pre­served for the less exacting conditions ofcerentonial parades

expected on service, it seems clear that thesmaller rygiments had proved more effective inthe field.

On operations, no doubt for what must haveappeared at that time good reason, the trooporganization was almost entirely abandoned;troops worked in pairs to form squadrons underthe senior troop commanders, and, curiously, thehalf-squadron, not the troop, was the basic sub­unit for manoeuvre. Captain Neville, in histreatise on light cavalry which was largely em­bodied in the cavalry manual of I 803, put forwardthe view that thirty-six or forty-eight files (i.e.seventy-two or ninety-six men and horses) com­posed a manageable squadron. This suggests thatan eight troop regiment organized in four squad­rons was at its best with under 400 men present inthe ranks.

To adopt the operational organization troopsfirst paraded and sized; then each pair of troopscame together to form a squadron in a two-rank

19

Sabugal on the River Coa. (St Clair). A light cavalry outpost.The hussars are wearing their fur pelisses buttoned up. Adragoon in his helmet with a flowing mane sits on a log with

line with the largest men from both in the centre;when in line the men on the Ranks tended to leaninwards setting up a considerable pressure on thecentre, and for this reason the heaviest men wereplaced there to prevent them being forced out ofthe ranks like corks from bottles of champagne. Itseems unlikely that during operations this clumsyprocedure was always followed, and in anemergency squadrons must surely have fallen inas such.

The intervals to be observed within thesquadron were carefully defined. Between thefront and rear ranks there was to be a horse'slength; men in close order rode with their boottops touching; in loose files boot tops were to besix inches apart, and in open files there was aninterval of a horse's length between every man.When the squadron had been formed and the menhad checked their dressing on the centre file, theywere numbered and detailed into half-squadrons,quarter-squadrons and threes; (as in the infantry

20

two comrades wearing some strange headgear of their own.The men butchering the sheep are probably Portugueselight cavalry

the nomenclature was somewhat haphazard andsuch phrases as divisions and sub-divisions wereoccasionally used).

The numbering in threes was important. Thespace taken by a horse in the ranks was reckonedat three feet, or a third ofa horse's length. Hence ifevery three men in a rank wheeled their horsesindependently to the right, the rank would facein that direction in column of threes with ahorse's length between each three. It would thenbe in a very manageable formation, and when ithad reached its new position, on the command'front' the men could wheel to the left and, sincethere was a horse's length between each three,could resume line without falling into disorder.In a squadron both ranks would perform thismanoeuvre simultaneously, the rear rank wheel­ing up besides their opposite numbers in the frontrank and the whole squadron facing to the right orleft in a column of sixes. (The drill was in practicea little more complex than that outlined here, as it

involved men reining back.) Movement by threeswas normally used for all changes offormation. Intrue British style, when the order 'threes about'was given, in fact the squadron moved on a frontof six men.

For movement over any distance, it was recom­mended that regiments should move in column ofhalf-squadrons, or if this was impossible, by threes(i.e. sixes) or as a last resort in file or single file.The principle was that wherever feasible thelength of the regimental column should not exceedthat of the regiment in line.

As in the infantry, the main battle formationswere columns of half-squadrons or squadrons, andline. In line, owing to the peril of pressuredeveloping on the centre, an interval was pre­served between squadrons, and in an advance themen in each aligned themselves on the centre fileof their own particular squadron; the sq uadronleader himself rode a horse's length in front of hiscentre man and therefore could control the paceand direction of the whole squadron; to ensurethat the regiment preserved its line the squadronleaders of the flank squadrons aligned themselveson those in the centre, while these in turn tooktheir positions from the commanding officer whogallantly rode in the cen tre of his regiment ahorse's length in front of the rank of squadronleaders, a rather more hazardous position thanthat occupied by the infantry colonel happilyensconced six paces behind his colours. Of theremaining officers and sergean ts in the sq uadron,an officer, covered by a sergeant took post on eachof its flanks, three sergeants occupied positionson the right of quarter-squadrons, and the restmade up a serre-file, or supernumerary rank, ahorse's length behind the rear rank. The trumpeteror trumpeters, rode in the serre-file, but directlybehind the squadron leader. Commands wereinitially given by word of mouth, generallyrepeated by the appropriate call on the trumpet;the most important calls such as 'charge' or 'rally'were taken up by all the trumpeters. Bugles weresometimes used instead of trumpets, but themanual of r803 clearly thought this was a deplor­able surrender to utility. It stated of the buglehorn: 'Soundings are exactly the same as thosefor the trumpet in place of which the bugle hornmay occasionally be substituted. The trumpet is

always to be considered as the principal musicalinstrument for the sounding; it particularlybelongs to the line and the bugle horn to detachedparties. '

The main cavalry method of attack was thecharge. On this su bject the manual of r803 stated,'vVhen cavalry attack cavalry, the sq uadrons mustbe firm and compact; when they attack infantrythe files may be opened; when they attack abattery, they must not ride up in front of it, butthey must in two divisions attack on each flank,the files opened.'

'When cavalry attack infantry they should ingeneral do it in column; the squadrons of thecolumn should have at least three times as muchdistance between them as the extent of theirfront. The leading squadron, after breaking theenemy's line should move forward and form, thetwo succeeding ones should wheel outwards byhalf squadrons and charge along the line.' Theaction after a charge was important, the manualcontinues, 'In a charge of either infantry orcavalry the instant the enemy gives way the linemust again be formed and the pursuit continuedby light troops.' This was easy enough to lay down,but it was a ruling all too often forgotten in prac­tice. Time and again the British cavalry failed torally after a successful charge, galloping off in awild pursuit of their beaten enemy, only to beconfronted when horses were blown by freshFrench cavalry and their triumph to be turnedin to disas ter.

In a charge against infantry, the gallop beganabout 300 yards away to cut to a minimum thetime under fire; against cavalry, on the otherhand, the most important consideration was toarrive with reasonably fresh horses for the melee,and only the last r50 yards were covered at agallop. It is difficult to believe that two squadronsever galloped at each other in a compact mass.If they did so they would have resembled twomotorists driving along the crown of the road andcolliding with a closing speed of thirty miles anhour, and the drivers would have been in a muchhappier position than the cavalryman on hishorse. Colonel Tomkinson, who served through­out the Peninsular War in the r6th Light Dra­goons, made some illuminating comments whendescribing a skirmish:

21

Captain Belli's squadron with one of theHussars, was in advance; and the enemyhaving sent forward two or three squadrons,Major Myers attempted to oppose them infront of a defile. He waited so long and was soindecisive, and the enemy coming up so close,that he ordered the sq uad ron of the 16th tocharge. The enemy's squadron was about twicetheir strength and waited their charge.

This is the first instance I ever met with twobodies of cavalry coming into opposition, andboth standing, as invariably as I have observedit, one or the other runs away.

Our men rode up and began sabring, butwere so outnumbered that they could donothing and were obliged to retire across thedefile in confusion, the enemy having broughtup more troops to that point.

The ability to outflank an enemy was clearlyone of the keys to a successful cavalry action andthe length of front was of critical importance.The manual specified, 'Two or three squadronsin attack may divide into small bodies with 14 or

Firing from the saddle. The uniform is that of a formerperiod. The horse seems to be rearing, perhaps to register aprotest at the odd happenings over his head

22

Lieutenant-General Sir Stapleton Cotton. He is wearing theshako of a light dragoon and the epaulettes of a field officer.He must be wearing the uniform of the colonel of a regiment

16 files in each and intervals between them equalto their front, the second or reserve covering theintervals 150 yards to the rear; if only twosquadrons, the first line should be four smalltroops, the second of two again sub-divided, threecovering the intervals and one outflanking.' Theuse of the word 'troop' here illustrates the remark­ably casual atti tude to terminology typical of theperiod.

In the rugged country of the Portugueseborder and of much of Spain, the cavalry had fewopportuni ties to exert a decisive influence inbattle. Their most valuable functions were to actas the eyes and ears of the army and to screen it inmovement and at rest. Single well-mountedsentries called vedettes could observe and hangaround an enemy and gallop away if threatened.The tactics of the cavalry when patrolling or onoutpost were strikingly similar to those of thelight infantry. They worked in pairs in openorder, covering each other and using theircarbines to fire from the saddle - apart from thedifficulty of persuading their horses to stand still

The Battle ofSala01anca, 1812. Le Marchant's heavy brigadeO1aking the charge that broke the French infantry. Botlt theinfantry and cavalry uniforDls shown are those ofcere010nialparades and not service where overalls had replaced

while aiming and firing, reloading must havepresented nearly insuperable problems and onesuspects that the effect of such fire was moralrather than physical.

The standard cavalry formation was thebrigade composed of two, three or, less usually,four regiments. During the early stages of thewar Wellington formed two cavalry divisions;although these on occasion consisted of twobrigades, one heavy, one light, their organizationwas far more fluid than that of the infantry andtended to reflect the needs of a particular si tua­tion. He was plagued by incompeten~ divisionalcommanders, and from 1812 on wards discardedthe divisional organization, leaving the cavalrybrigades largely independent under the generaldirection of a single cavalry commander, GeneralSir Stapleton Cotton, who normally exercisedcontrol from army, headquarters.

breeches. In particular the cocked hat of the cavalrY01enhad proved useless on service, and until it was replaced by ahelDlet tlte troopers generally wore forage caps

For most of the war Wellington was heavilyoutnumbered in cavalry by the French; duringthe first three years he had only eight regiments,bu t towards the end of 181 J ma tters improved;during the Salamanca campaign of 1812 he hadsixteen, and used his new-found strength todecisive advantage at the Battle of Salamanca;here Le Marchant, with a Heavy CavalryBrigade, in brilliant charge shattered a totteringFrench line to turn a French reverse into utterdefeat.

The following year at Vitoria and during thebattles in the Pyrenees the country inhibited theuse oflarge bodies of horsemen. However, duringWellington's great advance through Spain to theborders of France the cavalry faithfully imposedan impenetrable screen in front of his armies andenabled him utterly to deceive the Frenchcommanders.

23

u1rtilleryThe organization of the Royal Artillery reflectedthe somewhat casual fashion in which that armhad evolved; it had a logic all its own. Gunnerswere men who fired guns; guns were tubes downwhich various types of projectiles could bestuffed to be subsequently blown to a remotedestination. The process clearly required certainspecialized skills not to be found in the infantry,but since one tube, give or take a few feet in lengthand a few inches in diameter, much resembledanother, a man who could deal with one mani­festly could deal with another. It would be a falseand expensive move, therefore, to train gunnersto deal with only one particular type of equip­ment; what was needed was a number of all-

purpose gunners capable of firing any type ofcannon that might be appropriate to the task ofthe moment.

At the beginning of the eighteenth century,when it had become clear that artillery waslikely to be a permanent feature of the battle­field, the British Army raised a Regiment ofArtillery consisting of a single battalion. The oldRoman organization of tens and centuries whichseemed to work well enough for the infantry wasobviously equally suitable for gunners. When overthe years more battalions were raised they werecomposed often companies each about a hundredstrong. These companies were expected to manany type of cannon, so there seemed little pointin issuing them with a standard number of guns,or indeed any guns at all. When the need arose abattery of guns could be drawn from the gun­park, the number and type being those deemedsuitable for the particular task. Since it might

Royal Horse Artillery changing position at speed. The gundetachments normally rode separately as outriders. Pre­sumably in this incident it has not proved possible to bring

24

forward their horses. A field officer of the Royal Foot Artil­lery seems to be enquiring about the move

I

MICHAEL ROFFE

1 General, review order, I8I42 Staff Officer, service dress, I8I43 Ensign, 9th or East Norfolk

RegiInent of Foot, service dress, I814

3

A

B

1 Field Officer, 7th Foot (RoyalFusiliers), full dress, 1813

2 Infantry Officer, Line Regiment,cold weather uniform, 1812

3 Private, 3rd or East Kent Regimentof Foot (Buffs), marching order, 1814

MICHAEL ROFFE

I Rifleman, 95th Foot (The RifleBrigade), service dress, 1811

2 Portuguese Rifleman, 5th Cacadores,campaign dress, 1811

3 Corporal, Portuguese 8th Infantry,full dress, 1810

MICHAEL ROFFE c

D

I Corporal, Grenadier Colllpany,42nd of Foot (Royal HighlandReginlent or Black Watch),service dress, 1810

II Officer, 511nd Light Infantry,service dress, 1814

3 Colour Sergeant, 11th Foot,full dress, August 1813

MICHAEL ROFFE

MICHAEL ROFFE

Private, loth (Prince of Wales's Own Royal)Regim.ent of Light Dragoons (Hussars), cam.paign dress, 1814

E

F

I Officer, 9th Light Dragoons,parade dress, 18I2

!;l Private, 3rd Dragoon Guards,service dress, 1814

3 Gunner, Royal Horse Artillery,service dress, 1810

MICHAEL ROFFE

MICHAEL ROFFE

I Officer, Marching Battalion,Royal Artillery, service dress, 1814

2 Gunner, Royal Artillery,service dress, 1810

3 Sapper, Royal Sappersand Miners, service dress, 1814

G

H

I

I Field Officer, Royal Engineers,service dress, 1811

2 Pioneer, Line RegiInent,29th Foot, service dress, 1811

3 DruID Major, 57th Foot,cerelDonial dress, 1812

3

c

prove unnecessary to move the guns it would befolly to provide any form of transport. The in­fantry humped their muskets, there seemed noreason why the gunners should not pull theirguns; if transport should be necessary, the sensibleanswer was to hire contractors for the occasion anddischarge them when the occasion was over.

It was a delightfully simple approach and onelikely to appeal strongly to those in financialauthority. The possibility that, while it mightprovide the cheapest form of artillery, the systemwas hardly likely to produce the most efficient,was only slowly and reluctantly accepted. Thefirst reform came when some astute member of theBoard of Ordnance, which controlled suchmatters, realized that invalid companies werequite fit enough to man the guns on permanentfortifications, and thus the first tentative attemptat specialization was introduced. This reform,being an economy, was relatively painless. Butthe next, the decision to discontinue the hiring ofcivilian contractors to transport guns, was anothermatter. Yet civilian transport had indisputabledisadvantages. Civilians, for some inscrutablereason of their own, were very apt to depart fromthe battle-field at the most critical moments,leaving the guns stranded or without ammunition.As these civilians were not subject to military law,the only punishment was to discharge them, aservice that they had frequently already per­formed for themselves. By the time of the Penin­sular War, however, a Corps of Royal ArtilleryDrivers had been raised, but this corps was com­pletely separate from the Royal Regiment ofArtillery and was commanded by officers fromthe Commissary. It was organized in troops fromwhich drivers and horses were allotted to theartillery companies as might be necessary. Thiswas the organization in force in the Peninsula.When a company of artillery had been allotted abattery of guns and the wherewithal to movethem, it was known as a 'Brigade of Artillery'.This term, which had a completely differentsignificance for most of the first halfof this century,may be confusing; since these brigades corres­ponded to what in modern parlance would becalled a field battery, it will, perhaps, be lessconfusing to use this title.

In the early days of the Peninsular War the

finding of the gunners from one source andtransport and guns from others had the unfortu­nate results to be expected; in particular thegunners tended to suffer from a critical shortageof transport. However wi th the passage of time theartillery companies operated for long periodswith a particular type of gun and a roughlystandardized amount of transport, but even thena company might find itself suddenly drafted toman siege guns, and the provision of horses anddrivers to make the guns mobile still had itsproblems. In 1813 Captain Cairns commandingan artillery company wrote, as quoted in theDickson papers:

We, that is our brigade [i.e. battery] and theHousehold Cavalry, arrived here on the 27th.Although marching with them we are not intheir brigade; however, as we are of theReserve, I am quite well pleased with them, aswith no superior officers of our corps being nowleft to myself to forage and arrange as I please.

I am getting my naked drivers clothed hereas well as I can. These lads were only three daysin Lisbon, when they were pushed up to theArmy and unluckily fell to my lot.

They leave England paid in advance, sellhalf their necessaries when lying at Portsmouthand the other half either at Lisbon or on theroad, the driver officers never inspecting theirkit. Thus they join a brigade perfectly naked.In my establishment of 100 drivers, I have menfrom three different Troops. I am resolved to

Royal Artillery Drivers. They wore blue jackets with redfacings and the saJIle pattern helJIlet as the Royal HorseArtillery. The non-coJIlJIlissioned-officer is in full dresswith yellow braid and velvet triJIlJIlings. The JIlan on thewagon is in undress uniform and wearing a forage cap andstable jacket. Artillery drivers carried no personal weapons

25

see that my officer of drivers, LieutenantDalton, does his duty in supplying them withnecessaries, soap and salt. That is all I allowhim to interfere with. My own officers look tothe stable duties, and inspect the drivers' kitsof their division every Saturday. The poordrivers are sadly to be pitied - considering thelabour of taking care of two horses and harnessthey are worse paid than any other troops, andwhen left to the management of their ownofficers they are luckless indeed. By being witha brigade there is some hope of instilling intothem the idea that they are soldiers.

The first part of this letter indicates anothercurious aspect of the artillery organization. At anyone time an artillery battalion might have itscompanies spread as far apart as the West Indies,Spain and Sicily. All attempts to concentratebattalions in particular regions invariably failed

. and the commanding officers, accepting withphilosophy the impossibility of visiting theircompanies, generally stayed in Woolwich, con­tenting themselves with organizing drafts andlooking after the administration of their com­panies overseas. In consequence there tended tobe no real gunner hierarchy with the armies inthe field. In operations near England, such asthat at Walcheren, a reasonable number of seniorofficers might take part, but farther afield therewas often only one senior artillery officer, perhapsa major, who acted as the Commander RoyalArtillery, and his duties rarely extended to morethan solving the many administrative problemswhich the peculiar gunner organization waslikely to produce. The artillery company com­manders were virtually independent, and asCairns's letter shows, they were probably far fromdissatisfied with their fate.

In the Peninsula the artillery initially wasofficially in charge of a Major-General, RoyalArtillery. He seldom accompanied the army inthe field, partly because his most important dutieswere administrative, partly because Wellingtonseems to have taken a dislike to the two generalswho successively occupied the post. During mostof the war he took as his artillery adviser MajorAlexander Dickson (later Major-General SirAlexander Dickson) a captain in the Royal

26

Artillery who had transferred to the Portugueseservice to obtain a step in rank. It was a fortunatechoice, and quite possibly Wellington was happyto have as his artillery adviser an officer too juniorto press on him gratuitous advice, something hedetested. During the course of the war, Dicksonwas promoted Lieutenant-Colonel and in 1813was appointed to command all the artillery in thefield. By the time of the Battle of Vitoria he hadaccumulated the nucleus of a staff and majorswere to be found on occasion co-ordinating theactivities of two or more batteries.

This lack of a gunner hierarchy, particularlyduring the early period, may have influencedWellington against using his artillery massed. Heallotted one battery semi-permanently to eachdivision and that battery rarely strayed far fromits parent formation. The reserve artillery wasgenerally minimal in strength and artillery tacticsseldom rose above the level of the battery. At thislevel the standard became remarkably high .

But although the company of Royal Foot Artil­lery in the Peninsula remained a maid-of-all-work,

Sir Alexander Dickson wearing a post-Napoleonic uniform.He has the Army gold cross with a number of Peninsularclasps

the first step in producing a battery trained andequipped for the field had already been taken. OnI January 1793 orders were issued for the forma­tion of A and B Troops Royal Horse Artillery.These Troops were designed to act with thecavalry, and, therefore, had to be highly mobile,fast into action and quick and accurate in theirshooting. They were trained almost exclusivelyin their own particular role, and their drivers,although initially drawn from the Corps of RoyalArtillery Drivers, were carried on the Troopstrength and to all intents and purposes formed anintegral part of the unit. Only officers of provenability and the pick of the recruits were posted in.As a result these troops soon established a veryhigh reputation. Since they supported the cavalry,they adopted a light cavalry style of uniform qui tedifferent from that of their comrades with theinfantry. Troops R.H.A. supported the twocavalry divisions in the Peninsula and that mostfamous of divisions, the Light Division.

In an embarkation return dated 8 June 1809quoted in Captain Duncan's History oj the RoyalArtillery, Captain Ross's Troop R.H.A. is shownas being composed as follows:

Captains 2Subalterns 3Assistant SurgeonsN.C.O.s 13TrumpetersArtificers 7Gunners 81Drivers 54

Total 162

Horses 1626-pounder guns 551- in. HowitzersAmmunition wagons 6Baggage wagons 3

This shows a troop R.H.A. at full strength.Whether horse or field, batteries were com­manded by captains with 'second captains' tounderstudy them. The light six-pounders and thehowitzer were generally drawn by teams of sixhorses, but for the wagons mules might be substi­tuted. Gunners carried sabres but the drivers

were unarmed. During the campaigns the R.H.A.fully justified their position as the right of the line,and at the Battle of Fuentes de Onoro underCaptain Ramsay, their second captain, Bull'sTroop R.H.A. performed a famous feat. TheTroop was cut off by French cavalry and wasgiven up for lost by the remainder of the army.Ramsay however, limbered up his guns andcharged the French cavalry at the gallop. Thegunners broke through the astonished Frenchhorsemen and rejoined the Army with their gunsintact.

The work of the Companies Royal Foot Ar­tillery, although less glamorous, was no less vitalto the success of British arms. Since their gunswere heavier than those of the horse artillery,these companies had rather more gunners onestablishment. In the Dickson papers a companywas shown with an authorized establishment of2 captains, 3 subalterns, 4 sergeants, 4 corporals,9 bombardiers, 120 gunners and 3 drummers,giving a total of 145 all ranks. In the field, itsstrength probably fluctuated between I 10 and130. The batte.ry was armed with five field guns,9-pounders or heavy 6-pounders, and one 5t inchhowitzer. In addition it might have allotted to itabout 100 drivers and horses and mules totallingaltogether nearly 200. Teams of eight horsesharnessed in pairs were normally used to dragthe guns, but for the ammunition and baggage(a standard field battery might have eightammunition and three baggage wagons plus atravelling forge) mules were often employed.However, the companies were far from standard­ized and would reflect in their organization theprejudices of their company commanders, or theneeds of a particular task. The drivers would havea commissary officer theoretically in charge ofthem, and being mounted and therefore unableto understand drum calls, had their own trumpeter.

The characteristics of the guns in both fieldbatteries and the Horse Artillery troops differedlittle, those in the horse artillery being merelylighter for greater speed of movement. There werethree main types of projectile, roundshot, grapeand shell. Round shot was a solid iron ball thathad an extreme effective range of about 1,200yards. It depended for its effect on the veloci t\with which it struck its target, hence field guns

27

The passage of the River Douro by Murray's Division, Illog(St Clair). In the foreground foot artillerymen have taken thebarrel of a field gun, probably a heavy six-pounder, off itscarriage preparatory to embarkation - the triangularornaments on the back of the gunners' coatees show up

needed long, heavy barrels to stand up to largecharges and impart a high muzzle velocity. Onthe other hand, since these barrels had to bemounted on robust yet light carriages that couldtravel across country unharmed and at a reason­able speed, the weight of the barrel had to beseverely limi ted; British field pieces initially onlytook a six lb. ball, not a very daunting missile, andlater a model was introduced capable of firingone of nine lb.

Roundshot, unless striking a column of troops,was comparatively harmless, but it was the onlymissile that could be used against a moving targetat ranges of over 300 yards. Under this distancegrape was far more effective. This name wasapplied indiscriminately to grapeshot itself, canis­ter and case. Grapeshot consisted of about nineiron balls sewn together in a canvas bag that

. dissolved after the rounds left the gun, and

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clearly. Behind them a light dragoon who has left his carbineon his horse is having trouble coaxing it into the boat, whileon the left an infantry sergeant, clutching his spontoon,superintends the embarkation of his men

received its title from its resemblance to an over­size bunch of grapes; it was issued only to theeighteen-pounder and twenty-four-pounder gunsof the siege train. Case and canister, as the namesimply, were metal containers filled with a hundredsmall bullets or forty large ones. The containerdisintegrated as the round left the muzzle and theshot fanned out to produce a deadly pattern ofdestruction for a distance of nearly 300 yards.

Between 300 'and 1,000 yards shells could bevery effective, but only if the target was reason­ably stationary. The common shell, as it wascalled, consisted of a hollow iron ball containinga fuze and a bursting charge. The fuze was ignitedby the explosion of the charge that propelled theshell, and if all went well, it would cause thebursting charge to explode after the shell hadlanded; fragments of the exploding shell casewould, it was hoped, strike anyone rash enough

to be standing near by. To achieve this desirableresult it was necessary that the shell should havethin walls and carry a large bursting charge, sothat the casing broke up into numerous fragmentsmovi ng wi th a lethal veloci ty; in consequence theshell was too large and too fragile to be fired froma field gun. However the shell did not need to begiven the high muzzle velocity of roundshot anda shorter, lighter piece could be used. The S1inch howitzer, the standard field piece for firingshells, although capable of accommodating a24 lb. ball, owing to its light construction andshort barrel (only 33 inches compared with 72inches for the light 6-pounder, 96 inches for theheavy, and 84 inches for the 9-pounder) couldkeep up even with the cavalry.

Since field guns could not fire shells, everybattery included a howitzer. This complicatedarrangements for ammunition, and experimentswere made with all-howitzer batteries, but theseproved too specialized to suit the dispersed wayin which Wellington generally deployed his guns.

There was an obvious need to make field gunsmore effective at ranges over 300 yards andLieutenant Shrapnel developed a shell originallycalled spherical case, but which later attainedmore fame under the name of its inventor. Hefilled his shell with bullets; now the burstingcharge had only to be strong enough to break openthe shell case and let loose the bullets, it could bemuch reduced and the walls of the shell could bethicker. Spherical case was issued to all field guns,although technical difficulties prevented its beingfully effective at that time.

In a regimental order the following proportions

A 5t-inch howitzer

---------"1

were laid down for a hundred rounds. Field gunswere to carry 60 rounds roundshot, 30 ofsphericalcase and 10 of common case; howi tzers So roundsspherical case, 10 rounds common case and 40rounds common shell. Ammunition was to becarried at the scale of 180 rounds per 6-poundergun, 116 per 9-pounder and 84 per howitzer.

In action guns were aimed by lining up thebarrel with the target, hence the gun-layer foreither field guns or howitzers had to have a clearview of his target. Range was obtained by ele­vating the barrel, but even with howitzers it wasrare to elevate it more than roO with the hori­zontal.

To load the gun, first a charge of gunpowderwas rammed down the barrel, then the missile,and finally some wadding to keep it in place. Atthe same time powder was trickled down a ventwhich led to the charge, or some combustiblematerial was inserted. When the order to fire wasgiven, a slow match or port-fire was applied tothis powder which burnt down to the charge andcaused it to explode. Immediately after firing,the gun barrel had to be sponged out to removeany burning embers that might remain and pre­maturely ignite the next charge; if for any reasona sponge was not available the gun was out ofaction. Five or six men were sufficient to load andpoint a gun but four or five more were needed toprepare the ammunition and help haul it back toits firing position, as the shock of each dischargewould cause it to recoil a few feet. Rates offire arenot known for certain. General B.P. Hughes,perhaps the best authority on the subject, calcu­lated that under battle conditions guns couldprobably fire two rounds of roundshot or three ofgrape in a minute. Dickson merely observed thatthe rate of fire for howitzers was slower than thatfor guns: it may be guessed at about three roundsin two minutes.

Besides the field artillery there were two morecategories in the Peninsula, the siege train, whichwill be considered later, and rockets. Althoughin the Peninsula no complete battery of rocketsever operated, as Wellington viewed their un­certain behaviour with considerable distaste, it isrecorded that 'Captain Lane's rocket detachmentdid good service during the crossing of the R.Adour before the battle of Orthes.'

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Wellington's handling of his artillery has some­times been called in question, yet his methodcorresponded exactly to his own particulartactical policy. Napoleon concentrated his artil­lery and signalled his attacks by massive bom­bardments. Wellington, generally fighting on thedefensive, was determined to conceal his dis­positions until the last possible moment; hetherefore spread his artillery across his front,placing the batteries under the control of hisdivisional commanders, so that it was possible forthe commander on the spot to use his guns to bestadvantage without the hampering rigidity inevit­able under a system of centralized control. Con­centrations of artillery might indeed pave theway for a successful attack, but in defence it couldresult in furnishing an easy target for the guns ofthe enemy and might rob an area ofvitally neededartillery support.

At the same time Wellington was quite com­petent to deploy his individ ual batteries to bestadvantage himself. At the battle of Salamanca

the French had a considerable superiority In

artillery, but it was the British guns that exercisedthe most influence on the battle. During theinitial attack on the French flank, they werepositioned at right angles to the infantry line ofadvance and raked the front of the Frenchcolumns with deadly effect. When later in thebattle Clause! launched a counter-attack thatachieved a considerable initial success, the Frenchinfantry found themselves advancing up a shallowvalley with the Bri tish artillery, personally postedby Wellington long before, pouring in a devas­tating cross-fire from the high ground on eitherside, a fire which contributed powerfully to theireventual repulse. It was perhaps natural for theRoyal Artillery to watch enviously Napoleon'stechnique for handling guns en masse, a tech­nique perfectly suited to the tactics he used. It didnot follow that Wellington's less ostentatious useof that arm was any less well suited to the tacticsthat at Waterloo led to the defeat of the Emperorof the French.

Badajoz. The 3rd Division takes the Castle by escalade. Abare-headed field officer, probably Major Ridge of the 5th,

30

is stepping on to the ramparts while a grenadier waves hiscomrades forward

<.Siegesand<.SappersThe organization of the Royal Artillery may haveseemed peculiar, but the organization ofthe RoyalEngineers had the distinction of being barelydiscernible. For most of the eighteenth century,like the inmates of a college at a university withfellows and dons but no undergraduates, RoyalEngineer officers were unencumbered by thepresence of soldiers. They moved in the aura of amysterious craft no lesser mortals could compre­hend, and depended on contract labour for theexecution of their designs.

However, after the capture of Gibraltar it wasrealized that contract labour might not relishrepairing fortifications while a siege was actuallyin progress, and a company of military artificerswas raised for this purpose. Later, when revo­lutionary France threatened invasion, new com­panies under Engineer officers were formed tofortify the English coastline and the name waschanged to the Corps of Royal Military Artificers.

But this corps remained distinct from the RoyalEngineers and at the time of the Peninsular WarEngineer officers still had virtually no troopsunder their command; in addition, although theywere competent enough in the art offortification,as they showed when constructing the Lines ofTorres Vedras, they had no experience and littleknowledge of how to conduct a siege. Since siegeswere considered pre-eminently the province of theEngineer assisted by the Artilleryman, beingclearly too complicated for the ordinary armyofficer to understand, the inexperience of theengineers, and above all the lack of trainedengineer units was to cost the Peninsular Armyvery dear. The tragedy was the greater in thatduring the eighteenth century an elaborate ritualhad developed by which a siege, if the attackershad sufficient men and siege guns, became largelya formal and relatively bloodless exercise inexcavation and mathematics. General Jones, whoas a young engineer officer was present at allWellington's major sieges, has described theaccepted procedure: the besiegers broke groundabout 700 yards from the ramparts of the fortress:

This is effected by secretly approaching theplace in the night with a body of men carryingentrenching tools and the remainder armed.The former dig a trench in the ground parallelto the fortifications to be attacked, whilst thosewi th arms remain in readiness to protect thoseat work should the garrison sally out. Duringthe night this trench is made of sufficient extentto cover from the missiles of the place thenumber of men requisite to cope with thegarrison ... This trench is afterwards progress­ively widened and deepened till it forms acovered road called a parallel, and along thisroad guns, wagons and men can securely moveequally sheltered from the view and the missilesof the garrison. Batteries of guns and mortarsare then constructed on the side of the roadnext the garrison and in a short time bysuperiority of fire silence all those [enemy guns]which bear on the works of the attack.

The procedure was continued at distances pro­gressively nearer the enemy and from about 500

yards onwards heavy guns using groundshotwould start to batter a gap, called a breach, in theramparts ofthe fortress. While the guns demolisheda selected section of the wall the mortars had animportant task to perform. They resembledstocky wide-mouthed howitzers with barrelspermanently set at an angle of forty-five degrees:their role was to lob large bombs into or over thefixed defences of the enemy subduing their fireand enabling the construction of the parallels andthe covered road to proceed until the coveredroad led into the breach itself. At this juncture itwas customary for the garrison to admit defeatand walk out with the 'honours of war'. Ifproperly carried out, time and gunpowder wereconsumed rather than lives.

The main difficulty arose when the approachescame within 300 yards of the enemy ramparts.Jones continues:

Then the work becomes truly hazardous andcan only be performed by selected brave menwho have acquired a difficult and most dan­gerous art called sapping from which theythemselves are styled sappers. An indispensableauxiliary to the sapper is the miner, the exercise

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of whose art requires an even greater degree ofskill, courage, and cond uct, than that of hisprincipal. The duty of the miner at a siege is toaccompany the sapper, to listen for and dis­cover the enemy's miner at work underground,and prevent his blowing up the head of theroad either by sinking down and meeting him,when a subterranean conflict ensues, or byrunning a gallery close to his opponent andforcing him to quit his work by means ofsuffocating compositions and a thousand artsof chicanery, the knowledge of which he hasacquired from experience. Sappers would beunable of themselves, without the aid of skilfulminers, to execute that part of the covered roadforming the descent into the ditch, and invarious other portions of the road, the assistanceof the miner is indispensable to the sapper;indeed without their joint labours and steadyco-operation no besieger's approaches ever

reached the walls of a fortress. A siege, scien­tifically prosecuted, though it calls for thegreatest personal bravery, the greatest exertionand extraordinary labour in all employed, isbeautifully ceqain in its progress and result.

Unhappily this was never true of the Bri tishsieges in the Peninsula. Wellington had neitherthe trained sappers to accomplish the final stagesof the siege, nor sufficient guns to silence those ofthe enemy; he always lacked time. In consequencehe was forced to storm imperfectly blastedbreaches from too far away. Even if he wassuccessful the cost of life, as at Badajoz, could beappalling, while he frequently risked a bloodyrepulse, as at Burgos and San Sebastian.

The number of trained engineers at his siegesis revealing. At the unsuccessful attempt onBadajoz in 181 I he had seventeen engineerofficers distributed at two per brigade, excluding

The siege of Ciudad Rodrigo. On 19 January 181:.1 the French the working party are seen putting up a stout resistancegarrison made a sally while the covering troops were being with anything that came to handrelieved, and nearly captured the breaching batteries. Here

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The Kurnool Mortar

the commander in charge of the siege. He hadbesides twenty-five men of the Royal Corps ofMilitary Artificers who were no more than store­keepers responsible for the engineer park and theissue of engineer stores. He formed an ad hocengineer unit by calling in forty-eight carpentersand forty-eight miners from his infan try battalions.At the sieges of Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz in1812 his engineer resources were much the sameand he supplemented them with twelve officersand 180 men culled again from the infantry, butthese were no substitute for properly trained men.

After the atrocious number of casualties hesuffered at the storm of Badajoz, he wrote homebitterly complaining of the lack of trainedsappers, and Horse Guards responded by creatingthe Royal Corps of Sappers and Miners. At thesiege of San Sebastian he had 105 rank and filefrom the newly-formed corps, but their numberswere quite inadequate and the fortress fell onlyafter the second attempt at a storm.

Guns were the other half of the siege equation.Siege guns were heavy and difficult to move,requiring long trains of oxen if they travelled by

An artillery officer personally lays a siege gun while twoothers stand ready to observe the fall of shot. The artillery­man with the handspike wears two fringed epaulettes and istherefore a corporal (bombardiers, equivalent to the modern

lance corporal, wore only one fringe on the right shoulder).Chevrons, although officially adopted by the Royal Artilleryin 1802 to conform with the infantry, were not actually wornuntil 1813

33

road. The siege train sent out from England forthe siege of Ciudad Rodrigo is fairly typical. Jonesquotes this as being:

24-pounders iron 3218-pounders " 410 inch mortars iron 85! inch mortars" 205! inch mortars brass 108 inch howi tzers" 2However, for various reasons only thirty-eight

of these were actually used at the siege and to manthem there were 17 I Bri tish gunners and 371Portuguese, giving a total of 542 non-com­missioned-officers and men; of these, Jones noted,'85 men over two reliefs for laboratory andmagazine duties and escorts and to replacecasualties'. The actual gun detachments wereonly six men strong; this may seem strangelysmall, but the guns were aimed with a deliberationthat was almost pedantic, and care had to be

taken to avoid overheating the barrels; as a resultrates offire as compared with field guns were slow.At San Sebastian a breaching battery of ten gunsfired 350 rounds per gun over a period of 15thours, giving an overall average of a little morethan one round per gun every three minutes.J ones said of this, 'such a rate of firing wasprobably never equalled at any siege'.

As regards supplies and the movement of storesthere was a small Bri tish uni t, 'the Royal WaggonTrain', but for most of his transport Wellingtonhad to depend on locally engaged Spanishbullock carts and pack mules, and for rations onthe local purchases of his commissary officers.Medical arrangements were rudimentary. Everyregiment had its own surgeon, but there were noambulances or field hospitals, and the sick andwounded were cared for, so far as they were caredfor at all, in improvised hospitals set up atnearby towns.

The Royal Waggon Train. The coatee was blue with redfacings and the cut of the jacket resem.bled that of theartillery drivers

34

GonclusionIt can be said with justice that despite its manyanomalies the Peninsular Army under Welling­ton was probably one of the finest that the worldhas known. Clausewitz suggested that as a warprogressed the best men in the armies engagedbecame casualties resulting in a general levellingof standards. This process almost certainly hap­pened to the Napoleonic armies, but Wellingtonwas always careful of the lives of his men, and inthe later stages of the war he and his armytogether merited the somewhat abused title,invincible. He himself remarked that if he hadhad his old Peninsular Army under him atWaterloo, instead of the astonishing miscellanyof nationalities with which he was presented, theissue would never have been in doubt and thewhole affair ended in three hours. Finally, a pointnot to be forgotten, one third of that magnificentarmy was Portuguese, and when he came toconfront Napoleon in Belgium, he tried to havesome of his veteran Portuguese regiments sent tohim, but he appealed in vain.

T'he'PlatesA I General, review order, 1814The 'loops' (the technical term for the long, falsebutton-holes) on the lapels, cuffs and tails of thecoatee were spaced evenly for generals, in threesfor lieutenant-generals, and in pairs for major­generals. Two gold epaulettes were worn until181 I, when they were replaced by a gold aiguil­lette on the left shoulder. The cocked hat andfeather were worn as shown in review order, buton active service a lower version was worn fore­and-aft for greater convenience.

A2 Sta.ffOfficer, service dress, 1814

This officer is wearing the uniform of an assistantadjutant-general or an assistant quarter-master­general. The embroidered loops were distinctiveof all staff officers below general rank. They werein silver for the A and Qstaff, and gold for aides­de-camp. Deputy assistants and brigade majorsalso wore silver lace, with only one epaulette,worn on the right shoulder by infantry and on theleft by cavalry. Brigade majors were usuallycaptains in rank, but those who were regimentalmajors did not wear the two epaulettes of a majorwhen in staff pattern uniform, as they would thenhave been wearing the uniform of the senior gradeposts of assistant adjutant- or quarter-master­general.

A] Ensign, 9th or East Norfolk Regiment if Foot,service dress, 1814

The ensign was the junior commissioned rank inthe infantry, corresponding to the cornet ofcavalry and the second lieutenant of artillery. Hewears the so-called 'Belgic' shako, officiallyadopted in 1812; earlier pattern 'stovepipe'shakos remained in use until stocks were exhausted,however. The double-breasted coatee came intouse at the turn of the century. The tails, originallylong as in a civilian tail-coat, were graduallyshortened for convenience. The coatee could beworn buttoned up, but usually the top threebuttons were left undone and the lapels turnedback to reveal the same facing colour as on thecollar and cuffs. The ground of the RegimentalColour he carries is of the same facing colour.

B 1 Field Officer, 7th Foot (Royal Fusiliers), fulldress, 181]

Wings were worn on the shoulders by all ranks ofthe grenadier and light companies of infantrybattalions, and by all companies of light infantryand fusilier regiments. The Royal Fusiliers haveblue facings, a distinction of all 'Royal' regiments.Their fur 'grenadier' caps, and grenade skirtornaments, were worn to mark the original con­nection of the Fusiliers with the artillery; theywere formed to escort the artillery, being armedwith the then new flintlock fusil. Field officers atthis time wore two epaulettes, but companyofficers had one on the right shoulder only.

35

Grenadier and light company officers wore twolace wings, as did all officers of fusilier and lightinfantry regiments. Field officers of these regi­ments wore small epaulettes over their wings.

B2 lrifantry Officer, Line Regiment, cold weatheruniform, 1812

The stovepipe shako is protected by an oilskincover wi th a flap at the neck. Other types of head­dress, including the helmets of the cavalry, hadsimilar covers adapted to their shape. Thegreatcoat is the approved dismounted version(although some officers had shorter, fur-trimmedcoats, while others had very long patterns reachingalmost to the ground). The crimson waist sashwas the distinction of an officer, tied on the leftby cavalry and all field officers, and on the rightby dismounted and all company officers. Thegorget was worn by officers of the battalion com­panies when on duty, attached to the collar of the

coatee by a ribbon of the facing colour. Lightinfantry officers wore curved swords, as did mostfield officers; the remainder carried a narrow,straight sword.

B3 Private, 3rd or East Kent Regiment ifFoot (Buffs),marching order, 1814

The 3rd of Foot took their ancient nickname fromthe buff facings of their coats. The 'Belgic' shakoshown here was made of felt, and the plume wascarried on the left-hand side to avoid confusionwith the French when viewed from a distance.Grenadier companies had a white plume, lightcompanies a green one, and the battalion com­panies the national colours of white and red. Greytrousers and spat gai ters were officially sanctionedfor active service in 181 I, replacing the whitebreeches and black gaiters previously worn. Theshade of grey depended on the quality of materialand the effects of weathering.

The Battle of Fuentes de Onoro, 5 May 1811 (St Clair). Theregimental surgeons, wearing the cocked hat of battalionstaff officers, have set up a regimental dressing station to

36

which stretcher-bearers are carrying a wounded man on animprovised stretcher. The musicians in a regiment werenorn>ally trained to perform this duty

CI Rifleman, 95th Foot (The Rifle Brigade), serVlcedress, 1811

The dark green uniform worn by the 95th, and bythe rifle companies and 6th Battalion of the 60thFoot. This was in imitation of the corps of sharp­shooters recruited from the huntsmen or jagersof the German forests, who wore on militaryservice the same traditional and practical greenclothing that they wore in their peacetime occupa­tion. (Another German-imported custom was themoustache, worn at this time only by riflemenand Hussars, whose style of uniform was alsocopied from the Continent.) Officers of Rifleswore a uniform based on that of the Hussars, witha braided jacket, fur-trimmed pelisse, curvedsword, barrelled waist sash, and tasselled Hessianboots. Rifle regiments, like Fusiliers, eventuallysaw the rest of the army equipped with their ownspecial weapon; but, at this time, they alone werearmed with the muzzle-loading Baker rifle.Tactically, they operated in the same way as thelight infantry. The black collar, cuffs andshoulder-straps outlined in white braid werepeculiar to the 95th, the 60th wearing red facings.Note the special black rifleman's equipment, withits distinctive silver 'snake' belt-buckle; the cordfastened to the cross-belt of the cartridge pouchsupported a flask of fine-grain powder, used forloading and priming the rifle when there wasleisure to do so. At other times the normal paper­wrapped cartridge is thought to have been used.Note also the brass-hilted Baker rifle sword­bayonet.

C2 Portuguese Rifleman, 5th Cayadores, campaign dress,1811

The Portuguese army was completely re-organ­ized and trained from 1808 by Bri tish officers andN.C.O.s, under the supreme command ofWilliamBeresford. They soon became extremely reliabletroops, capable of operating as a matter of course"in mixed divisions with British Line formations.The Ca<;adores were the light troops, equivalentto British Riflemen, French Chasseurs a Pied andGermanJagers. Some were armed with the Bakerrifle, others with muskets. The basic brown uni­form had different coloured facings and decora­tions according to unit, and exact cut seems tohave varied, according to surviving illustrations of

the period. This figure is based on a reconstructionin the Lisbon Military Museum.

C3 Corporal, Portuguese 8th lrifantry, full dress, 1810Al though the Portuguese conformed in generalterms with British patterns of uniform and were,in fact, supplied with them largely from the loomsand mills of northern England, they kept theirown particular distinctions - notably the bluecoatees ofthe infantry, and the distinctively shapedshoulder-straps. Grey trousers, in the Britishstyle, were often worn on active service, althoughthe uniform illustrated officially included bluebreeches and high black gai ters (see C2). Therank distinction of the Cabo or corporal is thedouble gold stripe around the cuff, and the sabrewith yellow or gold sword-knot. The colours ofcollar, cuffs, and piping varied according toregiment; they were dark blue, yellow, and redrespectively for this uni t, the 8th (Castello deVide) Line Infantry. Light companies wore thesame uniform with a brass cor-de-chasse replacingthe national arms on the shako, and a greenfringe on the outer edge of the shoulder-straps.

D I Corporal, Grenadier Company, 42nd ofFoot (RoyalHighland Regiment or Black Watch), service dress,18lO

The Highlanders wore many distinctions of uni­form based on their national dress, but otherwiseconformed to the rest of the army. Thus thecorporal illustrated has two chevrons, and wearsthe white hackle and wings of the grenadier com­pany. The 42nd had the privilege of wearing redplumes, so their grenadiers had white with redtips. The dark blue facings identify a 'Royal'regiment. The diamond-ended or 'bastion' loopswere worn by several units, including the RoyalArtillery and Royal Sappers and Miners. Thefeather bonnet could be fitted with a detachablepeak, like that of a shako, for active service.Officers of Highland regiments carried a Scottishbroadsword, and mounted officers wore tartantrews and a plaid. Officers and sergeants of High­land regiments wore their sashes over the leftshoulder. (For further details, see the Men-At­Arms title The Black Watch.)

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D2 Officer, 52nd Light Infantry, service dress, 1814Light infantry regiments were dressed andequipped in much the same way as the lightinfantry companies of Line battalions. Thus theywore shoulder wings, and the green plume, andthe officers carried curved swords and did notwear the gorget. The stovepipe shako continuedin service with the light and rifle regiments whenthe rest of the infantry adopted the Belgic style,and remained the headgear of these eli te corpsuntil 1816. The sergeants carried light musketsinstead of spontoons, and both sergeants andofficers used whistles to signal orders in the field.These were carried attached to the crossbelt bya metal chain.

D3 Colour Sergeant, lIth Foot,full dress, August 18/3The rank of colour sergeant was introduced inJuly 1813. There was only one to each company,and the appointment, intended to improve thecareer structure of the non-commissioned ranks(always a pet reform of the Duke of Wellington)corresponded to that of the modern companysergeant-major. The badge of rank was worn onthe upper right arm: a crown above a UnionFlag, below which were two crossed swords, andbelow this again a single chevron. The threechevrons of a sergeant were worn on the left arm.N.C.O.s wore chevrons on both arms, with a gapof about half an inch between them; corporalswore two, sergeants three, and sergeant-majors(corresponding to the modern regimental sergeant­major) four. Sergeants wore scarlet coats likethose of officers, instead' of the madder-red ofcorporals and privates. Their distinctive weaponwas the spontoon or short pike; in general usagethis continued to be referred to as a halberd,although the true halberd - a pike with an axe­head - had been replaced by the spontoon in theI 790s. Additionally, sergeants were armed witha sword of the same type as that carried by theirofficers; and, like them, wore a crimson waistsash, although sergeants' sashes had a centralstripe of the regimental facing colour.

E Private, IOth (Prince of Wales's Own Royal)Regiment of Light Dragoons (Hussars) campaigndress, 1814

Originally hussars were a branch of light cavalry

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raised from the half-wild mounted herdsmen ofthe Hungarian plains; and a number ofdistinctiveitems of dress, evolved in accordance with localfashion and working conditions, were later takenup by military tailors and adapted into moreformal styles. The braided waistcoat became thelaced hussar jacket; the wolf-skin worn aroundthe shoulders as protection against the weatherbecame the fur-trimmed pelisse; the fur cap witha long 'night-cap' bag became the fur busby witha flat bag hanging down one side; and the cordsworn around the waist became a corded goldsash clasped together with crimson 'barrels' orhoops. The gradual adoption of these items bysome regiments of British Light Dragoons wasrecognized in 1805, when the 7th, loth and 15thregiments were permitted to add the suffix'Hussar' to their title. The 18th were convertedin 1807. Despite their flamboyant uniforms andcontinental moustaches, their tactical employ­ment remained identical to that of conventionalLight Dragoons. Note that this trooper is wearinghis pelisse over his laced jacket for warmth.Leather trouser cuffs were not uncommon amongboth cavalry and dismounted troops in the field,and leather inserts on the inside of the leg werenormal for the mounted branches.

FI Officer, 9th Light Dragoons, parade dress, /8/2Most of the British Army's light cavalry work ­reconnaissance and patrolling - was done by theLight Dragoons. The uniform illustrated wasintroduced in 181 I and was in fact less functionalthan that worn previously: the bell-topped shakoso closely resembled that already in use by theFrench light cavalry that the possibility of mis­takes under campaign condi tions was considerable.The coatee had short tails reaching to the saddle,and the lapels were usually worn buttoned backto give the effect of a plastron or cloth breast­plate. When worn in this way they were buttonedback all the way down to the waist, and the coateewas fastened in the centre with hooks and eyes.The cap lines were to prevent the shako being lostwhile galloping, and terminated in tassels and'flounders' or knots of cord, plaited in the shapeof the flat fish whose name they borrowed.

F2 Private, 3rd Dragoon Guards, service dress, IBI4Until 181 I British heavy cavalry (the Life Guards,the Royal Horse Guards, Dragoon Guards andDragoons) wore the large cocked hat, long-tailedcoatees with looped button-holes on the chest,cuffs and collar, white breeches and high boots.However, regiments on active service had gener­ally worn various types of forage caps as head­dress; and overalls, buttoned over boots andbreeches, were common for some years before thispoint, when they were officially sanctioned for allmounted personnel on active service. For paradesand reviews boots and white breeches remainedthe rule for all mounted officers and cavalrymen.The 181 I reforms included a new heavycavalry coatee without loops, and fastened downthe middle with hooks and eyes. Dragoons hadpointed cuffs, Dragoon Guards square ones.Heavy gauntlets were worn. The metal helmet,resembling the Romanesque patterns used byFrench cavalry formations, had a bearskin crestcurling forward for the Household Cavalry, anda flowing horsehair tail in the Line Cavalry. Thebrass chin-scales were not entirely decorative, asthey gave a degree of protection from horizontalcuts to the throat and face.

F3 Gunner, Royal Horse Artillery, service dress, IBIOThe Horse Artillery continued to wear this uni­form - based on that of the Light Dragoons before181 I - until after the Napoleonic Wars. The shelljacket was in the artillery colours of blue with redfacing and gold lace, and the black helmet withthe fur crest also bore the artilleryman's whiteplume. The numerous rows of loops were a LightDragoon characteristic before the adoption of thecoatee. Officers of the R.H.A. wore a hussar-typepelisse trimmed with brown fur, and all rankswore the sabretache, or wallet, when this wasintroduced into the cavalry in 181 I.

GI Officer, Marching Battalion, Royal Artillery,service dress, I B14

The Royal Artillery at this time conformed toinfantry patterns of dress in most respects; themajor difference was that they traditionally woreblue coats, as servants of the Board of Ordnance,rather than red, as soldiers of the monarch. Theywore the white plume of grenadiers.

G2 Gunner, Royal Artillery, service dress, IBwThe gunner wore the infantryman's stovepipeshako until 1812, when both arms adopted theBelgic pattern. The diamond-ended or 'bastion'loops were worn by all Ordnance Corps, as wellas by a few infantry regiments. The pouch beltcarried a small hammer and prickers, and the redcord carried a powder flask for priming. Thesword bayonet was the most common personalweapon carried by the gunners of field batteries;one or two light muskets were carried on thelimber for use in emergencies or by sentries.Gunners of garrison batteries carried musketsand infantry equipment, to defend their guns ifthe enemy came too close for the fixed armamentto bear on them.

G3 Sapper, Royal Sappers and Miners, servzce dress,IBI4

This sapper wears ordinary infantry pattern uni­form, with the white plume and bastion loops ofan Ordnance Corps. The red coatee with bluefacings came into use in 1813; prior to this, thearmy's few sapper units had worn a blue coateesimilar to the artillery pattern, with black facings.The change to red was ordered to make thesappers less conspicuous when serving withinfantry working parties.

HI Field Officer, Royal Engineers, service dress, IBI IThe Royal Engineers were at this time an all­officer corps, selected from those cadets who camehighest in the final order of merit at the RoyalMilitary Academy, Woolwich. Engineer andartillery commissions could not be purchased, butdepended on completing the R.M.A. course. Theywere therefore a type of specialist staff officer, andwore the cocked hat rather than the shako.

H2 Pioneer, Line Regiment, 29th Foot, service dress,IBIl

The pioneers of the infantry provided localengineer support, obstacle clearance, and so forth.The grenadier cap could be worn with or withouta peak, and with several minor variations ofshape and size. The other distinctions of appear­ance were the felling axe, the leather apron, andthe beard - in an otherwise clean-shaven army.

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H] Drum Major, 57th Foot, ceremonial dress, 1812

The drum-major illustrates the widespread - andinternational - convention by which trumpeters,drummers and bandsmen wore the colours of theirregiment reversed; i.e., if the regiment had redcoats faced with yellow, the musicians woreyellow coats faced with red. Drummers and bandsof marching battalions wore shoulder wings (asthey still do) and heavily laced coatees. Thetrumpeters of cavalry units wore especiallyornate uniforms, carrying on the traditions of theheralds of chivalry. Musicians usually wore the

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normal headdress of the company or regiment towhich they belonged with various embellishments,except for the drum-major, who was distinguishedby a feathered cocked hat. He wears the infantrysergeant's sword and sash, and a baldric, richlylaced, bearing two miniature drum-sticks. Thebrilliant uniforms of trumpeters and drummersnot only looked impressive on parade but fulfilleda useful tactical purpose; it was important for anofficer to be able to pick them out quickly tosound field calls in battle.

Men-at-Arms Series ~ .'

Each title in this series gives a brief history of a famous fighting unit, with afull description of its dress and accoutrements, illustrated with eight colorplates and many drawings and photographs. Collectors of militaria, wargames enthusiasts, historians and amateur military strategists will find in theseworks a wealth of enriching background material that will add to their know­ledge of this fascinatjng subject.

MEN-AT-ARMS SERIESBLUCHER'S ARMY Peter YoungFRENCH FOREIGN LEGION Martin WindrowGEORGE WASHINGTON'S ARMY Peter YoungTHE IRON BRIGADE John SelbyJAPANESE ARMY OF WORLD WAR II Philip WarnerLUFTWAFFE AIRBORNE AND FIELD UNITS Martin WindrowTHE SOVIET ARMY Albert Seaton

;, THE RUSSIAN ARMY OF THE NAPOLEONIC WARS Albert SeatonUNITED STATES MARINE CORPS John SelbyWAFFEN SS Martin WindrowWELLINGTON'S PENINSULAR ARMY James Lawford

LIEUTENANT-COLONEL J. P. LAWFORD was commissioned into theIndian Army in 1937 and the following year joined the 1st Battalion, the16th Punjab Regiment. He served with this regiment until the disbandmentof the old Indian Army in 1947, and then transferred to the Royal Artilleryuntil his retirement in 1961. He is now a Senior Lecturer at the Royal MilitaryAcademy Sandhurst. Among his published works, Colonel Lawford hasedited a history of the 16th Punjab Regiment, co-edited History of the BritishAmry, and wrote The 30th Punjabis for the Men-at-Arms Series.

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