Osmeña, Jr. V. Pendatun, et al

Embed Size (px)

Citation preview

  • 7/28/2019 Osmea, Jr. V. Pendatun, et al.

    1/2

    Osmea, Jr. V. Pendatun, et al.

    Justice Bengzon

    Facts:

    -In a privilege speech delivered before the House on June 23, 1960, Congressman

    Osmea made the serious imputations of bribery against the President

    -A special committee, composed of fifteen members of the HoR, was formed to

    investigate the truth of Osmeas charges (House Resolution 59). The resolution

    also summoned him to appear before the HoR committee and substantiate his

    charges.

    -Failing to substantiate evidence, Osmea was found guilty of serious disorderly

    behaviour. House Resolution 175 was issued on July 18, 1960 suspending him

    from office for fifteen months.

    -Petitioner (Osmea, Jr.) argues that:

    a. the Constitution gave him complete parliamentary immunity; he ought

    not to be questioned

    b. his speech is not a disorderly behaviour which is punishable

    c. Supposing he could be questioned, the House lost power to do so

    because it had taken up other business before approving house Resolution 59.

    d. House has no power to suspend one of its members

    ISSUES.

    1) WON petitioner has absolute parliamentary immunity as provided by the

    Constitution-the petitioner has no absolute parliamentary immunity

    -while parliamentary immunity is a fundamental privilege cherished in

    the legislative assembly, it is not absolute.

    -parliamentary immunity does not protect him from responsibility before

    the legislative body whenever his words or conduct are considered by the latter

    disorderly or unbecoming a member thereof

    -in the past, members of the Parliamentary or Congress had undergone

    imprisonment, suspension or expulsion for unparliamentary conduct.

    2) WON petitioners action constitute disorderly conduct

    -Only the House is the judge of what constitutes disorderly behaviour.

    -This Court fastidiously observes the separation of power.

    3) WON House lost the power to question the petitioner because it entertained

    other business matters before approving House Resolution 59

    -No, it did not.

    -The rule limiting the period for the imposition of a penalty for a speech

    to the day it was made, was merely one of procedure.

    -mere failure to conform to parliamentary usage will not invalidate an

    action taken by a deliberate body when the requisite number of members has

    agreed to a particular measure.

  • 7/28/2019 Osmea, Jr. V. Pendatun, et al.

    2/2

    -Resolution 59 was unanimously approved by the House and such

    approval amounted to the suspension of house rules, which according to the

    standard parliamentary practice may be done by a unanimous consent.

    4) WON House has power to suspend its members-While under the Jones Law, the Senate had no power to suspend

    appointive members (Alejandrino V. Quezon), at present, Congress has the

    inherent legislative prerogative suspension which the Constitution did not

    impair.

    Justice Reyes Dissent

    1. The Congressman, even before the resolution was adopted (after 15 days)had ceased to be answerable for the words uttered by him. Hence, to

    divest him of the immunity through the resolution was against the ex post

    facto legislation. He is being subjected to a punishment to which he was

    formerly not amenable.

    2. Whatever liability petitioner has incurred was extinguished when theHouse thereafter considered other business. Under the Philippine HoR

    rules, the immunity becomes absolute if other debate or business has

    taken place before the motion for censure is made.

    3. Court must decide on the unconstitutionality and nullity of questionedresolutions and of all actions that has been taken in pursuance thereof.

    Justice Labrador Dissent1. The fact that no action was promptly taken after petitioners speech,

    except to have some parts deleted, shows that the members of the House

    did not consider his speech a disorderly conduct.

    2. The imposition of penalty is not merely a rule of procedure. It is alimitation of the time in which the House may take punitive action against

    an offending member; it is a limitation on the liability to punishment. The

    rules is substantive, not merely a procedural principle, and may not be

    ignored when invoked.