CHAPTER - V .-

COMMUNALISM: A THEORETICAL STUDY ,

Communalism is a very complex phenomenon.' I t is very

difficult to give a precise definition of communalism. Communalism is

derived from the word 'Community'. Communalism, broadly speaking,

is the manifestation of that philosophy which stands for the

promotion of the interests of a particulm community based on

religion, race, caste or language. M m is described as a gregarious

animal. No human being can live in isolation, He has to live in a

community. The community is his identity, his prop, his means of

sustenance.

Communalism in any form and colour assumes notoriety. I t

thrives whenever there arises a difference between one community

and another over rewon, race, caste or language. Of all of them,

communalism which is sustained by religious differences is the most

powerful. Religious communalism is the most dominant amongst the

numerous forms of commun~sm, eg., racial communalism, linguistic

communalism, and casteist communalism. It is even said that

religious communalism is synonymous with communalism. 'Simply

put, communalism is the belief that because a group of people follow a

particular religion they have, as a result, common social, politicd and

economic interestsm.2 Whatever it might be, in popular parlance,

whenever communalism is talked about, it is the religious

communalism which is hinted at. Communalism is 'Sewed in the

same sense in this study also.

I t is quite riatural that he is drawn to his community which

gives him his identity, his character, his mode and manner of living,

his outlook and so on. His &mity towards his own community is an

inherent weakness. This cannot be avoided. But when this

attachment assumes bigotry, when he becomes obsessed with concern

for the interests of his own communiw only, he is said to be

communal in approach. He cannot see anything beyond his own

community. Rightly or wrongly, the interests of his own community

are upper-most in his mind and the activities of other communities

are always looked upon with suspicion as if their activities are

directed against the interests of his own community. Consequent on

such an approach and way of thinking, not only the persons belonging ,..

to other communities but also people belonging to his own community

also suffer in the process. Imaginary and illusive grievances are put

fonvard, unreasonable demands are projected, &cia1 barriers are

raised and an inferiority psyche is foisted. Communalism sets in; it

becomes a means of exploitation for furthering one's own objectives, of

capturing power - political, religious, economic, social, or otherwise, of

perpetuating obscurantism and of projecting one's own image.

5.2 Definition of Communzrlism

The term 'communal' has, in the context of certain facts and

development in our country, come to assume a bad sense. I t is derived

from 'commune' which was a small territorial division of self-

government in France. I t meant 'a group of people living as a

cornrnunity,"3 It implies living as a self-governing b d y for certain

limited local purposes sharing certain common objective of living

together as organisms within a larger national entity.4

One of the earlier definitions of communalism reads thus, 'a

theory or system of Government according to which each commune is

seIf governing and the state is a federation of communes. Another

defmition sees it as a doctrine or practice of communal living, as in a

religious community. "5 All these definitions indicate the positive

aspect of this phenomenon. But as the time passed the originally

innocuous idea came to assume a virulent sense and now it is looked

at with suspicion and dread.

But the end of the medieval times a drastic change in the

economic system emerged and it resulted in he supremacy of the

l- urban society over the rural populace. This led to a kind of

unbalanced plurality in socio-economic status of the various

denominations that constituted the population in Europe from he

Baltic to the Adriatic region.

The Word "Communalism" coined in California in the first

decades of our century, has now received a new meaning, since the

phenomenon has become nearly universal. Today communalism

refers to religious intransigence, intolerance, fanaticism,

fundamentalism and extremism. Its ethos is both anti-secular and

anti-democratic. I t occurs in Islam, Judaism, Christianity, Hinduism,

Buddhism and Sikhism. Emotional rather that rational, despotic and

domineering rather than democratic, unwilling to acknowledge the

.. human rights of adherents of other rewons, its roots are to be sought

in economic and social insecurity and in a lack of love for humanity.

The causes for this new upsurge of communalism as a nearly

universal, phenomenon cannot be analysed here. Religious

intolerance used to be characteristic of the West Asian religions and

East Asian religions were once regarded as basically tolerant and

peace-loving. Today in tolerance becomes he hall-mark of religious

revivalism in Hindu and Buddhist circles as well. Communalism in

one religious community provoke a similar reaction in other

communities which feel insulted and threatened by the former.

In our country, 'the word, 'communal' has been used for those

who are united by religious bonds to pursue certain objectives

in tended to benefit their particular community."6 I t has acquired, not f

without good reasons, the meaning of an objectionable activity by

trying to benefit from some communal bond, especially religion, to

gain an unfair advantage over and even at the cost of others similarly

organised on the strength of communal or religious bonds. The

original meaning, as a group of persons living in a locality and sharing

the requirements and pursuing the objects they are entitled to enjoy

on the basis of their organisation into an organ of local self

government, has not only been overshadowed but displaced by the

objectionable implications of an organisation, working on the basis of

a religious or racial or caste affinity, to attain political and economic

ends and aggrandisement at the expense of others.

In the latter sense, every organisation which purports to explain

any common bond, such as that of creed or caste or locality or

.. language or culture, for the purpose of gaining unfair advantage for

the organisation could be called a ucommunal organi~ation".~

Religious communalism, in one form or another, is present

everywhere because wherever the division on rehgious basis is more

pronounced, the hold and impact of religion on one's life is astounding

and people can easily be mustered and swayed in the name of

religion. A classic example of the tremendous power wielded by

religious communalism is demonstrated in the creation of Pakistan.

Pakistan was created solely on the basis of religion. Though people

professing different religions, including Hindus and Muslims actively

participated in the epic struggle for the emancipation of the Indian

subcontinent, virulent relig~ou s communalism ultimately succeeded in

carving out a separate state out of it, exclusively for the Muslims. The

y famous Lahore Resolution of the M u s h League of 23rd March, 1940

demanded separation of Muslim majority areas from India so as to

constitute an independent sovereign state.

5.3 Commuualism in India

It is hazardous to offer explanations for the continuance of

communal violence in India. Unfortunately very few empirical studies

have been carried out in an objective and unbiased manner which

could throw light on the causes of communal riots. The response of

the government, press and public figures to such riots has become

more or less stereotyped and even predictable. There is a strong

condemnation of the so-called communal groups; anti-social elements

are held responsible; a sinister foreign hand is seen pulling the

strings; pious statements are made in favour of national integration; a

commission of enquiry is appointed; and soon afterwards everything is

forgotten until we are shocked by a fresh wave of violence. In private,

people blame one sr the other community, but in public care is taken "-

not to hurt any group's sensibilities. The villain is always located

somewhere else - economic frustration, legacy of the British political

opportunism, etc8

Communal violence should be distinguished from protest

movements like the anti-reservation agitation in Gujarat, the Assam

riots, the Punjabi Subha riots, etc., in which there is a group which

organises itself on the basis of grievances felt, real or imaghmy, and

some demands are articulated. When people feel aggrieved and

wronged because of certain government policies, an attempt is made

to get certain concessions from the regime and such a protest action

leads to confrontation with the police. Communal riots take place in

an entirely different setting. There is no articulation of demands,

organisation of groups seems to be informal, leadership is

spontaneous and not sharply defined, and the administration is not

generally directly involved in the initial stages of the tension.

Communal violence needs to be distinguished from communal

prejudice and communal conflict. Prejudice, conflict and violence are

inter-related, one leads to the other and yet these three sociological

expressions of inter-community relations have an autonomy of their

own. Each may exist independent of the other, too. Till the early

sixties there was a great deal of racial prejudice against the Blacks in

the United States of America (USA) and yet violence remained on a low

key. The Hindu-Punjabis and the Sikh-Punjabis were on opposite

sides of the conflict over the question of the Punjabi Subha, between

1950 and 1963 and yet there was very little violence. TWO groups may

be fighting each other for control over political, economic and

administrative resources like the Brahmins and the non-Brahmins in

Madras during 1910-40 yet the informal rules of the game of not

aggravating the conflict into street violence may be observed by both

the groups.9

The Shivsena agitation in Maharastra was directed against the

south Indians. Yet, very few South Indians lost their lives. There is

prejudice against Punjabis in Uttac-Pradesh but it Ieads to neither

conflict nor violence. The Musl ims in Sri Lanka do not mix with the

other communities and yet are at peace with them. Thus it is

meaninpful to study prejudice, conflict and violence separately.

Prejudice is an attitude that predisposes a person to think, feel

and act in biased ways toward a group and its individual members. A

prejudiced individual evaluates a person belonging to a certain group

not as a person but on the basis of his group membership. When

Ahmad cheats Bashir, Bashir thinks that Ahmad is a cheat. But when

Gupta cheats Bashir, he thinks that all Hindus are cheats. Certain

negative traits are rust associated with the members of the other

group and all individuals are then presumed to have those

objectionable qualities ascribed to that group. Prejudice results in five

types of rejective behaviour - talking ill of the other group with friends,

avoidance, discrimination, physical attack and, in its extreme form, it

leads to a desire for the extermination of the other gmup.1°

An average Hindu's prejudice against the Muslim community is

due to some misconceived notions. Firstly, the attempts made by the

Muslim rulers in medieval times to destroy Hindu culfire; secondly,

the separatist role played by the Muslims in the freedom struggle;

thirdly, their refusd to modernize themselves and accept the uniform

civil code, family planning etc., and lastly, their having extra-territorial

loyalties. After the riots of Ahmedabad many educated Hindu rioters

felt that they had avenged the plundering of the Somnath temple by

Mahmud of Ghazni. An incident which had taken place ten centuries

before was still fresh in the minds of the Hindus and in their perverted

perception, an attack on the present day Muslirn population meant

vindicating themselves against Mahmud of Ghazni. l . School

textbooks also unfortunately encourage anti-Mush feelings by

teaching and praising the culture and values of the majority

community.

Mu slim prejudice against the government and the majority

community is derived from their heightened sense of discrimination in

jobs, from a belief that conscious and concerted efforts are being

made to wipe out their language and culture, and that the Hindu

communal group are always conspiring to perpetrate genocide on

them.

The Muslims in India have acquired the psychology of a

deprived group. They compare their status with the Muslims of other

Muslim majority countries, or with their own status during the British

days, when they had a strong political party, administrative and

political reservations, separate electorates and a godfather in the

British Empire. They have not been able to come to grips with t he

changed realities of a secular country, and they feel alienated. Owing

to the migration of the urban professional Muslim class to Pakistan,

234

.- the percentage of Muslims in government jobs declined soon after

independence. This percentage has continued to be low, of which

discrimination is aminor causative factor, other reasons being lack of

preparedness and sufficient educational qualifcations. h i s has

further increased the sense of frustration in the minds of Muslims..

Against the background of such feelings of alienation and

presumed persecution, an ordinary incident of the nature of a Hindu

band playing music in front of a mosque or the presence of a few pigs

before a religious congregation takes on an mtirdy diDTerent meaning

in the M u s h mind. They see it as a deliberate act of sacrilegious and

vindictive hostility not only to individual Muslims but also towards the

sacred tradition of Islam, being perpetrated not by a few uncouth and

mis-guided rowdies but by the entire Hindu community, which is bent

- upon punishing them. Thus, an incident which may be trivial in

nature leads to a series of monstrous atrocities in quick succession.

They see the police force as a symbol of the Hindu communal

animosity, and by attacking it in those moments of anger and

fmstration imperil further their own interests. The lower cadres of the

police force, particularly the constables, usually corning from the

lower strata of the society are often prejudiced against the Muslims,

who are seen by them as criminals, suspects, communal and

irrational people.

Conflicts arise when the two groups compete with each other

for a better place or share in political power, government jobs or s w i d

status. Conflict may also arise if the two groups follow mutually

contradictory goals in matters of political and cultural policies. The

Hindu would like to define an ideal society as lone in which all

citizens participate freely in all forms of social interaction, with no

concern for communal &diation.*l2 In their view, the state should not

be concerned with problems of any group based on religion. I t may

allow for some degree of cultural diversity, but its basic premise

should be denial of any sociaI obligation to presenre communal

identities. On the other hand, most minority groups wiU view it as a

calculated denial of protection for their cultures and so as the tyranny

of the majority. They would prefer the government to follow policies of

pluralism in which privileges are distributed to groups according to

their proportion in the population.

Thus in India right upto 1935 responsible leaders of both the

Congress and the Muslim kague desired Hindu-Muslim unity, but

there was a basic difference in their approach. The Congress thought I

of unity in terms of fusion and obliteration of communal moulds,

while the Muslim leadership visualized unity as a federation in which

group identity was not destroyed and this led them to demand a

federal government with a weak centre with adequate Muslim share in

all wings of the government, that are to be explicitly guaranteed by the

Constitution. The Hindu leaders were prepared to grant cultural

autonomy but not such rights, which would imply that Muslims

constituted a political community. This dBerence in the approach

ultimately led to the partition of the country.

As India cannat be partitioned any further the strategy of the

Muslim community to create yet another political federation for itself

had to be given up. Consequently, the nature of their demands

changed. They demanded among other things cultural and

educational rights for the presewation of the Muslim personal law, job

reservation and minority status for Aligarh Muslim University. Such

demands appeared to the Hindus as weakening the unity of the nation

and were, therefore, opposed.

Apart from religious minorities there are linguistic groups in

India, which have demanded from time to time, separate states and

more federal rights for their regions. Although in the early fifties such

demands were interpreted as divisive and detrimental to national

integration, there has been, of late, an increasing willingness to

accommodate regional demands. There is no evidence that the

strategy of promoting regional identfication by creating states based

on languages has either proved to be divisive and impeded the

economic growth of the country. On the other hand, it has reduced

the conflicts directed against the Central Government, has

regionalized politics and has increased the political participation of

the masses.

The attitude of the Central Government towards religious

minorities has been different, only partly due to the heritage of

partition and the memories of the intense conflict, which took place in

the first half of the twentieth century. But the more important reason

why religious demands have not been accommodated lies perhaps in

the geographical dispersal of Musl ims in the countxy. Since they are a

minority not only in all the states (except Jammu and Kashmir) but

also in all the districts {except Murshidabad and Malappuram),

Muslims cannot convert their cultural identity into a politicd pressure

group nor can privileges of a political nature be granted to them. Since

Muslim M P s have to depend on substantial Hindu support for

-.. winning the elections, they cannot openly espouse Muslim causes.

This makes the Muslims feel isolated and embittered. Certain Muslim

newspapers and frustrated political leaders have developed a vested

interest in romanticizing and exaggerating Muslim grievances. It suits

them if the Muslim masses suffer from a sense of being subjected to

injustice; it will keep their leadership credential in tact. An objective

analysis will perhaps show that the Muslim discontent is not so much

the cause of the disturbed Muslim mind as the consequence of that

disturbance which is brought about by the frustration over the

inability to secure political participation to the desired level.

As already stated prejudice and conflict have to be distin-

guished from violence. Certain general conditions which transform

conflict into violence are:

1. Relative deprivation - high

2. Legitimacy of the Government- blocked

3. Channels of communication - blocked

4. Insecurity among a group - high

5. Dehumanization - widely practised

6 . Beliefs and traditions - sanctioning violence

7. Instruments of violence - readily available

The direct cause of the eruption of violence has to be sought in

administrative lapses. When the law and order machinery proves

impotent in times of crisis, the two communities start losing faith in

the ability of the t administration for the maintenance of peace. Each

community then is misled into giving emotional and financial support

to its anti-social fringe elements in their impulsive and often violent

outbursts. Such elements now begin to indulge in arson, looting and

killing, thereby further aggravating the breakdown of law and order.

Another administrative explanation, which may sound 'iautological, is

that violence is habit-forming and continued riots in a t o m lead to an

acceptance of violence as the only means to settle inter-community

issues, thereby creating a vicious circle. This may partly explain the

reasons for the continued occurrence of riots in certain towns in Uttar

Pradesh in the past three decades.

Many writers have tried to find economic factors behind such

riots. Economic argument may be expressed in a number of ways.

(a) First, it is asserted that most of the employers, industrialists and middlemen are Hindus, whereas most

of the employees, workers and artisans are Muslims. Therefore, communal riot are a distorted form of class- conflict.

(b) Secondly, it is hypothesized that there is a competitive conflict of interests within the middle class and among the self employed people over access to a given 'array of opportunities like government jobs, export contracts, market shares, etc. Since identities of groups have already been formed on religious lines, which are tirne-

resistant in nature, group clashes occur dong communal lines just as in Bihar, where there is a clash of interests between caste groups such as the Brahmins, Rabuts,

Bhuluhars and. Kayastas.

(c) Thirdly, it is alleged that communal clashes are

deliberately planned and encouraged in order to ensure that people do not begin identdymg themselves with the

economic class to which they belong. Exponents of this explanation find a strong co-relation between periods of economic slump in traditional d s a n - based activities and periods of communal clashes.

(d) Fourthly, it is asserted that even the present economic crisis in our society have increased the atrocities on

women, scheduled castes and members 'of the weaker sections of society. In a stagnant economy there would always be a greater danger of violence against those who

are nat regarded as full members of the society, who are Living beyond the pale of legitimately in the eyes of the

majority group, and whose existence is marginal.

There is a general impression that the irresponsible behaviour

of politicians is a major factor in escalating communal tension. Some

people go to the extent of asserting that politicians have a vested

interest in perpetuating Hindu-Muslim differences as feelings of

insecurity will push the minority community to vote en bloc, in favour

of the political party that succeeds in wooing it most.

The role of politics in communal violence can be discussed at

two levels - the national policy level and the district level, where

politicians compete with each other within and outside the party

maintaining their hold over different segments of the population.

These. aspects of political involvement may better be discussed

separately.

There are broadly two kinds of policy, which may be followed in

declhing group demands. One seeks the assimilation of the entire

population of the state so that it shares a common identity. Only

individual rights, privileges and duties are recognized. The Soviet

Union and Thailand have been pursuing this approach toward the

Muslim segment of their population. The success of this method

depends on the willingness of the minority group to abandon their

group demands and merge with the more dominant group. The other

approach recognizes the existence of differentiated groups in the

population and concede to such groups, rights, privileges and

obligations based on their proportion in the population:' Lebanon and

Malaysia have been following this approach, where political and

administrative reservations for various religious and racial

communities are built into the constitution. No general guidelines

can be laid down as to which approach would he more advantageous.

Much would depend on the history, traditions and economic

capabilities of the two communities as also on the nature of the state,

whether it is authoritarian, democratic or elitist. From the experience

of other communally divided societies, perhaps, it can be pointed out

that if the political leaders seek to identify the nation with the state,

the problem of conflict management is likely to become more

complicated.

The Govt. of India has been following, perhaps rightly so, a

middle of the road policy as far as Muslims are concerned. I t frowns

upon demands of a overtly political nature, such as those for a

separate electorate, proportional representation, the formation of

rekigious parties etc., at the same time conceding culfxral and

edu ca.tionaI demands like encouragement to Urdu, the preservation of

the Muslim Personal law, the minority status to the Aligarh Muslim

University, etc. Thus the Central Government's policy is directed

towards political assimilation and cultural pluralism. This, however,

leaves a certain amount of grey area, the most important issue being

the reservation of jobs, whether formal or informal. It should be said

in the larger interests of the country that such issues are settled once

for ail by taking clear-cut decisions thereon leaving no room for

apprehensions and ambiguities rather than dragging them to

negotiating tables on the eve of general elections to the~wliament or

the State legislature.13

The role of district level politicians in communal violence c a be

more easily detected. Since economic growth is teking place at a very

slow pace, the politicians are left with nothing but to indulge in the

politics of distribution and not of production. Politics being the art of

winning by hook or cmok, the politicians find it more paying in terms

of votes to appeal to the people in the name of caste, religion and

language. Thus local politics often assumes the character of a zero-

sum game with a built-in-potentiai for social conflict. At the same

time, since in a mixed constituency, legislators have to depend on the

votes of both the communities, the Muslim legislators belonging to all-

India parties are often constrained to eschew communal issues on the

platform and are obliged to work behind the scenes.

To conclude, sectarian violence needs multi-causal analysis and

a deeper understanding. Certain important questions are listed

below. An objective study of some selected riots in India may throw

more light on their nature 'and provide us with clues to understand

the following questions that still remain unanswered:

( I ) If A attacks B during a communal riot, what was the relationship between A and B before the riot? Were they known to each other, was there a casual acquaintance or business rival between them or were they members of two different factions with longstanding enemity? Are they in touch with each other, for better or worse, after the riots, or are they still unknown to each other?

(2) It is generally believed that while people of the lower class actually participate in the riots, leadership is provided by

the middle class and funds are provided by business men. To what extent is thjs true? In case there is an involvement of different classes of people, either psychological or physical, what is the nexus between such classes? How are the ideas actudy transmitted? Where, if at all, are meetings held and where are

decisions taken to attack other community?

(3) There is a difference between preparedness and conspiracy. Does a communal riot occur as a result of preparedness or

after a conspiracy?

(4) What is the background of the so-called communal

leaders? Why does extremist ideology appeal to some and not to the rest of the people? Is it because of economic frustrations?

(5) What class of people are responsible for the spread of rumours? Why are some rumours strongly believed and others disbelieved?

(6) So far the administration seems to have relied only three kinds of control curfew, large-scale arrests and peace committee meetings. Each method has its own

limitations. Curfew results h severe hardship. I t sharpens the anger of the entire community and focuses it against the police. Large-scale arrests tend to be arbitrary and often of anti-social elements many of whom may not be participating in rioting. Peace committee meetings sharpen the communal identities of the leaders. Can there be better methods of effective riot control?

(7) Who usually constitute the peace committee? Are they prominent members of the communities or are they

'secular people' with very little hold over the masses?

(8) Behind communal riots is a feeling of strong prejudice and hostility between the communities. How can the local administration reduce such feehgs in times of peace?

-..

(9) What kind of training can be given to the police and P.A.C to improve their effectiveness and public image?

(1 0) Is there a connection between recurrence of riots and the

trade cycle of local industries?

5.4 Communal Riots: The Causes

All the riots prior to the partition were attributed to the British

policy of 'divide and rule'. I t is t m e that the British did t r y to divide

Indians in order to consolidate their power. But Indian elites both

from amongst the Hindus and Mushs cannot escape their own

responsibility for the frequent occurrences of this terrible social

menace. And now in free India, we have to take note of many other

factors, which have newly emerged on the scene. The British 'divide

and rule theory' is no longer adequate causative factor even as a

legacy of the past, and is no more relevant at dl. That theory should

be buried now. I t could be used only as one of the major causes of

communal riots in India before the Partition.14

In order to develop an adequate theory of communal violence in

post-independent India it would be highly necessary to take into

account the dynamics of economic and political developments and the

accompanying social changes. Any theory, which tends to ignore this

cannot adequately explain the true nature of caste or communal

violence in contemporary India. The changes, which have occurred as

a result of these developments, also necessitate a reappraisal of the

role of some political parties, which claim to be secular. The Indian

National Congress was founded as a secular party and it organized

the freedom struggle under the banner of secularism. However, it

would not be incorrect to deny the fact that the Congress has on

... several occasions compromised its secular ideolow in order either to

tide over some crisis or to get votes of one or the other community.

Thus the pressure of events often deflects political parties from their

set ideological course. In order to develop a comprehensive theory of

communal violence it would be pueriIe to put the whole blame on

some communal groups or parties such as the RSS or the Jan Smgh

(which later became the constituents of the Bharatiya Janata Party

i.e., BJP). These parties have continued to play their role in

provoking communalism and communal violence but other so-called

secular parties have aggravated the situation by trylng to fish in

troubled waters.

Same new communal organisations have also emerged on the

scene since the early eighties. The VHP began to play an aggressively

communal role, especially after the conversion episode in the

Meenakshipuram district in Tamil Nadu. When the Ramjanmabhoomi

-Babri M W controversy emerged, new organisations like the Bajrang

Dal also appeared on the political scene. Since the VHP and the

Bajrang Dal are not mainstream political parties like the IMP, they

can for the same reason afford to be more aggressive and irresponsible

in their conduct. Likewise the Shiv Sew which was primarily a.

Bombay-based local party, has stretched its tentacles far and wide.

First it threw its political net to MurathWa, then to other parts of

Maharashtra and now it has tried to establish its branches in several

other parts of the country spreaded over the Hindi belt and beyond it.

In this connection it is important to note that these communal outfits,

i.e., the VHP, the Bajrang Dal and the Shiv Sena, have succeeded in

alluring mainly the unemployed youth. It is a known fact that the

increasing unemployment provides a fertile soil for spread of

communalism.

These organisations offer, not only employment to these youth,

but also provides a cause to be i d e n a d with and opportunities for

leadership. A study of the Shiv Sew in Mamthwada and the Raipur

district in M.P. clearly substantiates this theory. The problem of

communalism thus, must dso be seen as a structural problem of

socio-economic dimension. It cannot be seen in isolation. A study of

many riots clearly established the fact that it was this segment of

unemployed youth who are directly involved in arson and looting

during a riot. It gives them temporary relief from economic misew. I t

also fulfils their unfuIfdled desire to possess articles of luxury. During

the Bombay riots of December 1992 and January 1993, such articles

formed the bulk of the things looted by the rioters.

The fanate-lstani also has greatly succeeded in attracting

such youth from amongst the Muslims. The Students' Islamic

Movement of India (SIMi) has also drawn its cards from the rank of

unemployed M u s h youth. The SIMI leaders make highly provocative

speeches in defence of Islam. Thus both the Hindu and Muslim

communalists try to 'sublimate', to use a Freudian terminology, the

economic and social frustrations of their respective youth,

To build up a comprehensive theory on communal riots, one

must take into account the crucial fact that in every riot there are

micro as well as macro factors involved. The macro- factors are often

of ideological nature and have nation-wide sweep. The micro factors

may be non-ideologic& and of local nature. But both macro as well as

.* micro factors are integrally connected with the process of socio-

economic developments in the country. In other words, the whole

problem should be seen in the perspective of the dynamics of social

change and development. A social scientist has to &ke a serioua note

of the basic changes in order to grapple with the changes in the

super-structure. It is a dia3ectical process. The changes taking place

sect the super-structure and changes in superstructure affect the

base. However, it will be wrong to establish one to one relationship

between base and superstructure in a mechanical sense as some

social scientists try to do. The complexity of this relationship should

be borne in mind in order to appreciate the problem in its totality.15

5.4.1 Macro Factors

Let us first deal with the macro factors involved in promoting

comrnun~sm and communal violence. The most impartant aspect of

macro-level theorizing about communalism is the class nature of the

society and the underdevelopment of economy including scarcity of

resources. The under-development often resulted in its uneven

development of economy both community-wise as well as region-wise

and this uneven development inevitably throws up the problem of

communal or regional identity. This identity becomes a powerful

factor in mobilization. And in a democratic set-up this m o b h t i o n

becomes a crucial factor. Again in a democratic set-up it is elites

belonging to the majority community who are more likely to

monopolise the fruits of uneven economic development. Similarly, the

elites also appropriate the greater share of political power, Thus it was

the upper-caste Hindu elite who grabbed both political-9nd economic

power in the independent India.

CommunityYwise uneven development leads to a situation

where inter-communal cohesive class structure does not develop

whether it be the development of capitalist class or proletarian class

structure. Thus the upper classes of the less-developed community

feel a strong sense of rivalry vis-a-vis their counterparts in the other

community which has gained the upper hand. In order to win the

support of the masses of one's community in such a situation, its

grievances are formulated, not in terms of class but in terms of

community. This can best be done by adding a few religio-cultural

demands to the down to earth economic demands on the one hand,

and, by mythologizing the community's past on the other. Thus we see

that the communalists among both the communities often try to

glorify their respective past and project it as a golden period, free of

any inter-class or inter-ethnic conflict. Thus mythologising and

rornanticising one's community's past s e m s as a very powerful

instrument for mobilising the mass support for redsing class

aspirations. Such an instrument proves far more powerful in a

socially backward society like India.

In consequence, in a backward and communally divided society

it becomes very mcuft to develop chss solidarity across communal

lines, especially in the case of the working class which, ironicdy,

happens to be the main victim of communal violence. In their case the

mythologiscd version of history as well as other powerful myths

cleverly manipulated by the exploiting classes have far greater

rnobilizatory potentiality than their own cIass in"terests. I t is

particularly true of urban petty bourgeois classes.

+ This brings"us to another important aspect of the theoiy of

communalism. Communalism, all social scientists agree, is an urban

phenomenon, rooted among the petty bourgeoisie. In a backward

society, it is among the members of this class that traditional religion

has the greatest appeal. The real base both of the R S S and the

Jarnati-e-Mami is among the urban petty bourgeois classes. Their

religious sentiments are successfully exploited for secular ends by the

elites of the respective communities. Thus the danger of

communalism keeps on looking large on the socio-political horizon of

India. Another important characteristic of the petty bourgeois class is

its tendency to submit to the authority. This tendency is taken

r advantage of by the communal parties to develop anti-democratic

authoritarian structures. Both the RSS and Jamti lay emphasis on

submission to the authority rather than freethinking and democratic

functioning. This also leads to a blind submission to the authority of

Gad or the Holy Scriptures as interpreted by the priests thus

perpetuating utter conservatism in the society.

There is another problem at the macro-level to be taken into

account for developing the theory of communal conflict. It is

integrally connected with the dynamics of social change in the

country. Socio-economic changes, especially in a tradition-bound

society, bring about a deep sense of insecurity among those strata of

society, which are adversely affected by them. The working class as

well as the petty bourgeois classes are usually the worst affected in

such a situation. They are tradition-prone and the sense of insecurity

accompanying socio-economic changes reinforces '&is tendency

among them. At t imes they provide fertile grounds for revivalist

religious movemeqts. I t baffles many who take either a very superficial

or mechanical view of socio-economic development. They feel that

such a development should lead to greater rationality in society.

Nevertheless, it i s not true. On the contrary, the sense of insecurity

generated by such socio-economic changes in a considerable section

of the society increases the appeal of religion by providing solace and

reducing the psychological stress involved. The recent rise of religious

fundamentalism must be seen in this perspective.

However, there are two categories of religious revivalism and

fundamentalism as far as the Indian socio-religious scene is

concerned. Included in the first category of religious revivalism is the

emergence of an amazingly large number of yogis, babas and other -

religious gurus, teachers and tricksters of all varieties, who encash

upon the growing sense of insecurity, urban tensions and other

stresses generated by the modern industrial pattern and

consumeristic pattern of life. They also satisfy the urge for social

recognition by the neo-rich as well as facilitate for the flow of black

money to the ruling politicians from smugglers, black marketers,

profiteers and similar other sources. Such religious frauds are fast

mu 1 tiplying in our society particularly in urban areas, strengthening

and promoting irrationalism. The ruling classes even otherwise

encourage such trends in so far as these irrational cults generate

illusions and false consciousness among the masses, thus providing

at least, a semblance of stability to the crisis-ridden economic system.

However, these cults and frauds do not directly lead to promotion of

communal conflict in the society as they ostensibly keep out of the

political arena. They do not reflect the aspirations of the rising

bourgeoisie but function as their havens and refuges. I

The second category consists of religious fundamentalism as

contained in the movements like the V i s h m Hindu Parishad and

Islamic fundamentalism represented by a host of extremist

organizations. These movements have political aspirations and reflect

the rising ambitions of the petty bourgeois classes in the society. Here

the religious revivalism is directed towards political goals. The Vishwa

Hindu Parishad, seizing upon the opportunity provided by the

conversion of a few Harijans to Islam, launched an offensive

propaganda, offensive thus intensifying communal antagonism in the

country, Several communal riots such as the riots in Ahmedabad in

December 1983, in Pune, Sholapur and Pandharpur thereafter, were

found to be the direct result of an intensive whfyhg campaign by the

Vishwa Hindu Parishad. In Meerut riots, too, that raged from

September to early Octaber, 1982, the hand of the VHP was apparent.

The VHP continues to publish rniUians of pamphlets in various

languages and painting wall slogans in most of the towns and cities to

promote militant Hinduism. It would not be wrong to say that the

VHP has provided new virulence to communal canker. Such virulence

is needed by a section of the ruling classes to manage the crisis in the

system.

There is yet another related factor at the macro-level which has

an important bearing on the theory of communal conflict. It is the

question of militant assertion of regional and communal identity.

Assertion of communal or regional identity is a direct result of the

... conflict over the share in the limited economic resources. As the

aspirations are rising faster and economic development is extremely

sluggish, the conflict is bound to drive the different sections of the

society to strive for either regional or rebo-cultural identity.

Recently we have seen its extreme manifestation in Assam and Punjab

and we see it now in Kashmir.

5.4.2 Micro Factors

Micro factors are equdy important in making as true

assessment of the nature of communal conflicts. More often than not,

communal tension develops in a particular town on some local issue.

Those who make hasty generalizations often ignore the significance of

these local issues which we call micro-factor in triggering off extensive

and prolonged communal riots in India. In many cases, the local ,?

issues play a key role in causing eruption of communal violence. A s

in pre-independence days, the local issues are no longer confined to

the playing of music before a mosque or the slaughter of a cow,

although, even today, they have by no means lost their relevance and

evil potentialities. But many new factors in keeping with the changing

socio-economic pattern have sprung up on the communal scene.

Some of these factors are competition between rival traders or s m d

manufacturers from the two communities, rivahy between two hostile

gangs of hoodlums dealing either in smuggling, illicit arms or liquor or

similar other anti-social activities, machinations of the local industrial

magnates to weaken the eade unions by projecting some communal

issues, elections to local bodies or contest over some assembly or

parliamentary seats, etc.

For developing a theory of communal confi&, it is also

necessary to understand some of the local characteristics of a

communal situatiop. Most of the riots tend to occur in medium-sized "

towns (as in such towns petty bourgeois elements who are usually

quite conservative often predominate the religious community Life).

Further, the tendency of communal conflict gets far more intensified

in such towns where there also exists a previous history of communal

riots. Keeping these characteristics in mind one can easily understand

why towns such as Moradabad, Aligarh, Meerut, Jarnshetpur,

Banaras, Bhivandi, Malegaon, the old city of Hyderabad, etc, have

turned into communal hotbeds and frequent scenes of communal

eruptions. However, this should not be taken to construe that big or

cosmopolitan cities like Bombay are riot proof. We all know what

happened in Bombay and Calcutta soon after the demolition of the <

Babri Masjid. Bombay witnessed a furious eruption of communal

riots. As a matter -of fact, Bombay had been the seen of fierce riots in

1984 also. The emergence of the Shiv Sena as a well-organized

communal force made Bombay highly riot-prone.

in a ballot box-oriented democracy a large proportion of the

minority population in a town, intensifies political rivahy between the

elites of the two communities, who try to mobilize votes by appealing

to their respective communal sentiments. In Meerut, there being

around 40 per cent Muslim population, even the Congress-I was

divided on communal lines as a Muslim candidate for the assembly or

the parliamentary election was rated to have a much better chance of

winning. The Hindu leadership of the Congress-1 felt frustrated and

allegedly entered into a clandestine understanding with the local BJP

leadership. The Mandir-Masjid controversy in 1932 and the

consequent riots in Meeru t were merely a symbolic expression of the

political ambitions of the two communities. The issue was dug up

from a forgotten past by vested interests to create a paranoia in the

Hindu mind through a systematic propaganda in order to win their

support for electoral purposes. So the political dimension of

communal riots on a micro factor should not be lost sight of.

5.5 Communalism - The Right Perspective

The foregoing observations lead us to the conclusion that

communalism is a relatively modern phenomenon, I t is, to be precise,

a product of the British period. The British followed the policy of

'divide and rule' and created a rift between the Hindus and the

Muslims, which really did not exist on such a scale earlier. In fact, the

British were teded by the Hindu-Muslim unity during the 1857

'mutiny' (i.e., the frst war of independence) and the fact that both the

Hindus and the Muslims acknowledged Bahadur Shah Zafar to be

their leader.

The British employed the services of Eliot and Dawson to write

history and provided source material for it by selectively translating

from Persian sources that depicted eternal fight between the Hindus

and the M u s l i m s . These two British historians deeply influenced the

process of history writing in India. The periodization of history by the

British as 'Hindu', 'Muslim' and 'British' also was a mischievous one.

This kind of periodization identSed earlier periods with respective

religions while identifying their own period with their nationality.

An even more fundamental cause of communalism was on

account of what can be described, for want of a better term, as

'structural shift' both in polity and economy. The colonial polity and C

economy replaced the feudal polity and economy. Both the feudal

polity as well as economy were non-competitive. In the feudal period

power was wielded through competitive bdot box. Similsrly, the

feudal economy was non-competitive in as much as the production

was mainly for local consumption and not, unlike the modern

capitalist economy, for market. The colonial polity as well as economy

were competitive h d it is partly the phenomenon of competitive polity

and economy during the British period which gave rise to the

communal phenomenon.

The British introduced highly controlled doses of

democratization, which created a sense of competition between the '*

elites of the two major communities i.e., the Hindu and the Muslim.

Thus when the British introduced the Local Self-Government Act in

the early seventies of the 19th century, Sir Syed Ahmad Khan, the

modernizer among the 19th century Muslirns, opposed it saying that

democracy does not suit India as it will lead to competition for power

between the two major communities of India; it suits European

countries inhabited only by the Christians. Sir Syed had a point and

his prognosis proved prophetic. I t was the introduction of democratic

measures which brought about conflict between the Hindu and the

Muslim elites for sharing power. The Muslim elite demanded a certain

share, which was resisted by the Hindu elite and this question could

not be resolved until the country was partitioned. Thus political

competition between the elites of the two communities proved divisive

.. and strengthened the forces of communalism. Similarly, the

competition for British jobs fanned the flame of communal feelings.

The British rulers replaced Persian by English as the language of -f

administration at higher levels and by Urdu and Hindi respectively

written in Persian and Nagri scripts at the district levels. A circular by

the U.P. Governor required that the aspirants for government jobs at

the district level should know both Hindi and Urdu written in Nagri

and Persian scripts respectively. This created strong resentment both

the Hindus and the Muslims. The Hindus argued that Hindi written in

Nagri script should be the language of administration while the

Muslim elite demanded that it should be Urdu written in Persian

script. Thus the question of language as a means of obtaining

government jobs brought about a cleavage both the Hindu and

Muslim elites.

To understand the nature of communal violence in modem

India one has to understand the role of various classes, social

organisations, political parties, communal as well as secular, and the

aspirations of the elites of communities involved in the conflict. I t

should also be borne in mind that contrary to the impression carried

by the people in general, religion is not the root cause of the

communal conflict; it is rather a powerful instrument in the hands of

those interests, which seek to play their game through it. It is wrong

to make it the cause celebre as it is often sought to be done by the

vested interests, political as well as economic, who want to hide their

real intentions from the masses. To hold religion as the main culprit

would amount to adopting an unsociological approach to the problem.

To put it differently, one must distinguish between religious and

.# sectarian violence, the reasons for which lie in the conflict over

controlling political power and economic resources between the elites

of the two or several religious communities particularly in a pluralist

society.

Communalism, it should be noted, i s not a religious

phenomenon but a phenomenon connected with the vested interests

in a religious community. It does not involve any conflict about

sectarian questions but about worldly interests. Of course, the elite

groups often invoke religion not for conviction but for legitimation.

Communalism right from the 19th century has been generated by

conflicting interests of educated elite, not the masses. I t is also

interesting to note that Sir Syed Ahmad Khan represented the

interests of upper class Muslim elite and distanced himself from the

interest of Muslim masses. I t was orthodox Ularna led by Maulma 9

Quasim Ahmade Gangohi, Rashid Ahmad Nanotvi and others who

were in close contact with the Muslim masses and who represented

their interests. These orthodox Ulama were totally and

uncompromisingly opposed to the British rule as it had ruined the

Muslim masses consequent on the introduction of British

manufactured goods and deprived the Ulama of power which the

Shari's courts had given them when the Muslim dynasties ruled.

When the Indian National Congress was formed in 1885, Sir

Syed Ahmad K h a n advised Muslims to keep away from it while the

orthodox Ulama led by Quasim Ahmad Nanotvi urged them to join it

and fight against the British rule along with the Hindu brethren. Not

only this, Maulana Nanotvi collected about hundred fatwas from the

various mama to this effect and published them under the title

.,

Nusrat al-Ahrar (i.e., help for those fighting for the liberation from the

British rule.) mese f a w urged upon the M u s h to wage jihad

against the British,rule as India under the British was Dam1 Harb i.e.,

abode of war. This contrast in behaviour between a modernist like Sir

Syed and an orthodox mama like Maulana Nanotvi also demonstrates

that communalism is a conflict of interests. not of relikon, The

orthodox Ularna were fraternizing with the Hindus in their fight

against the British where as the Hindu and Muslim elites were

fighting amongst themselves for their interests communalizing the

situation.

5.6 Conclusion

Thus carnmunalism is mainly born out of secular issue like

controlling political or economic power through the exploitation of

religious sentiments of one's own community. Communalism is not

generally promoted by religious organizations or establishments but

by secular leaders of political parties. Thus in the pre-partition period,

Muslim communajism was promoted people like M.A. Jinnah, a highly

westernized and modernized political leader. The chief ideologue of the

Hindu Mahasabha, on the other side, was Veer Savarkar who too had

a modern outlook and who advocated the reforming of the Hindu

society. Neither the M u s h League was led by a mulla nor did the

Hindu Mahasabha a Shankaracharaya. Thus communalism is all

about secular issues without involving any major religious or

sectarian doctrine. So we can say that the fundamental cause of

communalism is political, and religion is only an instrumental cause.

Communalism essentially belongs to the category of politics whereas

religion belongs to the category of faith. A truly religious person -like

Mahatma Gandhi or Maulana Abdul Kalam Azad- is incapable of

being communal. $irnilarly, one who is communal, like M.A. Jinnah

and Veer Savarkar, could never develop an inner faith in religion.

They only made it a powerful political instrument. One with a deep

inner faith in something would never permit it to be used as an

instrument for furthering one's ambition.

Modem terminology such as 'secularism' and 'nationalism' did

not appeal to the Indian masses. These terns were in vogue only

among the educated elite. They left the masses cold. Hence, those who

were in touch with the masses like the Mama or persons like Tilak

from amongst the Hindus had to invoke rewon for the mobilization of

Indian masses against the British. It did inject a dose of religion in the

nineteenth century liberative politics, as there was hardly any other

option. I t was, so to say, a contextual needs, a compulsion of

expediency. However, it should be well understood that this induction

of religion in the fight for freedom did not as much communalize polity

as the conflict of interests between the elites of both the communities.

I t is a strange irony in history that these educated elite who opposed

mixing religion with politics were largely responsible for

communalizing our politics.

REFERENCE .,)

Asghar Ali Engineer , Communal Riots in Post Independence India, First Edition Reface, Sangam Book, Hydrabad - 1954.

Bipin Chandra, 'Communalism in Modem ~ndia'', New Delhi, 1984, p- 1.

The World Book Didonary ZroL Ed. by Cleane L. Barnhar, Chicago, 1988, p.4 19 and The Oxford Universal Dictionary, ed. by Onions C.T., Oxford at the Clarendon Press, London, 1933, p. 351.

'Webster's CohLmbia Reference Dictionary, ed. by, Franklin J. Meine, Chicago, 1940, p. 146.

The World Book Dictionary, Vol. 1 ed. by Clearene. L. Barnhart, Chicago, 1988, p. 419.

"Definition and Scope of the Tenn Communal Organisation" as suggested by the Minorities Commission, page 352.

Great Encyclopedic Dictionary, Vol. 1, The Readers' Digest Association, London, 1978, p. 190.

Saxena N.C., T k Nature and Origin of Communal Riots in India, ed. by Asghar Ali Engineer, Communal Riots in Post-Independence India. Sangam Books, Hyderabad, 1984, p. 57.

Madan D.P., Report of Enquiry in to the Communal Disturbances at Jalguon and Mahad in May 1970.

Saxena N.C., The h ture and Ongin of Communal Riots in India, ed. by Asghar Ali Engineer, Communal Riots in Post-independence India. Sangarn Books, Hyderabad, 1984, p. 58.

Ibid., p. 59.

Ibid, p, 60.

Smith W.C., Modern Islam in India: A Socialo Analysis, Victor, London, 1946, p. 176.

Benures A Gazetteer, V o l 2 6 of ihtrrtrrct Cazetters of United Bvinces of Agra and Oudh compiled by H.R. Neville, 1900.

Ghosh, S.K., Crisis in Administmtion, Eastern Law Publishers, Culcutta, 1974.