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Online Appendix for Managing TerrorPeter Schram October 14, 2015 Contents I Historical Appendix and Other Examples 2 1 Background on the Haqqani Network and AQI 2 1.1 The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Qaeda in Iraq: 2003-2010 ................... 2 1.2 Haqqani Network ........................................... 5 2 Other Examples of the Model 6 II Model Appendix 6 3 Folk Theorem Proof 6 3.1 Folk Theorem Example ....................................... 7 4 Principal’s Strategies 8 4.1 No Contracting Strategy: ...................................... 8 4.2 Transfer Contracting Strategy .................................... 8 4.3 Worst-Case Organizational Contracting Strategy ......................... 9 5 Proving Proposition 0 9 5.1 Part 1: Define the Vertices of the Convex Hull .......................... 10 5.2 Part 2: Define the Efficiency Frontier ................................ 11 5.3 Part 3: Determine the feasible and efficient set: .......................... 13 6 Calculating “Worst Payoff” for the Principal 15 III Estimation Appendix 16 7 Structural Estimation Example 16 8 Recovering Number of Subversive Acts 17 IV Model Extension 17 9 Motivation 18 1

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Page 1: Online Appendix for Managing Terror · intercepted by the United States in 2008) portrayed AQI as a highly dysfunctional organi-zation that, amongst other things, was never able to

Online Appendix for “Managing Terror”

Peter Schram

October 14, 2015

Contents

I Historical Appendix and Other Examples 2

1 Background on the Haqqani Network and AQI 21.1 The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Qaeda in Iraq: 2003-2010 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21.2 Haqqani Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

2 Other Examples of the Model 6

II Model Appendix 6

3 Folk Theorem Proof 63.1 Folk Theorem Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

4 Principal’s Strategies 84.1 No Contracting Strategy: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.2 Transfer Contracting Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84.3 Worst-Case Organizational Contracting Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

5 Proving Proposition 0 95.1 Part 1: Define the Vertices of the Convex Hull . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105.2 Part 2: Define the Efficiency Frontier . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115.3 Part 3: Determine the feasible and efficient set: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

6 Calculating “Worst Payoff” for the Principal 15

III Estimation Appendix 16

7 Structural Estimation Example 16

8 Recovering Number of Subversive Acts 17

IV Model Extension 17

9 Motivation 18

1

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10 Auditing Model 1810.1 Actors and Organization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1810.2 Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1910.3 Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

10.3.1 Agent Stage Game Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2110.3.2 Principal Stage Game Utilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

10.4 Supergame Utilities and Strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

11 Principal’s Strategies 2311.1 Equilibria and Parameter Space Refinements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2311.2 No Contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2311.3 Transfer Contracting . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2411.4 Organizational Contracting with Auditing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2511.5 Principal’s Decision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

12 Mechanics of Organizational Contracting with Auditing 2812.1 First Deviation: Cell member deviates from xm,t = ρt to xm,t = 1 for one round . . . . . . . 2912.2 Second Deviation: Cell leader deviates from xl,t = ρt to xl,t = 0 for one round . . . . . . . . . 3012.3 Third Deviation: Cell leader forms homogeneous cell for one round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

12.3.1 Preventing single round deviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3112.3.2 Preventing multiple round deviation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3212.3.3 Preventing single and multiple round deviation: constructing the auditing

function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3312.4 Forth Deviation: Defecting and avoiding punishment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

V Leadership Targeting Analysis: Data, Alternative Explanations and Ro-bustness 33

A Summary of Targeting Data, May 2007-April 2008 33

B Alternative Explanations 34B.1 Alternative Explanation: Opportunistic Violence, Infighting, and Retaliation . . . . . . . . . 35B.2 Ruling out Alternative Explanations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

C Robustness Checks 35C.1 Population Normalized . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35C.2 Dropping Governorates and Months . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36

Part I

Historical Appendix and Other Examples

1 Background on the Haqqani Network and AQI

1.1 The Islamic State of Iraq and Al-Qaeda in Iraq: 2003-2010

The group that became al-Qaeda in Iraq was started by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian

militant with personal and financial ties to Osama bin Laden. After fleeing Afghanistan

following the 2001 US invasion, Zarqawi began supervising camps run by of Ansar al-Islam,

a Kurdish-Sunni terror organization operating in northeastern Iraq. In early 2004, Zarqawi

2

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established the militant group Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to resist US military forces in

Iraq. On October 2004, he publicly declared allegiance to Osama bin Laden and renamed the

group Tanzim Qaidat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (which translates to “the Organization

of Jihad in the Country of Two Rivers”), and the group became known as al-Qaeda in Iraq.

Though Zarqawi was killed in June 2006, the organization outlived its founder and provided

the foundation for the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) today.

From the beginning, AQI possessed ambitious goals. In addition to attempting to incite

a civil war through attacks on Shi’a civilians, AQI sought to expel American troops from

Iraq, overthrow the established Iraqi government, and establish an Islamic state operating

under Sharia law. To meet these goals, AQI was particularly brutal. Whereas most Sunni

insurgent groups used conventional and guerrilla tactics against US and coalition forces, AQI

used these tactics as well as suicide attacks targeting members of the Iraqi Security Force,

UN troops, humanitarian workers, and Shi’a Iraqi civilians. AQI also controversially engaged

in the beheading of Iraqi and foreign hostages, which led to al-Qaeda Central (referring to the

primary network of al-Qaeda operatives in Afghanistan and Pakistan, hereafter referred to

as AQC) to warn Zarqawi in November 2005 that such tactics might weaken Iraqi civilians’

support of the group (CTC, 2005).

Over the course of 2006, tensions rose between AQI and local Sunni insurgent groups due

to AQI’s AQI’s move into racketeering and smuggling (which had previously been a major

source of revenue for the other Sunni groups), and AQI’s killing of members of other Sunni

insurgent groups (Fishman, 2009). This tension was made public on September 17, 2006,

when several Sunni tribes in the Anbar Province announced an alliance with US forces and

pledged to fight AQI. This event, known as the “Day of Awakening” or the “Anbar Awaken-

ing,” is viewed as a major turning point for the US military and Iraqi government (Biddle

et al., 2012). Support for the Awakening movement grew as AQI continued to attack Sunni

groups and as AQI on 15 October 2006 created their own political entity, the Islamic State

of Iraq (ISI), which claimed to be the legitimate government across much of Iraq.

The declaration of the ISI openly demonstrated AQI’s political intent, but also had a tactical

purposes. The ISI was an institution that AQI leadership hoped would absorb other tribal

and insurgent groups; if the ISI was indeed the “true” Islamic rulers of Iraq as they claimed,

rebelling against their dictates, as those in the Anbar Awakening were doing, was a violation

of Islamic ideology (Fishman, 2009). However, the declaration of the ISI did little to change

the attitudes of the tribes that had already turned against AQI, and it created additional

tension among the militant groups that were allied with AQI but were not willing to accept

3

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the ISI as the true Islamic government of Iraq.

The violent and criminal behavior of the members of AQI continued to alienate other Sunni

militant groups. In late 2007, the Islamic Army in Iraq, an umbrella group of Sunni insurgent

and tribal organizations, denounced the ISI. While AQI attempted to reach out after the

statement, this progress was hindered by AQI’s dysfunction and the actions of its members.

Around this time, AQI began turning away foreign fighters, but this did not seem to stop

the group’s decline. By 2010, the US military reported 80% of AQI leadership had been

removed, and in the first five months of 2010 the number of attacks and casualties on US

troops were at the lowest level since 2003 (BBC, 2010).

A great deal of insight into AQI’s decline can be gathered by the “Analysis of the State

of ISI,” a leaked internal document which circulated to al Qaeda leadership. Beginning in

2006, AQC became concerned with what was being done in Iraq, and requested information

on the inner workings on the group. The document that was reported back (which was later

intercepted by the United States in 2008) portrayed AQI as a highly dysfunctional organi-

zation that, amongst other things, was never able to properly integrate foreign and local

fighters into a cohesive fighting force. In addition to the quote introducing the paper, the

group discusses the counter-productive behavior of local Iraqi fighters:

“It reached a stage where one of the brothers who was stationed close to one of

the IEDs that was originally set to target one of the renegades, saw one of the

American’s convoy passing by and did not set off the IED off, and he was later

asked about his behavior and he answered, and we wish he did not, that he did not

have orders to attack the Americans ???!!!!... The apostates and the Americans, as

a result, started launching their attacks to destroy us. We lost cities and afterward

villages, and the desert became a dangerous refuge.”(CTC, 2007)

Because of the failure to integrate foreign mujahideen into the group, in 2007 AQI began

turning foreign fighters away. This action highlights the extent of the personnel problems

that the group faced; as AQI was losing ground in Iraq, leadership determined it would be

better to turn manpower away than to try to take on additional soldiers.

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1.2 Haqqani Network

Since its inception in the 1970s, the Haqqani network has developed into the most lethal

terrorist network operating in Afghanistan today (Dressler, 2012). Geographically, the group

has a number of operational and training bases in the North Waziristan region of the Fed-

erally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan and has a strong insurgent presence in the

Loya-Paktiya region in Afghanistan. While technically the group was subsumed by the

Afghan Taliban in 1995 and group members have played a strong role in assisting the Tal-

iban’s takeover of Kabul and other areas in Afghanistan pre-2001, the leaders of the network

still maintain control over actions taken in the Loya-Paktiya region and still have indepen-

dent funding sources.

The Haqqani network possesses two non-exclusive goals: to control the security environment

in the greater Loya-Paktiya region in Afghanistan, and to help foster the global Jihadist

movement (Dressler, 2012; Brown and Rassler, 2013). To meet these goals, the Haqqanis

welcomed Arab jihadists to their group.

After the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan, the Haqqani network as well as a num-

ber of other mujahideen groups fought to topple the communist Democratic Republic of

Afghanistan. Arab jihadis were involved in the Battles of Jalalabad (1989), Khost (1990-1)

and Gardez (1991), but as the Battle of Jalalabad demonstrated, the Arab fighters were not

necessarily well utilized. After several commanders at the Battle of Jalabad refused to coop-

erate or lead the Arab mujahideen into battle, one of Jalaluddin Haqqani’s colleagues– Haji

Khalid– commanded these forces into what was generally agreed upon as a poorly planned

and executed battle. However after the Battle of Jalabad, Ma’afi Khan, a Haqqani comman-

der, noted that ”the lack of a unified, structured command [at the battle] created a huge

obstacle on our way to success,” and the Haqqanis adapted their organization. The next

year, in the Battle of Khost, for the first time Arab mujahideen fought under the command

of other Arabs who were integrated into the Haqqani chain of command. The new command

structure appeared effective as both Khost and Gardez fell to the Haqqanis, and in time

these victories proved instrumental in the decline of the communist government (Brown and

Rassler, 2013). The integration of foreigners continued throughout the history of the group,

and to further ensure local and foreign fighters continue to work together, the Haqqanis

today are known to have assigned facilitators who act as liaisons between indigenous and

foreign fighters (Dressler, 2010).

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2 Other Examples of the Model

• Lawyers and Economists in the FTC (covered in Wilson (1989)). The US Federal

Trade Commission employes both lawyers and economists. Wilson discusses how these

two types of actors possess different preferences over what types of cases they work

on. For example, Wilson claims lawyers are happiest with pursuing allegations that two

companies have conspired to fix prices, while economists are happiest with the discovery

that the market power of a company may reduce industry competition. By integrating

both parties, the FTC becomes a more effective organization.

• Actors in the Forest Service: Wilson (1989) discusses how, between 1950-1980, the US

Forest Service changed from being composed of almost entirely foresters to a group

including engineers, biologists and economists. Wilson claims this diversity of actors

made the Forest Service an agency that was better able to represent the interests of the

public.

Part II

Model Appendix

3 Folk Theorem Proof

Folk Theorem: For any (vl, vm) ∈ V with vl > EUl[SNE] and vm > EUm[SNE], there ex-

ists a δ such that for all δ ∈ (δ, 1) there is a subgame-perfect equilibria with payoffs (vl, vm).

Proof: Let X (ω) refer to a mixed action profile that assigns a fixed probability weight

to a set of action profiles.1 Assume there is an action profile X (ω) with EUl[X (ω)] = vl

and EUm[X (ω)] = vm and consider the following strategy profile: In period 1 each player

plays the action profile defined by X (ω). Each player continues to play X (ω) so long as the

realized actions were those defined by X (ω) in all previous periods. If at least one player did

not play according to X (ω), then each player plays SNE for the rest of the game.

Letting X ∗l (ρt) denote the terror cell leader’s optimal deviation from X (ω) given ρt, this

strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium when:

Ul,1(X ∗l (ρt)) +δEUl[SNE]

(1− δ)≤ Ul,1(X (ω), ρt) +

δEUl[X (ω)]

(1− δ)1For simplicity, it is assumed this cannot be correlated with type.

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Which can be re-written as:

(1− δ)(Ul,1(X ∗l (ρt))− Ul,1(X (ω), ρt)

)≤ δEUl[X (ω)]− δEUl[SNE]

This inequality is satisfied for a range of δ < 1 because it holds strictly in the δ = 1 limit.

This profile is subgame perfect because in every subgame off the equilibrium path, the strate-

gies are to play SNE.

Additionally, the assumption that there exists a EUl[X (ω)] = vl and EUm[X (ω)] = vm

for all (vl, vm) ∈ V is proven in the first part of the proof for Proposition 0.

3.1 Folk Theorem Example

In the example in the paper, it is assumed δ → 1, and then the principal’s worst possibleoutcome is selected. The example below considers the “best case” for the principal, when theagents both match action to ρt for all t.

First, for the best-case to be feasible, it is assumed that (1− ρ)(1− 32β) + βρ

2> 0. Without

this assumption, the foreign agent does strictly better playing the Nash stage game equilib-ria (setting xm,t = 0). This assumption could be relaxed, but it would require considering amixed strategy on the Pareto frontier.

For matching action to the state of the world to be sustainable in a infinite horizon gamewith a grim-trigger strategy, it must be that the two inequalities hold:

−1 + 32β

(1− ρ)(2β − 1)≤ δ

−1 + 3β2

ρ(2β − 1)≤ δ

These are the requisite conditions for a domestic fifer (above) and a foreign fighter (below).

In the top condition, as ρ moves towards 1, the condition is more difficult to support (re-quires a larger discount rate). In the bottom condition, as ρ moves towards 0, the conditionbecomes more difficult to support. This is fairly intuitive. If ρ = 0, then the foreign typemember would perform poorly matching action to the state of the world, and could be muchbetter selecting xm,t = 1. The reverse holds for the domestic type fighter. This impliesthat δ can be lowest for values of ρ closer to 1/2. While this condition is influenced by theassumption that agents match action to the state of the world in organizational contracting,generally equilibria on the efficiency frontier are easier to be sustained with values of ρ thatare not very close to 0 or 1.

For both conditions below, as β increases, δ must increase to support the cooperative action.This is also intuitive- if β was low, then inefficiency costs are low, which means matchingaction to the state of the world only has small benefit.

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4 Principal’s Strategies

4.1 No Contracting Strategy:

Information Decision: i = 0

Partnering Decisions: a = d

Breaking Ties Decision: b = nr

Action Strategies: xl,t = xm,t = 0 for all ρt, h(t), and t.

Expected Payoffs:

EUl = EUm = −(1− β)ρ/(1− δ)EUp = −2ρ/(1− δ)

4.2 Transfer Contracting Strategy

Information Decision: i = 0

Transfer Contract: For all t, set gl,t = (3β2− 1)xl,t + β

2xm and gm,t = (3β

2− 1)xm,t + β

2xl

Partnering Decisions: a = d

Breaking Ties Decision: b = nr

Action Strategies: xl,t = xm,t = ρt for all ρt, h(t), and t.

Expected Payoffs:

EUl = EUm = −(ρ− βρ)/(1− δ)EUp = −θ(4β − 2)ρ/(1− δ)

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4.3 Worst-Case Organizational Contracting Strategy

Information Decision: i = 1

Organizational Contract: If a = d, then b = r

Partnering Decisions: a = f

Breaking Ties Decision: b = nr

Cell Leader Strategies: In t = 1, play Action Profile 1 with probability α = −4βρ+β+2ρ(β−2)(ρ−1)

,

and Action Profile 2 with probability 1− α. If in period t− 1 the cell member does not do

the same, then play xl,t = 0 for all remaining t. If not, then continue mixing over action

profiles 1 and 2.

Cell Member Strategies: In t = 1, play Action Profile 1 with probability α, and

Action Profile 2 with probability 1 − α. If in period t − 1 the cell leader does not do the

same, then play xm,t = 1 for all remaining t. If not, then continue mixing over action profiles

1 and 2.

Expected Payoffs:

Ul = −[α(β(1+ρ

2) + (1− β)(1− ρ)) + (1− α)βρ

]/(1− δ)

Um = −[(1− α)β(1− ρ) + αβ(1−ρ

2)]/(1− δ)

Up = − [ψ + α(1− ρ)] /(1− δ)

5 Proving Proposition 0

Definition: This paper will refer to the three action profiles by their specified number:

• Action Profile 1 : xl,t = 1, xm,t = ρt for all t.

• Action Profile 2 : xl,t = ρt, xm,t = ρt for all t.

• Action Profile 3 : xl,t = ρt, xm,t = 0 for all t.

Proposition 0: If δ → 1, the set of efficient SPNE strategies are constructed by mixingover Action Profiles 1 and 2, and over Action Profiles 2 and 3.

9

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The roadmap for the proof is as follows. First, I will demonstrate that the payoffs of thethree action profiles above are three of nine vertices to the convex hull of possible payoffs.Second, I will identify the efficiency frontier of action profiles. This will be accomplished byidentifying the action profiles not on the efficiency frontier as Pareto inferior to the convexcombination of action profiles on the frontier. Finally, I will identify the feasible set of actionprofiles as defined by the Folk Theorem.

5.1 Part 1: Define the Vertices of the Convex Hull

First it must be shown that the expected value of any single-stage payoff can be generated

through some combination of selecting xl,t ∈ {0, ρt, 1} and xm,t ∈ {0, ρt, 1}.

Abusing notation, let xm ∈ [0, 1] and xl ∈ [0, 1] denote two arbitrary action profiles in

time t. Abusing utility notation , the payoff for the terror cell leader (domestic type) for this

arbitrary action profile is:

Ul,t(fixed) = −βxl + xm2

− (1− β) ∗ |ρt − xl|

And the payoff for the terror cell member is:

Um,t(fixed) = −β(1− xl + xm2

)− (1− β) ∗ |ρt − xm|

With these profiles fixed, it is necessary to define the probability weight each agent places

on the pure strategies. These are:

η = Pr(xl,t = 0), κ = Pr(xl,t = ρt), 1− η − κ = Pr(xl,t = 1)

λ = Pr(xm,t = 0), µ = Pr(xm,t = ρt), 1− λ− µ = Pr(xm,t = 1)

Without loss of generality, assume λ and µ are fixed so that xm = µρt + (1 − λ − µ).

When this holds, then the expected payoff for the terror cell leader from mixing over 0, ρt,

and 1 is:

EUl,t(mixing) = η[−βxm

2− (1− β) ∗ ρt

]+ κ

[−βρt + xm

2

]+ (1)

+(1− η − κ)

[−β 1 + xm

2− (1− β) ∗ (1− ρt)

]

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If EUl,t(mixing) can be equivalent to Ul,t(fixed), then it has been shown that through a

convex combination of xl,t ∈ {0, ρt, 1}, any payoff from an arbitrary action profile can be

expressed. For the two utility terms to hold with equality, it must be that:

xl = κρt + (1− η − κ)(1)

&

|ρt − xl| = ηρt + (1− η − κ)(1− ρt)

If ρt 6= 0, these are two independent equations defined by two variables (κ and η). Therefore,

a closed form solution exists.2 If ρt = 0, then the system of equations is dependent, and any

η and κ such that xl = 1− η − κ will solve the equation above.

By fixing η and κ such that xl = κρt + (1− η − κ)(1), it can also be shown EUm,t(mixing)

can be made equivalent to Um,t(fixed).

Therefore, the vertices below define the convex hull of payoffs in stage t for a fixed ρt:

Action ordered pair (xl,t, xm,t)(Asterisk Denote Efficiency

Frontier)

Payoffs (Ul,t, Um,t)

(0, 0)∗ (−(1− β)(ρt), −β − (1− β)(ρt))

(0, ρt) (−β ρt2− (1− β)(ρt), −β(1− ρt

2))

(0, 1) (−12β − (1− β)(ρt), −1

2β − (1− β)(1− ρt))

(ρt, 0)∗ (−β ρt2, −β(1− ρt

2)− (1− β)(ρt))

(ρt, ρt)∗ (−βρt, −β(1− ρt))

(ρt, 1) (−β ρt+12, −β(1− ρt+1

2)− (1− β)(1− ρt))

(1, 0) (−12β − (1− β)(1− ρt), −1

2β − (1− β)(ρt))

(1, ρt)∗ (−β ρt+1

2− (1− β)(1− ρt), −β(1− ρt+1

2))

(1, 1)∗ (−β − (1− β)(1− ρt), −(1− β)(1− ρt)

Note that the action ordered pair (xl,t, xm,t) notation will be used throughout the rest of

this and the following section.

5.2 Part 2: Define the Efficiency Frontier

It remains to be shown that the following convex combinations (in the table below) define

the efficiency frontier for any realization of ρt. For the line equation in the table below, I

2As an example, if ρt > xl, then κ = xlρt

and η = 1− xlρt

.

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abuse notation further and let the “x” term denote terror cell leader’s expected utility, and

the “y” term denote the terror cell member’s expected utility.

Connecting Points Line equation

(1, 1) to (1, ρt) y = −4βρt + 2−2ρtβ

+(

2β− 3)x+ β + 6ρt − 4

(1, ρt) to (ρt, ρt) y = β∗(β(2ρt−1)−2ρt+2)β−2

+ ββ−2

x

(ρt, ρt) to (ρt, 0) y = β(2ρt − 1)− 2ρt + (β−2)βx

(ρt, 0) to (0, 0) y = b2(4p−3)+b(2−6p)+2p3b−2

+ x b2−3b

Note that moving from the (1, 1) to (1, ρt) line to the (1, ρt) to (ρt, ρt) line has the slopes

strictly decreasing. This similarly holds for moving from the (1, ρt) to (ρt, ρt) line to the

(ρt, ρt) to (ρt, 0) line and so on. This implies the the function defined by these line segments

is concave, which means that any convex combination outside of the ones defined above

would be Pareto inferior. For example, any point on the (1, 1) to (ρt, ρt) line is weakly worse

than a point defined on the frontier above.

It remains to be shown that the action profiles (0, ρt), (ρt, 1), (0, 1), and (1, 0) are Pareto

inferior to the efficiency frontier for all ρt and β. This is accomplished as follows. First,

for each Pareto inferior action profile, I identify the terror leader’s utility from that action

profile as falling within a certain segment (or multiple segments, depending on parameter

values) of the efficiency frontier. For example, for Pareto inferior action profile (0, ρt), the

terror cell leader does better under (0, ρt) than under (ρt, ρt), and worse under (0, ρt) than

under (ρt, 0). Therefore, through some convex combination of strategies on the efficiency

frontier (mixing strategies (ρt, ρt) and (ρt, 0)), it is possible to give the terror cell leader a

payoff equivalent to his payoff from (0, ρt).

With the first part identified, I then take the terror cell leader’s utility from the inferior

strategy (from the (0, ρt) example this is −β ρt2− (1− β)(ρt)), and I plug it into the x value

of the respective segment of the efficiency frontier. This will identify the utility value for

the terror cell member when the terror cell leader is receiving his equivalent payoff on the

efficiency frontier. If this calculated utility value for the terror cell member is greater than

the utility of the terror cell member from action profile (0, ρt), then the point on the frontier

is Pareto improving.

The following table identifies the Pareto inferior action profiles, the segment(s) of the ef-

ficiency frontier that the inferior action profiles lies below, and the Pareto improving point

that lies on the frontier. It also defines the “outside condition;” the outside condition defines

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under what conditions the inefficient point falls under the designated segment of the Pareto

frontier. This is:

InefficientPoint

Falls on followingsegment of

Pareto-frontier

Outsidecondition?

Pareto improving point

(0, ρt) (ρt, ρt) to (ρt, 0) Always(−β ρt

2− (1− β)(−ρt), 5β2ρt−2β2−8βρt+4ρt

)(ρt, 1) (1, ρt) to (ρt, ρt) Always

(−β ρt+1

2, (3β2−4β)(ρt−1)

2(β−2)

)(0, 1) (1, ρt) to (ρt, ρt)

β2(2β−1)

≥ ρt

(−β ρt+1

2, 6β2ρt−3β2−6βρt+4β

2(β−2)

)(0, 1) (ρt, ρt) to (ρt, 0) β

2(2β−1)< ρt

(−1

2β − (1− β)(ρt),

(3β−2)(2βρt−β−2ρt)2β

)(1, 0) (1, 1) to (1, ρt)

2−2β2−β > ρt

(−1

2β − (1− β)(1− ρt), −2βρt−7β+2ρt+4

2

)(1, 0) (1, ρt) to (ρt, ρt)

2β−2β−2≤ ρt, &0 ≤

1− ρt − β2

(−1

2β − (1− β)(1− ρt), β(2βρt−β−2ρt+2)

2(β−2)

)(1, 0) (ρt, ρt) to (ρt, 0) 0 > 1− ρt − β

2

(−1

2β − (1− β)(1− ρt), 2β2ρt−β2+2βρt−4β−4ρt+4

)Through algebra, it can be seen that the inefficient action profiles are in fact Pareto in-

ferior to the defined points in the right most column. Thus, the combinations of the five

action profiles above define the efficient set.

5.3 Part 3: Determine the feasible and efficient set:

It remains to be shown where the feasible set lies. By the Folk Theorem, this is all points

that exceed the minmax payoffs for the two agents in the terror cell. Based on the table

immediately above, in expectation the terror cell leader’s minmax utility falls within the

(1, ρt) to (ρt, ρt) range. This can be seen because β2(2β−1)

≥ ρ for all possible β and ρ.3

The minmax payoff for the terror cell member can fall within two possible segments on

the efficiency frontier. When 3β−2(4β−2)

≤ ρ then it falls within the (ρt, ρt) to (ρt, 0) segment.

When 3β−2(4β−2)

> ρ holds, it falls within the (1, ρt) to (ρt, ρt). An example of this is shown

below in Figures A1 and A2 show this for a fixed β = 0.75 and either ρ = 0.15 or ρ = 0.55.

Note the blue polygon represents the convex full of possible payoffs.

3This is because β ∈ (2/3, 1] and 2ρ ∈ ( 12, 1].

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In either case, the set of efficient and feasible outcomes can be defined by over mixing

Action Profiles 1 and 2 and by mixing over Action Profiles 2 and 3.

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6 Calculating “Worst Payoff” for the Principal

It is assumed state-contingent mixing is not possible. This implies that the agents cannot

select one mixing profile for some values of ρt and a different mixing profile for a different set

of values for ρt. Because the principal does best when agents select (ρt, ρt) any movement

along the Pareto frontier away from this action profile makes the principal strictly worse. it

can be seen from Figure A1 and A2 that the principal will do worst when one of the agents

is receiving his minmax payoff.4

First consider the minmax for the terror cell leader. In expectation, the terror cell leader

would receive −β2− ρ+ βρ when agents play their stage-game Nash equilibrium action pro-

file. Because in expectation this utility falls between the utility from action profiles (1, ρt)

and (ρt, ρt), I let λ denote the probability of matching action to (1, ρt), 1 − λ denote the

probability of matching action to (ρt, ρt), and solve:(−β

2− ρ+ βρ

)< α

(−β ρ+ 1

2− (1− β)(1− ρ)

)+ (1− α) (−βρ)

This gives:

α <−4βρ+ β + 2ρ

(β − 2)(ρ− 1)

The Folk Theorems imply that this value of α is an upper bound on how much the (1, ρt)

action profile can be played.

I also need to consider the minmax payoff for the terror cell member. It should be noted that

if the terror cell member’s minmax utility falls within the (ρt, ρt) to (ρt, 0) segment, then the

principal does worse when the minmax for the terror cell leader is achieved (defined by α

above). To reach the terror cell member’s minmax when the cell members are mixing over

the (ρt, ρt) to (ρt, 0) strategies, I let γ denote the probability of playing the (ρt, 0) action

profile:

−1

2β − (1− β)(1− ρ) < γ

(−β(1− ρ

2)− (1− β)(ρ)

)+ (1− γ) (−β(1− ρ))

4In the first part of this proof, it was shown that any payoff in the convex hull of payoffs forthe agents could be achieved by mixing over 0, 1, and ρt. Along the Pareto frontier, becausethe principal’s payoffs are linear, the full set of payoffs for the principal can be achieved bymixing over Action Profiles 1, 2, and 3. This implies that this section is, in fact, calculatinga “worst case.”

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This gives:

γ <−4βρ+ 3β + 2ρ− 2

(β − 2)ρ

Comparing the upper bounds of α and γ, αupper > γupper. For ease, the paper will simply

set α with equality to the upper bound for calculating utilities. Therefore, the worst the

principal can do is when the terror cell leader achieves his minmax payoff while mixing over

(1, ρt) and (ρt, ρt) with probability weights by α and 1− α (respectively) as defined above.

Part III

Estimation Appendix

7 Structural Estimation Example

(Local Kill)i,t(Fired upon)i,t + (Local Kill)i,t

= (Zarqawi)tβ1 + FEi + ωi,t

Consider what this model means for a single district (district i) for two periods (one before

the Zarqawi targeting, and one after). By Assumption 1 β1 is equal to:

β1 =(Not subversion)i,2 + (Subversion)i,2

(Not subversion)i,2 + (Subversion)i,2 + (Fired upon)i,2−

− (Not subversion)i,1 + (Subversion)i,1(Not subversion)i,1 + (Subversion)i,1 + (Fired upon)i,1

+ ψi,2 − ψi,1

Decomposing the ψi,t terms and expressing the above (whenever possible) in terms of the

principal’s preferred levels gives:

β1 =(Not subversion)∗i,2 + (Subversion)i,2

(Not subversion)∗i,2 + (Fired upon)∗i,2−

−(Not subversion)∗i,1 + (Subversion)i,1

(Not subversion)∗i,1 + (Fired upon)∗i,1+ µi,2 − µi,1

By the definition of ρi,t (using (7)) and taking expectations gives:

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E [β1] = −E [ρi + εi,2] + E [ρi + εi,1] + E [µi,2 − µi,1] +

+E[

(Subversion)i,2(Fired upon)∗i,2 + (Not subversion)∗i,2

]−

−E[

(Subversion)i,1(Fired upon)∗i,1 + (Not subversion)∗i,1

]Which, by Assumption 1, 2, and 3, can be re-written:

E [β1] = E[

(Subversion)i,2Ki,2

]− E

[(Subversion)i,1

Ki,1

]

8 Recovering Number of Subversive Acts

The following establishes the technique for recovering a lower bound:

minimize [(Subversion)i,post−Zarqawi − (Subversion)i,pre−Zarqawi]

Such that:

β1 =(Subversion)i,post−Zarqawi

Ki,post−Zarqawi− (Subversion)i,pre−Zarqawi

Ki,pre−Zarqawi

Using the condition on β1 above and substituting this into the top generates:

minimize

[Ki,post−Zarqawi ∗ β1 +

Ki,post−Zarqawi ∗ (Subversion)i,pre−ZarqawiKi,pre−Zarqawi

− (Subversion)i,pre−Zarqawi

]Because violence in Iraq was continuing to grow, it is assumed Ki,post−Zarqawi > Ki,pre−Zarqawiin this setting. Therefore, to minimize the difference, the level of subversion pre-Zarqawishould be fixed at 0. Therefore, the lower-bound of post-Zarqawi subversion can be measuredas: β1 ∗Ki,post−Zarqawi.

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Part IV

Model Extension

9 Motivation

In the existing “Managing Terror” model, there are two concerns. First, it might be expected

the principal could develop a sense of if a terror cell was subverting, investigate to see if

this was the case, and then punish or disband the cell if subversion was occurring (in other

words, the principal might possess the ability to audit and punish). Second, once the agent’s

terror cell is organized, the cell stays with that organizational structure for the remainder of

the infinite horizon game (in other words, there is no changing from a homogeneous to het-

erogeneous formation, or vice versa). This extension addresses these two concerns, though

is less concise and more technical.

The following is written as a stand-alone model. Much of this is redundant with the model

that currently exists in “Managing Terror.”

10 Auditing Model

10.1 Actors and Organization

In the game, the principal offers contracts to agents within a terror cell. Feminine pronouns

refer to the principal, and masculine pronouns refer to the agents.5 Within the cell, there

are two classifications of agents. One agent is classified as the “terror cell leader.” The terror

cell leader will select another agent, the “terror cell member,” to act as a partner, and these

two agents will repeatedly conduct operations.

Each agent has a type, denoted y ∈ {d, f}, which corresponds to if an agent is domestic

(y = d) or foreign (y = f).6 It is assumed the terror cell leader is a domestic type.7 Thus,

when the cell leader selects a partner, either he forms a homogenous cell by selecting a type

y = d agent as partner, or he forms a heterogeneous cell by selecting a type y = f agent as

partner. The terror cell leader’s choice is denoted by a ∈ {d, f}, where a = d is forming a

homogeneous cell and a = f is forming a heterogeneous cell. For simplicity, it is assumed the

terror cell leader has the option to work with either a single foreign type agent or a single5This assignment was determined by a randomizing procedure and is done entirely for convenience.6This framing should not only be considered for the foreign-local fighter dichotomy. It can also be though, more generally,

of two types of agents possessing different and offsetting preferences.7While this model assumes this is not a strategic choice, even if the principal could select this, she would be weakly worse

off by letting an agent of type y = f act as terror cell leader.

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domestic type agent– in other words, the foreign agent and domestic agent that the terror

cell leader selects from is the same throughout the game.

Crucially, while the principal knows the type of the terror cell leader, the principal does

not costlessly observe the type of the terror cell member (in other words, she does not cost-

lessly observe a). If the principal chooses to learn the type of the terror cell member, she

must incur a one-shot cost, denoted by Ψ.

10.2 Structure

The games structure is presented below, then expanded upon.

1. The principal offers contracts.

2. The terror cell leader forms a terror cell (sets partner type a ∈ {d, f}).

3. Nature sets the state of the world ρt.

4. The agents in the terror cell select actions xl,t ∈ [0, 1] and xm,t ∈ [0, 1].

5. The principal’s action utilities are realized.

6. The principal has the “audit” option to pay cost Ψ and assess the previous cell compo-

sition.

7. All utilities are realized.

8. The principal has the option to reject (or “break”) the terror cell by setting b ∈ {r, nr}.If disbanding occurs, all players receive reservation utility for the remainder of the game.

9. The game repeats infinitely, starting at Step (1) .

Each period of the game can be broken into three components. Stages (1) and (2) comprise

the organizational component, where the terror group is formed. Stages (3)-(4) comprise

the operational component, where agents observe the situation on the ground and conduct

operations. Stages (5)-(8) comprise the auditing component, where the principal gains in-

formation, chooses to audit (or not), and then chooses to disband the terror cell (or not).

It should be noted that this final component is most relevant when the principal chooses to

audit the agents.

In (1), the principal specifies a contract for the stage game. One form of contracting has

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the principal offer a utility transfer to the agents in the terror cell. In period t, a transfer to

the terror cell leader is denoted by gl,t ≥ 0, and a transfer to the cell member is denoted by

gm,t ≥ 0. The set of transfers given to the terror cell leader and terror cell member in period

t is gt.

In (2), the terror cell leader selects his partner’s type by setting a ∈ {d, f}.

In (3), the state of the world is realized. The state of the world is denoted by random

variable ρt ∈ [0, 2ρ], which identifies the action profile that the principal most prefers at pe-

riod t. It is assumed 2ρ ∈ (12, 1], realizations of ρt are independently drawn from a uniform

distribution, and the agents observe the state of the world but the principal does not. When

ρt is low, the conditions on the ground are such that AQI leadership would prefer its agents

take more actions directed against domestic actors to secure local power; if ρt+1 < ρt, AQI

leadership would prefer its terror cells to take more actions against domestic actors in period

t+1 than in period t. The reverse holds for ρt being high and attacks against Coalition forces.

In (4), each agent in the terror cell selects an action. The terror cell leader’s action is

denoted by xl,t ∈ [0, 1] and the terror cell member’s action is denoted by xm,t ∈ [0, 1]. The

principal observes these selections. When agents select low values of xm,t and xl,t, this rep-

resents the agents selecting operations targeting domestic actors. When agents select high

values of xm,t and xl,t, this represents the agents selecting operations targeting coalition

forces. The actions are aggregated to determine xt, which denotes the profile of violence

being carried out by the terror cell. The following equation determines xt:

xt =xm,t + xl,t

2(2)

In (5), the principal’s “action utilities” are realized. The “action utilities” are the utili-

ties the principal receives from the actions the agents are undertaking. Formally, this is

UaP,t − |xl,t − ρt| − |xm,t − ρt| + εt, where εt is a i.i.d. random variable (assumed uniform

for ease with εt ∈ [−ε, ε]). This will be described below, but essentially here the principal

receives a noisy signal from the terror cell if the agents are subverting (or not).

In (6), the principal has the ability to monitor the composition of the terror cell (setting

It ∈ {0, 1}). Doing so incurs cost Ψ. This strategy can be conditional on terms of a contract

instituted in (1).

In (7) all utilities (agents and principal) are realized.

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In (8), the principal can disband the terror cell. The principal’s choice is denoted by

b ∈ {r, nr}, where b = r corresponds to the principal rejecting the cell and b = nr cor-

responds to the principal not rejecting the cell. If the principal rejects the cell, all agents

and the principal receive their reservation utility (denoted U0a and U0

p respectively) in each

period.

In (9), the game repeats starting with step (1).

10.3 Utilities

10.3.1 Agent Stage Game Utilities

The utility functions for the stage game are presented then described below. For the

terror cell member, the utility function of a domestic type agents is:

Um,t(xm,t, ρt, gm, y = d) = −βxt − (1− β) ∗ |xm,t − ρt|+ gm,t (3)

And for a foreign type terror cell member:

Um,t(xm,t, ρt, gm, y = f) = −β(1− xt)− (1− β) ∗ |xm,t − ρt|+ gm,t (4)

First consider the −βxt term in the utility function of the domestic type agent. The domes-

tic agent prefers taking actions that secure local power and prefers other agents within their

terror cell do the same. Therefore, as the profile of violence xt moves further away from the

domestic fighter’s ideal point of xt = 0, he incurs a disutility. The β term can be thought of

as a utility weight the agent places on the value of actions he prefers relative to the cost of

conducting actions. This similarly holds for the foreign fighters, whose ideal violence profile

is xt = 1.

The −(1− β) ∗ |xm,t− ρt| term captures the inefficiency from deviating from the state of the

world. Because ρt represents the most efficient action profile for conducting an insurgency,

any deviation from ρt generates a cost borne by the agent.8

The gm,t term denotes transfers.

8This assumption could be relaxed and the cost of one agent deviating from ρt could also be borne by both members of thecell; changing this assumption does not radically change the model and will therefore not be considered.

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The terror cell leader (who is always a domestic type) has utility:

Ul,t(xl,t, ρt, gl) = −βxt − (1− β) ∗ |xl,t − ρt|+ gl,t (5)

It is assumed β ∈ (23, 1). This assumption implies an important feature: for a single iteration

of the stage game, the Nash equilibrium outcome has agents match action to their ideal point

rather than the state of the world.

10.3.2 Principal Stage Game Utilities

The principal’s stage game utility is:

Up,t(xl,t, xm,t, ρt, gt) = −|xl,t − ρt| − |xm,t − ρt| − θgt − iΨ

The −|xl,t − ρt| and −|xm,t − ρt| terms captures the disutility the principal receives when

agents select actions that differ from the state of the world. The θ term (with θ > 0) is a

constant capturing the relative cost of transfers to the agents. The ψ term (with ψ > 0) is

a constant capturing the information cost of learning the terror cell member’s type.

10.4 Supergame Utilities and Strategies

The variable X denotes the sequence of actions played in the stage game, or X =

{(xl,1, xm,1) (xl,2, xm,2), ...}. Similarly, ρ denotes the sequence of realized values of ρt, or

ρ = {ρ1, ρ2, ...}. The variable G denotes the sequence of realized transfers, or G = {g1, g2, ...}.Finally, the variable δ denotes the discount rate of the agents and principal. Conditional on

the principal not selecting b = r, the utilities of the agents in the terror cell are:

Ul(X , ρ, G, d) =∞∑t=1

δt−1Ul,t(xl,t, ρt, g, d)

Um(X , ρ, G, y) =∞∑t=1

δt−1Um,t(xm,t, ρt, g, y)

And the principal’s utility is:

Up(X , ρ, G, i) =∞∑t=1

δt−1Up,t(xl,t, xm,t, ρt, gt)

The agent’s and principal’s strategies are mappings from all information sets to strategy

profiles. Because this is an iterated game, this is a mapping from the period number t, the

state of the world ρt, and the t-history (denoted h(t)) into an action profile for period t. The

mapping Sl will denote the strategy for the terror cell leader, Sm will denote the strategy for

the terror cell member, and Sp will denote the strategy for the principal.

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11 Principal’s Strategies

11.1 Equilibria and Parameter Space Refinements

This paper will only consider subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Additionally, this paper

will introduce an efficiency refinement:

Efficiency Refinement: Strategy S is efficient if there does not exist strategy S ′ such

that for i, j ∈ {l,m}, i 6= j denoting the agents in the terror cell:

Ui(S ′, ρ, G, y) > Ui(S, ρ, G, y) and Uj(S ′, ρ, G, y) ≥ Uj(S, ρ, G, y).

This is Pareto-efficiency applied to the agents in the terror cell. The refinement implies

if two agents are interacting repeatedly, the outcome will not be such that one player could

be made better off without making the other player worse off.

This paper will also introduce Condition 1:

Condition 1: When Condition 1 is in place, U0a = U0

p = −1.

This condition ensures all actors are better off when the principal does not walk-away from

the terror cell (b = nr). While relaxing Condition 1 could speak to the agents’ and prin-

cipal’s decision to join into the terror group, this is outside of the scope of the question

motivating this paper.9

The following subsections will describe the strategies the principal selects from. It is as-

sumed that the principal will select one of these three strategies, and implement it in the

first stage of each iteration.

11.2 No Contracting

In this setting, the principal offers no contracts for each iteration of the stage game.

When this occurs, the terror cell leader will form a homogeneous terror cell and agents will

set xl,t = xm,t = 0 for all periods. The principal will neither audit nor terminate the terror

cell. The expected utilities are: EUl = EUm = −(1− β)ρ/(1− δ) and EUp = −2ρ/(1− δ).To summarize the selected actions:

1. The principal offers no contracts.

2. Terror cell leader sets a = d.9Two papers that explore the importance of the outside option are Bueno de Mesquita (2005) and Berman and Laitin (2008).

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3. N/A

4. Agents set xl,t = xm,t = 0.

5. N/A

6. The principal does not audit.

7. N/A

8. Principal does not reject, setting b ∈ nr.

9. The game repeats.

11.3 Transfer Contracting

Consider the setting where the principal uses transfer payments to get agents to match

their action to the state of the world. For simplicity, Assumption T is in place:

Assumption T: It is possible for the principal to make take-it-or-leave-it (TIOLI) con-

tracts to the agents in the terror cell.10

With Assumption T in place, the principal can commit to pay a transfer to agents af-

ter observing the action profiles. Consider what a transfer schedule of gl(xl,t, xm,t) =

(3β2−1)xl,t+

β2xm,t and gm(xm,t, xl,t) = (3β

2−1)xm,t+

β2xl,t would accomplish for two domestic

type agents. For the terror leader, the new utility function can be written as Ul,t = βρt− ρt.This transfer schedule makes the terror cell leader indifferent over his own actions and the ac-

tions of his partner.11 With this transfer schedule, it is equilibrium behavior for the terror cell

leader to partner with a domestic type agent and to match action to the state of the world.12

The expected utilities are EUl = EUm = −(ρ−βρ)/(1− δ) and EUp = −θ(4β− 2)ρ/(1− δ).

To summarize the selected actions:10While generally pushing aside the issue of credible commitment should be viewed with caution, there are two reasons why,

in this setting, assuming the possibility of binding contracts is actually fairly benign. First, while this game is only concernedwith a single terror cell, in reality AQI or the Haqqani Network uses many cells for conducting operations. By reneging onagreements for a single cell, these groups would damage their reputation which could lead to systemic repercussions throughoutthe organization. Second, in the case when the contract defines a transfer payment conditional on an action (as it is here), ahigh enough discount rate can make the principal’s contract self-enforcing. Therefore, assuming credible commitment is possibleis a technical simplification.

11

If the β2xm,t term was not included in the transfer schedule, agents would be indifferent over their action profiles, but would

have their utilities decreasing in the action profiles of their partner; without the β2xm,t term, the efficiency refinement would

imply both agents setting xl,t = xm,t = 0 would be the equilibrium.

12A different transfer contracting strategy exists where the agents form a heterogeneous terror cell and the principal offerscontracts to make them indifferent. While this different outcome is technically very similar, it does highlight the fact thatforeign fighters can be used in the transfer contracting setting.

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1. The principal offers gl(xl,t, xm,t) = (3β2−1)xl,t+

β2xm,t and gm(xm,t, xl,t) = (3β

2−1)xm,t+

β2xl,t

2. Terror cell leader sets a = d.

3. N/A

4. Agents set xl,t = xm,t = ρt.

5. N/A

6. The principal does not audit.

7. N/A

8. Principal does not reject, setting b ∈ nr.

9. The game repeats.

11.4 Organizational Contracting with Auditing

The principal can require a heterogeneous terror cell to form. In a heterogeneous terror

cell in the non-repeated setting, it is a stage-game Nash equilibrium for the foreign and

domestic agents to match action to their type. However, for these agents, through repeated

interactions it constitutes a Pareto improvement to select some action profile that is closer

to matching action to the state of the world. Thus, in an infinitely repeated setting with a

heterogeneous cell and a high enough discount rate, a Pareto improving state can be reached

that is both better for the agents and better for the principal.13 To explain what occurs, the

folk theorems provide a great deal of insight.

Introducing the folk theorem in use here requires some notation. Let SNE denotes the

iterated stage game equilibrium for a heterogeneous cell. This is simply both agents se-

lecting their most preferred action profile (xl,t = 0 and xm,t = 1 for all t). Let EUl[SNE]

and EUm[SNE] denote the expected per-period payoffs for the terror cell leader and mem-

ber when they implement the stage game equilibrium. The expected-payoff convex hull as:

V = convex hull{(vl, vm) | ∃ (xl,t, xm,t) with EUl(xl,t, xm,t) = vl & EUm(xl,t, xm,t) = vm}.13Consider the strategies if period t = 1 was a one-shot game, ρ1 = 1

2, and a heterogeneous terror cell formed. In this game,

the Nash equilibrium has both agents matching action to their type (xl,t = 0 and xm,t = 1). This is inefficient because if bothplayers could commit to setting xl,t = xm,t = 1/2, then the cell would be committing the same violence profile without paying

the inefficiencies. In a repeated setting where ρt always equals 12

, a repeated prisoners’ dilemma type game arises, and theFolk Theorems imply that for a certain strategy profile and sufficiently high discount rate, always setting xl,t = xm,t = 1/2 is

a subgame perfect equilibrium. While ρt does not always equal 12

in the game here, through repeated interactions the sameintuition can be applied.

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The V term can be thought of as the set of feasible per-period payoffs, in expectation. Fi-

nally, δ denotes the discount rate for the principal and agents.

Folk Theorem: For any (vl, vm) ∈ V with vl > EUl[SNE] and vm > EUm[SNE], there

exists a δ such that for all δ > δ there is a subgame-perfect equilibria with payoffs (vl, vm).

The Folk Theorem implies for a high enough discount rate, a range of feasible equilibria

are possible. For ease, this model will only consider a single efficient equilibrium, where a

heterogeneous terror cell is formed and agents match action to the state of the world. This

is Assumption C:

Assumption C : When agents form a heterogeneous cell, they will match action to the

state of the world.

There are reasons to suspect that the equilibria where both agents match action to the

state of the world is particularly focal. For a sufficiently high discount rate, not only is it the

simplest efficient equilibria to implement, but it is also what the principal would encourage

coordination upon. If this rationale is not compelling, it is also important to note that this

is a stronger assumption than necessary; the model in the main paper demonstrates that

even the in principal’s “worst case,” organizational contracting can still be better for the

principal. Here Assumption C provides simplicity, as the auditing procedure is already

notation-heavy. For these reasons, this assumption is in place, and the full set of conditions

on δ and ρ that allow for this assumption will be discussed in the following section.

The equilibrium is described below.

Recall that the audit procedure is in place to identify if operations were conducted by a

homogenous or heterogeneous terror cell. At the outset of the game, the principal defines

an auditing function as part of a contract. The auditing function assigns a likelihood of

auditing given the realization of actions (xl,t and xm,t) and the action utility for each period

t. In defining their supergame strategies, the agents choose between two types of profiles.

First is the “cooperative profile,” which has both agents set xl,t = xm,t = ρt. Next is the

“punishment profile,” which has the terror cell leader set y = f and xl,t = 0 and the terror

cell member set xm,t = 1.

The strategies are:

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• Principal: For all periods, if auditing occurs and the terror cell is homogenous, disband

the cell. An audit occurs under two conditions:

– 1) Audit with probability defined by function γ(UaP,t).

– 2) Audit in period t+ 1 if xm,t 6= xl,t.

• Terror Cell Leader and Terror Cell Member: The terror cell leader sets y = f

and both agents start playing the strategies in the cooperative profile. If there is no

deviation, the terror cell leader continues to set y = f and agents continue playing the

strategies defined by the cooperative profile. If either (or both) agents deviate from the

actions defined in the cooperative profile, enter the punishment profile for the remainder

of the game.

One final term must be introduced. Letting K = max{ε, 1 − β}, the full auditing function

defining the probability of audit, γ(UaP,t

), is:14

γ(UaP,t

)=

(−UaP,t−K

2

)((2β−1)(1−δ)−U0

Aδ−β(ρ)δ

)if Ua

P,t≤ K

1 otherwise

In defining the expected utilities, it is useful to let γ =(K

2

) ( (2β−1)(1−δ)−U0

Aδ−β(ρ)δ

), which is the ex-

pected probability that the principal will audit. With this in place, the expected utilities are

EUl = −βρ/(1− δ), EUm = −(1− β)ρ/(1− δ), and EUP = −γΨ/(1− δ).

To summarize the selected actions:

1. The principal will audit under two conditions: 1) Audit with probability defined by

function γ(UaP,t), and 2) audit in period t + 1 if xm,t 6= xl,t. If auditing occurs and the

terror cell is homogenous, disband the cell.

2. Terror cell leader sets a = f .

3. N/A

4. Agents set xl,t = xm,t = ρt.

5. N/A

6. The principal audits based on the contract defined in stage 1.

14It should be noted that this is not the only auditing function that would work.

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7. N/A

8. The terror cell will never be homogeneous; the principal will always set b ∈ nr.

9. The game repeats.

The mechanics of how this auditing scheme works will be left to the final section. For audit-

ing to be a feasible strategy, a series of inequalities must hold. The first set of inequalities

pertains to δ exceeding some cutoff point. The second inequality is a technical condition that

allows the strategy of both agents matching action to the state of the world to be feasible.

It should be noted that for a sufficiently high discount rate, there will be Pareto-efficent (for

the agents) strategies that do not require this additional condition.

The section below is concerned with payoffs.

11.5 Principal’s Decision

The principal maximizes her expected utility by deciding to use transfer contracts, orga-

nizational contracts, or no contracts at all. Using the payoffs from the respective strategies

gives Proposition A1:

Proposition A1 : Suppose Condition 1, Condition T, Assumption C, and As-

sumption T hold, and δ → 1. If organizational contracts lead to the worst-case for the

principal, then an equilibrium exists where the principal selects:

• Transfer Contracting Strategy if γΨ/(1− δ) > θ(4β − 2)ρ and 2ρ > θ(4β − 2)ρ,

• Organizational Contracting with Auditing if γΨ/(1−δ) ≤ θ(4β−2)ρ and 2ρ > γΨ/(1−δ),

• No Contracting Strategy otherwise.

Proof: This follows from payoffs above.

12 Mechanics of Organizational Contracting with Auditing

For organizational contracting with auditing to be feasible, four deviations from the strat-

egy above must be considered. The first two deviations involve a heterogeneous cell. These

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are when the foreign agent or domestic agent deviates and sets their action equal to some

point that is not the state of the world. The third deviation to consider has the principal

align with a domestic type actor and deviate from the strategy of matching action to the

state of the world for at least one round (and then returning to a heterogeneous cell and

matching action to the state of the world). The forth deviation is the terror cell leader not

matching action to the state of the world in the heterogeneous cell, then forming a homoge-

neous cell (thus avoiding the terror cell member’s punishment phase).

To summarize, to prevent these deviations, there must be three conditions on δ (that δ

must be greater than a fixed value), and one technical condition (which is discussed in detail

below. Letting K = max{ε, 1− β}, these are:

−1 + 3β2

2βρ− ρ≤ δ

−β2− 1 + 2β

−1 + ρ+ 2β − 2βρ≤ δ

(−Ua

P,t −K)( (2β − 1)

2(−U0A − β(ρ))

)≤ δ

1− δ

3β − 2

4β − 2≤ ρ

12.1 First Deviation: Cell member deviates from xm,t = ρt to xm,t = 1 for one

round

To keep the terror cell member (foreign type) from not matching action to the state of the

world, the threat of entering the “punishment phase” must be sufficiently high. This would

require:

−β[1− (1 + ρt)

2

]− (1− β)(1− ρt)−

δ(β(

12

)+ (1− β)(1− ρ))

1− δ≤ −β(1− ρt) +−δβ(1− ρ)

1− δ

The left side of the inequality is the terror cell member’s expected utility from deviating from

the “cooperative phase” in period t to xm,t = 1 and then entering the punishment phase. The

right hand side is the expected utility from cooperating in period t (and all periods after).

Note that the incentive to deviate will be greatest when ρt = 0. Thus, the cell member

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does better cooperating when the inequality below holds:

−1 + 3β2

2βρ− ρ≤ δ

This constraint also demands what will be known as the “technical condition.” It must be

that the terror cell member’s min-max payoff is less than his cooperative payoff. This holds

when:

3β − 2

4β − 2≤ ρ

Intuitively, this condition implies that in expectation, ρ is not too far away from the foreign

member’s ideal point. When ρ is close to zero, then the foreign type does strictly worse by

matching action to type rather than simply playing his stage game Nash equilibrium. It

should be mentioned that this technical condition is necessary because this section is only

considering the case when agents match action to the state of the world. As was shown in

the proof for Proposition 0 (in the body of the main paper), for a sufficiently high discount

rate a range of efficient and feasible equilibria exist. This technical condition ensures the

xl,t = xm,t = ρt action profile falls within the efficient and feasible set for a sufficiently high

δ.

12.2 Second Deviation: Cell leader deviates from xl,t = ρt to xl,t = 0 for one

round

To keep the terror cell leader (domestic type) from not matching action to the state of the

world, the threat of entering the “punishment phase” must be sufficiently high. This would

require:

−β(ρt2

)− (1− β)(ρt)−δ(β

(12

)+ (1− β)(ρ))

1− δ≤ −βρt +− δβρ

1− δ

The left side of the inequality is the terror cell leader’s expected utility from deviating from

the “cooperative phase” in period t to xl,t = 0 and then entering the punishment phase.15

The right hand side is the expected utility from cooperating in period t (and all periods after).

Note that the incentive to deviate will be greatest when ρt = 1. Thus, the cell member

15A deviation to xl,t = 0 is the most valuable deviation for the domestic agent, so satisfying this constraint would also satisfyany other deviation.

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does better cooperating when the inequality below holds:

−β2− 1 + 2β

−1 + ρ+ 2β − 2βρ≤ δ

12.3 Third Deviation: Cell leader forms homogeneous cell for one round

Consider the setting where the principal deviates by partnering with a domestic type

agent for at least one round. There are two possible outcomes:

12.3.1 Preventing single round deviation

Here the terror cell leader forms a homogeneous terror cell for one round. In this setting

the terror cell member (domestic type) would select the stage-game Nash equilibrium strategy

and set xm,t = 0. Letting xl,t = ρt − ql denote the cell leader’s selected action (with ql ∈(0, ρt]), and letting π denote the probability that an audit occurs, the principal must define

the audit function to make the terror cell leader weakly worse off choosing this strategy:

−βρt − ql2− (1− β)ql + (1− π)

[−β(ρ)δ

1− δ

]+ π

[U0Aδ

1− δ

]≤ −βρt +− δβρ

1− δ

The left side of the inequality is the terror cell leader’s expected utility from deviating

from the “cooperative phase” in period t to forming a homogenous cell and setting xl,t = 0.

This would then invoke an audit with probability π, or the game would continue with a

heterogeneous cell with probability 1 − π. Note that doing this for one round and then

reverting back to the foreign type agent sets the agents back to the cooperative profile,

unless the cell leader is caught and the cell is disbanded. For the threat of audit to be a

sufficient deterrent, the following must hold:

βρt(1− δ)2(−U0

Aδ − β(ρ)δ)+

(32β − 1)(1− δ)−U0

Aδ − β(ρ)δql ≤ π

This defines the auditing scheme in relation to q, the amount each agent deviates from the

state of the world, and ρt, the state of the world. Importantly, both of these variables are

unobserved. However, the principal can condition the probability of audit on her realized

utility from the stage game (as will be shown below). In the case of a single round deviation,

it is useful to note the principal’s expected action utility has the property:

E[UaP,t

]= E [−ρt − |xm,t − ρt|+ εt] = E [−ql − ρt + εt] = −ql − ρt

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12.3.2 Preventing multiple round deviation

The terror cell leader can also create a homogeneous terror cell for more than a single

round. If this is the case, the terror cell member and leader must select the same action

profile in all remaining rounds (lest they would trigger an audit with probability 1).

There are several ways forming a homogeneous cell for multiple rounds could work. In one

setting, the terror cell leader could plan to form a homogeneous cell for all rounds greater

than or equal to t, only stopping when the principal terminates the game. Alternatively, the

terror cell leader could establish a randomization procedure, where with some probability

he will terminate forming a homogeneous cell and revert to a heterogeneous cell. For an

auditing scheme to prevent both cases from occurring, it would be sufficient to prevent a

single-round deviation where both agents set xl,t = xm,t = ρt − q, with q ∈ (0, ρt].16 For the

auditing scheme to be effective, it must be that:

−β(ρt − q)− (1− β)q + (1− π)

[−β(ρ)δ

1− δ

]+ π

[U0Aδ

1− δ

]≤ −βρt +− δβρ

1− δ

The left side of the inequality is the terror cell leader’s expected utility from deviating from

the “cooperative phase” in period t to forming a homogenous cell and setting xl,t = xm,t =

ρt− q (these are the first two terms). This would then invoke an audit with probability π, or

the game would continue with a heterogeneous cell with probability 1− π. Note that doing

this for one round and then reverting back to the foreign type agent sets the agents back

to the cooperative profile, unless the cell leader is caught and the cell is disbanded. For the

threat of audit to be a sufficient deterrent, the threat of audit must increase with q by the

following inequality:

(2β − 1)(1− δ)−U0

Aδ − β(ρ)δq ≤ π

This defines the auditing scheme in relation to q, the amount each agent deviates from the

state of the world. While q is unobserved the principal can condition the probability of audit

on her realized utility from the stage game (as will be shown below). In the case of a single

round deviation, it is useful to note the principal’s expected action utility has the property:

E[UaP,t

]= E [−|xl,t − ρt| − |xm,t − ρt|+ εt] = E [−2q + εt] = −2q

It should be mentioned that this value is different that the value the expected utility takes

in the setting with a unilateral deviation.

16Note that while this is sufficient to prevent this type of action from happening, it may not necessarily be the most efficientauditing scheme to prevent this kind of deviation.

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12.3.3 Preventing single and multiple round deviation: constructing the auditingfunction

A successful auditing function would prevent both types of deviation. To achieve this,

three issues must be considered. First is the rate at which the probability of audit increases

with q. In the inequalities above, the rate at which the probability of audit conditional on

q increases faster in the multiple-round deviation. Second, the probability of audit must be

non-negative and less than or equal to one. Third, in the case of a single-round deviation,

the expected probability of audit must be at least βρt(1−δ)2(−U0

Aδ−β(ρ)δ)regardless of what action the

terror cell leader selects. Through algebra, it can be shown that for K = max{ε, 1− β}, the

following audit procedure accommodates all these considerations:

γ(UaP,t

)=

(−Ua

P,t −K) ( (2β−1)(1−δ)

2(−U0Aδ−β(ρ)δ)

)if Ua

P,t≤ K

1 otherwise

Note that in order for this audit schedule to be feasible, it must be that(−Ua

P,t −K) ( (2β−1)

2(−U0A−β(ρ))

)≤

δ1−δ

12.4 Forth Deviation: Defecting and avoiding punishment

The final deviation to consider has the terror cell leader not matching action to the state

of the world in the heterogeneous cell, then forming a homogeneous cell (thus avoiding the

terror cell member’s punishment phase). This is prevented by the principal’s commitment

to audit in period t+ 1 when in period t action profiles do not match.

Part V

Leadership Targeting Analysis: Data,Alternative Explanations and Robustness

A Summary of Targeting Data, May 2007-April 2008

Below are summaries of the numbers of targeting events that occurred.

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Level

Functional role Cell City Regional Senior

Admin 0 2 8 5

Facilitator 0 1 67 3

Finance 0 0 8 0

Intel/Security 1 8 4 0

Media 0 0 26 1

Military 28 14 18 1

Emir 0 24 25 8

Sharia 0 0 5 2

VBIED 5 8 19 0

Level

Location Cell City Regional Senior

Anbar 2 4 13 0

Baghdad 4 10 40 2

Bayji 0 5 3 1

Diyala 0 2 9 2

Kirkuk 0 1 1 1

Mosul 11 15 21 9

Salah al Din 2 6 18 2

Sulimaniyah 0 0 1 0

Functional Role

Location Admin Facil Finance Intel/Sec Media Mil Emir Sharia VBIED

Anbar 0 9 1 1 1 2 3 1 0

Baghdad 2 14 2 1 1 7 7 1 21

Bayji 2 3 0 1 0 1 2 0 0

Diyala 1 5 0 0 2 1 3 0 0

Kirkuk 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 0

Mosul 5 8 0 6 5 17 9 2 3

Salah al Din 1 11 1 0 1 4 9 1 0

Sulimaniyah 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0

B Alternative Explanations

Future versions of this memo will consider more alternative explanations and will attempt

to address these. For now, the most compelling alternative explanations for the results are

below.

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B.1 Alternative Explanation: Opportunistic Violence, Infighting, and Retalia-

tion

One explanation for the results above is that other Sunni or Shia groups were opportunisti-

cally increasing their attacks against AQI when the group had recently suffered a loss to their

leadership. In other words, the increase in local violence and local violence ratio stemmed

from other groups taking advantage of a destabilized AQI.

A second explanation would be that the in increase in local violence stemmed from infighting

within AQI to fill the leadership vacuum. Because the IBC dataset is unable to distinguish

violence against civilians from intra-group violence, the increase in recorded local violence

might stem from violence among members of AQI. This kind of behavior is also discussed in

Mexican cartels in Calderon et al. (2015).

A third explanation is that after a leadership strike, members of AQI retaliate against civil-

ians. After the capture or killing of a member of leadership, members of AQI might suspect

that civilians gave Coalition forces the necessary information to effectively target leadership.

For all cases, these explanations would create the pattern of leadership targeting and an

increase in civilian casualties.

B.2 Ruling out Alternative Explanations

The shortcoming of the explanations above is that they do not explain why the increase

in local violence ratio only seemed to occur for cell-level military leadership and not for

Emirs or upper-level military leadership. For each of these three explanations, there is no

distinguishing feature of cell-level military leadership that would only create the effect in

these cases. Instead, based on outside discussions of AQI embracing the M-form hierarchy

and giving cell leadership the ability to select operations, it seems plausible that removing

cell leadership left lower level members unconstrained, and this gave them the freedom to

act against civilians in the pursuit of local power or in an attempt to settle grievances.

C Robustness Checks

C.1 Population Normalized

The analysis in Table 2 is re-tested using population normalized leadership strikes and vi-

35

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olence measures. The population levels in use are from the 2007 World Food Program’spopulation estimates, provided by the Empirical Studies of Conflict Program. The Table be-low demonstrates that normalizing for population does not substantively change the results.

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)

Sect Ratio I Sect Ratio II Fired Upon I Fired Upon II Sect I Sect II

F.D. Military, Cell 0.0283∗∗ 0.0283∗∗ -39.47∗∗∗ -39.47∗∗∗ 10.95+ 10.95+

(0.0108) (0.0108) (3.103) (3.103) (6.514) (6.514)

F.D. Military, Upper -0.0334 -0.0334 -0.451 -0.451 -30.51 -30.51

(0.0248) (0.0248) (14.41) (14.41) (21.72) (21.72)

F.D. Emir -0.0278∗∗ -0.0278∗∗ 14.79∗ 14.79∗ -9.981 -9.981

(0.0112) (0.0112) (6.648) (6.648) (6.465) (6.465)

F.D. Facilitator/Finance -0.00172 -0.00172 0.861 0.861 0.0370 0.0370

(0.00855) (0.00855) (2.786) (2.786) (9.950) (9.950)

F.D. Media -0.0229∗∗∗ -0.0229∗∗∗ 12.55 12.55 -15.58 -15.58

(0.00469) (0.00469) (16.80) (16.80) (9.718) (9.718)

F.D. Sharia -0.00938 -0.00938 5.727 5.727 -6.451 -6.451

(0.0248) (0.0248) (26.99) (26.99) (24.15) (24.15)

Full Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes

R-Squared 0.0322 0.0322 0.116 0.116 0.0774 0.0774

N 77 77 77 77 77 77

Standard errors in parentheses

All regressions run at governorate-month level with standard errors clustered at governorate level.

+ p < .15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

C.2 Dropping Governorates and Months

Another common robustness check for outliers is to re-run the above, though iterating

through by dropping a governorate. The results are below, with columns labeled by the

removed governorate, and with the local killing ratio as the dependent variable. Note that

Sulimaniyah is not included, as no cell level leadership targeting was recorded in this gover-

norate.

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Table 1: Impact of Leadership Decapitation on Profile of Violence, Limited Area, Pop Controls

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Anbar Baghdad Diyala Ninewa Salah al Din

F.D. Military, Cell 0.0254∗∗ 0.0171∗∗ 0.0256∗∗∗ 0.0269∗∗∗ 0.0243∗∗

(0.012) (0.039) (0.004) (0.002) (0.021)Full ControlsR-Squared 0.0462 0.0459 0.0359 0.0185 0.0403N 66 66 66 66 66

p-values in parentheses

All regressions run at governorate-month level with standard errors clustered at governorate level.+ p < .15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

This table reveals that no governorate appears to be driving the result; the correlationbetween leadership targeting and the local killing ratio remains positive and statisticallysignificant at the 5% level in all cases.

A similar pattern emerges dropping individual months, where all results remain positiveand statistically significant at the 15% level.

Table 2: Impact of Leadership Decapitation on Profile of Violence, Limited Area, Pop Controls

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)Jun 07 Jul 07 Aug 07 Sep 07 Oct 07

F.D. Military, Cell 0.0226∗∗ 0.0246∗∗∗ 0.0258∗∗∗ 0.0178∗∗ 0.0247∗∗

(0.013) (0.009) (0.000) (0.036) (0.012)Full ControlsR-Squared 0.0427 0.0368 0.0337 0.0222 0.0471N 70 70 70 70 70

p-values in parentheses

All regressions run at governorate-month level with standard errors clustered at governorate level.+ p < .15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

Table 3: Impact of Leadership Decapitation on Profile of Violence, Limited Area, Pop Controls

(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)Nov 07 Dec 07 Jan 08 Feb 08 Mar 08 Apr 08

F.D. Military, Cell 0.0226+ 0.0278∗∗∗ 0.0226∗∗∗ 0.0340∗∗∗ 0.0328∗∗∗ 0.0220∗∗∗

(0.119) (0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)Full ControlsR-Squared 0.0345 0.0473 0.0548 0.0615 0.0442 0.0322N 70 70 70 70 70 70

p-values in parentheses

All regressions run at governorate-month level with standard errors clustered at governorate level.+ p < .15, ∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01

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