CAS GSMS Item List

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CAS Global Safety Management System Item List

Search: Designator like BSH* and (Problem Type = CA) and (Status Code = O) and Review ID like *2 and ( ( Item Assigned Between 03-15-2011 and 04-28-2011)) Sort: CAPA_REVIEW_NO Asc

New Search Page: Page 1 of 2 Total Items: 27 Preferences

Source

Item No (View/Edit)

Item Title (Attach)(URL)

Review ID Category

Status (History)

ID by Person

Created On

CAPA Plan Due Date

CAPA Impl Due Date

CAPA Impl Cmpl Date

Prime Resp Person

Resp Person

Last Status Dt

Observation/Other

101080 The tow bar broken during the A/C VP-BAX towing(6)(0)

145-2 Safety - Incident Product

O(9) Chen, S

03-16-2011

03-23-2011

04-07-2011

Chen, Junrong

Chen, J; Xin, W; He, X

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: During the A/C VP-BAX towing from ramp into hangar bay 3,the tow bar disconnected from aircraft caused by the lock pin of tow bar broken.

CAPA Remedial Action:

1.Inform managment of the event. - Manager (JR) was informed of this incident on 3/11/2011. Action completed. 2. Attached the un-serviceable tag on 767 towbar and transfered to facility department for repair on 14 MAR11. Action completed.

CAPA Plan: 1.Briefed with all HM staff the maintenance tips for aircraft towing and towbar installation between A/C and tow truck,and coordinated with purchase department to require that towbar manufactory should assign engineer to perform the new type towbay training for all HM staff. meanwhile, training record or certification is neccessry for QA approvement. action completed at 22MAR11. 2. Required all HM staff to acknowledge the HM checklist regarding aircraft towing without power in hangar , which mentioned the pressure of brake accumulator as AMM requirement. action completed at 07APR11. 3. required all HM staff to perform the towbar OJT.towbar OJT program will be done at around 28APR11 during the N768DA C check while A/C out of hangar for operation. and OJT instructor is wen shen xin(employee number 363). action open

CAPA Root Cause: 1.HM mechanics did not perform the towbar training. 2.insufficient training regarding aircraft towing without power in hangar.

Last Status Desc: On the check lists that have been uploaded where is there a place the person or persons preforming the check of the A/C so there is documentmented that this check has infact been completed and where will form be retained for future referance should there be a need to review the form? Also the Maint tip is still in Chineese only it needs to be translated into English and the MEDA form can not be viewed in MET at this time, the MEDA form also need to be rerviewed by Quality there are some questions as to what really happened and what is refelected on the MEDA form, this must be acclompished prior to closure of this MET item, we need do the right thing.

Audit - Internal

101085 Some calibration tools have no calibration labels.(1)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(3) Xue, C 03-22-2011

04-21-2011

Olson, Gary

Olson, G

04-27-2011

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CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: PRO-10-M07R3 3.B: Each piece of measuring/test T/E must be attached with an appropriate label indicating its current status. Users are required to operate per the status identified in the labels. Audit found some calibration tools and equipment have no calibration label. For example: rulers BSAS0301SM656 and BSAS0301SM612 in SM workshop have no calibration label. Engine wash machine BSAS02030043 in bay 3 has no calibration label. Radom moisture meter in composite workshop has no calibration label.

CAPA Remedial Action:

The engine wash machine BSAS020300043 without OEM's Certificate should be stopped using and will be put into use after the result of calibration is in tolerance Stick to the serviceable label on the radome moisture meter and then put into use.

CAPA Plan: The newly-purchased T/E will be labeled on according to the calibration requirements raised by back shop. The new-purchased T/E should be kept in the receiving area until it is stick to calibration label All newly-purchased T/E should be received and inspected by tool/equipment receiving personnel. For the tools that are evaluated to be calibrated by tool engineer, tool engineer should notify calibration administrator to stick to the calibration label on them and the receiving & inspection sheet should be filed Calibration administrator should get a report from SAP of all new tooling to check for possible missed items every two weeks.

CAPA Root Cause: (1) Those tapes & rulers without calibration labels are newly purchased and received on Mar. 9th, 2011. The user department of back shop should put forward the calibration requirements of tools to the person who is assigned to take charge of calibration. The person who is assigned to take charge of calibration feedback the calibration requirements to calibration administrator and the tools will be controlled. But calibration administrator has not received any calibration requirement from back shop. During these days the person who is assigned to take charge of calibration is on leave and back shop is busy with production task, so it leads to the result that the user department didn't put forward the calibration requirements to calibration administrator in time and didn't keep these tools without calibration labels in the quarantine area. Calibration administrator received the evaluation report of measuring/test T/E without calibration required of the newly-purchased tools on Mar. 23th, 2011. (2)SAP SYS. Show that the engine wash machine BSAS020300043 was received on May.3rd,2010. But Calibration administrator didn't known about the calibration requirement of the equipment after it was inspected and put into use. Now there is no receiving & inspection sheet and manufacture's certificate found except for the operation manual. (3) The radome moisture meter BSAS0305CO01 in composite workshop was shipped to Boeing Shanghai on Nov. 9th,2009. The equipment was found out-of-tolerance during the receiving and returned to manufacture for repair. It was recalibrated after modification on May. 4th 2010 and was put into use without control by calibration administrator. (4) Now all the newly-purchased T/E of the tool rooms including back shop, facility, HM/LM, NDT& training center aren't assigned appropriate personnel for receiving and inspection. It leads that some calibration T/E without control was entered to tool room and was used for production

Last Status Desc: Attached an updated QSACAR which includes PRO revision with an Estimate completion of May 15, 2011. And a start week for the bi-weekly report to audit for any exceptions.

Audit - Internal

101086 The calibration administrator can not monitor the loaned/leased tools calibration condition.(1)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(3) Xue, C 03-22-2011

04-21-2011

Olson, Gary

Olson, G

04-27-2011

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CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: PRO-10-M07R3 4.I.ii: Calibration Administrator is responsible for control of these T/E during the loan/ lease time period so as to ensure these equipments are under control within Boeing Shanghai facility. Files will not be established; these equipments will not be coded and labeled per Boeing Shanghai procedure. This is to ensure that equipment due for calibration during the loan term, are removed from work sites. Audit found, the calibration administrator can not monitor the loaned/leased tools calibration condition.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: 1. Sent email to support chain manager & operation support manager to the requirement that calibration administrator should be advised of an calibration tool loaned/leased before used PRO-10-M07 4.I.i on 18 April 2011. This should ensure that above procedure is followed.

CAPA Root Cause: Now Supply Chain department don't offer calibration administrator the information about the measuring/test T/E that is loaned/leased from outside sources according to PRO-10-M07R3 4.I.i.

Last Status Desc: Attached an updated QSACAR and copy of email traffic.

Audit - Internal

101087 The process of SOOT evaluation is not executable.(1)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(3) Xue, C 03-22-2011

04-21-2011

Olson, Gary

Olson, G

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: PRO-10-M07R3 4.F.ii.c is out of tolerance calibration tools procedure. Audit found the process of SOOT evaluation is not executable. For example, the calibration tools used records can not tracked to specified maintenance practice, so the engineering can not evaluate the impact on aircraft. After the evaluation, the follow-up process is not specified.

CAPA Remedial Action:

Back Shop and NDT Shop could trace the used records of calibration tool/equipment by manual system.

CAPA Plan: 1. Back Shop and NDT Shop could trace the used records of calibration tool/equipment by manual system. 2. The PRO-12-M57 has procedure that states job card is traced Refer to the Form PRO-12-M57C by operation support department. 3. Xu Haiqiang, the leader of operation support department will ask IT for help to modify the SAP system to control tooling to task card level. 4. Revise PRO 10-M07 include procedure for QA to return completed PRO 10M07l form for filing. Clarify some other verbiage ie Description or Evaluation, Departmental Title changes. Estimate revision of procedure to be available for approve by April 28, 2011

CAPA Root Cause: Now in main stores the computer program outside of SAP only trace the used records that when and which plane out-of-tolerance T/E is used for and can't trace which task of work card it was used for. So are back shop and NDT shop. It leads to the result that engineering department can't have an evaluation of the impact on the product and QA department can't take further action according to the evaluation.

Last Status Desc: Waiting for reply from QA department on clear instruction for the actions for SOOT after Engineering evaluation. The estimated PRO revision date adjusted to allow for this data to make it into this revision.

Audit - Internal

101088 Some load test tools are not controlled.(1)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(3) Xue, C 03-22-2011

04-21-2011

Olson, Gary

Olson, G

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: Audit found some hoist equipments were controlled as calibration tools, but some are not. For example, BSAS020200139 fishpole hoist and BSAS020200276 MLG R&I equipment were not controlled by calibration.

CAPA Remedial Action:

Remedial action is that operation support department to ensure that all tools/equipments needing proof test, load test, etc are currently controlled.

CAPA Plan: 1. Draft procedure to control the tooling and equipment needing the proof load test or magnetic force inspection inside of the Tooling Calibration system. Estimate October 2011. 2. Operation support department supplies a 100% complete listing of all tooling and equipment from the SAP system to calibration administrator and tool engineer so that all BSAS items could be traced. Tool engineer categorizes all tooling and equipment in different groups that which needs the proof load test or magnetic force inspection. Estimate June 2011. 3. Calibration administrator picks up a list of tools/equipments needing the proof load test or magnetic force inspection according to the result of categorization. Estimate Budgetary changes and get LT agreement. Estimate October 2011. 4. Remedial action is that operation support department to ensure that all tools/equipments needing proof test, load test, etc are currently controlled.

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CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Root Cause: The MLG R&L Equipment BSAS020200276 Gage has been controlled since it was received. Please check the certificate of calibration on the web \\10.1.0.220\bsdms\Quality\Calibration\calibration certificate report\HM\BSAS020200276. The fish pole hoist BSAS020200139 wasn¡¯t controlled as calibration equipment because it was evaluated as the equipment that isn¡¯t required for calibration during the receiving and inspection. Now, calibration administrator only controls the measuring tool/equipment, not including the equipment that needs the proof load test or magnetic force inspection. The some hoist equipments were controlled as calibration equipments, because they were evaluated as calibration equipments during the receiving and inspection. So Calibration administrator put them into the list of calibration tool/equipment and controlled as schedule.

Last Status Desc: Attached an updated QSACAR which include the requirement of the PRO to be completed by May 15, 2011.

Observation/Other

101090 Inspection Taskcards signed without required access gained per Taskcards(6)(0)

145-2 O(5) Olson, G

03-23-2011

04-25-2011

Chen, Junrong

Li, E; Chen, J; He, X

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: Taskcards 20-006-02 and 20-003-01 on Aerosvit UR-VVF were signed off without access required per Taskcard gained. 1. Inspection of flt ctl cables over center wing tank- seat and floor boards not removed. 2. Inspection of flt ctl cables in floorbeam cavity in bulk cargo compartment - ceiling panel not removed. Note: Access for STA 955 modification does gain you access to see cables in the sta 785 -852 area. Nor does ceiling in fwd cargo compartment (fairleads block view). Taskcard has specific instruction that must be followed unless you get written documented alternate means of compliance from authorized authority.

CAPA Remedial Action:

Removed access panels from STA 785 to STA852 and ceiling panels 161BCX for Job card CONTROL CABLE TURNS - LOWER FUSELAGE, and re-inspected the cable as per the job card 20-003-01 and 20-006-02 requirements and re-signed off the job card 20-003-01 &20-006-02 at 21MAR11.Action completed.

CAPA Plan: 1. Coordinate with planning to prepare the STA and access panel picture to attach on board in planning room before each A/C maint project input.Action completed at 31MAR11. 2. Require PM to enhance the team coordination at the daily meeting. All PM acknowledge and action completed. 3.if mechanic stamp and sign off job card without performing job, mechanic will be subjected to discipline action per PRO-3-307

CAPA Root Cause: 1.Since no reference picture regarding STA and ceiling panel attached on the original job card, mechanic made a misunderstanding of job card requirement and only remove the access panel from STA852 to STA955. 2.Insufficient coordination between flight team and cabin team for ceiling panel 161BCX removal (Flight team take the responsibility for cable inspection,and cabin team take the responsibility for bulk ceiling panel removal.)

Last Status Desc: completed read&sign regarding discipline action, item ready for review and closure.

Audit - Regulator

101097 The CRS sampled in base maintenance did not refer to the latest version of the Operator's work scope.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Sun, X

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CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: The Certificate of Release to Service sampled in base maintenance did not refer to the latest version of the Operator's work scope for the maintenance check so as to demonstrate that all maintenance ordered has been properly carried out by the organisation.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101098 MOE Section 2.16 "Release to Service Procedure" is not adequated.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE Section 2.16 "Release to Service Procedure" does not adequately describe the procedure to be followed for the release to service of an aircraft from base maintenance.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101099 MOE section 2.20 does not describe the sub-contract control procedure required by AMC145.A. 75(b).(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE section 2.20 does not describe the sub-contract control procedure required by AMC145.A. 75(b).

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101100 Some lower order procedures are not approved or controlled via the MOE(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The fundamental principles and limitations of all Part 145 compliance are not set out in the MOE procedures. In several areas lower order procedures, which are not approved or controlled via the MOE, are referred to for compliance purposes, e.g. MOE section 3.4.4 refers directly to a lower order procedure for certifying staff authorisations. All MOE procedures need to be reviewed in this regard.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

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CAS GSMS Item List

Audit - Regulator

101101 The list of certifying staff is not contained in MOE section 1.6.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The list of certifying staff is not contained in MOE section 1.6, and there is no MOE procedure permitting the delegation of approval for the list of certifying staff to the organisation.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101102 The responsible level three NDT person is not identified in the MOE.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The responsible level three NDT person is not identified in the MOE.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101103 MOE Section 1.9 does not include the NDT methods used in the course of maintenance under the organisation's A1 rating.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE Section 1.9 does not include the NDT methods used in the course of maintenance under the organisation's A1 rating.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101104 MOE Section 3.4 does not clearly identify the privileges of the Category A, B1, B2 and C certifying staff.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

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CAS GSMS Item List

CAPA Finding: MOE Section 3.4 does not clearly identify the privileges of the Category A, B1, B2 and C certifying staff. In addition the restriction for Cat A staff to only release tasks for which they have performed themselves is not detailed.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101105 MOE section 3.4 does not include Part 145 Appendix IV requirements for the authorisation of certifying staff not qualified to 145.A.30(i) 1 and 2(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE section 3.4 does not include Part 145 Appendix IV requirements for the authorisation of certifying staff not qualified to 145.A.30(i) 1 and 2. EASA User Guide CAO 00006-001 Section 7 should be used for compliance.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

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CAS GSMS Item List

Management Emphasis TrackingHome My MET Site Map Contact Us Help Log Off

CAS Global Safety Management System Item List

Search: Designator like BSH* and (Problem Type = CA) and (Status Code = O) and Review ID like *2 and ( ( Item Assigned Between 03-15-2011 and 04-28-2011)) Sort: CAPA_REVIEW_NO Asc

New Search Page: Page 2 of 2 Total Items: 27 Preferences

Source

Item No (View/Edit)

Item Title (Attach)(URL)

Review ID Category

Status (History)

ID by Person

Created On

CAPA Plan Due Date

CAPA Impl Due Date

CAPA Impl Cmpl Date

Prime Resp Person

Resp Person

Last Status Dt

Audit - Regulator

101106 The Certification authorisation document (PAC) does not identify the holder as a B1, B2 or C certifying staff member.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Zhang, Q; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The Certification authorisation document (PAC) does not identify the holder as a B1, B2 or C certifying staff member.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101107 The Quality plan does not demonstrate that all aspects of Part 145 compliance are audited on an annual basis.(1)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

04-30-2011

04-25-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Xue, C; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The Quality plan does not demonstrate that all aspects of Part 145 compliance are audited on an annual basis.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: The audit plan is amended to show all aspects of Part 145 compliance are audited every 12 months on April 25, 2011.

CAPA Root Cause: At the time of the audit, the annual audit was planned is such a way to show the functions to be audited instead of showing the aspects of Part 145 compliance.

Last Status Desc:

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CAS GSMS Item List

Audit - Regulator

101108 Extension of authorisations to cover EASA part145 depended upon a brief training module on 145 procedures without further assessment.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Zhang, Q; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: The sampled authorisation assessment procedure interview records for certifying Staff indicated that competence assessment on company procedures predated the existence of EASA part 145 procedures. Extension of authorisations to cover EASA part145 depended upon a brief training module on '145 procedures without further assessment.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101109 MOE section 2.2 Acceptance of Parts does not specify the certification required to accompany parts for use under the Part 145 approval.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE section 2.2 Acceptance of Parts does not specify the certification required to accompany parts for use under the Part 145 approval.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Audit - Regulator

101110 MOE section 1.8.2 does not accurately reflect the layout of the line station facility.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Qiu, L; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: MOE section 1.8.2 does not accurately reflect the layout of the line station facility.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

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CAS GSMS Item List

Audit - Regulator

101111 Line station personnel have not been issued with appropriate B1 and B2 authorisations.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) 03-31-2011

04-30-2011

Sun, Xianghua

Zhang, Q; Sun, X

CAPA Finding: Line station personnel have not been issued with appropriate B1 and B2 authorisations.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: As Boeing Shanghai has not been excising the EASA Part 145 privilidges under its line maintenance rating

Last Status Desc:

Safety - Hazard/Risk

101116 Repeat Item Ref: MET # 100949 - Non Compliance with PRO-12-M22 R4(7)(0)

145-2 Non Compliance

O(2) Cerda, A R

03-31-2011

04-15-2011

Chen, Junrong

Chen, J; He, X

04-27-2011

CAPA Finding: "We have open Fuel Tanks" Repeat Item Ref: MET # 100949 - Non Compliance with PRO-12-M22 R4 Page 2 of 12. There were no "warning signs" posted at power receptacle; unable to verify flight deck entrance door to flt. deck was locked. MET item 100949 was closed on 30Mar11 The enclosed attachments are for refrence only and not to used as part of CAPA Plan. This escape was a CAAC item of particular intrest, and very sensitive in nature.

CAPA Remedial Action:

posted the "do not apply power due to fuel tank cell open" warning sign at exterior power receptacle at 31MAR11, action completed.

CAPA Plan: make the waining sign which should post at erterior power receptacle during the fuel tank open as per PRO 12-M22. Action completed.

CAPA Root Cause: mechanic can not find the warning sign regarding" do not apply power due to fuel tank cell open"

Last Status Desc: read&sign for discipline action completed, item ready for review and closure.

Observation/Other

101125 Failure to control re-work required because improper fluid added to NLG(3)(0)

145-2 O(4) Olson, G

04-02-2011

05-03-2011

Li, Eric Li, E; Chen, J

04-20-2011

CAPA Finding: During the prep for shoring the NLG was improperly serviced with MIL-H-5606 with lubrication additive. PM and Team notified that NLG would require draining and reservicing iaw AMM. 3Apr2011 NRC for NLG was shown to me as evidence of actions taken, NRC had no corrective action recorded, and work on nose landing gear was reported complete. I asked PM and Team leader what actions taken, and the described actions did not include complete draining, or draining down to side port of outer cylinder. At this point I informed PM and Team leader that fluid inside inner cylinder was not drained. Findings: 1. Failure to sign off work iaw PRO 10 M02,working progress sign-off 2. Failure to perform required rework to rectify previous error in servicing.

CAPA Remedial Action:

Drain Nose Landing Gear of fluid and reservice iaw AMM.

CAPA Plan: 1.require all HM staff make AMM copy while they perform the job card. 2. if mechanic stamp and sign off job card without performing job, mechanic will be subjected to discipline action per PRO-3-307

CAPA Root Cause: mechanic did not have approved documentation to perform the require N/L service bulletn, they try to perform task by memory.

Last Status Desc: CAPA plan update

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CAS GSMS Item List

Audit - Internal

101132 Material planner didn't run MRP in SAP system periodically.(0)(0)

145-2 Non Conformance

O(0) Xue, C 04-25-2011

05-24-2011

Guo, Lynne

Guo, L; Huang, Y

CAPA Finding: PRO-15-M07R2 4.B: Material planner runs MRP in SAP system periodically. When the current inventory levels lower than total material request, MRP will produce a supplement proposal spreadsheet of inventory levels. The spreadsheet includes: part numbers, inventory levels, reorder levels and requested delivery date. Audit found there was no evidence to show material planner run MRP in SAP system periodically.

CAPA Remedial Action:

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc:

Safety - Incident

101093 Presure gauge missed during Line maintain(1)(0)

2 O(0) Chen, S

03-28-2011

04-10-2011

04-30-2011

Song, Chengzhe

Song, C; Zhang, F

CAPA Finding: Incident Report: 23 Mar, Around 21:00 at ramp 301, The LM performed pre-flight check on ship N451PA,during PDC,got NLG strut service request form customer's representative due NLG strut low. After discussed with customer's MGR. make a Agreed to cancel the SVC job to make the flight on time. After A/C taxi away, The LM mechanics walked back from A/C side and forgot to take back the guage which was put on the N2 Bottle cart and cause missed.

CAPA Remedial Action:

1. went to SIA to find lost tool, but did not find. 2. interviewed on dutu staffs Wu Xiaochun, Kang ZP and Yang JX on 04/24; confirmed tools were not lost on aircraft. 3. debreifed with team on tool keeping during working on ramp.

CAPA Plan: 1. interview duty staff; 2. debrief with team about good tool keeping while working on ramp. 3. warning letter will be issued to duty staff

CAPA Root Cause: duty staff has no sense of good tool keeping while working on ramp.

Last Status Desc:

101095 Missing one walkie talkie in course of line maintenance.(1)(0)

2 Safety - Incident Product

O(2) Chen, S

03-30-2011

04-11-2011

04-30-2011

Song, Chengzhe

Song, C

04-18-2011

CAPA Finding: Incident Report: LM reported Missing 1 walkie talkie on N1 shift 29Mar 11 after departure the A/C 497, and A/C 409. The concerns mechanics checked the lift truck and Ramp where they even worked area , even the way they driving ( could be falling from truck) but cannot find the walkie talkie.

CAPA Remedial Action:

1. interviewed duty staff James Wang on 30 Mar; 2. confirmed that the walkie talkie was not lost on a/c;

CAPA Plan: 1. interview duty staff before 01 Apr; 2. need to confirm is it was lost on a/c; 3. debrief with team for how to keep tools safety while drive high lift with tools putting on platform by 30 Apr

CAPA Root Cause: duty staff did not reliaze that he will lose tools while put walkie talkie on platform with a long distance driving on high lift because of really bad road situation.

Last Status Desc: Log: Item was closed on 4/18/2011 6:38:06 PM by Stephen Yan

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CAS GSMS Item List

Safety - Incident

101124 Mobile Boom Crane Tipped on Side (see attachment/s)(4)(0)

Level 2 Safety - Incident Personal/EHS

O(1) Cerda, A R

04-02-2011

04-20-2011

Li, Eric Li, E; Chen, J; He, X

04-06-2011

CAPA Finding: Note: This incident should require team concurrence to determine if this incident is a reportable or non-reportable incident. Since the crane usage was non aircraft related; it is currently entered in MET as a Level 2 and not a 145-2. Update on 07Apr11 Stephen Yan, Xianghua Sun and Tony Cerda meet and agreed that this MET item should remain Level 2 and NOT a 145-2, but that this item be addressed as "Major issue, requiring immediate attention¡±. ******************************** On 03Apr11 at approximately 0920hrs we encountered an incident involving the operation of the mobile crane in bay 4,it was attempting to remove the wing cradle saddle from A/C shoring stand. The Crane's out riggers were not extended, hydraulic down locks had been extended, mobile crane tipped on its side please refer to enclosed attachment/s. Boeing Shanghai Security has been notified to make hangar security video footage available for review on 04Apr11; there are two hangar cameras in direct line of sight of incident area this should aid in an in depth investigation report.

CAPA Remedial Action:

1.Informed the managment of event-heavy maint manager JR and facility manager Mike Zhang were informed at 03APR2011, action completed. 2. Removed the mobile crane outside of hangar for repair at 04 APR2011, action completed. 3. Involved person go to hospital for injury check at 03 APR2011, action completed. 4. Mobile crane driver Xu Bin (employee number 563) was temporary terminate the vehicle operation authority from 03 APR2011 to 04 JUL2011.action completed.

CAPA Plan: CAPA Root Cause: Last Status Desc: Update on 07Apr11 Stephen Yan, Xianghua Sun and Tony Cerda meet and agreed that this MET item should

remain Level 2 and NOT a 145-2, but that this item be addressed as "Major issue, requiring immediate attention”.

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