Courtney Evans Oral History Interview –RFK#5, 1/8/1971

Administrative Information

Creator: Courtney Evans

Interviewer: James A. Oesterle

Date of Interview: January 8, 1971

Place of Interview: Washington, D.C.

Length: 13 pages, 3 page addendum

Biographical Note

Evans, Assistant Director, Special Investigative Division, Federal Bureau of

Investigation; Liaison to Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy [RFK], discusses FBI

wiretapping procedure, RFK and Hoover during the December ’66 controversy, and

MLK wiretapping, among other issues.

Access

Open.

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Transcript of Oral History Interview

These electronic documents were created from transcripts available in the research room

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Some formatting changes were made. Page numbers are noted where they would have

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Suggested Citation

Courtney Evans, recorded interview by James A. Oesterle, January 8, 1971, (page

number), Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program of the John F. Kennedy Library.

Courtney Evans – RFK #5

Table of Contents

Page Topic

79 Hoover’s reaction to Martin Luther King, Jr. [MLK] wiretapping

80 FBI wiretapping procedure

81 MLK telephone tap memo

82 Robert F. Kennedy [RFK] and J. Edgar Hoover during the December 1966

controversy

85 Surveillance records and policy

87 Wiretapping in organized crime investigations and other areas

88 Victor S. Navasky article

90 Hoover’s possible successor

Fifth Oral History Interview

with

COURTNEY EVANS

January 8, 1971

Washington, D.C.

By James A. Oesterle

For the Robert F. Kennedy Oral History Program

of the John F. Kennedy Library

OESTERLE: Mr. Evans, in the last interview you referred to the Martin Luther King

tap and said that sometime in October 1963 Robert Kennedy had a

request before him. Paraphrasing you a bit, you said that he said that

he was “still uncertain about the advisability of utilizing this telephone tap but that he would

approve it if I could assure him that the results would be evaluated and the advisability of

continuing this tap was considered in another thirty days.” And of course, within the thirty-

day period President Kennedy [John F. Kennedy] was assassinated and this matter was not

brought up again prior to the controversy that later developed between the director [J. Edgar

Hoover] of the bureau [Federal Bureau of Investigation] and the attorney general. Do you

recall both in this case and in the case of the former bureau agent that you mentioned – the

bureau wanted to put a tap or electronic surveillance on the agent – the reaction of the

director in regard to the comments of the attorney general either restricting the tap or

suggesting that it was advisable?

EVANS: In the ordinary course of business, I handled matters with the director

in writing, unless there was some emergency that required that he be

contacted telephonically. It’s my best recollection now that in both of

the instances you mentioned the information that I received as a result of talking to the

attorney general was transmitted through bureau channels to the director in memorandum

form. I don’t recall that there was any reaction to these memoranda from the director other

than the fact that, with reference to the former bureau agent, the technical surveillance was

not conducted. I don’t recall that there was any reaction at all, either in writing

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or orally from the director, with regard to the other situation.

OESTERLE: In the case of an approval, what would the normal routine be or the

procedure for the bureau to follow?

EVANS: The procedure ordinarily in connection with telephone taps, was that

the interested division within the FBI – and this was normally the

Domestic Intelligence Division that was concerned with security

problems – would submit a recommendation up through channels to the director that a

memorandum be forwarded to the attorney general requesting authorization for a particular

telephone tap. When this action was approved in the director’s office, one of the employees

immediately assigned to the office would personally hand-carry this request over to the office

of the attorney general.

It was only in those very unusual situations where the interested division felt there

was something that should be brought to the attorney general’s attention that shouldn’t go in

writing for one reason or another that I would be requested to hand-carry this request over to

the attorney general myself. As a consequence, with a large percentage – practically all – of

the requests for telephone taps that went to the office of the attorney general, I wouldn’t even

know about the request being made unless I was informed by the attorney general who

wanted to raise a question. Or if he had no question and approved it and I happened to be

there, he would give me the approved request to return. Sometimes even his secretary would

catch me walking out of the attorney general’s office and say she had some approved

requests, would I take them back over. That’s how I found out about most of them.

OESTERLE: What would the process be once the FBI had received the approval?

How would they then initiate whatever it was that they wanted to do?

EVANS: The approved request would go from the director down to the

interested division. Knowing that they had the approval of the

attorney general, the interested division would issue the necessary

instructions to the particular field office involved as to how to proceed.

OESTERLE: So could things proceed quite rapidly, or would special budget

appropriations have to be made that might involve further delay?

EVANS: Oh, no. Ordinarily, there’d be no delay. As a matter of fact, these

requests ordinarily would arise in the particular field office where the

investigation was being conducted. That

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field office, feeling that a telephone tap would be productive in furthering the investigation,

would actually initiate the recommendation. So that once it was approved, the field office

would be in a position to move immediately. There was no financial considerations that I

know of that would have delayed this in any way. This is just a part of the normal operating

expense of the bureau.

OESTERLE: In the case of, for instance, the New York City telephone company

proceeding, would they later bill the bureau for a service that they

performed for the bureau, or would the bureau actually have an

account with the telephone company?

EVANS: I don’t have any exact knowledge of bookkeeping details. The only

service that the telephone company would perform, of course, is the

making available of a leased line, a dedicated telephone line, from

point A to point B in New York City. And this is just a common, commercial occurrence.

Dedicated telephone lines are leased by, I assume, thousands and thousands of concerns in

New York City. So that it’s hardly an unusual transaction.

OESTERLE: The other memo that you spoke of in regard to the Martin Luther King

tap inferred that Robert Kennedy was anxious to have a telephone tap

put on Martin Luther King. And you said, “I don’t think that this was

true. If, indeed, I wrote that, I would like to consider that in light of the rest of the

memoranda that had been written at that time.” First of all, are you unsure about the

authorship of the memoranda? Are you not sure that you did write it?

EVANS: I don’t have any specific recollection now what was in the

memorandum. As I think I’ve pointed out before, I wrote hundreds of

memoranda and, absent the record to refresh my recollection, I just

can’t say what was said. The point I was trying to make was that if in one instance or two or

three instances I may have written something that stated explicitly or inferred that Robert

Kennedy was anxious to do this, that statement alone is not true and that the statement has to

be read in light of everything that was written at about that period of time with regard to the

Martin Luther King investigation. I just don’t think that you can take one sentence out of

context or that you can take one memorandum out of context and say that this represents the

whole picture. I probably should also point out that many, many of these memoranda that I

wrote were written under very tight time pressures and that as a consequence the language

was not frequently considered in a thoughtful and detailed manner, and there was never time

for editing of material that was prepared. So the document has to be considered in that light

too. It wasn’t a studied effort to record perhaps the entire story.

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It was never a thoroughly edited manuscript where every word was weighed as to its possible

meaning.

OESTERLE: It’s my understanding that Robert Kennedy had signed a blind memo

that later became the problem and that this was the August 17, 1961,

memorandum which was used by the director to defend his position.

Do you possibly recall that this was the case, or was this the case many times that there were

blind memos? In other words, he would sign his name to a memo and later the text would be

typed in?

EVANS: Oh, no. No. Those memos that he signed, the blind memos – he

signed a separate one with regard to every telephone tap that he

approved. These were prepared ahead of time. Generally, they

followed a very stereotyped form. The same language, in essence, had been used for years,

as I recall it, to get approval. The August 17 memo on the leased lines from the telephone

company in New York followed the same general pattern in that it was a blind memorandum

and sought approval and it was signed. And there’s no question that the language here, I

think, is the same as he signed. I don’t believe there’s been any change in language or the

memo’s been altered in any way.

OESTERLE: Maybe I don’t understand the significance of the blind memo. Would

a blind memo be a blank sheet of paper with his signature at the

bottom and then attached to it a draft of what would later be added?

EVANS: No, nothing would be added afterwards. A blind memorandum was

just not addressed to anybody. My best recollection is that it was on

stationary, FBI stationary, but rather than being addressed to the

attorney general or anybody else, it was simply a request for authorization to institute, to

install a telephone tap. There was a place at the bottom and it was already typed in

“Approved” and a blank line for the attorney general to approve it. It was just a form of

communication that had grown up over the years. The memos that I’m talking about where

they may not be a considered use of language and where they were prepared under great time

pressures are intra-bureau memoranda that were informative in nature.

OESTERLE: In general, how much back and forth had there been between the

attorney general and the director before the whole controversy hit the

papers in December ’66?

EVANS: You mean contacts and communications back and forth with regard to

the wiretap controversy? I really don’t have any

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personal knowledge as to how much contact there may have been.

The controversy surfaced in December 1966. I had left the bureau at the end of December of

1964. I’d had very limited contact with Robert Kennedy when he was a senator. I do know

that there was some indication, Robert Kennedy had some indication that this controversy

was brewing, because it was in that period of time that he asked me for this letter to which

we’ve referred.

OESTERLE: How do you think he got this impression that this was about to

happen?

EVANS: Oh, I think that there was a great deal of talk on the Hill [Capitol Hill]

about it, both by members of Congress and by staff people and by

newspaper reporters working there. I know that Kennedy was under

the definite impression that this issue was going to surface. He didn’t know when, but it was

going to have to come out into the open. I just assume that these were his sources.

OESTERLE: But when…

EVANS: Look at the way it did surface ultimately, on the basis of requests from

a member of Congress formally directed to the director of the FBI for

information about it. Now, this is not an isolated situation that just

arose. That kind of thing takes a good deal of development. The way these stories are

broken, a congressman has to have detailed information before he asks the question. I would

speculate that perhaps there are other members of Congress who were approached about

asking the kind of questions that were ultimately asked by this particular congressman.

I think there was some talking on the Hill about this on the part of FBI

representatives. At least, that’s been reported to me. I was personally asked by a ranking

FBI official – I think it was early in 1966 – about whether or not Kennedy, in fact, did have a

letter from me. And I, as I remember, told him at the time that this was really my business

and Robert Kennedy’s business, he shouldn’t make any assumptions one way or the other; he

shouldn’t put words into my mouth as to what the facts were with regard to a letter or

anything else because I was well aware of a tendency that existed in the FBI at times to

submit memoranda that contained information which people thought the director wanted to

receive. Its relationship to the whole story in many instances was sometimes quite distorted.

For these reasons, I’m just convinced in my own mind that there was a lot of activity.

I had also heard the stories of the FBI trying to interest certain members of Congress

in material reportedly obtained about

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Martin Luther King. I never saw the documents. Nobody who would be in a position to

know or to have seen the documents ever talked to me about it. But the story was around the

Hill, and there was some speculation in the press from time to time that such documents

might exist. But I don’t know that the documents themselves have ever been disclosed. Who

has them, where they are, I don’t have the faintest idea.

OESTERLE: Yet, it’s highly extraordinary to think of some of these selected

memoranda being released to the press and published. And I wonder

in my own mind if the attorney general really felt at that time that the

director of the bureau would go that far. One would think that this is the kind of thing that

even if it went so far as to be turned over to a congressional committee, that it would still not

be released to the press.

EVANS: I suppose that maybe Robert Kennedy felt that it would be confined

and not become public, although once things are supplied to Congress,

unless they’re very, very sensitive, there’s a tendency that it becomes a

matter of public knowledge.

OESTERLE: David Kraslow wrote in an article that appeared in the Los Angeles

Times on December 11, 1966, that both the director and the attorney

general and their associates had been arguing their conflicting points

of view for months in private discussions with reporters and others. I wonder, did this really

go on for months?

EVANS: I would assume that it did.

OESTERLE: I mean prior to….

EVANS: December ’66?

OESTERLE: Uh-huh.

EVANS: Well, I would assume it went on for a period of months, yes. I don’t

know. I had no part of it, but I just assume that this is true.

OESTERLE: He also says that it was understood that the question of whether Robert

Kennedy had approved bugging of Black [Fred B. Black, Jr.], Baker

[Robert G. Baker] and others came up in a meeting that LBJ [Lyndon

B. Johnson] had at the White House with the director and Katzenbach [Nicholas deB.

Katzenbach] in ’65. Did you hear anything at all about that?

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EVANS: No, I didn’t know anything about that other than I did read the

Kraslow article at the time.

OESTERLE: Oh, you do recall the article? He says in that article – he mentions

your name too saying that, “It was evident from Courtney Evans’ letter

that Robert Kennedy had been anticipating a broadside from Hoover

for a long time.” This is what you referred to before, but it wasn’t necessarily what one

might call a long time. It was a period of a month or two from the time that he asked you to

write the memoranda?

EVANS: Well, it was a period of a few months. [Interruption] With regard to

how long this negotiation, the period of negotiation – to use that term

very loosely – between the FBI and the Kennedy factions went on, I’d

only point out as a matter of evidence that my letter to Kennedy was dated February of 1966

and that this ultimate disclosure in the Hoover letter to Congressman Gross [H.R. Gross] was

in December of ’66. So there’s a period of at least ten months and probably a little more that.

At least during this period of time – perhaps as much as a year – Robert Kennedy was

concerned that there was going to be a surfacing of allegations in this regard.

OESTERLE: Were his records perhaps not as complete as they might have been in

terms of checking back over the various memorandum that had been

written so that he could retrace the events?

EVANS: You’re talking about Robert Kennedy’s records.

OESTERLE: Uh-huh.

EVANS: At this time he was a senator. I assume that he still had access to his

personal papers prepared during the period of the time that he was

attorney general. They must have been very voluminous. He no

longer had the kind of staff assistance that he had when he was attorney general to dig things

out, so he may not have had ready access to everything. In addition, the material that he

would have had in his files were the formal memoranda requesting authorization for

telephone taps. Much of the data, however, that came over from the FBI that might even

have been relevant to issues here undoubtedly remained in the files of the Department of

Justice proper rather than in the files, the personal papers, of the attorney general. Later on,

perhaps in ’66, ’67, it’s my impression that a great deal was done within the office of the

attorney general with regard to wiretaps and microphone surveillances, and that there was an

intensive review of all the material that was in the files of the Department of Justice proper to

develop facts concerning how policy

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in this regard moved along in this period of time and what various attorneys general over the

years had done. I think this was all done as background for the development of current

policy and probably in connection with the department’s position on the omnibus crime bill

in 1968.

OESTERLE: This was done under Katzenbach?

EVANS: Yes, this would be Katzenbach and I assume even by Mr. Clark

[Ramsey Clark].

OESTERLE: Could this also have been, on the part of Katzenbach, in part to assist

Robert Kennedy, at least Robert Kennedy’s view, in regard to the

confusion of approval and when this had started and what the form had

been?

EVANS: Well, it could have been, but I think it was primarily to enable the then

attorney general to carry out his responsibilities. Remember that the

Black case and some other cases were then going to the Supreme

Court. And the attorney general was called upon to make a very definite statement to the

Supreme Court with regard to these matters. I think it was primarily for the purpose of

enabling the attorney general to respond to the demand of the Supreme Court and to prepare

a policy base for the omnibus crime bill that this research was done.

OESTERLE: I imagine that Jack Miller [Herbert J. Miller, Jr.] was quite involved in

the whole question of electronic surveillance in regard to some of the

cases that were mentioned, the Baker case and others.

EVANS: Well, remember that these issues came up in the Baker case and in

other cases not because any technical surveillance or telephone taps

had been used in the investigation of those particular cases, but rather

because during the course of some maintenance of technical surveillance in other cases, be

they organized crime or be they internal security, by chance there was an interception of a

communication involving Baker or one of the other people. So I’m not at all sure that I can

agree with you that Miller was very well informed in this area. He was concerned with…

OESTERLE: By the way, I meant that as a question and not as a statement.

EVANS: I don’t think that he was too well informed. One of the letters that was

released by the FBI in December 1966 to show knowledge on the part

of Robert Kennedy that the bureau

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was using microphone surveillances was Miller’s letter to I think it was Senator Ervin [Sam

J. Ervin, Jr.], advising him as to the number of telephone taps and microphone surveillances

that were being used at the time of the letter. Miller got that information from the FBI, I’m

sure. He wouldn’t have had any way of getting it himself. Beyond that, I’m not certain that

Miller knew very much at all about what was going on. He certainly had no part in

approving telephone taps. This was strictly a prerogative of the attorney general.

OESTERLE: Of course, he could have requested that a tap be instigated and asked

the attorney general to give approval so that the FBI could conduct

such an operation.

EVANS: In my whole history in the FBI I have never heard of that being done

by any assistant attorney general in charge of the Criminal Division.

And I just doubt seriously that there would have been any from the

assistant attorney general in charge of the Internal Security Division. I just don’t think that

was the normal practice. These things were initiated by the FBI.

OESTERLE: By the way, did some of the techniques that were used in internal

security matters become a matter of course in organized crime work?

You mentioned something about this, that the attorney general thought

that maybe some of these various techniques and all would be useful.

EVANS: Yes, I think there was some adoption of techniques used in the

investigation of espionage cases in the organized crime area. The two

types of situations are very comparable in that you have well financed

groups interested in infiltrating another organization, be it government or business. In

espionage, it’s primarily the federal government. Foreign nations would be interested in

infiltrating governments so they could know about major policy decisions that were of a

secret nature, of military preparations, et cetera. In organized crime, the infiltration is for the

purpose of insuring protection to the illegal activities of organized crime, and these primarily

center in local units of government. But the techniques of the infiltration are somewhat

similar, and as a consequence, the techniques used to counter that infiltration could be

similar.

When I was involved in the supervision of organized crime matters, I encouraged the

use of espionage investigation type techniques. The thing that is similar and, I think,

important is the development of intelligence type information as contrasted to evidence for a

prosecution in a given case. The intelligence type information that is developed will enable a

government to take administrative action to thwart the activities of the intended infiltrators.

It’s common

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practice in the security field, and I thought that it should also be a common practice in

organized crime. At least, this is what we were trying to do. And it was in this regard, of

course, that you try to utilize every possible source of information to develop intelligence

that could be used in this way. You’re not concerned as to whether or not the evidence is the

type that can be introduced in court. You’re not concerned with the repercussions of cross-

examination that would perhaps disclose techniques and other informants that you didn’t

want disclosed because they were continuing to produce information for you, and if the

infiltrators knew you had a counteragent within their ranks, they would immediately take

steps to close off the productivity of this counteragent. Actually, it was through this

intelligence type investigation that the first really specific details as to the operation of

organized crime groups within the United States were amplified to a point that the picture

began to be very clear as to how they operated and what they were doing.

OESTERLE: Were any of these techniques ever used to uncover lobbying on the

part of foreign governments or businesses?

EVANS: Oh, I think here we’re getting into a pretty highly classified area. It

would be well to look at some of the leads that resulted from the Baker

case. I think there’s a good lead there into this area which might be

illustrative of what was going on.

OESTERLE: Very well. [Interruption] To the best of your knowledge, does the

Navasky [Victor S. Navasky] article that appeared in Atlantic

magazine entitled “The Government and Martin Luther King” do

justice to the various aspects of the entire controversy that developed?

EVANS: Well, let me say first of all that I never talked to Mr. Navasky in my

life and that I am not the veteran FBI agent that is said in the article to

have furnished him information. Who this veteran agent is, I don’t

know. On the whole, I’m inclined to think that Mr. Navasky has pretty well gotten the

essential facts about the situation. The article is obviously a little bit more pro-Kennedy than

it is pro-J. Edgar Hoover. It would seem to me that much of the article concerns matters

about which I have little, if any, personal knowledge, insofar as the article relates to matters

within the civil rights area. It would seem to me that much of the information in this regard

that is contained in the article could best be evaluated by some individual who was a highly

ranking official in the Civil Rights Division of the department during this early 1960 period,

that is during the time that Robert Kennedy was attorney general. I just have the feeling that

Mr. Navasky didn’t get this information from FBI sources, and it would seem to me that

either

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directly or indirectly he has developed some information that must have originated within the

Civil Rights Division itself. Despite the fact that Mr. Navasky says that the article will serve

a purpose only if it tends to smoke me out along with a couple of other people, I don’t think

there’s anything more that I could add other than the information that I’ve given during the

course of these interviews for the Kennedy Library. I just feel that this is the proper avenue

for me to furnish what information I can and hope that this can be evaluated in light of much

more extensive written material which history may subsequently develop.

OESTERLE: On page 46 of the Navasky article, at the bottom of the page, on the

right hand side, he refers to the Evans memorandum not released at

this writing. Now, I guess I have not seen this memorandum. Do you

recall this one in particular at all?

EVANS: Does he identify the memorandum?

OESTERLE: [The article] It’s here.

EVANS: This is the June 1963 memorandum in which I reported a conversation

I had had with the attorney general with regard to his concern about

reports that Doctor King was a student of Marxism and was allegedly

associating with a New York attorney with known Communist connections, and if it was

technically feasible to use electronic devices to prove or disprove these allegations. The text

of this memorandum, to the best of my knowledge, has never been released publicly, which

raises in my mind some questions as to what else there is in the memorandum. As I’ve said

before, I don’t have access to this material. I don’t recall what was in the memoranda. But

this and similar instances are the basis for my statement that you have to judge what is in one

memorandum by putting it in context with a series of memoranda. In this particular instance,

perhaps the unreleased portion of the memorandum is also very significant. But I just don’t

recall what was in the memorandum, and I’ve thought a good deal about it since December

1966.

OESTERLE: From the point of view of conjecture, would you go along with

Navasky’s understanding that the Kennedy version conflicts with the

Hoover version in two essentials: one, that Kennedyites say that the

tap was Hoover’s idea and installed at his urging and, two, they deny that Kennedy ever

entertained doubts about Doctor King’s loyalty?

EVANS: It’s my opinion that the first conclusion here is probably, is

undoubtedly accurate, considering everything that happened

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in the entire situation. With regard to whether or not Kennedy ever

had any doubts as to Doctor Martin Luther King’s loyalty, I don’t know that I really have

enough knowledge to even speculate here. But going beyond speculating and just guessing,

it’s my guess that Mr. Kennedy never did have any doubts about his loyalty. This is a typical

situation wherein subversive elements infiltrate legitimate organizations or try to. And I

wouldn’t say that Robert Kennedy felt that everybody that was in Doctor King’s organization

or everybody that was associated with him was completely loyal, but I think it’s probably a

fair statement and my guess that Mr. Kennedy never did have any doubts about Doctor

King’s loyalty personally. [Interruption]

OESTERLE: I don’t recall the name of the author, but the title of the book was The

Crime War, and in the book the author says that DeLoach [Cartha

Dekle DeLoach] considered himself to be the heir apparent to J. Edgar

Hoover. In contrast to this book, in the de Toledano [Ralph de Toledano] book on page 362,

the author says that Courtney Evans would have succeeded Hoover as director had RFK won

out. And this was mentioned in reference to the controversy over approval by the attorney

general of wiretaps. This is very speculative, of course, but what is your reaction to this?

EVANS: Oh, I think you’ve hit the nail on the head with the word speculative. I

think they’re both very highly speculative conjectures. Recognize that

there’s a time differential here. And I think the speculation with

regard to my possible appointment was much earlier than DeLoach’s. He came to greater

prominence in the FBI after I left, and I think that the speculations as to his being an apparent

heir were after I left. I think I could say in all frankness, and should say, so that whatever

I’ve indicated during the course of these interviews can be properly evaluated, that I have felt

that if the circumstances worked out and the directorship of the FBI became vacant that I

could count on support from Robert Kennedy to be appointed to the position. I recognized

all along, however, that the circumstances had to be exactly right for this to happen and that

if there was a compelling situation that required the naming of somebody who had a broader

national reputation than I did, perhaps somebody with a different background, somebody

such as a fairly prominent federal judge, that if those circumstances came along, then Robert

Kennedy’s first loyalty – and rightfully so – was to his brother and to the administration.

And I wouldn’t have been at all lacking in understanding if he had recommended the

president appoint someone else. But I do have a very – had a very close relationship with

him. I felt we were good official friends, as we’ve talked about. My record was such that I

felt in my own mind the promotion was not inconceivable. Incidentally, throughout Robert

Kennedy’s lifetime, he never mentioned this to me once. He

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may have talked to other people about it, I don’t know, but he certainly never talked with me

about it. The fact is, he never said anything to me about a change in the leadership in the

FBI. But in the period of 1963, there was a good deal of gossip around Washington that

following the ’64 elections, assuming President Kennedy were reelected and with Mr.

Hoover reaching the mandatory retirement age on January 1, 1965 – and this provision of law

can be waived only by the president – that with all of these things happening, J. Edgar

Hoover would be allowed to retire and that a new director to the FBI would be named. These

rumors, of course, were known to the director, and I got the very distinct impression that he

was very resentful that any consideration at all would be given to replacing him.

Now, if as time develops and more information concerning anything that I’ve said

becomes public or greater details are available – even if entirely new matters arise that we

haven’t been able to recall during these interviews – then, by all means I would think it most

proper that we get together again and try to explore these new avenues and develop the old

ones further if this is indicated. It would be most appropriate, and we ought to do it.

OESTERLE: Very worthwhile. I appreciate your time very much.

EVANS: My pleasure.

[-91-]

Courtney Evans Oral History Transcript – RFK #5

Name List

B

Baker, Robert G. 84,88

Black, Fred B., Jr. 84,86

C

Clark, Ramsey 86

D

de Toledano, Ralph 90

DeLoach, Cartha Dekle 90

E

Ervin, Sam J., Jr. 87

G

Gross, Harold Royce 85

H

Hoover, J. Edgar 79,85,88-91

J

Johnson, Lyndon B. 84

K

Katzenbach, Nicholas deB. 84,86

Kennedy, John F. 79,89,91

Kennedy, Robert F. 79,81-86,88-90

King, Martin Luther, Jr. 79,81,84,88-90

Kraslow, David 84,85

M

Miller, Herbert J., Jr. 86,87

N

Navasky, Victor S. 88,89