Operation Billy Budd

8/4/2019 Operation Billy Budd

1/5
http://www.blackvault.com/


2/5

3112964

Cryptologic Almanac 50th Anniversary Series EO 1 .4 .-{S#SftOperation Billy Budd:NSA and the U.S. Army's S e c r e t ~ - - - - - - -

Operation, APnrr9'rn( ~ W 8 I ) Since World War II, one of the key administrative efforts in the cryptologiccommunity has been to realize complete operational control of all its assets. During theVietnam War, NSA and the Service Cryptologic Elements controlled all SIGINT activitiesand resources in Southeast Asia. They provided strategic and tactical SIGINT support tothe Commander, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV). Generally, relationsbetween the commanders in Vietnam and the SIGINT elements were good. However, therewere a number of officers who criticized SIGINT support both for a lack of timeliness andfor the practice of not giving them "all of the SIGINT." The validity of both complaintsvaried from service to service and the type ofoperations involved. Part of the problem alsorested with the cryptologic support staffs, who did not always explain to commanders theall-important limitations of SIGINT. Still, relations were considered good, which makesthe story behind Operation Billy Budd all the more surprising. Billy Budd involved arenegade COMINT activity by a major U.S. field command in Vietnam. This secretoperation originated because MACV did not trust the SIGINT elements in Vietnam to keepsecret the impending invasion ofCambodia set for I May 1970. It also exemplified the tugof interests that SIGINT liaison officers can find themselves caught in.(8//81) From the beginning of 1970, MACV had been working contingency plans forpossible cross-border operations into Cambodia. The Nixon administration believed that alarge portion of the Vietnamese communist supply effort came from Cambodia and that anassault across the border would hamper Hanoi's forces. At the same time, such an attackmight help cover the American withdrawal. By March, General Creighton Abrams,COMUSMACV, had approved the plan and expanded the objectives and the number ofallied forces allocated to the operation. Responsibility for the attacks was given to theAmerican II Field Force, Vietnam (FFV). The II FFV was a corps-level organizationdesigned to control multidivisional operations, much like a standard U.S. army corps. Itsresponsibility included the territory in South Vietnam that was north and northwest ofSaigon from where the Cambodian incursion would start. The commander of the II FFV,Lieutenant General Michael Davison, had been ordered to prepare for the attack on 24April. He was reminded to maintain total security about the operation and limit knowledgeof it to only a few people. This order kept the entire NSA liaison group in Vietnam, knownas the NSA Pacific Representative, Vietnam (NRV), out of the picture until only 72 hoursbefore the attacks were to begin. The ASA headquarters in Vietnam, the 509th ASADeclass i f ied and approved fo r r e lea se by NSA on 27 February 2007 pursuan t to E.O.12958, as amended. MDR-51909


3/5

3112964Group, also was left out of the loop. Yet, the planners on the II FFV staffwere usingSIGINT to determine objectives and fix communist units.(U) About three weeks before the American attack, the South Vietnamese Army (ARYN)began a series of limited attacks at various points along the Cambodian border. Theseattacks, part of operation Toan Thang (Total Victory) were meant to reconnoitercommunist positions and test their reaction to further probes. Cooperation developedbetween the ARVN and the Cambodian military, known as the FARK (Forces ArmeesRoyales Khmeres). The Cambodian defense minister, General Lon Nol, had justoverthrown Prince Norodom Sihanouk and was anxious to strengthen ties withWashington and Saigon. The opportunity for Cambodian and Vietnamese liaison wasgood. In fact, MACV was encouraging the Vietnamese to d e v ~ l o p joint operations with theCambodians.(8//81) Ten days before the American attack -- and recall that no one in the SIGINT staff inSaigon knew of the plan -- a representative from the headquarters of the Commander,Naval Forces Vietnam, showed up at the NRV offices in Saigon. He handed the staff acopy of a "secret message" that a naval intelligence liaison officer stationed near the town . 4.ofGo Dau Ha at the Cambodian border had received.

L . . - _ ~ - - -J The only problem for the NRVwas that the intercept did not come from any known U.S. or Allied COMINT facility.(8/181) .The deputy N '!' I r ~ n H o u ~ e h e a d u O ~ i n t e n i g e f i C e f 6 t U M A c v , . m u u mBngadler General Wllham Potts, and nefed hIm on the mtercept. Potts agreed W l t ~ a p l a nfor a COMINT site to take over the activity. He provided a h e l i c o P ~ ~ ~ J o r , a t ~ ~ ~ t o fly tothe Cambodian border and find out what was going on. T h ~ n c : x t d a y ~ ~ a n d this showshowseriously the SIGINT command considered the i ~ ~ ~ 9 c : n t , " , " r - - l t h e commander ofthe509th ASA G r o U P , ~ / j a n d the com'manirer'of the 30300 A ~ Battalion,I new out to Go Dau Ha. After landing, they inquiredabout any Special welHam,s DI ute i An American advisor to the local ~ V unit toldthem that there was an American officer working with some signal equipment in a buildingcloser to the border. They found a two-story stucco building next to the border crossing.Inside were an American major and some ARVN radio operators working a bank ofreceivers. The three asked the major to come outside away from theVietnamese so theycould talk to him about his work.( ~ I I ~ I ) In the field along the road to the Cambodian border,/the four discussed what wasgoing on. The officer identified himself as a I Irecently the advisor to the RoyalThai Army's 2nd Brigade. He was also a French hngUlst. In early April, the chiefofoperations of the II FFV had ordered him to set up a watch operation to intercept some


4/5

(b) (6 )

~ ; n ; ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ f ~ ~ ~ ~ : ~ ~ : ; : : ; s ~ ) i ~ ~ ~ e r i ib r ~ ~ ? ~ ~ ~ ~ / 1 1 1 1 1he used Vietnamese Nationalpolicetadio equipment that ~ ~ ~ I r ~ l : l d Y attheoor-der/stat$oitHe had ARVNlll()tlitors;who did not understand F r ~ ' , l 9 h ; I i s t e n f o r thelinkto...become.: ~ : Q . W : ~ d t h ~ ~ ~ : : : " : ' t ~ ; = ; ~ ; : i ; ; ; \ 7 ~ ~ ~ T p e 1 ~ ~ ~ Z ~ ~ 1 ~ W ]such reports to the SSO. /It 'Bil ly' ') /r--land1 ~ 1 ' ~ B u d d " 1 Ithe NRV. They arranged fora tdeveloped. The/deputyNRV, I . . afterinforming GeneralPotts ofthe renegade operation, decided to cable NSA with details of it.At this point, General Potts ordered>him not to do so. Potts told1 ~ h a t both theAmerican ambassador to South Vietnam, Ellsworth Bunker, and General Abrams wereaware of the operation and wanted it continuedwithoutNSA being informed.1 Ihadalready alerted NSA toOs operation, but had sent/it none of the intercept. Potts toldI ~ h a t NSAcould not>get any of the material and that this order came fromAmbassador Bunker andGeneral Abrams. Meanwhile, NSA ordered1 ~ transmitgistsoDs intercept-He was caught between the demands of both sides.(S//SI)I ~ e l a y e d sending the/material/to Fort Meade, citing the commands fromBunker andAbrams. However, he kept "pestering" Potts for pennission to send theintercept. Potts kept refusing.I lithough,/had an alternate plan. A team from the 175thRadio Research Company had located the radio link and began reporting it in COMINTchannels to NSA and, ironically, to the SSO II FFV. With everyone satisfied with this"back door" plan, a crisis was averted. Eventually, the issue died down . l l s e n t thedisputed transcripts to NSA.I Ishut down his mission and r e t u ~ Thailand.Shortly after, American troops crossed mto Cambodia.(SHSI) In retrospect, the incident illustrated the long-tenn problem that SIGINT


5/5

EO 1 .

3112964organizations have hadl ~ n b e i n g q t i a r a r i t i r i . e d f r ( ) l ' l lplanning stages of sensItIve mIhtary operatIons. As eventually was learned, GeneralAbrams was very nervous about any leaks of the impending Cambodian operations. TheSIGINT elements in Vietnam were considered potential security problems when it came to"blue force" information. So the plans stayed entirely withinMACV and II FFV. BillyBudd also illustrated the dilemma that liaison officers such as the NRV can findthemselves in: whom do they really serve, the customer or NSA? In this case, the NRVfound himselfcaught between the need to shut down the rogue intercept mission andorders from General Abrams to keep it secret. There was no simple solution, made noeasier by the clash ofvested interests for both sides over Billy Budd. Fortunately, theproblem faded away.[(U/lfOUO) Robert J. Hanyok, Center for Cryptologic History, 972-2893s, rjhanyo]

Almanac 50th Anniversary Series

Content Owner: FeedbackWeb POC: Feedback

Last Modified: by nsrLast Reviewed: February 28, 2003

Next Review: 365 days

Documents

Operation Billy Budd