'

From: Madrid To : Tokyo 8 December 1944 JAS

!OP SBCRE'f'

(SPAIN) (SUl~~:IB - Vice-Chief, General-Staff)

510 . (Parts 1-5 complete)

I believe thst the Leyte operations are so im­portant that they may decide the outcome of the Greater East Asia War. Therefore, I hope you will excuse me if, regardless of my inability to cast any light on the cur­rent military situation, I offer my humble opin!ons on the subject.

1. I think the Awericans show by these operations that they are not pursuing any diplomatic courses, but are resolved to decide the war by force of arms, to make this the basis ot' their policy and to continue fighting stubbornly~ no matter what losses they suffer, until they have won the war.

2. It is the pec~liar character1ntic of the strategy of the Amer~cgn Army, that it is be.sod on great material strength. ~e cannot overlook the sc~le of American oper­ations, always carriec1 out with absolutely· superior· military strength, nor the grandeur of the.1r conceptions, the resolute and dar·ing ideas of their conunand. Tho home-country is untouched by the horrors of war and is vast and powerful. The U.S. has suffered some losses but not enough to hav~ received a mortal wound. It is only when the Americans (?have been made to see the terrific costs of ope·r-ations ?) that defeatism will spread amongst them.

PART 3: There are two chings in the current Leyte situa­

tion which I find in~~~ first, how it

if«J)lP ~ n-s~.a~ WARJ?~..f A~TMENT • 'i Pe ge 1

This sheet of paper and all of its co"ilfe'ifs m~\tG,IJ';l'eguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

eclassifi ed and a ro d for rel ea e b SA on 12- 3-2013 ursuantto E .0. 13 2

REF ID:A69281 e WAR DEPARTMENT e 1r@IF ~18J<C~lF:!llr

'i'OP SECftE'f

is that our navy, after inflicting such tremendous losses on the enem~r, should then, to all purposes, have disappeared from view, while enemu-task forces keep on appearing in the Philippine waters, and the

enemy continues to organize great transport convoys and to supply his troops; the second, how it is that our air strength, which could so easily be concentrated and supplied, has not gained that air superiority in the Philippines which would give us mastery of the seas.

In opposing enemy operations which are on a great scale, we too, must make our preparations and our plans on a great scale. Against the enemy's tenacity we must pit equal tenacity with equal disregard of losses.

The enemy is now carrying out continual air-raids against Japan proper, but I judge these raids to be con­taining operations connected with the Philippines opera­tions.

In my opinion it is absolutely necessary that we concentrate all our air strength in the Philippines, and immediately wipe out the enemy's landing forces with superior strength 1 and thus decide the Greater East Asia War at tp1s time.

Inter Rec 1d Trans

8 Dec 44 (1) Japanese 8 Dec 44

10 Dec 44 (938tJ)

'Jr<e)IF ~mi~~ WARiWA~

This sheet of paper and all of its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utmost secrecy is necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital intelligence at its source.

D-8484 PP.ge 2

. . . ·. .

• L -- .. , ...... . . . . . .

..

~ I•

'·

:J.·~ j.t. .... ..

.,..,

.. . ' ;.• ...

:.. .

,.

. ,. ..

. ..... ..

.:v.1.-- .• t. ' • • .. , • 1~··· • /::' .

... •,!~. ........ I

"' '"'. .. . . ... .

, '

, I

- ..... ~I I ._ r I

: :"

.. ..,

" I

. ;. .. "

. E;:E"F ID.: K6.9Z8i e . . . .. .. ,•. --- ...... ., · '). WAR DEPARTMENT . ..s

~~~ '11

-~~~: Berlin ( Oshima) To: Tokyo 11 October 1944

.JAA

#1135 ~ . ..

. .

Message #322 sent· from the Embassy in France tp Yo~r ExQellency.

' . . At the time when we evacuated our office

'at Vichy ~he condition of public· order was extremel~r bad, ~nd I was very apprchenRive that. some untoward situation might artse".in that place or its vicinity .. Because of air ~aids and the activities of the· 11!8quis I .considered it _both from tJ::ie standpoint of . preservetion and eafQty to be very difficult to convey such· an imp01~tant machine as the HI!'f,OKI from· Viyhy to Be~fort_,a distance of 5~~ kilometers (it took four- days t.o make '(;he t;"'ip). Theref·ore, we deciqed to destroy the ma-chine;

. -As for its destruction I entrusted the

· mat.te11 to' the two men who a1!e in charge of it apd tt10 othe1i rnembers or my· stnff, and they coraplcted ·tne dest1"1uct ion betw1?en 1~ p .m. on the 19th of .p..ugust and. 2 a .m. on the following day. As i'or, th~ place and. ope1"ation by whiph the destruction was carri~d out, on the.basis of your instructions given ir. your c:i.rcu],ar telegram .¥23300 in 1941, wo _ first. removed thQ covers froru the body of the

· machine ·and the rectifierr, ·then we took the cr1ypto­graphic unit and the printing unit apa_rt by removing . the scre)fs. We then detached the-connecting un'.lt

·and.dismounted it into its smallest components, after which we knocked it to p1epes with a hammera

·, We were particularly careful to destroy the c:r;>ypto­graphic unit Completely. i'he ipflammabl~ parts

-~.~6~5

·-

· ..

.. _. . wA'ffft~ Thia sheet of paper and all of lta conte4!..~~u·~ :i-u:r1n:~~a:.:.~= Utmoet aecrecy la nec:ea•ry to prevent .. ,,._..up . . . . 1• I I

____ _..... .... - ··-- -1 - , __ ... -

·.

~--.--.-----

.......,.. '··- __ .. ·-- -. . ... c .. ,

.. -· _._'

, .. .. _-..' '. ,"!. • .I

- . '

-. e REF ID:A69281 e . . .~ WAR DEPARTMENT '}

mlF -~CJRET ., . \: ..

. ' , ' . I

· : ' '!'OP °F{'flP'l' I 1 • ...., ,J ;_t_

' , such as the elect~ic wires, plug board, and ebonite rods \-'e b1:1rned up ..._iii th a mixture of gasol:i.ne and fuel otl.. 1\n1ong the vari.oua p8rts that w·e took apart and· destroyed we took tI1e frames of the crypto"° grat)h.ic unit and the printing unit! the f1')alile of · tne !'(~Ctifter and the typew.r1.ter's ,a) and (b). and · hr.fore daim en .the 20th tl1t\::'°1 them iaway and scattered · them nbout in ~rar1.ous ploce13 f1~om three to five ki lometePs _no1~thwest of Vtc:1y { th~se wer•o pla cea tbat ·He had selected before:i::.1:d when we considered . that .such ar~ occasion might i:~rise) ~ As for the other small pnrts we threw tlK·m 1n the river along the roac1 hetweeti Vichy :lnd D:·.jon during th.e 20th and 21st of .t\U6Ust aa we wen·; alongq

a . - ct .. ·~6if 5 o

\ ' I

' .

' . )

• . ,

WAR DEPARTMENT

' I f

,

:l'hls heet I. a er ancf ~11 oJ it\ contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. lnmaA£'secfec: l~&t"ess'-ry t«>lp~eJent dryfn~p~f-~r,s B' vital Intelligence a~ ~.f2.~'5:; 5 Rec •d -12 Oct l~Ji ·

- -- '""""' I'"'" '" ""

• ' I

·-• "' I ..

• e I

- • .J £7~ - - . AL -,,,.·,,,.t,..- ... ~ I

I I Prom: London ( GBI.al:)

·To: 'tolqo (Vinter) (Bead. Geneal. .Arf'a1.ra L ection) 13 Auguat 1,9!0

I

JAB .

139 P1ve-part meaaaga

(Part 1) a

Answer to your vlre 1521 •

I I

I . I

i

! I

I. I ! I

'

i I

l. I ha"e aa 7et no evidence aa:to whether or not

the 81'1 t111h have alread:J solved Japa.ueae ooaea. However,

aco~1ng to a :r&l1&ble aource,. "both Bagland and Ge~

bave succeeded 1n solving the codes o-r almost •ll tbe

•jor nattona in the voi-ld,. &Dd the British See,.et Intei-

11gance Bul'Mu EDrPlOJ'• Eoreans and Qh1neae." ·An .Amei-1ca.n.

A14e fllOB.AEa] stated, "!he Bngliah oan solve mq qode,

' -

no mat:t• hov good,. v1th1n a week,. ao J'OU ¥111 have to com.­

munio•te eeoret •:te:r1aJ. ·- :meaaenser cml.7. " Ccmaequentl7

I b&ve beoome cautious rtn sending ~eu1ages],. t'ecring that

IQ' wtrea m&7 be solved and re&d..

(Pal"t 2)

2. Izr p•ce-time Sagland,. the A1'11Q', K&VJ',. and .A1r

J'cmce each 'bad. an &geDOJ" tor criptanal,-tic and other 1ntel·

.. r.

. J&paileae

: -

·'·

a - i166

Page 1

I

' ~ I 1·

i I I I

I

. ... I • I !

I

i I !

REF ID:A69281 -

0i'l.Pl1 11.ICP A..°'imM'EJ.\T,t' 'lilP A.miff lf.f!i'Rlt

ligenoe t'-cttv~ t:A.er.... (In tbe ltar M:Lnlotey is ,_,, .... ~·. a· '!tion

in the Intolllganco Departn1ent.) It is almost ee:·t~l..-!.n tli..L\.t

vhen the ve.r stc.i•ted '' joint S-:..cz·&t Intelligence J3l-::.~c:--l1

( ce.lled "The Bln.ck Ch«-'111ber") wa'a set up; vilicb. is cn1 .. r-ying ·

on CJ"7ptPnRlyttc vork with the ald of a Bl~eat n~~~e~ o~ ~x­

pert Spec1a:t.1atR ¢ollected tor the purpose. Rcnra\er. ¥e

do not lmcnr w.\l<> oontl'.ols this Bureau., hov it 1o orr:,e.n1.zod

or ~tb1'1g ot that aort.

(Part 3)

3. Mentions tbe.t be b•B heuad that the ~:-1.t:i.ah are

al so intercepting 'VI'i t ten C011lJITlln1cat1 ons • hAve opecia.J . esv1 tahboe.~s for listi::'i"ting iu on telephone conver~at1ons,

and e1ren have me~ns ".tor listening to conversations in

pr1va'&e rooms.

(Pai-t 4)

4 • :aee~1.!ae ot all t'heae f'acts. all or ua a!-e being

ver7 carefu1, both in the h&ndl.ing of code Dll~terials Pnd

in our per•~nei speech and behavior.

tears up and burns tho pe.pera on vh!ch 1n,~om1ng awl outgo--ing code morg11.gea h1've been Vl'1tten. heJ.'e&f'ter pleese ses

Japu!.ese C - 1166

Page 2

'1'8P Wftli! tf.&'llh\ WAR DEPARlfMERT

.. .. REF ID:A692§.l

• WAH ~.~:H'i:to!i:!.1'!ii

5. 6P 5Heftln' Ui.Ji'M:

to tt the.t mEu1ae.ces irou Japau '-o no'~ contis.iJ:L .:"'..n O!:.~•-ci?c,

text almost tdi;.nttc,a!. vi t..."Li u. public fl.r.ucuncem~nt or u

OO~l!:r. 11""1.rc • a.:id that code t.ext ha.vine t.o do vi ti:\ loct.:::.

i"il'ms ia cai-etully COL'lJ>Osed·.

(Part 5)

5. .'\ccordlng to a ataten1ent by a --lU-- of'.i.'.i.c::Lal., ·

Gel'DHlll.Y has lately gone ahead of Britain and thf.: llni·:t:d

Ste.tee 1.n cryplia..."J.alyaia. and has direotl:v under the P1·0.r-a­

gd.lldo Minis~· (?intelligenc3?) and code schacla (?L'1. vhlch

the sub~eot !s atL1dtE=td systemRticJ.ll.7?) o.nd vbich ae::.•ve

both to"J: reac&.l1ch and tratning •

.. I

, r~

""· a ... Bot r:\'V~tlab:to. L.

b - !'ext incomplete in Part 3 .

•

..

Intel" --M-- (?) Japanese Rec'd --14--Tran.a· 1601 26 Hov 45 (9387-1)

'f BP 5B9RM lf.b'!RIL WAR DEPART!fB'.r

0 - J.166

Page ·3

... ft

' ,.

.. i •

~~Qk~692jJ OJ£')-11~~~ WAR DEPAR.TM;KNT - . W f .

~· ~ -~:;;::. u-;·~ ~ . .,'A--~

From: Berlin (QMBRK) '> To: · Tokyo (Summer) (Vice Chief, General Starr) 24 August 1944 JAS

"59 Part l*

To the Vice Chief of General start and to the Chief of Ordnance Administration Headquarters:.

Gist of Colonel ITOis field report on the short course of the rortificat1ons and engineers school: ·

I. Training and other matters: 1. A good part of .the school management

visits the actu~l battlefields~ and is assigned to actual participation in th.e construction of fortifi-cations. .

: -2 .. Using a very small nulnber ot instructors, they give a short course (about 3 weeks) in the con­struction of field fortifications to 6~ officers at a time, men brought in from every area. (A good many of them are company officers with the advantage of pre­liminary training and men with eng1neer1~ background in construction, civil-engineering, etc.) - . .

~ . J. ,. 11- "°" "'' # • - Parts J,U,6.9,1ra,12 1ame_numbe»; PaJ!.ts

4 p19..g.ge.a a ; -Par-t-11---not .... reads bl&--

Inter 26 Aug 44 ( 2) Japanese Rec 1d 26 Aug 44 -Trana 1559 18 Oct 44 (}~2~-1)

WAR DEPAR't'MENT1

. .

2,5,7,g !n

. D - 6666

Thia 9hei.t of paper uul all of lta coa.tenta mut be -..aanled with the ar-m.t cue. Utmmt l8Cl'8eJ' 18 necell"PJ' to prnea.t drJ'IDI up thla mrt if Tltal l:a.te'1 ..... .,. at lta mmce.

I .

·.

REF ID:A69281 e WAR DEPARTMENT -

1£1(())IF ~JOO~IE:11

'l'eP BBSRH

Froiis 'Berlin (GMBRX) - '-'o:· 'l'olqo (SUMMER (Vice-chief, Gen. Staf't))

25 August 19-4 JAS

'59 Pat 2*

3. '!'he .subatanoe ot the t11ain1ng course is

varied to ••t ·new dewlopaents 1n the· situation. In

'the short oouraa1emphas1s 1a placed on :r1eld f'ort1t1oat1~~·

and on ~ound f'ort1f1cat1ons 1n part1oul8.l'. 'l'he7 !· i

teach the outline ot organization or rort1t1cat1ons and

the essentials Of' COD&tl'UOt!on O~ th8 V&l'10U8 kinda ot"

8.l'i'DOl'ed works. The7 ai-e taught the necessal'J practical

matters for.their duties' as supervisors or fort1r1cat1on-:

. engineer uni ts.

4. or:r1oers who have taken this short course

al'e sent pr1nc1pall7 :to the EA stern ~ant.

• - Parts 1, 3-12 same number.

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2,92) Japamse · Rec'd 26 .Aug 44 Trans 0912 5 Dec 44 (9,90-g)

D-6666

WAR DEPARTMENT Thia aheet of paper and all of lta contents muat be aafetuarded with the greatest cue. Utmoat a~ la neceaaary to prevent dl"Ylna up thia aort of Yitai lnteWtenc~ at Its aource.

I •

• 1

•

\

•

. 2 11n1t• Prom: Be~lin ( GMBRIC}

- To: 'l'olao (SUMMER(Vice 25 Auguet 1944 JAB

#059 (Part 3*)

i'he TOM OPgan1zat1on~ Which 1a attached to

· the Porat\'4tcat1ona Engineering BeadqUB.l'ters supplies

- labor [moatl7 foreign] ror the ccmstruct1on or f'Ol"f.1:t1ed

positions. Germana -drat'ted through labor aociet1ea are

ueed to direct the construction_ work.

( Pal't 2) • T~ German ArmJ'' 11 preeent :r'ort1f'1cat'1~

organ1zet1on capa.cit7.

1. Up to nov --20-- thel'e has been no aign or

autf1e1entl7 strong poa1t1one on the Eastern FJ'Ollto

* - Part 10 same number ' 7-.' ~ #- . : Pal'ta 1-2,. 4-~ not 79t readable. ~,cr1 lO"ll"'l. ta• ... ..;,lr..6 ·

Inter :26 Aug 44 (2) . · '/ffl.' ·· : "'. Rec'd 26 Aug 44

· Trana 1127 ]j Sept 44_(9'87-o) Japanese D-6666

'1'8P S'Rml&W

WAR DEPARTMENT Thia aheet of paper and all of Its contents must be safeguarded with the greatest care. Utm~t secrecy Iii necessary to prevent drying up this sort of vital lntelll&ence at Its source,

! I

'· i

.•

,

From: Berlin (OMBRK) To: !oleyo (SUMMER}(Vice Chie.t,, General Staff) 25 August 1944 JAB

#059 Part 4•. Oonsequentl7, the pos1t1oDS do not consist or

man7 zones, but or about one zone onl7. 'l'!Ua is caused

•I : .

• !

b7 the peat diat~oea of the man,- fronts and the, (?shortage?). i

of mateia.1als to construct aueh positions, as well u the

labor and the mean.a or transporting .it.

2. !'he width o~ the poa.1t1on ocoupi~d bJ' a div1a1on

depends on the terrain. Of course, '.1t 1• not alwa7a the

·a~ 1n·ever1 case, but this uauall7 amount~ ~o 15 to 20

ld.lo~ters, and at· times to -0 kilometers. . '. outline of the organization ot the posit~on.

a The position installations 8l'e very tundamental., ••••••

..4d-""" ·f:I.. *•Parts ,,6,9,10, and.12 Ssmct number; Pa:rta 1,2,5,q, and 8)

in process; part ll .not readable •.

a -.continued 1.n next part.

· Inter 26 Aug 44 (2) Japapese · Be~ 1 d 26 Aug 44 ~rans 11 Oct 4- (9,90-y)

WAR DEPARTMENT Thie aheet of paper and all of lta contents muat be aafeguarded with the areateet care. Utmoat aecrecy la neceaaary to prevent drying up thle aort of vital lntelllgence at lta source.

D-6666

!

-- .

-

e WAR~:i.~~~~~i928•

1f<e)IF ~lElce~~

1' OP SECRM"

Fl'am: '.Berlin (OMBRK) To: Tokyo (SUMMER (V1ce-Ch1e/', Oen. Staf".f')) 25 August 1944 ' JAS

59 P&l't 5*

•. • • . tbe7 meztel7 construct between the moat advantapoua . line on the battlefield (th1a is called the ''main line

ot combat") and a line 200 to 300 metal's to 1ta rear,

two liaison tl'enches running parallela to the lines.

a~ some nl0l'8 liaison t1'8nches which run.pel'pendioularb

t!> the main line. thus joining together the above two

liaison lines. TheJ' constl'1iot also- some shOl't liaison

tren.clM!la 'Which shoot otf ban the above oms. 'l'ank

.tl'aps cons1s~ ott positions covered bJ' ar"tillel'J' se"t up

on a line two to thl'ee kilometers to the Nar· o'f" the •in

line ot combat.

* - PB.l'ta 1-4 and 6-12 same numbel'. a - YCJICO ~.

' b - '1' ATE H1Jlt"D. --

WAR DEPARTMENT

D-:6666

ThlB sheet of paper, and all of ita contents muat be safeguarded with the greatest care. · Utmost secrecy la neceaaary to prevent dryln& up thlB aort of vital Intelligence at lta source.

! -

'

-'

•

REF ID:A69281 e WAR DEPAR'tMIN'l)ECRETe

'lr(())lfD &S)IEJ(O~~

From: Berlin (OMBRlt) · To:· TokJ'C) (SUMMER) (Vice Chief,, GeneMl Staff') 25 August 1944 JAB

:/1059 Part 6•.

2. Between the main combat line and the &l'tillel'J ·

support positions are the so-c&1led lines of defense. In '--

this 1nterv"3- 82'8 placed all sorts ot light and he&VJ"

~ant17 weapons. The &l't1ller7 troops are usuallJ' located

to the N&l' ot the positions on the &rt1ller7 (?line?). I

'· The positions deso:i-1bed in l a.re organised fop

invincible defense by l'einf'oroing them 1n t1me,, materials,,

and labor,, and b7 hav1llg·all units from squads to battal1ona

co:nstruat obstacles in their respective areas to afford a

trul7 desperate defense.

~i:I:.

• - Parts ,,,4,,9,,10 end 12 aame number; pa!'ta 1,,2,5~ and 8) u process; part 11 not readable.

I

Inter 26 Aug 44 (2) Japanese Rec'd 26 Aug 44

D-666p \

Trans 11 Oct 44 (9390-7)

WAR DEPARTMENT This aheet of paper and all of lta contenta muat be aateauarded With the greateatrare. Utmoa~ aecreq Ill neceaaary to prevent dryln.11 up this aort of vital lnteUJaence at ita aource.

- . -- - - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - -- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -- - - - -

REF ID:A692Bl - WAR DEPfA\l:~f' -e.

1M»? SJEce~~ From: ·Berlin ( GMBRK) To: Tokyo {Summer) 25 August 1944 JAS

059 Parts 7 and 8*

I

(1Vice Ch1et, General Statt)

III. Battle experiences bearing on the construc­tion of fo~t1f1cations:

1. Choice of pos1 tibn:_

Since positions on the forward slopes are very often prematurely destroyed by concentrated fire on the occasion of any large-scale enemy ~ffen-s 1 ve, they recommend the selection of positions on the rearward slopes. When ·positions on the rearward slopes a.re thus used, the losses inflicted by the enemy tend t'o be slighter, and the disadvantage of not being· close to the main fighting line is overcome in the fol~ lowing ways : ; .

.. One can enhance an already adequate ! fire-powe~ by guiding it through observation) etc. '. c~rried out either from commanding heights 'to the rear~ or from ~

I

(Part 8) the flank or, again, from individual pos1tione ~

set on the forward slopes.

2. Anti-tank measures: I " I

. . (1) .. When one builds the tank-traps out _in front of the main fighting lines, the disad­vantages entailed in their use as positions for . assault against the enemy are great~r than the advanta~ gained by stopping the tanks witb them. · .

Japanese .- . D - 6666

Page 1

I

WAR DEPARTMENT Thia .beet of paper and' all of lta contentll mu•t be meltuUded with the areatemt care. Utmau ucrecy la necem•ary to prevent dr71na up thl• •ort of vital lntellltence at lta 110Urc:e.

~ .

..... -.. -

\ , r

-"'

REF rn:A692Bl

e WAR nlPrafiffifi'l' e lr(())]p $IE:~~

· It is better to build the tank-traps within the main zone of tortif1cations (and prefer­ably in double lines) than out 1n front or the main f1gl1.ting ,lines.

* -.

Parts 1,2,5 in process; Part 11 not readable; Parts ,,4,6, 9,1m, 12 same number.

- ---,

- I

i .,

I ' I

Inter 26 Aug 44 "(2) Japanese D - 6666 26 Aug 44 Rec'd

Trans 14,45 19 Oct 44 ( 31lJ2f6-l )

1£3(0)? $~Elf -WAR DEPARTMENT

Thie eheet of paper and all of Its contents must be ufeguarded with the areateat care. Utmost secrecy Is neCU11111'7' to prevent clryln& up tbla aort Of vital lD.tellt.aence at lta source. . . .

I

' Page 2 :

-=~

•

•

- -- - - - r - - - - - -- -- -.i

2 UD.:l.ta

Prom: Berl1n(GMBRK) To: Tokyo {SUMMh'R 25 August 1944 JAB

1159 Part 9*

2. Teebnigu0 ot liquidating eneJQ" tanks in a

given area ..

M111.es ·will. be la.id to cover aa much as poaa1.ble . .

eve:ry sectio~ of the area. In ~ddition to this the ~

traps mentioned earlier will also be em;plo7ed to &1'l"~~t

tanlt activ~ty,. ....

3. In addition to setting up tank obstacles.

an·i;1-tcmk gµns mu~t be placed to .tire as much as possible

on evc:r·y pa,~t of' the field. .Moreover, 1n ehooaiJJg the 81Dl "' . positj_ons, it is neqessa:ry t.o. use the terrain so that the

gun.a lfi 11 not be run over b7 the tanks.

J.i.. Since the enelD1' has intant17 t:roopa .rolloving

Lhe t:• nl-:s: theec trioope must· be repulsed by :macb1ne-gun.a

J.oc.u:t.cu ncc.:r· tho o.nti-tank guns.

* - ~1c:.•t3 3 PJld 10 same numbe~ ·; P-arts l.2,4-8, 11 and :t2 noi .. yet ::.~ead('.bJ.e.

I!lter 26 AUG '~4 ('2) Japanese · rcc 1 d 26 Aug 44 -

Ti·ans 1553 18 Sep 44 ( 9:590-H)

D-6666

'IQP SEGRE

I

·J I

I "I

I

. I -:. f ~LLt~;.;; , ,.. "' . ,. I 1· ;J 6f/>

1·~-!t #, -\l I -: •

REF ID:A692B~ e WAR DEPARTMENT •

'lr<eIF $JE<e!RlEiT (.,.t 1.- i '

I "'' ', / ' l~~v~~ I ;y_'"' 7 !

i_V f' rP'r /' . .; 'l'Of SEC!tft (("v v \ y-t i¥ f ;

2· tm1ta . ,vJ)f / Pram: Berlin ( GMNtlt) T(t-a TokJ'o (SUMMER (Vice Chief'• General Starr)) ~. AUgt.'\&t J.91f.4 JAB

#059 ( Pa.rt 10*)

Theae a.nt1-ail'crart gun and machine gun positions

Bl'e constructed and eqU1pped so as to serve as nests of"

resistance.

'. Prov1s1one ror de!"e:rice aga1Dat ~ombing:

' I -

I :­i

(l} Since fort1t1cat1ona on the Atlantic Coast vel'e

deatrQJ'ed b7 he&VJ' art1llei.,- carpets {TEPPICH) • 1n the

.tut'Ul'e pe~ent fort1r1cat1ona v111 have to be protected

With armol' and caaamatea. . . ,,,.

(2) The dug outs and sun shelter• on the Atlantic

Coast were able to withstand both the capets and naval

gun tire.

• - P§lrt 3 same n1aber Part• l.-2 • 4-9 • 11-12 not 7et readable •

Inter -26 Aug 44 ( 2) . Japanese ~ec•d 26 Aug 44 '!'rans 1127 13 Sept 44 (9'87-o)

WOP SECE.!l'.

WAR DEPARTMENT Thie aheet of paper and all of lta oontenta muat be aafejuarded with the treateat care. Ut~t aecrec:y la neceaaary to prevent clrylnA up thla aort of vital ~telllgence at ita aource.

D-6666

-· '

. > II • f '""

•

•

a REF ID:A692Bla • WAR DEPARTMENT -

Jr(())? ~JEJ((;~~

: Prom: Berlin (OMBRIC) · '1'01 Tolqo (SUMMER (Vice-Chief. Gen. Starr)) 25 August 1944 JAS ...

59 Part 11*

Oun shelters 1D the rutuzre will be simple in .conatructlon.: . . but a greater number of them 11111 be bu11 t. · The th1ok- ,

DeSS of" zre1llf'Ol'Ced- CODONte shelters 18 150 centimet~ra.

vh1ch makes them 1mposs 1ble to f!destr()J'?) •

(:5) BIIO'USlltJTE11Da8 (independent cmilbat trenches

_·tor one OP two mn. attached to bunke:ra) a1'8 excellent

taz- combat purposes (Atlantic coast rort11"1cat1ons and

battle .fields 1n the east).

4. Measures against attacks rrom. the rear.

·• - Pal'ts 1-10 and 12 same number. a· - Oel'l'JlBl'l word. pl'Obabl7 RIIO~LIB.

_Inter 26 Aug 44 (2.4.92) Japanese "Rec'd 26 Aug -4 'l'rana 0912 5 Deo 4- (9j90-g)

· D-6666.

. WAR DEPARTMENT ·,. Thia sheet of paper and all of Its contents must be safeauarded ··with the areatest care. Ut~ost secrecy Is necessary to prevent drylnA up this sort of vital lntelllience at Its source.

! '

I . '

I •I -

! I

• I I ""

• REF ID:A6928.

2 Uni.ts

From: Bel".Jtl aOM!IUC) To:. Tolq'o SUMMER) (Vice Chief. General 8t&r:l') 25 August 19 JAB

#059 (Part 12*) •.

1·. Since the &DeDlJ' uauall.J' swings around and_ attacks

~ the rear. 1.t 1.s necesa&r7 to organize ke7 pos~t.1.on I • • .,

reaiatanee nests vhich can be defended on all Ji. ai.dea.

(Atl~t.1.c Coast :l'aztt.1.ficat1ons.)

2. The above has proved e:rrective through exper.1ence

on the Eastern battle line. 'l'here:f"01'8• 1n the cha1n de­

t~ae &J"Stem. too, the,- &l'8 constructing their !ntel'Jl&l.

organization on the ke7 pos1t1on res.1stance neats aJ&tem.

(See part 2~.

* - Parts }, 9 and 10 same number; parts i.2,lf.-8., 11 not i-eadable.

Inter 26 AUS 4J&. (2) Japanese Rec'd 26 Aug 44 'lr~a 1427 2' Sep 44 (960,-:r)

--·

,

. ,--- -- - - -- - - - -----:-------------------.....--

-- de Tl60

-- 'ltsu '6

REF ID:A692B:J.... e WAR DEPARTMENT •

irerF $JEJ(e]RE1f 11 SEPT 44 2327

Qi 496 52 11 SEPT 2220

B1ka fWIILA '1'0 RABAUL ·(11)

-- '

~I" Code Message #524. pats 1...:4 COJJQ>lete.

In a.·· certa~ a.Na. there vaa considerable dela7 in the

: diaposal ot cr11>tosraph1c_mater1a1a atter communications uaing

them had ~en •topped. It was onl7 attar purchasing tobacco

.from aome natives and diecoverins that pages beam. the A:l!'lq . Add.re•• Codebook 13•had been uaed as 'Wl'&ppings tor thia tobacco

. . I· .that ve rc3l1zed the c~irptographic me.~~r1al& had been compzaom1sed.

'.rhi• 1nc1.~r.n.t which oacw11ec;. in the Southern Area leads us to

·believe that the mats:&."i&l bas .tall.en into 8nem.J' hand.a.

The mmeroue occurrence• ot' compro~ae are deplm.ble.

eapeo1al17 1n viev or the preaa1ng var a1tuat1on. ~ I

In the near tuture n'll\11eroua tnea ot new material• ¥111 be

1aaued, t;he distribution or which Will entail considerable d1.tt1-

cult7. _.or this reason, ve 1na1at' that there be no deviation ..

hom the Ngul.at1ona governing the distribution and tN.11Gport

ot these materials. in order that the aeaurit7 ot the ArmJ''• codes be preserved and allotments &rPive aate17.

Communication codebooks and discriminant add.itiv• books as

vell as convera1on·aquares.eto.have·eaa117 diatingui,hable

~cteioi•ti:x:gp ~ 1-tb;', !'hi• 1• • :

WAR DEPARTMENT RX-:5911-, Th.ls aheet of paper and all of - ufe&uarded. with the areateat care. Utmoet aec:recy I• neceuary to prM1 -- sort Of vital intelll&encet~Ul'48·

t... fi .L

-- - - - - - - - - - - - ,_ -

,,

-- - - -- - - -----------------------· REF ID:A692BJ...

• WAR DEPARTMENT •

iro>IP ~CC~1E!i1r zc =· &ra1'c:tma

I

Meea~e add:Pe111eed toi

All ott1C88 under OUP direct COD~l901

•OKA (!'8UKASA• ltAM.PlfGUB YASD' TE'J.'SUD'O'

SBIREIBU. BAMP?iJU?f B'&:lt! lt!VBUIBV.

11AJIPOOUR L''r:IJK.'f1' J ~AI) JIORI (HiltARI)

BAY.A3BI

AltATSTJn

SAMB'a° HOMBU -.

._

w .:.J. l ;. ··r-r·· ..... rr- •··· -r,.J J. ..., I;, U.::..1 _,. 't. ··~ .: ;.. e.,.

Trans 13 Oct Ji.4

WAR DEPARTMENT

F11 9C6 49'0 '782 reo' Fll 743 1225 70~8 ~,10 Fll 289 0351 26Q.I~ 8997

' Rlt•:5943

Thia sheet of paper and all of lta .l#iln~e aafeguarded with the greatest care. Utmoat aec:recy Iii Dece888l'J" to pze )a sort of Yitai lnteJll11tence at fta source.

___,__ ____ - - - - - -- - - -- - - - -- -- - - --

I

!'

I

I ' I .

--.·r:---------------------y

REF ID:A692~ e WAR DEPARTMENT •

1r@IF &$JlEJCC~~

•

de 10280 ,,

'f su 28

RJ!E: -·E--Manila to Menado

F '87·12-A

~Q28 238 8131 0073 3887

10 Jul. 44 1852 95

On 299 52 9 Ju1 44 2:;20

"I" Sta.ti' #l"Message #&76, Part l

~cause there are man7 careless points 1n the

handling of' --lG-- secret documents, the7 get lost

(stolen). The i'l'equent occurrences· (of' this) are in­

deed very regrettable. Recentl7 ve got. a spy l'eporta .. that tho e12emy is planning to steal Ol'del's and import-

ant docum.ents~an all fronts, so ---

. a - CHQH<J.

Thia sheet of paper and all of Its contents must be aafeguarded with the greatest care. Utmoet secrecy la neceeeary to prevent drying up this sort Of vital Intelligence at It• source.

I

' !1 I I I

.. • 1

' i' '

.1 • I~

' . I I I . : : j

--- ------- - - - -- ..... - --- -- - -- - --- --- -·--~-----~·-

.. e 2Ja..

--- de 6440

' 1628 'M TO M (M)

... REF ID:A6928 •

w. 1\. 6.l 'f'6P SB8RM

29 JUL 44 1425

o 2,a 59

95

1i' 29 JUL 1400

TRABS.# 1026

IltIOI SEii Sta.ff Meaaage /1154- parta 1 and 2

Begiiin1ng 1 Auguat.11 please use temporar117 (unt11 the arrival

ot th8 main bod7 ot the OUB SHIBBIBU) the JWJAYAXI SB'UDAB Codebook

when oomm.un1cat1Dg v1th our SED'!O SBIREI.To.

Pul'ther. trom the point ot v1ev ot the present var situation

ooncem1ng the BIAJt and BOEMPOOR detachments,, there 1a an exoeee

ot 114.gmarole and vaate.' of time connected with the compilation

and d.1atr~but1on ot C17Ptograph10 materials. In add1 t1on. ve '

are afraid that communioation will become impoasible. aince the

materials m&J not be read7 on time. Under theae ,circumstances.

piease

End message

V .s.# W6 985 5,,1 2132 8568 . W6 454 3574 0~81 5~65 .

c.I. Comment Tqis is the original of the "rigamarole and waste of time" reference. ~QP SB9RB!'

~ ..-1

I

REF ID:A6928.

7552

J.ilrom: Vash111ft:ton (Af'@h.an Hin:1ster) (Afghan I.egat1on) To: Kabul_ {Fo~1gn. Otfiee) l'.5 AUguet 1944 APA

//23/23 a.

In continuation or my dispatch #584 • For aome time

now the Legation has been without a serva.nt. All m:r efforts

in various cities tluaoUsh employmei~t agencies, peroonal

Afghan and Indim1 acqu.ai:ntancea., and otlm:r agencies -= and

even.also 1n Can.ad.a - ha.ve been utterly fruitless. The

State Depe.3.~tment unott1c1all7 has aleo mnde many attempts

to hE!lP me. Moreover, ever7 sel'"VWl t d$ttJRnds a. t<sge of

tventy-~ive dollars.

This situation is unbearable Es.D.d has driven me to

desperation. Two days ago I had to open the door myself

tor the Irani.an M1n1ste:r•. Then. since there vaa no one

to open the door· tor the man vho came to read the el0ctPic

meter, I ho.d to excuse ~self from His Ex.cellenc7 to go

open the door tor him.

--u-~ theretora either send me at once a capable

servant,, or grant me immediately the salary I have pro­

posed. or send a Minister vho is able 'to endure th~G state

ot ar.tatrs, sine~. with al.l due respect,, I have ne1tJler the

Que.11fioat1ons of & doorman nor those ot a aweepe~. -a - not ava1~able. Inte~ 15 Aug ·44 (59) Af'ghan fi~l,6160 Rec'd 17 Aug 44 · Trans 20 Aug 44 (5040-B}

'f 9P SBGRJPP

i ..

'· I I

I ' .. I

• I

-From: To .:

' ...

7 Oct 47

9 Sep 470 51

-~t the beginliing or one ot your telegrams there is a . - . : .

tive-letter group Ml>GSC. Wh.&t a1gn1f:fcance hail this?

Cipher Office.

..

' -

• •• - ,t. .. _

55

(bL 86-36/~o u~p 3605 .go 3,3(h)(2) ....

-- -_GR 17

-+ -

·r- --=! - -Mr .~.ft. ... : • ., •

. . I \ 1 ·-:·

• -~- '!: r

; - ,

' 7 Oct 47 · ·

From: I · : , .. To .. : ....._ ____________________ ___, 13 Sep JJ7

67

_ . · -~1 Your :telegram received& • .:,.. .. ~--

'. -, - ;-· ~- : }·~,~he f1ye-letteI" group MDG.SC at the beginning of the -• ·t . . . -

.'~:_.-:. ~ea11age has absolutely no Bigni?icance. It was

...... · . ~ ;.;.::t.~~- • . . :. . ·-" ,:,. r Iii.iii lead -~riyone here studying "cryptanalysis :1~nto

--: r·rz.~· . ,- -. . . ..... :.:.z ...... ,. .... ·- .: ... ,'' ' . was the bame ota codebook.

a ~I -:

added solely to­

th1nk1ng that it

'l'! 'il'R . -'&. .....__..,,.... _ _____,...._I·

83 "•• • I

TT·- 4-oc-t 47 1722Z - :.. .. 1=..

GR 25

COPY -·

,_ '-··-~ -...

••~ " "' I

; ,

i . - j I - • • , .

. .. ! I •

.... - .. , I :

i

' ~'¥;:~;; :~ - '. -~--fla'at~~~ . _, ___ - -- - ------=~-----. ---------+---·-·