Organizational Culture Change at a Military College from an Attritional/Adversarial Model to a Developmental Model

iii

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE AT A MILITARY COLLEGE FROM AN

ATTRITIONAL/ADVERSARIAL MODEL TO A DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL

Kevin Casey Dopf

A DISSERTATION

in

Higher Education Management

Presented to the Faculties of the University of Pennsylvania

in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the

Degree of Doctor of Education

2014

Supervisor of Dissertation: _____________________________________________ Lawrence Moneta, Adjunct Professor of Education

Dean, Graduate School of Education:

_____________________________________________ Andrew C. Porter, Dean and Professor

Dissertation Committee:

Lawrence Moneta, Adjunct Professor of Education

John Mathew Hartley, Associate Professor of Education

Kevin J. Dougherty, Adjunct Professor of Political Science, The Citadel

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ABSTRACT

ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE AT A M ILITARY COLLEGE FROM

AN ATTRITIONAL/ADVERSARIAL MODEL TO A DEVELOPMENTAL MODEL

Kevin Casey Dopf

Lawrence Moneta, Ed.D.

Military colleges have various points of commonality, such as some type of

“fourth class system,” which trains and indoctrinates new cadets and offers upper class

cadets leadership opportunities. Certain problems have accompanied these fourth class

systems, including physical and mental abuses of freshmen (hazing), an unproductive

first year experience that leads to high attrition and inferior preparation for future

collegiate demands, and the perpetuation of leadership techniques that are increasingly

inappropriate in the post-graduation environment. These challenges are inherent in the

attritional/adversarial model commonly associated with traditional military colleges. An

alternative is a developmental model, which fosters a positive environment, promotes

teamwork, and develops freshmen while maintaining a balance between caring for them

and ensuring that they meet the standards of followers. Various military colleges have

attempted to address the fourth class system through study and reform. To explore the

process of organizational culture change from an attritional/adversarial model to a

development model at military colleges, this research qualitatively examines two cases

studies – West Point and The Citadel. The assumption of this research is that an

organizational change model, such as the one John Kotter describes in Leading Change,

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explains successful organizational culture change at a military college. If this is valid,

there should be a relationship between West Point’s adherence to an organizational

change model and its successful transition from an attritional/adversarial system to a

developmental one. Similarly, there should be a relationship between The Citadel’s

incomplete adherence to an organizational change model and its incomplete transition.

Analysis of this research suggests that there is a relationship between West Point’s

adherence to Kotter’s organizational change model and its successful transition.

Likewise, it suggests that there is a relationship between The Citadel’s incomplete

adherence to Kotter’s organizational change model and its incomplete transition. The

conclusion is that adherence to an organizational change theory is essential when

attempting an organizational culture change at a military college.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 1

Statement of the Problem 1

Research Questions 4

Assumptions 4

Structure 5

CHAPTER TWO: REVIEW OF L ITERATURE 8

Student Development and the First Year Experience 8

The First Year Experience at a Traditional Military College 13

Fourth Class Culture Change at West Point and The Citadel 18

Looking at Organizational Culture Change Through the Prism

of Organizational Change Theory 23

Summary and Applications 26

CHAPTER THREE: METHODOLOGY 28

Overview 28

Rationale 30

Design 31

Data Collection 32

Instruments of Data Collection 32

Study Participants 33

Data Analysis 34

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Trustworthiness 35

Expertise and Background of the Researcher 36

Ethical Considerations 36

Limitations of the Study 37

CHAPTER FOUR: CASE STUDY OF WEST POINT ’S FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM :

SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE 38

Call for Organizational Culture Change 38

Table 4.1: West Point Governance Organizational Structure 39

Historical Incremental Change 39

1976 to 1985: Enabling Change 41

Organizational Culture Change Inception 44

Facilitating a Leadership Development Model 46

Tactical Officer Education System 47

Cadet Schedule Modification 47

Establishing a Leadership Integration Team 49

Cadet Leadership Development System (CLDS) 49

Table 4.2: Cadet Development Under the Fourth Class System 51

Table 4.3: Cadet Development Under CLDS 52

Scrambling vs. the Cohort Model 55

Leadership Development Master’s Degree 56

Adjustments for the Fourth Class 58

Leadership Change and Preserving Organizational Culture Change 61

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Major Strides in West Point’s Organizational Culture Change 61

Sustaining Organizational Culture Change 62

Effectiveness of Organizational Culture Change for West Point

and the Army 65

Resistance to Organizational Culture Change 67

A Lengthy Path to Full Implementation 69

Resources Needed for Organizational Culture Change 69

Leaders Leading Organizational Culture Change 70

Table 4.4: Changes in Values and Norms 71

CHAPTER FIVE : CASE STUDY OF THE CITADEL ’S FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM :

ATTEMPTING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE 72

Call for Organizational Culture Change 72

1979-1997: Preserving the Status Quo 74

1997-2004: Enabling Change 79

2004-2006: Marching in Place 85

2006-Present: Incremental Change 86

Table 5.1: Organizational Chart for the Krause Center 89

Table 5.2: Timeline for Leadership Development 91

New Proposals Receive Little Traction 95

Resistance to Organizational Culture Change 97

Table 5.3: The Citadel’s Governance Organizational Structure 98

Recognizing That Change is Still Needed 101

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CHAPTER SIX : ANALYSIS 102

Introduction 102

Kotter’s Eight Stage Change Process 104

Stage 1: Establishing a Sense of Urgency 104

Analysis of Stage 1 105

Stage 2: Creating the Guiding Coalition 107


Stage 3: Developing a Vision and Strategy 110


Stage 4: Communicating the Change Vision 112


Stage 5: Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action 114


Stage 6: Generating Short-Term Wins 116


Stage 7: Consolidating Gains and Producing More Gains 119


Stage 8: Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture 121


Additional Hypotheses 124

Summary 127

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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 129

Conclusions From My Research 129

Recommendations 132

Recommendations for The Citadel’s BOV and President 132

Recommendation 1: Act Now 132

Recommendation 2: Change Tactics from Incrementalism 133

Recommendation 3: Adopt and Maintain a Change Theory 134

Recommendation 4: More Resources Are Not Necessary 134

Recommendation 5: Educate All Stakeholders About the Change 135

Recommendation 6: Mobilize All College Organizations 135

Recommendation 7: Monitor the Change 135

Recommendation 8: Modify the Cadet Schedule 136

Recommendation 9: Evaluate Leadership Development 136

Recommendation 10: Follow a Best-Practice Model 137

Recommendations for the Commandant of Cadets 137

Recommendation 1: Educate, Train, and Certify TACs 137

Recommendation 2: Create a Cadet Leader Distribution Plan 138

Recommendation 3: Recognize that Change Begins at the Top 138

Recommendation 4: Rotate Cadet Ranks and Positions 139

Recommendation 5: Recognize Freshmen by Corps Day 139

Recommendation 6: Reduce Freshmen Mess Hall Requirements 140

Recommendation 7: Appoint a Regimental Tactical Officer 140

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Closing 141

APPENDICES 142

Appendix A: The West Point Case Study Interview Protocol 142

Appendix B: The Citadel Case Study Interview Protocol 144

Appendix C: List of West Point Interviews 146

Appendix D: List of The Citadel Interviews 147

Appendix E: Coding and Triangulation Matrix 148

REFERENCES 150

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L IST OF TABLES

Table 4.1: West Point Governance Organizational Structure 39

Table 4.2: Cadet Development Under the Fourth Class System 51

Table 4.3: Cadet Development Under CLEDS 52

Table 5.1: Organizational Chart for the Krause Center 89

Table 5.2: Timeline for Leadership Development at The Citadel 91

Table 5.3: The Citadel’s Governance Organizational Structure 98

1

CHAPTER ONE:

INTRODUCTION

Statement of the Problem

There are several types of higher educational institutions in the United States that

have adopted a military education model. These include the federal service academies,

such as the U.S. Military Academy in West Point and the U.S. Naval Academy in

Annapolis; state military colleges such as The Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, the

Military College of Georgia, the Corps of Cadets at Texas A&M and Virginia Tech;

private military colleges such as Norwich Military Academy; military junior colleges

such as New Mexico Military Institute, Marion Military Institute, and Valley Forge

Military Academy; and military high schools such as Fork Union Military Academy and

St. John Military School. For the purposes of this study, all such institutions will be

referred to as “military colleges.”

These military colleges have various points of commonality, including uniforms,

regulations, and a cadet chain of command. They also tend to have some type of “fourth-

class system,” through which new cadets are trained and indoctrinated and upper class

cadets are given leadership opportunities. Certain challenges and problems have

accompanied these fourth class systems. They include physical and mental abuses of

freshmen, an unproductive first year experience that leads to high attrition and inferior

preparation for future collegiate demands, and the perpetuation of leadership techniques

that are increasingly inappropriate in the post-graduation environment. To one degree or

2

another, the various military colleges have attempted to address these issues by study and

reform.

The difficulties in administering the fourth class system are merely a symptom of

the attritional/adversarial model commonly associated with traditional military colleges.

In this model, which began almost with the inception of military colleges, both the

institution and cadets believe that the fourth class system should weed out cadets who

seem to lack the “moral, mental, and physical fiber” (Betros, 2012). Under this type of

system, some cadets use hazing to test other cadets, putting the military colleges at risk.

This attritional/adversarial model also produces a leadership culture that is unsustainable

in the military; it is very negative and fails to motivate soldiers (Betros, 2012). In this

model, cadets are allowed to “sink or swim” on their own, with little encouragement or

help from the upper class cadets.

An alternative is a developmental model, which creates an environment that is

positive, promotes teamwork and cohesion, and develops freshmen while maintaining a

balance between caring for them and making sure they meet the standards of followers

(Army Leadership, 2006). The developmental model uses teaching, coaching,

counseling, and mentoring. The model a military college adopts impacts not only its

freshmen, but all four classes, as well as the nature of the graduates it delivers.

Both the United States Military Academy (referred to in this study as West Point)

and The Citadel have attempted to transition to a developmental model. West Point is

generally regarded as having been successful in implementing this change. The Citadel,

on the other hand, has experienced difficulty and resistance to its attempts at change. It is

3

striking that West Point has succeeded in changing and The Citadel has not, because the

structure of each institution is similar. Organizational change theory offers a possible

explanation of this phenomenon.

All dissertations must begin with certain assumptions. This research study

accepts the idea that West Point’s transition has been successful and outlines the

documentation upon which this assumption is based. Likewise, the study assumes that

The Citadel’s transition has been incomplete and outlines the supporting documentation.

Proceeding from these assumptions, this study examines the process of organizational

culture change at these two institutions.

In Leading Change, John Kotter (1996) outlines eight steps required to change an

organization’s culture. These eight steps are:

1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency: “In an organization with 100 employees, at least two dozen must go far beyond the normal call to duty to produce significant change” (p. 35). Complacency must be kept as low as possible (p. 36).

2. Creating the Guiding Coalition: “Building such a team is always an essential part of the early stages of any effort to restructure, reengineer, or retool a set of strategies” (p. 52).

3. Developing a Vision and Strategy: “In a change process, a good vision serves three important purposes. First, by clarifying the general direction for change…. Second, it motivates people to take action in the right direction, even if the initial steps are personally painful. Third, it helps coordinate the actions of different people, even thousands and thousands of individuals, in a remarkably fast and efficient way” (pp. 68-69).

4. Communicating the Change Vision: “But the real power of a vision is

unleashed only when most involved in an enterprise or activity has a common understanding of its goals and direction” (p. 85).

4

5. Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action: “… in this ever faster-moving world, I think the idea of helping more people to become more powerful is important” (p. 101).

6. Generating Short Term Wins: “Running a transformational effort without

serious attention to short-term wins is extremely risky…” (p. 119).

7. Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change: “Major change often takes a long time, especially in big organizations…. Under these circumstances, short-term wins are essential to keep momentum going, but the celebration of those wins can be lethal if urgency is lost. With complacency up, the forces of tradition can sweep back in with remarkable force and speed” (p. 132).

8. Anchoring New Changes in the Culture: “Anchoring change in a

culture…comes last, not first. New approaches usually sink into a culture only after it’s clear that they work and are superior to old methods. Without verbal instruction and support, people are often reluctant to admit the validity of the new practices. Sometimes the only way to change a culture is to change key people. If promotion processes are not changed to be compatible with new practices, the old culture will reassert itself.” (p. 157).

Kotter’s model offers one means of comparing and analyzing organization change at

West Point and The Citadel.

Research Questions

The questions this research study aims to answer are: How do two military

colleges approach an organizational culture change from an attritional/adversarial model

to a development model? What explains the different outcomes of their efforts?

Assumptions of the Study

My assumption is that an organizational change model, such as John Kotter’s, can

explain successful organizational culture change at a military college. If this is valid,

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there should be a relationship between West Point’s adherence to an organizational

change model and its successful transition from an attritional/adversarial model to a

developmental model. Similarly, there should be a relationship between The Citadel’s

incomplete adherence to an organizational change model and its incomplete transition.

The research objective of this dissertation is to provide disciplined configurative

case studies on West Point’s and The Citadel’s efforts to transition from an

attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model and to test the theory that

adherence to an organizational change model contributes to a successful outcome.

This study is important to The Citadel because as a result of past studies, The

Citadel is under renewed pressure to transition to a development model. This dissertation

tests the theory that there is a relationship between adherence to organizational change

theory and successful organizational change at a military college. If the dissertation

confirms the validity of this theory, The Citadel should align future attempts at change

with an organizational change model, using West Point’s experience as a guide.

This study is also important to the discipline of student affairs, because there is

strong consensus that a systematic program of development, through all four years in

general and the first year experience in particular, are critical to a successful collegiate

environment that prepares graduates to enter their chosen profession.

Structure

This dissertation consists of seven chapters. The first chapter establishes the

relevance of the topic by placing it in the context of student development in higher

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education in general and the first year experience in particular. The second chapter

reviews the abundant literature contending that a nurturing, supportive, and positive first

year experience contributes to improved overall student success and reduced

attrition. Conversely, an adversarial, detached, and abusive first year experience

contributes to poor overall performance and increases attrition. Hazing traditions are

highlighted as a particular feature of an adversarial environment. Building on this first

year experience, the remaining years of a student’s college career shape the character,

skills, and adaptability with which they will enter their chosen profession.

The second chapter then refines this generic first year experience by focusing on

its application within the military college setting. This particular subset of higher

education is unique in its traditionally adversarial approach to the first year experience,

known as “the fourth class system.” Over time, certain rituals become ingrained that, at

worst, amount to systematic hazing and, at best, are of marginal utility in preparing

cadets for the skills required of military officers.

The third chapter describes the methodology used in this research. The fourth

chapter presents West Point as a case study of a military college that stated a desire to

transition from an adversarial to a developmental model and succeeded in doing so. The

fifth chapter presents The Citadel as a case study of a military college that stated the same

desire but has, thus far, been markedly less successful in making the transition. The sixth

chapter uses Kotter’s organizational change theory to analyze why West Point was

successful in making the transition and The Citadel less successful. The seventh chapter

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consists of recommendations for The Citadel that would make its effort to transition to a

developmental model more effective.

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CHAPTER TWO:

REVIEW OF L ITERATURE

Student Development and the First Year Experience

The literature on student development and the first year experience provides clear

and unequivocal studies indicating that student development and a developmental first

year experience are critical. Several themes emerge from the literature on the role of

institutions. Vincent Tinto establishes the importance of the role of the institution,

especially in the first year. Colleges and universities have a responsibility and an

obligation to help a student stay and graduate. To do this, they must set the conditions in

which students are placed in the college or university and establish the institution’s

expectations (Tinto, 2012).

Institutions should set high expectations, since student performance and success

have a direct relationship to the clarity, consistency, and level of expectations (Tinto,

2012). How students expect to be treated and their actual experience can make a huge

difference on student success and favorable outcomes (Moneta & Kuh, n.d.). An

institution’s goals, values, policies, and procedures need to be communicated clearly to

students. When this does not happen, or when people in the institution present

conflicting goals, values and policies, retention suffers (Berger, 2001, p. 14). Students

need opportunities to participate in the decision-making process of the institution, and

when this happens, retention rises (Berger, 2001, p. 15).

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Colleges and universities must also provide academic and social support,

especially during the first year (Tinto, 2012): “When bureaucratic mechanisms (e.g.,

chain of command, rules, policies, and procedures) are the source of a problem for

students, they can have a negative effect on student adjustment at college” (Berger, 2001,

p. 12). Collegial organizational behavior on campus has positive effects on student

persistence (Berger, 2001, p. 12), while highly politicized environments have negative

effects on student persistence. In addition, higher levels of symbolic behavior on campus

are associated with higher persistence (Berger, 2001, p. 13). These findings on the role

of institutions are significant, especially for military colleges, which are very bureaucratic

in their organization and not very collegial.

Institutions must also provide assessment and feedback frequently, so students

can adjust their behaviors so they are successful, and again, this is particularly important

during the freshman year. Berger (2001) finds that there is a balance needed between

structure and responsiveness. Students need to be provided advocates, and colleges and

universities must assess the nature of the institutional environment on campus (Berger,

2001, pp. 15-19).

Colleges and universities must insure student involvement academically, socially,

and with peers (Tinto, 2012). Seventy-five percent of college students who leave college

do so after the first semester (Davig & Spain, 2004, p. 305). Research has found that a

freshman orientation course is helpful and increases rates of retention, as do freshman

seminars. The development of social networks is essential to students integrating into the

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institution; it also increases retention rates. The assimilation of freshmen into college life

is critical to students’ persistence rates (Davig & Spain, 2004, p. 306).

The literature on student development supports the need for colleges to provide

academic and social support, frequent assessments and feedback, and student

involvement on campus. This enables students to achieve clear and high expectations,

which will in turn create student success and lower attrition.

Colleges and universities have instituted developmental programs in a number of

different areas (Evans, et al., 2010). Leadership development, which incorporates ethical

development and the development of others, surfaces as a theme throughout the literature.

Successful colleges and universities use different models or a combination of models in

their leadership development. A summary of the different models shows the varied

approaches to student development.

The “Relational Leadership Model” is based on the relational and ethical

processes of people trying to achieve positive change (knowing, being, doing) (Komives,

et al., 2013). The “Social Change Model of Leadership” promotes values of equity,

social justice, self-knowledge, service, and collaboration. “Servant Leadership”

emphasizes that serving comes first and servant leaders put people and organizations

before themselves (Greenleaf, 2013). The “Emotionally Intelligent Leadership Model”

involves three areas: consciousness of context, consciousness of self, and consciousness

of others (Shankman & Allen, 2008). “Leadership Identity Development” has six stages,

Awareness, Exploration/Engagement, Leader Identified, Leadership Differentiated,

Generativity, and Integration/Synthesis (Komives, et al., 2006). Army Manual FM 6-22

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from Army Leadership (2006) devotes an entire chapter to developing soldiers and

includes a sub-section titled “Organizational Leadership.” All of these leadership models

have the common theme of taking care of students and creating a positive environment.

Another theme that emerges from the literature on leadership development is

mentoring, an example of taking care of students. A good definition of mentoring can be

found in Army Leadership: “Mentorship is the voluntary developmental relationship that

exists between a person of greater experience and a person of lessor experience that is

characterized by mutual trust and respect” (2006). Seventy percent of students reported

that they were mentored by classmates or by the staff and faculty. For those who

received mentoring, 50% said they were mentored by student affairs staff and 33% by a

person in the community. Faculty and employer mentoring were strong predictors of

values. The conclusion is that mentoring in college truly makes a positive difference

(Dugan & Komives, 2007).

Coaching and counseling are other common themes in the literature on the

developmental model (Lawson, 2011). Coaching is teaching and guiding designed to

bring out the talents that already exist. Counseling occurs when the leader reviews the

subordinate’s performance (Army Leadership, 2006). The Trainer’s Handbook of

Leadership Development (2011), states that mentoring and coaching are critical

competencies for developing people. The Emotionally Intelligent Leadership model lists

coaching as a key feature in one of its three areas. The Servant Leadership model lists

nurturing the growth of employees as one of its important areas in its section “Ten Areas

a Servant Leader Needs to Concentrate On.”

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Other common themes in the literature on the developmental model are character

and ethical behavior (Army Leadership, 2006). One of the seven “C’s” in the Critical

Values of the Social Change Model is “congruence,” which refers to acting with honesty

and within your values (Dugan & Komives, 2007). The Relational Leadership Model

also emphasizes ethics; it is a pillar of the model (Komives, et al., 2013).

Another important theme in the literature is creating a positive environment,

which includes the environment’s climate and culture. Creating a positive climate

includes fairness and inclusiveness, open and candid communications, and a positive

learning environment (Army Leadership, 2006). In the Social Change Model of

Leadership Development, the concept of citizenship includes the climate and culture

(Dugan & Komives, 2007).

The abundant literature on overall development, especially during the first year,

makes it clear that colleges and universities must create the conditions to foster a

nurturing, supportive, and positive first year experience. This then contributes to

improved student retention, especially during the first year. Conversely, an adversarial,

uninvolved, detached, and abusive first year experience contributes to poor overall

performance and increased attrition (Tinto, 2012). This is one of the main tenets of

Vincent Tinto’s work. Colleges and universities should minimize negative encounters,

which lead to attrition, and maximize positive encounters, which leads to retention

(Tinto, 2012).

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The First Year Experience at a Traditional Military College

The review of literature reveals that most military colleges did not include much

student development when they were founded, especially for the important first year.

They also had very little leadership development, despite the fact that after graduation,

cadets were put in charge of leading soldiers. A common characteristic of military

colleges was that they put freshmen in a fourth class system, which evolved into an

attritional/adversarial system where cadets weak in academics, moral issues, and physical

strength were eliminated (Betros, 2012; Macauley, 2011). There was a complete lack of

leadership development of the freshmen cadets and throughout the Corps of Cadets,

especially at West Point and The Citadel (Betros, 2012; Macauley, 2011). Lance Betros

called it “leadership through osmosis” (2012). This attritional/adversarial model goes

against the current literature on student development.

One outcome of the attritional/adversarial model was that cadets believed their

role was to test freshmen. They had few other outlets to keep them busy, so they

substituted hazing (Ambrose, 1966, pp. 226-227). Hazing became the bane of

Superintendents, Presidents, and Commandant of Cadets for well over 100 years (Betros,

2012; Macauley, 2011). The attritional/adversarial model can become so culturally

engrained that even parents of cadets and alumni organizations support hazing (Student

Affairs Leadership Council, 2012).

The literature describing hazing in the military and at military colleges generally

applies a different meaning to the word than elsewhere. Civilian interpretations of hazing

fail to take into account military life (Nuwer, 2004, pp. 141-146). Much of military

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training would be considered hazing by the StopHazing.org definition: “Hazing refers to

any activity expected of someone joining a group (or to maintain full status in a group)

that humiliates, degrades, or risks emotional and/or physical harm, regardless of the

person’s willingness to participate” (2013). An article on the U.S. Air Force Academy in

Colorado Springs states of their fourth class system: “Superficially the fourth class year

resembles a fraternity ‘hell week’ of hazing, spread over eleven long months” (“You are

nobody here,” 1961, p. 82). The question always comes back to what is beneficial to the

training of the military personnel and what is considered harassment and hazing? (Nuwer,

2004). The type of hazing that the literature on military colleges refers to falls outside

the boundaries of legitimate military training, which itself could be considered hazing at

civilian colleges and universities.

Hazing scandals relating to the fourth class system occurred in 1881, 1900, 1907,

1917, 1973, 1976, and in 1979 at West Point (Betros, 2012; Nuwer, 2004). The most

famous was a Congressional Inquiry ordered by the President of the U.S. A cadet had

died and Cadet Douglas McArthur was forced to testify before Congress as a witness

(Nuwer, 2004, pp. 141-146). Most of the West Point leadership’s efforts to stop and

prevent hazing were fruitless (Crackel, 2002, p. 270). For most freshmen cadets, the

worst part of hazing was the isolation resulting from not being allowed to feel part of the

Corps (Ambrose, 1966, pp. 226-227).

West Point historian, Steve Grove, documented the history of the fourth class

system in his July 1989 publication. It provides a rich history of the fourth class system

15

since West Point was founded, pointing out some good elements, but primarily

emphasizing the multiple problems that the system has caused for about 180 years.

Reviews and studies of West Point’s fourth class system increased in the sixties.

Almost all of them concluded with comments like one 1969 study: “It would seem that

from The Academy’s mission of developing mature and independent officers, this initial

effort is counterproductive” (Grove, 1989). In 1976, “abuses of the fourth class system

represent the greatest potential for future public embarrassment of the Military Academy.

We need to keep asking ourselves the rationale for everything we do within the fourth

class system” (Grove, 1989). A 1979 study found that a more progressive and

educational approach was needed to develop freshmen. A 1988 study of the fourth class

system found that it seemed “to conflict with developing the leader attributes” (Grove,

1989).

The Citadel had similar issues. Abusive behavior there was detailed by Betty

Harper in her essay Welcome Sister Rats: Coeducation at Two Southern Military

Colleges. Harper states that “VMI [Virginia Military Institute] considers itself ‘more

civilized’ than The Citadel, and less prone to enforcing its lessons with violence” (p. 3).

Harper also notes that The Citadel does not have the control they should have over its

cadets. Both schools require “harsh physical and mental initiation. Hazing is an accepted

part of the initiation rite and alumni take great pride in having stuck it out and survived.

High attrition is a badge of honor and those that fail leave in disgrace” (Harper, n.d., p.

10).

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In Catherine Manegold’s book (2000) on Shannon Faulkner, The Citadel’s first

female cadet, Manegold compares the freshmen to slaves, the upper class to plantation

slave masters, and the campus to that of the Charleston Center for Punishment of Slaves.

When The Citadel had issues with hazing after Shannon Faulkner attended, “officials

insisted the hazing was not ‘gender based’ but rather related to endemic problems in the

Fourth Class System” (Manegold, 2000, p. 301). Indeed, the Commandant of Cadets

claimed “that the women were so well accepted that male cadets treated them like any

other first year students. He noted that, like Shannon Faulkner, two male cadets also had

their shirts set afire after being doused with nail polish remover” (Manegold, 2000).

Harvard Law School’s Negotiation and Mediation Clinical Program reported their

findings in The Citadel, Dispute Resolution System Review (The Citadel, 2008) that

showed the outcome of The Citadel’s attritional adversarial system. The hazing activities

refer specifically to the fourth class system. The report states that cadets support hazing

in the fourth class system because they believe that hazing:

1. develops bonds within a class,

2. encourages teamwork,

3. develops leaders,

4. teaches individuals to overcome adversity, and

5. is an important part of tradition (The Citadel, 2008).

The report outlines a series of improvements that would enable changes in the

culture to occur, mainly related to the Corps of Cadets’ leadership (The Citadel, 2008). It

17

specifically outlines how hazing is a poor means of achieving the goals that the cadets

spoke of above:

1. Some cadets believe they are treated worst and resent classmates they perceive as being treated better;

2. Some female cadets feel alienated because they are not hazed to the same degree as their male counterparts: their ‘better’ treatment spurs resentment from other cadets;

3. Cadets tend to ‘tune out’ certain kinds of hazing, rendering it ineffective;

4. Individuals who learn leadership through hazing are more likely to learn to

lead through intimidation instead of motivation;

5. Learning to overcome adversity can be taught more safely and effectively without mental abuse (The Citadel, 2008).

The Lords of Discipline, a popular novel by Pat Conroy (2002), a Citadel

graduate, describes The Citadel and what it was like to go through the fourth class

system. The book points out the horrors of the system, but also the incredible bonding

between those cadets who survived it. It is a very popular perception of the system and

one that many alumni deem as significant in their lives. Only about 40% of graduating

cadets enter a military service, so for most alumni, the fourth class system is the only

“military” experience they have. To them, it represents a badge of courage and a positive

aspect of military schools. A significant portion of the alumni who resist change to the

fourth class system have an attitude of “I made it through and turned out well” (Conroy,

2002).

18

The literature has documented well the freshman year at military colleges. West

Point and The Citadel are just two examples of military colleges using an

attritional/adversarial model that fosters hazing.

Fourth Class Culture Change at West Point and The Citadel

As stated in the previous section, one of the outcomes of an attritional/adversarial

fourth class system is hazing. The literature reveals that as early as 1879, Superintendent

John M. Schofield was so concerned about the fourth class system that he wrote a

“Definition of Discipline” and required cadets to memorize it (The Citadel, 2009-2010):

The discipline, which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle, is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an army. It is possible to impart instruction and to give commands in such manner and such a tone of voice to inspire in the soldier no feeling but an intense desire to obey, while the opposite manner and tone of voice cannot fail to excite strong resentment and a desire to disobey (The Citadel, 2009-2010). Schofield became one of a long line of college Superintendents, Presidents, and

Commandants who tried to change the fourth class system. Over time, various leaders at

West Point started to introduce leadership into the fourth class system. They first

introduced the freshmen to leadership concepts and then allowed the upper classmen the

opportunity to put into practice the leadership concepts they had learned on freshmen

(Betros, 2012).

The concept of leader development started to be introduced at West Point in 1920,

but it would take until 1990 for the concept to overtake the attritional/adversarial model

(Betros, 2012, pp. 239-243). The leaders of these introductory concepts were

19

Superintendent Brigadier General Douglas MacArthur (1919-1922) and Major General

Maxwell Taylor (1945-1949) (Betros, 2012, pp. 243-249). Both tried introduce expanded

instruction in Psychology into the academic curriculum and both failed, due to resistance

from West Point’s Academic Board. Psychological disciplines studied leadership and

how humans could be lead, but Taylor was unsuccessful in getting the Academic Board

to teach Psychology, so he created the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership

(OMPL) and placed it under the Commandant of Cadets (Betros, 2012, p. 249).

MacArthur used the same tactic described above when he was Superintendent but in both

cases, when they departed the successors failed to carry on their efforts (Betros, 2012).

The literature also shows that The Citadel paralleled West Point in fourth class

issues. One of the most noted Presidents of The Citadel, General Charles P. Summerall,

summed up the system to Colonel John P. Thomas, Chairmen of the Board of Visitors

(BOV) in 1943 saying, “The oppression exercised over fourth classmen is not discipline

but the antithesis of discipline. This is shown by the in-discipline of those who were

subjected to its so-called benefits as soon as they became oppressors” (Summerall, 1943).

Starting in 1968, The Citadel appointed committees to study the fourth class

system about every eight years during the following 40-year period, which demonstrates

the magnitude of the issues The Citadel faced with the fourth class system (Macauley,

2011). These study reports are significant; they each document the serious nature of the

issues with the fourth class system which led to further cultural issues in the Corps of

Cadets. The 1968 report to the president and the Board of Visitors, known as the

Whitmire Report, contained 56 findings and seven recommendations that included a

20

complete overhaul of the fourth class (The Citadel, 1968). In 1980, another report was

commissioned on the fourth class system known as the Mood Report. It had 21

recommendations that again, included a complete overhaul of the fourth class system

(The Citadel, 1991).

The next report on the fourth class system came in 1992, named the Lane Report.

The Lane Report made five recommendations that also suggested overhauling the fourth

class system. In 1997, because there were huge issues with the admission of women to

The Citadel, the federal court had to step in to ensure a viable program that eliminated the

huge discriminatory issues The Citadel faced. The federal court and The Citadel decided

to review the fourth class system again. The federal court appointed outside investigators

to look into The Citadel. They recommended to the court that the fourth class system

was an adversarial system as it is run at The Citadel, but that the women’s assimilation

should be treated differently (McDannell, 1997, pp. 2-3).

The Citadel appointed a new Commandant of Cadets in 1997, Brigadier General

Mace, who made changes to the Corps of Cadets’ regulations and to the fourth class

system (Macauley, 2011). These changes became known as the Mace Plan (The Citadel,

1997). The last committee to look into the fourth class system was the Institutional

Program Assessment Committee (IPAC) and was appointed in 2012; they produced the

IPAC Report (The Citadel, 2012). The IPAC Report discussed the entire Citadel

institution, but one sub-committee on hazing and training abuses examined the fourth

class system specifically. The IPAC Report recommended, once again, an overhaul of

21

the fourth class system. This sub-committee made nine recommendations to change the

system (The Citadel, 2012).

Each of these committees were appointed because of major issues with the fourth

class system in the last 40 plus years. They provide documentation of the issues and the

knowledge that a properly functioning developmental system is critical to the

development of healthy values and respect for the program at the college. They are a

reflection that one committee report called the “…seventeen (17) major and about

fourteen hundred (1400) minor Plebe Systems at The Citadel tied strictly to individual

personalities, attitudes and interpretations” (The Citadel, 1968, p. 42).

Like The Citadel, West Point appointed various committees to review the fourth

class system and was making a modicum of progress (Betros, 2012). The Cadet

Counseling Center had a leadership component that was a vestige from previous

Superintendents’ attempts to add leadership into the curriculum. Being unsuccessful,

they followed MacArthur and Taylors’ precedents and established a leadership

component in the Cadet Counseling Center (Betros, 2012). The Cadet Counseling Center

reported to the Commandant of Cadets (Betros, 2012). The Cadet Counseling Center

made a number of changes related to the fourth class system, but the seminal change took

place when Lieutenant General Dave Palmer became Superintendent in 1986 (Betros,

2012).

Under Palmer, West Point took a huge turn in leader development that changed

the fourth class system. Palmer ordered a complete review of the fourth class system,

starting three reviews simultaneously (Betros, 2012). The staff and faculty committee

22

even recommended that the fourth class system be abolished (Betros, 2012, pp. 257-258).

Palmer prohibited many nonsensical definitions in required freshmen (plebe) knowledge

and changed other facets of the fourth class system (Crackel, 2002, p. 270).

Palmer decided to implement a four class system, in which each class would be

administered a demanding leadership model (Betros, 2012, p. 258). The new system was

called Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS, pronounced “kleds”). This new

system:

…included a plebe experience that retained many of the traditional elements of the old fourth class system and thus insured a challenging first year. For third, second, and first classmen, however, the expectations were higher. The new system described leadership responsibilities and developmental goals that grew more demanding each year and focused on proper leader-subordinate relationships (Betros, 2012, p. 258).

Palmer explained that the new system was “a constantly progressive process that adds as

you go along: holds you more responsible; holds you more accountable; expects you to

know more; expects you to be more mature….When you start looking at things that way,

you start creating a system for all four classes” (Betros, 2012, p. 258). Palmer also

decided to send his company tactical officers (TACs) to receive a graduate degree

specifically in leadership, rather than any graduate degree (Betros, 2012, p. 258). Three

areas seem to be the change agents that are responsible for the organizational culture

change to a developmental system at West Point. They were Palmer’s direction and

leadership, the change in the tactical officer graduate degree requirement, and the Cadet

Counseling Center (Betros, 2012).

The results of Palmer’s changes were immediate. In 1990, the first year of the

new four year leader development program, that “bans upperclassmen from verbally

23

abusing freshmen…and emphasizes ‘positive leadership techniques’… only about 66

people or 5% of the institution’s 1,248 freshmen left the academy during ‘beast

weeks’.…Usually, about 10% of the freshmen leave” (Dodge, 1991, p. A39). By 1993

the change in the fourth class system and the introduction of four class leader

development program was established and solidified (Donnithorne, 1993; Betros, 2012).

West Point’s Circular 1-101-1, Cadet Leader Development System for Cadets,

delineates a four class leader development program at West Point that included more than

freshmen (United States Military Academy, 2005). This is significant, as it confirms that

12-15 years after the transition to a developmental model, West Point still produced

documents that indicate that their organizational culture change from an

attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model was being sustained (United

States Military Academy, 2005).

The literature shows that West Point stated a desire to transition from an

adversarial to a developmental leadership model and succeeded in doing so (Betros,

2012). The Citadel has thus far been markedly less successful in making the transition

(Macauley, 2011).

Looking at Organizational Cultural Change Through

the Prism of Organizational Change Theory

Adrianna Kezar in her book titled, Understanding Change in the 21st Century

(2001), outlines models of change that shed light on successfully establishing

organizational culture change at a university. Kezar states that it is critical to understand

24

the nature of higher educational organizations in order for organizational culture change

to be successful (Kezar, 2001, p. v). She identifies six models of change in higher

education: evolutionary, teleological, life cycle, dialectical, social cognition, cultural, and

multiple methods (Kezar, 2001, pp. 79-111).

Understanding the institutional culture and the various sub-cultures is essential,

especially for leaders who are trying to make changes. Edgar Schein, in his book

Organizational Culture and Leadership (1996), defines culture as:

The culture of a group can now be defined as a pattern of shared basic assumptions learned by a group as it solved its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, which has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore, to be taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to those problems.

Sub-cultures at military colleges have markedly different cultures than those at civilian

colleges and universities.

According to Schein, there are external and internal factors that affect an

organization’s culture. The organization must have good communication internally and

externally in order to understand the culture fully. For an organizational culture change

to occur, a process called “disconfirmation” occurs, that first produces guilt and anxiety,

and then leads to resistance to the culture change. The way to avoid this problem is by

making the people at the organization feel “psychologically safe.” This means not

defining the issue as a “culture change,” but rather as “a problem that needs to be

addressed” (Schein, 1996). The people who still believe in the old culture need to be

eliminated. Culture change will be successful if the change leads to success and

25

satisfaction, but culture change will always require a period of unlearning that will be

psychologically painful (Schein, 1996).

William Pasmore, in his book Creating Strategic Change (1994) recommends that

when planning organizational changes, an organization should change all things at the

same time. Pasmore believes a complete redesign is absolutely necessary in order for

organizational culture change to be successful. According to Pasmore, an incrementalism

strategy will guarantee that “nothing significant will ever change” (1994, p. 264).

Incrementalism is a strategy that makes changes very slowly over a time period.

Another approach to organizational culture change, which is another methodology

considered by this research, is the five principle method discussed in the book Change

the Culture, Change the Game by Roger Connors and Tom Smith (2001). Connors and

Smith identify the first principle as accountability, both inside and outside of the

organization. Without accountability, there can be no culture change. The second

principle is getting people ready for the change. Change is hard and people are not

predisposed to change. Everyone in the organization must be prepared to make the

change. The third principle is to start at the top of the organization in order to be most

effective in accomplishing the change. A culture change that starts without involvement

of top leadership will be disastrous. The fourth principle is to ensure that there is a

strategy for staying on track. Every process needs controls, especially cultural changes in

an organization. The last principle is allowing for creativity and maximum participation.

For organizational culture change to succeed, everyone in the organization must be

involved (Connors & Smith, 2001).

26

John Kotter’s eight step change method, described in Chapter One, offers another

model for achieving organizational culture change (Kotter, 1996). It was developed as a

model for business and is relevant to culture change in bureaucratic organizations

(Kotter, 1996). In addition to measuring success in the eight steps, an organization can

measure the management’s and leadership’s ideas about the organizational culture

(Kotter, 1996). While support from management is important, it will not alone produce

change; only support from leadership will produce successful change, as it removes

inertia, changes behavior, and insures a sustaining change (Kotter, 1996, p. 30).

According to Kotter, leadership “produces change, often to a dramatic degree, and has the

potential to produce extremely useful change” (1996, p. 26).

Summary and Application

As stated in Chapter One, this study poses the following two research questions:

How did two different military colleges approach an organizational change from an

attritional/adversarial model to a development model? and What explains the different

outcomes of these efforts? The dependent variable here is the outcome of the attempted

change (success or failure); the independent variables are the degree of adherence to the

specific organizational change models selected.

The Citadel is still attempting to achieve the degree of success in its transition that

West Point has. If the study reveals that West Point successfully followed an

organizational change model and The Citadel did not, the study will make specific

recommendations concerning how The Citadel should structure its on-going efforts.

27

Furthermore, if the study supports the conclusion from Betros (2012), that the leadership

of Superintendent Lt. Gen. Palmer and his sense of urgency, the expanded role of the

Cadet Counseling Center, and the integration of a highly trained and empowered tactical

officers were essential to the change process, then this study will make additional

recommendations to The Citadel. Like West Point, The Citadel has a three-star chief

executive, a Cadet Counseling Center, and tactical officers. The organizational change

model used will hopefully explain why The Citadel’s execution of these assets has not

produced the change experienced at West Point.

28

CHAPTER THREE:

METHODOLOGY

Overview

Presented in this chapter are details about the methodology of this study. It will

discuss the different approaches within the methodology, the instruments used, the

selection process for participants, data collection methods, data analysis procedures, as

well as the trustworthiness and methods of verification. In addition, my role as

researcher is explained. The analysis of my research, when added to the current literature

on the topic, should help stakeholders at The Citadel and other military colleges who are

struggling with organizational culture change.

Through a qualitative mode of inquiry, the following research questions were

explored: How do two different “military colleges” approach an organizational change

from an attritional/adversarial model to a development model? and What explains the

different outcomes of these efforts?

My assumption is that an organizational change model can be used to explain

successful change at a military college. If this is valid, there should be a relationship

between West Point’s adherence to an organizational change model and its successful

transition from an attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model. Similarly,

there should be a relationship between The Citadel’s incomplete adherence to an

organizational change model and its incomplete transition.

29

Two case studies were compiled, one at West Point, which the literature review

suggests underwent a successful organizational cultural change, and the other at The

Citadel, which the literature suggests has had an incomplete transition from an

attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model in their fourth class system. Both

case studies were looked at through the lens of John Kotter’s (1996), Leading Change.

Kotter’s theory of organizational change was selected because it is a top-down business

model similar to the top-down bureaucratic model that military colleges follow. Kotter’s

theory offers a functional approach for analyzing organizational culture change at

military colleges. Interestingly, the U.S. Army War College just finished using Kotter’s

methodology in their 2013 top-down review.

This study examines the literature on organizational culture change in military

colleges and identifies the causes for the successful organizational change at West Point

and incomplete change at The Citadel. In addition, this study looks at three factors that

Brigadier General Lance Betros (2012) identified in his book as significant to West

Point’s organizational culture change to determine if they played a prominent role in the

change. The three factors that each case study analyzes are:

1. The sense of urgency and direction from the top leadership at West Point and The Citadel.

2. The education and training of the Tactical Officers (TACs) at West Point and The Citadel.

3. The role played by the Cadet Counseling Center in the organizational change

at West Point and The Citadel.

30

Rationale

The methodology used this study was qualitative. Qualitative research was

selected because, as John Creswell (2007) explains in his book Qualitative Inquiry

Research Design, qualitative research is best when “a problem or issue needs to be

explored” (Creswell, 2007, p. 47). Creswell goes on to say that if the issue or problem

requires a detailed understanding, then qualitative methods would be useful. If it is

important for individuals to put the issue or problem into perspective and hear their

interpretation of events, then qualitative methods should be used. Qualitative analysis

was also selected because using quantitative and statistical analyses would not easily

provide the answers to this study’s research questions (Creswell, 2007, p.48). The case

study, after careful evaluation, was the qualitative approach that provided the researcher

with the best opportunity to collect and examine the data desired.

The first case study examined how West Point changed the organizational culture

from an attrition/adversarial system to a developmental system. This instrumental case

study was very significant to my overall research, because it is a best practice example of

a successful organizational culture change in a Corps of Cadets. Case study methodology

was chosen because the West Point fourth class organizational culture change required an

in-depth look at the instruments that caused the cultural change to take place. Other

qualitative approaches were reviewed, but the case study fit the parameters for obtaining

the best data from West Point’s organizational change.

The second case study focused on The Citadel. The case approach was used to

identify and codify issues that The Citadel has had in the past and continues to experience

31

today. The research included interviews and examining the past and current fourth class

system, and its findings were corroborated by documents such as committee reports, case

reports, press reports, etc. This study determined exactly where The Citadel was in terms

of its attempts to change the fourth class system. Case study methodology was chosen

because enabled the researcher to document the past of the fourth class system and better

understand where The Citadel was regarding their transition.

Design

The unit of analysis was at the institutional level. The specific sites for most of

the data collection were the United States Military Academy in West Point, New York

(West Point) and The Citadel, in Charleston, South Carolina. These two military colleges

have similar structures, histories, and internal models, such as a fourth class system.

There are, however, some significant differences between the two colleges: West Point is

a federal academy that produces officers for the Army. The Citadel is a state military

college, and only about 40% of cadets enter a military service.

The Citadel interviews were conducted in Charleston, South Carolina. The West

Point interviews were conducted by telephone, because many of their college

administrators have retired from the Army and relocated around the country. Qualitative

interviews were conducted because they provided the best technique for a complete

understanding of all the issues both colleges faced. This type of interview enabled

follow-up questions and gathering additional sources. Interviews were semi-structured to

allow for additional questions. Documents was also examined, such as committee

32

reports, position papers, regulations, publications, and memorandums, to corroborate data

collected in the interviews (Creswell, 2007).

Data Collection

Data was collected from one-on-one interviews that lasted from one to two hours.

The participants were asked a set of questions that helped define both the organizational

change from an attritional/adversarial model to a developmental model and the lack of

that transition, and also included the interviewee’s assessment of the reasons. All

interviews were audio-recorded and transcribed. There was no confidentially given to the

participants.

Interview questions included both structured and unstructured questions. As a

staff and faculty member at both colleges and an Army Officer, I feel that I was able to

elicit constructive assessments from the participants interviewed.

Document analysis was performed to corroborate (triangulate) data collected from

the interviewed participants. Such documents included fourth class system manuals,

regulations, and memorandums.

Instruments of Data Collection

Interview protocols are included in Appendix A (p. 135) for West Point, and

Appendix B (p. 137) for The Citadel. These protocols were designed so the interviewee

would provide data on three areas this research analyzed along with Kotter’s eight stage

33

change methodology. In addition, the instrument provided further information on other

possible interviewees and written documentation. Each interview was audio-taped.

Study Participants

Participants were chosen based upon their positions in the decision-making

process relating to the fourth class systems. The West Point case study participants were

mostly involved with West Point during its period of change (1988-1993). The Citadel

case study participants were involved there from 2008 to the present. People in

leadership positions, such as Superintendents and Presidents, Provosts and

Commandant’s of Cadets were selected because they were knowledgeable about

leadership at their institution and the sense of urgency that existed regarding changing the

fourth class system. A list of all interviews conducted appears in Appendix C and

Appendix D (pp. 139-140).

Such participants included retired Lt. Gen. David Palmer (West Point); Maj. Gen.

Cliff Poole (The Citadel); retired Maj. Gen. John Grinalds (The Citadel); retired Lt. Gen.

John Rosa (The Citadel); Brig. Gen. Harry Carter (The Citadel); Provost and Brig. Gen.

Sam Hines (The Citadel); Commandant of Cadets retired Col. Leo Mercado (The

Citadel); and Commandant of Cadets retired Col. Greg Stone (The Citadel).

Counseling Center Head retired Col. William Wilson (West Point) and retired Lt.

Col. Bob Byrne (West Point) were interviewed because they were essential to testing the

hypothesis regarding the Cadet Counseling Center’s role at both institutions. The

Citadel’s director of The Cadet Counseling Center refused to be interviewed for this

34

research. Other college officials at The Citadel were asked additional questions about the

Cadet Counseling Center.

Additional interviews were conducted about West Point with retired Brig. Gen.

Howard Prince, former Head of the Department of Behavioral Sciences & Leadership;

retired Brig. Gen. Lance Betros, former Head of the Department of History; retired Brig.

Gen. Barney Forsythe, former Vice Dean for Academics; retired Col. Larry Donnithorne,

former Special Assistant for Strategic Planning; retired Col. Scott Snook and retired Col.

Joe LeBoeuf, both former Professors in the Behavioral Science & Leadership

Department; and retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart, former Head of Strategic Planning for the

Commandant of Cadets.

Interviews were also conducted about The Citadel with retired Col. Joe Trez,

Director of the Krause Leadership Center and former Commandant and Chief of Staff of

the college; Col. Steve Nida, Head of the Department of Phycology; retired Lt. Col. Jeff

Weart, former Director of the Krause Leadership Center; and retired Command Sgt. Maj.

Sylvan Bauer, Command Sargent Major for the Commandant’s Department.

Data Analysis

The data was analyzed using qualitative research methods described in Creswell

(2007). The data was further organized and read to get an entire picture. The next step

from reading and memorizing the data was to describe, classify and interpret data into

codes and themes. The findings were analyzed using John Kotter’s (1995) eight stage

change method. Data was then interpreted and represented in charts for analysis.

35

Additional evidence from the case studies was analyzed to determine if the three

areas thought responsible for the organizational culture change at West Point (leadership

of the institution, tactical officers, cadet counseling center) were, in fact, responsible. In

The Citadel’s case study, the same three areas were analyzed (leadership of the

institution, tactical officers, and cadet counseling center) to see what role they played in

its incomplete organizational culture change

This evidence was triangulated with institutional documents to corroborate if

these three areas precipitated the change at West Point and how these three areas

impacted The Citadel’s attempted change. The data was recorded into a matrix for

analysis; this matrix appears in Appendix E (pp. 141-142). The results of the two case

studies were then compared. From this comparison a detailed set of conclusions and

recommendations emerged on how best to accomplish an organizational culture change

of the fourth class system at a military college.

Trustworthiness

In Creswell’s book, Qualitative Inquiry and Research Design (2007), he equates

trustworthiness to the term validation: “I use the term validation to emphasize a process

(see Angen, 2000), rather than verification or historical words such as trustworthiness and

authenticity” (Creswell, 2007, p. 250). In this study, data from interviews were

transcribed, which helped insure accuracy. Triangulation was used to verify data

obtained from interviews. Debriefing occurred immediately after each interview to also

verify data (Creswell, 2007, p. 250).

36

Expertise and Background of the Researcher

I have served at West Point as a company and battalion TAC officer, where I dealt

directly with the fourth class system. I also served there as the officer in charge of cadet

discipline on the Commandant’s staff and as Assistant Professor of American Politics in

the Department of Social Sciences. I am currently employed at The Citadel as Assistant

Commandant for Personnel, Logistics, and Cadet Life, a position that also avails me the

opportunity to observe the fourth class system. This personal experience has shaped my

research and provides this study with a level of credibility and verification. It is

important to note, however, that I may hold some biases based upon my two assignments

at West Point and my current position at The Citadel.

Ethical Considerations

This research was conducted according to ethical considerations for qualitative

research (Creswell, 2007, p. 58-59). Permission was obtained from both colleges and all

participants were informed of the general purpose of the study and how the data would be

used. All perspectives were considered, including contrary findings.

There were no known risks at West Point. There was some risk, which is defined

below at The Citadel. The risks concerning The Citadel were three-fold: that the analysis

of the culture would be incorrect, and that The Citadel might not be receptive to feedback

(Schein, 1992, pp. 195-196). Also the risk concerning those members of the college that

might not handle well the findings about their own culture, and they also might not be

aware that they could be at risk once information about their organizational culture is

37

known outside of the college (Schein, 1992, pp. 197-198). To mitigate these risks

caution was been taken at The Citadel to explain the research to each participant in the

study and that confidentiality would not be granted. Two college administrators at The

Citadel refused to participate in the research. There have been no ethical issues

concerning the study.

Limitations of the Study

This study looked at John Kotter’s eight stage change methodology and three

specific areas, institutional leadership, role and education of the tactical officers, and the

Cadet Counseling Center’s role in successful organizational culture change or an

incomplete change. These three areas were chosen because they appear to be the change

agents in West Point’s successful transition from an attritional/adversarial model to a

developmental model. This was determined from the findings in a pilot study, personal

observations, and a review of relevant literature. As such, the results may not represent

the entire scope of what caused organizational cultural change at West Point or the entire

scope of a change that did not happen at The Citadel.

The study will not evaluate the effectiveness of the developmental model either in

the military services or military colleges, although it is apparent that both West Point and

The Citadel are convinced of the developmental model’s value.

38

CHAPTER FOUR:

CASE STUDY OF WEST POINT ’S FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM :

SUCCESSFUL ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE

Call for Organizational Culture Change

The United States Military Academy, more commonly known as West Point, has

a long history of an attritional/adversarial fourth class system. In addition to producing

unacceptable abusive behavior and hazing at West Point, one observer notes that this

“dysfunctional style of leadership” has followed cadets into their Army careers

(Donnithorne, 1993). “Abusive behavior” is defined as uncaring, unhelpful and

disparaging behavior that did not rise to the level of “hazing.” The adversarial fourth

class system, however, was deeply rooted at West Point. Indeed, given the repeated

failed attempts at change, it appeared that “by the 1980s, the odds of success of any

future reform were quite low” (Donnithorne, 1993). To reverse this trend, an

organizational culture change at West Point would be required.

Table 4.1 depicts the governance organizational structure at West Point in 1990

and is provided to better understand the structure of West Point before its organizational

culture change:

39

Table 4.1: West Point Governance Organizational Structure

Historical Incremental Change

The Superintendents and Commandant of Cadets were dissatisfied and frustrated

with the attritional/adversarial model. Top leaders of the Army agreed that the system

was responsible for disciplinary issues and poor leadership skills that followed future

Army officers and deterred their success (L. Donnithorne, personal communication,

40

October 16, 2013). At West Point, MacArthur, Eisenhower, and Vuono were among the

Army leaders supporting change in these areas (Betros, 2012). In 1949, Chief of Staff of

the Army, Gen. Eisenhower, directed Superintendent Maj. Gen. Maxwell Taylor to

change the way West Point taught leadership:

During the war, Eisenhower had been introduced to the work of social scientists on the Army staff who had conducted attitudinal surveys of soldiers. Some of the studies suggested that American soldiers did not respect their officers because of the latter’s poor leadership skills. Believing that the behavioral sciences could improve leadership instruction at West Point, he gave Taylor clear guidance (Betros, 2012, p. 247).

Taylor was unsuccessful in getting the Academic Board to teach Psychology, so he

created the Office of Military Psychology and Leadership (OMPL) and put it under the

Commandant of Cadets (Betros, 2012, p. 249). The Academic Board is comprised of the

department heads of the major academic departments and the Superintendent. The Board

played a huge role in West Point’s governance before World War II, but gradually lost

governance to the Superintendent after the war (Betros, 2012, p. 32).

Over the years, West Point had been able to make incremental changes to the

fourth class system, such as doing away with bracing in 1969 (B. Forsythe, personal

communication, October 14, 2013). Bracing, a much exaggerated form of attention,

requires cadets to stand rigidly with their backs arched as if trying to make their shoulder

blades touch, with their chins tucked into their necks, and their arms straight against their

sides. This “military brace” is an abnormal posture, which can cause Erb’s palsy (Lain,

1969). The only military college that still authorizes bracing is The Citadel.

In 1969, West Point also conducted a major review of the fourth class system

(called Preliminary Evaluation of the Fourth Class System) at the direction of the

41

Commandant of Cadets Brig. Gen. Bernard Rogers. This evaluation concluded that the

fourth class system needed to remain challenging and accomplish the following:

socialization of cadets; equalization of cadets; identification of unsuitable cadets; and

development of leaders. It also revealed that the fourth class system needed to be

oriented primarily towards development, so the cadets could achieve their full potential

and be supported in their efforts by the leadership. The report stated: “It would seem that

from the Academy’s mission of developing mature and independent officers, this initial

effort is counterproductive” (A Preliminary Evaluation of the Fourth Class System,

USMA, 1969). Most of the changes to the fourth class system occurred on the periphery,

and little of the core of the system changed (Betros, 2012). Despite many studies

indicating that change was needed, there was no effective major change from 1920 to

1976 (Betros, 2012).

1976 to 1985: Enabling Change

Brig. Gen. Walter Ulmer was sent to West Point in 1975 to assume duties as

Commandant of Cadets, and one of his directives from the Chief of Staff of the Army

was to change the fourth class system (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8,

2013). Ulmer said: “abuses of the fourth class system represent the greatest potential for

future public embarrassment of the Military Academy. We need to keep asking ourselves

the rational for everything we do within the fourth class system” (Grove, 1989). Major

Howard Prince, who was in charge of the Cadet Counseling Center, informed Ulmer that

a majority of cadets left West Point during their freshman year because of the

42

attritional/adversarial fourth class system (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8,

2013). Ulmer agreed with Prince, but unfortunately two major issues would derail Ulmer

from accomplishing his fourth class system directive: the Electrical Engineering 304 (EE

304) cheating incident, and Congressional mandate allowing women to be admitted to

West Point (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; L. Betros, personal

communication, October 18, 2013).

EE 304 was a Physics class required for juniors at West Point. Each cadet was

given a take-home project to complete individually, without assistance. A large number

of cadets collaborated on the project, resulting in 152 cadets being dismissed from West

Point (Betros, 2012, p. 57). This caused a national incident involving both houses of

Congress. It also led to a major investigation of West Point by the Secretary of the

Army, who appointed a committee lead by Frank Borman. The Borman Commission

findings dealt with issues on West Point’s governance, which prompted the Chief of Staff

of the Army to initiate a study, the West Point Study Group (WPSG) (Betros, 2012, p.

59). One of the areas examined at by the WPSG was the fourth class system. The WPSG

report of 1977 noted: “the difficulty in eliminating abuse but also with some fundamental

aspects of the system itself” (West Point Study Group Report, p. 115). The report

recommended positive leadership, phased development of freshmen cadets, and realistic

senior-subordinate relationships like those found in the Army (Superintendent’s Annual

Report of 1980, p. 33).

The other issue that challenged Ulmer, but ultimately eased the path for change,

was the 1976 Congressional mandate that women be granted admission to West Point, a

43

move that the Army and West Point opposed (Betros, 2012). The Army worried that the

presence of women would make West Point’s old fourth class system become even more

unacceptable to the country (L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013).

Despite creating challenges, both the admission of women and the EE 304 cheating

incident set the stage for future change at West Point.

About this time, West Point received a new Superintendent, Gen. Andrew

Goodpaster, who returned from retirement to make changes recommended by the WPSG.

Goodpaster accepted almost all 156 recommendations of the WPSG, 30 of which dealt

with leader development (Betros, 2012, p. 252). In 1979, another study of the fourth

class system was conducted, called the Fourth Class Working Group. This study led to

additional positive leadership that improved summer attrition rates in the freshman class

(cadets who left during the summer training of their freshmen year), reducing it from

10.5% to 7.5% between 1977 and 1983 (Betros, 2012). Crucial to these early leadership

development changes, including the institutionalizing and educating tactical officers

(TACs) and cadets, was the Cadet Counseling Center (H. Prince, personal

communication, October 8, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March 28, 2013).

Change agents like Lt. Col. Howard Prince, Chief of the Cadet Counseling

Center, continued to encourage positive leadership. Prince left the Cadet Counseling

Center to take over the new academic department of Behavioral Science & Leadership

(BS&L), now placed under the Dean of Academics (H. Prince, personal communication,

October 8, 2013). Lt. Col. Will Wilson took over the Cadet Counseling Center and

continued Prince’s work, while Prince implemented leader development from the West

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Point’s academic side in the 1970s and early 1980s. Prince and Wilson, from 1981 to

1986, continued to introduce leadership development at West Point in both the academic

curriculum and in military training, especially during new cadet basic training (H. Prince,

personal communication, October 8, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March

28, 2013). Although the changes by Prince and Wilson were incremental, they set the

foundation for the larger changes that would occur years later.

Gen. Willard Scott took over as Superintendent of West Point from Gen.

Goodpaster in 1981. He stabilized West Point after the many changes that resulted from

the cheating scandal and the admission of women (W. Wilson, personal communication,

March 28, 2013). This continued to set the stage for an organizational culture change

that would follow when Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer took over as Superintendent in 1986.

Palmer described the 1976 crisis as:

the storm that nearly sank the ship called West Point. To continue his metaphor, one could say that the ship did not sink, fortunately, due to rather desperate efforts to save it; but, it came through the storm badly in need of repairs before it could again be seaworthy. These sizable tasks – saving and repairing the ship – fell to General Palmer’s predecessors, Generals Andrew Goodpaster (1977-1981) and Willard Scott (1981-1986). Their successful efforts prepared the ship to set sail once again. But, on what course? (Donnithorne, 1991).

Organizational Culture Change Inception

Lt. Gen. Palmer had as much as 18 months to prepare for his role as

Superintendent of West Point (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013). In

addition, he knew that this assignment would be his final one in the U.S. Army; this had

been one of Gen. Goodpaster’s recommendations, and it was approved by the Army in

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1977. This gave Palmer a five-year term followed by retirement so he could make lasting

changes at West Point without fearing consequences for promotion or his next

assignment (L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013).

When Palmer assumed duties as the Superintendent, he received no specific

guidance, tasks or missions from the Chief of Staff of the Army, Gen. Carl Vouno.

Palmer knew that he had a limited time to implement changes, not only because of his

fixed five-year term, but also because West Point was experiencing a calm period, both

internally and externally. The Army, too, was experiencing a calm period in the world.

Such times did not come often, and Palmer felt a sense of urgency (D. Palmer, personal

communication, October 9, 2013):

The time of calm, which had permitted a period of affirmation and change, drew to a close in the early 1990s. The window of opportunity began sliding shut. A rising number of issues in which the Academy found itself embroiled – downsizing the Army and the Military Academy, extending the active duty service obligation, investigating the service academies’ costs, and others – were a signal that the time of calm was over. The possibility that the window would close abruptly had imposed urgency on the planning and the change process from the beginning. That urgency had proved itself essential by the end (Donnithorne, 1991, pp. 10-11).

Any changes Palmer made would have to be well established before his term ended.

Palmer directed yet another series of studies that dealt with the fourth class

system and leader development (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).

The studies were to determine the purpose of West Point. The studies revealed that West

Point’s overriding purpose was to produce officers who were leaders of character for the

U.S. Army (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).

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Facilitating a Leadership Development Model

Lt. Gen. Palmer confirmed from the studies he directed that West Point was a

leader development institution (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).

Palmer’s knowledge of West Point’s history and the reasons why other leaders there had

attempted to reform the fourth class system and add leadership development suggested to

him that West Point was not offering development opportunities for the upper class

cadets (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013). This allowed the upper

class cadets to concentrate on the fourth class cadets.

Palmer wanted a system that challenged the upper class cadets more than the

fourth class cadets. Army officers needed to be skilled in developing subordinates, and

Palmer felt that teaching the upper class these skills would also relieve the pressure on

the fourth class. Palmer visited Col. Howard Prince, Department Head of BS&L, to ask

for ideas and help in establishing a leadership development program for all four classes.

He then told the subordinate leaders at West Point (Dean of Academics Brig. Gen. Roy

Flint, Director of Athletics Carl Ullrich, and Commandant of Cadets Brig. Gen. Fred

Gordon) that everything they did in their areas would have to relate to leader

development. If it did not, then they were to discontinue the program or activity (D.

Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal

communication, October 16, 2013). Palmer discussed leader development in all meetings

and demanded that this vision be communicated to all stakeholders in the West Point

nation: “…all cadet programs and activities are intended ultimately to contribute to one

objective, leader development…” (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 68).

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Tactical Officer Education System

Gen. Palmer also asked for help in educating tactical officers (TACs). TACs

went to universities around the country to receive master’s degrees in counseling, not

leadership development. Palmer wanted them to receive degrees in leadership

development and directed Col. Prince to make this happen. He also appointed Prince to

chair a committee for the entire college that would recommend solutions and tie together

the many disparate leadership programs at West Point (D. Palmer, personal

communication, October 9, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013).

Cadet Schedule Modification

As part of his efforts, Palmer examined carefully the 24-hour schedule of the

cadets. In a military college, the 24-hour schedule is the one document that controls

cadet time. Palmer rebalanced the cadet 24-hour schedule so that leader development

played a prominent role; everything that was not related to leadership development was

purged from the schedule. Palmer insisted that he be kept informed about every item,

existing or planned, on the cadet schedule that was not connected with leadership

development. Furthermore, he demanded to see anyone who added anything to cadet

time that could not be tied to leadership development. Some circles at West Point viewed

Palmer as a radical for challenging the current system and forcing the college out of its

comfort zone.

Palmer recalled that after a number of lower grade officers had to report to him,

word spread quickly around the campus that he was serious about implementing

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leadership development. Once, after hearing that the Physics Department was opposed to

his policy of lights-out at 2300 hours, because they required several all-night assignments

during the semester, Palmer asked the Head of the Physics Department to come see him.

Palmer remembers telling the Department Head that he might not know much about

teaching Physics, but why was it important to have cadets stay up all night 2-3 times a

semester? The Department Head replied that the General may not have realized it, but

that was the way Physics was taught. Palmer responded that in that case, the course

syllabus should specify that in order to pass the course, cadets would be required to stay

up all night 2-3 times during the semester. He also said that he hoped the course would

meet accreditation standards with this requirement. The Head of the Physics Department

then said that he would modify the course to require no further overnight work (D.

Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).

Palmer completely revised the cadet 24-hour schedule. He reduced the

curriculum to 40 courses, reduced class periods, and eliminated Saturday class periods.

Palmer felt that the cadets were overwhelmed with requirements and had no opportunity

to effectively accomplish them, let alone develop leadership skills: “He then protected the

newfound time for approved uses, including weekend trips, passes, and activities that

formerly competed with academics during the weekdays” (Betros, 2012). These changes

were necessary in order to incorporate leadership development fully into West Point.

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Establishing a Leadership Integration Team

Palmer realized he would meet resistance internally and externally to his planned

changes for leader development. He also recognized that he could not himself supervise

the changes throughout West Point. He created the Office of Leader Development

Integration (OLDI) and staffed it with two highly talented Colonels, Will Wilson and

Steven Hammond (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013). Col.

Donnithorne was supposed to become an Assistant Dean of Academics, but Palmer

changed that assignment to Special Assistant to the Superintendent for Plans and Policy

(SASPP) (L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013). These two

offices would later merge together (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 63). Col. Wilson, who had

supported leader development at West Point for more than 10 years, replaced Prince at

the Cadet Counseling Center. The Office of Leader Development Integration was

essential for keeping the entire campus focused on the transition to a leader development

system (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal

communication, October 16, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March 28,

2013).

Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS)

Prince, Department Head of Behavioral Science & Leadership, had his

department work with others at West Point to design a new four year leader development

program (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; B. Forsythe, personal

50

communication, October 14, 2013). The new program was called Cadet Leader

Development System (CLDS, pronounced “kleds”):

CLDS provides the organizing framework around which the four years of the West Point Experience are designed to achieve this noble end. Provisions of the CLDS are directive in nature. ALL USMA and United States Corps of Cadets (USCC) publications pertaining to the development of cadets as leaders of character are subordinate to CLDS (CLDS, USMA Circular, 1-101, 1 August, 1993).

The CLDS system marked a significant change in organizational culture; it

completely replaced the attritional/adversarial fourth class system with a system

consisting of four distinct classes (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013).

For more than 100 years, the fourth class system had really recognized only two classes –

the fourth class and the upper class (S. Snook, personal communication, October 16,

2013). The upper class interacted with the fourth class through an attritional/adversarial

system, leading to abusive behavior and hazing. The new CLDS system was designed to

engage all four classes by increasing expectations every year. Essentially, this replaced

the old attritional/adversarial system with a mandated four year leadership development

model (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal

communication, March 28, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16,

2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; B. Forsythe, personal

communication, October 14, 2013). Brig. Gen. Bramlett explained the Cadet Leader

Development System to the Board of Visitors (BOV) in this way:

The Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS) is an evolutionary program and is an outgrowth of several studies done on the “fourth class system” during 1989. General Bramlett pointed out that essentially CLDS codified the requirements for each class in a single document. Not only is there still a fourth class system, but there are also third, second, and first class systems. General Bramlett pointed out

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that CLDS was more of a change for the upper classes than the fourth class. He noted the Class of 1991 was exceptional in its acceptance and implementation of CLDS. The Class of 1992 was uneven in its acceptance when they were the second class but are much more positive now that they are leading the Corps. He noted in conclusion that the plebe year remains tough and stressful, and by design teaches self-discipline, subordination and selflessness. The remaining three years build on that foundation with the development process intensifying as cadets assume leadership roles by position and class (BOV Annual Report, 1991). Table 4.2 and 4.3 illustrate the changes in cadet development under the

attritional/adversarial fourth class system and the four class system under CLDS. It

clearly demonstrates that under CLDS, all classes are developed for a post-graduation

environment, as opposed to just freshmen under the fourth class system:

Table 4.2: Cadet Development Under the Fourth Class System

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Table 4.3: Cadet Development Under the CLDS

.

(BOV Annual Report, 1991).

Under the new CLDS system, if an upper class cadet was not successfully

developing and caring for their subordinates, then that cadet might fail in their own

leadership development. This shifted the burden from the fourth class to the upper class,

which was challenged with increasing responsibilities as they progressed through West

Point (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal

communication, March 28, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16,

2013; B. Forsythe, personal communication, October 14, 2013). “Developing” and

“caring” were defined in CLDS as:

Subordinate development is a chain of command responsibility. Cadet leaders are responsible for the accomplishment of developmental goals at each level within

53

the chain of command. This requires that all cadet leaders recognize their responsibility to instruct, to coach, to counsel and to correct subordinates. Cadet leaders must set the example. They must enforce standards and/or regulations. They must help subordinates realize their developmental goals. And, when necessary, they must learn how to make constructive, on-the spot corrections. In addition to these general responsibilities shared by all cadet leaders, CLDS is based on recognition that certain groups of cadets have specific responsibilities that derive from their level within the rank hierarchy. Cadet officers, for example, bear responsibility for the development of cadet non-commissioned officers within their chain of command. Similarly, cadet NCOs exercise primary responsibility for the development of Cadet Corporals, while Cadet Corporals are responsible to develop Cadet Privates in their chain of command. The success of this system rests on the extent to which leaders at each echelon do, indeed, set the example. Subordinates cannot be held to higher standards than their leaders. (CLDS, USMA Circular, 1-101, 1 August 1993).

CLDS was so thorough and detailed that even Superintendent Palmer was

involved at the lowest levels of the Corps of Cadets. Palmer, Prince, Wilson,

Donnithorne, and Forsythe all described the planning done for sophomores, which are

called “yearlings” at West Point. The yearlings were their biggest concern, since they

had no special responsibilities so they often bothered freshmen, referred to at West Point

as “plebes.” They designed a program in which every sophomore was promoted to

Corporal and assigned a number of freshmen as subordinates to develop, train, and

educate. Detailed expectations were provided to the sophomores. In order for them to

successfully pass, they had to meet high standards for tracking the successful

development of their subordinates.

The same conditions applied to the juniors, or second class cadets. They were all

promoted to Sergeants and had increasing responsibility for freshmen and sophomores.

All seniors, or first year cadets, were promoted to Cadet Officers and had increasing

responsibility for the development of the three lower classes (D. Palmer, personal

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communication, October 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March 28, 2013;

L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013; B. Forsythe, personal

communication, October 14, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013).

USMA Circular 1-101 was a 79-page document that described specific

requirements for each class but concentrated on the upper class. This focused the

attention on the upper class to perform in a developmental system:

Information concerning leader development comes from two primary sources. First, program directors evaluate cadet performance in their respective programs (Academic, Military, and Physical). Scores in each program are combined by prescribed procedures to produce a Cadet Performance Score that reflects relative development performance. This score forms a basis for sequencing for branch selection and for graduation sequence numbers. Second, whole person reviews of performance across programs at specified checkpoints during Third Class (sophomore), Second Class (junior), and First Class (senior) Year identify cadets with particular developmental needs. These reviews culminate in identification of Cadets of Concern (CLDS, USMA Circular 1-101, 1 August 1993).

The document also prescribed roles and responsibilities for everyone at West Point, not

just cadets.

The new CLDS system was briefed throughout the campus and everyone at West

Point was expected to understand and follow it. Prince observed that if he asked a Math

professor what his/her role at West Point was, the answer should be “a leadership

developer” (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013). The West Point

Board of Visitors (BOV) in its 1989 report approved the organizational culture change

and made the following statement:

The Board agrees that the adoption of a four-year development system will be much more comprehensive than the “old” fourth class system and there is consensus among the Board that the fourth class system focused disproportionate attention on freshmen cadets at the expense of the upper three classes. Based on presentations received from members of the staff and faculty, the Board concludes

55

that the proposed changes should inhibit demeaning and humiliating treatment of subordinates and foster responsibility and maturity in upperclassmen, while continuing to insure that the USMA experience is tough and challenging for all cadets. We particularly commend the new system of leadership development, which emphasizes increasing responsibility in the command structure as the cadet advances during each of the upper three years (BOV Annual Report, 1989).

Scrambling vs. the Cohort Model

“Scrambling” is a term used to describe the random assignment of cadets from

one company to another company. From about 1960 until 1984, West Point usually

scrambled cadets after their freshmen year. After the Army began its cohort model, West

Point followed the Army’s lead, and in 1985 began keeping cadets in the same cadet

company (Donnithorne, 1991). But the cohort model presented West Point with serious

issues that pressured Lt. Gen. Palmer to return to the scrambling model:

… the sustainment in some companies of norms contrary to those of the institution. Once begun, such dysfunctional norms tended to become entrenched rather than to dissipate from year-to-year. That problem would be improved by scrambling, as cadets would find themselves in new companies associating with other cadets who had experienced dissimilar company norms and would be more likely to fall back upon institutional norms as their common ground for behavior (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 32).

Another reason for the strong push for to return to scrambling was because:

Under the cohort system, the friendships among upperclassmen in a company developed over a long period and could conflict with the leader-subordinate relationships. When cadets resolved the conflict in favor of the friendship, the opportunity to gain in the practice of leadership was foregone. However, it was noted that, by one scramble of a cadet class between their Third and Second Class year, the relationships between all classes in a company at the beginning of the academic year would be uncomplicated by former, long-standing friendships. The First Class would not know the Second, the Second would not know the Third, and none of them would know the Fourth (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 32).

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Palmer made the decision to scramble the second class, calling this the “Leader

Distribution Plan” (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 32).

Leadership Development Master’s Degree

Palmer wanted the tactical officers to attend graduate school in leadership

development (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; H. Prince, personal

communication, October 8, 2013). Col. Barney Forsythe was tasked by Prince to develop

a TAC officer master’s degree in leadership development. After researching programs

throughout the country, Forsythe found no such degree at any college or university (B.

Forsythe, personal communication, October 14, 2013). He found leadership degrees at

universities, but none specifically in leadership development (B, Forsythe, personal

communication, October 14, 2013). Most leadership degrees in colleges were tied to a

MBA program or management degree and consisted of courses about general leadership,

“pretty much just knowledge transfer” (J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, November

27, 2013).

Palmer was informed of this problem and told Prince that West Point should

develop its own master’s degree in leadership development (D. Palmer, personal

communication, October 9, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013;

L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013). West Point then designed a

master’s program in leadership development that included curriculum in counseling,

student development, and leader development (J. LeBoeuf, personal communication,

March 21, 2013). Col. Joe LeBoeuf described the development of the program:

57

The challenge in this program was to insure that the students had a rigorous, world-class, ACADEMIC experience [not just a trade-school experience], but an experience that was also practically related to the mission of the Academy, and the purpose for their roles – to develop cadets as leaders of character – an educational process; not just a training mission. The TACs were the key engines for driving a leader [intrapersonal: individual development], and leadership [interpersonal: collective/collaborative] development culture at the Academy that was in line with what we know about human development. (J. LeBoeuf, email, February 22, 2014).

The most important courses in the masters program were: an advanced leadership

theory course, an organizational change theory course, an organizational culture course, a

course in moral/ethical/intellectual development and a course on the history of West

Point with the Department of History. In addition, many speakers came to talk to

students about their areas of expertise. This curriculum was designed to insure that TACs

understood leadership and development concepts so they could use these concepts to

change the culture in their cadet companies (J. LeBoeuf, personnel communication,

February 22, 2014). LeBoeuf explained that the TACs were viewed as change agents

who had to be able to assess human and organizational behavior, change the behavior as

required, and then affect a culture that would reinforce and sustain the changes and

desired behavior over time” (J. Leboeuf, email, February 22, 2014).

In the early years of the program, students had to write a thesis and take a difficult

oral exam. Later, the thesis requirement was dropped, but the oral exam requirement was

retained. Students also had to conduct a major study of the cadet development culture

and summarize the results in a presentation to the Commandant. Throughout the program

the students had to demonstrate mastery of course materials through writing papers and

presentations. At times, there were TACs who failed to complete the program and were

58

not granted the degree or allowed to continue as TACs. (J. LeBoeuf, personnel

communication, February 22, 2014).

The program received accreditation and West Point started granting master

degrees for TACs. Palmer, Prince, Forsythe, Donnithorne, LeBoeuf, and Wilson all

considered this a seminal element in West Point’s new leadership development system.

Palmer even viewed this TAC officer education as training for future battalion and

brigade commanders (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013).

In 1992, Congress told the Army that they could no longer grant master’s degrees

in leader development. West Point eventually developed a program with nearby

Columbia University to grant master’s degrees in leadership development (L. Betros,

personal communication, October 18, 2013; J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March

21, 2013). Now called the Eisenhower Fellowship at West Point, this program is unique:

Columbia University teaches the counseling and the student development pieces and

West Point teaches the leadership development piece (J. LeBoeuf, personal

communication, November 27, 2013). Interestingly, the U.S. Air Force Academy, which

adapted nearly all of West Point’s leader development system, has a similar program with

the University of Colorado at Colorado Springs (J. LeBoeuf, personal communication,

November 27, 2013).

Adjustments for the Fourth Class

Once Palmer had all of West Point focused on leader development, he then made

changes to the fourth class system traditions in the Corps of Cadets (L. Donnithorne,

personal communication, October 16, 2013). Under his instruction:

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the Academy faculty explored every aspect of the cadets’ four year experience. Each element was scrutinized and, in some cases, altered, to ensure that it contributed to a coherent framework for leadership development. Examined thusly, the shortcomings of the “Fourth Class System” became more and more apparent and were reported in findings of two different review committees (Donnithorne, 1993, p. 155).

Because of the new leadership development education and training, upper class cadets

began to “…experience a transformation in self-image” (Donnithorne, 1993). For the

first time in West Point’s history, “cadets began to think of themselves more as

developing leaders than purveyors of a harsh but necessary plebe system” (Donnithorne,

1993). The fourth class system adopted new purpose:

1. to promote leader development (including followership),

2. to facilitate transition from civilian life into military life and organizations,

3. to promote development of military attributes (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 36).

Palmer then asked the Corps of Cadets to do away with everything in the

freshman year that had nothing to do with leader development (D. Palmer, personal

communication, October 9, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16,

2013). Such changes included plebe knowledge, where freshmen memorized facts about

the U.S. Army instead of useless data (Engen, n.d.). Plebe knowledge was just one of

many areas that were changed or eliminated from the fourth class system. The cadets

themselves recommended eliminating plebe traditions that played no role in leader

development.

In a July 1990 memorandum for activity directors and department heads,

Commandant of Cadets Gen. David Bramlett elaborated on five areas of changes that

related to the fourth class: bearing, duties, cadet dining hall, discipline, and knowledge.

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Bramlett concluded his memorandum by stating: “We owe it to our cadets and the nation

to provide a developmental experience that is consistent with the highest standards of

professionalism. I am confident that the initiatives addressed herein will help move us

closer to that objective” (USCC Memorandum, 1990). The key to Palmer’s success in

making changes was that “Instead of trying, as his predecessors had done, to force cadets

to obey rules they did not believe in, he instead led them to believe in the new rules”

(Donnithorne, 1993).

Palmer also moved up the timing of fourth class recognition to before Spring

Leave. “Recognition” at military colleges is when the freshmen are officially

acknowledged by the other classes as being fully trained. This means knowing all the

duties and responsibilities of a member in the Corps of Cadets and being considered a full

members of the Corps. Recognition completely changes the tone and attitudes toward the

fourth class. After recognition, the fourth class system is no longer in effect, but fourth

class duties still must be performed (Donnithorne, 1993).

Finally, after 30 years of incremental change, the Corps accepted Palmer’s

changes, though it took about four years for full implementation of the leader

development system to take effect (D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013;

L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013). In 1991, West Point reported to

the BOV that the new four class system was more successful than anticipated. West

Point based this on indicators such as counseling feedback, faculty observations, and

nightly reports written by commissioned officers in charge of the cadet barracks that

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documented any issues in the Corps of Cadets during the night (BOV Annual Report,

1991).

Leadership Change and Preserving Organizational Culture Change

During times of any organizational culture change, sustaining the change is as

important as the change itself. Palmer knew this, and before his time as Superintendent

was finished, he talked with the Chief of Staff of the Army about the selection of his

replacement. He said that it was critical that his replacement understood the culture

change that had occurred at West Point – from an attritional/adversarial model to a

leadership developmental model. He further requested that his replacement support and

sustain all the changes that were required to affect this organizational culture change (D.

Palmer, personnel communication, October 9,2013). The Army Chief of Staff agreed and

selected as the next Superintendent, Lt. Gen. Howard Graves, who supported and added

to the changes made during Palmer’s tenure (BOV Annual Report, 1995). Palmer also

ensured that the integration office (OLDI) remained after his departure to facilitate the

new Superintendent with sustaining the changes (D. Palmer, personal communication,

October 9, 2013).

Major Strides in West Point’s Organizational Culture Change

As Palmer’s tenure at West Point ended in 1991, several major strides in West

Point’s organizational culture change were in place:

1. the Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS) was introduced;

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2. the new Tactical Officer Education System required company tactical officers to obtain a master’s degree in leadership development before starting the job;

3. the entire West Point community agreed that its main mission was that of leadership development

(L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013; S. Snook, personal communication, October 16, 2013; B. Forsythe, personal communication, October 14, 2013; J. Weart, personal communication, October 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal communication, March 28, 2013; J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March 21, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; D. Palmer, personal communication, October 9, 2013; B. Byrne, personal communication, March 20, 2013; L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013).

Sustaining Organizational Culture Change

It is important to learn if West Point was able to sustain its organizational culture

change. In a 1995 report to the BOV, Superintendent Lt. Gen. Graves maintained that:

The Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS), though less visible, is an equally dramatic departure from past practices. It provides an overarching framework for integrating and organizing cadet leader development experiences and, since leader development is central to the Academy’s purpose, this change means that CLDS affects every program at West Point. As perhaps its most noticed effect, it has eliminated most of the demeaning and counterproductive features of the old “Plebe” system (BOV Annual Report, 1995).

In the same year, the Commandant of Cadets Gen. St. Onge explained to the BOV how

CLDS focused on leader development: “It is oriented on the cadets and the environment

in which they serve as young officers. I am convinced it is relative to the needs of the

Army” (BOV Annual Report, 1995).

In 2003, the Cadet Leader Development System was still in place at West Point

and had been greatly improved upon since its beginning in 1990 (G. Stone, personal

communication, September 13, 2013). Col. Greg Stone, the Brigade Tactical Officer

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(BTO) in 2003, noted significant changes from his time as a cadet in the 1970s, a TAC in

the 1980s, and upon returning as BTO in 2003. The CLDS system that had been in the

development stages when he left in the 1980s was fully operational when he returned in

2003, and improvements were made each year to keep it relevant (G. Stone, personal

communication, September 13, 2013). This view was confirmed by others, such as Lt.

Col. Jeff Weart, the first TAC officer to receive a master’s degree in leader development;

Col. Joe Leboeuf, Special Assistant to the Commandant of Cadets and a Behavioral

Science and Leadership Professor who was in charge of the TAC master’s education

program in 2003; and Lt. Col. Bob Byrne, Director of the Cadet Counseling Center (J.

LeBeouf, personal communication, March 21, 2013; J. Weart, personal communication,

October 9, 2013; B. Byrne, personal communication, March 20, 2013). All reported that

when they departed West Point around 2005, CLEDS was still going strong.

In addition, an April 2005 review of the West Point Circular 1-101-1 revealed that

the core concept started in 1990 was still present in 2005 (Cadet Leader Development

System, 2005). In the introduction of the circular, Superintendent Lt. Gen. William

Lennox called CLDS a developmental process that will prepare cadets to lead soldiers in

war and peace (Cadet Leader Development System, 2005). In 2013, retired Col. Art

Coumbe, a Social Science Professor, reported that CLDS was still successful, and there

was little evidence of the abusive behavior and hazing caused by the old fourth class

system (A. Coumbe, personal communication, March 3, 2013).

All those interviewed for this research noted that the change in tactical officer

education was one of the primary means of affecting and sustaining West Point’s

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organizational culture change (J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March 21, 2013).

Retired Col. Joe LeBoeuf maintains that the tactical officer education program was

critical to the success of the leader developmental system (J. LeBoeuf, personal

communication, March 21, 2013). This also was confirmed in interviews with retired

Col. Greg Stone, retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart, and retired Col. Scott Snook. Even in 1992,

when Congress stopped West Point from granting master’s degrees, West Point

recognized the critical importance of the program and arrangements were made for

Columbia University to offer the leadership development degree to future TAC officers

(J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March 21, 2013).

The Cadet Counseling Center (CCC) has also been also a key component in

sustaining West Point’s organizational culture change. This is particularly true during

new cadet basic training, when new cadets have their highest attrition. Lt. Col. Bob

Byrne said that the Center played a significant role in identifying and working with

cadets who had trouble in the initial stages of their cadet careers. During the summers,

the Center helped cadet commanders retain new freshmen cadets. The Center helped

cadets create conditions that fostered a positive environment, which focused on caring for

subordinate cadets and making the cadet company the best possible environment.

Lt. Col. Byrne also stated that the Cadet Counseling Center had always been a

developmental asset (B Byrne, personal communication, March 20, 2013). This view

was reiterated by other interviewees, including Gen. Prince, Col. Stone, and Lt. Col.

Weart). The Center was the one avenue that West Point used to introduce development

concepts to the Corps until CLDS was established (Will Wilson, personnel

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communication, March 28, 2013). The Center continued to be a development asset after

the West Point’s organizational change. It became a place where all cadets would reflect

on how their leadership techniques could be further improved as well as address issues

such as mental wellness (B. Byrne, personal communication, 24 February, 2014).

Effectiveness of Organizational Culture Change for West Point and the Army

This case study has outlined and noted the benefits of West Point’s organizational

culture change from an attritional/adversarial system to a leader developmental system.

What, though, indicates that this organizational culture change is better for the U.S.

Army? As stated by Col. Scott Snook, a former Behavioral Science & Leadership

professor and now a professor at the Harvard Business School, it is difficult to counter a

Vietnam veteran who says that his attritional/adversarial freshman year was one of the

things that enabled him to survive in a prisoner of war camp in Vietnam (S, Snook,

personal communication, October 16, 2013). Despite this, all the behavioral sciences

research indicates that if your mission is to produce leaders of character, then a

developmental system will help you accomplish that. More specifically, there are three

compelling reasons that suggest that the leader development system implemented by

West Point in 1990 made significant positive changes in the Army.

The first is that the Army itself departed from the attritional/adversarial system of

leadership long ago. The Army had realized that the leadership learned by cadets under

this system would have to be unlearned as Army officers, because it was abusive and

would not command the respect of soldiers (D. Palmer, personal communication, October

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9, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013; W. Wilson, personal

communication, March 28, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13,

2013; J. LeBoeuf, personal communication, March 21, 2013; J. Weart, personal

communication, October 9, 2013; L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16,

2013).

Secondly, as Lt. Gen. Palmer maintained, the mere existence of the Cadet Leader

Development System after 22 years indicates its benefit to the Army, because no system

lasts that long in the Army if it is not successful (D. Palmer, personal communication,

October 9, 2013). Col. Scott Snook, who conducted annual assessments of West Point

officers by interviewing Army battalion and brigade commanders, stated that over a

period of years, abusive officer behaviors were not an issue among West Point graduates

(S. Snook, personal communication, October 16, 2013). In contrast, some of the best

leaders the U.S. Army ever produced, among them MacArthur and Eisenhower,

recognized the need for change among West Point graduates produced under the

attritional/adversarial system, because they were not satisfied with the leadership skills

the graduates displayed (H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013). The

Army is the reason that West Point exists and thus, the fact that West Point functions

under a leader development system indicates that this system benefits the Army. All of

the West Point officers interviewed for this research agreed with this.

Thirdly, the benefits of the organizational culture change were apparent at West

Point almost immediately. Abusive behavior toward freshmen that was previously

deemed acceptable among the cadets under the attritional/adversarial system was now

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considered unacceptable. Col. Donnithorne noticed that upper class cadets made

corrections among themselves, and peer pressure in the Corps itself was a positive

influence among cadets. He further noted that freshmen learned more quickly under the

new system, citing as an example the first day that new cadets arrive at West Point (L.

Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013). In the past, new cadets were

barely able to put on their uniforms on the first day, let alone march in the first day’s

parade. Under the new developmental system however, with the absence of yelling and

harassment, new cadets are able to concentrate on the tasks at hand and are almost in step

during the first day’s parade (Donnithorne, 1993, p. 157).

Interestingly, the data on freshmen who resigned during new cadet training also

supports the success of the new leader development system. In the past, many cadets

identified poor leadership as the key to their decision to leave, but after the

developmental system was in place, the rate of resignation during new cadet training

decreased from 40 to only two to three, thus reducing attrition (Donnithorne, 1993, p.

158).

Those interviewed for this research in the 2000s stated that there was little hazing

or abusive behavior that was ingrained in the Corps after the culture change. Col.

Coumbe related the same based on his discussions about the leader development system

among cadets in 2013 (A, Coumbe, personal communication, March 3, 2013).

Resistance to Organizational Culture Change

When reading a summary of how organizational culture change occurred at West

Point, one might conclude that it was a smooth process and wonder why West Point did

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not make the change 100 years earlier. The reality is that there was strong resistance

from staff, faculty, alumni, and cadets to organizational culture change during Gen.

Palmer’s tenure (D. Palmer, personal communication, October, 9, 2013; W. Wilson,

personal communication, March 28, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October

8, 2013).

Col. Wilson and Gen. Prince remember receiving letters from fellow alumni

saying that they no longer recognized them as classmates. Gen. Palmer stated that he had

to create a sense of urgency, since many did not agree with him that change was needed.

Many believed that West Point traditions and methods had produced outstanding officers

for the Army in the past 100 years. They viewed the changes as being “soft” and worried

that they placed in jeopardy the outstanding service to the nation that West Point

provided (D. Palmer, personal communication, October, 9, 2013; W. Wilson, personal

communication, March 28, 2013; H. Prince, personal communication, October 8, 2013;

S. Snook, personal communication, October 16, 2013).

Palmer recalled dealing with Department Heads who resisted some of his

changes. He said that they acted “with malice and forethought” to undermine his

policies, and admitted that they were “doing a fairly decent job of it” (Betros, 2012).

Palmer threatened to use a tenure review process to look at professors who resisted the

organizational culture change. The tenure review process had been established by the

Chief of Staff of the Army in the late 1970s as part of reforms to West Point. The

previous Superintendent Gen. Scott did not use the process, but Palmer announced that he

would use it (Betros, 2012). As it turned out, Palmer never had to convene a review

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board; many professors recognized the inevitability of change and retired, allowing

Palmer to retain professors who supported his changes (Betros, 2012).

A Lengthy Path to Full Implementation

As a 1992 General Accounting Office report states, the organizational culture

change at West Point did not take place overnight (Stokan, 1994). The report notes that

the new Cadet Leadership Development System did reduce inappropriate treatment, but

some forms of hazing continued. It further stated that this was partly because the cadets

did not accept all of the changes and that organizational culture change would take time

to become institutionalized (Stokan, 1994). Lt. Gen. Graves, the Superintendent after

Palmer, told the West Point community in 1994, at the five year mark of the Cadet

Leadership Development System, that maintaining it would require everyone at West

Point to keep working to support it (Stokan, 1994).

Resources Needed for Organizational Culture Change

Palmer recalls that West Point did not ask the Army for any extra resources, such

as money or people, to make the organizational culture change (D. Palmer, personal

communication, October, 9, 2013). Palmer stated, though, that he did have to realign a

few resources within West Point. He created the Office of Leader Development

Integration and staffed it with officers from other West Point offices. He also assigned

many extra projects and duties, such as having Col. Howard Prince, Department Head of

Behavioral Science & Leadership, head-up the four class leader development system and

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develop the new TAC officer education program in leader development. This

realignment of internal resources allowed Palmer to introduce organizational culture

change at West Point.

Leaders Leading Organizational Culture Change

Brig. Gen. Betros summed up the organizational culture change at West Point by

saying that “MacArthur, Taylor, Davidson, and Goodpaster all contributed to the change,

but if anyone would win the Nobel Prize, it would be Lt. Gen. Palmer, who brought the

change to fruition” (L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013). Betros

added that “while these initiatives were neither perfect nor a panacea, they allowed West

Point to become a true leader development institution, as opposed to an unforgiving

crucible in which to prove oneself fit for leadership” (2012). Col. Donnithorne

maintained that all previous attempts to reform the attritional/adversarial fourth class

system at West Point were managerial, in contrast to Palmer’s leadership of the

organizational culture change from the top. Donnithorne added that most of the previous

attempts to change the culture at West Point focused on the rules rather than the culture,

and he noted that Palmer was well aware of this when he attempted the organizational

culture change (L. Donnithorne, personal communication, October 16, 2013).

The following Table summarizes the changes in values and norms that occurred

during Palmer’s 1990 attempt at organizational culture change at West Point:

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Table 4.4: Changes in Values and Norms

CADETS

BEFORE AFTER

- Challenge new cadets (adversarial)

- Develop new cadets

- Eliminate weak cadets (attritional) - Assumes some are not worthy to stay - Determined by cadets (paternal)

- Develop all new cadets - Assumes all cadets who have been

accepted are worthy to stay and succeed

- One class developed (freshman/plebes) - All upper classes have adversarial and

attritional attitude toward the freshmen, leading to dysfunctional, fraternal behavior

- Four classes developed (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior)

- All upper classes are held accountable for their own development and subordinates’ development

- A culture of development established - Leadership development reinforced

- An inward-focused West Point - “leadership” model - Determined by cadets

- A new external-focused Army - post-graduation leadership model

(CLDS)

FACULTY AND STAFF

BEFORE TAC OFFICER EDUCATION AFTER TAC OFFICER EDUCATION

- Master’s Degree in Counseling - Master’s Degree in Leader Development

-

- Only cadets and TAC Officers in charge of “4th class system”

- -All Staff and Faculty in charge of extensive, comprehensive four class system

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CHAPTER FIVE :

CASE STUDY OF THE CITADEL ’S FOURTH CLASS SYSTEM :

ATTEMPTING ORGANIZATIONAL CULTURE CHANGE

Call for Organizational Culture Change

In its advertising and mission statement, The Citadel defines itself as a leadership

development institution: “The Citadel takes pride in educating the ‘Whole Person’ –

mind, body, and spirit – and the cadet lifestyle is an important aspect of this educational

process…developing principled leaders in all walks of life since 1842” (The Citadel,

http:///www.citadel.edu/ root/corps-of-cadets). In this statement, The Citadel clearly

articulates its responsibility to develop its cadets in areas other than academic. Fulfilling

this responsibility, however, has presented challenges to The Citadel (J. Rosa, personal

communication, November 14, 2013; J. Grinalds, personal communication, September

24, 2013; H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013; S. Hines, personal

communication, September 25, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13,

2013; J Weart, personal communication, October 9, 2013). Many maintain that the

“fourth class system” imposed on The Citadel’s cadets has created these challenges.

Like all military colleges, The Citadel requires cadets to live in a barracks setting

under a 24-hour schedule and separates them into a four classes. The incoming freshmen

are called “fourth class cadets” or “knobs,” sophomores are called “third class cadets,”

juniors “second class cadets,” and seniors “first class cadets.” Cadets receive privileges

based on this class system and their individual rank within the system. For example,

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cadet rank holders administer 100-cadet companies each, and so have significant control

over the lives of their subordinate cadets (The White Book, 2013-2014).

According to the 2009-2010 “Fourth Class Manual,” the fourth class system was

designed to: “provide a base upon which a fourth class cadet may develop those qualities

essential to a good leader. It is dedicated to the principle that no one is fit to lead who

has not learned to follow. The system requires mental preparedness, physical

conditioning, and self-discipline, and is conducted with impartiality.” In order for this

type of system to succeed, however, it is essential that all cadets be treated with value and

respect. When this does not occur, the entire fabric of the institution changes (J. Rosa,

personal communication, November 14, 2013), causing a breakdown in cadet morale and

discipline (The Citadel, www.citadel.edu/root/corps-of-cadets). An attritional/adversarial

fourth class system enables abuse, such as hazing of freshmen, which in turn, leads to a

lack of value and respect throughout the Corps of Cadets (“The fourth class manual,”

2009-2010”).

The Citadel has long had an attritional/adversarial fourth class system, enabling

abusive behavior and hazing throughout its history (“Report to the President” (Whitmire

Report), 1968; “Report of the Fourth Class System” (Mood Report), 1980; “Report of the

Fourth Class System Inquiry” (Lane Report), 1991; Jenkins Report, 1997; “Enhancement

Initiatives” (The Mace Plan), 1997; “Institutional Program Assessment Committee

(IPAC) Final Report,” 2012). The Citadel is not alone in this; all other U.S. military

colleges in the country have faced similar challenges.

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In the 1950s, society became less tolerant of abusive behavior and hazing. This

created external and internal pressure at The Citadel, which acknowledged that the fourth

class system required study and change (H. Carter, personal communication, September

9, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Starting in the 1960s,

several fourth class system commissions (Whitmire, Mood, Lane, Jenkins, Mace Plan,

IPAC) were developed at The Citadel; they produced a series of reports on reforming the

fourth class system. Some changes were made to regulations, but there was little change

in the culture and behavior of the Corps of Cadets (Macaulay, 2011).

1979 - 1997: Preserving the Status Quo

Retired Vice Admiral James Stockdale became The Citadel’s President in 1979.

Stockdale, a Vietnam prisoner of war, a Medal of Honor recipient recognized for his

leadership in the prison camps, and a published scholar, came to The Citadel after serving

as President of the Naval War College. He quickly realized that the fourth class system

had been “blown up in the minds of mature men to be the prime status symbol” of the

college (Macaulay, 2011). Stockdale came to The Citadel hoping to improve academics,

but spent most of his energy as President trying to eliminate the hazing that grew out of

the fourth class attritional/adversarial system (Macaulay, 2011).

In 1980, Stockdale commissioned a study of alumni that recommended many

changes; the report was named after its Chairman, Dr. Frank Mood. The Mood Report

recommended 21 modifications to the fourth class system. This report caused great

controversy among the alumni, many of whom were state legislators (Macaulay, 2011).

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The report recommended that the fourth class system be “academically and physically

demanding and rigorous, but should be predicated on individual interest, respect, and

goodwill, and should scrupulously avoid discrimination, harassment, physical abuse and

obscenity/vulgarity” (1980). The Mood Report’s most controversial recommendations

were the following:

Completely reevaluate the purposes and the content of the fourth class indoctrination week with a view to decreasing its tempo and concentrating on those relatively few requirements which must be handled early in the freshmen experience. Many of those requirements now crammed into that first week could very easily be handled at a later date. Terminate the Fourth Class System at Corps Day and incorporate a formal recognition ceremony as part of the Corps Day activities. Eliminate all Fourth Class System activities in the mess hall, with the exception of instruction in good manners. We consider that the upper class/fourth class relationship in the mess hall should be one which produces an atmosphere conducive to relaxed dinning. Limit the time prior to scheduled formations that fourth classmen must fall in to two minutes prior to assembly. This should be sufficient for proper inspection and issuance of such instructions as are deemed necessary” (“Fourth Class System” (Mood Report), 1980). Stockdale supported the recommendations and was able to convince a reluctant

Board of Visitors (BOV), comprised of South Carolina residents and graduates of the

college, to approve the recommendations. Doing this, though, cost Stockdale all his

political capital with the BOV. Despite their approval, the BOV was concerned about

Stockdale’s governance of The Citadel (Macaulay, 2011). Their dissatisfaction spread to

the Corps of Cadets. Stockdale made some changes to the fourth class system and tried

to change the culture, but was overcome by resisters.

Walter Fraser, a former professor at The Citadel, summarized the school’s attitude

at the dawning of the 1980s by stating that Stockdale’s failure “to minimize hazing, to

change the school’s macho image, to attract scholarly students and to reorganize the

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command structure stemmed largely from his inability to overcome the fact that he was

neither a graduate of the institution nor a southerner” (Macaulay, 2011). Stockdale

resigned as President in less than a year, citing issues with the BOV: “I’ve resigned, and

the reason is simple. I’m just tired of hassling with the Board of Visitors over every

change in status quo I’ve tried to make…The forces of the status quo were marshaled and

they won.” Stockdale furthermore commented that The Citadel was “locked in pre-Civil

War concrete” (Macaulay, 2011).

Major General James Grimsley replaced Admiral Stockdale as President in 1980,

and he dismantled many of the changes that the Mood Report recommended for the

fourth class system. This ensured that the fourth class system at The Citadel would

remain attritional/adversarial, thus no major changes occurred during Grimsley’s

presidency. The stakeholders of The Citadel were satisfied with the status quo

(Macaulay, 2011).

Maj. Gen. Grimsley retired in 1989 and was replaced by retired Lt. Gen. Claudius

Watts as Interim President. The Citadel that Watts inherited enjoyed a good reputation

externally, but internally was plagued by racial tension, resistance to the admission of

women, and problems stemming from the fourth class system. Watts commissioned

another fourth class study, the Lane Report (Macaulay, 2011). Like the Mood Report,

this report recommended modifying the fourth class system (“Report of the Fourth Class”

(Lane Report), 1991). The most significant changes recommended were:

The Fourth Class System must emphasize positive leadership, gentlemanly conduct, and the mature exercising of responsibility for subordinates under one’s authority… Practices which are basically demeaning to fourth classmen must be eliminated; The Fourth Class System needs adjusting to ensure that freshmen

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cadets receive ample food, sleep, and study time. The information gathered by the Committee from cadets, TAC officers, medical staff, and faculty reveals that the current system results in freshmen operating in a deficit in these important categories… Eliminate such extra duties for freshmen as the painting of company banners and the company area in the barracks… The Committee feels that Hell Night serves no apparent constructive military purpose as it now exists. The overzealous activity of upperclassmen on the freshmen by yelling and punitive physical training set a negative tone for the remainder of the year and teaches a style of leadership inconsistent with The Citadel’s ideal (Report of the Fourth Class System (Lane Report, 1991).

Lt. Gen. Watts’ Presidency soon became consumed by fighting the admission of women,

and the recommendations implemented were incremental and resulted in little, if any,

substantial change to the fourth class system (Macaulay, 2011). Watts retired in 1995

because he opposed the federally mandated admission of women to The Citadel; he felt

the college needed a clean start with a new President (C. Poole, personal communication,

October 8, 2013).

Lt. Gen. Watts, Interim President, was replaced by Maj. Gen. Roger Cliff Poole.

Poole had formally served as Provost and Dean of Academics (C. Poole, personal

communication, October 8, 2013). Poole graduated from The Citadel in 1959 and

noticed immediately upon his return in 1995 that the fourth class system had problems.

Poole observed that the system had become very mean-spirited, filled with abuse and

hazing (C. Poole, personal communication, October 8, 2013). He stated that when he

attended The Citadel in the 1950s, there was hazing by the current definitions in the

college regulations, but the hazing was good-natured and was never meant to abuse

cadets (C. Poole, personal communication, October 8, 2013). Poole also observed an

overall breakdown in the discipline of the Corps of Cadets. He had little time to devote

to the fourth class, though, although the outcomes of abusive behavior and hazing were

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rampant. The admission of women and the subsequent hazing of women triggered

lawsuits against The Citadel; Poole acknowledged that women received the same

treatment as men. Poole spent most of his time involved with this issue; the federal court

ended up stepping in to monitor the integration of women into The Citadel (C. Poole,

personnel communication, October 8, 2013).

The Commandant of Cadets under Poole was retired Col. Joe Trez, who authored

an article in 1996 for the Homecoming edition of The Brigadier, the cadet newspaper (J.

Trez, personal communication, September 6, 2013). In the article, Trez states:

I am committed to the vision communicated by the former Presidents of The Citadel and the Board of Visitors who directed the changes to our system over the last 28 years. Every committee that has studied our system in depth has found abuses that run counter to the stated goals, principles, and objectives of the Fourth Class System as found in College publications. These abuses are rooted in what in the mind of some were traditions… Those traditions which are not authorized and, in particular, those that do not support the goals and objectives of the system are abuses that have no place in a military organization (The Brigadier, 1996).

Trez was never able to change anything about the fourth class system and observed that

to his mind, the system remained much as it was 1996 (J. Trez, personal communication,

September 6, 2013). Poole transferred Trez to the college staff in 1997 to assist him with

the coed integration, and he hired a new Commandant, retired Brig. Gen. Emory Mace

(C. Poole, personal communication, October 8, 2013).

The Army, Navy, and Air Force Professors of Military Science (ROTC) – they

called themselves the Jenkins Committee because their offices were located in Jenkins

Hall – wrote to the BOV in February 1997:

The Fourth Class System, as currently implemented, is largely a “rite of passage.” It does not produce the basically trained, self-disciplined, motivated third classmen we expect. Fourth classmen are abused by immature members of the

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Corps; they know they are not receiving good leadership; and in the end many only want to hold rank so they can in turn repeat the abuse, and many more want to assume the role of third class “senior privates” (“The Corps of Cadets,” Memorandum for the BOV, 1997).

The Jenkins Committee outlined a plan for correcting the fourth class system and

concluded:

…the ideas presented in this Memorandum have the potential to break the cycle of abuse in the current system. We could argue details, but fixing the little things will never be effective until there is a decisive intervention in the way the Corps does business… It will not be easy or cheap. We believe you must commit the dollars to survive this storm. There can be no sacred cows… What we propose is radical, audacious, and will be hard to swallow by the alumni. We believe it will be easier to sell to the Corps, largely because most young men of the caliber of ours do respond to good leadership (“The Corps of Cadets,” Memorandum for the BOV, 1997).

1997 - 2004: Enabling Change

Retired Maj. Gen. John Grinalds became President in 1997, and Poole returned to

his former position of Provost and Dean of Academics (C. Poole, personal

communication, October 8, 2013). Grinalds’ initial assessment was that The Citadel was

undisciplined as a Corps, and he expressed grave concerns over the fourth class system

and the cadet honor system, which stated a cadet would not lie, cheat or steal, nor tolerate

anyone who would. Grinalds observed excessive abusive behavior and a good deal of

hazing in the fourth class system (personal communication, September 24, 2013). At the

time, some college administrators called the fourth class system “life threatening” due to

the brutal nature of the hazing (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).

After his assessment of the Corps, Grinalds clearly saw the need for an organizational

culture change (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013).

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Grinalds began his Presidency facing both internal and external pressures.

Internally, The Citadel embraced the problematic fourth class and honor systems, which

led to an undisciplined Corps of Cadets. In Grinalds’ view of the fourth class and honor

systems, he compared some cadets in the Corps to extortionists (J. Grinalds, personal

communication, September 24, 2013). As an example, Grinalds remembered that it was

common for an upper class cadet to enter a freshmen’s room and take anything they

wanted.

Externally, The Citadel was still under high profile federal court supervision on

coed-integration. Maj. Gen. Grimsley appointed a committee on the integration of

woman into the Corps of Cadets. The resulting “Grimsley Report” made 13

recommendations. One of those concerned the fourth class system. It recommended a

“reaffirmation of ‘zero tolerance’ of a system abuse, continuous monitoring at all levels,

selection of a female admission-supportive training cadre, withholding sophomore rank

until second semester, and application of the system uniformly regardless of gender”

(Alumni News, 1997).

The BOV recognized these internal and external pressures and wanted them

resolved (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013; S. Bauer, personal

communication, October 2, 2013). This presented a rare opportunity to bring

organizational cultural change to The Citadel. The BOV gave Grinalds and Mace the

power and authority to make decisions, especially regarding the fourth class system (S.

Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013). Grinalds developed a three-part plan

to facilitate organizational culture change in the fourth class system. Although written

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documentation of this plan cannot be found, evidence of parts of it exists in the Alumni

magazine, Winter and Summer of 1998. The plan consisted of three tasks to be

accomplished over five to six years:

1. Clear enunciation of the new philosophy. This new philosophy required the Corps of Cadets to shift their thinking, from simply surviving to striving to achieve high standards. Cadets would be challenged by high standards rather than adversarial treatment.

2. Develop a set of new cadet regulations that align with the new philosophy.

3. Establish a supervisory structure for the Corps of Cadets. Tactical Officers

(TACs) were needed in every company to coach, teach, and train cadets (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013).

Grinalds tasked Mace to implement the three components of his plan (J. Grinalds,

personal communication, September 24, 2013). The plan was called the Mace Plan and

was considered a “jump start” covering Grinalds’ overall plan. Significantly, the Mace

Plan was published in the Summer, 1997 Alumni magazine. The plan would create a

Citadel Leadership Development Center, whose goal would be to develop and teach the

Corps of Cadets positive leadership. It would also develop a formal program of

instruction on leadership, complete with lesson plans and training materials

(“Enhancement Initiatives,” Mace Plan, 1997). The Mace Plan included 23 specific

provisions dealing with the fourth class, including these significant ones:

The fourth class will join the Corps during an early September date (The usual date was MID OCT). Hell night is eliminated. Unauthorized solicitation of funds from the fourth class will be dealt with severely. The fourth class system will end during the Corps Day weekend (March rather than May). Fourth class cadets will have the option of remaining at the mess after second rest with their schedule being the only time constraint. Money will not be solicited from fourth class cadets without the Commandant’s approval in writing and without the fourth class cadet receiving a direct benefit from the solicitation (“Enhancement Initiatives,” Mace Plan, 1997).

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Additional recommendations were planned for the Corps on cadet rank, cadet leaves,

privileges, mess hall, haircuts, publications, ring night activities, and physical training

(“Enhancement Initiatives,” Mace Plan, 1997).

There were significant resource issues, primarily monetary, associated with the

Mace Plan. In fact, some of the Mace Plan was never implemented due to these

constraints (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013). Other parts of

the plan never came to fruition, such as The Citadel Leader Development Center and the

associated leadership classes (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013). The

Mace Plan brought about conditions for change, but never went far enough to actually

cause change (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).

Grinalds then developed a strategic plan, “Goals 2000,” that focused on

leadership development. The plan was to:

establish a formal four year undergraduate program of leadership development based on achievement; establish an undergraduate community service program for all sophomores to serve in meeting Charleston community needs; establish an undergraduate internship program for all juniors to serve in Charleston public or private sector enterprises (Office of External Affairs, 2000).

The plan, however, does not mention the fourth class system or a culture change in the

Corps, and was not comprehensive enough to change the system (H. Carter, personal

communication, September 9, 2013).

Another criticism of Grinalds’ overall plan, of which The Mace Plan was a part,

was that it involved only the Commandant’s Department and the Corps of Cadets, thus

lacking the involvement of the entire college. Without engaging the entire college

community, there were not enough change agents to affect any major change (J. Weart,

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personal communication, October 9, 2013). Grinalds and Mace proposed little in the way

of fourth class changes from 2002-2004, except for a rehash of proposals that were not

completed in the Mace Plan. Small changes to reduce “screaming and yelling” in the

barracks and review “knob knowledge requirements” were the only fourth class changes

proposed (BOV Minutes, June 2002).

Grinalds established a leadership initiative called the Krause Initiative, named

after a major donor who contributed money allocated for leadership:

Envisioned as an institutional dialogue to improve The Citadel’s ethics and leadership programs, the Krause Initiative was a unique strategic step for the college. A series of internal, cultural issues and incidents, along with external environmental factors, called for the college to do something different in these areas. Though the actual details and desired end state for this type of institutional changes were not solidified, The Citadel’s leadership committed to creating a gift-funded position for an individual to start the process (“Report of Krause Initiative,” 2004).

The Krause Initiative enabled a director to be hired, retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart. His jobs

were to fund, coordinate, and facilitate leadership programs on campus to change the

culture from an attritional/adversarial model to a leadership developmental model, in

coordination with the honor system (J. Weart personal communication, October 9, 2013).

A major problem with The Krauss Initiative was that unless other departments

agreed to the Center’s recommended changes, the Krause Center had no authority to

direct any change; it also had limited resources to help implement any changes. (J.

Weart, personal communication, October 9, 2013). Grinalds stated in a memorandum to

the faculty and staff that the Krause Initiative would:

1. Establish a Citadel Development Model and Supporting Documentation,

2. Develop and Refine Instructional Efforts to Promote Ethical Leadership,

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3. Improve and Expand Opportunities for Interaction to Promote Ethical

Leadership Development (“Implementation of the Krause Initiative,” 2004). Grinalds purposely did not establish a leadership center, because he felt this would

encourage the responsible parties of The Citadel to delegate their responsibility to

leadership and honor development to the Center, and would not remain involved with

funding and coordinating these efforts themselves. He wanted the entire college to be

engaged in developing principled leaders (J. Grinalds, personal communication,

September 24, 2013).

Grinalds believed his plan to be well aligned to the issues that he encountered

when he assumed the Presidency. He acknowledged that the situation in the Corps was

constantly changing and so his plan required constant adjustments (J. Grinalds, personal

communication, September 24, 2013). The Corps of Cadets discipline and the

functioning of the fourth class system improved dramatically under Grinalds and Mace’s

leadership. Although The Citadel kept no data on the different levels of hazing, brutal

physical hazing was stopped during the Grinalds/Mace era. Some examples of brutal

hazing were putting fourth class cadets into wall lockers and throwing them down the

stairs, and duct-taping a sophomore cadet from each company to a chair in the quadrangle

so the seniors could brand them with their rings on Ring Night (S. Bauer, personal

communication, December 18,2013).

Despite this, Grinalds’ overall plan and the Mace Plan were not able to achieve an

organizational culture change of the fourth class system from an attritional/adversarial

system to a developmental system (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013;

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H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013). Their efforts never went far

enough to make the changes recommended by the many commissions over 40 years that

had studied the fourth class system (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013;

H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013).

2004-2006: Marching In Place

When Grinalds retired as President in 2005, Poole was once again appointed as

Interim President to lead The Citadel. For the second consecutive presidential transition,

there was no permanent incoming President to replace an outgoing one. Grinalds has

stated that there was little opportunity to ensure continuity of his plan during the

transition, except to note that Poole was familiar with his policies, despite not serving in

The Citadel’s administration since he left the Office of Provost and Dean of Academics

three years earlier (J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013). Poole

acted as Interim President until the arrival of Lt. Gen. Rosa in 2006. The Commandant of

Cadets, Brig. Gen. Mace, also retired in 2005 and was replaced by an Interim

Commandant (The Citadel, www.citadel.edu/history). The loss of continuity during this

time period prevented the gains in leadership from being sustained, necessitating many of

the efforts to be started over again (S. Hines, personal communication, September 25,

2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).

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2006 – Present: Incremental Change

Retired Lt. Gen. John Rosa arrived at The Citadel from the United States Air

Force Academy (USAFA), where he had been Superintendent. He was selected by the

Air Force to be their Superintendent as a non-graduate to mend the image of the Air

Force Academy, which had been marred by sexual assaults and sexual harassment. He

also was given the mission of putting the “Air Force” back into the USAFA (J. Rosa,

personal communication, November 14, 2013). Rosa stated that as Superintendent of the

USAFA, he had asked for 75-100 people to be assigned to the USAFA to help with a

culture change on sexual assault and to develop a four year officer development system

called Officer Development System (ODS). These requests were implemented within six

months. Rosa added that as of 2013, the ODS was still currently in effect at the USAFA,

although improvements had been added (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14,

2013).

When Rosa arrived at The Citadel, he was very familiar with the problems

relating to values and respect among the Corps of Cadets. In his previous position at the

Air Force Academy, Rosa had worked to instill values and respect to remedy the sexual

assault and harassment issues the USAFA faced (J. Rosa, personal communication,

November 14, 2013). In his inauguration speech at The Citadel on April 21, 2006, Rosa

proposed five key questions that required attention. The top two addressed the issue of

values and respect among cadets:

1. What is the process we use to ensure that every cadet receives the training and experience he or she needs to develop into a principled leader?

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2. How can we change the culture at The Citadel so that respect – respect for others and respect for self – is a trait that each and every cadet internalizes and personifies? (Rosa Inauguration Speech, 2006).

Rosa soon signaled to various college administrators that he would act rapidly on

the issue of values and respect and would temporarily hold off on fixing the fourth class

system. He told Command Sgt. Maj. Bauer that, “The last guy who messed with the

fourth class system was fired, and I will not be fired” (S. Bauer, personal communication,

October 2, 2013). Brig. Gen. Harry Carter, the Provost under both President Grinalds

and President Rosa, said he never saw a plan to change the system, even incrementally

(personal communication, September 9, 2013).

Rosa’s first hire was retired Col. Greg Stone, who came to The Citadel from West

Point, where he was the Brigade Tactical Officer (BTO). As the BTO, Stone was in

charge of all tactical officers and directly responsible for the Corps of Cadets in the

barracks (G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Upon hiring Stone,

Rosa informed him that his job was to help establish a culture change within the Corps of

Cadets. In Stone’s opinion, hazing, lack of respect in terms of diversity, the treatment of

women, and the fourth class system were the prime issues hindering values and respect.

He was, however, given no plan, guidance or direction by President Rosa or the BOV (G.

Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Stone left The Citadel in 2010.

Stone’s replacement, Col. Leo Mercado (2010-present) has also maintained that a

comprehensive integrated strategy is needed to make an organizational culture change at

The Citadel (personal communication, September 18, 2013).

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Rosa decided to develop a four year leadership development program at The

Citadel a few years after assuming the presidency. Nearly all of the people interviewed

for this research agreed that The Citadel had a two class system. The freshmen who

survived were well trained in followership, but there was little to no leadership

development of the upper class cadets (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14,

2013; S, Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013; L. Mercado, personal


2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013; J. Trez, personal

communication, September 6, 2013; S. Nida, personal communication, November 4,

2013). A system that recognized clearly all four classes was needed before any changes

could be made to the current fourth class system. Rosa decided to accomplish this

through the Krause Initiative, which he soon renamed the Krause Center for Leadership.

Table 5.1 depicts the Krause Center’s organizational chart:

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Table 5.1: Organizational Chart for the Krause Center

(Trez, 2013).

In a letter to Weart, Rosa described why a center for leadership was needed:

Any further evolution of the Krause Initiative must address three essential areas: Leader Development related programs, the organizational design and institutional relationships to conduct these programs, and a facility or space to help house this new entity…Establishing a “center for leadership and ethics” would provide the additional structure to develop, conduct, and assess these programs in concert with the other key college organizations (e.g. Commandant’s office and Provost) (“The Krause Initiative,” 2008).

The BOV approved the Krause Center in October, 2008. Except for the gift from Mr.

Krause and some other endowments, though, the new Krause Center had few resources

(J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013; J. Weart, personal

communication, October 9, 2013; J. Trez, personal communication, September 6, 2013).

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The great recession of 2008 put the brakes on any four year leadership

development program (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013). As of

September 2013, the Krause Center still did not have the staff or money it needed to

develop a complete four year leadership development program; it relied heavily on

funding from outside sources (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013; J.

Trez, personal communication, September 6 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication,

September 18, 2013; Trez, 2013). According to Trez, the Krause Center’s resource

constraints could delay an organizational culture change from an attritional/adversarial

system to a developmental system for 10 more years (J. Trez, personal communication,

September 6, 2013).

The leadership development program is just beginning at The Citadel. It could

take another five years before a four year development program is in place (J. Rosa,

personal communication, November 14, 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication,

September 18, 2013). Mercado, the Commandant of Cadets, is currently waiting for the

Krause Center to develop a comprehensive plan for leadership development. Mercado

also sees the need for someone to monitor the plan and keep the various college

stakeholders on track to ensure that the plan is executed in a coordinated manner (L.

Mercado, personal communication, September 18, 2013).

According to the Krause Center, though, change is well underway. Table 5.2

illustrates a timeline for leadership development at The Citadel. The information comes

from the Krause Center in 2013.

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Table 5.2: Timeline for Leadership Development

(Trez, 2013).

This table reflects the same information as the “Path for the Future” plan described to the

BOV in 2006. The five arrows correspond to the five phases to the 2006 plan. The chart

shows a timeline that is not supported by those interviewed for this research. Most

interviewees agreed that the culture at The Citadel has not changed. Many saw the

Krause Center as having little influence on leader development or behavior in the

barracks (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).

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Under Lt. Gen. Rosa, The Citadel has embarked on an incremental organizational

culture change, with no set timetable, due to historical presidents (Admiral Stockdale),

pressure from parents, alumni, and state legislators, and resource constraints (J. Rosa,

personal communication, November 14, 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication,

September 18, 2013). Rosa has maintained that in The Citadel’s case, an evolutionary

approach to change has a chance to succeed, but a revolutionary approach does not,

mainly due to strong stakeholder resistance (J. Rosa, personal communication, November

14, 2013). Former Provost of the College, Brig. Gen. Carter, agreed with Rosa that an

incremental approach would be the most successful, as long as a number of steps are

completed every year according to a master plan. The Citadel, however, has no master

plan (H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013).

According to Rosa, The Citadel is perhaps halfway to making an organizational

culture change. He bases this on his assessment of what still must be done to implement

a four year leader development program. In his view, one thing that has to change is that

every component of the institution (faculty, staff, TACs, cadet leadership) needs to

reinforce standards in the college. Rosa also notes that the culture among the staff and

faculty of The Citadel differs from the federal service academies, particularly in terms of

work schedule. The Citadel employees operate more on a work-week schedule rather

than a cadet schedule; consequently, they are not always present at all critical times in the

cadet schedule (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013).

There are some who say that conditions at The Citadel over the past four years

have gotten worse under Rosa’s incremental approach; it has allowed the

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attritional/adversarial system to become more entrenched (S. Bauer, personal

communication, October 2, 2013). Some believe that little progress toward a

developmental system has been made, and there is no visible sense of urgency to change

a system that breeds abusive behavior and hazing (S. Bauer, personal communication,

October 2, 2013).

Col. Stone, the first Commandant under Rosa, observed that since the college had

no comprehensive plan, changes instituted by the Commandant received very little

support from the faculty. According to Stone, both Brig. Gen. Carter and Brig. Gen.

Hines provided little support and would not include more leadership development

education on the cadet schedule. Stone asserted that the cadet schedule remained

unbalanced. There was little coordination on leadership development and no agreement

to assess a four year academic grade for a cadet’s leadership development. Furthermore,

leadership development efforts were not integrated across the campus; various

components existed separately. For example, the Cadet Counseling Center staff seldom

assisted with leadership development or new cadet training (G. Stone, personal


Almost all interviewees at The Citadel agreed that Tactical Officers (TACs) were

a critical component for changing the organizational culture to a development model.

The Citadel now has a TAC in every company, an effort that has just been completed in

the last three years. Rank and education requirements for TACs have been significantly

raised. TACs are now required to have a master’s degree in any subject or be willing to

earn one in three years (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013; G. Stone,

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personal communication September 13, 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication,

September 28, 2013).

In spite of this, most agreed that the current TACs require more training on leader

development (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013; G. Stone, personal

communication, September 13, 2013; J. Weart, personal communication, October 9,

2013; H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013). Some hold that the

institution has failed to provide TACs the education and training to be successful at their

jobs. They feel TACs would benefit from additional education in student affairs,

specifically around student development (H. Carter, personal communication, September

9, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013; L. Mercado, personal


Most also agreed that there must be standards developed to train TACs in

leadership development. There was general consensus that current TACs vary greatly in

how they accomplish their jobs. Rosa commented that the current training and

performance of the TACs is uneven, and this prevents certain programs from being

implemented that require evaluative standards (J. Rosa, personal communication,

November 14, 2013; L. Mercado, personal communication, September 18, 2013; G.

Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Rosa agrees that this area needs to

be fixed, but currently the college has no plan to do so (S. Bauer, personal

communication, October 2, 2013). Brig. Gen. Hines went as far as to say that some

TACs needed to be removed from their positions for not carrying out their

responsibilities, and cited poor personnel management as the only reasons they have not

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been removed (S. Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013). The lack

professionalism of TACs has been holding back the organizational culture change at The

Citadel (G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013).

New Proposals Receive Little Traction

Many proposals have been advanced, such as scrambling a class in the Corps of

Cadets. Since its existence, The Citadel has always kept cadets in the same company

throughout their careers. This has resulted in the same issues discussed in the West Point

case study – companies develop their own dysfunctional norms and these norms become

entrenched, creating 21 fraternal cadet companies, each with their own standards of

behavior. The company then becomes the most important element in a cadet’s life, more

important than anything else at the college (S. Bauer, personal communication, October,

2, 2013; g. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). The cadets think that

the worst punishment they could receive is a transfer from their original company. Bauer

describes it as a perfect confederacy, since cadets are more loyal to their own company

norms than the regulations of the Corps of Cadets (S. Bauer, personal communication,

October 2, 2013). An example of this is that when graduates meet, the first thing they ask

is what company they were in, rather than the year they graduated (S. Hines, personal


Proposals made by the staff and faculty, such as scrambling cadets, never seem to

move forward; resistors (alumni and cadets) either view them as threatening traditions or

too difficult to implement (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).

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The President initiated an Institutional Program Assessment Committee Review

(IPAC) in 2012 to determine risk areas at The Citadel. One of the areas the Committee

recommended changing was the fourth class system (IPAC Report, 2012). The

committee reviewed the work of previous committees (Whitmore, Mood, and Lane) and

was surprised that their recommendations mirrored those from previous committees:

…we began by looking at three major studies of that system which the institution had conducted since 1968. The Panel was struck by the fact that all three of these studies repeatedly identified some of the same concerns (for example, an atmosphere of stress in the Mess Hall which prevents Freshmen from eating properly, and a variety of factors that lead to sleep deprivation for Freshmen), even though the studies collectively covered the period from 1968-1991 (IPAC Report, 2012, p. 56). The committee presented nine recommendations for the college’s consideration:

1. Eliminate all Fourth Class System activities in the Mess Hall other than instruction in good table manners (recommended by previous committees);

2. Reduce the length of time for the Fourth Class Training Period, having freshmen be recognized at Corps Day at the latest, but possibly even as early as the beginning of the second semester (recommended by previous committees);

3. Limit sophomore rank to administrative positions only but allow sophomores

to have no interaction with or authority over freshmen (recommended by previous committees);

4. Consider using teams of seniors selected in their companies through secret

ballot to administer the Fourth Class System in a manner similar to that suggested in the Whitmire Report (Recommended by previous committees);

5. Consider annual “scrambling” of company assignments in an effort to (1)

promote Corps identity and loyalty over Company identity and loyalty, and (2) widen the circle of a cadet’s friendships over the course of four years (recommended by previous committees);

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6. Eliminate morning PT for all freshmen – and perhaps for all cadets, moving that activity to afternoons if ROTC programs require it;

7. Consider implementing some degree of rank rotation within the school year

(recommended by previous committees);

8. Eliminate morning PT for all freshmen;

9. Restrict physical exercise as a form of punishment to groups no smaller than a squad, to be held only outdoors in the daytime under the direct supervision of at least three responsible upperclassmen (IPAC Report, 2012, pp. 57-58).

None of these nine recommendations have been implemented or seriously considered by

the leadership of The Citadel (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013).

Resistance to Organizational Culture Change

Typical of military colleges, resistance to change exists, but The Citadel faces

even greater challenges due to its governance structure (J. Rosa, personal communication,

November 14, 2013; S. Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013; H. Carter,

personal communication, September 9, 2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October

2, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013; J. Weart, personal

communication, October 9, 2013; J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24,

2013). Table 5.3 depicts The Citadel’s Governance Organizational Structure in 2014,

taken from The Office of Institutional Research, Fact Book, 2013.

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Table 5.3: The Citadel’s Governance Organizational Structure

The BOV must be Citadel graduates living in South Carolina. They are appointed

by the State Legislature, the Governor, or are elected by the Alumni. They are political

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creatures by nature (S. Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013). And The

Citadel alumni have become the main external source of resistance to changing to a

developmental system.

Strong bonds exist between The Citadel’s alumni; these strong bonds exist

because they are survivors of an attritional/adversarial system that condones abusive

behavior and hazing (S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013; H. Carter,

personal communication, September 9 2013). The survivor concept as described in Pat

Conroy’s book, The Lords of Discipline, is alive and well among some alumni and cadets

(J. Trez, personal communication, September 6, 2013). A good number of alumni

believe that surviving the attritional/adversarial system has enabled them to deal with

anything they might encounter for the rest of their lives. There may be some truth to this

belief, but the attritional/adversarial system works against developing principled leaders,

which is The Citadel’s mission (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013;

H. Carter, personal communication, September 9, 2013; S. Hines, personal


2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013; J. Weart, personal

communication, October 9, 2013). The alumni who believe this are using “cognitive

dissonance” to rationalize their position (H. Carter, personal communication, September

9, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013). Cognitive dissonance

is having two conflicting beliefs, which creates a feeling of discomfort. In order to

remove the discomfort or dissonance, something must change (Cherry, n.d.).

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In the case of the fourth class system, cadets come to The Citadel expecting

principled leaders in the Corps, but soon discover that this is not the case. In order to

rationalize remaining in the somewhat dysfunctional attritional/adversarial fourth class

system, cadets exaggerate the value of staying. Some alumni can be powerful advocates

of the “status quo”; they want no change to the long line of Citadel traditions. They

become a powerful block and elect peers to the BOV who share their views. They are

interested in preserving The Citadel the way it was when they attended, most likely with

zero leadership training. These same alumni still oppose women in The Citadel, some 17

years after they were first admitted (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14,

2013; J. Grinalds, personal communication, September 24, 2013; H. Carter, personal

communication, September 9, 2013; S. Bauer, personal communication, October 2, 2013;

G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013; S. Hines, personal


Even further complicating matters in attempting to change to a four class

developmental system is The Citadel’s method of assigning a cadet to one company for

the cadet’s entire time at The Citadel. This has led to 21 fraternal-like organizations that

have bred 21 different sub-cultures, which makes culture change even harder. Some

alumni want cadets assigned to the same company that their grandfather or father were in

20 or 50 years earlier, thus reinforcing that the company is administered in the same

manner as it was then (S. Hines, personal communication, September 25, 2013).

The main internal source to change has been the cadets. Some cadets felt that

there was no real support from the academic side of the college because the

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administrators refused to rebalance the academic schedule to increase time devoted to

leader development education and training. This was in addition to refusing to grant any

academic credit towards a practicum in the barracks (J. Weart, personal communication,

October 9, 2013; G. Stone, personal communication, September 13, 2013).

Rosa did state that most alumni and cadets understood that in order to develop

principled leaders, the fourth class system must change into a four class developmental

system, but there was still a large and very vocal resistant minority (J. Rosa, personal

communication, November 14, 2013).

Recognizing that Change is Still Needed

All interviewees acknowledged that the attritional/adversarial fourth class system

must be transitioned to a four year developmental model. They also all agreed that The

Citadel advertises a developmental system to current and prospective cadets in its stated

educational and training goal of developing principled leaders. Parts of the college have

started working towards accomplishing this goal. Despite this, all interviewees contend

that there is currently no integrated, coordinated, comprehensive, or synchronized plan

for The Citadel to change from an attritional/adversarial system to a four year

developmental system (J. Rosa, personal communication, November 14, 2013; H Carter,

personal communication, September 9, 2013; S. Hines, personal communication,

September 25, 2013; J. Weart, personal communication, October 9, 2013; S. Bauer,

personal communication, October 2 2013).

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CHAPTER SIX :

ANALYSIS

Introduction

This research used John P. Kotter’s organizational culture change theory, outlined

in his book Leading Change (1996), to analyze the case studies at the United States

Military Academy (West Point) and The Citadel. Kotter developed an eight stage change

model that makes a distinction between leadership and management. Kotter describes

management as processes that keep complex systems running in good condition (2012),

while:

Leadership defines what the future should look like, aligns people with that vision, and inspires them to make it happen despite the obstacles…. Managing change is important… But for most organizations, the much bigger challenge is leading change. Only leadership can blast through the many sources of corporate inertia. Only leadership can motivate the actions needed to alter behavior in any significant way. Only leadership can get change to stick by anchoring it in the very culture of an organization (Kotter, 2012, p. 25, 30).

The case studies at West Point and The Citadel were analyzed through the lens of

Kotter’s theory because his is a top-down business model similar to the top-down

bureaucratic model that military colleges follow. Kotter’s change theory has been used in

the U.S. Army, most recently by the U.S. Army War College for a complete top-down

review of the college (L. Betros, personal communication, October 18, 2013).

Kotter’s change theory offers a functional approach to analyze organizational

culture change at military colleges. In Leading Change, Kotter (1996) outlines eight

stages required to change an organization’s culture. These eight stages are:

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1. Establishing a Sense of Urgency: “In an organization with 100 employees, at least two dozen must go far beyond the normal call to duty to produce significant change” (Kotter, 1996, p. 35). “Complacency must be kept as low as possible” (Kotter, 1996, p. 36).

2. Creating the Guiding Coalition: “Building such a team is always an essential part of the early stages of any effort to restructure, reengineer, or retool a set of strategies” (Kotter, 1996, p. 52).

3. Developing a Vision and Strategy: “In a change process, a good vision serves three important purposes. First, by clarifying the general direction for change… Second, it motivates people to take action in the right direction, even if the initial steps are personally painful. Third, it helps coordinate the actions of different people, even thousands and thousands of individuals, in a remarkably fast and efficient way” (Kotter, 1996, pp. 68-69).

4. Communicating the Change Vision: “But the real power of a vision is unleashed only when most involved in an enterprise or activity has a common understanding of its goals and direction” (Kotter, 1996, p. 85).

5. Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action: “I’m still not enthusiastic about using faddish words, but in this ever faster-moving world, I think the idea of helping more people to become more powerful is important” (Kotter, 1996, p. 101).

6. Generating Short-Term Wins: “Running a transformational effort without serious attention to short-term wins is extremely risky…” (Kotter, 1996, p. 119).

7. Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change: “Major change often takes a long time, especially in big organizations… Under these circumstances, short-term wins are essential to keep momentum going, but the celebration of those wins can be lethal if urgency is lost. With complacency up, the forces of tradition can sweep back in with remarkable force and speed” (Kotter, 1996, p. 132).

8. Anchoring New Changes in the Culture: “Anchoring change in a culture…comes last, not first. New approaches usually sink into a culture only after it’s clear that they work and are superior to old methods. Without verbal instruction and support, people are often reluctant to admit the validity of the new practices. Sometimes the only way to change a culture is to change key people. If promotion processes are not changed to be compatible with new practices, the old culture will reassert itself” (p. 157).

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Kotter’s model offers one means of comparing and analyzing the experiences at West

Point and The Citadel.

This research delved into the area where the literature on this subject ended and

identified the factors in the successful organizational change at West Point and the

incomplete change at The Citadel. In addition, this research looked at three factors that

Brig. Gen. Lance Betros (2012) identified in his book as significant in the organizational

culture change at West Point to determine if they played a prominent part in the

organizational culture change. The three factors that were analyzed in both case studies

were:

1. The sense of urgency and direction from the top leadership of West Point and The Citadel.

2. The education and training of the Tactical Officers (TACs) at West Point and The Citadel.

3. The role of the Cadet Counseling Center in the organizational change at West

Point and The Citadel.

Kotter’s Eight Stage Change Process

Stage 1: Establishing a Sense of Urgency

Kotter describes the first stage, establishing a sense of urgency, in detail:

Establishing a sense of urgency is crucial to gaining needed cooperation. With complacency high, transformations usually go nowhere, because few people are even interested in working on the change problem. With urgency low, it’s difficult to put together a group with enough power and credibility to guide the effort or to convince key individuals to spend the time necessary to create and communicate a change vision. In those rare circumstances in which a committed group does exist inside a canyon of complacency…no matter how much they threaten, if many others don’t feel the same sense of urgency, the momentum for change will probably die far short of the finish line. People will find a thousand ingenious ways to withhold cooperation from a process that they sincerely think is

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unnecessary or wrongheaded…. If top management consists only of cautious managers, no one will push the urgency rate sufficiently high and a major transformation will never succeed…boards of directors have a responsibility to find leaders and to place them in key jobs. If they duck that responsibility, as they sometimes do, they are failing to do the board’s most essential work” (Kotter, 1996, pp. 36-45).

Analysis of Stage 1

The contrast between West Point and The Citadel becomes vivid when looking at

the two institutions through the lens of stage one. Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer came to West

Point as Superintendent and found a calm period that existed with no major internal or

external threats. He saw this as a small window of opportunity to create change that had

eluded many past Superintendents and Commandants of Cadets. Palmer wanted to act

before a crisis overtook the calm period that existed at West Point when he arrived. He

also knew his appointment was a short time period of five years as Superintendent.

During calm periods complacency reigns and Palmer had to create a sense of urgency to

transition to a four year leader development system and away from an

attritional/adversarial fourth class system. As the leader of West Point he could do that,

and he created a strong sense of urgency there, as outlined in Chapter 4, the West Point

case study.

This contrasts sharply with The Citadel. Maj. Gen. Grinalds also established a

sense of urgency in his plan to lead The Citadel out of its major issues with the fourth

class system, the honor system, and the coeducation of women. The problem, however,

was that his plan was not comprehensive; it did not involve all college stakeholders and

did not go far enough to achieve an organizational culture change. Any sense of urgency

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developed slowly and had evaporated by the end of his term and during the transition to

the interim President, Maj. Gen. Poole in 2005.

A sense of complacency returned by 2006, when Lt. Gen. Rosa began his term as

the new President. Although Rosa came to The Citadel and created a sense of urgency in

terms of a values and respect program, the same type of program he instituted at the U.S.

Air Force Academy, he chose not to take this same approach to the fourth class system

mainly due to resistance from the alumni and a perceived lack of resources. Instead,

Rosa chose an incremental approach to changing the fourth class system, which

according to Kotter, almost guaranteed an impossible path for change. Many of The

Citadel’s administrators were frustrated by Rosa’s approach. They tried to deal

themselves with the abusive behavior and hazing caused by the attritional/adversarial

fourth class system, essentially attempting to change The Citadel’s organizational culture.

A culture change could not occur, however, without sense of urgency from the leadership

of the college. To date, Rosa’s incremental approach has yielded only an incomplete

change of the fourth class system at The Citadel.

Clearly, West Point and The Citadel took different approaches to Kotter’s stage

one, establishing a sense of urgency. West Point established a sense of urgency and The

Citadel did not. Palmer chose to lead the change process at West Point despite a history

of unsuccessful attempts and formidable complacency. His strong leadership created the

sense of urgency that overshadowed the complacency that would have existed under any

ordinary managerial attempt.

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Maj. Gen. Grinalds initially created a sense of urgency, but it slowly died before

his term was complete, due to his lack of leading the change at the Citadel. The sense of

urgency was completely lost during the interim presidency of Maj. Gen. Poole. Rosa

developed no sense of urgency at The Citadel, due to the political climate of the BOV,

previous unsuccessful efforts, formidable complacency from all stakeholders, a perceived

lack of resources, and his own unwillingness to take leadership of the change.

Stage 2: Creating the Guiding Coalition

Major transformations are often associated with one highly visible individual…one might easily conclude that the kind of leadership that is so critical to any change can come only from a single larger-than-life person. This is a very dangerous belief…. No one individual, even a monarch-like CEO, is ever able to develop the right vision, communicate it to large numbers of people, eliminate all the key obstacles, generate short term wins, lead and manage dozens of change projects, and anchor new approaches deep in the organizations culture. Weak committees are even worse. A strong guiding coalition is always needed – one with the right composition, level of trust, and shared objective. Building such a team is always an essential part of the early stages of any effort to restructure, reengineer, or retool a set of strategies…. Leadership is particularly important. You need both management and leadership skills on the guiding coalition, and they must work in tandem, teamwork style (Kotter, 1996, pp. 51-52).

Analysis of Stage 2

When there is no sense of urgency, it can be difficult to develop a guiding

coalition. Lt. Gen. Palmer was able to assemble a guiding coalition of leaders and

managers at West Point amidst the sense of urgency he developed. The Dean of

Academics, Brig. Gen. Roy Flint (1985-1990) and Brig. Gen. Gerald Galloway (1990-

1995); the Commandant of Cadets, Brig. Gen. Fred Gordon (1987-1989) and Brig. Gen.

David Bramlett (1989-1992); the Director of Athletics, Carl Ullrich (1980-1990) and

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retired Col. Albert Vanderbush (1990-1999), were all great leaders; even though they had

not seen a need for change, they were able to communicate the desired change throughout

West Point because they were accomplished leaders who knew how to execute a

commander’s guidance and directives.

To compliment these skilled leaders, Palmer put three skilled managers into the

Office of Leader Development: Col. Larry Donnithorne, Col. Steve Hammond, and Col.

Will Wilson. Wilson had been introducing leader development concepts at West Point

for almost 15 years, and he knew what it would take to manage an organizational culture

change. Donnithorne was one of the most highly regarded officers, returning to West

Point after receiving his Ph.D. Hammond was also a highly regarded officer who had

received his Ph.D. in leadership. Palmer assigned Col. Howard Prince to lead and design

the new development system at West Point that would eventually replace the fourth class

system. This team of leaders and managers served as the “guiding coalition” that enabled

the change to take place at West Point. They were the change agents who managed the

organizational culture change.

During the presidency of Lt. Gen. Rosa at the Citadel, the major organizations of

the college recognized a need for change and began working on leadership development

in different areas. The Commandants, Col. Greg Stone and Col. Leo Mercado, had a plan

to increase the number of TACs and increase their education requirements. The Provost

and Dean of Academics, Brig. Gen. Sam Hines, introduced mandatory academic

leadership courses to all four classes. The Krause Leadership Center, Lt. Col. Jeff Weart,

Brig. Gen. Cliff Poole, Brig. Gen. Harry Carter, and Col. Joe Trez, put together a

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leadership symposium and made improvements to the symposium over the years. There

was, however, no integrated coalition that was working cohesively to make a change in

the fourth class system at The Citadel. The best that could be said was there may have

been some loose coupling of ideas. Many staff and faculty were unaware that the college

needed to change because there had been little communication about it. There was little

leadership from the top leaders at The Citadel to build a sufficiently powerful guiding

coalition. Different parts of the college were working on various leader development

projects, but there was no direction or plan, thus no guiding coalition, at The Citadel.

Kotter’s stage two illuminates clear contrasts in how the two colleges approached

organizational culture change. West Point developed a guiding coalition while The

Citadel has yet to establish a guiding coalition, which reflects on the leadership of the

college. Palmer carefully selected the personnel he wanted to lead the change at West

Point. He also monitored them and eliminated opposition to his change goals. By

leading the guiding coalition and then evaluating how the coalition lead their respective

areas, Palmer was able to form a cohesive coalition to effect change.

Rosa did not clearly establish a sense of urgency, nor did he establish a coalition.

He lacked a plan on how to change the fourth class system at The Citadel. Guiding

collations are only successful if the leader sees the need for transformation to occur. In

the Citadel’s case, it is uncertain whether Rosa believed that a change to the fourth class

system was necessary, or that he needed a strong team to direct the change.

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Stage 3: Developing a Vision and Strategy

Vision refers to a picture of the future with some implicit or explicit commentary on why people should strive to create that future…. First, by clarifying the general direction for change…it simplifies hundreds or thousands of more detailed decisions. Second, it motivates people to take action in the right direction, even if the initial steps are personally painful. Third, it helps coordinate the actions of different people, even thousands and thousands of individuals, in a remarkably fast and efficient way. Effective vision is: Imaginable: conveys a picture of what the future will look like; Desirable: appeals to the long-term interests of employees, customers, stockholders, and others who have a stake in the enterprise; Feasible: comprises realistic attainable goals; Focused: is clear enough to provide guidance in decision making; Flexible: is general enough to allow individual initiative and alternative responses in light of changing conditions; Communicable: is easy to communicate; can be successfully explained within five minutes (Kotter, 1996, pp. 68-72).

Analysis of Stage 3

Both West Point and The Citadel each developed an excellent end vision for their

organizational culture changes. West Point’s vision was articulated as a “Leader of

Character” and The Citadel’s vision was articulated as a “Principled Leader.” West Point

developed a strategy to make the vision a reality, but The Citadel has been unsuccessful

doing the same.

Lt. Gen. Palmer, after numerous studies that involved all West Point stakeholders,

cadets, staff and faculty, the Army, and alumni, decided that the development of leaders

for the Army was the mission of West Point. Palmer used leader development as the

focal point for all areas at West Point – academics, military, and athletics. West Point

developed a clear vision and a strategy to implement it successfully. The three factors

that enabled organizational culture change at West Point were the Cadet Leader

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Development System (CLDS), the new TAC education, and the involvement of the entire

college in CLDS.

The Citadel has an outstanding vision that is incorporated into its strategic and

operational plans. The major difference between West Point and The Citadel is that The

Citadel has no strategy to implement their vision. This presents a challenge to The

Citadel, because the college advertises a vision that is not a reality. The Citadel

advertises its vision as making “principled leaders,” but the current fourth class system

and leader education do not contribute to the this vision.

Both institutions developed well-articulated visions, but only West Point had an

operational strategy for implementing their vision. The implementing strategy contained

numerous changes, which included a four year leadership development system, a revised

TAC education master’s program, a modified cadet schedule, a cadet leader distribution

plan, and the scrambling of the junior class from a cohort model. The strategy adhered to

Kotter’s organizational change theory and was implemented over a five-year period,

however the conditions leading to change were set over decades of work by dedicated

officers. Some of those past strategies failed due to resistance and complacency. Some

were successful, but failed to be sustained.

The Citadel, like West Point, determined their end vision but could never put together

an operational plan to achieve the vision. Various organizations in the college took

action unilaterally to make the vision a reality, but there was not enough coordination,

integration, or synchronization to achieve a synergy toward the vision. The lack of

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synergy is directly attributed to a lack of leadership from The Citadel’s top administrators

to develop a strategy or plan.

Stage 4: Communicating the Change Vision

…the real power of a vision is unleashed only when most of those involved in an enterprise or activity have a common understanding of its goals and direction. That shared sense of desirable future can help motivate and coordinate the kinds of actions that create transformations.… Key elements in the effective communication of vision: Simplicity: All jargon and technobabble must be eliminated; Metaphor, analogy, and example: A verbal picture is worth a thousand words; Multiple forums: Big meetings and small, memo’s and newspapers, formal and informal interaction – all are effective for spreading the word; Repetition: Ideas sink in deeply only after they have been heard many times; Leadership by example: Behavior from important people that is inconsistent with the vision overwhelms other forms of communication; Explanation of seeming inconsistencies: Unaddressed inconsistencies undermine the credibility of all communication; Give and take: Two way communication is always more powerful than one-way communication (Kotter, 1996, pp. 85-90).

Analysis of Stage 4

In this stage there are stark differences in how the colleges communicated their

visions and built their strategies to bring their visions to fruition. The organizational

culture change at West Point included a complex set of changes that needed to be

communicated to a diverse set of stakeholders. At The Citadel, there was a vision but no

implementation plan across the college. Without an implementation plan, there could be

no plan for communicating the culture change, despite various organizations working

independently on components of a change.

Lt. Gen. Palmer first involved all West Point stakeholders in a series of 10-12

studies on the mission of West Point and the fourth class system. The studies were

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conducted by different stakeholders, including alumni and cadets. These studies helped

with the two-way communication that enhanced the vision’s acceptance. Once results of

the studies were analyzed, it was clear that the mission of West Point was to produce

leaders of character. The way to achieve this vision was clear to all at West Point:

leadership development. Palmer would accomplish this through many other actions, but

the overarching vision was leadership development, whether in academics, military or

athletics. Palmer used leader development in all meetings and memorandums. He

demanded that this vision be communicated to all stakeholders in the West Point nation:

“…all cadet programs and activities are intended ultimately to contribute to one

objective, leader development…” (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 68). Palmer’s leadership

communicated clearly the West Point’s mission of leader development.

Although a lot of work went into establishing The Citadel’s vision, there was little

strategy developed for how the vision would be executed (stage three of Kotter’s model).

A number of people interviewed for this research saw no evidence of a plan for the

change, so they could not communicate much information to their employees about the

vision (stage four of Kotter’s model). Employees in the Commandant’s Department,

which included 26 TACs, knew surprisingly little about the vision or how it would be

implemented. There was little communication to the entire campus, because there was no

clear strategy for implementing the vision.

Stage 5: Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action

Major internal transformation rarely happens unless many people assist. Yet employees generally won’t help, or can’t help, if they feel relatively powerless.

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Hence, the relevance of empowerment…. What are the biggest obstacles that often need to be attacked? Four can be particularly important: structures, skills, systems, and supervisors…. Structures…Sometimes we become so accustomed to one basic organization design, perhaps because it has been used for decades that we are blind to the alternatives…. Training…People are expected to change habits built up over years or decades with only five days of education…Some training could be required at this stage in transformation, but it needs to be the right kind of experience. Throwing money at the problem is never a good idea, nor is talking down to people…. Systems…unaligned systems also block needed action…. Supervisors…confront supervisors who undercut needed change: nothing disempowers people the way a bad boss can (Kotter, 1996, pp. 108-115).

Analysis of Stage 5

Lt. Gen. Palmer and West Point had to create a new structure, the new four class

system or The Cadet Leader Development System (CLEDS), in order to eliminate the old

attritional/adversarial fourth class system. The entire West Point community had to be

educated on CLEDS since it involved everyone on campus. Some of the most important

change agents, the TACs, received new education and training (master’s degrees in leader

development). The TACs gave West Point a trained base of administrators closest to the

cadets to help coach, teach, train, and mentor them in a four class development system.

TACs became a cadre of true believers in change, because of the time and effort they and

the Army had put into their education. This education empowered the TACs as change

agents for the new developmental system.

Changes in cadet personnel systems empowered cadets by giving each of the

upper classes, sophomores, juniors, and seniors, developmental responsibilities and

making them accountable to a leader development standard. West Point achieved this

empowerment by promoting all sophomores to cadet corporals, all juniors to cadet

sergeants, and all seniors to cadet officers. This empowered them by giving them not

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only a rank and privileges, but also the responsibility to develop subordinates to high

standards. The Cadet Leader Distribution Plan (scrambling juniors) empowered cadets

not to rely on friendship of fellow company mates, but to act professionally with other

members of the Corps who had not been their buddies for four years. This empowerment

raised professional standards. The academic realignment of required cadet courses

enabled more time for leadership development in the Corps, which in turn empowered

those responsible for developing the new system by demonstrating the importance West

Point’s leadership placed on the new four year development model. Palmer had to

confront those at West Point who opposed his vision. He did this by personally talking

with them and threatening to hold a tenure review board for faculty. Although he

monitored their progress, Palmer clearly empowered his subordinate leaders to make

widespread changes across West Point in the name of leader development and the four

class system.

There was general consensus that The Citadel failed to remove the obstacles, both

real and perceived, that blocked their vision from becoming a reality. The obstacles were

traditions, resistors from all stakeholder groups, and resource constraints (in people,

money, and time). Due to a perceived lack of resources, The Citadel has yet to develop a

four year leader development program or to give TACs a base-line education program.

The Citadel’s leadership has not made leader development a priority, thus the cadets and

TACs are aware of The Citadel’s vision of “Principled Leadership,” but have not been

empowered to achieve this vision.

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Part of empowering people is giving them the means, guidance and direction on

how to proceed. The Citadel has not realigned the cadet schedule to allow more time for

leadership development, due to parochial interests by the academic part of the college.

The Citadel’s leadership refused to consider a Cadet Leader Distribution Plan, because it

feared resistance from alumni, despite the fact that most administrators believed this to be

a critical component to achieving change. The leadership has also neglected to consider

other changes, such as cadet rank to empower the upper class, because that would break

the tradition of The Citadel, despite recognizing that this change would bring much more

good than harm and would facilitate an organizational culture change as it did at West

Point. Some of The Citadel’s administrators do not want to change and see the vision as

a far-off future goal or a façade that is only there as window dressing to make the college

look good. In this case, empowering people is not going to be an option for The Citadel.

The absence of a plan coupled with the lack of guidance by The Citadel’s leadership has

not empowered either the TACs or the cadets to change.

Stage 6: Generating Short-Term Wins

Major change takes time, sometimes lots of time. Zealous believers will often stay the course no matter what happens. Most of the rest of us expect to see convincing evidence that all the effort is paying off. Nonbelievers have or need even higher standards of proof. They want to see clear data indicating that the changes are working and that the change process isn’t absorbing so many resources in the short term as to endanger the organization…. Running a transformation effort without serious attention to short-term wins is extremely risky. Sometimes you get lucky; visible results just happen. But sometimes your luck runs out…. The role of short-term wins: Provide evidence that sacrifices are worth it: Wins greatly help justify the short term costs involved; Reward change agents with a pat on the back: After a lot of hard work, positive feedback builds morale and motivation; Help fine-tune vision and strategies: Short-term wins give

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the guiding coalition concrete data on the viability of their ideas; Undermine cynics and self-serving resisters: Clear improvements in performance make it difficult for people to block needed change; Keep bosses on board: Provides those higher in the hierarchy with evidence that the transformation is on track; Build momentum: Turns neutrals into supporters, reluctant supporters into active helpers, etc. (Kotter, 1996, pp. 119-123).

Analysis of Stage 6

Both West Point and The Citadel were able to generate short-term wins, but only

West Point was effective in this stage due to an overall strategy. At West Point, gains

were achieved through a top-down plan, while at The Citadel, gains were driven from

bottom-up attempts, with separate departments trying to make needed culture changes

from their own individual positions. The problem at The Citadel was that none of the

short-term wins achieved were coordinated, integrated, or synchronized.

West Point rewarded its change agents by promoting them to jobs that had more

influence and greater responsibility. Col. Will Wilson was promoted to head the Leader

Development Integration Office under the Superintendent. Col. Howard Prince was

selected to lead the Department of Behavioral Science & Leadership Department. The

large number of assessments (10-12) that Lt. Gen. Palmer conducted, involving all

stakeholders at West Point, enabled large numbers of stakeholders to see progress being

made on their recommendations. Four important short-term wins occurred in a relatively

short period of time: a four year cadet development system was created, essentially

transitioning the fourth class system from an attritional/adversarial system to a leadership

development system and changing about 140 years of culture; a new TAC education

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program was developed; the fourth class regulations received a complete overhaul; and

Palmer decided to scramble the rising Second Class.

Positive feedback was received both internally and externally at West Point about

the initial rollout of the change, which reinforced the legitimacy of the plan and had

primary, secondary, and third order effects on West Point, which Kotter considers to be

very important in this stage. Internally, the BOV report summed up the findings of the

feedback:

The expanded leader development initiatives directed by the Superintendent and unanimously approved by the Policy Board provided for the incorporation of the Fourth Class system into a broader, more challenging, four year framework called the Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS). Academic Year 90-91 marked the first year for the Corps under CLDS. Implementation of CLDS has proceeded much more successfully than anticipated. Indicators from several sources… suggest that cadets are beginning to grasp the developmental objectives of CLDS and are integrating them into their outlook on leadership. Resistance to the new system seems to be on the wane with each passing month, as cadets learn that the rigor, demand, and challenge of the West Point Experience are protected under CLDS. As the Academy heads into academic year 91-92, our focus will be on the continuing education of the Corps to ensure broad understanding of CLDS and why it is central to their development as leaders of character…. The Department of the Army concurs (“BOV Annual Report,” 1991, pp. I-2-I-3).

The external feedback was also positive. A large number of newspapers ran

articles that had a balanced perspective, but reflected positively on West Point’s change.

An example was an article in The Christian Science Monitor that stated:

Alumni gathering for fall events at the United States Military Academy here find that it’s not like it was in the old days. Many cadets agree. West Point is striving to change its tradition-bound training system by modifying the way plebes and cadets at the academy are treated by one another. Both faculty members and cadets say revision is difficult but necessary. It’s a change sponsored from the top. Tomorrow’s leaders must be more “flexible, creative, and able to relate to their personnel” says Superintendent Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer. With divisions scaling back in size, officers will command smaller light-infantry units and elite

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Special Forces, for which these demands are critical, he says. And West Point was not doing the job, he acknowledged in an interview. General Palmer’s concerns are heightened by the crisis in the Middle East and the demand for skilled combat troops…. Four years is the minimum success or failure window – time for one class to go through the new system (“West Point plebes,” n.d.).

The Citadel also created many short-term wins: creating the Krause Center for

Leadership; the Provost’s designing an academic program for a four year leadership

development system; developing various leadership assessments; improving the

Leadership Training Program; establishing a principled leadership vision; hiring of a

TAC for every cadet company; and improving TAC education. Each of these was a

significant short-term win for The Citadel. The problem was that short-term wins were

not tied to an overall plan or strategy, therefore employees did not recognize them as

progress in a plan. Consequently, their impact was diminished. Different departments at

The Citadel had no idea what other departments were working on. The Citadel had failed

in Stage Four, Communicating the Change Vision.

Stage 7: Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change

Major change often takes a long time, especially in big organizations. Many forces can stall the process far short of the finish line: turnover of key change agents, sheer exhaustion on the part of leaders, bad luck. Under these circumstances, short-term wins are essential to keep momentum going, but the celebration of those wins can be lethal if urgency is lost. With complacency up, the forces of tradition can sweep back in with remarkable force and speed. Resistance: Always waiting to reassert itself; …one cardinal rule: Whenever you let up before the job is done, critical momentum can be lost and regression may follow…. What Stage 7 looks like in a successful major change effort: More change, not less: The guiding coalition uses the credibility afforded by short-term wins to tackle additional and bigger change projects; More help: Additional people are brought in, promoted, and developed to help with all the changes; Leadership from senior management: Senior people focus on maintaining clarity

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of shared purpose for the overall effort and keeping urgency levels up. Project management and leadership from below: Lower ranks in the hierarchy both provide leadership for specific projects and manage those projects. Reduction of unnecessary interdependencies: To make change easier in both the short and long term, managers identify unnecessary interdependencies and eliminate them…. Without sufficient leadership, change stalls, and excelling in a rapidly changing world becomes problematic (Kotter, 1996, pp. 132-144).

Analysis of Stage 7

Stage 7, Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change, is the pivotal stage in

organizational culture change. This is when the forces of change are strong enough to

produce further change and overpower any resistance and complacency. Although the

culture change is not yet fully anchored in the organization, it builds a synergy that is

increasingly hard to contain. The majority of the organization, in this case the cadets,

staff and faculty, has now accepted the change.

The change in the TAC officer education program was one of West Point’s key

moves to consolidate gains and produce more change. This cadre of officers with

master’s degrees in Leader Development formed a bastion of knowledge that directly

influenced cadets; they were also enthusiastic change agents ready to counter any

resistance. The TAC education program provided a steady stream of officers skilled in

leader development who continued to refine and produce more change. The new changes

produced were increased acceptance by the Corps of Cadets, and enhanced development

of the Cadet Leader Development System (CLDS). CLDS was refined and upgraded; it

added additional requirements for the entire West Point community. Palmer’s

replacement, Lt. Gen. Graves, led the sustainment of the organizational culture change

and continued to develop and refine the CLDS under his administration. Every year that

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passed, the probability of resistance decreased, and CLDS acceptance continued to rise

among all stakeholders.

The TAC education program at The Citadel has not been developed, due to an

inattentive leadership and the lack of an overall plan to change the fourth class system.

The failure to establish a credentialing program for leadership development has caused

the TACs to have little standardization in leader development. Not having a strategic or

operational plan caused issues about the TACs role. TACs were confused about whether

they should develop leadership in the cadets or discipline them. The lack of a fully

developed four year leader development program has prevented any substantial change

from occurring. In addition, the many leadership transitions at The Citadel have

prevented any continuity of changes that have been made. Since there has been an

incomplete change and no articulated plan presented, resistance and complacency remain

high at The Citadel.

Stage 8: Anchoring New Approaches in the Culture

Whenever you hear of a major restructuring, reengineering, or strategic redirection in which step 1 is “Changing the culture,” you should be concerned that it might be going down the wrong path. Both attitude and behavior change typically begin early in a transformation process. These alterations then create changes in practices that help a firm produce better products or services at lower costs. But only in the end of the change cycle does most of this become anchored in the culture. Anchoring change in a culture comes last not first: Most alterations in norms and shared values come at the end of the transformation process; Depends on results: New approaches usually sink into a culture only after it’s clear that they work and are superior to old methods. Requires a lot of talk: Without verbal instruction and support, people are often reluctant to admit the validity of new practices; May involve turnover: Sometimes the only way to change a culture is to change people; Makes decisions on succession crucial: If

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promotion processes are not changed to be compatible with the new practices, the old culture will reassert itself (Kotter, 1996, pp. 156-157).

Analysis of Stage 8

West Point changed from a fourth class system to a four class system and named

it CLDS. Over a period of time, CLDS enabled West Point to create an organizational

culture change. To insure that this culture change would become anchored, a number of

other enabling changes had to occur. The leadership transition from one Superintendent

to another at West Point had to be executed so that there would not be a decline in

support or urgency. The TAC education program had to be sustained. New staff and

faculty had to be educated about their roles in CLDS. This final stage of culture change

was not accomplished until 1995, after the last class under the old fourth class system

departed and a four year period of the new developmental system could be analyzed.

Like other colleges and universities, military colleges have a repetitive cycle.

Twenty-five percent of the United States Corps of Cadets are new every year. The entire

leadership of the Corps is turned over every year, so leadership of the cadets is critical.

Maintaining a solid anchor in leader development is largely accomplished by the TACs,

with the help of the entire staff and faculty. Entering new cadets have norms and values

that change every year, so education and training are essential. At military colleges, once

a pattern of behavior can be sustained for at least four years, it becomes ingrained into the

culture. Over the years, this process leads to a stronger culture as graduates return to

West Point to occupy administrator positions. In this way, improvements and

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modifications are continually made to the system, creating more change and keeping it up

to date.

All people interviewed for this research acknowledge that The Citadel has made an

incomplete culture change, so it is impossible to analyze how they have accomplished

stage eight of Kotter’s theory since they have not completed the first seven stages.

Although incomplete, many positive changes in The Citadel’s culture have occurred.

Portions of a four year leader development system are in place. The academic leader

development classes for each year has been approved, developed, and are being taught.

Leader development training has been upgraded by the hiring of additional personnel and

an improvement in instruction quality. TACs with a minimum standard of some type of

master’s degree have been hired for every company and battalion. Ethical reasoning

education will be introduced next year for all classes. Honor education has been

substantially upgraded. Peer evaluations, training records, and e-portfolios have been

added and counseling requirements for TACs have increased. All these positive changes

are critically needed to enable a culture change at The Citadel. They have, however,

occurred in a bottom-up process, and The Citadel’s culture change remains incomplete

and unanchored due to the absence of an overall strategic and operational plan.

The reason there has been no overall plan is lack of leadership by senior leaders

due to their perceived fear of resistors led by alumni. Senior leaders have also perceived

a lack of resources that would prevent a plan from succeeding. The lack of a plan has

prevented the completion of a four year leader development system and the associated

changes, such as TAC certification on leader development, Cadet Leader Distribution

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Plan, cadet ranks adjustments, and cadet schedule modifications. All these incomplete

areas have caused the attritional/adversarial fourth class system to continue at The

Citadel. While the system as it exists today is better than what Maj. Gen. Grinalds

encountered in 1997, it is still not the development system that is needed. Only pieces of

change at The Citadel are being anchored, which is not enough to cause an organizational

culture change.

Additional Hypotheses

Three additional factors were studied to see if they played a role at each military

college’s attempts at organizational change. The first was whether the sense of urgency

and direction from the top leadership of West Point and The Citadel was a contributing

factor in organizational cultural change at military colleges. The research on this

hypothesis showed the difference between the leadership approaches taken by the

Superintendent of West Point in 1988 and the President of The Citadel in 2006.

All people interviewed for this research, as well as the literature reviewed, stated

that it was the leadership of Lt. Gen. Palmer that was the driving force behind the

organizational culture change at West Point. If Palmer had not masterfully led the first

seven stages of Kotter’s change theory, it is doubtful that the organizational culture

change would have occurred at West Point in the early nineties. Palmer’s leadership

assured successful completion and set the conditions for the final stage of Kotter’s model.

In March 1990, Palmer wrote: “To remain unchanging in changing world risks decay

from irrelevance” (Donnithorne, 1991 p. 10). Palmer, himself, stated that he started and

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led this change as the Superintendent of West Point, and this is supported by

overwhelming evidence in the West Point case study (Chapter Four).

Only two of those interviewed at The Citadel thought that in order for culture

change to occur at The Citadel, it was critical to have the President lead the change

efforts by creating a sense of urgency and direction. The other interviewees identified

various other components of the college as the most important change agents, including

Lt. Gen. Rosa. A number of administrators at The Citadel named the cadets themselves

as the primary change agents in a culture change of the fourth class system. This

contrasts with West Point, whose interviewees did not list the cadets in their top five

change agents considered most important to a culture change. Almost all college

administrators are waiting on guidance and direction from The Citadel’s leadership.

The second factor was whether the education and training of the Tactical Officers

(TACs) at West Point and The Citadel would be a contributing factor in organizational

cultural change at military colleges. The research on this hypothesis revealed that all

interviewees at West Point agreed that the education and training of the TACs was a

critical component to organizational culture change. The TACs, more than any other

element of the staff and faculty, were considered the primary change agents to make and

sustain the change. The TACs new master’s degree in leadership development at the

West Point was a critical step that enabled TACs to fully understand and implement the

change to the four class developmental system (CLDS) from the attritional/adversarial

fourth class system. The degree gave TACs credibility; they became a cadre of experts

on leader development who coached, taught, trained, and mentored cadets in a four class

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developmental system, CLDS. The TACs were able to sustain this change as new

educated and trained TACs replaced those who moved on with their Army careers.

Similarly, all those interviewed at The Citadel felt that the TACs and their

education and training were critical to creating the conditions for organizational culture

change, supervising the change, and sustaining the change at The Citadel. While all

agreed that education and training were essential, all also agreed that there still remains a

large amount of education and training the TACs need in order to successfully perform

their mission to facilitate culture change at The Citadel. Currently there are no plans to

address this deficiency.

The third factor was whether the role of the Cadet Counseling Center in the

organizational change at West Point and The Citadel would be a contributing factor in

organizational cultural change at military colleges. The research on this hypothesis

revealed that the Cadet Counseling Center (CCC), although very important, was not

regarded by the interviewees as one of the top four change agents in West Point’s

organizational culture change. The CCC did, however, play an important role in setting

the conditions for change and assisting in all areas of the change process, including

sustaining the culture change. The CCC played a contributory part of the overall change

strategy at West Point.

None of those interviewed at The Citadel mentioned The Cadet Counseling

Center as a critical or necessary change agent for their fourth class system change. By

neglecting the CCC as an important potential change agent, The Citadel has lost a key

organization that could have positively impacted their incomplete culture change.

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Summary

John Kotter’s theory of organizational change was not published until 1996,

however from this research, it appears that West Point achieved some measure of success

in all eight stages of Kotter’s theory. Some stages aligned with their efforts better than

others, but every step in West Point’s successful organizational culture change from an

attritional/adversarial fourth class system to a four class developmental system was

consistent with Kotter’s stages. The area that Kotter emphasized the most was leadership

of the organizational culture change; Lt. Gen. Palmer provided that for West Point.

The Citadel’s incomplete transition from an attritional/adversarial fourth class

system to a four year developmental system seems be attributed to their incomplete

adherence to Kotter’s eight stages. The Citadel has not successfully proceeded through

Kotter’s eight stages and significantly, they lacked strong leadership in their attempt at

cultural change.

According to those who were interviewed and my analysis, the three additional

factors appear to play a role in the successful transition at West Point. It is important to

note that there was universal agreement from those interviewed at West Point that the

leadership and a sense of urgency was the number one factor that contributed to the

change of the fourth class system. In contrast, among those interviewed at The Citadel,

there was no consensus about the number one factor that contributed to successful

change; three or four different factors were mentioned, none of which included the

importance of leadership and a sense of urgency.

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The TACs at each institution were identified as the second most important factor

in successful culture change. This was the only area of agreement between the two

colleges of the factors affecting change. The third important factor in culture change at

West Point was the Behavioral Science & Leadership Department, while at The Citadel,

three or four different areas were mentioned. The reason for this discrepancy was that at

West Point, there was a systematic plan that all stakeholders could identify with, and thus

a consensus about the important factors in the change. This was not the case at The

Citadel, where stakeholders were not united by an overall strategic plan and

consequently, had very different ideas about what was an important factor for change.

The assumption that Kotter’s organizational change model could be used to

explain successful change at a military college suggests that there is a relationship

between West Point’s adherence to Kotter’s organizational change model and its

successful transition. The research also suggests that there is a relationship between The

Citadel’s incomplete adherence to Kotter’s organizational change model and its

incomplete transition.

The three additional factors that were identified by Brig. Gen. Betros (2012) in

the organizational culture change were also found as important factors by this research in

the successful culture change at West Point. The absence of these factors in the case of

The Citadel seems to suggest that these factors could have played a positive role in The

Citadel’s incomplete organizational culture change of it fourth class system.

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CHAPTER SEVEN:

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Conclusions from My Research

This research indicates that military colleges should not support an

attritional/adversarial fourth class system that leads to abusive behavior and hazing. All

military colleges ostensibly educate and train cadets in leader development. The outdated

fourth class system is the antitheses of today’s leader development model. Military

colleges that allow this antiquated system to survive are educating their cadets in the

wrong leadership methods, which often result in leadership and job failures when the

cadet graduates. If former cadets enter the military or civilian occupations, their poor

treatment of subordinates will not be tolerated.

Military colleges that continue this system could risk both the future failure of

their graduates and losing their reputation for producing qualified leaders. An antiquated

fourth class system leads to high attrition – especially in the freshmen year, poor morale

that affects the entire college, poor performance including academics, and less than

adequate values and respect. At its worse, this outdated fourth class system could

increase the college’s risk for bad publicity and lawsuits. The lawsuits fall into two

areas: lawsuits from the victims of abusive behavior and hazing, and lawsuits from those

seeking compensation for a product that was advertised but not delivered. More risk

could also assumed from college regulatory agencies, which increasingly have reviewed

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administration performance on student behaviors. All these factors should provide a

sufficient sense of urgency for military colleges to change.

A highly successful paradigm exists that can be duplicated by following West

Point’s organizational culture change as a best practice model. This model, coupled with

Kotter’s organizational change theory, described in his book Leading Change, offers

military colleges a successful example for planning and executing a cultural change of

their attritional/adversarial fourth class system. West Point’s innovative four year Cadet

Leader Development System (CLDS), along other improvements that compliment CLDS,

can be applied to any military college and will create the conditions for a successful

organizational culture change in the fourth class system. Failure to act and use a

successful best practice model could be construed as a lack of leadership, negligence, and

an ethical failure. Future cadets and parents who send their sons and daughters to

military colleges expect the latest in military leader education. A military college that

does not adapt to the best practices, like those that occurred at West Point 24 years ago, is

accepting unnecessary risk in a number of different areas.

This research has shown that there are some key principles that enable military

colleges to position themselves for success when attempting an organizational culture

change from an attritional/adversarial fourth class system to a leadership development

system. The first principal is that a military college have a four class system developed

and in place. This four class system will impose well-defined development standards on

the upper three classes. The upper class developmental standards will shift the upper

class’ focus from the freshmen to the development of goals for their own class, which

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includes developing freshmen. The four class development system is one of the key

principles that needs to be up and running before working on other principals.

The next principal is selecting an organizational culture change model such as

Kotter’s. A model is necessary as a guide though the culture change process. It allows

the college administrators to evaluate where the college is and make any necessary

adjustments. It also allows the development of nested strategic, operational, and tactical

plans to be developed. Education, training, and communication are a necessary principle

that synchronizes all stakeholders so that everyone is aware of and supports the mission

and plan objectives. More education and certification for certain college administrators,

such as TACs, is needed because they have an influential role to play in the change

process.

The final principal is a breakdown of the old paradigms of ethos in cadet culture

and structure to ensure that the new systems become accepted and integrated into the

Corps. New programs must be introduced that replace past structure, traditions, and

company norms to reduce resistance and to foster acceptance of the new system.

Programs such as Cadet Leader Distribution Plan for the second class (scrambling) and

empowering upper class cadets through rank changes are a few of the necessary

additional programs that should occur alongside the four year cadet leader development

system. The final principal will be the adjustment and enforcement of the new fourth

class rules and regulations. Together, these principles enable a military college to set the

conditions for success as it strives to transition the culture of the fourth class system.

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Recommendations

Although these recommendations are directed at The Citadel, they are broad-

based recommendations that apply to any U.S. military college trying to create an

organizational culture change in their attritional/adversarial fourth class system to a

developmental system. Since all military colleges have very similar structures and

regulations, almost all of these recommendations will be applicable. Kotter’s change

theory is also applicable for cultural changes at military colleges.

In January 2014, there was a consensus at The Citadel that an organizational

culture change from the attritional/adversarial fourth class system to a four year

developmental system was still needed. The Citadel has been attempting serious

organizational culture change since the arrival of Maj. Gen. John Grinalds as President in

1997. For a variety of reasons outlined in The Citadel’s case study (Chapter 5), The

Citadel has had an incomplete transition to date. The following recommendations, if

implemented, will enable The Citadel to complete the culture change to a four class cadet

development system and eliminate their attritional/adversarial fourth class system.

Recommendations for The Citadel’s BOV and President

Recommendation 1: Act now

The American public no longer tolerates abusive behavior and hazing as it has in

the past. The behavioral standards for student conduct at colleges and universities are

much higher in 2014 than 1950, even at military colleges like West Point and The

Citadel. The Citadel advertises to prospective students and parents that the college will

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educate and develop a cadet into a “principled leader,” yet the institution is well aware

that it has been unable to transition from their attritional/adversarial fourth class system

to the four year developmental system that would enable them to do this.

This puts the college in a quandary, as it advertises a product that it is not able to

deliver. This then causes ethical concerns, since parents and cadets do not chose The

Citadel to risk being abused or hazed; they choose The Citadel to be developed into

principled leaders. They believe The Citadel would use the very latest leader

development techniques. Countless lives are unnecessarily disrupted due to The

Citadel’s current system and its inability to change it. It is ironic that the Quality

Enhancement Plan (QEP) for the 2014 Southern Association of Colleges and Schools

(SACS) accreditation of The Citadel is focused on ethical reasoning as The Citadel

knowingly has a fourth class system that continues to abuse current cadets.

Recommendation 2: Change Tactics from Incrementalism

The Citadel currently uses an incrementalism strategy towards their fourth class

organizational change, which has failed. Incrementalism involves planning and

executing many small tasks over a long period of time. Incrementalism has been The

Citadel’s approach since the late 1960s. Their persistence with incrementalism, with only

minor adjustments, is uninspired approach that has failed and will continue to fail. This

strategy has not proven successful in reforming the fourth class system at any military

college. There is, however, decades of evidence of this strategy’s failure, as noted in the

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two case studies conducted for this research. The Citadel needs to adopt a fast-paced

model, and even that will take a minimum of five years to fully implement.

Recommendation 3: Adopt and Maintain a Change Theory

The Citadel would do well to follow the fast-paced organizational culture theory

discussed in Kotter’s Leading Change (1996). It is a business organizational change

model, but the military and military colleges work much like bureaucratic top-down

businesses. It is notable that the U.S. Army War College used Kotter’s model in their

recent top-down review. Any organizational change will take five to seven years to fully

implement. West Point’s organizational culture change to a four class leadership

development system can be used as a paradigm for The Citadel. There are also other

organizational culture change models that could be used as a guide for this process.

Recommendation 4: More Resources Are Not Necessary

More resources (people, money, time) are always more desirable, but not

necessary for an organizational culture change at The Citadel. College administrators

should not think they need additional resources before beginning a major attempt at

change. Most of the people interviewed at The Citadel felt that their current resources

were more than adequate to start the change. The Citadel should be reminded that West

Point did not use additional resources in its successful culture change.

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Recommendation 5: Educate All Stakeholders about the Change

Among The Citadel’s stakeholders, many will resist any organizational culture

change. The majority of these resistors do not understand what the changes will do or the

context within which the changes are being made. This will require extensive education

and communication plans, both internally and externally. Once properly educated about

the change, most will support it. The Citadel may have to deal with internal resisters, but

they should be advised to simply ignore external resistors. This is well within the

capability of the college’s External Affairs Department.

Recommendation 6: Mobilize all College Organizations

It will take the entire campus, all stakeholders, and all available expertize at The

Citadel to affect change. Academic departments, like Psychology and Education, must

help with TAC and cadet education and training and assist with drafting a four year

comprehensive leadership development plan. The Alumni Center must be responsible for

educating and communicating with the alumni, which includes some of the strongest

resistors at military colleges. The Cadet Counseling Center needs to be engaged, as it

was at West Point. Every department and organization on campus must be involved in

the culture change for it to succeed.

Recommendation 7: Monitor the Change

The Citadel’s Krause Center seems to be the ideal organization to monitor the

change process, but it needs to report directly to the President, which it currently does

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not. As Kotter (1996) continually states in his book, leadership of the change must come

from the head of the organization. The head of a college or university is the President.

The President also must establish a guiding coalition to help implement the change.

Whatever organization is dealt the responsibility of monitoring the change process, it

needs to be empowered and have the President’s authority to act.

Recommendation 8: Modify the Cadet Schedule

To have an effective four year leadership development program, the cadet

schedule needs to be rebalanced so that more leadership development time is available.

The current schedule at The Citadel only includes one dedicated hour per week to

conduct leader development education. The time for leader development needs to be

doubled, at a minimum, in order to facilitate a fully functional four year development

system.

Recommendation 9: Evaluate Leadership Development

Cadets must be held accountable for their performance in the four year leadership

development program just as they are held accountable in the academic program.

Evaluation is a method for holding the cadets accountable. This could be accomplished

by assigning an academic grade, as West Point does, or by requiring a cadet to pass a

grade standard before moving up to the next class year or graduating. The current system

at The Citadel has few consequences for cadets who perform poorly in leader

development.

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Recommendation 10: Follow a Best-Practice Model

Military colleges are faced with strikingly similar situations in cadet behavior.

The military part of all military academies and colleges, whether federal, state, or private,

consist of exactly the same functional systems. The excuse that the fourth class system

cannot be changed because of minor differences between military colleges is not a valid

position. Military colleges are vastly more alike than different, making it advisable to

adapt a best-practice model, such as West Point. The employees at The Citadel need to

be educated about their mission in the organizational change. They also need to

understand that they will be held responsible for their part in the organizational change,

regardless of the number of hours it takes to accomplish the change.

Recommendations for the Commandant of Cadets

Recommendation 1: Educate, Train, and Certify TACs

Tactical Officers (TACs) are critical change agents necessary for successful

organizational culture change at any military college. Their education and training at The

Citadel must be designed to include a solid background in leader development. TACs

must be able to meet minimum certification standards that ensure that they all operate

from a common basis of leader development. Their education should also include a

leader development sustainment education program while they are employed at The

Citadel. This should be tied to a tiered compensation system that provides additional pay

for additional skills in leadership development.

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Recommendation 2: Create a Cadet Leader Distribution Plan

The Citadel should establish A Cadet Leader Distribution Plan that would

scramble the rising junior class. This will break the cycle of friendship that occurs with

cadets in the current model, in which 21 company fraternal organizations create their own

rules and regulations:

When cadets resolved the conflict in favor of the friendship, the opportunity to gain in the practice of leadership was foregone. However, it was noted that, by one scramble of a cadet class between their Third and Second Class year, the relationships between all classes in a company at the beginning of the academic year would be uncomplicated by former, long-standing friendships. The First Class would not know the Second, the Second would not know the Third, and none of them would know the Fourth (Donnithorne, 1991, p. 32).

Scrambling will eliminate the cycle of fraternal companies, where unwritten company

rules prevail, creating a much stronger Corps of Cadets who will follow the Corps

regulations.

Recommendation 3: Recognize that Change Begins at the Top

Organizational culture change must begin at the top rather than with the cadets.

Research substantiates this. Organizational change at West Point, a best-practice model,

began with a plan that involved change agents who directed, coached, taught, educated,

and mentored cadets about the organizational culture change. Change at the Citadel will

never occur if left to cadets. Waiting for 18 to 22 year old cadets with little experience in

leadership development to become change agents is fruitless. As in academics, the cadets

must be led, educated, and trained on what the organizational culture change is before

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they will understand and embrace it. The leaders of The Citadel need to initiate

organizational culture change.

Recommendation 4: Rotate Cadet Ranks and Positions

In a developmental system, all upper class cadets need the opportunity to develop

subordinates. It’s impossible to become a “principled leader” without having led anyone

during your cadet career. It is recommended that all sophomores be promoted to corporal

and assigned freshmen cadets. These sophomores would be graded on how well they

developed their subordinates. In the same way, all juniors would be promoted to

sergeants and assigned sophomores and freshmen to develop, and all seniors would be

promoted to officers and assigned juniors, sophomores, and freshmen cadets to develop.

Cadets with discipline issues would lose rank and return to freshmen privileges.

Leadership positions would be rotated each semester in order to evaluate and develop

cadets in a number of different Corps of Cadets positions. Currently the Corps’

leadership remains the same throughout the year, affording cadets with few opportunities

to learn various leadership positions in the Corps. The current model also results in burn-

out of those selected to lead the entire year.

Recommendation 5: Recognize Freshmen By Corps Day

The Citadel should follow the recommendations of most of the fourth class

committees appointed by Citadel Presidents to investigate and improve the fourth class

system. Almost all recommended moving Recognition Day to Corps Day:

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Corps Day is the birthday of the South Carolina Corps of Cadets, and is one of the most highly attended weekends at The Citadel. Attractions include dress parades, awards presentations, special cadet performances and athletic events. A highlight is the mess hall birthday celebration in which the oldest alumnus and the youngest cadet share cake-cutting honors (The Citadel, 2013).

Corps Day is usually held on a weekend in March. Almost all other military colleges

have studied the issue and moved up their Recognition Day to earlier in the second

semester of the freshmen year. This makes sense, since the freshman year goals and

objectives have clearly been met by Corps Day; it also raises morale. Celebrating

Recognition Day later in the freshmen year provides few, if any, benefits.

Recommendation 6: Reduce Freshmen Mess Hall Requirements

All military colleges, including The Citadel and West Point, have had issues with

the Mess Hall. The only way to effectively deal with the Mess Hall issues is to reduce

the freshmen requirements in the Mess Hall to just one – the ban on talking. Then, The

Citadel must enforce this regulation.

Recommendation 7: Appoint a Regimental Tactical Officer

When The Citadel had only eight TACs, it was feasible for the Commandant of

Cadets to supervise the TACs. The Citadel now has twenty-six TACs in addition to five

battalion TACs as supervisors. Consequently, the Commandant’s Department and the

Corps of Cadets have grown too large for the Commandant to effectively manage the

daily operations of the TACs. The Commandant needs to be engaged in the strategic and

operational aspects of the department and the college, and does not have adequate time to

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supervise the tactical control of the TACs. Appointing a Regimental Tactical Officer

would enable the TACs to receive more effective guidance and direction. Since TACs

are one of the critical change agents for the Corps of Cadets, this recommendation is vital

to ensure successful organizational culture change.

Closing

West Point has demonstrated that despite more than 150 years of tradition, an

attritional/adversarial system can undergo a successful organizational culture change to a

four class leadership development system. The resulting improvements included

improved and more realistic leadership skills learned by the graduating cadets; a better

first year experience for cadets, creating a more positive environment; less attrition of

freshmen cadets, and a significant decrease in abusive behavior and hazing.

The Citadel has a moral and ethical responsibility to both their current and future

parents and cadets to study similar fourth class systems that existed for a long period of

time that underwent a successful organizational culture change, such as West Point’s.

Failure to study the proven strategies or to follow a best-practice model of organizational

culture change would be a moral and ethical failure on the part of the institution.

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APPENDIX A: THE WEST POINT CASE STUDY INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Organizational Cultural Change of the Fourth Class System at West Point

Time of Interview:

Date:

Place:

Interviewee:

Questions:

1. Would you please describe the fourth class system that existed in the 70’s and

80’s at West Point?

2. Would you please describe the fourth class system in the 90’s at West Point?

3. Did a change take place at West Point?

4. Who were the main actors who caused this change?

5. Specifically, what did they change?

6. How were actors who resisted the change handled?

7. Can you describe the sense of direction provided by the leadership at West

Point? The Superintendent? The Commandant?

8. Was there a sense of urgency?

9. What was the role of TACs in this change?

10. What was the importance of TAC officer education in this change?

11. How were the cadets approached about this change?

12. What was the importance of cadet education in the change?

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13. What role did the counseling center play in this change?

14. How is this change working today at West Point?

15. Who should I speak to in order to find out more about this cultural change?

16. Where could I find documents that would substantiate West Point’s policies on

this change?

17. Thank you for participating in this interview.

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APPENDIX B: THE CITADEL CASE STUDY INTERVIEW PROTOCOL

Past and Present Status of The Citadel’s Fourth Class System

Time of Interview:

Date:

Place:

Interviewee:

Questions:

1. Would you please describe the fourth class system that existed at The Citadel in

the 70’s and 80’s?

2. Would you please describe the fourth class system in the 90’s at The Citadel?

3. Would you please describe the fourth class system today at The Citadel?

4. Who were the main actors in the fourth class system?

5. Specifically, how were the actors involved?

6. How were actors who resisted the change handled?

7. Can you describe the sense of direction provided by the leadership at The

Citadel? The President? The Commandant?

8. Was there a sense of urgency?

9. What was the role of TACs in this change?

10. What was the importance of TAC officer education in this change?

11. How were the cadets approached about this change?

12. What was the importance of cadet education in the fourth class system?

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13. What role has the counseling center played in the fourth class system?

14. How is the fourth class system working at The Citadel today?

15. Who should I speak to in order to find out more about the fourth class system at

The Citadel?

16. Where could I find documents that would substantiate The Citadel’s policies on

the fourth class system?

17. Thank you for participating in this interview.

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APPENDIX C: L IST OF WEST POINT INTERVIEWS

1. Retired Brig. Gen. Lance Betros, US Army, Ph.D, Department Head of History (2005-2012), 18 October 2013.

2. Retired Lt. Col. Bob Byrne, US Army, Ph.D, Head of the Cadet Counseling Center (1998-2004), 20 March 2013. **

3. Retired Col. Arthur Coumbe, US Army, Professor of Social Sciences (2011-present), 10 April 2013.

4. Retired Col. Larry Donnithorne, US Army, Ph.D, Chief of Leader Development

Integration (1989-1993), 16 October 2013.

5. Retired Brig. Gen. Barney Forsythe, US Army, PhD, Professor of Behavioral Science & Leadership, Vice Dean for Education (1994-2005), 14 October 2013.

6. Retired Col. Joe LeBoeuf, US Army, Ph.D, Professor of Behavioral Science &

Leadership, Director of the Eisenhower Tactical Officer Education Program (1993-2003), 21 March 2013.

7. Retired Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer, US Army, Superintendent (1986-1991), 9 October 2013.

8. Retired Brig. Gen. Howard Prince, US Army, Ph.D, Head of Behavioral

Sciences & Leadership, (1976-1993), 8 October 2013. 9. Retired Col. Scott Snook, US Army, Ph.D, Professor of Behavioral Science &

Leadership (1995-2002), 16 October 2013.

10. Retired Col. Gregory Stone, US Army, Brigade Tactical Officer (2004-2007), 13 September 2013. **

11. Retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart, US Army, Head of Strategic Planning for the

Commandant of Cadets (1993-2003), 9 October 2013. **

12. Retired Col. Will Wilson, US Army, Ph.D, Head of the Cadet Counseling Center (1978-1993), 28 March 2013.

** denotes assignment at West Point and The Citadel

147

APPENDIX D: L IST OF THE CITADEL INTERVIEWS

1. Retired Command Sgt. Maj. Sylvan Bauer, US Army, Command Sergeant Major (1996-present), 2 October 2013.

2. Brig. Gen. Harry Carter, Unorganized Militia of South Carolina, Provost (1999-2005, 2006-2007), Director of Krause Leadership Center (2010), 9 September 2013.

3. Retired Maj. Gen. John Grinalds, US Marine Corps, President (1997- 2004), 24 September 2013.

4. Brig. Gen. Sam Hines, Unorganized Militia of South Carolina, Provost (2008-

present), 25 September 2013. 5. Retired Col. Leo Mercado, US Marine Corps, Commandant of Cadets (2009-

present), 18 September 2013. 6. Col. Steve Nida, Unorganized Militia of South Carolina, Department Head of

Psychology (2002-2009, 2012-present), 4 November 2013.

7. Retired Maj. Gen. Cliff Poole, US Army, Interim President (1996-1997, 2005), Provost (1993-1996), Director of Krause Leadership Center (2011), 8 October 2013.

8. Retired Lt. Gen. John Rosa, US Air Force, President (2006-present), 14 November 2013.

9. Retired Col. Greg Stone, US Army, Commandant of Cadets (2006-2009), 13

September 2013. ** 10. Retired Col. Joe Trez, US Army, Commandant of Cadets (1997), Director of Staff

(1999-2012), Director of Krause Leadership Center (2012-present), 6 September 2013.

11. Retired Lt. Col. Jeff Weart, US Army, Director of Krause Leadership Initiative,

Director of the Krause Center (2003-2010), 9 October 2013. **

** denotes assignment at West Point and The Citadel

148

APPENDIX E: CODING AND TRIANGULATION MATRIX

A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 A-6 A-7 A-8 A-9 A-10 A-11 A-12 West Point Lt. Gen. Dave Palmer X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$

X X**$ X**$ X**$

L Brig. Gen. Howard Prince

X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ L

Brig. Gen. Lance Betros X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$L X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ L

Brig. Gen. Barney Forsythe

X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ L

Col. Joe LeBoeuf X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X** $ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ L

Col. Will Wilson X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ L

Col. Scott Snook X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X** $ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ L

Col. Larry Donnithorne X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X* *$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ L

Col. Gregory Stone X**$ X**$ X**$ X**$ X**S L

Col. Arthur Coumbe X**$ X**$

Lt. Col. Bob Byrne X**$ X**$

149

A-1 A-2 A-3 A-4 A-5 A-6 A-7 A-8 A-9 A-10 A-11 A-12 The Citadel Lt. Gen. John Rosa X$ X**$ M Maj. Gen. John Grinalds X**$ X**$ X X** X$ L Maj. Gen Cliff Poole X**$ L Brig. Gen. Sam Hines X$ X X**$ Brig. Gen. Harry Carter X$ X**$ M Col. Leo Mercado X$ X**$ Col. Steve Nida X$ Col. Gregory Stone X$ X**$ M Col. Joe Trez X$ X**$ Lt. Col. Jeff Weart X$ X**$ M CSM Sylvan Bauer X$ X**$ M CODES:

A-1: The sense of urgency and direction from the top leadership of West Point/The Citadel A-2: The education and training of the Tactical Officers (TACs) at West Point/The Citadel A-3: The role of the Cadet Counseling Center in the organizational change at West Point/The Citadel

KOTTER ’S STEPS: SYMBOLS :

A-4: Establishing a Sense of Urgency **: Confirmed by document (triangulation) A-5: Creating the Guiding Coalition $: Confirmed by separate interview

A-6: Developing a Vision and Strategy M: Management A-7: Communicating the Change Vision L: Leadership A-8: Empowering Employees for Broad-Based Action

A-9: Generating Short Term Wins A-10: Consolidating Gains and Producing More Change

A-11: Anchoring New Changes in the Culture A-12: Management versus Leadership

150

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