OPCW Executive Council

Thirty-Sixth Meeting EC-M-36/DG.317 December 2013 15 December 2013 Original: ENGLISH

NOTE BY THE DIRECTOR–GENERAL

PLAN FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS OUTSIDE THE TERRITORY OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

CS-2013-8292(E) distributed 15/12/2013 *CS-2013-8292.E*

BACKGROUND AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE DESTRUCTION OF SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS OUTSIDE OF THE TERRITORY OF THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC

1. At its Thirty-Fourth Meeting, the Executive Council (hereinafter “the Council”), adopted a decision setting forth the detailed requirements for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons and Syrian chemical weapons production facilities (EC-M-34/DEC.1, dated 15 November 2013).

2. In that decision, the Council, inter alia, considered the reasons why the Syrian Arab Republic proposed that the destruction of its chemical weapons would need to take place outside its territory, and established the following timelines for the removal from and their destruction outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic (subparagraph 2(a) of EC-M-34/DEC.1):

(a) For mustard agent and the key binary chemical weapon components DF, A, B, and BB, including BB salt, as declared by the Syrian Arab Republic: removal from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic not later than 31 December 2013. For these chemicals, destruction should begin as soon as possible, with effective destruction not later than 31 March 2014, and destruction of any resulting reaction mass by a date to be agreed by the Council, based on the Director-General’s recommendation for the plan for destruction; and

(b) For all other chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic: removal from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic not later than 5 February 2014, with the exception that isopropanol shall be destroyed in the Syrian Arab Republic not later than 1 March 2014. For these chemicals, destruction should begin as soon as possible, with completion of destruction not later than 30 June 2014.

3. Pursuant to paragraph 8 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Council requested the Director-General, “in close consultation with States Parties offering to host a destruction facility or otherwise providing assistance with transport or destruction, to present to the Council for its consideration, not later than 17 December 2013, a plan for the destruction of chemical weapons outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic”. The plan was to include provisions for ensuring clear responsibility at

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each stage for all chemicals and take into account all relevant considerations, including the dates specified in paragraph 3 of EC-M-34/DEC.1 decision, as well as requirements for safety and security, and overall costs.

4. The Technical Secretariat (hereinafter “the Secretariat”) has developed the plan presented below, taking into consideration, inter alia:

(a) the initial declaration and the general plan for the destruction of chemical weapons submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic on 23 October 2013 pursuant to Article III of the Chemical Weapons Convention;

(b) the amendment to the initial declaration submitted by the Syrian Arab Republic on 21 November 2013;

(c) the outline plan for the removal of chemical weapons in the Syrian Arab Republic for destruction outside its territory, developed by the Operational Planning Group;

(d) the plan developed by the Syrian Arab Republic for the transportation of chemicals from the storage sites to Latakia port;

(e) the outcome of consultations with the States Parties offering to host a destruction facility or providing assistance with removal or destruction;

(f) the availability of required financial, technical, logistical, and other resources as at the date of issuance of this plan; and

(g) the fact that all activities on the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic will take place within the framework of the OPCW-UN Joint Mission (hereinafter “the Joint Mission”).

ACTIVITIES TO BE UNDERTAKEN FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

5. The Syrian Arab Republic will conduct packaging activities, consistent with procedures related to transportation under the International Maritime Dangerous Goods (IMDG) Code, required for the safe and secure transport of chemicals from the 12 chemical weapons storage facilities to the maritime vessels for removal. All activities related to reloading and packing will be verified. Appropriate resources for the packaging and transport from the chemical storage sites to the embarkation point are being provided by the United States of America and the Russian Federation.

6. The Syrian Arab Republic has shared with the Secretariat a plan for the transportation of chemicals from the storage sites to the port of embarkation in Latakia. Sequenced convoys of appropriately packaged chemical materials have been planned and will be moved along selected routes to Latakia in coordination with Syrian security and hazardous materials response elements. The Syrian Arab Republic has indicated that it will take steps to ensure appropriate separation of potentially hazardous materials. The Syrian Arab Republic has also indicated that it will implement a comprehensive security and safety plan to ensure the effective monitoring and oversight of the

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process and the physical security of materials during transit from storage sites to and at the embarkation point.

7. Sequenced Syrian convoys transporting chemical materials will arrive at Latakia where verification activities will be conducted, which are to include an inventory of the chemicals, individual storage containers, and shipping containers, inspection of seals, and analysis of representative samples. A designated Syrian official will provide required documentation to enable international maritime transportation. The Syrian Arab Republic will be responsible for loading chemical materials onto designated vessels in accordance with appropriate loading requirements pertaining to the transfer of dangerous goods. Security during loading operation at the port of embarkation is the responsibility of the Syrian Arab Republic. The Russian Federation has offered additional naval security at the port of Latakia and within Syrian territorial waters.

8. Denmark and Norway will provide vessels and military escorts to transport the Syrian chemical materials to the destruction locations. Security for the vessels while in transit will be provided by Denmark and Norway. Finland will provide chemical weapons emergency-response capabilities in support of the Danish/Norwegian contribution.

ACTIVITIES TO BE UNDERTAKEN FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

9. To enable the destruction of mustard agent and key binary chemical weapon components DF, A, B, and BB, including BB salt, the United States of America will provide technology to neutralise the chemicals aboard a sovereign United States vessel at sea. Italy will provide a port for the transloading of these chemicals from the Danish/Norwegian vessels onto the United States vessel specially outfitted to conduct destruction operations. If alternative facilities are identified in a timely manner for the destruction of Substance A, Substance B and/or Substance BB, these chemicals may be retained on the Danish/Norwegian vessels and transported directly to the commercial facilities. Otherwise, they will be retained on the United States vessel and transported to a commercial destruction facility or neutralised on the vessel. Pursuant to paragraph 15 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, representatives of the United States of America and the Secretariat are working on a detailed plan for verification and a facility agreement to fulfil the verification objectives defined in paragraph 66 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex to the Convention (hereinafter “the Verification Annex”).

10. To enable the destruction of all other chemicals declared by the Syrian Arab Republic, with the exception of isopropanol, and the effluents generated during the destruction of mustard agent and the key binary chemical weapon components, the Secretariat issued a call for expressions of interest from companies interested in participating in a tender process for the treatment and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and inorganic chemicals and related packaging materials and containers/drums, or parts thereof, and brought it to the attention of the States Parties via a Note (S/1142/2013, dated 22 November 2013). Furthermore, the Secretariat will undertake a solicitation process pursuant to Financial Regulation 10.6 and issue a “call for proposals”. A Note by the Director-General will be issued outlining the solicitation

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and evaluation process before the award of contracts to commercial facilities. The commercial facilities shall conduct the disposal work in accordance with the applicable national and local regulations and requirements of their country, and shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment. The Secretariat, in consultation with the hosting State Parties and the commercial facilities, will develop appropriate verification measures, consistent with paragraphs 14 and 15 of EC-M-34/DEC.1.

11. The Syrian Arab Republic has informed the Secretariat that it is developing a plan for destroying, on its territory, isopropanol and residual mustard agent in containers previously containing mustard agent. In accordance with paragraph 9 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, this plan shall be submitted not later than 1 January 2014, for review by the Council not later than 15 January 2014.

CONSIDERATIONS RELEVANT TO THE REMOVAL AND DESTRUCTION OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

12. As provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Syrian Arab Republic maintains ownership of its chemical weapons until they are destroyed. As long as the chemical weapons are on its territory, the Syrian Arab Republic also maintains control over them. Thus, the Syrian Arab Republic will bear the primary responsibility for the conduct of the activities to be undertaken on its territory. The Syrian Arab Republic also remains responsible for ensuring adequate security during all activities inside the Syrian Arab Republic contemplated in this plan. Upon removal of the declared chemical weapons from its territory, the Syrian Arab Republic no longer has possession, or jurisdiction, or control over these chemical weapons.

13. It is recalled that, pursuant to paragraph 10 of Article IV and paragraph 3 of Article VII of the Convention, each State Party, during the implementation of its obligations under the Convention, shall assign the highest priority to ensuring the safety of people and to protecting the environment.

14. The selection of methods for the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons will ensure that destruction meets the requirements pursuant to paragraph 12 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex to the Convention, namely, that the chemicals be converted “in an essentially irreversible way to a form unsuitable for production of chemical weapons” and none of the methods explicitly banned pursuant to paragraph 13 of Part IV(A) of the Verification Annex (“dumping in any body of water, land burial or open-pit burning”) will be employed.

15. With respect to their responsibilities, the States Parties assisting in the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons, transporting Syrian chemical weapons from the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic to a State Party hosting destruction activities, or hosting destruction activities on their territory (“Assisting States Parties”) have arrived at certain common understandings. Accordingly, it is recognised that the United Nations Security Council resolution 2118 (2013) and the relevant Executive Council decisions establish a multilateral legal framework for the activities of the Assisting States Parties. The responsibilities of the Assisting States Parties, including liability for claims will be determined according to the circumstances, to the extent of their respective roles, and in light of the purposes of resolution 2118 (2013) and applicable

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Council decisions. Should an unexpected contingency arise in this regard, the Assisting States Parties could raise the situation to the United Nations Security Council or the OPCW Executive Council. An exchange of letters on this matter took place between the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the President of the United Nations Security Council on 11 December 2013.

16. The security situation on the ground remains volatile, and the main arterial Damascus-Homs road has mostly remained closed since 16 November 2013 due to heavy fighting in the Qalamoun and surrounding areas, posing a risk to removal efforts. Whilst the Joint Mission is working to obtain a clearer understanding of the evolving security situation to mitigate those risks, it is highly likely that a continued deterioration in conditions would constrain planned activities and require a recalibration in order to adapt to the situation.

OVERALL COSTS AND STATUS OF THE TRUST FUNDS

17. Currently, it is not possible to quantify the overall costs for the destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic. Costs will be met through in-kind contributions and the trust funds established by the OPCW and the United Nations. Relevant operations will only be undertaken once sufficient funds are available.

18. In accordance with paragraph 6 of EC-M-34/DEC.1, the Secretariat established a special trust fund for the financial resources needed for the activities related to complete destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons outside the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic (S/1141/2013, dated 19 November 2013). Total contributions to the trust fund as at 15 December 2013 were EUR 4.1 million from the Czech Republic, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, New Zealand, Norway, and the Republic of Korea. A further four States Parties (Finland, Germany, Poland, and Turkey) have made formal commitments to contribute an additional amount of approximately EUR 3.5 million.

19. The OPCW trust fund to provide funding to facilitate the technical activities of the OPCW in support of the verification of the destruction of Syrian chemical weapons (S/1132/2013, dated 16 October 2013) had received a total amount of EUR 10.3 million as at 15 December 2013, from Andorra, Canada, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. A proposal will be submitted to the contributing States Parties regarding the utilisation of balances in this trust fund for purposes of destruction.

ACTIVITIES UNDERTAKEN AS OF 15 DECEMBER 2013 TO ENABLE THE REMOVAL AND DESTRUCTION OF THE SYRIAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS

20. The Syrian authorities have identified packaging, loading, transport, and some security-related assets necessary to implement the movement of the Syrian chemical weapons from the storage locations to the designated port of embarkation. This includes, where necessary, resources for the reloading of chemicals from their current storage containers into appropriate containers that are safe for transportation. The United States of America has provided the necessary packaging material, primarily consisting of 2,275 container drums of various capacities.

EC-M-36/DG.3 page 6 21. The individual containers will be placed inside maritime shipping containers, fitted

with Global Positioning System (GPS) locators. These containers, as well as the GPS locators, have been purchased with support from the United States of America.

22. Loading equipment (forklift trucks, cranes), other loading materials (pallets, compressors and so on), and decontamination equipment are being provided by the United States of America.

23. The sourcing of flatbed and recovery trucks is currently ongoing, with assistance from the United States of America. Once purchased, the vehicles will need to be fitted with GPS locators prior to entry into the territory of the Syrian Arab Republic.

24. The United States of America is providing the aforementioned materials and equipment to the Joint Mission, which, in its facilitation and coordination role, will oversee their use.

25. In support of the secure movement of Syrian chemical weapons to Latakia, 50 all-wheel drive trucks, 15 all-wheel drive armoured trucks, 20 water tanks, 52 tents, and 13 kitchen trailers are being provided by the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation has indicated the possibility of additional monetary or material assistance.

26. Selected Syrian personnel attended a five-day packaging and IMDG Code transportation course in Beirut, Lebanon, from 25 to 30 November 2013 to facilitate reloading and packaging operations organised by the Joint Mission.

27. The Secretariat has developed verification measures to be implemented during packaging, transportation, and removal of the Syrian chemical weapons to ensure against tampering and possible diversion.

28. For the purpose of destruction operations involving mustard agent and key binary components, a Field Deployable Hydrolysis System has been placed aboard a United States vessel in anticipation of operations that will be conducted at sea. Members of the Secretariat toured the vessel on 10 and 11 December 2013, during the development of a verification plan and facility agreement.

29. For the purpose of destruction of other chemicals and effluent, on 21 November 2013 the Secretariat issued the aforementioned call for expressions of interest from companies interested in participating in a future tender for the treatment and disposal of hazardous and non-hazardous organic and inorganic chemicals and related packaging materials and containers/drums, or parts thereof, and brought it to the attention of the States Parties via a Note (S/1142/2013). The Secretariat has developed guidelines for the evaluation of tenders, which were shared with the States Parties on 29 November 2013.

CONCLUSION

30. The Director-General wishes to express his deep appreciation to the States Parties that have decided to assist in the removal and destruction of the Syrian chemical weapons outside its territory; States Parties that are providing material assistance in this process; and those States Parties making financial contributions to the trust

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funds. The success of this plan is incumbent upon a collective endeavour and it is the hope of the Director-General that there will be additional contributions, especially related to the trust fund, as well as in the form of facilitation of destruction at commercial facilities. In this context, States Parties in a position to do so are strongly encouraged to consider making, at the earliest possible, in-kind contributions by directly sponsoring commercial entities to undertake the treatment and disposal of chemicals and effluent.

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