Opposition to Colombian Immigration in Venezuela and the 1980 Matrcula General de Extranjeros

Alex Escalona 11.15.2004 B.A. Thesis

Faculty Reader: Andreas Feldmann

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Introduction

In August of 1980, the government of Lus Herrera Campns instated a general amnesty

for undocumented immigrants residing in Venezuela. The amnesty titled the Matrcula General

de Extranjeros (General Register for Foreigners: 1980 MGE, thenceforth)came at the end of a

period of unprecedented economic prosperity that had been initiated in 1973 as a result of the

sudden increase in oil prices brought about by the OPEC cartel. As I will argue in this paper, the

ulterior purpose of this program was to displace the blame for the sudden economic downturn

onto the sizable undocumented immigrant population in the country. In the late 1970s with the

first signs of economic depressionthe Venezuelan media and government put into motion a

campaign to stigmatize undocumented immigration, blaming this group for much of the

countrys economic woes. The contradictions between the media- and government-sponsored

campaign to stigmatize undocumented immigration and the particular position of these flows

within the Venezuelan economy inform the role of the 1980 MGE. That is, many undocumented

Colombians who constituted the overwhelming majority of undocumented immigrantshad

been brought into the country to fulfill labor shortages in the mid-1970s, and, primarily, to build

a sustainable base of cheap labor. However, faced with a sharp economic downturn and

ineffective economic policiesthe government and the media began to blame undocumented

immigrants for the countrys unemployment problems, the social services deficit, and the overall

condition of underdevelopment they now confronted. Around the same time, and particularly

at the end of 1979, deportations took a stringent turn and the volume of deportations not only

increased, but procedures became more aggressive. On the one hand, then, the 1980 MGE

represented an attempt on the governments behalf to put a precise number on the magnitude of

the situation, one that would confirm the runaway figures estimating undocumented immigration

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in the country. On the other, however, the rather sobering results of the 1980 MGE served to

counter further entrenchment of opposition to Colombian immigration in Venezuela. In fact,

according to the government and media, estimations of the size of undocumented immigration in

the country had reached up to 4 million people, in 1980. This figure overwhelmingly surpassed

the official figure of 1,312,318 registered foreigners, for 1979.1 In particular, I would argue that

opposition to Colombian immigration around the time of the 1980 MGE was formulated in the

language of national sovereignty and, primarily, economic development. As we shall see,

national sovereignty was inextricably bound to the theme of economic development. Thus,

though the problems the country faced were largely economic in nature, the language through

which they were formulated (i.e., opposition to undocumented immigration) was essentially

political.

In her study of Undocumented Immigrants within Colombian Immigration in

Venezuela, Adela Pellegrino notes that

the population exchange between Venezuela and Colombia was a running practice in the border regions of both countries since Independence, both having fallen under the same administrative jurisdiction during the colonial period.2 The reality of this historical interaction is highlighted by the common culture shared between

people living on both sides of the Colombo-Venezuelan border. This border region is

characterized by a relatively homogenous and even distinct cultural entity that shares not only

geography, but a common linguistic identity and even a common livelihood. As Pellegrino has

remarked,

the cultural identity presented by the Andean population of both countries, united by the fact that the exchange of products within the international market of the border states was carried

1 Berglund, Susan, and Hernndez Calimn, Humberto, Los de Afuera: Un Estudio Analtico del Proceso Migratorio en Venezuela, 1936-1985 (Caracas: CEPAM, 1985), 119. 2 Pellegrino, Adela, Los Indocumentados en la Inmigracin Colombiana en Venezuela (Caracas: UCAB, 1985) 1.

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out through the Port of Maracaibo during most of the nineteenth century, determined a certain economic unity in the region and a relative autonomy with respect to other economic circuits in both countries. These remarks emphasize not only the fluidity of immigration between these regions, but also

their well-established history. Colombian immigration in Venezuela, however, had not always

been a characterized by sizable flows.

Indeed, these movements did not register significant numbers until the 1930s, when a

small but significant contingent of Colombians immigrated to the neighboring country in search

of work in the new oil industry.3 Yet despite the sudden increase in immigration from Colombia

in the 1930s, these flows did not represent a sizable and sustained movement until the 1950s.

Furthermore, while immigration flows between Venezuela and Colombia began to receive

political attention in the beginning of the 1940s with the passage of the Estatuto de Rgimen

Fronterizo a statute regulating cross-border migrations through the issuance of frontier

permitsthe institution of cross-border immigration policies did not garner considerable

discussion until the late 1950s, when a joint commission was established by the governments of

both countries to debate the matter. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Colombian immigration in

Venezuela increased significantly in volume, owing to the growing practice of mechanized

agriculture and the concomitant decreases in employment opportunities. Moreover, with the

outbreak of la violencia in the 1940s and 1950s, Colombian immigrants began to seek refuge

away from highly vulnerable rural areas. With the outbreak of civil war, the Colombian economy

entered a period of declining power that was initiated by the political instability and growing

rural unemployment. Added to the displacing effects of industrialization, both in the urban

3 Castao, Juanita, La Legislacin Migratoria Colombiana y Andina: Un Marco Necesario para el Estudio de la Migracin entre stos Pases, Migracin de Colombianos a Venezuela, ed. Ramiro Cardona Gutierrez, et al. (Bogot: Editorial Carrera, 1983) 74.

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economy and in the agricultural sector, these factors created the conditions for larger migrations

out of rural regions in Colombia.4

As former campesinos became landless and jobless, people looked to escape the growing

unrest and economic downturn through migration to more populous centers within the country,

but also through emigration, especially to Venezuela and the US, as well as to Ecuador, Panama

and Peru in smaller numbers. Small groups of skilled workers and technicians left for Venezuela

as well in the 1970s to take advantage of higher pay in the neighboring country. During this time

particularly after WWIIVenezuela saw a sudden increase in immigration that made it and

Argentina the two largest destinations for migrants moving to South America, especially those

originating in Europe. These European immigrants came largely from Mediterranean countries,

in particular, Spain, Italy and Portugal, though smaller groups came from other Western and

Eastern European nations. Before this period, it should be noted, Colombian immigration

represented the largest group of people entering the country. In the 1960s however, European

immigration lost much of its momentum, and many Europeans that had settled in Venezuela

packed their belongings and returned to their home countries due to political instability in the

country, but also because of economic growth back home.

In the decade of the 1970s, immigration in Venezuela reached its highest point, as an

increasing number of immigrants from Venezuelas brother country were joined by flows from

South America and the Caribbean. These movements were constituted by a large number of men

in search of work in Venezuelas growing urban sectors.5 However, even when migration flows

from Colombia lost momentum in the 1980s, due largely to deteriorating economic conditions in

4 Pellegrino, Adela, Historia de la Inmigracin en Venezuela, Siglos XIX y XX (Caracas: ANCE, 1989). 5 Pellegrino (1985), 1-2.

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Venezuela, many Colombian immigrants opted to remain in their new country of residence due

to a rise in unemployment next door and the devaluation of the Colombian peso.6

The growth in overall immigration to Venezuela in the 1970s from Colombia and

elsewhere in South America, and the Caribbeanwas due to two major economic factors. The

first was the renewed strength of the Venezuelan economy added to the stability of its

currencywhich was due largely to OPECs strategy of increasing oil prices, in 1973. The

upsurge in oil prices created a newfound source of public spending, thanks to artificially-high oil

profits and heavy borrowing. This spending translated into significant economic expansion and

the creation of new employment opportunities in the country.7 Further, faced with acute labor

shortage, the government proceeded to address the issue by looking past its borders for sources

of labor both skilled and unskilled. At the same time, government efforts to attract immigrant

workers to the country through newly established legal channels were largely ineffective. That is,

while the Venezuelan government had setup a program to attract skilled workers from South

America and Europe, most immigrants came to Venezuela on their own means. In fact, the

overwhelming majority of skilled workers applied to consulates in their home countries, ignoring

the legal mechanisms established through the new program that sought to attract skilled workers.

Immigrants from the southern cone countries, in particular, sought to escape military regimes at

home, while other Latin American immigrants faced stagnant economies and high rates of

unemployment.8 However, this period of economic bonanza was rather short-lived. Between

1979 and 1980, the countrys economy took a sharp turn for the worse. The signs of this

6 Ibid, 33. 7 Ibid, 29. 8 Bidegain, Gabriel, Inmigrantes: Mito o Realidad?, Revista sobre Relaciones Industriales y Laborales, 18 (1986): 17.

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downturn were increasing inflation, deteriorating social services, and worsening levels of

unemployment, as well as an overall decrease in private and public spending.

Faced with ineffective economic policies that sought to rescue the country from further

economic depression, in 1980 the government of Lus Herrera Campns instated an amnesty for

undocumented immigrants residing in the country. The unprecedented scope of this amnesty

made it the first of its kind in the countrys history, though smaller amnesty programs had been

instated before. Further, practically everybody who applied for the amnesty was successfully

registered and, in the process, their previously irregular situation was regularized. That is, the

overwhelming majority of these undocumented immigrants were granted a temporary

identification card that lasted for a period of one year and that was open to renewal. At first sight,

the implementation of the MGE may be seen as a conscientious step on the governments behalf

to right the situation of thousands of undocumented immigrants. Despite its veneer of

benevolence, however, the particular context within which it was implemented points to a

different role for the amnesty program.

As will be argued in this paper, the role of the 1980 MGE was to displace the blame for

the economic downturn onto the countrys sizable undocumented population. The media- and

government-sponsored campaign to stigmatize undocumented immigration blamed this group of

people for the increasing social services deficit, worsening levels of unemployment, and a

general importation of underdevelopment. However, figures published in the media and stated

by government officials concerning the size of the undocumented population were essentially

disproved by the sobering results of the MGE. While running estimates over the size of this

group were as high as 4 million people, the number of applicants for the MGE failed to reach

300,000 people.

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This begs the following questions. How is opposition to Colombian immigration in 1980

Venezuela informed by the end of the "economic bonanza" of the 1970s? Moreover, how was

opposition to Colombian immigration formulated in the public sphere during this time? In order

to answer these questions, I will look closely at immigration discourse in government and in the

media around the time of the 1980 MGE. In particular, I will consider the various ways through

which this opposition was formulated, focusing on the role of territorial sovereignty specifically

within the context of the ongoing diferendo, a dispute between the governments of Colombia

and Venezuela over territorial waters in the oil-rich region of the Gulf of Venezuelaand

economic development within the discussion of undocumented immigration. Before we may

proceed with this, however, it will be necessary to develop a description of the particular

political and economic context within which the Colombian immigrant in Venezuela became a

pivotal actor. The ongoing project of economic development which informs the question of

territorial sovereignty, among othersis central to the formulation of opposition to Colombian

immigration in Venezuela. The questions this paper will address, moreover, are not only relevant

to the current Venezuelan political situation, they offer important contributions to the

immigration literature as whole.

The issue of undocumented immigration in Venezuela has garnered considerable

discussion within the immigration literature of the 1970s and 1980s. Most of this literature is

sociological in nature, though there have been some anthropological and historical approaches to

the subject. However, within this literature the issue of opposition to Colombian immigration in

Venezuela was generally considered as a secondary topic. Thus, there exist few elaborated

discussions on the particular factors whether economic, historical, or geopoliticalthat inform

the subject. Moreover, I was unable to find any one source that devoted itself fully to the topic of

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opposition to Colombian immigration, particularly surrounding the 1980 MGE. Several

academic sources that did emphasize the effects of economic factors on opposition to Colombian

immigration even endorsed the very ascriptions of crime, disease epidemics, unemployment, and

other sources of stigmatization published in the press and voiced by government officials at the

time. Therefore, I hope to illuminate on the particular context within which such sources of

opposition to Colombian immigration were formulated, placing a particular emphasis on the

economic and political factors that inform the issue.

This paper is divided into three sections. The first section seeks to provide the economic

and political context within which Colombian immigration played a pivotal role. In this section, I

will elaborate on the contemporary economies of Colombia and Venezuela, highlighting the

effects the countries economies had on the sudden increase in Colombian migration to

Venezuela in the 1970s. These migrations took place during a period of considerable policy

planning that sought to define the role of immigration within a general program for economic

development. As we shall see, economic actors in Venezuela actively stimulated Colombian

immigration to the country through various means. These efforts to attract immigration were

quite successful, and they aimed to create a sustainable base of cheap labor for the Venezuelan

economy. While these objectives were seen as essential for the economic development of the

nation, the role of undocumented immigration changed drastically at the end of the decade,

particularly in the face of a sharp economic downturn. At that time, deportations came to be seen

as a solution to economic problems posed by undocumented immigration.

The second section of the paper discusses the demographic and socioeconomic

characteristics of Colombian immigration. Most of this discussion will be based on the evidence

presented by sociologists working with the topic of immigration in Venezuela. In the same

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section, I will elaborate on the meaning of the undocumented immigrant in Venezuela. In

particular, I will show that not only was undocumented immigration considered to be

problematic for the countrys economy, but, at the same time, Colombian immigration was

described as largely undocumented. This contributed to a process of stigmatizing redefinition of

Colombian immigration as largely undocumented. That is, while most of the undocumented

immigrants applying for the 1980 MGE were Colombian, the size of the legally-resident

Colombian population was actually larger if only slightlyin comparison. Through this process

of redefinition, the problems associated with undocumented immigration however unfounded

they may have beenwere essentially ascribed to Colombian immigration as a whole.

The third and final section of this paper will discuss the general implications of the 1980

Matrcula General de Extranjeros and, in particular, the discussion of Colombian immigration in

government and in the media at the time. The purposes of the 1980 MGE were largely defined by

opposition to Colombian immigration. Thus, the press reported statements by government

officials that stigmatized undocumented immigration by blaming these flows for the economic

downturn of the late 1970s. Further, undocumented Colombian immigration was seen as a threat

to territorial sovereignty, a subject which was closely tied to the securing of the same oil

resources that had fueled the economic boom of the 1970s. Ultimately, the magnitude of these

problems was widened by overestimations of the size of undocumented immigration published in

the press and voiced by government officials.

The discussion of immigration in the media and in government represents an influential

forum through which public opinion on the subject of immigration especially undocumented

immigrationis elaborated. In his study on the Influence of the Press on Public Opinion

concerning Immigration, van Roy (1983: 368) states that within a democratic system,

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government has to confront and compete in the formation and capture of public opinion

mainly with those who, like the mass media, have the easiest and most direct reach over that

opinion. While this assertion may be true, government statements concerning immigration and

those made by the press around the time of the 1980 MGE did not differ too strongly on their

treatment of undocumented immigration. Moreover, not surprisingly articles in the press often

cited extracts of statements by government officials concerning undocumented immigration.

Therefore, most of the official statements on immigration cited in this paper come from sources

in the Venezuelan press.

Van Roys study found that between 1977 and 1980 discussion of immigration in the

press editorials of two popular newspapers increased with time. Though this trend was not

uniform for the period in question, the author notes that the discussion of immigration was most

frequent around the time of the 1980 MGE, between the last quarter of 1979 and through 1980.

Most importantly, we know that the total circulation for the nations four largest newspapers

reached 800,000 people, around 1983. Evidently, newspapers in Venezuela have a broad and

captive audience, and it can be said that their discussion of immigration is an important source of

public opinion concerning the topic. The thrust of this paper, therefore, will be its consideration

of this discussion within the context of opposition to Colombian immigration.

Most of my newspaper sources were gathered during research in Caracas, over a period

of two to three weeks.9 I have translated all of these sources into English. I will be discussing

mostly newspaper articles from 1980 and before, though I gathered sources for other periods as

well. The overwhelming majority of my newspaper sources were taken from the pages of El

Nacional, which circulates throughout the country and competes with another major newspaper,

9 A list of the newspaper articles cited in this paper is available under Appendix A.

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El Universal, for national readership. A few of my newspaper sources will also come from a

work on undocumented immigration written by Alcides Gmez Jimnez and Luz Marina Daz

Mesa, which is titled The Modern-day Slavery: Undocumented Immigrants in Venezuela

(1983). In this work, the authors catalogued a considerable number of newspaper sources

between 1979 and 1980 that discussed the subjects of xenophobia, chauvinism, and others in

response to undocumented Colombian immigration in Venezuela.

This paper is essentially a case study of the public perception of undocumented

immigration in Venezuela. Therefore, I will be considering sources that relate mostly to

immigration in Venezuela. Many of these sources are in Spanish, and I have translated excerpts

cited in this paper where necessary. Although the general purpose of this paper is to provide a

case study of undocumented immigration, I hope to contribute not only to the Venezuelan and

Colombian immigration literature, but also to the general literature on international migrations.

Again, most of my sources are not only sociological in nature, but pertain to the topic of

immigration as it applies to the Venezuelan and Colombian contexts. Furthermore, most of these

sources are dated in the 1980s, and only one comes from the 1990s. This is a result of the relative

obscurity of the topic, and it is largely confined to discussion around the time of the 1980 MGE,

and the half decade or so that followed. For this reason, I hope to offer new interpretations of this

dated discussion of undocumented immigration in Venezuela.

I. Colombian Immigration and the Period of Economic Bonanza

The Economic Bonanza of the 1970s

Beginning in 1973, the Venezuelan economy entered a period of economic bonanza

that was due partly to an upsurge in the prices of hydrocarbon and iron exports. That same year

the OPEC cartel implemented a policy of increasing oil prices that benefited its exporting

members. As an OPEC member country, Venezuela profited considerably from the hike in oil

prices. Further, Venezuela was in an advantageous position given the countrys role as the

number one exporter of oil in the western hemisphere. The higher oil prices thus brought in new

financial resources for the country, which allowed it to accelerate its programs in search of

economic and social development.1 As a result of this newfound source of national income, the

country saw a resurgence of immigration flows from the region that now included groups of

people from Chile, Argentina, Ecuador, Dominican Republic, Peru and Uruguay.2 Colombian

and Portuguese immigration, which had been steady before this period, also saw a reinvigoration

of their flows. Part of this renewed source of immigration, particularly the increase in Portuguese

and the new Southern Cone immigrants, was a result of government policies that sought to attract

skilled labor to the country. Indeed, immigration hit a high point during this period of positive

economic performance and the active segment of the foreign-born population doubled, going

from 325,755 to 632,702 between 1971 and 1981.3 To understand the considerable rise in

immigration flows, then, it is important that we take a closer look at the Venezuelan economy of

the 1970s.

1 Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 112. 2 Ibid, 60. 3 Pellegrino, Adela, Los Indocumentados en la Inmigracin Colombiana en Venezuela, Revista sobre Relaciones Industriales y Laborales 18 (1986): 51.

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The Venezuelan economy of the 1970s

Between 1972 and 1977, per-capita income in the country nearly tripled.4 Investments in

the country, both in the public and private sectors, increased 45% between 1974 and 1978.

Capital in agriculture, mining, industry, and construction increased every year through 1978. The

manufacturing sector, in particular, saw considerable growth. Out of 654 new projects, 71%

corresponded to new firms that had been founded during this period. Construction alone saw a

ten percent annual growth rate during this period. Indeed, as a result of high growth rates across

all economic sectors in the country, Venezuela found itself in a period of economic bonanza.5

The overwhelming effects of this bonanza the fact that it affected all sectors of the economy

simultaneouslygave rise to a high demand for labor that could not be fulfilled by the native

population. As Berglund and Hernndez (1985: 115) put it, native labor was not sufficient with

respect to capacity and technical experience. As a result, the country decided to turn to sources

of labor beyond its borders to fulfill this shortage. Moreover, as Bidegain (1986: 17) has pointed

out, much of Latin America at this time was experiencing economic and social crisis and in

some [countries] coups had taken place, all of which furthermore facilitated political and highly

qualified immigration. However, this high point in the Venezuelan economy was to be rather

short-lived. The subsequent fall of the economy came just before the end of the 1970s, some five

years after the launch of this fecund period of economic production.

Berglund and Hernndez (1985: 131) state that during the period 1980-1984, the country

experienced a radical change in the behavior and performance of the economy, since from a

situation of general bonanza it passes to the opposite extreme. Samper, et al (1981: 33) argue

4 In fact, it went from Bs. 1,072 to 3,180. At the time, the exchange rate was about Bs. 4.5 to the dollar, which would translate the latter figure into roughly $707. 5 Figures cited from Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 112-5, and Pellegrino (1986), 44.

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that, due to an excess in public spending, the economy became overheated. As a result, private

investment began to drop. Signs of this economic decline had begun to appear in 1979, when

many sectors of the economy and particularly economic investments experienced a drop from the

general state of economic resurgence. At the same time, the government faced staggering debt, in

the figure of $6.175 billion. This led to a decrease in protectionist policies, the devaluing of the

currency and tightening spending limits, all of which created a climate of uncertainty.

Unemployment nearly doubled between 1978 and 1980, going from an all-time low of 4.3

percent to 7.3 percent. Tellingly, overall trade between Venezuela and Colombia dropped

considerably between the first semesters of 1979 and 1980. In fact, the trade balance between the

two countries went from a surplus of $189 million, to a deficit of $21.7 million. In 1983, then,

the abrupt economic changes effectuated a so-called economic crisis that practically broke

with the high economic performance that had characterized the previous decade.6

Concomitantly, official immigration from Colombia became negative in 1979, as more

Colombians left than entered the country. However, it should be noted that despite the steady

economic decline of the early 1980s, Colombian immigration continued to enter the country due

mostly to a parallel rise in unemployment in Colombia and the devaluation of the Colombian

peso.7

In 1979 Venezuelan immigration policy took a stringent turn. Deportations became more

frequent and the government tried to suppress flows from the Andes (primarily Colombia) and

the Caribbean.8 Coming at the end of a decade of economic bonanza, these restrictive

immigration policies reflected the close relationship between immigration and the Venezuelan

6 Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 131. 7 Pellegrino (1986), 54. 8 Bidegain (1986), 20.

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economy, especially seeing as immigration had brought in rather large flows in the earlier,

economically-productive period of the 1970s. Within the context of an abrupt downturn in the

economy, the media and government began to use undocumented immigration as a scapegoat for

Venezuelas economic woes.9 In 1980 the Venezuelan government unrolled the MGE as a

political solution to the economic implications of the presence of a large, cheap source of labor

that could competitively displace Venezuelan workers. Indeed, as Berglund and Hernndez

(1985: 136) have speculated,

it would be lamentable and dangerous, with regards to xenophobia, if unemployed [Venezuelans] saw their possibilities reduced, or if they would be substituted by non-national labor that enters the country in an uncontrolled manner, attracted by the existence of new opportunities. Whether the Venezuelan government implemented the 1980 MGE to prevent a worsening of

unemployment levels, and particularly the displacement of Venezuelan workers, remains to be

seen. The motives behind the 1980 MGE, however, may be elucidated through a closer look at

the policies implemented during the period of economic bonanza.

The New Model for Economic Development

Implemented under President Rafael Calder (1969-74), the Fourth Plan of the Nation

1970-4 an outline of the national goals of the executive officecalled for selective immigration

policies that did not compromise the employment opportunities of Venezuelans. As stated within

the plan,

unskilled workers hinder, if not completely outdo, any effort to solve the present occupational problem. The increase of this type of immigrants normally translates into a displacement of national labor and generally results in a significant deterioration of the level of real salaries, which definitively accentuates unemployment and underemployment.10

9 Samper P., E. et al., No a Venezuela (Bogot: ANIF, 1981), 35; Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 135. 10 Pellegrino (1989), 244.

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This opposition to undocumented immigration had been elaborated before, in 1970. That year,

the Department of Labor presented a speech on The Policy of Selective Immigration at the

First National Convention for Employment, highlighting the challenges posed by mass

immigration and, contrastively, the advantages of selective immigration. Selective immigration

policies selected for qualified immigrants, or skilled workers, shunning open-door policies that

attracted mass immigration. Put simply, Venezuela would decide on policies that determine

how many and which [immigrants] we need for its economic development.11 The Secretary of

the department considered undocumented Colombian immigration a grave concern that should

be addressed within the framework of a concrete, national labor policy. This led to a rejection of

immigration agreements with Colombia, favoring instead unilateral, but decisive national

policy.12 These convictions against undocumented immigration were closely tied to the poor

economic situation in the country at the time.

In 1973, however, economic expansion knocked on the door and, faced with acute labor

shortages the government responded with a new and vigorous plan for selective immigration. By

the following year, under President Carlos Andrs Prez, the country had entered a period of

unforeseen economic productivity fueled by a sudden rise in oil prices. In order to attract much-

needed skilled labor to the country, Prez reintroduced immigration policies that called for the

recruitment of immigrants from Europe and a select group of Latin American countries. While in

Europe these efforts were mostly unsuccessful, in the Southern Cone countries they were met

with a willing and professional work force looking to escape the political situation in their home

countries. Further, while the initial implementation of the new selective immigration program

11 Inmigracin Si, pero Selectiva, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Dec. 27. 12 Chen, Chi-Yi, et al., Los Movimientos Migratorios Internacionales en Venezuela: Politicas y Realidades, Revista sobre Relaciones Industriales y Laborales (Caracas: UCV, 1982), 22-3.

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took place during a high point in the period of economic bonanza of the 1970s, coinciding with

this apogee was a boom in immigration from South America as a whole. In fact, South American

immigration flows more than doubled in size during this year, in comparison to the first year of

the decade of the 1970s.13

In 1976, the Fifth Plan of the Nation called for the implementation of a new program for

economic development. This program called for one million new workers over the following

four years. Fifty percent of these workers were to be brought in from oversees. These alternative

sources for economic expansion were thought to be necessary for the attraction of new sources of

economic investment. Concerning this, Didonet (1983: 426) states that

not only in the government but also in the institutions that represented the [countrys] capital and employment sources, [was] a strong conviction that the country should reopen itself to immigration or face the consequences of shortcutting the new possibilities for development created by Venezuelas condition as an oil country. These skilled workers would be directed to basic industries controlled by the state, for example,

such as petroleum, petrochemicals, iron and electrification.14 These recruitments were made

possible by the founding of several government entities in charge of the new policies for

selective immigration.

To fulfill these recruitment goals, the government created the Human Resources Program

and established the Tripartite Committee for Selective Immigration, which was constituted by

Fedecmaras, the CTV the countrys largest workers unionand the government. Recruitment

of the necessary foreign workers was to be carried out under the Human Resources program. In

particular, this program which was responsible for handling the petitions for workers submitted

13 Berglund and Hernndez (1985), 116. 14 Schloeter, et al., Selective Latin American migration in Venezuela: the Case of Sidor, White Collar Migrants in the Americas and the Caribbean, ed. Arnaud, A.F., and Vessuri, H.M.C. (Leiden: Royal Institute of Linguistics and Anthropology, 1983) 212.

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by the various entities in the countrys economic sector. The DIEX, the countrys immigration

office, was to take charge of visa processing and to ensure that the nations security standards

were fulfilled throughout the programs implementation. Finally, the CIME was to take charge of

the recruitment process in Europe.

From 1973 on, the CIME the Intergovernmental Committee for European Migrations

handled settlement, funding, and the general coordination of the entry of European immigrants.15

This was the same entity that had controlled the logistics for the largely European immigration of

the 1950s. The CIME had been founded in Brussels in 1951, and was largely a result of US

backing. The entity took charge of oversight of the then lively European emigration process,

including placement, finance, and transportation means.16 However, Venezuela had suspended

the local functions of this entity in 1966, when the country withdrew from the committee

following the end of the era of European immigration.

However, despite the hopeful planning that went into effect, the goals of the program

were poorly met: between 1977 and 1980, only 18,400 qualified foreign workers were brought

into the country through the newly established legal channels. On the contrary, many more

immigrants entered the country through legal means that made no recourse to the Human

Resources program. Between 1970 and 1979, the DIEX processed a total of 246,944 visas for

foreigners coming to Venezuela. Moreover, as Chen, Chi-Yi, et al (1982: 24) have noted,

alongside the recruitment of skilled professionals came a large group of unskilled workers that

filled numerous industrial and agricultural positions. Thus, though the explicit goals of the new

15 Pellegrino (1986), 30. 16 Venezuela Decidi Retirarse de Comit Intergubernamental para Migraciones Europeas, El Nacional [Caracas], 1966, Oct. 9.

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plan for immigration called for skilled workers, provisions for the entry of unskilled workers

were included within this plan, though in a less formal manner.

Interestingly, in 1976 Fedecmaras the nations largest business conglomerate

announced that included within the new plan for selective immigration was the possibility of

immigration programs to bring in unskilled labor.17 On the one hand, we might assume that the

potential need for unskilled labor was the result of labor shortages addressed by the plan. On the

other hand, another possibility is that the nations preeminent business conglomerate was looking

for sources of cheap labor outside of the countrys borders. Indeed, the unofficial economic

strategies that took advantage of mass undocumented immigration in the country operated along

similar lines, and knowledge of their widespread implementation was known to the public by the

1980s. As we shall see, undocumented Colombian immigration occupied a vulnerable space

within the new model for economic development. These flows were exploited for their size and

promise of cheap labor. Moreover, they fulfilled a real need for experienced workers in the

stagnant agricultural sector. Therefore, their undocumented flows were not only condoned, they

were encouraged by powerful actors in the economic sector. For many unemployed rural workers

in Colombia, then, the promise of paid work across the border was a prospect that stood within

their grasp.

Colombian Immigration and the New Model for Economic Development

Powerful economic actors in Venezuela looked to secure a sustainable source of cheap

labor by attracting undocumented Colombian immigration. However, Colombian workers also

provided much-needed labor for the stagnant agricultural sector. Given decreasing wages and a

17 Bolsa de Trabajo para Inmigraciones Selectivas Propuesta en Fedecmaras, El Nacional [Caracas], 1976, Sep. 12.

20

largely landless and unemployed peasant community in Colombia, these immigrants were

willing to take positions in better-paid, readily available agricultural work in Venezuela. Of

course, undocumented Colombian immigration was not merely a response to the attractive

economic surplus in the Venezuela of the 1970s. On the one hand, as I have already stated, local

actors in the Venezuelan economic sector could and did solicit Colombian workers through

extra-legal channels. On the other hand, Colombian immigration to Venezuela date to the very

inception of the Republic of Venezuela. Therefore, the reasons for Colombian immigration to

Venezuela included both economic and historical factors. Further, while immigrants made the

final choice whether to migrate or not to Venezuela, mechanisms for their recruitment as well

as the social networks that often supported their journeywere already in place. In particular,

the mechanisms for the enganche, or hooking, of Colombian agricultural workers were well-

established processes that operated along the Colombo-Venezuelan border. Contrary to

government and media statements that blamed the deteriorating economic situation on

undocumented immigration, undocumented Colombian immigrants were in fact considered

essential to the economic model of the country.

Colombian Immigration as a Source of Cheap Labor

In an interview with the newspaper El Nacional, Efrn Lopez de Corral, the general

director of the countrys central immigration office, the DIEX, noted that some Venezuelan

employers might discourage their workers from registering in the 1980 MGE.18 As noted in the

interview, many would complain that once workers statuses were regularized, they would likely

leave their current employer in search of better-paying employers. Others argued that once

documented, their workers would demand higher pay. Moreover, as is already known, in order 18 Visa de Transente y Cdula de Identidad a Extranjeros que se Hayan Registrado, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Nov. 4.

21

to maintain a source of labor with very low pay, some employers turn in their employees before

disbursement of their salaries, and in response to, we might assume, pleas for salary increases.

Interestingly, just a month later another article in the same newspaper reported that while

officials in government were concerned about the economic effects of mass expulsions that

would theoretically follow the 1980 MGE, landowners were eagerly expectant of the new waves

of undocumented immigrants resulting from a new shortage of cheap labor.19 Quoted in the

article were the governor of Tchira, the major-entry point for migration flows from Colombia,

and the secretary of Zulia, another important western state within the context of Colombian

immigration. These officials stated that,

this immigration flow of Colombians is not only useful, but indispensable, especially seeing as Colombians accept work in agriculture and ranching, something Venezuelans do not do.

However, despite the fact that Colombian immigration was an integral part of the Venezuelan

economy of the 1970s, officials in government often argued that the low, competitive wages

accorded this group lead to an increase in the countrys unemployment levels by displacing

better-paid Venezuelan workers.

In fact, one newspaper article in early 1980 quoted the denouncements of the Federation

of Workers of the state of Carabobo, a powerful industrial center for the country, which alleged

that in at least one case, payments had been made to facilitate the employment of undocumented

workers.20 Fetracarabobo, as the federations initials are spelled, accused an anonymous union

leader of managing these transactions. Quoting the secretary general of the workers federation,

contractors in the region throw out Venezuelan workers in order to [replace them with]

foreigners that are recommended by the union, whose members allegedly receive commissions. 19 Tensa Expectativa en Colombia y Honda Preocupacin en Venezuela, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Dec. 4. 20 En 60 Das Censo de Indocumentados, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Feb. 12.

22

These accusations, then, posit a direct connection between the active efforts of local economic

actors to recruit cheap labor and the effects of undocumented immigration with regards to

unemployment. The frequency of such practices, however, is unknown. Despite this uncertainty,

reports of the displacement of Venezuelan workers by poorly-paid undocumented workers

contributed to the stigmatization of undocumented immigrants. More likely, undocumented

workers filled vacant positions in the agricultural sector, and less so in urban industries.

Moreover, in order to understand the willingness of these Colombian workers to emigrate to

Venezuela, we shall take a look at the condition of the Colombian economy in the 1970s.

The Colombian Economy of the 1970s and Emigration to Venezuela

As a result of the era of la violencia in the 1950s and the concomitant trend in

decampesinization, throughout the 1950s and 1960s Colombian campesinos became

increasingly landless while the few that were able to hold on to their lands faced growing poverty

and damaged harvests.21 At the same time, the economy suffered significant overall losses. These

factors, argues Pellegrino (1989), are the principal reasons for the mass migration flows of

Colombians to Venezuela, and abroad, that took off starting in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

Pellegrino cites figures that illustrate the major losses in rural land ownership. While in 1950,

270,000 hectares of land were cultivated through industrial methods, by 1970, 2,700,000

hectares out of a total of 4,200,000 hectares of agricultural landshad joined the trend in

industrial agriculture. In terms of monetary value, this industrial sector controlled 70 percent of

overall production in agriculture. Thus, in 1960 campesino landowners who comprised 58

percent of the countrys landownerscontrolled 3.6 percent of the agricultural lands in

Colombia. Conversely, large landowners who comprised 1.7 percent of the landowners

21 Pellegrino (1989) 263. Much of the data in this section were cited from Pellegrino (1989: 263-8).

23

controlled 55 percent of the agricultural lands. The new trend, then, was characteristic of the

growing stake in agriculture commanded by large landowners. As Pellegrino has noted, the

growing concentration of agricultural lands under a decreasing number of landowners

exacerbated unemployment levels in the country. In fact, with the industrialization of agriculture

not only did campesinos become increasingly landless, but mechanization of agricultural

decreased the need for manual labor. Throughout the 1960s, unemployment rates increased

steadily. High rates of unemployment held steady in the 1970s.

Starting in the 1960s, then, the Colombian economy underwent a strong movement

towards industrialization. Imports gave way to manufacturing exports, a process which

encouraged foreign investment in manufacturing. At the same time, rural-urban migrations grew

significantly, as unemployed rural workers migrated to the countrys metropolitan centers in

search of better employment opportunities. In fact, industrial employment grew significantly in

the 1970s. Over the first three years of the 1970s, more employment opportunities were created

within this rapidly growing sector than were during the entire previous decade. From these

figures, it is not hard to imagine how already-mobilized rural populations that had migrated to

their countrys urban centers saw the employment opportunities created by the booming

economy next door. Further, due to a depopulation of frontier regions in Venezuela, landless,

unemployed rural Colombians stepped in to fill labor shortages in the growing agricultural and

ranching industries of that country.

Owing to the nature of these movements, Pellegrino (1989: 267) has termed this trend in

migrations to the border regions in Venezuela a border regionalization of the labor market.

That is, Colombian immigrants originally went mostly from rural and border regions in

Colombia, to border regions in Venezuela. Their geographic distribution in Venezuela was in

24

fact confirmed by the 1980 MGE, which showed that more than two-thirds seventy-three

percent, to be exactof Colombians that had registered resided in border regions. Over time,

however, Colombian immigration to Venezuela shed its largely rural characteristics, as these

flows were joined by a large contingent of Colombians from urban areas. This shift in the origin

of migration flows may have been a result of the sizable rural-urban migrations of the 1960s.

That is, faced with rising unemployment rates particularly in urban areasits possible that

previously rural Colombians decided to try their luck in the Venezuelan economy. In fact,

Pellegrino (1989: 330) reports a rather diverse geographic representation amongst deported

Colombian immigrants, as evidenced in a group of surveys carried out following deportation.

However, the economic trends delineated in this section illustrate only one part of the

larger picture. Another crucial factor in the discussion of Colombian migration flows to

Venezuela is the active recruitment of Colombian immigrants by economic actors many of

them landowners, but also business entitieson the Venezuelan side of the border. As I have

stated before, the purposes of these actors were to contract largely undocumented workers that

not only helped keep wages down, but filled vacant positions in the growing agricultural and

ranching sectors, and particularly in the agro-industrial sector of the economy. The position of

these undocumented workers, then, was a highly vulnerable one that left them open to economic

exploitation. In fact, these undocumented workers were actively recruited by Venezuelan

companies in search of a cheap and willing source of labor.

Securing an Undocumented Colombian Workforce

In their chapter on the Entry of Colombians for the Sugar-Cane Harvest in Venezuela,

Daz & Gmez (1983: 106) published their findings on the nature of the enganche, or hooking

in, of Colombian immigrants. Most of their data was based on interviews with human-

25

traffickers and business leaders in Venezuela. The authors concluded that while the mechanisms

for legal entry allowed businesses to petition for workers, it was in the workers and employers

interests to subvert these mechanisms and reach arrangements in a more direct manner. As

Daz & Gmez explained, this gave workers greater liberty in switching between employers,

especially given the fact that many of them were seasonal migrants. Further, the authors reported

that businesses made general recourse to bribes paid to authorities patrolling the Venezuelan

border in order to import undocumented Colombian workers. Many Colombians, they said,

secured entry into Venezuela through the same means.

As the authors have explained, businesses generally recruited Colombian workers

through middlemen that traveled personally to specific regions in Colombia in search of willing

seasonal workers. The targeted regions included: Valle del Cauca (including Choc, to the north,

and Nario, to the south), in southwestern Colombia; Boyac, which borders on Venezuela in the

northeast; and Puerto Santander, located just north of Ccuta, the main entry-point for

Colombian immigrants entering Venezuela. A third of these Colombians were recruited from the

Valle del Cauca region, which includes regions north and south of the state.

Active efforts to recruit Colombian workers from within Colombia originated in the mid-

1970s. According to the manager of a large agricultural services firm,

starting in 1975, [the country] suffered from a general labor shortage, and enganches began to take place in Valle del Cauca tailors, lawyers, technicians came, and 60 percent were sugar-cane workers.22 While the interviewee claimed to have submitted the necessary paperwork in order to bring these

workers into Venezuela, extralegal alternatives prevailed in the recruitment process. Further, one

interviewee commented on the economic considerations involved in the recruitment process. In 22 Daz, Luz M. and Gmez, Alcides, La Moderna Esclavitud: Los Indocumentados en Venezuela, (Bogot: Oveja Negra, 1986) 108.

26

particular, one company opted to recruit Colombian workers from contractors working within

Venezuela, particularly because this outsourcing strategy saved the company time and money.

These contractors were said to have recruited Colombian workers leaving other agricultural

companies or migrating into Venezuela on their own.

Explained the Chief Engineer of Cane Harvest of the Central Azucarero Carora that,

the majority of those that leave [us] go to the center of the country. Despite the desertions [the company] has the good fortune of a prolonged harvest many sugar-cane workers come our way. I want to say that Central Carora will not be returning to Colombia to make enganches; its far easier and more economic to contact contractors that supply Colombians that are already in Venezuela everyone knows that close to Puerto Santander is El Chivo, a Colombian colony. You pay a fee that varies between 200 and 600 Bs. and you can get to the front door of [the company] without any problems.23 The interviewee reported that when the company handled the recruitment process, the cost per

worker came to be Bs. 366, which apparently included Bs. 15 a day for basic necessities. The trip

lasted 28 hours, from Cali to Ccuta, and the workers were generally recruited through radio

announcements. Further, desertion was a common concern for companies and landowners that

relied on recruited workers for their harvest. Thus, guards were often employed to ensure

workers commitment to the company. That is, in the event that a worker decided to desert his

company, the guards could release detailed information, including workers documents and

pictures, to the necessary authorities, asking that the workers be deported at first sight. These

desertions were termed sonsaques, or wheedling outs of migrant workers. Daz & Gmez

explained that the frequency of desertions was due the difficult working and living conditions of

migrant workers in Venezuela.

Many Colombian workers were recruited in the northern part of Boyac. Daz & Gmez

(1983: 109) inform that since the mid-1970s, this region has figured prominently in the

23 Ibid, 108-9.

27

recruitment drives from Venezuela. Recruited workers from this region move on to work in

sugar-cane plantations, coffee plantations in Tchira, ranching in Zulia and in agro-industry in

Portuguesa, further east, as well in domestic service in the countrys urban centers. However,

many Colombians opted for passage on their own through the infamous green paths caminos

verdes, or paths cutting across unsettled parts of the borderalong the Colombo-Venezuelan

border. Ccuta and Maicao were the two main entry points for many immigrants from Colombia

and abroad. However, those that opted for a less conspicuous passing often crossed at other

points, including Puerto de Santander. From this point, many immigrants proceeded to

Coloncito, in the Venezuelan state of Tchira, where 4 in every 10 migrant workers were

recruited, according to Daz and Gmez. Many of these immigrants fell prey to the whims of

human-traffickers.

Reading through the interviews with human-traffickers, the reader can note several

important facts related to their work. Like in the recruitment drives carried out by Venezuelan

companies, these human-traffickers generally bribed border authorities in order to carry out their

work. Moreover, one interviewee informed that the National Guard the Venezuelan entity in

charge of border patrolwould alert these traffickers as to when they would carry out their

roundups of undocumented immigrants, always for a certain fee. This enabled traffickers to

choose potential workers from recent arrivals on the Venezuelan side. In such instances, many

undocumented immigrants simply sat and waited in or around local inns after crossing the

border. Although Daz and Gmez do not elaborate fully on the procedures of this informal

process, its presumed that human traffickers and middlemen working for Venezuelan companies

visited these inns sporadically in search of undocumented workers. Falling prey to the National

Guards roundups, then, were the leftovers, the old, the sick, and the weak amongst

28

undocumented immigrants.24 Once deported, of course, many immigrants attempted the border

crossing once again, while others settled in local colonies, or even ended up homeless.

Indeed, recruitment and enganche efforts were thriving in the 1970s. Undocumented

Colombian immigrants offered an indispensable source of cheap labor that helped fill the acute

labor shortages in the agricultural sector. Ironically, the pivotal role they played in the

Venezuelan economy lost its meaning in the face of the economic depression of the late 1970s.

Instead, these immigrants came to be seen as the main source of the countrys economic woes.

As a result, undocumented immigrants began to be deported in large numbers in 1979 and 1980.

Deporting the Immigrant Problem

The DIEXs official figures reported 168,895 immigrants deported between 1970 and

1979.25 Didonet (1983: 419) notes that seven percent of those deported to Colombia were non-

Colombian nationals. The author identifies this trend as a break from the bi-national treatment of

immigration. Instead of addressing the issue of deportations via diplomacy with the deportees

countries of origin, the Venezuelan government began to simply rid itself of its immigration

problem by deporting undocumented immigrants across the same Colombo-Venezuelan border

through which they entered. Moreover, in 1980 deportation procedures in Venezuela became

more unilateral, shunning cooperation even with the Colombian authorities. No longer would the

Colombian border police, the DAS, carry out transportation-runs between Colombia and jails on

the Venezuelan side of the border during deportations. Rather, immigration authorities in

Venezuela decided to simply release deportees at entry points along the border. This, notes

Didonet (1983), causes a distortion in the registry of the real number of deportees. However,

24 Ibid, 113. 25 Didonet, Mateo, La Inmigracin Clandestina y la Poltica Inmigratoria en Venezuela, Migraciones Latinas y Formacin de la Nacin Latinoamericana, Instituto de Altos Estudios de Amrica Latina (Caracas: Universidad Simn Bolvar, 1983): 423.

29

the step away from established deportation procedures may reflect an important change in

immigration policy. Faced with more numerous deportations, Venezuelan immigration

authorities may have decided to cease cooperation with their Colombian counterparts in order to

expedite the outflow of deportees. In fact, during this time press articles in Venezuela published

frequent reports of deportations to Colombia.

As reported that year, a noticeable increase in deportations had taken place between July

1979 and February 1980.26 Given the informal deportation methods employed in 1980, however,

it is difficult to provide exact deportation figures for the end of this period. Official figures from

the DIEX the countrys department of immigrationshowed that while almost 46,000 people

had been deported in 1977, less than 19,000 were deported the following year, and only 9,000 in

1979.27 However, Didonet (1983: 424) states that, according to local police reports, 15,000

people had been deported in the first four months of 1980. Reports of the mass deportations

taking place at this time were often accompanied by a generic shopping list of problems

associated with undocumented immigration. One report in March 1980 stated that 1,429

undocumented immigrants had been detained around the various states in the Venezuelan

Andes.28 These roundups had been carried out over a period of hardly a week, and the report

emphasized that an operation to detain these immigrants had taken place in order to diminish

the criminal incidents carried out principally by undocumented immigrants that come to these

frontier regions in order to commit their misdeeds. Further, a National Guard general involved

26 Reunin en Ccuta, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Mar. 5. 27 The large number of deportations for 1977 which were similar to figures for 1976may be a result of concerns over the sudden increase in immigration between 1974 and 1976. Selective immigration policies that sought to encourage mostly skilled workers were implemented in 1976. Further, official entries decreased annually starting in 1977. 28 Detenidos 1.429 Indocumentados en Operativo Policial Sur del Lago, El Nacional [Caracas], 1980, Mar. 4.

30

in the operation assured the reader that, given the good results obtained, we have given

precise instructions to our commands, that they reactivate and intensify such operations.

These operations had resulted in even more prodigious deportations in the previous

month. In fact, in February of that year, one report stated that 1,249 undocumented immigrants

had been deported in the last three days.29 According to another press report in January of the

same year, 7,500 undocumented immigrants had been detained at a flea market in Maracaibo,

Venezuelas second largest city. Indeed, deportations had increased significantly between the

end of 1979 and the second semester of 1980, and press reports reflected a significant increase in

overall deportations. Interestingly, surveys among Colombians deported during this period

showed that a disproportionately large number of these undocumented immigrants had been

detained in the larger urban areas of the country.

Two surveys of deportees conducted in 1980 and 1979 reflected the geographic

distribution of deported Colombian immigrants.30 The surveys were conducted by the

Department of Labor and Social Security of Colombia, and by CEPAM, a prominent entity

within immigration in Venezuela that sponsored various immigration projects and research with

the help of the Catholic Church and academics in Venezuela. One survey found that 30.5 percent

of those interviewed had been deported in the capital and central regions of the country, where

most urban and industrial centers are concentrated with the exception of the countrys second

city, Maracaibo, to the west, and Ciudad Bolvar, located in the south-eastern part of the country.

The second survey found that 27.2 percent of deportees had been detained in the same regions.

These figures compare to the 18.3 percent of undocumented immigrants that registered for the

29 La Polica de Inmigracin Deport a 1.249 Indocumentados en los ltimos Tres Das, El Universal [Caracas], 1980, Feb. 11. 30 Pellegrino, Adella, Venezuela: Illegal Immigration from Colombia, Internacional Migration Review 18, 3 (Autumn, 1984): 753.

31

1980 MGE as residing in those regions. The disparity in geographic representation between the

surveys of deportees and the applicants of the 1980 MGE may reflect an intensification of

deportation procedures in urban areas located in the central and capital regions of the country. In

fact, this pattern may be indicative of the highly metropolitan nature of concern over

undocumented immigration in the country. As has been argued previously, this concern

increased significantly as the number of immigrants moving to urban centers increased in the

1970s. It should be noted, however, that the larger number of deportees detained in the central

urban regions of the country may be a result of better-developed policing capacities in these

regions, especially in comparison to rural regions to the west. Notwithstanding, as we shall see

we in a later section, opposition to undocumented immigration was often termed from a

metropolitan perspective. Further, this urbano-centric opposition to undocumented immigration

was phrased in the language of economic development and public security.

Finally, males were overrepresented in deportations of undocumented immigrants. In

fact, among deportees registered in Ccuta an important site for entries and deportations in

Venezuelanine of every ten deportees were male. This may denote the public aspect of these

deportations. That is, while a very large number of female undocumented immigrants worked in

the services sector particularly in domestic workmales tended to work in industry and

agriculture. Concerning this, Pellegrino (1984: 750) argues that the private, domestic nature of

the work done by many female undocumented immigrants may have helped shield them from the

legal consequences of their extra-legal status.31

With the economic downturn of the late 1970s, then, deportations in Venezuela became

more frequent and informal. At the same time, government officials and the Venezuelan media

31 Pellegrino (1984): 750.

32

voiced their concerns regarding undocumented immigration and the overall burdens they posed

to economic development. The blame placed on undocumented immigrants ignored the

important position these immigrants had held within the countrys model for economic

development of the 1970s. As stated in No to Venezuela (1981: 13), when faced with

economic crisis, Venezuelan governments have chosen to use [Colombian] immigrants as

scapegoats for the political problems brought about by the economic ones. As we shall see,

opposition to Colombian immigration became most acute during the final year of the decade, and

especially around the 1980 MGE. Much of this opposition was shaped by unfounded claims in

the press that speculated over the characteristics of undocumented immigration. Undocumented

immigrants were characterized as potential threats to national sovereignty, as criminal offenders,

and even as factors of economic underdevelopment. These stigmatizations, moreover, were

compounded by estimations of the alleged, unwieldy size of this group, which were published in

the media and echoed by government officials.

II. Characteristics of Colombian Immigration

Demographic and Migratory Characteristics

The size of the Colombian population in Venezuela had been an object of heated debate

in the press and government of the 1970s and 1980s. Towards the end of the 1970s, figures for

undocumented immigration alone varied between 1.5 and 4 million people. Even in 1986, six

years after the sobering results of the 1980 MGE were made public under 300,000

undocumented immigrants registered for the 1980 MGEgovernment officials and the media

estimated that one million undocumented immigrants were residing in the country.1 According to

the MGE, about 90 percent of the undocumented immigrants that registered were Colombian.

1 Bidegain (1986), 10.

33

Taking this into consideration with the previous estimates, this would result in a figure between 1

and 3.6 million, and 900,000 undocumented Colombian immigrants, in 1980 and 1986,

respectively. However, Bidegain (1987: 45) obtains a figure of around 530,000 Colombian

immigrants more or lessresiding permanently in Venezuela in 1980. According to the

DIEXs register, in 1980, 307,148 Colombian immigrants were residing legally in the country.

Adding this figure to the MGE results, we could say that around 550,000 Colombian immigrants

were living in Venezuela in 1980. Citing various sources including census figures and scholarly

estimates, Pellegrino (1986: 33) concludes that between 478,174 and 600,000 people migrated to

the country between 1971 and 1981. Even assuming that 95 percent of these immigrants were

Colombian, we would arrive at a maximum figure of 570,000 Colombians migrating to

Venezuela during that period. However, as Pellegrino (1986) has noted, it is difficult to estimate

the total size of the Colombian population in Venezuela. Even more uncertain is the number of

the undocumented Colombian immigrants in Venezuela. Such a consideration would ultimately

rely on available poll and census data, and certainly some educated guessing. It should be noted,

however, that it would be difficult to defend estimates as large as 1 to 4 million undocumented

immigrants in Venezuela.2

In order to make comparisons between the two groups of Colombian immigrants those

that registered for the MGE being subsumed by the total Colombian populationwe will look at

figures from the 1980 MGE and the 1981 Census. From the latter we may consider the

characteristics of the total Colombian population in the country. Moreover, given that no formal

identification was required to participate in the census, Pellegrino (1986: 33) notes that it should

not be assumed that undocumented Colombians were unwilling to participate in the 1981 census.

2 Pellegrino (1986), 34.

34

266,795 people over age 9 registered successfully for the 1980 MGE. Of these, 246,194,

or 92.3 percent, were Colombian. Another 6.3 percent of those registered under the MGE came

from other Latin American nations, including South and Central American countries, as well as

Caribbean countries. Within this latter group, Ecuadorians comprised 1.8 percent of the

population, Dominicans 1.6 percent, and Peruvians 1.1 percent. European immigrants comprised

1.0 of the total population registered under the MGE.

Of the 246,000 Colombians over age 9, more than three quarters, or 76.8 percent, were

between 15 and 40 years old. In contrast, the 1981 census showed the overall age distribution of

Colombians in Venezuela to lie mainly between 15 and 54 years of age, with 81.4 percent falling

within this segment. Of the former, 16.3 percent were between 15 and 20 years old, while of the

latter, 8.2 percent were between 15 and 19 years old. These figures show undocumented

Colombian immigrants to be somewhat younger than their previously registered counterparts.

39.2 percent of women registering for the MGE claimed to have children, as did 35.2 percent of

men.

In comparison to the 1981 census, gender distributions for Colombians registering for the

MGE show some differences. For every 100 Colombian women that registered, there were 119.2

Colombian men, while under the 1981 census, 91.8 Colombians, for every 100 of their national

counterparts, were male. Amongst Colombian immigrants, the 1981 census showed that while

women tended to migrate more to the capital region, men migrated to rural areas in the border

states. Moreover, the majority of Colombians registering under the MGE were living in border

states or in those near the border with Colombia. Therefore, as Pellegrino (1986: 36) has noted

Colombian immigration is a concern of rural border-states more than it is one of urban areas.

35

Pellegrino (1986: 34) classifies Colombian immigration in Venezuela according to three

categories:

1. Immigration flows with the most permanence in the country that reside in urban areas, working mostly in industrial, business and services sectors.

2. Permanent immigration flows that migrate to border regions in the west and are employed in the agricultural and ranching sectors, but also in positions of an urban nature within these regions.

3. Seasonal immigration flows taking place during harvest time or that fulfill other temporary needs in agriculture.

These categories are closely tied to the geographic proximity of Colombia to Venezuela.

Geographic Distribution of Colombians in Venezuela3 State or District 1971 Census 1980 MGE 1981 Census Federal District and Miranda* 20.3 11.4 29.7 Aragua and Carabobo 4.0 6.9 9.9 Tchira and Zulia** 60.1 56.2 43.3 Barinas and Mrida** 7.1 17.0 7.1 Others 8.5 8.5 10.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 *Caracas is distributed across the Federal District and parts of the state of Miranda. ** Tchira, Zulia, Barinas and Mrida are all located near the border with Colombia.

Immigrants registering for the 1980 MGE represented 1.8 percent of the countrys total

population. Within the Capital region, registrants represented 1.1 percent of the local

population, within the central region 1.0 percent of the local population, and in Zulia and the

Andes to the west, 4.8 and 6.9 percent of the population, respectively. This means that a very

small number of people just over 1 percentin the capital region were undocumented before

the MGE, and within the border region that encompasses the Andean states and Zulia, the

registrants did not reach ten percent of the local population.4 Interestingly, Pellegrino (1984:

751) notes that while the Andean and coastal regions of both Colombia and Venezuela have

internal cross-border migrations, there is practically no migration from one region to another. 3 Reproduced from Pellegrino (1986), 37. 4 Van Roy, Ralph, Undocumented Migration to Venezuela, International Migration Review 18 (Autumn, 1983): 547.

36

Thus, coastal residents migrate mostly to other coastal regions, while Andean populations do so

within the Andes region. This pattern is reflected in the available data on deportations, and

Pellegrino concludes that these findings confirm that migrants tend to settle in those regions

culturally closer to their place of origin.

Socioeconomic and Occupational Characteristics

The educational level of Colombian immigrants that registered for the MGE is somewhat

lower than for the total Colombian population in Venezuela. However, Pellegrino (1986: 37)

notes that the overall educational levels of Colombians in the country are not unlike that of

Venezuelans in general.

Educational Attainment for Colombian and Venezuelan Population5 Educational Level

Colombians Venezuelans 1980 MGE* 1981 Census* 1981 Census*

Illiterate and without formal education 17.1 10.5 11.0 Primaria** 66.2 56.3 59.1 Secundaria*** 16.4 29.4 24.9 Superior 0.2 3.8 5.0 Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 *For the 1980 MGE, figures represent population aged 9 or older, for the Colombian population from the 1981 census, 5 or older, and for the Venezuelan population from the 1981 census, 7 or older. ** Primaria includes first through sixth grades (second through seventh in the U.S.). Preparatorio, which is the equivalent of first grade in the U.S., is not included within Primaria. ***Secundaria includes seventh through eleventh grades (eighth through twelfth in the U.S.).

Sixty-eight percent of those registered under the 1980 MGE were active members of the

countrys working population. This compared to 65.2 and 54 percent of previously registered

foreigners and Venezuelans, respectively. The active segment of the Colombian population is

higher in comparison to those born in Venezuela. 59.6 percent of Colombians in the country are

employed, in comparison to 46.2 percent of Venezuelans. These numbers are derived by dividing

5 Reproduced from Pellegrino (1986), 37.

37

the active population, age 12 and older, by the corresponding age group of the total population

and multiplying by one hundred. Moreover, from the 1981 census, Pellegrino (1986: 39) found

that 40.3 percent of Colombians were economically dependent, in comparison to 69.8 percent

of Venezuelans. This figure is derived by dividing the inactive segment of the population by the

total population, and multiplying by one hundred. The low levels of unemployment amongst

MGE registrants are significant, even in comparison to the overall foreign-born population.

Concerning this, van Roy (1983: 62) cites a poll among Colombian deportees wherein 72.5

percent of respondents spent 1 to 8 days searching for work once in Venezuela and then finding

employment, and 13.5 percent spent 9 days to one month in the same process. These figures

show that undocumented workers were quite successful in finding work once in Venezuela, and,

concomitantly, that there was a high degree of demand for their labor.

Occupational Groups for the Colombian Population6 Occupation

1980 MGE 1981 Census Total % Total %

Professionals and Technicians 2,232 1.22 12,346 4.07 Managers, Administrators and Functionaries 214 0.12 4,770 1.57 Office Employees and Related Occupations 2,414 1.32 17,210 5.68 Salesmen and Related Occupations 4,948 2.70 26,964 8.90 Agriculture, Ranching, Fishing 28,968 15.79 50,212 16.57 Transportation and Communications 675 0.37 6,568 2.17 Miners, Quarrymen and Related Occupations 379 0.21 422 0.14 Artisans, Factory Operators and Related Occupations 62,838 34.25 82,676 27.28 Other Artisans and Operators 30,000 16.35 71,604 23.63 Service Workers, Sports and Entertainment 43,372 23.64 26,602 8.78 Undeclared or Unidentified 7,429 4.05 3,680 1.21 Total 183,469 100.0 303,054 100.0 About seventeen percent of Colombian immigrants registering for the MGE worked in

agriculture, ranching or fishing, while more than fifty percent worked in industry. Further, if we

split the figures for the MGE by gender, 22.7 percent of Colombian men worked in agriculture,

6 Reproduced from Pellegrino (1986), 40.

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ranching or fishing, while 79 percent of the women worked in services. In fact, Pellegrino (1984:

748) reports that 50 percent of working Colombians were employed in agriculture and services,

especially domestic service in urban areas. In fact, Colombian representation in the agriculture

and services sectors exceeded that of the local population, of which 32 percent were working in

similar occupations.

Compared to the overall Colombian population in Venezuela, those registered under the

MGE had very little representation in other sectors of the economy that demanded higher

qualifications.7 Van Roy (1983: 64) suggests that this may be due partly to the difficulty of

obtaining the necessary documentation for these positions, and not so much a lack of work

experience. Further, Colombians in general and undocumented immigrants tended to replace

native agricultural labor, and the Venezuelan-born population had showed decreasing

participation in this sector in the 1961 census.8 This contrasted with the growth in the urban

sector, where construction grew 9.4 percent in the 1970s, and where the tertiary sector

essentially businesses and serviceswent from 35 percent of the active population in 1950, to

50 percent in 1980.9 Interestingly, van Roy (1983: 62) argues that, given the negligible

difference in overall occupational tendencies between previously registered Colombian

immigrants and those registering for the MGE, the regularization (i.e., the switch from

undocumented to legal status) of undocumented immigrants under the MGE does not

contradict the results of the running policy of selective immigration. That is, undocumented

Colombian immigrants were working in very similar occupations as those that had entered the

country through legal channels.

7 Pellegrino (1986), 40. 8 Ibid, 43. 9 Ibid, 44.

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According to the 1981 census figures, while there was a higher tendency for women to

migrate to the capital region, men were more likely to be found in the border states to the west of

the country. On this, Pellegrino (1986: 39) reports that 78.6 percent of women registering under

the MGE declared to be working as service workers, and many were employed as domestic

workers. Specifically, 32.4 percent of domestic workers were foreign-born women, and of these

83 percent were Colombian.10 The employment prospects of these domestic workers, in general,

were more promising than for Colombian men, especially seeing as shelter, food, and other

necessities were provided by their patrons. Concerning this, following are some monthly salary

figures earned by Colombian workers according to the most common economic sectors they

represented:11

Domestic Work (Women) Bs. 1,000-1,500 $ 250-375 Agricultural Workers and Fishing (Men) Bs. 500-1,000 $ 125-250 Construction Workers (Men) Bs. 1,500-2,000 $ 375-500 Specialized Industrial Workers (Men) Bs. 3,000-5,000 $ 750-1250 Garment Industry Workers (Women) Bs. 1,000-1,500 $ 250-375

The salaries of Colombian workers employed outside of the agricultural sector were not

unlike those accorded to the population in Venezuela as a whole. However, the salaries of

Colombian agricultural workers were significantly lower than those accorded the countrys total

population. Thus, while 47.7 percent of the agricultural work-force earned less than Bs. 1,000,

66.5 percent of Colombian agricultural workers earned the same amount. Moreover, while 91.6

percent of the countrys agricultural work-force made Bs. 3,000 or under, a similar percentage of

the Colombian agricultural work-force in the country, 89.8 percent, made Bs. 2,000 or under. In

other words, while 16 percent of all agricultural-sector workers in Venezuela earned more than

10 Ibid, 45. 11 Reproduced from Pellegrino (1986), 47. Dollar figures are based on the 1980 exchange rate of Bs. 4 to the dollar and were added by the author.

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Bs. 2,000, only 3.8 percent of Colombian workers employed in the same sector earned the same

amount. These figures show a pattern of lower-pay for Colombian workers employed in the

agricultural sector in comparison to the overall Venezuelan population working in the same

sector. The lower-wages accorded Colombian workers evidenced the economic role of these

immigrants as cheap laborers for the countrys agricultural sector.12

The Undocumented Immigrant in Venezuela

In her section on the Image of Migration, Anzola (1983: 120) states that migration, as

in the other instances of interaction between the two countries [Colombia and Venezuela],

oscillates along an axis of cooperation and conflict. That is, immigration is treated as an

instance of cooperation when Colombians are contracted through legal channels to work in

Venezuela. However, when it concerns the thousands of Colombians that, not having obtained

the necessary visa, cross the border surreptitiously, the topic of immigration becomes

conflictive. Specifically, in the latter instance the image of the undocumented immigrant is

imbued with an aspect of illegality that leads to the automatic stigmatization of those falling

under this category. Indeed, Berglund and Hernndez (1985: 85) remark that, exempting their

personal characteristics and formation, [undocumented immigrants] are marginalized for the

simple fact of being undocumented. Because of the invisible nature of these migration flows,

the image of the undocumented Colombian immigrant can come to represent a problematic

factor when it is formulated in opposition to Venezuelas model for economic development. In

this context, the undocumented immigrant is deemed undesirable for his or her poverty and

12 The figures are cited from Pellegrino (1986: 49). The figures for the Colombian work-force were extracted from the 1981 census, while those concerning the total working-population in Venezuela were taken from the Random Survey of Homes carried out in 1980 and 1981 by the OCEI.

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alleged lack of knowledge and, for this reason, he or she tends to be resented (Berglund and

Hernndez 1985: 86).

However, as we saw earlier, although undocumented immigrants are stigmatized for their

alleged socioeconomic characteristics, the reality of the undocumented Colombian immigrant is

one of economic exploitation. This vulnerable group of immigrants is often seen by powerful

economic actors and the Venezuelan government as an essential source of cheap labor that is

beneficial to the process of economic development. In his report on Los Indocumentados

Colombianos (1972), Norman Gall informs that although the Venezuelan government was well

aware of the invasion of Colombian conuqueros, or agricultural workers, it stood by passively

and reasoned that the nature of their work was unacceptable to Venezuelans who refused to live

and work in the isolated areas of the countrys western frontier.13

In spite of this, Colombian immigration was often stigmatized due to its undocumented