OP Approach: 3Phase OP Build, Clear & Hold. 1st. WAS & Stability, CLOSE- BUILD while understanding OE, influence Principales and Isolate & Protect Population in centers and deny ENY access. 2nd. CAM & OFF, DEEP - CLEAR while visualizing and directing – clear ENY LOG bases & capability, recruiting.3rd. WAS & DEF, SECURITY – HOLD while describing ideas to Principales, POP, HNSF, Defeat ENY support & rifles & Enable local HN GOV to rule and achieve end state.End state: Safe and secure S. Luzon OE w/ legit HN GOV & transition capable to HNSF.Conditions (P/M): Stateside pressure to end the war (P);deceleration of M law & GO 100 (M). COG: Principales influence POP(O), Rifles & Ammo (T)Decisive Points: Use of Principales to allow Isolation of POP, DEST of ENY LOG and Rifles/AmmoBasing: major POP centersLOO/LOE: Small unit patrols; isolate barrios OP Reach: Southern Luzon, no issues – to man troops on FOBs and Monsoons can slow/limit reach. Tempo: Slow to understand/BUILD, fast to CLEAR, slow to HOLD and defeat ENY.Simultaneity/Depth: Bell was able to maintain tempo while simultaneously executing a pacification campaign Phasing/Transitions: Build, Clear, Hold. Culmination: Soldiers (manpower) prevented Bell from culminating. Disease and monsoon – could force slowRisk: Health of soldiers; time to successfully complete the pacification campaign, % of troops on FOBS.Theorist Synthesis: Govern ungoverned space; control the population; integration of positive and negative feedback into barrios. Trinquier, Clausewitz, Kalvais, Galula.

EOA 7: Philippines 1900-1902, General Franklin Bell’s Elements of Operational Art in Southern Luzon

Timeline: Third Separate Brigade Pacification Campaign in Southern Luzon

Before 30 November 1901- Sumner was in charge of the OE and was unable to separate the insurgents from the locals and had many inccidnets.1 December 1901-30 April 1902: Pacification Campaign in Southwest Luzon1-25 December – Bell met this the majority of Principales and discussed his ideas, and solicited their opinions and support for his operations. 1 January 1902: Counter-guerrilla operations begin16 April 1902: Malvar surrendered 6 May 1902: Malvar issued last manifesto23 June 1902: Batangas province transferred from military to civilian government4 July 1902: President Theodore Roosevelt proclaimed Philippine Insurgency has ended.

Third Separate Brigade, Department of North Philippines.

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OP Approach: INDIRECT APPROACH

PROBLEM STATEMENT: HOW DO I:

1. Defeat the Insurgent forces2. Pacify the Population3. Establish a Legitimate Government4. Provide a safe and secure

environmentIOT: Promote Economic and Civil Security from local to national level government.DURATION: approx. 7 months or UTC GIVEN: US Volunteers & regulars 5-7,500 AGAINST: armed and experienced insurgencyIN CONSIDERATION TO:

1. Disease ridden area2. Cultural & Language Barriers3. Mature and complex Insurgent

Networks4. Varied and difficult terrain.5. Limited infrastructure and road

networks6. Political pressure (local and US)7. Continuing reorganization of US forces

by LDRS

EOA 7: Philippines 1900-1902, General Franklin Bell’s Elements of Operational Art in Southern Luzon

TENENTS OF ULO for this OPERATION:Flexibility – Local CDRS seize & retain initiative and use HNSF & Local ROL to winAdaptability – CDRs understand OE/problem and are able to shift / keep initiative. Integration – HNSF & Principales and Navy-blockade, POL/MILLethality – when Attacked – kill as many as you can, Reduce # of rifles/ammoDepth – blockade & CAM attacks to limit and destroy ENY basesSynchronization – No Safe areas/NGAs – Support local LDRS – Influence POP – Deny ENY access

Third Separate Brigade, Department of North Philippines.

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ENY OBJS: Lengthen war, maintain control of the cities through the principales, Avoid major tactical engagements with the US Army, Maintain their recruitment of locals to support their cause.