G.R. No.Case TitleIssue/Doctrine/PrincipleSC Ruling

107852Aruelo vs. CA Whether laws governing election protests be construed strictly against any of the candidates for an elective post.No. Laws governing election protests should be liberally construed to the end that the popular will, ex pressed in the election of public officers, will not, by purely technical reasons, be defeated. An election protest does not merely concern the personal interests of rival candidates for an office. Over and above the desire of the candidates to win, is the deep public interest to determine the true choice of the people.

160465Estrella vs. COMELEC Whether 3 is the majority number of COMELEC sitting en banc to reach a decision.No. Section 5. Quorum; Votes Required. (a) When sitting en banc, four (4) Members of the Commission shall constitute a quorum for the purpose of transacting business. The concurrence of a majority of the Members of the Commission shall be necessary for the pronouncement of a decision, resolution, order or ruling. Section 5(a) of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure was lifted from Section 7, Article IX-A of the Constitution which provides: SECTION 7. Each Commission shall decide by a majority vote of all its members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision or resolution. The provision of the Constitution is clear that it should be the majority vote of all its members and not only those who participated and took part in the deliberations. Under the rules of statutory construction, it is to be assumed that the words in which constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained. Since the above-quoted constitutional provision states all of its members, without any qualification, it should be interpreted as such.

113219Mateo vs. CA

101428Vital-Gozon vs. CA

90780Acena vs. Civil Service Commission

L-80519-21Cua vs. COMELEC

L-31455Filipinas Engineering and Machine Shop vs. FerrerWhether or not Filipinas, the losing bidder, has a cause of action under the premises against the COMELEC and ACME, the winning bidder, to enjoin them from complying with their contract.The COMELEC resolution awarding the contract in favor of Acme was not issued pursuant to its quasi-judicial functions but merely as an incident of its inherent administrative functions over the conduct of elections, and hence, the said resolution may not be deemed as a "final order" reviewable by certiorari by the Supreme Court. Being non-judicial in character, no contempt may be imposed by the COMELEC from said order, and no direct and exclusive appeal by certiorari to this Tribunal lie from such order. Any question arising from said order may be well taken in an ordinary civil action before the trial courts.

104639Province of Camarines Sur vs. CA Whether Titi Dato was a permanent employee of petitioner Province of Camarines Sur at the time he was suspended on March 16,1976The S.C Agrees with Petitioners contentions. Dato, being merely a temporary employee, is not entitled to his claim for back wages for the entire period of his suspension. The fact that private respondent obtained civil service eligibility later on is of no moment as his having passed the supervising security guard examination, did not ipso facto convert his temporary appointment into a permanent one. What is required is a new appointment since a permanent appointment is not a continuation of the temporary appointment these are two distinct acts of the appointing authority

49677Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services vs. National Housing CorporationWhether or not the employees of NHC have the right to form unionThe court held that the workers or employees of NHC undoubtedly have the right to form unions or employees' organizations. The right to unionize or to form organizations is now explicitly recognized and granted to employees in both the governmental and the private sectors. The right to unionize is recognized in Paragraph (5), Section 2, Article IX B which provides that "(t)he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees." The government is in a sense the repository of the national sovereignty and, in that respect, it must be held in reverence if not in awe. It symbolizes the unity of the nation, but it does perform a mundane task as well. It is an employer in every sense of the word except that terms and conditions of work are set forth through a Civil Service Commission. Generally, formed unions do not bargain for wages because these are fixed in the budget but they do acquire a forum where, among other things, professional and self-development is (sic) promoted and encouraged. They also act as watchdogs of their own bosses so that when graft and corruption is committed, generally, it is the unions who are no longer afraid by virtue of the armor of self-organization that become the public's own allies for detecting graft and corruption and for exposing it.

L-69137Luego vs. Civil Service Commission Whether or not the Civil Service Commission is authorized to disapprove a permanent appointment on the ground that another person is better qualified than the appointee and, on the basis of this finding, order his replacement by the latterThe Supreme Court ruled in the negative. The Civil Service Commission is not empowered to determine the kind or nature of the appointment extended by the appointing officer, its authority being limited to approving or reviewing the appointment in the light of the requirements of the Civil Service Law. When the appointee is qualified and the other legal requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance with the Civil Service Laws. Indeed, the approval is more appropriately called an attestation; such attestation is required of the Commissioner of Civil Service merely as a check to assure compliance with Civil Service Laws. Hence, the Civil Service Commissions resolution is set aside.

*** Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a political question involving considerations of wisdom which only the appointing authority can decide.

85279SSS Employees Association vs. CA

L-44061Salazar vs. Mathay

L-23721Corpus vs. Cuaderno Whether officers holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing power.

- What positions compose the non-competitive or unclassified service under R.A. No. 2260?No. Under the constitution, No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. In the interest of service, reasonable protection should be afforded to civil servants in positions that are by their nature important, such as those that are highly technical. The Constitutional safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be for cause as provided by law at least demands that dismissal for alleged loss of confidence be attended with prudence and deliberation adequate to show that said ground exists. In the case, although there are charges against the petitioners, the same were not substantiated, thus the abovementioned provision should be followed.

1. Positions expressly declared by law to be in the non-competitive service 2. Primarily confidential positions

> These positions end upon loss of confidence because their terms of office lasts only as long as confidence in them endures and thus their cessation involves no removal.

3. Highly technical posts

> These are positions that require special skills and qualifications 4. Policy determining positions

L-3881Delos Santos vs. Mallare Whether the position of City Engineer is protected by the constitutional mandate that No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law, thus, cannot be ceased at any time.Yes. There are three specified classes of positions in the Civil Service policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical. They are excluded from the merit system and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution. The office of city engineer is neither primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical. A city engineer does not formulate a method of action for the government or any its subdivisions. His job is to execute policy, not to make it. The position of city engineer is technical but not highly so. A city engineer is not required nor is he supposed to possess a technical skill or training in the supreme or superior degree.

Therefore, the petitioner is entitled to remain in office as City Engineer of Baguio with all the emoluments, rights and privileges appurtenant thereto, until he resigns or is removed for cause.

83896Civil Liberties Union vs. Executive Secretary Does the prohibition in Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution insofar as Cabinet members, their deputies or assistants are concerned admit of the broad exceptions made for appointive officials in general under Section 7, par. (2), Article I-XB?No. Although Section 7, Article I-XB already contains a blanket prohibition against the holding of multiple offices or employment in the government subsuming both elective and appointive public officials, the Constitutional Commission should see it fit to formulate another provision, Sec. 13, Article VII, specifically prohibiting the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants from holding any other office or employment during their tenure, unless otherwise provided in the Constitution itself. While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the Constitution itself. In other words, Section 7, Article I-XB is meant to lay down the general rule applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the President, the Vice- President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.

104732Flores vs. Drilon Whether the proviso violates the constitutional proscription against appointment or designation of elective officials to other government posts.YES, Sec. 7 of Art. IX-B of the Constitution Provides: No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any public office or position during his tenure. Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. The subject proviso directs the President to appoint an elective official i.e. the Mayor of Olongapo City, to other government post (as Chairman and CEO of SBMA). This is precisely what the Constitution prohibits. It seeks to prevent a situation where a local elective official will work for his appointment in an executive position in government, and thus neglect his constituents.

L-8321Quimson vs. Ozaeta Double compensationAccording to law, under certain circumstances, the President may authorize double compensation in some cases, such as government officials acting as members with compensation in government examining boards like the bar examinations, or department secretaries acting as members of Board of Directors of government corporations, and in such cases the prohibition against double compensation is not observed The Supreme Court held that the appeal should not be reversed with costs. The SC also added He (Quimzon) should have known that his appointment had to go over or through several obstacles and hazards, but he took the risk and began serving as agent-collector before his appointment was approved. We are afraid that he has no one to blame but himself.

93867Brillantes vs. Yorac Designation by the President

Guarantee of tenureDesignation made by the President of the Philippines should be sustained for reasons of "administrative expediency," to prevent disruption of the functions of the COMELEC. The Court has not the slightest doubt that the President of the Philippines was moved only by the best of motives when she issued the challenged designation. But while conceding her goodwill, we cannot sustain her act because it conflicts with the Constitution. Hence, even as this Court revoked the designation in the Bautista case, so too must it annul the designation in the case at bar.

The Constitution provides for many safeguards to the independence of the Commission on Elections, foremost among which is the security of tenure of its members. That guaranty is not available to the respondent as Acting Chairman of the Commission on Elections by designation of the President of the Philippines.

100113Cayetano vs. Monsod Practice of lawIt means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training, and experience. To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill.

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceeding, the management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and condemnation services, contemplating an appearance before judicial body, the foreclosure of mortgage, enforcement of a creditors claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice.

95061Lindo vs. COMELEC Rules on promulgation of a decision in election protest cases.Sec. 20. Promulgation and Finality of Decision. The decision of the court shall be promulgated on a date set by it of which due notice must be given the parties. It shall become final five (5) days after promulgation. No motion for reconsideration shall be entertained.

Promulgation is the process by which a decision is published, officially announced, made known to the public or delivered to the clerk of court for filing, coupled with notice to the parties or their counsel.

199082Arroyo vs. DOJ

118861Relampagos vs. Cumba

112060Edding vs. COMELEC Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) has jurisdiction to issue Writs of Certiorari against the interlocutory order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in election cases.The settled rule is that the mere filing of a notice of appeal does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction over a case and resolve pending incidents. Where the motion for execution pending appeal was filed within the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, as in the case at bench, the filing of a notice of appeal by the opposing party is of no moment and does not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to resolve the motion for immediate execution of the judgment pending appeal because the court must hear and resolve it for it would become part of the records to be elevated on appeal. Since the court has jurisdiction to act on the motion at the time it was filed, that jurisdiction continued until the matter was resolved and was not lost by the subsequent action of the opposing party.

104848Gallardo vs. Tabamo Whether the Trial court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of Special Civil Action no. 465?There is as well no merit in the petitioners' claim that the private respondent has no legal standing to initiate the filing of a complaint for a violation of the Omnibus Election Code. There is nothing in the law to prevent any citizen from exposing the commission of an election offense and from filing a complaint in connection therewith. On the contrary, under the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, initiation of complaints for election offenses may be donemotu propio by the Commission on Elections or upon written complaint by any citizen, candidate or registered political party or organization under the party-list system or any of the accredited citizens arms of the Commission. 28 However, such written complaints should be filed with the "Law Department of the Commission; or with the offices of the Election Registrars, Provincial Election Supervisors or Regional Election Directors, or the State Prosecutor, Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal." 29 As earlier intimated, the private respondent was not seriously concerned with the criminal aspect of his alleged grievances. He merely sought a stoppage of the public works projects because

of their alleged adverse effect on his candidacy. Indeed, while he may have had reason to fear and may have even done the right thing, he committed a serious procedural misstep and invoked the wrong authority.

95346Galido vs. COMELEC Whether or not a COMELEC decision may, if it sets aside the trial courts decision involving marked ballots, be brought to the Supreme Court by a petition for certiorari by the aggrieved party.The fact that decisions, final orders or rulings of the COMELEC in contests involving elective municipal and barangay offices are final, executory and not appealable, does not preclude recourse to this Court by way of a special civil action of certiorari. Under Article IX (A), Section 7 of the Constitution, which petitioner cites, it is stated, Unless otherwise provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order, or ruling of each (Constitutional) Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt thereof. We resolve this

issue in favor of the petitioner. We do not, however, believe that the respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in rendering the questioned decision. The COMELEC has the inherent power to decide an election contest on physical evidence, equity, law and justice, and apply established jurisprudence, in support of its findings and conclusions; and that the extent to which such precedents apply rests on its discretion

88919People vs. Inting Whether the preliminary investigation conducted by a Provincial Election Supervisor involving election offenses have to be coursed through the Provincial Prosecutor before the Regional Trial Court may take cognizance of the investigation and determine whether or not probable cause exists?The 1987 Constitution empowers the COMELEC to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing an information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC. The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing this power to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair its effectiveness in achieving this clearconstitutional mandate. Bearing these principles in mind, it is apparent that the respondent trial court misconstrued the constitutional provision when it quashed the information filed by the Provincial Election Supervisor.

93419-32People vs. Delgado Whether or not the Regional Trial Court (RTC) has the authority to review the actions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in the investigation and prosecution of election offenses filed in said court.Yes, Based on the Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code, it is clear that aside from the adjudicatory or quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC to decide election contests and administrative questions, it is also vested the power of a public prosecutor with the exclusive authority to conduct the preliminary investigation and the prosecution of election offenses punishable under the Code before the competent court. Thus, when the COMELEC, through its duly authorized law officer, conducts the preliminary investigation of an election offense and upon a prima facie finding of a probable cause, files the information in the proper court, said court thereby acquires jurisdiction over the case.

83938-40People vs. Basilia Whether or not Commission on Elections has authority to deputize the chief state prosecutors, provincial and city fiscals and their assistants, under Sections 2 (4) and (8), Article IX-C of the 1987 ConstitutionYes. The Petition must be granted. There is no dispute that the Comelec is vested with power and authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all election offenses punishable under the Omnibus Election Code and to prosecute such offenses in court under Section 265.We note that while Section 265 of the Code vests "exclusive power" to conduct preliminary investigation of election offenses and to prosecute the same upon the Comelec, it at the same time authorizes the Comelec to avail itself of the assistance of other prosecuting arms of the Government. Section 2 of Article IX-C of the 1 987 Constitution clearly envisage that the Comelec would not be compelled to carry out all its functions directly and by itself alone.

129417COMELEC vs. Silva Whether the orders of dismissal should be appealed is for the COMELEC to Decide or for Chief State Prosecutor whom it has merely deputized to representThe authority to decide whether or not to appeal the dismissal belongs to the COMELEC. Art. IX-C, 2(6) of the Constitution expressly vests in it the power and function to investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices. The COMELEC is empowered to conduct preliminary investigations in cases involving election offenses for the purpose of helping the Judge determine probable cause and for filing information in court. This power is exclusive with COMELEC.

105628Sarmiento vs. COMELECWhether the challenged resolution (SPC) as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion in that, the commission, sitting en banc took cognizance of and decided the appeals without first referring them to any of its divisionSection 16 of R.A. 7166, it provides: "All pre-proclamation cases pending before the Commission shall be deemed terminated at the beginning of the term of the office involved and the rulings of the boards of canvassers concerned shall be deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular election protest by the aggrieved party. However, proceedings may continue when on the basis of the evidence thus far presented, the Commission determines that the petition appears meritorious and accordingly issues an order for the proceeding to continue or when an appropriate order has been issued by the Supreme Court in a petition for certiorari.

108886Reyes vs. RTC of Oriental Mindoro Whether the petitioner's failure to file a motion for reconsideration of the decision can be dispensed with.No. A motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc is required for the filing of a petition for certiorari is clear from the provisions of the Constitution regarding the powers and functions COMELEC. Conformably to these provisions of the Constitution all election cases, including pre-proclamation controversies, must be decided by the COMELEC in division. Should a party be dissatisfied with the decision, he may file a motion for reconsideration before the COMELEC en banc. Petition is dismissed for lack of merit.

132922Telecommunications & Broadcast Attorneys of the Phils. vs. GMA Network, Inc.COMELEC can supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media of communication or information.It is argued that the power to supervise or regulate given to the COMELEC under Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution does not include the power to prohibit. In the first place, what the COMELEC is authorized to supervise or regulate by Art. IX-C, 4 of the Constitution, among other things, is the use by media of information of their franchises or permits, while what Congress (not the COMELEC) prohibits is the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads. In other words, the object of supervision or regulation is different from the object of the prohibition. It is another fallacy for petitioners to contend that the power to regulate does not include the power to prohibit. This may have force if the object of the power were the same. Petition is dismissed

103956Adiong vs. COMELEC Whether or not the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) may prohibit the posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places, public or private, and limit their location or publication to the authorized posting areas that it fixesThe COMELEC's prohibition on posting of decals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in designated areas provided for by the COMELEC itself is null and void on constitutional grounds. The prohibition unduly infringes on the citizen's fundamental right of free speech enshrined in the Sec. 4, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. It is difficult to imagine how the other provisions of the Bill of Rights and the right to free elections may be guaranteed if the freedom to speak and to convince or persuade is denied and taken away. We have also ruled that the preferred freedom of expression calls all the more for the utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage. There is another problem involved. Considering that the period of legitimate campaign activity is fairly limited and, in the opinion of some, too short, it becomes obvious that unduly restrictive regulations may prove unfair to affected parties and the electorate. The posting of decals and stickers in mobile places like cars and other moving vehicles does not endanger any substantial government interest. In sum, the prohibition on posting ofdecals and stickers on "mobile" places whether public or private except in the authorized areas designated by the COMELEC becomes censorship which cannot be justified by the Constitution. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The portion of Section 15 (a) of Resolution No. 2347 of the Commission on Elections providing that "decals and stickers may be posted only in any of the authorized posting areas provided in paragraph (f) of Section 21 hereof" is DECLARED NULL and VOID.

102653National Press Club vs. COMELECWhether Section 11 (b) of Republic Act No. 6646 is constitutional.The Comelec has been expressly authorized by the Constitution to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of the franchises or permits for the operation of media of communication and information. The fundamental purpose of such "supervision or regulation" has been spelled out in the Constitution as the ensuring of "equal opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply," as well as uniform and reasonable rates of charges for the use of such media facilities, in connection with "public information campaigns and forums among candidates." Finally, the nature and characteristics of modern mass media, especially electronic media, cannot be totally disregarded. Realistically, the only limitation upon the free speech of candidates imposed is on the right of candidates to bombard the helpless electorate with paid advertisements commonly repeated in the mass media ad nauseam. Frequently, such repetitive political commercials when fed into the electronic media themselves constitute invasions of the privacy of the general electorate. It might be supposed that it is easy enough for a person at home simply to flick off his radio of television set. But it is rarely that simple. For the candidates with deep pockets may purchase radio or television time in many, if not all, the major stations or channels. Or they may directly or indirectly own or control the stations or channels themselves. The contemporary reality in the Philippines is that, in a very real sense, listeners and viewers constitute a "captive audience." The paid political advertisement introjected into the electronic media and repeated with mind-deadening frequency, are commonly intended and crafted, not so much to inform and educate as to condition and manipulate, not so much to provoke rational and objective appraisal of candidates' qualifications or programs as to appeal to the non-intellective faculties of the captive and passive audience. The right of the general listening and viewing public

to be free from such intrusions and their subliminal effects is at least as important as the right of candidates to advertise themselves through modern electronic media and the right of media enterprises to maximize their revenues from the marketing of "packaged" candidates. WHEREFORE, the Petitions should be, as they are hereby, DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

90878Sanidad vs. COMELEC Whether section 19 of of Comelec Resolution 2167 violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression of the press.Section 19 of Comelec Resolution 2167 violates the constitutional guarantees of the freedom of expression and of the press enshrined in the Constitution even with the Comelec spaces and Comelec radio time which provides a forum for expression but they do not guarantee full dissemination of information to the public concerned because they are limited to either specific portions in newspapers or to specific radio or television times. Since plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people's right to be informed and to be able to freely and intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, including the forum. The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right to expression may be exercised.

98355Osmea vs. Commissioner on Audit Whether Commission on Audit has no authority to declare the abattoir contract voidThe Commission has the authority since it has the power, authority and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to revenue and receipts of and expenditures or uses of funds and property, owned of held in trust by, or pertaining to, the government, or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities. The prohibition contained in Sec. 85 of PD 1445 (Government Auditing Code) is explicit and mandatory. Fund availability is, as it has always been, an indispensable prerequisite to the execution of any government contract involving the expenditure of public funds by all government agencies at all levels. Such contracts are not to be considered as final or binding unless such certification as to funds availability is issued. Antecedent of advance appropriation is thus essential to government liability on contracts.This contract being violative of the legal requirements, the same contravenes Sec. 85 of PD 1445 and is null and void.Moreover, neither the petitioner nor HFCCI questioned the ruling of COA declaring the invalidity of the abattoir contract, thereby resulting in its finality even before the civil case was instituted. Petitioner could have brought the case to the Supreme Court on a petition within thirty days from receipt of a copy of the COA decision in the manner provided by law and the Rules of Court. A decision of the Commission or of any of its Auditor not appealed within the period provided by law, shall be final and executory.Therefore, the settlement of the supposed obligation of the City of Cebu arising out of a void contract becomes a personal liability of petitioner who is directly responsibleWhether the subsequent comprise agreement entered into between the City of Cebu, through its Mayor, Tomas Osmea is null and void.It is null and void since the Compromise Agreement entered into between the City of Cebu, through its Mayor, Tomas Osmea is void being merely a derivative of a previously void Abattoir Contract, and thus becomes a personal liability of the officer who entered into it

92279Sambeli vs. Province of Isabela

75959Orocio vs. Commission on Audit

103309Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit Whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners claim for transportation allowanceThe disallowance of the petitioners claim for transportation allowance is within the power of the Commission on Audit as it is provided in Const. Sec. 2., Article XII-D, 1973 Constitution. The use of government motor vehicle and the claim for transportation allowance are mutually exclusive.

L-61676Saligumba vs. COA Whether the Supreme Court can review the decision of the COA in its decision in this case.Supreme Courts power to review COA decisions refers to money matters and not to administrative cases involving the discipline of its personnel. Even if the SC have jurisdiction to review decisions on administrative matters, they cannot do so on factual issues. Their power to review is limited to legal issues.

L-171115Guevarra vs. Gimenez

91890Philippine Airlines vs. COA Whether Pedro M. Gimenez, as Auditor General of the Philippines, and Ismael Mathay, as Auditor of the Central Bank of the Philippines can approve and pass in audit two (2) bills of petitioner Guillermo B. Guevara for professional services rendered by him to said Bank.This duty implies a negation of the power to refuse and disapprove payment of such expenditures, for its disapproval, if he had authority therefor, would bring to the attention of the aforementioned administrative officer the reasons for the adverse action thus taken by the General Auditing office, and, hence, render the imposition of said duty unnecessary. The writ prayed for is granted and respondents herein are hereby ordered to pass in audit and approve the payment of the amounts claimed by petitioner herein, after deducting therefrom the sum of P6,000 already collected by him. It is so ordered.

112399Bagatsing vs. Committee on Privatization

201716Abundo vs. COMELEC

133495Borja, Jr. vs. COMELECWhether or not Capco Jr. is eligible to run for mayor.Yes, the three-term limit for elective local official refers to the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective position. In relation to this it is not enough that a person has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the same position. Therefore, the succession by operation of law by Capco does not count as a term in counting the three-term limit rule.

R.A. no. 8249Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan

R.A. no. 1379AN ACT DECLARING FORFEITURE IN FAVOR OF THE STATE ANY PROPERTY FOUND TO HAVE BEEN UNLAWFULLY ACQUIRED BY ANY PUBLIC OFFICER OR EMPLOYEE AND PROVIDING FOR THE PROCEEDINGS THEREFOR.Acts constitute of unlawful acquisition of public officerSection 1. Definitions. (a) For the purposes of this Act, a "public officer or employee" means any person holding any public office or employment by virtue of an appointment, election or contract, and any person holding any office or employment, by appointment or contract, in any State owned or controlled corporation or enterprise. (b) "Other legitimately acquired property" means any real or personal property, money or securities which the respondent has at any time acquired by inheritance and the income thereof, or by gift inter vivos before his becoming a public officer or employee, or any property (or income thereof) already pertaining to him when he qualified for public office or employment, or the fruits and income of the exclusive property of the respondent's spouse. It shall not include:

1. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but its ownership is concealed by its being recorded in the name of, or held by, the respondent's spouse, ascendants, descendants, relatives, or any other person.

2. Property unlawfully acquired by the respondent, but transferred by him to another person or persons on or after the effectivity of this Act.

3. Property donated to the respondent during his incumbency, unless he can prove to the satisfaction of the court that the donation is lawful.

R.A. no. 6770Ombudsman Act of 1989AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE FUNCTIONAL AND STRUCTURAL ORGANIZATION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

Appointive Power of the PresidentSection 4. Appointment. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, including the Special Prosecutor, shall be appointed by the President from a list of at least twenty-one (21) nominees prepared by the Judicial and Bar Council, and from a list of three (3) nominees for each vacancy thereafter, which shall be filled within three (3) months after it occurs, each of which list shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation. In the organization of the Office of the Ombudsman for filling up of positions therein, regional, cultural or ethnic considerations shall be taken into account to the end that the Office shall be as much as possible representative of the regional, ethnic and cultural make-up of the Filipino nation.

139 SCRA 252Orap vs. Sandiganbayan Issue: whether the Tanodbayan has power to conduct preliminary investigations, file informations and prosecute criminal cases against judges and their appurtenant judicial staff.The Tanodbayan functions not only as an ombudsman but also as a prosecutor as well. As an ombudsman, his investigatory power is limited to those complaints initiated against officers and personnel of administrative agencies, as defined in Section 9(a) of PD no. 1607 which puts the courts, judges and their appurtenant judicial staff outside the Tanod bayan's investigatory power.But as a prosecutor where the tanodbayans power as defined in section 17 and 19 of P.D. 1607 confers upon him through the chief special prosecutor and the special prosecutors, the exclusive authority to conduct preliminary investigation of all cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, to file informations therefor, and to direct and control the prosecution of said cases therein.

193459Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice One-Year Bar RuleWhat is important is that there should only be ONE CANDLE that is kindled in a year, such that once the candle starts burning, subsequent matchsticks can no longer rekindle the candle. The Supreme Court held that the whole import of the constitutional safeguard of one-year bar rule in consideration of the impeachable officers is that when the impeachable officer is made to undergo such ride, he or she should be made to traverse it just once. Similarly, if Congress is called upon to operate itself as a vehicle, it should do so just once. There is no repeat ride for one full year.

164316Office of the Ombudsman vs. Madriaga

125296Khan vs. Office of the Ombudsman For violations of the Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act (Republic Act 3019), the Office of the Ombudsman exercises jurisdiction over public officials/ employees of GOCCs. Exception: It ONLY extends to GOCCs with original charters.The Philippine Airline was originally chartered by special law as distinguished from corporations organized under the Corporation Code. Although the government later on acquired the controlling interest in PAL, the fact remains that the latter did not have an "original charter" and its officers/employees could not be investigated and/or prosecuted by the Ombudsman. The definition of public office/ officer as quoted from Mechem in the 2002 case of Laurel vs Desierto was reiterated in this case: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer. The most important characteristic which distinguishes an office from an employment or contract is that the creation and conferring of an office involves a delegation to the individual of some of the sovereign functions of government to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public; that some portion of the sovereignty of the country, either legislative, executive, or judicial, attaches, for the time being, to be exercised for the public benefit. Unless the powers conferred are of this nature, the individual is not a public officer.

160261Francisco vs. House of Representatives

133715Villavert vs. Desierto Whether the Supreme Court has the jurisdiction to review from a decision or final resolution or order of the Ombudsman in administrative casesSec. 27 of RA 6770, which authorizes an appeal to this Court from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases, was declared violative of the proscription in Sec. 30, Art. VI, of the Constitution against a law which increases the appellate jurisdiction of this Court without its advice and consent.

In addition, the Court noted that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43