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LONDON FIRE BRIGADE Organisational Overview London Fire Brigade 9 April 2018 LFB00001905_0001

Organisational Overview - Grenfell Tower Inquiry...2. Introduction 2.1 This document details the key information relating to the way the London Fire Brigade (LFB) delivers its core

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Page 1: Organisational Overview - Grenfell Tower Inquiry...2. Introduction 2.1 This document details the key information relating to the way the London Fire Brigade (LFB) delivers its core

LONDON FIRE BRIGADE

OrganisationalOverview

London Fire Brigade

9 April 2018

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London Fire Brigade - 'Organisational Overview' Document

1. Content

2. lntrod uction. . Page 3

3. London Fire Brigade. Page 3

4. What influences the Brigade. Page 3

5. The Brigade's Main Aims and Objectives. Page 4

6. London Resilience. .Page 7

7. Brigade Control. .Page 7

8. Stay Put and Fire Survival Guidance Page 8

9. Pre-Determined Attendance .Page 9

10. Pre-Planning and Risk Information .Page 10

11. High-Rise Firefighting. Page 11

12. Incident Command. Page 12

13. Operational and Training Assurance. .Page 13

14. Operational Discretion. Page 14

15. Incident Communications. Page 15

16. Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE).. .Page 16

17. Breathing Apparatus (BA) Sets. .Page 16

18. Breathing Apparatus Procedures. Page 17

19. Breathing Apparatus Entry Control Page 17

20. Breathing Apparatus Tactics. Page 18

21. Aerial Appliances. .Page 18

22. Command Support. . Page 19

23. Fire Investigation .Page 20

24. Underpinning Systems. .Page 20

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25. National Operational Guidance (NOG) .Page 20

26. Brigade Operational Policy. Page 21

27. Brigade Training Facilities. Page 21

28. Staff Development and Training Delivery .Page 22

29. Development and Maintenance of Operational Professionalism (DaMOP) . Page 24

30. Staff Promotion Page 24

31. Health and Safety. .Page 24

32. Provision and Maintenance of Appliances and Equipment Page 26

33. Cross Border Deployments and Mutual Aid. .Page 27

34. Major incident Investigation. .Page 27

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2. Introduction

2.1 This document details the key information relating to the way the London Fire Brigade (LFB)delivers its core Prevention, Protection and Response functions. It also details some of theunderpinning systems that are used to support these key functions. It is hoped that bydetailing all this information in a single document will assist the Grenfell Tower Inquiry (GTI)and Operation Northleigh (Op Northleigh) investigation teams to gain a more comprehensiveunderstanding of how the LFB operates in respect to the themes that are most relevant to theGrenfell Tower fire.

2.2 The document does not restate all of the information detailed in policy and procedural notesthat have already been disclosed, but aims to provide an easy reference overview of the LFB'skey activities and systems.

3. London Fire Brigade (the 'Brigade')

3.1 There are approximately 5,500 staff working at the Brigade, which includes 4,600 uniformedoperational firefighters and officers who make up a significant proportion of the total number ofwhole-time firefighters in England and Wales. London and the West Midlands are the onlyother UK Fire and Rescue Services (FRSs) where all operational staff are whole-time. OtherFRSs use a combination of whole-time and retained firefighters (the latter carry out firefightingduties in addition to their main employment).

3.2 To provide a 24-hour service the Brigade operates a two shift, four-watch system at firestations. Red watch, blue watch, green watch and white watch, each work two day shiftsfollowed by two night shifts, followed by four days off. This is often referred to as 2/2/4 shiftsystem. The change between the day and night shifts occurs at 9.30am and 8pm each day.

3.3 There are currently 103 operational fire stations in London, including one river station. Eachoperates 24 hours, 365 days per year. The Brigade has a variety of special appliances (ofwhich there are 15 different types) including Fire Rescue Units, Aerials (high-reach vehicles)and Command Units. Nearly half of the fire stations have at least one of these specialappliances in addition to a fire engine often referred to as a pumping appliance.

3.4 There are around 110 Control staff working in the Brigade's Control Centre (Brigade Control)who handle emergency '999' calls directed to the Brigade by British Telecom (BT) Operators.During a call control operators perform a number of tasks including finding out details ofincidents, mobilising fire engines and deploying the Brigade's resources to emergencies.Alongside the operational and control staff there are around 800 non-operational staff, knownas Fire and Rescue Staff (FRS), actively working to help prevent fires and manage all otheraspects of the service including fire safety inspection, fire safety engineering specialists andother support functions.

3.5 As well as responding to fires and other emergencies the Brigade's major priority is to preventfires from causing harm or damage to people, property and the environment. Educating thepublic and positively influencing the behaviours that cause fires is also vital to the work of theBrigade.

4. What Influences the Brigade

4.1 There are a number of pieces of legislation that govern and shape the way the Brigade operatesand delivers its services. Primarily these are:

• Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004• Regulatory Reform (Fire safety) Order 2005

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• Civil Contingencies Act (CCA) 2005, and• Health and Safety at Work Act (HASAW) 1974

4.2 In delivering its services the Brigade also has to have due regard to the following:

• The Fire and Rescue National Framework for England - The government's expectations forfire and rescue authorities (FRAs) are set out in the Fire and Rescue National Framework,which is a component of the Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004. This Framework waspublished in 2012 and requires FRAs to identify and assess the full range of foreseeablefire and rescue related risks in their areas and make provision for prevention andprotection activities and respond to incidents appropriately. The Framework also requiresFRAs to produce an integrated risk management plan (IRMP). The purpose of anintegrated risk management plan is to adopt an holistic approach to reducing the likelihoodof fire and casualties from fire. The LFB's IRMP is entitled the London Safety Plan (LSP) andthe latest iteration of this plan was published in March 2017. The current plan runs until2021.

• The Mayor of London - The Brigade is one of the organisations within the Greater LondonAuthority under the Mayor and plays a key role in supporting his aims, objectives andvision for London. The Mayor sets the proportion of council tax the Brigade receives, afterallowing for grants from Central Government and business rates. This is subject to theLondon Assembly's approval. The Brigade can vary its final spending plans provided theyremain within the component budget set by the Mayor.

• London's challenges - London is a very complex city in terms of challenges, risks,population, building type and density. There are persistent problems with poverty.Research has shown that vulnerable people living in deprived areas means are more likelyto have a fire. Much of the Brigade's community safety work is concentrated in theseareas.

• The People of London - The Brigade is influenced by the people of London through thepartnership work it does at a local level, interaction as part of its community safety workand communication with the public via the Brigade's website and through social media.The Brigade is also influenced by the responses it receives to formal consultation andengagement work.

5. The Brigade's Main Aims and Objectives

5.1 The Brigade's work is broadly delivered under three aims, which are set out in the Brigade'sIntegrated Risk Management Plan called the London Safety Plan (LSP). These are

• Prevention and protection• Response and resilience• People and resources

5.2 Prevention and Protection - The Brigade's aim is to stop fires happening. The approach topreventing fire focuses on the places and causes where the Brigade think it can changebehaviour to avoid unnecessary fires. The Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 places anobligation on fire and rescue services (FRS) to promote community safety, but it does notspecify how this should be done.

5.3 In carrying out community safety work the Brigade uses a risk based approach to targetgeographic areas and people who are most at risk from fire, e.g. areas of high social

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deprivation, elderly people and those with mobility issues. Community safety work isundertaken both by specialist centralised teams and by staff at fire stations.

5.4 The principal means by which the Brigade improves domestic fire safety is through home firesafety visits (HFSV). This involves firefighters or partner agencies visiting domestic premisesand providing bespoke fire safety advice and fitting smoke alarms free of charge to theoccupant. The Brigade aims to visit over 85,000 homes each year and 80 per cent of thesevisits are targeted at persons at greatest risk from fire, such as those suffering from mentalhealth and substance abuse.

5.5 The Brigade's 'protection' function is informed, in part, from the Regulatory Reform (FireSafety) Order 2005 (RRO). The RRO applies to all buildings that are not a single privatedwelling or family homes, which currently stands at over 700,000 premises in London. TheRRO gives the Brigade responsibilities and powers in respect to the common areas of a buildingsuch as the corridors, staircases, lifts and cupboards. It also places the obligation for fire safetyin the hands of a 'responsible person' (such as building owners and employers) who arerequired to undertake a number of fire safety related duties including conducting a fire riskassessment, acting on its findings and regularly reviewing the assessment to ensure it is currentand accurate. The 'responsible person' is also responsible for ensuring that the mitigations(control measures) outlined in the fire risk assessment are maintained.

5.6 The LFB discharges its RRO protection function by ensuring that building owners and occupierscomply with the RRO and any other fire safety legislation. A risk based approach is adopted forselecting buildings to be audited or inspected for compliance. The Brigade enforces fire safetylegislation through:

• The proportionate use of enforcement powers, ranging from the giving of advice andissuing enforcement notices to prosecution, when appropriate

• A proactive programme of building audits across London that focus on premises with thehighest risk - as defined by the Chief Fire Officer Association (CFOA) IRMP risk groups

• Seeking to influence those responsible for designing buildings so that, as far as possible,fire safety measures such as sprinklers are installed

• Providing advice and guidance to the business community and others on how they cancomply with the law whilst not hindering business growth

• Providing fire safety advice to other agencies through consultation processes

5.7 The Brigade also underpins its key prevention and protection activities through media andpublic affairs campaigns and communications. In all Brigade communications emphasis isplaced on:

• influencing the individual choices to keep people safe from fire, such as installing smokealarms and having an escape plan for your home, not leaving cooking unattended, etc, and

• working with other agencies that have fire safety responsibilities (such as local authorities)to improve safety and reduce risk, target high risk and vulnerable people, lobby for firesafety measures (e.g. sprinklers) in buildings. It also involves working with developers andthe building industry to optimise safety in new buildings and improve access to fire safetyinformation.

5.8 Recent Brigade campaigns have included:

• Reducing kitchen fires caused by people drinking alcohol and cooking at the same time

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• Supporting new regulations requiring landlords to install working smoke and carbonmonoxide alarms in their properties and distributing free smoke alarms to those most atrisk

• Reducing the number and impact of fires in waste and recycling facilities• Campaigning to make white goods safer and improve the product recall system• Reducing non emergency calls to people shut in lifts• Reducing calls to incidents that other agencies should attend such as the RSPCA in the

case of non-emergency animal rescues

5.9 In relation to high rise buildings the Brigade ran a specific campaign in March 2014 directed atthose living in these types of premises. This was in part a response to the outcomes from theCoroner's Inquest for the Lakanal House high rise fire, which occurred in 2009 where sixpeople lost their lives. The campaign was called 'Know the Plan and aimed at increasingawareness of what to do if there is a fire where you live. The campaign also sought to increaseawareness amongst landlords and building owners of their fire safety responsibilities.

5.10 Response & Resilience - The Brigade operates a large and varied fleet of vehicles that carry avariety of specialised equipment and apparatus for use in firefighting and rescue operations.The majority of our front-line fleet is made up of traditional 'fire engines' called pumps orpumping appliances. All fire engines carry standard firefighting equipment, but some carry alonger 13.5m extension ladders and have additional rescue equipment and these vehicles arecalled pump ladders (PLs). Every fire station in London houses at least one PL, whilst otherstations will have two fire engines (1 x Pump Ladder and 1 x Pump). The Brigade's wide rangeof specialist vehicles have different capabilities and are collectively referred to as specialappliances or just simply, 'specials'. These are located at different fire stations across London.

5.11 The Brigade locates its fleet of emergency response vehicles in fire stations that offer the bestprotection to London as a whole. Resources can be drawn from anywhere in London if anincident requires additional fire engines and/or specialist appliances. For the larger morecomplex incidents, responding fire engines will come from multiple fire stations across London.When this happens Brigade Control will move available fire engines from their base fire stationto another location to maintain a level of strategic operational cover across London.

5.12 The Brigade always aims to get fire engines and other resources to incidents as quickly aspossible. There are performance targets for measuring response times of the first and secondfire engines at an incident. The target for the first fire engine is within six minutes and thesecond fire engine, when needed, within eight minutes. In 2016/17, the average arrival for afirst fire engine was 5 minutes 25 seconds and average arrival time for a second fire engine was6 minutes 48 seconds.

5.13 People and resources - An operationally competent workforce is essential to the Brigade. Asa responsible employer the Brigade aims to ensure that all its staff continually develop andmaintain the skills and abilities necessary to safely perform their duties. Accordingly, theBrigade provides continual training, assessment and development of its firefighters and officersto ensure they are equipped to deal with incidents safely and effectively.

5.14 Operational competence is maintained through the Brigade's dynamic and intelligentoperational training (DIOT) process. This enables the Brigade to identify and respond to risk-critical issues that impact the operational effectiveness of the Brigade. The process alsomonitors operational and training performance, identifying both positive and developmentaltrends. It also provides mechanisms to support the maintenance of competence for alloperational staff, including the implementation of training interventions. Further detail of stafftraining, development and the DIOT process is set out later in this document.

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6. London Resilience

6.1 In terms of resilience within London the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 sets out the Brigade'semergency planning responsibilities, which include:

• Maintaining emergency plans in relation to pan-London emergencies on behalf of allLondon's boroughs and the City of London

• Conducting exercises in relation to pan-London plans for the boroughs and City of London• Provision of training in relation to the plans for the boroughs and City of London

6.2 In November 2014, the operational responsibility for London-wide resilience (including thetransfer of the London Resilience Team at City Hall) passed to the Brigade with the GreaterLondon Authority retaining strategic oversight for resilience in the Capital. The Brigade alreadyhad an Emergency Planning team, and since November 2014, both the London Resilience andEmergency Planning teams have been working together as a single group to align their workingprocesses. The London Resilience Group (LRG) is the result of this merger and the single teamnow has the responsibility for managing resilience in London.

6.3 To ensure collaboration between the LRG and the wider partnership is effective two servicelevel agreements have been negotiated. One is with the Greater London Authority and theother with the London boroughs. Both of these agreements help to ensure the LRG canproperly support the London Resilience Forum in planning for and co-ordinating the responseto any emergency.

6.4 The LRG fulfils the following tasks:

• Promote awareness and awareness of risks• Coordinate development of multi-agency capabilities, ensuring consistency in the

development and maintenance of London's plans• Provide the secretariat for the London Resilience Forum, London Resilience Programme

Board and Sub-Regional Resilience Forums• Provide a liaison point between London responders, the Mayor of London and Central

Government, other LRF areas and internationally• Provide 24/7 point of contact for the Partnership, coordinating the development of

situational awareness, and providing the secretariat for the Strategic Coordination Groupwhen responding to disruptive events

• Provide a dedicated programme and coordination function for London's Local Authorities.

6.5 The LRG also supports London's sub-regional resilience forums, the borough resilience forumsresponsible for emergency planning at the local level and the strategic response arrangementsof London's boroughs by providing the London Local Authority Co-ordination Centre (LLACC).This LLACC is based at the Brigade's London Operations Centre (Brigade Control) in Merton,South London and performs two key functions; i) providing up-to date and accurateinformation for boroughs and the City of London to make strategic decisions, and ii)coordinating the activities of all boroughs in line with the strategy aims established for anygiven event or incident.

7. Brigade Control

7.1 The emergency 999 call handling function is undertaken by Brigade Control staff who arelocated in the London Operations Centre (LOC) in Merton, 5W19. Brigade Control has overallresponsibility for the handling of the 999 emergency calls passed by BT Operators andmobilising resources in line with the Brigade's 'pre-determined attendance' and operational

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policies. The Brigade Control staff are also the people who provide fire survival advice to callerswhen this is required.

7.2 In addition to the above, Brigade Control manages the strategic operational cover when theBrigade's front line resources are depleted either because they are committed to a protractedincident and/or when a specific geographical area of London is experiencing high levels ofdemand.

7.3 The Brigade also has a fallback Control centre in Stratford, East London that mirrors themajority of the functionality and systems used at the primary Control facility. The fallbackBrigade Control is not permanently staffed and is primarily utilised when planned routinemaintenance and software upgrades need to be undertaken on the mobilising andcommunications systems at Merton. The fallback Control can also be brought in to operationfor a spontaneous and/or unplanned event that significantly impacts on the effective operationof the primary Control facility and/or renders the building unusable.

8. Stay Put and Fire Survival Guidance

8.1 The 'stay put' and 'fire survival guidance' (FSG) advice is normally provided by Brigade Controlstaff when a caller indicates that they are trapped by a fire and/or unwilling to leave theproperty without assistance. The advice given in these circumstances is based upon theestablished national 'stay put' principles, which are predicated on the expectation that aresidential high rise premises are constructed and maintained in accordance with statutory firesafety and building control requirements.

8.2 In addition to the national 'stay put' policy the Local Government Group Guidance 'Fire safetyin purpose-built blocks of flats' reaffirms the stay put strategy. It states (para. 12.1, page 20)that:

'When a fire occurs within one dwelling (or less likely, in the common parts), it is normallysafe for other residents to remain within their own flat. This principle is undoubtedlysuccessful in an overwhelming number of fires in blocks of flats.'

8.3 There is no other safe basis upon which to fight fires and carry out rescues in high riseresidential premises because the majority of these buildings are not designed or managed in away that permits mass evacuation. A sufficiently wide single staircase and/or multiple escaperoutes, appropriate fire alarms, an evacuation policy (including an up to date record of peoplewithin the building) and awareness by residents of this policy would all be necessary to allowfor an effective and reliable mass evacuation approach. This equally applies to a partialevacuation.

8.4 In most residential high rise premises there will not be a communal alarm system and the singlestaircase is not wide enough for all residents to leave simultaneously and safely, withoutsignificantly impeding the firefighting and rescue operations.

8.5 Where a person is in an area where smoke (but not fire) is present the Control Room Officers(CRO) who are located in a remote location at the Brigade Control have to be careful to avoid asituation in which they advise the occupant(s) to leave the relative safety of their flat and enteran area presenting a much more significant risk to their life.

8.6 Brigade Control staff will also provide callers with practical fire survival information, which isaimed to give reassurance and keep the caller relatively safe until the operational crews canreach them.

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8.7 As soon as control has confirmed that a FSG call is in progress they will contact the incidentground and start to pass over the initial details. At this stage it is likely to be basic informationrelating to the number of persons involved and their location within the property. Control willattempt to gather all the available information on a 'Control Information Form (a form used byControl staff to capture FSG information) and relay this information to the incident. The typesof information Control will aim to gather include:

• flat/house door number• number of persons involved• location of caller within premises and access point• condition of their location e.g. heavy smoke, slight smoke, etc.• the caller's proximity to fire (if known)• latest advice given by control• time of FSG call• time updated

8.8 FSG call information should be passed to the incident by Brigade Control where it will used todetermine what action(s) need to be taken. The expectation is that Incident Commanders (ICs)will treat FSG calls as a priority and develop their tactical plan accordingly. The IC will alsoconsider requesting additional resources to support the specific search and rescue operationassociated with the FSG calls.

9. Pre-Determined Attendance (PDA)

9.1 The number of appliances sent in response to an initial emergency ('999') call will depend onthe nature of the incident and the type of premises involved. This response is known as thepre-determined attendance (PDA). For example, the PDA for a private house fire is always twofire engines. For more complex buildings, or where there are complicated firefighter logistics totake into account, the PDA might be larger.

9.2 PDAs are currently divided into four broad categories:

• fires• special attendances• reduced attendances• special service attendances

9.3 Within each broad category there is a range of individual incident types listed that determinewhat fire engines, equipment, specialist equipment and number of senior/principal officersneed to be despatched. The full breakdown of all the attendances relating to each incidenttype is defined in the Brigade's mobilising policy (Policy Note 412 refers). In addition todefining the specific vehicle, asset or piece of equipment to be mobilised the mobilising policyalso details all of the notification requirements for informing senior/principal managers andother agencies when an incident is in progress.

9.4 The mobilising of fire engines, officers and specialist equipment and the maintenance ofoperational cover within the Brigade area is the responsibility of the Brigade's Control centre.As such, the Operations Manager in Brigade Control has discretionary power to order anyadditional resources or amend an attendance recommended for an incident. The need to orderadditional resources or amend the PDA is based upon a number of factors, which may include:

• the type of incident involved• the number of calls received

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• the nature and quality of information supplied by callers• reports of persons believed to be involved• whether mobilising restrictions were in force at the time of handling the emergency call• information known that could affect fire fighting operations, such as known water

shortages

9.5 Once Brigade Control has mobilised the appropriate PDA it is the responsibility of thedesignated IC to request any additional resources (Brigade or other agency) that are requiredto resolve the incident. With the exception of the first Command Unit (CU) to be mobilised ICsmay return any vehicles, forming part of the PDA, if they are not required to resolve theincident.

9.6 In June 2017 the PDA for a typical high rise fire comprised of the nearest four fire engines. Thiswas based on analysis of the national policy and the number of operational staff and resourcesrequired for dealing with a compartment fire in this type of building.

9.7 However, as a result of the Grenfell Tower fire, and while waiting for the outcome of theMinistry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) work into cladding onhigh rise buildings, the Brigade implemented an interim change to the pre-determined (PDA)to all high rise buildings. This resulted, from 22 June 2017, in five fire engines, one aerialappliance and the standard officer compliment for a five pump fire being mobilised to any highrise fire related incident.

9.8 In addition to the above, and as a result of the findings from the Government's series of firesafety tests of cladding and insulation combinations undertaken by the Building ResearchEstablishment (BRE), the Brigade made further interim revisions to the PDA to calls to fire inhigh rise premises. Since the 10 August 2017 when Brigade Control receives multiple calls(four calls or more) to a residential high rise premise the PDA now includes eight fire enginesand one aerial appliance. Where the fire is reported to Brigade Control as being on the outsideof a cladded building the PDA is increased to ten fire engines and one aerial appliance (if theaerial appliance hasn't already been despatched). When this increase in resources is made thestandard officer compliment for an eight and ten pump fire is also mobilised.

10. Pre-planning and Risk Information

10.1 Under the Fire and Rescue Service Act 2004 the Fire Authority has a duty to obtain theinformation it requires to make provision for firefighting, road traffic accidents and otheremergencies. The process for gathering operational risk information is set out in section 7(2)(d)of the Act. Across the Brigade the process is referred to as a '7(2)(d) visit' and includes:

• Stage 1 - Identification of premises that might potentially give rise to hazards and risks• Stage 2 - Initial site analysis (i.e., does the site require a regular visit?)• Stage 3 - Information gathering. (Examination of the site where risks can be identified)• Stage 4 - Risk assessment. (Deciding whether the site requires a scheduled station visit;

the frequency of the visits; the level of information recorded; whether sitespecific training is required and the level of information required on the tacticalplan)

• Stage 5 - Completing the Operational Risk Database (ORD1)/recording the information.

'The ORD stores electronic premise information and is linked to the Brigade's station diaryapplication which records all fire station visits.

10.2 The primary purpose of the ORD is to record significant hazards/risks. This includes lessobvious hazards and any unique control measures in place, as well as any particular tactical

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plans or command and control procedures that may be required. Risk information is fed fromthe ORD to the Brigade's mobile data terminals (MDTs), which are located on all of theBrigade's fire engines. This ensures that risk information is accessible by any appliancecommander and crew en-route to an incident (not just the local fire station crews who mayhave visited the premises as part of the 7(2)(d) visit). Access to this information aims to supportthe safe management and enhance the successful resolution of the incident.

10.3 Any pre-planning where significant risks/hazards have been identified is considered inconjunction with the Brigade's standard operating procedures (SOPs), operational tactics(especially those highlighted for the premises) and existing knowledge of the premises andlocal area. The frequency of 7(2)(d) visits also depends on the level of risk associated with thepremises.

10.4 Some buildings keep local plans and information in a premises information box, which isaccessible by the Brigade. Some premises also have external 'premise information plates' (PIPs)installed, which provide relevant information about the building, such as number of floors,location of stairs and lifts and the layout of flats. This information can be useful to all theemergency services during an incident. Currently the Brigade has no legislative powers torequire premises to keep such information.

10.5 The Brigade also has the facility within the ORD system to create electronic premise informationplate (e-PIP) information, which replicates the format of the information available on thephysical plates that are attached certain premises.

10.6 Given the large number of high rise premises in the geographical area covered by an individualfire station it is not practicable for crews to have a detailed understanding of every premise. Aswith all aspects of the Brigade's pre planning activities a risk based approach is taken tofamiliarisation with high rise premises.

11. High-Rise Firefighting

11.1 The Brigade's policy for high rise firefighting is based on the February 2014 publication'Generic risk assessment 3.2: fighting fires in high rise buildings'. GRAS are a series ofdocuments, which were originally published by the Department for Communities and LocalGovernment (DCLG) that establish the tasks that are necessary to be undertaken prior to anincident and when called to attend a fire.

11.2 GRA 3.2 describes high rise buildings as follows:

"For firefighting purposes, a high rise building is considered to be one containing floors at sucha height or position, or design that external firefighting and rescue operations may not befeasible or practicable. It should be borne in mind that a similar approach to firefighting andsearch and rescue may also be required in other buildings which although not viewed as highrise by the very nature of their design may be reliant upon the use of internal access andfacilities provided for the FRS.

In England and Wales Building Regulations require all buildings over 18m in height to haveprovisions for firefighting and search and rescue. Basic facilities to be provided within thesebuildings will include a Firefighting Shaft, a Fire Main (wet system for all buildings above 60mheight (50m as of 2007) and a Firefighting Lift. Firefighting Shafts including fire mains (but notfirefighting lifts) may also be found in certain building types with floor heights exceeding 7.5m.In addition to those within Firefighting Shafts fire mains may also be located in other staircaseswithin a high rise building."

11.3 The Brigade used the guidance within the GRA 3.2 document to develop its standard operatingprocedures for high rise incidents. Operational personnel within the Brigade are not necessarily

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familiar with GRA 3.2 as the Brigade's approach is set out within its own relevant policies,which mirrors the guidance detailed in the GRA.

11.4 The aim of the Brigade's high rise and related policies is to provide sufficient informationregarding the hazards most likely to be present at this type of incident and the means ofmitigating their potential effect. This enables firefighters to carry out their tasks with areasonable degree of safety.

11.5 The tasks to be undertaken on arrival at a high rise incident will be known to all firefightersthrough the training that they undergo. It is this training and preparation that informs the tasksthat the initial crew will undertake on arrival at a high rise incident. These are called 'on arrivaltactics' and for high rise incidents include:

• Securing a water supply• Setting in the dry rising main (DRM)2• Identifying and securing the firefighters lift (if available)• Establishing a bridgehead 3

2 A DRM is a vertical pipe installed in a building that can have a water supply attached to assistthe fire service to distribute firefighting water to multiple levels within the premises.

3 A bridgehead is a safe position inside a building from which to carry out fire fighting andsearch/rescue operations.

12. Incident Command

12.1 At any operational emergency the Brigade's Incident Commander (IC) is the personresponsible for the safety of the operational crews under their control. Each IC must ensurethat safe systems of work are used by identifying the risks that are present and adopting themost appropriate control measures. This permits operational firefighters to carry out theirduties and resolve the incident whilst remaining relatively safe.

12.2 In developing the tactical plan and overall strategy to resolve an incident an IC will consider:

• whether there is a need to take any action at all considering the benefit to be gained• the speed and weight of the fire fighting attack• the hazards and risks that can be reasonably foreseen and assessed• the capabilities and limitations of the personnel and equipment available• whether all of the above fits a planned scenario or could be reasonably adapted to the

circumstances• Implementing and maintaining a 'safe system of work' (SSoW)

12.3 There are currently four levels of incident command in the Brigade. These levels of commandare referenced within National Operational Guidance (NOG) and are separated into fourcategories; Operational - Levels 1 and 2, Tactical - Level 3 and Strategic - Level 4. The Brigade'sIC will always be in attendance at the incident, which differs from other agencies where theLevel 2 or 3 IC may be operating remotely from the scene. The Brigade's Level 4 designatedofficer will normally always be remote from the incident.

12.4 Within the Brigade Level 1 ICs are drawn from the roles of Crew and Watch Managers andLevel 2 ICs are Station and Group Managers. Deputy Assistant Commissioners (DACs) andAssistant Commissioners (ACs) undertake the Level 3 IC role. Assistant Commissioners canalso perform the strategic Level 4 role (often referred to as 'Gold' Command) and is the officerwho represent the Brigade at the multi-agency Strategic Co-ordination Group (SCG) meetings.

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The Brigade's operational Commissioner and Directors will undertake the role of MonitoringOfficer (MO) at the largest and most complex incidents attracting 15-fire engines or more. Thislevel of officer may also be required to attend and/or phone in to the Government's EmergencyResponse Committee meeting (COBRA) or attend the Mayor's Advisory Group (MAC)meeting.

12.5 As an incident escalates a higher level of supervision is needed to ensure that the commandfunction is maintained at the appropriate level to the size and complexity of the incident. Thisallows officers in command roles to have manageable spans of control to formulate andimplement an appropriate tactical plan. At the larger incidents (typically 4-pumps and above)the IC will have dedicated command support, including a Command Unit crew and aMonitoring Officer.

12.6 When an incident escalates in size in respect to the number of fire engines required and at thepoint it is decided to change the IC there will be an appropriate handover of the criticalinformation between the two officers. Where possible, previous ICs are kept within the chainof command. The Brigade's Command policy (Policy Note 238) details all of the specificthresholds (size and type of incident) where a higher ranking officer should take over the ICrole.

13. Operational and Training Assurance

13.1 Assurance of the Brigade's operational response to incidents and certain training events iscarried out by a discrete group of officers drawn from the Station and Group Manager cadre.This group of officers are known as the Operational Review Team (ORT) and attend the largerincidents and training events attracting 6 or more fire engines. The ORT officers review theincident against the Brigade's standard operational policies, provide operational advice to theIC/MO and, in exceptional circumstances, can be instructed to undertake an alternativecommand or command support role.

13.2 Closely aligned to the principles of Health and Safety Executive's HSG 65 -' Successful healthand safety management' guidance, the Brigade formally reviews the performance of its ICs andfirefighters at post incident debriefs. These formal post incident debriefs are called theperformance review of operations (PRO) and performance review of command (PRC).

13.3 The PRC is an analytical process that allows ICs and MOs to discuss, review, analyse andevaluate all aspects of their period in command. The evaluation of the performance of thecommand function is a mandatory requirement following all incidents and training events of 6fire engines and above. In addition, a PRC must be held for any incident that has been thesubject to a senior accident investigation (SAI), irrespective of the size or type of the incident.

13.4 The PRO is a formal review process for fire station personnel, which is similar to a PRC. PRO'susually involve the fire station crews from the first 6 fire engines to arrive at the incident andare undertaken following:

• All 'make-up' incidents (incidents where additional fire engines, over those despatchedas part of the initial PDA are requested by the IC)

• Incidents that involve persons reported or persons trapped.

13.5 A PRO will also be undertaken when the IC or MO believe that it would be beneficial to theattending crews to have a formal debrief.

13.6 All outcomes from both formal debrief events are recorded as part of the Brigade's IncidentMonitoring Process (IMP). This includes an electronic database that provides a means to recordboth positive and developmental trends arising from operational and training events. The IMP

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forms an integral part of the Brigade's Dynamic and Intelligent Operational Training (DIOT)process, which drives on-going organisational improvements. More information detailing theDIOT process is provided later in this document.

14. Operational Discretion

14.1 Fire service operations and the emergency situations encountered are not always predictable.It is therefore impossible for the Brigade to provide explicit guidance for resolving everysituation firefighters may encounter. To cover situations where an extant policy needs to beadapted to respond to exceptional circumstances the Brigade allows for 'operationaldiscretion'.

14.2 In applying operational discretion ICs need to be sufficiently aware of the Brigade's operationalprocedures, the skills and qualities of crew members and the capability of the resourcesavailable to them. The situations that would normally justify the application of operationaldiscretion include:

• rescue a saveable life in the circumstances where implementation of the full policy wouldlead to an unjustifiable delay, resulting in the potential for greater injury or lives being lost

• tackle a known small fire through a pre-emptive strike, where the adherence to policywould lead to delay and thereby create higher levels of risk for firefighters to extinguish afully developed fire

• where no action by the Brigade may cause the public to place themselves at risk andtherefore escalate the incident (e.g., child in a lake)

14.3 Any decision to apply operational discretion and any resulting deviation from Brigade policyshould be the minimum necessary and only continue until the objective is achieved. Where anincrease in risk to personnel, equipment and/or the environment is being considered the ICmust always balance this against the perceived benefit(s) to be gained. An IC should onlyexercise operational discretion after assessing their intended actions and the likely impact.Under these circumstances and in order to minimise exposure to increased levels of risk an ICshould consider the following:

• any move away from operational policy must be justified in relation to risk versus benefit,for example rescuing saveable life or, on occasions where the nature of any propertyunder threat justifies some increased level of risk being taken, such as irreplaceablenational heritage sites or their contents

• firefighters must not be put at unnecessary risk and the same priority for human lifeshould not be given to animals or property

• in order to minimise exposure to the increased levels of risk, any move away from policyshould be the minimum necessary to achieve the objective(s)

• extant operational policy must be returned to as soon as possible after operationaldiscretion has been exercised

• the reasons for adapting operational policy will need to be proportional to the degree ofadaptation undertaken i.e., a significant move away from an established policy willrequire correspondingly high levels of benefit

• if the IC considers that a course of action is required outside of operational policy (i.e.,that operational discretion is to be applied), they must ensure that sufficient controlmeasures are implemented to reduce the risk of injury to firefighters and others whomight be affected by fire service operations, to as low as reasonably practicable

• the use of operational discretion must be recorded as soon as practicable

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14.4 Operational discretion does not permit the wilful disregard of policy without the necessaryjustification for doing so.

15. Incident Communications

15.1 Effective communications are a key element to managing any operational incident. It is alsoessential for safe operation at incidents and fundamental for securing the level of command andcontrol required to manage operational resources effectively.

15.2 The Brigade employs two main forms of communication equipment. A digital national radiosystem for wide area communications (between Brigade Control and fire engines) and asystem of personal issue ultra high frequency (UHF) analogue radios for local at incident' use(incident ground personnel communications). The wide area communications radio traffic isrecorded by the computer system used in Brigade Control whilst the UHF analogue 'at incident'radio traffic is not recorded.

15.3 At every incident Brigade Control will communicate with fire engines, command units andofficers en-route using the digital national emergency services radio network known as'Airwave'. This is used primarily to pass specific incident related information from the incidentto Brigade Control or from Brigade Control to the incident. All fire engines are fitted with afixed 'Airwave' radio in the cab of the vehicle.

15.4 All principal and senior officers in the Brigade are provided with personal issue portablehandheld 'Airwave' radios. This radio is used by officers to monitor radio traffic (betweenBrigade Control and the incident) whilst they are en-route to the incident. Officers will typicallyuse this radio to communicate with Brigade Control on their arrival at the scene of operations tobook in attendance. Officers can also use this radio to talk to other agencies and organisationswho utilise the Airwave system.

15.4 In addition to the 'Airwave' technology every operational firefighter, including senior andprincipal officers, have their own personal issue handheld analogue UHF radio (similar to whatmay more commonly be described as a 'walkie talkie'). These handheld radios areprogrammed with 8 channels, which include channels 1 & 2 for incident command, channels 5& 6 for use by breathing apparatus crews and channel 3 for firefighter crew communication.These UHF analogue radios can only transmit or receive voice transmissions on one channel ata time. This means it is not possible for more than one user to simultaneously broadcast on thesame channel at the same time.

15.5 Channel 1 on the analogue radios is the default channel for all initial incident commandcommunications. It remains the primary command channel until the circumstances of theincident dictate, or the incident commander decides, that additional command and controlradio capacity is desirable or required. If this occurs, and once a command unit (CU) is inattendance and operational, the incident commander can introduce the use of an additionalcommand channel (Channel 2). The Brigade's fleet of CU vehicles are fitted with a fixed UHFradio repeater that allows this additional radio channel to be introduced.

15.6 The Brigade's fleet of CU vehicles also carry portable UHF radio repeaters and 'leaky feeder'equipment. The radio repeater technology can be deployed to aid or enhance communicationson the UHF channels 2 and 5. However, channel 2 and channel 5 repeaters must not be runsimultaneously on the same vehicle and must be at least 1Orri away from each other to avoid thepotential for signal blocking.

15.7 Breathing apparatus (BA) sets are also fitted with a dedicated UHF analogue radio. However, asbreathing apparatus crews can be committed into potentially explosive atmospheres all BAradios are certified as intrinsically safe. In order to meet this certification they are programmed

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to a lower power output of 1 watt per channel. The lower power output of the radio can insome cases reduce the range of transmission. The radio traffic generated using the UHF BAradios is not recorded.

16. Respiratory Protective Equipment (RPE)

16.1 Given the nature of the environment within which fire fighters frequently work the use of RPEis a critical part of the Brigade's operational response to an incident. Breathing Apparatus (BA)equipment provides respiratory protection to firefighters and is essential for their safety and toprovide them with the ability to conduct rescues and firefight at incidents where smoke and/orirrespirable atmospheres are, or have the potential to be present.

16.2 At all incidents the IC is responsible for ensuring that the correct level of BA is worn wheneverthere is a risk of personnel suffering respiratory injury or discomfort. Where any doubt exists asto the presence of safe (clean) air the IC will give instructions for RPE to be used. BA is thedefault level of RPE for fires and other incidents presenting an acute respiratory hazard.

16.3 In addition to the respiratory hazards the human body only has a certain capacity to deal withthe effects of heat and other stresses imposed upon it during arduous firefighting operations.Firefighters wear protective firefighting clothing, known as firegear, to provide thermalprotection. This additional level of personal protection has an impact on the body's ability todissipate heat and when firefighters work extremely hard, for prolonged periods in hightemperatures, this can result in an increase in the person's core body temperature, which inturn can lead to hyperthermia and in extreme cases even death.

16.4 The Brigade's policy note 466 (Respiratory Protection Equipment - Breathing Apparatus -Operational Procedure) covers in detail the Brigade's use of BA equipment. However, to assistthe understanding of this important element of the Brigade's equipment and capability anoverview of the key BA related information is set out below.

17. Breathing Apparatus (BA) Sets

17.1 The Brigade uses two types of BA set; Standard Duration Breathing Apparatus (SDBA) andExtended Duration Breathing Apparatus (EDBA). SDBA is a single cylinder system weighingapproximately 15kgs and providing the user with around 31 minutes of air. EDBA is a doublecylinder system weighing approximately 23kgs and providing approximately 47 minutes of air.These times are only approximate and can be affected significantly by matters such as afirefighter's workload, the location of the fire within the building and the environmentalconditions, i.e., extent of smoking logging and temperature the firefighters are experiencingwhilst undertaking their firefighting and search and rescue activities.

17.2 SDBA is used for all routine fires and rescue operations, whilst EDBA is provided to give anenhanced capability at certain incidents where long travel distances or the conditions likely tobe encountered make SDBA less effective, e.g. incidents in tunnels or sub-basements andsearching collapsed buildings.

17.3 Specialist training is required to wear EDBA and it is predominantly the firefighters that crewthe Fire Rescue Units (FRUs) who receive the training to wear and use this type of breathingapparatus. SDBA is normally used to fight fires in high rise premises. As such, EDBA is notmobilised as part of the PDA for high rise fires because it would not normally form part of thetactical plan for dealing with incidents in these types of premises. EDBA is generally used if anextended travel time is required in order to reach the scene of operations, such as a fire on atrain in a tunnel.

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18. Breathing Apparatus (BA) Procedures

18.1 When firefighters need to be committed in BA specific procedures must be followed to ensuretheir safe return before the air in the BA cylinder runs out. These procedures are safety criticaland have been developed nationally following years of experience and learning from previousserious injuries and fatalities involving firefighters at incidents. One critical safety procedurerelates to the control of firefighters as they enter a premise, which is known as BA Entry Control(BAEC).

19. Breathing Apparatus (BA) Entry Control

19.1 Whenever BA equipment is being deployed a BAEC operative (BAECO) will always beappointed to manage this aspect of the incident as it is vital to safe working practices. Theimportance of this role cannot be overstated. Crews are normally committed to a building inteams (minimum of 2) and should also return to the BAECO together once they havecompleted their task. A BA wearer will monitor the air within their own cylinder in order togauge when they should withdraw from the building. Each BA set also includes a device thatwill emit an audible warning to firefighters when their air supply is running low.

19.2 As an additional safety control the Brigade uses a telemetry capability, which is a live datasystem that transmits information to and from individual breathing apparatus (BA) sets and theEntry Control Board (ECB) using a set radio frequency. This data exchange allows the BAECOto remotely monitor the actual air consumption of individual BA wearers. The use of telemetrygreatly assists the BAECO to effectively monitor air consumption rates for individual BAwearers. The telemetry also provides the BAECO/IC with an ability to alert BA wearers todanger and the need to evacuate a premises and for those BA wearers to acknowledge thisalert at the touch of a button located on their BA set.

19.3 Telemetry operates in conjunction with the BA Entry Control Board (ECB), which is arechargeable battery powered unit incorporating a digital radio transmitter/receiver withintegral antenna. The ECB has twelve BA tally channel slots each able to accept the encodedBA tally of each BA set. The data transmission link between the ECB and each BA set isactivated following the insertion of a BA tally (which has a built in encoded transponder) intoany of the available BA tally channels of the ECB. The ECB identifies the associated BA set andthe individual BA wearer's telemetry signal radio icon illuminates (green) continuously,confirming a successful telemetry signal with the BA set. This signal can be affected by abuilding's layout and structure.

19.4 The individual BA tally channel LED display defaults to show the actual time of warning (theend of the working duration of the cylinder) information for each wearer. The followingadditional information is also communicated to the ECB every 20 seconds from each 'logged-on' BA set:

• Time of warning (TOW) default setting• Time to warning (TIVV)• Cylinder pressure (measured in bars)• Time elapsed (EL) from loss of signal from a logged-on BA set

19.5 Each ECB is individually programmed with a unique identity code together with the allocatedindividual ECB identification (ID) number. The ECB stores and maintains data that can bedownloaded to support any post incident analysis.

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20. Breathing Apparatus (BA) Tactics

20.1 The Brigade's primary objective is always to save saveable life. Equally important is the controlover the developing fire whilst undertaking any necessary search and rescue of casualties. Fireand the production of hot flammable gases and noxious smoke will continue to growexponentially where additional fuel is available. Fire and hot smoke may also spread, creatingirrespirable and potentially explosive environments in other areas of the building. Not achievinga degree of control over the fire and the explosive gases that are produced has previouslyresulted in deaths amongst members of the public and firefighters. Therefore, an initial crew'skey focus will always include trying to control the fire to enable the search and rescueoperations to be commenced and carried out safely.

20.2 When dealing with incidents in high rise premises a BA crew's expectation is that the fire wouldremain in the compartment of origin providing that the fire is fought in a timely fashion. If thefire spreads to other areas of the building more quickly than expected it not only adds to theurgency of extinguishing the new seats of fire, but it can also delay and impact on the progressof undertaking search and rescue activities.

21. Aerial Appliances

21.1 The Brigade has 11 frontline aerial appliances, which consist of 3 different types of vehicle:

• Turntable Ladders• Aerial Ladder Platforms• Hydraulic Platforms

21.2 All three vehicle types have varying functions/capabilities and achieve a range of heights from22 to 32 metres. In optimum conditions the Turntable Ladder has the maximum 32m heightreach, which is equivalent to the 10th floor of a typical high rise premise.

21.3 These vehicles were originally chosen taking in to account factors such as the technologyavailable at the time of purchase, the ability to locate the vehicles within the existing Brigade'sfire station estate, their operational capability and vehicular access in London streets, etc.

21.4 Across London, arrangements for access to buildings for Brigade vehicles, including aerialappliances, varies considerably. Whilst current building regulations require that new buildingsshould provide access for both fire engines (pumps) and aerial appliances, the reality is thatolder buildings in London often provide limited access, especially for the larger vehicles, suchas aerial appliances.

21.5 Aerial appliances are not normally used for external firefighting in high rise residential premisesuntil it has been confirmed that there is no longer any life risk in the building. This is becausethere is a danger of jets entering the building and injuring occupants or firefighters. Equally,whether a jet or a covering spray is used, there is a real risk of preventing hot gases and otherproducts of combustion being vented from the building. This in turn makes the conditionsinside the premises even more difficult for occupants and firefighters and increases thelikelihood of pushing the fire further into the building.

21.6 The effective deployment of an aerial appliance at a residential high rise fire will nearly alwaysbe predicated on being able to position the vehicle in close proximity to the building. This is notalways possible due to a number of factors such as restricted access, falling debris, radiatedheat and the volume of smoke and flame venting from the building.

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21.7 At the time of the Grenfell Tower fire an aerial appliance was not automatically included withinthe PDA for high rise premises. Prior to Grenfell their inclusion in the PDA was a matter ofdiscretion for the local fire station crews, in conjunction with their Station Manager. Inconsidering whether an aerial appliance should be included as part of the PDA to a particularhigh rise premise the fire station personnel would have placed a considerable reliance on thefact that the building would be compliant with the statutory requirements in respect to itsbuilding design, construction, maintenance and refurbishment. Fire station personnel wouldalso have been aware of the Brigade's policy on high rise firefighting tactics, which states thatfires in these types of buildings are intended to be fought from within.

21.8 As a result of the Grenfell Tower fire and while waiting for the outcome of the MHCLG workinto cladding on high rise buildings the Brigade implemented an interim change to the pre-determined (PDA) to all high rise building. This resulted, from 22 June 2017, in five fire enginesand one aerial appliance being mobilised to any high rise fire related incident. This interim PDAis still in force at the point this document was produced (March 2018).

22. Command Support

22.1 The Brigade operates a range of command support functions based upon on the size andnature of the incident. For the smaller more routine incidents, typically those that do notrequire any additional resources to be mobilised, the command support function will be carriedout from the Initial Command Pump (ICP) . The ICP will be established as soon as possiblewhenever more than one pumping appliance is in attendance. The headlights and bluebeacons of the designated ICP will remain on to assist in identifying this appliance as the ICP.

22.2 The ICP will provide the communications link between Brigade Control and the incident andremain the incident focal point until the incident is concluded or relieved by a Command Unit(CU). Appliance commanders and senior officers will report to the ICP, hand in their nominalroll board (NRB)4 and gather information on the incident. The ICP will also be utilised as a focalpoint for a roll call (when the CU is not in attendance) following an evacuation of Brigadepersonnel from a building or area of operations.

4 NRB is a physical plate carried on all Brigade vehicles that provides details about the fire engine type,vehicle call-sign and the names and rank of the crew riding that vehicle. For senior officers it will detailthe officer's name, call-sign, car registration and any specialist qualifications that the officer holds.

22.3 At the larger operational incidents (typically 4 or more fire engines) a CU will be mobilised toprovide a dedicated and enhanced level of command support. The CU will be crewed byminimum staffing of two Watch Managers (WM) and provide command support to the IC. Thevehicle has a bespoke software application, called the Command Support System (CSS) whichis used to help manage the incident. It also has a range of information systems, which enablesthe IC to access a wide range of information, including the operational risk database, watersupplies, chemical data, google maps, etc. Once in attendance and set-up the CU will becomethe focal/rendezvous point for booking-in fire engines, senior officers and other emergencyagencies attending the incident.

22.4 The CU staff will carry out the following specific tasks when in-attendance at an incident:

• Provide advice to the IC in relation to command support• Relieve the ICP of its duties and transfer all available information to the CU• Notify Brigade Control that the CU is now incident command vehicle• Enter preliminary incident details on the CSS or the incident information boards• Transmit and receive messages to and from Brigade Control

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• Maintain and update the plan of the incident, including the recording of the duties andlocation of senior officers and operational crews committed at the incident

• Maintain an operational overview of the reserve appliances and crews held at themarshalling area (if in operation) and advise the IC accordingly

• Maintain radio contact with the IC when they leave the CU• Co-ordinate and maintain radio contact with sector/operations commanders• Provide the appropriate level of information technology support using the available

systems• Maintain contact details of other agencies• Record key decisions• Prompt on any risk critical information or action.

22.5 Command staff may request additional personnel from the IC to assist with the CU'sadministrative functions. When allocated these personnel will be briefed by command staff,they will not however undertake the specialist duties of the command staff.

22.6 At the larger more complex incidents additional CUs will be automatically mobilised and/or canbe requested by the IC. For example, when Brigade Control is undertaking a fire survivalguidance (FSG) call(s) an additional CU will be automatically mobilised along with a seniorofficer to deal with the collation and management of the FSG information. CU vehicles can alsobe used for functions such as marshalling, hosting the Tactical Co-ordination Group (multi-agency) meetings or to provide a dedicated working space for an officer undertaking acommand or specialist support role.

23. Fire Investigation

23.1 The Brigade currently has five fire investigation (Fl) vehicles that operate from Dowgate firestation located in the City of London. The Fl teams provide support to the Incident Commanderin order to assist with determining the cause of a fire. The Fl team's other main function is torecord how the people and buildings involved in the fire were affected. While there is not astatutory duty to provide a dedicated Fl function, the Brigade's fire investigators do havestatutory powers under the Fire & Rescue Services Act (2004), which provide powers of entryto investigate fires and take samples.

23.2 The Brigade's Fl teams are also unique among Fire & Rescue Services due to the team's keycontribution to Prevention activities, with a focus on accidental fire trends such as electricalcauses and white goods fires. As well as this type of prevention work the Fl team regularlyprepare reports and attend Coroner's inquests to give evidence on behalf of the Brigade.

24. Underpinning Systems

24.1 The following sections detail some of the key under-pinning systems that support the functionsand services provided by the Brigade.

25. National Operational Guidance (NOG)

25.1 Operational guidance takes on a particular significance in the context of the fire service, due tothe inherent risks faced by staff in the course of their work. National Operational Guidance(NOG) therefore exists to ensure that the technical and operational considerations in areas suchas working in tunnels and at incidents involving railways or aircrafts are properly understood. Itprovides guidance on how these considerations should influence pre-planning for incidents aswell as incident management during an actual incident to both minimise the risks to staff andalso optimise the likelihood of successful incident outcomes.

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25.2 In 2012 the NOG programme was set up by the Brigade in collaboration with the Chief FireOfficers Association (CFOA), the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG)and the Local Government Association (LGA), to develop a programme of guidance to replaceexisting manuals and bulletins that were in use across FRSs. The aim was to:

• Develop and enhance safe systems of work• Promote interoperability between fire services• Promote effective operational deployment• Reduce the large volume of guidance, policies and operational doctrine used across the

fire sector

25.3 National guidance is written to inform local operational policies and procedures, but does notcompletely replace them, as individual fire and rescue services have responsibility to ensurethat policies and procedures are appropriate for their local risk, circumstances and resources. Ateam was set up in London at the Brigade Headquarters to carry out this work, known as theCentral Programme Team. The team is currently made up of secondees from fire and rescueservices including London Fire Brigade. They have been rewriting all the national guidance inphases over the past five years and are scheduled to finish this work in 2018.

26. Brigade Operational Policy

26.1 The Brigade has developed and has in place an extensive and mature portfolio of operationalpolicies. These extant policies contain a combination of policy statements, procedures,technical information and training. This combined with the training that staff receive, ensuresthe Brigade has a framework within which staff are able to respond safely to operationalincidents.

26.2 To ensure currency all of the Brigade's policy notes they are reviewed on a 3-yearly cyclicalbasis or more frequently if required.

26.3 To align the Brigade's policies to NOG an integration project was established by the Brigade'sOperational Policy department. This enables the Brigade to:

• ensure that Brigade procedures reflect NOG• change the structure of Brigade operational policy to minimise duplication and provide

clear differentiation between 'policy', 'procedure' and 'training'• ensure the Brigade's operational policies follow a standard format• facilitate engagement to ensure that any changes, meet the needs of all Brigade

stakeholder departments and policy-users• provide a user friendly interface which allows staff to easily access appropriate

operational guidance, training and technical information.

27. Brigade Training Facilities

27.1 In November 2011 the Brigade agreed to outsource its training function and awarded a 25 yearcontract for the full provision of training, except that associated with the Brigade Control, toBabcock International Group. This contract commenced on 1 April 2012. Babcock currentlydeliver the majority of their operational skills training at two purpose built training facilitieslocated at Beckton (East London) and Park Royal (West London).

27.2 Beckton - The Beckton training facility occupies around 3,200 square metres and contains acarbonaceous firehouse. It is an indoor 'all-weather' facility supporting a range of operationaland personal skills training. The classroom facilities include the main incident command trainingsuite, which includes a full size static replica of a Command Unit (CU) to provide a realistic

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training environment for ICs. The fire house at Beckton is a three storey carbonaceous facilitywith multiple burn rooms in which staff train in a wide variety of scenarios. Using the latesttechnology the fire house has zero emissions ensuring that the facility remains carbon neutral.This smoke cleansing system also means that other BA courses can run concurrently therebymaximising the capacity for training. There is also an urban search and rescue (USAR) rig atBeckton, which includes six areas for specialist rescue training that can be used individually oras one large multi-disciplined facility. Brigade staff benefit from being able to receive bothpractical and knowledge based training through the use of on-site classroom facilities.

27.3 Incident Command training at Beckton is delivered using state-of-the-art technology includingfloor to ceiling screens, recorded audio and a gaming style interactive software platform. Allsupervisory managers and above are able to hone their incident command skills in animmersive training experience. There are four pods on site, which can be used individually ortogether for a full view of the simulated incident ground. A wide range of incident commandscenarios, including many involving high rise premises, are available to keep training varied andcurrent. Interaction with on-screen characters (known as talking-heads) adds to the realism ofthe learning experience and trainers are able to monitor actions and provide immediatefeedback.

27.4 Park Royal - the Park Royal training facility is located on a site of around 4,500 square metresand includes a four storey fire house and drill tower facility capable of supporting carbonaceousfire training. The facility provides a wide range of operational skills training, personal skillstraining and modules within the initial trainee firefighter programme. The training block alsocontains classrooms, syndicate rooms, gym and welfare facilities. The Park Royal fire house isspread over four floors and can be set-up to replicate both commercial and domestic relatedscenarios. There are multiple burn rooms, which can be used simultaneously and operationalcrews benefit from being able to practice their BA skills and firefighting tactics at a range ofchallenging scenarios.

27.5 In addition to the two dedicated training facilities and as well as using Brigade venues such asfire stations, Babcock utilise external venues. For example; staff train in water rescue at the LeeValley White Water Centre in Hertfordshire and undertake trench rescue training at an externalsite close to City Airport.

27.6 Approval for funding to build a Brigade Training Centre in Croydon, was agreed in September2016. The Croydon facility will include a six storey fire house, which will be used to simulatehigh rise scenarios. This new facility is expected to be operational in early 2020.

28. Staff Development and Training Delivery

28.1 The Brigade's training requirements and frequency of delivery are categorised using thefollowing criteria:

• Initial acquisition: This refers to courses where a delegate is gaining specific knowledgeand skills for the first time. An individual will usually only complete this course once; forexample, firefighter development courses (operational staff).

• Refresher: This refers to a course that is completed to refresh the skills that an individualgained in their initial acquisition training. For example, a firefighter will gain initial trainingin breathing apparatus (BA) during their firefighter development programme. These skillsare then refreshed in a two day BA Refresher course. Refresher course frequencies aredetermined by HSE guidance (e.g. BA Refreshers), National Competency Frameworks(e.g. High Volume Pump and Mass Decontamination), external governance arrangements(e.g. clinical governance for Immediate Emergency Care training) and industry standards(e.g. line and water). These frequencies are reviewed annually.

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• Confirmation of skills: There are a small number of courses, which confirm an individual'sskills and may include refresher training, such as the one day BA Confirmation of Skillscourse or the Emergency Response Driver Refresher and Reassessment course.

• Initial/refresher: There are a number of courses, for which delegates will repeat the initialcourse in order to refresh their skills and knowledge. This is due to time elapsed between adelegates initial attendance and repeating the course. It is highly probable that the coursewill have been updated to reflect changes in legislation and to ensure that current practiceis adopted. This is the case for Senior Officer (operational staff) First Aid training.

• Assessment: These courses are completed by individuals going through a formalAssessment Development Centre (ADC) to gain promotion.

28.2 Learning and development opportunities are advertised in a course guide on the Brigade'sintranet site. The current course guide contains over 250 separate training interventionsavailable to Brigade staff. In addition there are around 300 online e-learning training packages.Each of these courses and training packages are reviewed formally on a 2 year rollingprogramme.

28.3 The National Incident Command System (NICS) forms an integral part of all the Brigade'sincident command training. A comprehensive training programme is in place to ensure that allICs (and potential ICs) are afforded high quality incident command development and theopportunity to practice command skills in a safe environment. Effective systems are in place toensure that all relevant staff are assigned regular training courses and monitoring systems areused to identify development needs and provide additional training and support if required.

28.4 Incident command training for level 1 (crew manager and watch manager) and level 2 (stationmanager and group manager) include an online pre-course knowledge digest and a multi-choice knowledge check on the first day of the training course. This knowledge digest containsextracts from a range of Brigade policies and other guidance such as the NOG notes andincludes several references to high rise buildings and firefighting. For level 1 training there arecurrently five exercise scenarios that can be used which relate to incidents in a building with 5or more floors. The level 2 training also includes a workshop relating to an incident in a 11-storey building, which may be used.

28.5 The established incident command training regimes for operational, tactical and strategiccommand have been enhanced over recent years. The 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Gamesprovided additional opportunities for command training and exercising at all levels. The JointEmergency Services Interoperability Programme (J ESIP) programme has also provided furtheropportunities for enhanced training and exercising.

28.6 Multi-agency training - a comprehensive multi agency training and exercising agenda is also inplace for tactical and strategic commanders. This includes the Multi Agency Gold IncidentCommand (MAGIC) course, which is delivered by the College of Policing.

28.7 Breathing apparatus (BA) training - Training in breathing apparatus (BA) in a real fire setting isdelivered in the Beckton and Park Royal training facilities. These fire house facilities allowoperational staff at firefighter, crew and watch manager levels to practice their skills in a safeenvironment. Staff individually attend a two day BA course every two years and a one day'Confirmation of Skills' BA course usually as a crew, annually. Monitoring systems are in placeto identify development needs and provide additional training and support if required.

28.8 Immediate emergency care (IEC) training - IEC is a training package developed by the Brigadeand the London Ambulance Service's (LAS) Clinical Education and Standards Department togive firefighters an enhanced first aid capability to treat casualties whilst carrying out theirduties. Firefighters, crew managers and watch managers (excluding watch managers on the

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command units and fire investigation vehicles) receive a five day initial acquisition course, athree day refresher course every three years and a one day update course annually. Seniorofficers (Station Managers and above, plus watch managers from the command units and fireinvestigation teams) currently receive an one day IEC overview course every two years.

28.9 Personal Development Records (PDR) - An online PDR system is used to record developmentand assessment activities in the workplace and record feedback on an individual's performanceand development. Quality assurance of PDR records is achieved using a two stage process. Theassessor's line manager acts as a primary quality assurer, moderating the record to make surethat consistent assessment standards are applied and maintained. The Development andTraining department complete a final quality assurance check to help ensure that assessmentdecisions are fair, consistent and robust across the organisation. Following this, the request forcompetence is either authorised or returned to the assessor and moderator for further action.

28.10 Following completion of the 11 week initial firefighter training programme or promotion to anew role, operational staff undertake a formal development programme before being assessedas competent in role by a sector competent assessor. The competent assessor is usually theindividual's line manager. Sector competence means that an assessor is occupationallycompetent in the area or sector in which a candidate is being developed and assessed. The linemanager assesses competence against national occupational standards using the appropriaterole map.

28.11For new firefighters competence in the role is expected to be gained within 36 months ofjoining the Brigade. For other operational roles, competence is expected to be demonstratedwithin 18 months from the date of promotion to a new role.

29. Development and Maintenance of Operational Professionalism (DaMOP)

29.1 The Brigade uses a number of systems to measure and evaluate the effectiveness of its trainingand development activities. A regular report is provided on the performance of BabcockTraining Limited to the Brigade's Corporate Management Board (CMB) and ResourcesCommittee. The latest report is available on the London Fire Brigade website.

29.2 In addition to the formal reporting processes the Brigade has a range of other training qualityassurance and evaluation processes in place. Through these processes, the Brigade measuresBabcock Training Limited's performance and seeks assurance that the training provided fullymeets the needs of the organisation. All courses in the Brigade's annual training delivery planare audited at least once a year. In addition, and as a minimum, all centrally led training deliveryis subject to a formal Level 1 evaluation. This performance data is reviewed on a monthly basisand remedial action is taken to improve areas of under-performance if any are identified.

30. Staff Promotion

30.1 Selection processes for all Level 1, 2, 3 and 4 command roles incorporate a formal incidentcommand assessment. For station managers and above (level 2 to 4) this involves a formalassessment at one of Babcock's incident command training facilities. The formal assessmentsare facilitated by Babcock Training Limited using Brigade principal and senior officers as roleplayers and assessors.

31. Health & Safety

31.1 Health and safety is an integral component in delivering quality services to the public byensuring that we manage risk in order to protect the health, safety and welfare of all ouremployees and any other persons who may be affected by our operations, including membersof the public.

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31.2 In confirming this commitment the aims of the Authority's Health and Safety Policy are to:

• Provide visible leadership by senior management through demonstration of the behaviourand culture that the Brigade requires of all employees and those who work with us

• Ensure compliance with relevant legislation, Authority Policy, Procedures and MayoralStrategies

• Clearly define the responsibilities and duties of all employees• Engage the co-operation of employees at all levels through open communication

and consultation and the promotion of health and safety awareness• Ensure safe systems of work are in place to minimise risk of injury and ill health, so far as is

reasonably practicable• Provide and maintain safe working conditions, plant and equipment• Ensure safe handling, use, transportation and storage of substances• Provide training and resources to ensure that all employees have and demonstrate the

required skills, knowledge and understanding to carry out their work safely• Ensure continuous improvement of the health and safety management system

31.3 To support the above the Brigade promotes communication and consultation with its staff andtrade union Safety Representatives to ensure participation in the continued development of apositive health and safety culture.

31.4 This Brigade has a specific policy detailing its health and safety commitments (policy No. 597refers) and this is reviewed annually by the Corporate Management Board (CMB) and/or whenthere has been significant changes in working practices, re-organisation, risk or legislation. Thepolicy sets out individual responsibilities for the management and integration of health, safetyand welfare within designated roles.

31.5 The Brigade also employs a Head of Health and Safety (HoHS) who is responsible for a range offunctions, including reviewing and recommending strategic changes, where necessary, to theHealth and Safety Policy, organisation, responsibilities, control, monitoring and reviewarrangements. In liaison with the Brigade's Information Management Team, the HoHS alsoprepares quarterly and other routine Health and Safety performance management reports,which are scrutinised by the CMB and the Brigade's Elected Members. The Elected Membersscrutiny function was passed to the Mayor's office once the Policing and Crime Act wasenacted (April 2018)

31.6 The Brigade also requires all personnel to be trained to the required level of competence fortheir duties with regard to health and safety. These competence are demonstrated by suchmethods as:

• Examination• Testing• Maintenance of skills• Externally accredited and recognised qualifications• Independent quality assurance assessments of the training provision

31.7 The training of the Brigade's firefighters relies upon maintaining the Safe Person Concept,which requires them to possess the necessary knowledge, skills and understanding of potentialhazards to facilitate professional judgement in order to control risks inherent in the uniquecircumstances of any emergency situation. This process does not require exhaustiveprescriptive procedures.

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32. Provision and Maintenance of Appliances and Equipment

32.1 All of the Brigade's fleet of vehicles and operational equipment items are capital assets and arecurrently wholly owned by the Brigade. With the exception of personal protective equipment(fire gear), breathing apparatus, hose, line rescue, hazardous material and first aid equipmentall the assets are managed through a 'Vehicles and Operational Equipment' contract withBabcock Critical Services Ltd (BCS).

32.2 All vehicles and operational equipment items covered by the BCS contract are subject to a lifingpolicy that baselines the expected life for each type of asset and group of assets. All asset lifingpolicies are reviewed annually with BCS.

32.3 In advance of each asset's end of life, projects are initiated with lead times intended to besufficient to work through the processes and procedures in order to procure and implementthe replacement items before the old equipment becomes redundant.

32.4 The requirements and specifications for new types of equipment (or additions to existing typesof equipment) are initiated by requests and business cases from the Brigade's lead userdepartments. These requests initiate procurement and implementation projects that aremanaged in the same manner as for replacement items. User engagement and feed back isundertaken through an Operational Sounding Board (OSB), which is managed by the Brigade'sOperational Policy Department.

32.5 The OSB meets as and when required and includes approximately 120 staff from across theBrigade who have volunteered to represent their operational colleagues in helping to identifyimprovements to operational vehicles and equipment. This approach ensures that end usershave input into the development of the specification for new and replacement appliances andequipment.

32.6 There is also a Vehicles & Equipment Assets Oversight Board, which sits quarterly to ensure theBrigade's operational needs are being met. This board also monitors the progress of the capitalassets' budget for all new and replacement projects.

32.7 In relation to the maintenance of the Brigade's vehicles and equipment BCS have a largeworkshop in Ruislip that they took over from the Brigade on the commencement of thecontract. The company also provide a mobile repair service.

32.8 BCS produce an annual planned service programme for the Brigade and once this is agreedthey provide the Brigade with a monthly service schedule for its fleet of vehicles. Each monthlyservice is listed in date order with an additional provisional date as a contingency should thefirst service date be missed due to the vehicle being unavailable or deployed at an operationalincident. The Brigade also employs its own 'compliance officer' who ensures the BCS timingsfor the maintenance and vehicle checks conform to both legal and manufacturersrecommended requirements.

32.8 A minimum of 28 days in advance BCS will, in writing, contact the officer of any vehicle orequipment item required for planned maintenance. This notification confirms the collection orappointment time. The Brigade officer will ensure that this information is recorded in thestation diary. This helps to ensure that the vehicle or item of equipment is available forcollection on the planned day, subject to the Brigade's operational requirements. At least 24hours before the collection/appointment, BCS will contact the fire station to confirm a time withthem and this will be repeated on the day of collection/appointment no later than 20 minutesbefore arrival to ensure the vehicle or item of equipment is ready.

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32.9 In terms of vehicle and equipment defects, BCS is contracted to either replace the item orrepair it within certain time frames. This is dependant on the nature and type of defect beingreported. For vehicle defect there are four different codes, which are:

• Code 1 - Fleet item unavailable due to being dangerously unsafe, illegal or not fit forpurpose. In this case, all pumping appliances must be repaired or replaced within 2 hoursand 4 hours for all other vehicle types

• Code ld - 'Delayed'; can be applicable to a limited range of defects and has a maximumtime of 24 hours to repair or replace the fleet item unless prevailing conditions change andthe vehicle is then rendered unavailable (Code 1)

• Code 2- This level of defect does not render the fleet item unavailable, but it is seriousenough to require a repair or replacement within 5 days

• Code 3 - This refers to a minor defect that does not render the vehicle unavailable andcan be left to the next scheduled routine service if soon enough or rectified within 13weeks as a maximum.

32.10 Equipment defects have two different categorisations as follows;

• Category 'A - Operational equipment that is of such importance that it must be repairedor replaced within 2 hours if carried on a front line pumping appliance and 4 hours for allother vehicle types

• Category 'B' - All other operational equipment items, these should be replaced within 5days.

32.11 In respect to the Mobile Data Terminals (MDTs) and the Command Support Software (CSS)these systems are jointly maintained by the Brigade and BCS depending on whether the issueis identified as a hardware or software problem.

33. Cross Border Deployments

33.1 The mobilisation of resources into and from neighbouring Fire and Rescue Service (FRS) areasis known as cross-border deployments. Resources that may be requested to deploy cross-border are mobilised under mutual aid arrangements provided for under sections 13 and 16 ofthe Fire and Rescue Services Act 2004 (FRSA).

33.2 Requests for resources from a neighbouring FRSs will normally being initiated by an LFB IC orwhen the Brigade Coordination Centre (BCC) has been established the Deputy AssistantCommissioner (DAC) who is managing this function. This would normally be done inconsultation with the IC at the scene of operations and the Operations Manager in BrigadeControl. Once the decision is taken to request a specific appliance or asset from a neighbouringFRS it is Brigade Control that will initiate the request and provide details of the address wherethe resource is required to go. In the event that the requested asset from the neighbouring FRSneeds assistance in locating the London incident arrangements can be made with theMetropolitan Police Service (MPS) to rendezvous with the vehicle/resource at an agreedlocation. From this agreed rendezvous point the MPS will provide a pathfinder vehicle to leadthe appliance/resource to the incident.

34. Major Incident Investigation

34.1 In the course of delivering its services to London, the Brigade has to respond to major incidentsand large scale events. Some of these will inevitably become the subject of detailed scrutiny ata subsequent inquest, public inquiry or other public forum. Examples of such incidents includethe London bombings (July 2005), and the Lakanal House fire (July 2009).

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34.2 These types of events require extensive investigation over and above the existing investigationprocesses and/or may require an enhanced level of co-ordination. When this situation arisesthe Brigade will consider appointing a dedicated team to take responsibility for coordinatingand managing all the available evidence that may be needed for disclosure to an external body.

34.3 The same team will also manage the internal review of the Brigade's performance and carry outany safety related investigations to highlight any lessons to be learnt, which would improvepublic/firefighter safety and drive organisational development.

34.4 Following the Grenfell Tower fire the Brigade established a dedicated team to undertake theabove functions including supporting the disclosure requirements associated with both thecriminal investigation and Public Inquiry.

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