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Irregular Warfare One Nature, Many Characters

Colin S. Gray

The conditions of small wars are so diversified, the enemy’s mode of fighting is often so peculiar, and the theatres of operations present such singular features, that irregular warfare must generally be car­ried out on a method totally different from the stereotyped system [for regular war]. The art of war, as generally understood, must be modified to suit the circumstances of each particular case. The conduct of small wars is in certain respects an art by itself, diverging widely from what is adapted to the conditions of regular warfare, but not so widely that there are not in all its branches points which permit comparison to be established. —CharlesE.Callwell,1906 Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers

Opening Shots

It isnotpossibletodaytotalkabout irregularwarfareandcounter­insurgency(COIN)withoutdiscussingIraq.However,Iamdetermined nottoallowthisarticletosinkintothegreatbogofendlessopinionpieces onthestateofplayinthatunhappycountry.Mysolutionistosayaslittle as I can about Iraquntil I reachmyconcluding thoughts,when Iwill releasemypersonal convictionsbrieflyanddirectly.This shouldenable youtoappreciatetheargumentbutdiscountmyconclusions,shouldyou sochoose.ThecommentsonIraq,inthemainbodyofthepaperatleast, areintendedtobescholarlyandpragmatic,notpolitical.Obviously,Iraq mustdominateourviewofthesubject.StevenMetziscorrecttoassert that“whentheUnitedStates removedSaddamHussein frompower in

Dr.ColinS.GrayisprofessorofinternationalpoliticsandstrategicstudiesattheUniversityofRead­ing,UK.Theauthorof22books,hismostrecent(publishedin2007)areFighting Talk: Forty Maxims on War, Peace, and Strategy; and War, Peace, and International Relations: An Introduction to Strategic History. ThisarticlewasoriginallyapaperpresentedattheAirForceSymposiumonCounterinsurgency,AirWar College,MaxwellAFB,AL,24–26April2007.

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thespringof2003,Americanpolicymakersandmilitaryleadersdidnot expecttobecomeinvolvedinaprotractedcounterinsurgencycampaign inIraq.Butithasnowbecometheseminalconflictofthecurrenteraand willserveasaparadigmforfuturestrategicdecisions.”1

ThomasR.MockaitistellsusthatIraq“istheinsurgencyfromhell.”2I suggestthatforallregularsoldiersallinsurgenciesarehell-born,though admittedly somearemorehellish thanothers.And toopenoneofmy themesjustacrack,WilliamTecumsehSherman,agreatAmericangen­eral,oncesaidthat“warishell”(actually,thoseexactwordswerecredibly attributedtohim).Withoursophisticationandscholarship,andnowour doctrinemongering,itisnecessarytorememberthatwearetalkingabout war,includingafairamountofwarfare.

Insurgency,or irregularwar, andwarfare areglobalphenomena, and theyalwayshavebeen.IamprovidinganAnglo-Americanperspectivebe­causethatiswhatIamandknowbest.Thiscanappeartobiasananalysis becauseitcannotavoidimplyingthatCOINandcounterterrorism(CT), andespeciallysomepathologiesintryingtodealwiththem,areuniqueto us.Theyarenot.

WhenRalphPetersurgesabloody,attritionalapproachononeofhis morecolorfuldays,heistalkingthelanguageofRomangeneralshipunder VespasianandhissonTitusintheirbrutalsuppressionoftheJewishRevolt inPalestineinAD66–77.3Irregularwarfareisanold,oldstory,andsoare themethodsappliedtowageit,onbothsides.Today’smotivesforirregu­larwarfare—supposedlysomodern,evenpostmodern—leadsomecom­mentatorstospeculateabout“newwars”ascontrastedwith“oldwars.”4 Ifyouarestronglyofthatpersuasion,thebestIcandoistosuggestthat youponderlongandhardonThucydidesandhisfamousandoverquoted triptychof“fear,honor,andinterest”ascomprisingtheprimarymotives for political behavior, including war.5 Irregular warfare, of necessity in commonwithitsThucydideanmotives,isaboutpoliticalpower:whogets it,andasarathersecondarymatter,whattodowithit.Thatmayseema banalpoint,butreallyitisnot.COINisaboutthecontrolofpeopleand territory, not the remaking of civilizations, or even cultures. Crusaders makebadpolicymakers;theytendtobedisinterestedinstrategy.

Also,speakingasastrategist,Ihaveaprofessionaldislikeforimpossible missions.EvenifIdothewrongthing,IliketothinkthatIcansucceed. Westrategistsarepragmaticpeople,andwedon’tlikeacceptinglong,ad­verseoddsinpursuitofbenefitsofhighlydubiousworth.

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Fromtimetotime,byandlargedeliberately,Iwilldelveintothedark woodsofscholarlyquibbling,butIampainfullyawarethatscholarsand officials,civilianandmilitary,areapttobemesmerizedbytheirowncon­ceptualgenius.Particularlyarethey—perhapsarewe(meaculpaalso)— devoted to theprocessofanalysisbyeverfinerdissection.We loveour categoriesandoursubcategories.Theirinventiongivesusanillusionof intellectual control.6We thinkwecan improveourunderstandingof a subjectasdiffuseandrichlyvariedasirregularwarfareandinsurgencyby huntingforthemostprecisedefinitionandsubdefinitions.Theresultsall toooftenareofficialdefinitionsthattendtotheencyclopaedicandareut­terly indigestible.Orwediscover ahostof similar terms, eachwith its subtlydistinctivemeaningandprobablyitsuniquehistoricalandcultural baggage.So,arewetalkingaboutirregularwarfare,insurgency,low-intensity conflict,guerrillawarfare,terrorism,andsoforth?Theanswerisyes,and morethanthose.Dothedistinctionsmatter?Well,theycan,becausesome wordscarryaheavyloadofimplicitandexplicitimplieddiagnosis,wis­dom,andadvice.Butalwaysrememberthatconceptualsophisticationcan beoverdone.IntheCOINregard,itisaclassicexampleofthesoundeco­nomicprincipleofsecuringdiminishingreturnstoeffort.Ofcourse,there ismuchmoretowarthanwarfare,butwarfareiswarfare,andthemost corecompetencyofsoldiersisskillininflictingpain,killingpeople,and breakingthings.Also,justasweneedtoseeirregularwarfareinthecon­textofCOIN,orviceversaformypreference,soinadditionwecannot permitourselvestoforgetthatinsurgencyiswarfare.Sporadic,episodic, protractedwarfareerodesthemodernWestern,andthereforetheinter­national,legaldistinctionbetweenwarandpeace.Canwetellacontextof warfromoneofpeace?Doweknowwhoareinnocentsandwhoarebel­ligerents?SometimesIfeelcompelledtoreturntobasicswithstudentsto cutthroughalotoftheoverelaboratetheorizingandremindthemthatwe arediscussingwarandwarfare.

Next,becausepoliticians,officials, and at least some strategists—not usuallythemoreacademicones—areprofessionalproblemsolvers,they are always in themarket for answers.The revolution inmilitary affairs (RMA)projecthassufferedfromprovidingveryexpensiveanswerstoan unknownquestion,atleasttoaquestionthatwashugelyunderexamined. Butnow,withCOINandtheirregularchallenge,thedefensecommunity againhasachallengeitbelievesitcangetitsteethinto.Theproblemisthat somechallengesaremuchmoretaxingthanothers.ToexcelatCOIN,for

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Americans,isinfinitelymoredifficultthantoexcelatregularconventional warfare.However, theAmericanisanoptimisticpublicculture,andits militarycultureshaveahostofallbutgeneticallyprogrammed“can-do” agents,soCOINistheflavorofthedecade.Imightaddtheancientre­minderthat“tothepersonwhodoesn’thavetodoit,nothingisimpos­sible.”COINisanactivitytowardwhichtheAmericanpublic,strategic, andmilitarycultureshavebeen,andIsuspectremain,deeplyhostile.But itisnottheAmericanwaytodothingsbyhalves.InBritain,wetendto use quarter measures when half measures are called for. In the United States,theerrorliesintheoppositedirection.Inthetroublingwordsof thatdistinguishedAmericanpoliticalscientist,SamuelP.Huntingtonof Harvard,writing in theWeinberger-Powell eraof themid-1980s: “The UnitedStatesisabigcountry,andweshouldfightwarsinabigway.One ofourgreatadvantagesisourmass;weshouldnothesitatetouseit.... Bigness,notbrains,isouradvantage,andweshouldexploitit.Ifwehave tointervene,weshouldintervenewithoverwhelmingforce.”7

ThisjustgoestoshowthatachairatHarvardcarriesnoguaranteeof wisdom,ordoesit?Huntingtonreflectedtheethosofthemid-1980s,but also—thereasonIquotehim—hedoessuggestareasonwhytheUnited StateshashadahardtimewithCOIN.Whenpolicydemandseffective­ness inCOIN,thegovernment––themilitary inparticular,naturally–– blowsdustoffitsancientmanuals if itcanfindthem;unearths“classic writings”byCharlesE.Callwell, theUSMarineCorps,DavidGalula, RobertTaber,MaoTse-tung,RobertTrinquier,FrankKitson,andT.E. Lawrence;andrediscoverswhatpreviousgenerationsknew,evenifthey didn’talwayspracticeitwell.8Ofcourse,thecontextshavechanged,and everyworkoftheory,foundedontheexperienceofthelifeandtimesof its author, is stuffed fullof inappropriateaswell asmuchgoodadvice. Nomatter,whenCOIN—orwhatever is thechallengeof thehour—is king,whateveristohandisrushedtothefronttoserve.Everypieceof fashionablejargon,everyexecrableacronym,everydodgyideaishijacked forthebandwagon.ThebandwagonnowisCOIN.Tocitebutafewof thelightweightnotionsthatarepretendingtobeheavymetal:so-called fourth-generationwarfare,network-centricwarfare, effects-basedopera­tions,culture,andatotallyintegratedapproach.Thedefensecommunity has made the remarkable discovery that what in Britain we call grand strategy—intheUnitedStates,nationalsecuritystrategy—isagoodidea. Italwayswas.Inpointoffact,Ithoughtthatthewholeaimofhavinga

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NationalSecurityCouncil structurewastoenableagrandstrategy,but perhapsthedistributionofpowerinWashingtonistooexquisitelydiffuse topermitthat.DareIcallitanother“missionimpossible”?

WhatIamsuggesting,admittedlyratherungenerously,isthatwhenwe confrontatrulydifficultchallenge,onethatAmericanculturalprogram­mingisnotwellpreparedtomeet,welookforthe“silverbullet,”thebig comprehensivesolution.Sotodaywelearn,again,howtodoCOIN;we discoverthevirtuesofculturalunderstanding;werediscoverthatwarand warfareisaboutpolitics;andwegraspthenecessityforanintegratedap­proach,otherwise longknownasgrand strategy. Itwould seemthat in desperationweareliabletobelievemanyextravagantpromises.Why?Be­causewewanttobelievethattherearesolutionsor,betterstill,thatthere isasingle,dominantsolution.

Iapologizeforopeninginsocensoriousamanner.Thatwasnotreallymy intention.Butsometimesthearmchairstrategisthastogowherehisbrain commands,forgoodorill.Toclosethisinitialbroadsideonaslightlyup­beatnote,Iwillsaythatwhatmattersmost,indeedwhatshouldbeadopted asaprinciple,isto“getthebigthingsrightenoughbecausethesmallerrors eventuallycanbefixed.”Rephrased,pursuethepathofminimumregrets. Mayourmistakesbemodestandcorrectible.

Whatoftheplanofattackhere?Thebodyofthediscussion—yes,we willgettoit,infactwenearlyhave—isorganizedtoposeandanswerfour centralquestions:

1. Whatisthenatureofirregularwarfare,andhowdoesitdifferfrom regularwarfare?

2. Whydoregularforceshavegreatdifficultywagingirregularwarfare effectively?

3. IsCOINwinnablebyregulars?

4. Whataretheleadingfashionableerrorsaboutirregularwarfare?

Thisagendashouldsufficetostirtheneedfulopinion,expertise,andprejudice.

What Is the Nature of Irregular Warfare, and How Does It Differ from Regular Warfare?

Irregular warfare does not have a distinctive nature. Warfare is war­fare,andwariswar,period.Butitdoeshaveanoftensharplydistinctive

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character.Infact,irregularwarfarecantakeawidevarietyofformsand bepracticedindifferentmodes,evenwithinthesameconflict.Wearein thechallengingrealmofwhattheChinesecall“unrestrictedwarfare”:in principle,anythinggoes,anythingthatmightwork.9Afterall,thatisthe veryessenceofstrategy.Inthetimelessandwell-quotedwordsofBernard Brodie, “Strategic thinking, or ‘theory’ if oneprefers, is nothing if not pragmatic. Strategy is a ‘how todo it’ study, a guide to accomplishing somethinganddoingitefficiently.Asinmanyotherbranchesofpolitics, thequestionthatmattersinstrategyis:Willtheideawork?”10

Thereisnoneedforustodevoteattentiontothenatureofwar;thatvi­taltaskhasbeenperformedmorethanadequatelybyCarlvonClausewitz. Andsinceallwarhasthesamenature,itmattersnotwhetheritisregular orirregular.Youwillfindscholarsandotherswhotrytopersuadeyouthat warischangingitsnatureasitsmanycontextsalter,andespeciallythat irregularwarhasanaturequiteuniquetoitself.Itisnonsense.Thereare noregularorirregularwars.Thereareonlywars.Insearchofadvantage or,asoften,toavoiddisadvantage,warfaremaybewagedbymethodsthat contemporarynormsregardasirregular.Thatreallyisamatterofdetail, albeitimportantdetail.Iamhighlightingadistinctionthatisnotalways wellunderstoodbetweenwarandwarfare.Asoftenasnot,thetermsare employedsynonymously,usuallyinignoranceoftheircrucialdifference inmeaning.Asecuritycommunitywillembarkuponawarforthepur­posestatedbyClausewitzonthefirstpageofhismasterwork,On War: “War is thus an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will” (emphasisin original).11Thatisit.Onedoesnotsetouttowagearegularoranirregu­larwar.Rather,themode,ormorelikelythemixofmodes,isdictatedby strategiccircumstances.

There is no need to explore the nature of irregular war because it is identicaltothegeneralnatureofwar.Atruegloryofthethreepreeminent classicsofstrategicthought—Clausewitz’sOn War,SunTzu’sArt of War, andThucydides’Peloponnesian War—isthattheytellusallthatweneed to know about war’s unchanging nature.12 Read properly, they explain thenatureofallwarinallperiods,amongallbelligerents,employingall weapons,anddeployinganendlessarrayofdeclaredmotives.Thismay soundpedantic;Ihopeitjustsoundsobvious.Iemphasizetheauthority ofClausewitz,andparticularlyhisinsistencethat“allwarsarethingsof thesamenature,”inordertohelpdemystifythisratheramorphousbeast, “irregularwar.”13

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Notonlyis itanerrortoreify irregularwar,whichafterall isonlya method,asadistinctivephenomenon,itcanalsobeaseriousmistaketo dividetherealmofwarfareneatlyintotheregularandtheirregular.Many wars areneitherpurely regularnorpurely irregular. In fact, if one side adheresstrictlytotheirregularcode,itisallbutcertaintobedefeated. Irregularforcesdonotwinunlesstheycantranslatetheirirregulargains intothekindofadvantagethatyieldsthemmilitary,strategic,andulti­matelypoliticaleffectagainsttheirregularenemy.Unlessthestatelosesits nerveandcollapsespolitically,theinitiallyirregularbelligerentcanonly winifitisabletogenerateregularmilitarystrength.Letuspausetosum­marizeafewimportantpoints.

1. Wariswar,andwarfareiswarfare.Clausewitziantheoryisrichbut austere.Hegivesushisremarkabletrinityof“primordialviolence, hatred, and enmity”; “chance and probability”; and “reason”; his identification of war’s “climate”—“danger, exertion, uncertainty, andchance”;theinsistencethatwarmustbeapoliticalinstrument; andhisreminderoftheubiquitousroleof“friction.”14

2. Therearenoirregularwarsobedienttosomedistinctivenatureof theirown.

3. Many,perhapsmost,warsarecharacterizedbybelligerentsresorting toarangeofcombatmodesontheregular-irregularspectrum.

4. Becausegenerallytheyarethelegalinstrumentsoflegalentities(i.e., states),regulararmedforcestypicallythinkintermsofaneatlybi­narycontextofpeaceorwar.Thiscanbeunhelpful.Belligerentsin irregularmodearewonttohover,tomovebackandforthperhaps, betweenpeaceandwar.Indeed,recallingthelateandunlamented SovietUnion,thereareideologieswhoseagentsmustalwaysbeat warwithprescribedenemies,thoughthewarwillrarelyinvolveac­tiveviolence.

5. Finally,whetherornottheyrecognizethefact,allbelligerentsfunc­tiongrandstrategically.Weshouldnotbeoverimpressedbythere­centrediscoveryofthestrategicwheelinthisregard.Thefactthat thereismoretowarthanwarfare,orfighting,wasaswellknownto AlexandertheGreatasitshouldbetous.15Theapparentrecentstra­tegicepiphanythathasrevealedtousthetruebreadthofbehaviors

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relevanttotheconductofirregularwarfareis,frankly,recognitionof theblindinglyobvious.

Sincethereisnocaseforasserting,orfearing,thatirregularwarfarecom­prisesanythingotherthanthestandardsetofingredientspresentinallwar­fare,albeitdistinctivelymixed,justwhatisitthatweareanalyzing?

Therearetworoughbutreadywaystodistinguishregularfromirregular warfare.Thefirstisbythecharacterofthecombatants.Writingacentury ago,ColonelCallwelloftheBritisharmyemployedthecontemporaryterm ofart,“smallwar.”Hedefineditthus:“Practicallyitmaybesaidtoinclude all campaignsother than thosewhereboth theopposing sides consistof regulartroops.”16Inotherwords,asmallwariswagedbetweenstateand nonstateadversaries.Thelegalandpoliticalstatusofthebelligerentsdefines theirregularity.Thesecondapproach,incontrast,focusesuponmodesof operation. Irregularwarfare iswagedby such irregularmethods as guer­rillawarfarepreponderantly,probablywithprecursorandthenadjunctter­rorism.Scholarsofstrategicarcanaliketodebatetheirconceptualchoices. Sometimes thesematter. Isour subject insurgency,or is it irregularwar­fare?17Thelatterrisksdivertingusundulyintoamilitaryboxcanyonatthe expenseofshortchangingtheimplicationsoftheeternaltruththatthereis moretowarthanwarfare.Indeed,insomepartsofthisworldevenrefer­ringtowarandwarfarecanmisleadbysuggestingthepossibilityoftheir opposites,peaceandstabilization.Aterritorymaybelockedinacondition ofpermanentwarandpeace.That isconceptually—aswellaspolitically, legally,andsocially—confusingtotidy-mindedacademicsanddraftersof doctrinemanuals.

Itisundeniablethatinsomeimportantwaysinsurgencyisamoresatis­factoryconceptthanisirregularwarfare.Itreferstoapurpose,typicallyto takepowerbymeansofatolerably,certainlyvariably,popularcampaign of violence to destabilize and ultimately defeat the established govern­ment.However,Iamreluctanttosurrendertheirregularlabelcompletely tosodefiniteapoliticalmission.Forme,atleast,theattractionsofthe broadchurchofirregularwarfareincludeitsabilitytowelcomeregulars behavingirregularly.Imustconfesstosomeunhappinesswithdefinitions that err on the side of exclusivity. Probably it is sensible to decline to choose.Instead,weshouldnotwasteeffortonthemeritsanddemeritsof insurgencyandirregularity.Theformerisobviouslypoliticallysuperior, butthelatterallbutcompelsustothinkinnovativelyand,dareIsayit again,inan“unrestricted”way.

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Letuscuttothechase.Iwillidentifythosecharacteristicsofirregular warfare that wemay elect to regard as the eternal nature of the genre. PleaserecallthatIamappearingtoviolatemyearlierClausewitzianargu­menttotheeffectthatallwarhasthesamenature.Itishelpful,actually itisessentialforourlimitedpurposehere,tolocatethosefeaturesmost characteristicofwhatwemeanbyirregularwarfare.Onlybyproceeding thuscanweentertheliststodointellectualandpracticalcombatwiththe beliefsandpracticesoftheseriouslymisinformed.

Irregularwarfarecanhavenofixedcharacter; its irregularity isdeter­minedbyspecifichistoricalandculturalcircumstances.Incommonwith theChinesech’iandcheng,unorthodoxandorthodox,LiddellHart’sin­directasopposedtodirectapproach,18andsymmetricalcontrastedwith asymmetricalwarfare, irregularity isdefinedby itsopposite.This isnot terriblyhelpful.Ittellsusthatirregularwarfareisnotregularwarfare.But whatisregularwarfare?Andtowhom?Toastrategicculturethatfavors raiding,presumablyastrategyofopenwarfarewouldbeirregular.Theo­rists canpassmanyahappyhour trying todefine the indefinable.The truthisthatirregular,indirect,andasymmetrical areallinherentlyempty concepts,definableonlywithreferencetotheiropposites.Andthoseop­posites, similarly,arebereftofdefinitemeaning.But letusnotdespair. Whenfacedwithatheoreticalconundrumsuchasthis,oneisobligedto resorttothatoldreliable,commonsense.Itsohappensthatwedohave a good enoughworkingunderstandingof irregularwarfare, one which grants the distinctiveness of each case. If we itemize irregular warfare’s principalfeatures,leavingsubtletiesasideforthemoment,weshouldbe closeenoughtofindingtheanswertothisfirstquestion.Whatisdistinc­tiveaboutirregularwarfare?

1. Irregularwarfareiswarfarewagedinastyle,orstyles,thatarenon­standardfortheregularforcesatissue.Theenemyisunlikelytobe intheserviceofastate.

2. Irregular warfare is waged in order to secure the acquiescence, if notthesupport,ofthelocalpeople.Militarydefeatoftheirregular enemy is desirable, butnot essential. It is his political defeat, his delegitimation,thatiscrucial.

3. Thedecisivecombatoccursinandaboutthemindsofcivilians,not onthebattlefield.Protectionofthepeoplemustbejobone.

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4. Intelligencerules!Butactionable,whichistosayreal-time,intelli­genceisattainableonlyfromdefectorsorasympatheticpublic.And forsuchinformationtobeavailable,itsagentsmustbelievethatyou arethewinningside.Prudencedictatessuchcaution.

5. Irregularwarfare,ascontrastedwithcommonbanditry,crime,orrec­reationalbrigandryandhooliganism,needsan ideology.At least, it needssomefacsimileofabigideaortwo.Ideasandcultureusuallydo matterinwarfare.Butforaninsurgencytomobilizeandgrow,ithas tohaveasourceofspiritualand/orpoliticalinspiration.Whencom­batinganirregularenemy,onecannothelpbeingincompetitionwith thatbigidea.Thereisanunhelpfulasymmetryinthestructureofthe context.The insurgent isbiddingwithpromises; you are counter- bidding with what must be a somewhat flawed performance. And bearinmindthattheirregularfoewillbestrivingwithimagination andperhapssomecompetencetomakeyourclaimsforbettergover­nancelooklikelies.

6. Ofcourse,allwarfareisaboutpolitics.Itisonlythepoliticaldimension thatgivesmeaningtothebloodyactivity.But,inregularwarfare,atleast forthesoldiers,politicstypicallytakesabackseatuntilthemilitaryissue issettled.Notsoinirregularwarfare.Inthelattercasetherewillprob­ablybeno recognizablemilitarydecision.Militarybehaviormustbe conductedforitspoliticaleffectsbecausethoseeffects,inthemindsof thepublic,comprisethetruefieldofdecision.

7. Culturemattersgreatly.Thisisyetanotherclaimthatisnotunique to irregularwarfare, but it is of greater significance in thatmode ofconflict.Sinceirregularwarfareisaboveallelseacontestforthe acquiescence and allegianceof civilian locals, their beliefs, values, expectations,andpreferredbehaviorsareauthoritative.Ifwedonot knowmuchaboutthosebeliefsandvalues,weareunlikelytoreg­istermuchprogress inpersuasion, exceptby accident. Indeed,by behavinglikestrangersinastrangeland—truealiens—ourregular soldiers and officials are as likely to do more harm than good to theirmission.Alwaysbealerttothemalignworkingsofthelawof unintendedconsequences.Youmightwishtomarrythatlawtothe maximthat“nogooddeedshallgounpunished.”

8. Finally,regularwarfaretheAmericanwayhasthehighlydesirable characteristicsofoffensiveness,aggressiveness, seizingandkeeping

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theinitiative,andmaintainingahightempoofoperations.Theob­ject is todefeat, indeedannihilate, theenemyinshortorderbya combination of maneuver and firepower. The idea that time is a weapon is somewhat alien—certainly it is unwelcome. But in ir­regularwarfare,anenemywhoisgreatlydisadvantagedmaterially isobligedtousetimeagainstyou.Heexpectstowinbynotlosing because he believes that he can outlast you. The war will not be wonorlostinthelocalbarriosandswamps,butinAmerica’ssitting rooms.Theirregularisnotattemptingtoinflictanimpossiblemili­tarydefeatuponyou.SteveMetzpointstothemeaningofstrategic effectiveness in irregularwarfarewhenhewrites that “insurgency, after all, is armed theater.”19All competent strategistsof irregular warfarerecognizethisfact.Theirregularopponents,timeaftertime, haveresistedsuchcomprehension.MichaelCollinsorchestratedhis IrishRepublicanArmycampaignagainstBritainin1919–21inobe­dience to thisprinciple, asdidVoNguyenGiap.Needless to say, perhaps,ifanirregularforceenjoysmilitarysuccess,itsleadersare alwaysvulnerabletothetemptationtochangetherules.Theymay seektoacceleratethepaceofhistorybygoingdirectlyforpolitical goldbymeansofaswiftmilitaryvictory.Asoftenasnot,suchhu­brisbringsthemclosetomilitaryandpoliticalnemesis.

Itisnecessarytohighlightthedifferencesbetweenregularandirregular warfare.ButImustconfess toconsiderableuneasewithsuchaneatand convenientbinarydistinction.ThereisanOrientalstrategictheoristlurking somewherewithinme,andthatelusivepersonfavorsaboth/andapproach ratherthananeither/orone.WhentheAmericandefensecommunitymakes agreatdiscovery,inthiscasethephenomenonofirregularwarfare,ittends tooverdiscovery.Byandlarge,thelong-belatedrediscoveryofwhathasreally alwaysbeenknownaboutirregularwarfareandinsurgencyisverywelcome. However,tociteyetanotherlaw,diminishingreturnstoeffortrapidlysetin. IwouldbelesstroubledwereIseeingamoreholisticapproachtostrategy andwarfarethanInoticetoday.IsuspectboththattheCOINenthusiasm willnotlongendure,butthatwhileitdoeswewilloverreachandoverreact. ThisisonereasonwhyIhavetriedtoarguethatoursubjectiswarandwar­fareandthattheyhaveapermanentnature.AsIshallexplain,Ibelievethat thecurrentcommendabledriveforgreatereffectivenessinCOINisgoing topromotenewstrategicerrors.

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Why Do Regular Forces Have Great Difficulty Waging Irregular Warfare Effectively?

Ifitisanyconsolation,youshouldbeawarethatveryfewarmieshave beenequallycompetentintheconductofregularandirregularwarfare. Theprincipalreasonisglaringlyobvious.Armiesgenerallyareorganized, equipped, and trained tofightother armieswith characteristics similar totheirs.Inregularwarfareoneseeksvictorythoughthedecisivedefeat oftheenemies’forcesonthebattlefield.Althoughtheenterpriseisthor­oughlypolitical inmotivationandmeaning, theproximatebehavior is, andhastobe,military.Anarmycommandermaycontributetoadialog onstrategywithhispoliticalmasters,butcorporals,sergeants,captains, colonels,andevenone-andtwo-stargeneralswillnot.20Theywillbefully occupiedfightingthewar.Theproblemisthatinirregularwarfarethere isanarmedenemyinthetheater,buthismilitarydefeatorhumiliationis nottheprimeobjectiveoftheCOINeffort.Thisisnottosaythatsuch defeatisunimportant,avitalmattertowhichIshallreturn.

TheprimaryCOINchallenge is strategic.This isperhapsunfortunate becausetrulyitcanbesaidthattheUnitedStatesdoesnotreallydostrategy. Rather,ittendstojumpstraightfrompolicytooperationsandtactics.21The dominantapproachtostrategythatonefindsinAmericanstrategicculture ismorethancasuallyreminiscentoftheviewofthemostadmiredsoldierof thesecondhalfofthenineteenthcentury—RobertE.Leealwaysexcepted, ofcourse—FieldMarshalHelmuthGrafvonMoltke.Thefieldmarshalde­claredin1871that“strategyappropriatesthesuccessofeveryengagement andbuildsuponit.Thedemandsofstrategygrowsilentinthefaceofatac­ticalvictoryandadaptthemselvestothenewlycreatedsituation.Strategyis asystemofexpedients.”22Weknowhowthatapproachfaredunderfire.To losetwoworldwarsin27yearswasquiteastrategicachievement.

Inregularwarfare,thesoldiersknowhowtowin,andthegeneralsunder­standthetaskthattheymustsetthetroopsto.COINisdifferent.The familiarconnectionbetweentactical,evenoperational,militaryexcellence andstrategicsuccessiseitherabsentortenuous.Youwinamilitaryen­gagement by standard metrics, but so what? Can insurgents be beaten militarily?Iftheycannot,justhowcantheybedefeated?IfCOINisall aboutpoliticaleffect,whatkindofmilitaryandotherbehavioursgener­ate,orundermine,thatpoliticaleffect?Thesearenotexactlynewques­tions.ItisnoteventruetoclaimthatCOINtodayconfrontsnewforms ofinsurgency.Strategichistoryhasbeenherebefore.Contextscertainly

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change.AsEdwardN.Luttwakremindsus,theoptionofout-terrorizing terroristsandencouragingsocialdisciplinethroughthegenerationofseri­ousfearisnotopentousasitwastoGeneralVespasianwhenheelected toteachtherevoltingJewsinAD67whyitwasnotagoodideatorevolt againstRome.23Changingnorms—aglobalizedtechnologyofnewsand opinionreporting—havealteredcrucially thecontextsofwarfare,espe­ciallyCOINwarfare.Regularforcesarestilltryingtocometogripswith themediadimensiontotheirbehavior.

Thechiefdifficultyforregularsistodecideuponastrategythatmight work.Militaryoperationsandtacticsarefarfromirrelevant,buttheyare notthekeystosuccess.Itisworthnoting,however,thattheycanprove tobethekeystopoliticalfailure.RecallDienBienPhuand,potentially, KheSanh.Theregularhas tochangehismind-setandadoptaviewof militaryactivitythathas it integral toaholisticapproachtoaproblem thatislargely,thoughnotentirely,political.Sincesoldiershavefighting as theirmostdistinctive core competency, andgiven that they arebest preparedtowrestlewithotherregularsoldiers,themilitaryculturalchal­lengeisprofound.Rephrased,typicallywhenaregularforceiscommitted toCOIN,althoughithassomeinherentadvantages,itisbeingaskedto performinways,andforpurposes,forwhichitisrelativelyillprepared. Ifproofofthisclaimisrequired,justconsiderIraq.Oftenitissaidthat itismoredifficulttoexpelanoldideathantointroduceanewone.Be­causeweonlyhaveonearmy,wecannotaffordtodeprogramourregulars, evenweresuchmentalsurgerypossible.Afterall,wemaywellneedthem toperforminaregularway,even inpursuitofCOINsuccess. Imight mentionthatIhavealwaysbelievedthatthefirstrequirementforspecial operationsforces(SOF),“fitforpurpose”asthesayinggoestoday,isan unconventionalmind-set.24UnlessSOFareemployedbypeoplewhocan thinkunconventionally,andunlesstheythemselveshaveunconventional minds,theymustperformfarshortoftheirpotential.Asalways,theprob­lemisstrategic.Whateffectisitnecessarytogenerate,andhowisthatto bedone?Itisalwaysessentialtobeabletoanswerthemostcriticalques­tionposedbystrategy,sowhat—whatdifferencedoesitmake?

Not all military institutions have equal difficulty with COIN. Public, strategic, and military cultures differ among countries. For example, the wagingofwarfareagainstirregularsofallpersuasionsandinmostkindsof terrainhaslongbeenacore,ifnotthecore,competencyoftheBritisharmy. Veryoccasionally,thoughrelativelybriefly,thatarmywouldchangeitsgame

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dramaticallywhencontinentaldemandshadtobemet.ButtheBritisharmy wasorganizedasanimperialpoliceforce.Itwastransportedbythenavyon expeditionsofconquest.Thenitpolicedtheempire,providingaidtothe civilpower.Andfinallyitconductedalengthy,andnotwhollyunsuccessful, imperialretreat,servingastherearguardforthelongprocessofdevolution after1945.OnecouldarguethattheBritisharmywasstillengagedinimpe­rialpolicinginNorthernIrelanduntiltheGoodFridayAgreementof1998. Weneedtobewareofcasualgeneralization.ThequestionIposeis,Ibelieve, validandimportant:whydoregularforceshavegreatdifficultywagingir­regularwarfareeffectively?Thescaleofthedifficultyvarieswiththesubject. TheBritisharmyhasalongtraditionofperformanceinirregularwarfare. IthasnotalwayscovereditselfwithgloryinCOINcampaigns.However, Britishmilitaryculturehasnobasicdifficultywithsuchwarfare.Itiswhat thearmyexpectstobeaskedtodo.Andhistorically,irregularwarfarehas beenthepreponderantBritishmilitaryexperience.

TheUnitedStatesanditsArmyisanothercasealtogether.Despite300 years of irregular warfare in North America against Native Americans, Americanmilitarycultureneverdesignatedirregularwarfare,orCOIN,as arequiredcorecompetency,atleastnotuntiltoday,ratherbelatedly.This isnottheoccasiontoexplainwhythishasbeenso.Isimplyrecorditas ahistoricalfact.TheUnitedStateshasapreferredwayinwarfareoflong standingthatis,onbalance,highlydysfunctionalforCOIN.Moreand moreAmericananalystshavecometorecognizethis,butrecognitionand effectiveresponseareratherdifferent.EvenastheUSArmyandAirForce appreciatethedifferencesbetweenregularandirregularwarfareinsofaras theybearupontheirbehaviors,itremainsanopenquestionwhetheror notAmericancultureandinstitutionsareabletomaketheadjustments necessaryformuchgreatereffectivenessinCOIN.

Atsomeriskofoverstatement,Iwillhazardthepropositionthatalmost everything that is regardednearuniversallyas“bestpractice” inCOIN contradicts theAmericanway inwarfare.25Toexcel inCOINanarmy needsto:

1. Understandthatallmilitaryactionispoliticaltheater.Irregularwar­faredoesnot,cannot,haveamilitaryoutcome.

2. Appreciatethattheconflictisfortheacquiescenceorsupportofthe people.Deadinsurgentsareabonus;theyarenotareliablemarkof success.

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3. Bepreparedtotearupitsdoctrinemanualsforregularwarfare.Its firstjobistoprotectthepeople.

4. Adoptdifferentprioritiesamongitsskills.Beinghighlyagileinma­neuverandlethalinfirepowerarenotespeciallyhelpful.Canitbe thatourmilitarytransformationwas,oris,headinginadirection irrelevant,oractuallyharmful,foreffectivenessinCOIN?

5. AcceptthatCOINrequiresalong-termcommitment,typically10 years.Also, it requires security forces in largenumbers.Historical analysisseemstoshowthatoneneedsroughly20membersofthe securityforcesforevery1,000peopleinthegeneralpopulation.26 Tacticalskillandtechnologyarenotveryrelevant.Theyareniceto have,butthebasisofsuccessisnumbersintherightratio.

Ifyourarmedforcesareshapedbyandweddedtoamilitarycultureof rapidmaneuverfordecisivevictory,iftheyseektoexploitfirepowerasthe longestoffriendlylongsuits,andiftheydrawasharpdistinctionbetween thepoliticalandthemilitaryrealms,COINwillbethesourceofendless frustration.Notonlyisanarmyexcellentintheconductofregularwar­fareunlikelytoshineatCOIN,thatexcellencewillalsoproveahindrance tounderstandingandrespondingtothedifferentchallengesposedbya contextofirregularhostilities.Thepicturelooksgrim,perhapsundulyso. AretheregroundstohopeforsuccessinCOIN?

Is COIN Winnable by Regulars?

Theanswertothisquestionisaresoundingyes.Isaythisnotjustasan affirmationoffaithbutalsoonthebasisofhistoricalevidence.Insurgencies haveadistinctlyunevenrecordofstrategicandpoliticalsuccess.Wetheo­riststendtobeoverimpressedwithstructuralfactors.Wehappilylistreasons forandagainsttheprospectsforCOINadvantage.Butwearenotoriously weakatdealingwiththehumandimensionofCOIN.Similarly,wearenot aseloquentasweshouldbeonthesubjectsofClausewitz’s“climateofwar” andfriction.Peoplemattermost,notleastinrelativelylow-technologyhos­tilities.Leaderscount.Politicalcharismaandstrategicinspirationareprice­lessassets.Inwarfareofallkinds,regularandirregular,moraleisbyfarthe mostimportantgeneratorofeffectiveness.Inaprotractedirregularconflict, themoraleof the rivalarmed forcescanbe literallydecisive.Theskillful leaderworkstodepressthemoraleoftheenemy’sspearcarriers.

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Ontheobversesideofinspiredleadership,itisimportanttoallowana­lyticalspaceforhumanerror.Itisalwaysamistaketodiscountfolly,in­competence,andsheerbadluck.Manycampaignsthatshouldhavebeen won were, in fact, lost because the troops were poorly led. Every war, regularandirregular,isaduel,asClausewitzmaintains.Itisalsoastrug­glebetweentwoormorelearninginstitutions.27Everyonemakesmistakes inwar.Notallmistakesarefatal,butthecourseofeventsisshaped,even determined,bywhichsidelearnsthefastestandadaptsmorequickly.

While anarmymustdiscardmostof itsdoctrine for regularwarfare inordertobeeffectiveinCOIN,itmustnottrytodiscardtheessential factsofitsregularity.It isthearmyoftheestablishedorder.Itprovides aidtothecivilpower.Ithasallthematerialadvantagesofofficialsanc­tionand resources. Ithas legitimacy; at least it shouldhave legitimacy. WhileaCOINcampaignrequiresaregulararmytoreorganize,retrain, andreequip,itdoesnotrequire,itcannotrequire,theregularstoapethe irregulars. The regular army and its adjuncts are the face of order and stability.Itneedstolookandbehaveasifthatisso.Whatdoweknow fromhistoricalexperience,fromlogic,andfromcommonsenseaboutthe prospectsforsuccessbyregularforcesinCOIN?

First,althougheveryinsurgencyisunique,eachhassomefeaturescom­mon to themall.This convenient factmeans that aCOINdoctrine is bothfeasibleandnecessary.28Weknowwhatconstitutesbestpracticein COIN,ifonlybecausewehaveaccesstoanabundanceofevidenceofthe consequences of poor practice. The beginning of COIN wisdom is to grasptheimplicationsofClausewitz’sfamousrule.Heinsistedthat“the first,thesupreme,themostfar-reachingactofjudgmentthatthestates­manandcommanderhavetomakeistoestablishbythattest[offitwith policy]thekindofwaronwhichtheyareembarking;neithermistakingit for,nortryingtoturnitinto,somethingthatisalientoitsnature.Thisis thefirstofallstrategicquestionsandthemostcomprehensive.”29Weknow thatCOINisacontestforthemindsofthepeople.Tothatend,weknow that themilitary instrumenthas tobe subordinate tocivilianauthority andinthebackgroundbehindthepolice.Also,weknowthattheuseof forceshouldbeminimal.TheentireCOINeffortrequirescoordinated centralciviliandirection.Thereisnoneedtodwellonthesefamiliardetails. Thepointisthatthereisnothingwhatsoevermysteriousaboutbestprac­ticeinCOIN,atleastinprinciple.Wehaveaglitteringarrayofvariably outstandingclassictextsandanevenmoreglitteringarrayofhistorical

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episodesofbothfailureandsuccessinCOIN.Thechargetodayisnotto comprehendtheCOINchallenge.Thatiseasy.Rather,itistopersuade ourinstitutionstochangetheirpreferredbehaviorswhilebeingalertto thepossibility that institutional, strategic, andpublic culturesmaynot permitthenecessaryadjustments.

Second,COINcananddoessucceedifthecontextsoftheconflictare permissive.Forexample,COINwasalwaysmuchmorelikelytobesuccess­fulinthePhilippines,Malaya,andElSalvadorthaninVietnam,Afghani­stan,andIraq.Notalltasksaredoable,eventoagiftedstrategist.Iraqtoday bearsallthehallmarksofmissionimprobable.Followingourinitialerrors, thesecuritysituationhasdeteriorated,probablybeyondrescue.Theconflict isnowsocomplexitevenmakesWorldWarIIYugoslavialooksimpleby comparison,andthat isquiteanachievement.Thestrategistshouldbea pragmatist.Whethertheprospectiveconflictisregular,irregular,oramessy, untidycombinationofthetwo,itmaynotbewinnableatbearablecost. Strategyisaboutmakinghardchoicesbaseduponcost-benefitguesswork. Evenasound,well-testedCOINdoctrine,tobeimplementedbyasuitably coordinatedcivil-militaryeffort,may standno reasonablechanceof suc­ceeding.Situationalawarenessiskey.DonotassumethatCOINisalways doable.Ahostofshowstopperscanrainontheparade.

Third and lastly, for COIN to succeed abroad it has towork politi­callyforusathome.IftheAmerican(andBritish)publiclosespatience orconfidence in theendeavor, theexercise isdoomed.Thispoint is so obviousastovergeonthebanal.WhenIraiseditinaspeechayearago,I wasnotpopular.Ipredictedasurgeofbumperstickerssaying“Nomore Iraqs.”Theaudiencewasnotimpressedatthattime.IftheUnitedStates believesthatitfacesagenerationandmoreofirregularchallenges,itisgo­ingtohavetoaddressthispotentiallyfatalweaknessinitsstayingpower. Irregularwarfareisprotractedandapparentlyindecisive.Itisdifficultto understandindetail,itscourseishardtodescribe,evidenceofprogressis elusive,anditsfutureisalmostimpossibletopredict.IfAmericanscannot acceptthesestructuralfacts,thecountrycannotsucceedatCOIN.

What Are the Leading Fashionable Errors Believed about Irregular Warfare?

Ifyoulikemaxims,trythisone:“Foreverycomplexproblemthereisa simplesolution,anditisalwayswrong.”Itisnoticeablethatthecurrent

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understandableflurryoftheoryandadviceonirregularwarfarehasencour­aged thepromotionof anumberof just such simple solutions. Imust prefacemynegativecommentsbysayingthat the ideasIwillciteareall excellentinthemselves.WhatIshallcriticizeistheviewthatanyofthemis theanswerforwhichwehavebeensearching.Imustriskexaggerationinor­dertohighlighttheargumentthataninherentlygoodidearapidlybecomes amuchlessgoodideawhenitslimitationsarenotappreciated.Thefour simpleideasthatcurrentlyarebeinginvestedwithmiraculouspropertiesfor thesuccessfulprosecutionofirregularwarfareareculture,COINdoctrine, theuseofSOF,andthedominanceofpoliticalovermilitarybehavior.

First,theUSdefensecommunityhasdiscoveredculture.Withallthe enthusiasmoftheconvert,ourmilitaryisbeingencouragedtobelievethat understandinglocalcultureisthekeytovictory.30Wemustcomprehend thepeopleandthesocietythatweaspiretorescuefromchaosandcapture bydangerouscreeds.Thisisanexcellentidea,asitalwayshasbeen.The mainproblemisthatitisnotachievable.Someculturalempathycertainly isattainable.Buttoacquireanythingmorethanasuperficialgraspoflo­calmoresandsocialstructuredemandsyears,ifnotalifetime,ofexposure andstudy.Ourpracticeoftoursofdutywithrapidrotationisincompatible withtheacquisitionofculturalexpertise.Still,thereiseverythingtobe saidinfavorofourdoingwhatwecantounderstandthepeoplewhose mindscomprisethebattlespaceinirregularwarfare.31Ishouldaddthat evenifahandfulofAmericananthropologistsandhistoriansdosecurea goodmeasureofculturalexpertise,whatdowedowithit?Recallthestrategist’s question,sowhat?So,nowtheUSdefenseestablishmentknowsthatcul­tureisimportant.Good.Butwhatcanitdowiththatgeneralknowledge thatwouldbereallyuseful?

Second,asproblemsolversourofficialsandsoldiersarealwaysinthe marketforsolutionstothequestionoftheday.AndrewF.Krepinevich spoketothismarketandtoldmanypeoplewhattheyweredesperateto hearwhen,in2005,heoffereddrinktothethirstyandfoodtothehun­grywithhis timelyarticle,“HowtoWininIraq.”32WhatKrepinevich providedwasafirst-rate summary,andapplication to Iraq,of standard COINtheory.HeexplainedbestpracticeinCOINasrevealedbyhistori­calexperience.Obviously,thisunexceptionalessaycameasarevelationto manyAmericanswhosomehowhadmissedtheCOINlecturesintheir professionaleducation.ItwouldnotbefairtocompareKrepinevichwith Gen Robert Nivelle, the French general who promised desperate and

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despairingpoliticiansvictory“atastroke”onthewesternfrontin1917. Amongotherdifferences,Krepinevichwasrecommendingasounddoc­trine.ButKrepinevich,Nivelle,andmorerecently,theadvocatesofamili­tary“surge”inBaghdaddoshareoneimportantcommonfeature.They areallpeoplewhoclaimtohavetheanswertotheproblemofthehour. “HowtoWininIraq”andsimilar,iflesscompetentofferings,arequin­tessentiallyJominian.Ifyourecall,AntoineHenrideJomini, theSwiss theorist,promisedvictorytothosewhoappliedthecorrectdoctrine.33The ideahastakenrootthatthesolutiontoourirregularwarfarenightmaresis adoptionoftherightCOINdoctrine.Thisisahalf-truthatbest.Inhis­toricalpractice,eachcaseissouniquethatalthoughtherearesomevalid principleswhichshouldgovernirregularwarfare,therecanbenoreliable templateforallcontexts.

Third,atlonglastSOFhavebecomefashionableand,dareIsay,popu­lar.Inandofitself,anewappreciationforSOFisentirelywelcome.But whatdoweexpectofourSOF?Whataretheirrolesinirregularwarfare? AretheykeytosuccessinCOIN?Theanswerisnotreally,exceptinthe contextof the totalprotractedcivil-militaryeffort thatCOINrequires. SOFcanonlybeaseffectiveascircumstancesallowandasthechainof commandpermits.Inparticular,inCOINtheyeitherplaywiththeteam ortheiruniquetalentsarelargelywasted.Ifthewrongstrategyispursued, SOFwillnotrescuetheenterprise.Thereisalwaysthedangerthataregu­lar military establishment deeply encultured in conventional maneuver warfare,andweddedindissolublytofirepowersolutions,willuseitsSOF assetstodobetterwhatitalreadydoeswell.Specifically,SOFwillbeem­ployedastargetspottersforstand-offweaponry.Recallthatin2001–2an allegedlynewAmericanwayofwar,vitallyenabledbySOFtargetspot­ting,wasproclaimedandcelebratedastheexperience inAfghanistan.34 Solittlecarefulthoughthasbeendevotedtothestrategiceffectivenessof SOFindifferentrolesthatitiseasytoseewhyexaggeratedestimatesof theirpotentialarenothardtocomeby.WelackpersuasivetheoryonSOF. Infact,thegenuinelystrategicliteratureonSOFandspecialoperationsis almostentirelyabsent.IcommendJamesKiras’sexcellentrecentbookto you.35Itisalonelyitemonanotherwiseemptyshelf.Somemayalsofind value, inspiration at least, inDerekLeebaert’s recentwork.36 Although mostofthosewhohavelatchedontoSOFastheprincipalanswertoour COINtroublesarenotwhollyinerror,theyreallydonotknowwhatthey

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aretalkingabout.Thereis,andcanbe,noSOFsolution.SOFareavital partofthesolution,whereasolutionispossible,thatis.

Fourthandfinally,thedefenseestablishmentappearstobeintheprocess ofoverreachingwiththedazzlinginsightthatthemilitarydimensionis subordinatetothepoliticalinirregularwarfare.Yetagain,thisisapower­fulandcorrectinsight.Butwhentakentoofar,whenreducedtoanarticle offaith,itbecomesadangerouserror.Ofcourse,insurgentsofallnoxious breedscannotwinmilitarily,atleastnotunlesstheCOINforcescommit trulyappallingstrategicmistakes.However,COINinallitsnonmilitary dimensionscanonlyflourishinacontextofphysicalsecurityforthepub­lic.ThetraditionalAmericanwayinwarfareishighlydysfunctionalfor COIN,asIhavesuggestedalreadyandasisgenerallyrecognizedtoday. However,weneed tobecareful lestweoverbalanceaway fromaccord­ingthemilitarydimensionitsproperdue.Itisimportant—actuallyit isessential—forthepublictoseetheCOINregularssucceedinbattle. Theyhavetobelievethattheinsurgentsarebeing,andwillcontinueto be,defeated.Naturally,onemustnotpursuenarrowlymilitaryobjectives regardlessofthepoliticalcostsofsodoing.ButIdetectsignstodayofan unduewillingnesstodemoteanddiscountthemilitaryelement.Without physicalsecurityforthepeople,aCOINcampaignisgoingnowhereuse­ful,nomatterhowsophisticateditsdoctrineorwellcoordinateditscen­trallycivilian-directedefforts.

Tosummarizetheargumentjustadvanced:bewareofthegreatover­simplifications.Lookoutforthefalselypromisedsilverbullets.Caveat emptor. Ihavesuggestedthatculture,COINdoctrine,SOF,andthe paramountcyofthepoliticalhaveallbeenadoptedasiconicsolutions tothehideouslycomplexchallengesofCOIN.Whileeachisvaluable, noneistheanswer.

Concluding Thoughts

Iclosewithhalfadozenthoughtsthatareasspareanddirectasmuchof theprecedingdiscussionhasbeenratherindirectandsometimeshedged withtypicalacademicqualifiers.Theseconcludingpointsareamixtureof theobviousandthecontroversial.

1. Irregularwarfareishighlyvariableinformandisalwayscomplex.

2. Irregularwarfarecallsforcultural,political,andmilitaryqualitiesthat arenotamongthetraditionalstrengthsofAmericans.Americaexcels

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intheconductoflarge-scaleregularwarfare.Moreover,airpoweristhe essenceoftheAmericanwayinwarfare.

3. Weneedtobewareofdrawingtoosharpadistinctionbetweenregu­lar and irregular warfare. Most wars have elements of both. And warfareiswarfare,whetheritisregularorirregular.

4. Fewarmiesexcelatbothregularandirregularwarfare.America’sir­regularwarfaredeficitishistoricallycommonamongstates.Itisnot atallextraordinary.

5. Irregularwarfarematters,butitmattersagreatdeallessthanwould, orwill,thereturnofgreat-powerrivalryandantagonism.Wehaveto becareful lestweoverreact to themenaceof thedecade—irregular warfare—onlytodiscoverthattheCOINchallengewasadistraction frommoreserioussecurityinternationalbusiness.

6. Itfollowsfromtheseconcludingthoughts,andfromtheargument inmuchofthispaper,thattheUnitedStatesshouldundertakelittle irregular warfare. It would be a political and strategic mistake to identifyirregularwarfare,COINespecially,asAmerica’sdominant strategicfuture.Ifthecountryshouldmakethemistakeofcommit­tingitselftoextensiveCOINprojects,itwillrequireamuchlarger army.Technologywillnotsubstituteanywherenearadequatelyfor numbersofAmericansontheground.

Notes

1. StevenMetz,Learning from Iraq: Counterinsurgency in American Strategy (CarlisleBar­racks,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,USArmyWarCollege,January2007),v.

2. ThomasR.Mockaitis,The Iraq War: Learning from the Past, Adapting to the Present, and Planning for the Future(CarlisleBarracks,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,USArmyWarCollege, February2007),1.

3. RalphPeters,“InPraiseofAttrition,”Parameters 34,no.2(Summer2004):24–32.For COINRomanstyle,seeJosephus,The Jewish War, trans.G.A.Williamson,rev.E.MarySmall­wood(London:PenguinBooks,1981).

4. MaryKaldor,New and Old Wars: Organised Violence in a Global Era(Cambridge:Polity Press,1999);andHerfriedMünkler,The New Wars(Cambridge:PolityPress,2005).

5. RobertB.StrasslerandRichardCrawley,eds.The Landmark Thucydides: A Comprehensive Guide to the Peloponnesian War(NewYork:TheFreePress,1996),43.

6. IamindebtedtoLtGenPaulvanRiperwhohasforcefullybroughttomyattentionthe excessiveproliferationoftermsforirregularwarfareandinsurgency.

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7. Samuel P. Huntington, American Military Strategy, Policy Papers in International Af­fairs,no.28(Berkeley,CA:InstituteofInternationalStudies,UniversityofCalifornia,Berkeley, 1986),16.

8. Charles E. Callwell, Small Wars: A Tactical Textbook for Imperial Soldiers (1906; repr., Novato,CA:PresidioPress,1990);USMarineCorps,Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, 1940 (1940; repr.,Manhattan,KS:SunflowerUniversityPress,2004);DavidGalula, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice(1964;repr.,Westport,CT:PraegerSecurityIn­ternational,2006);RobertTaber,War of the Flea: The Classic Study of Guerrilla Warfare(1965; repr.,Washington,DC:PotomacBooks,2002);Mao Tse-tung on Guerrilla Warfare,trans.Sam­uelB.Griffith (NewYork:FrederickA.Praeger,1961);RogerTrinquier,Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency(1961;repr.,FortLeavenworth,KS:USArmyCommandand General Staff College, 1985); Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency, Peacekeeping(London:FaberandFaber,1971);andT.E.Lawrence,“GuerrillaWarfare,”Ency­clopaedia Britannica,14thed.(1929;repr.,London:EncyclopaediaBritannica,1959),vol.10, 950–51.

9. QiaoLiangandWangXiangsui,Unrestricted Warfare: Assumptions on War and Tactics in the Age of Globalization,trans.ForeignBroadcastInformationService(Beijing:People’sLibera­tionArmyLiteratureandArtsPublishingHouse,February1999).

10. BernardBrodie,War and Politics (NewYork:Macmillan,1973),452. 11. CarlvonClausewitz,On War,ed.andtrans.MichaelHowardandPeterParet(1832;

repr.,Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1976),75. 12. SeeClausewitz,On War;SunTzu,The Art of War,trans.RalphD.Sawyer(Boulder,CO:

WestviewPress,1994);andStrasslerandCrawley,Landmark Thucydides. 13. Clausewitz,On War,606. 14. Ibid.,89,104,119–21,605–10. 15. DavidJ.Lonsdale,Alexander, Killer of Men: Alexander the Great and the Macedonian Art

of War(London:Constable,2004),5–6,219. 16. Callwell,Small Wars, 21. 17. Metz,Learning from Iraq,62–63. 18. B.H.LiddellHart,Strategy: The Indirect Approach(London:FaberandFaber,1967). 19. Metz,Learning from Iraq,44. 20. EliotA.Cohen,Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen, and Leadership in Wartime(New

York:TheFreePress,2002). 21. ColinS.Gray, “TheAmericanWayofWar:Critique and Implications,” inAnthony

D.McIvor,ed.,Rethinking the Principles of War (Annapolis,MD:NavalInstitutePress,2005), 13–40.

22. HelmuthGraf vonMoltke,Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings, ed.Daniel J. Hughes,trans.DanielJ.HughesandHarryBell(Novato,CA:PresidioPress,1993),47.

23. EdwardN.Luttwak,“DeadEnd:CounterinsurgencyWarfareasMilitaryMalpractice,” Harper’s Magazine 314,no.1881 (February2007):33–42.

24. ColinS.Gray,Explorations in Strategy(Westport,CT:PraegerPublishers,1996),chap.7. 25. ColinS.Gray,Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War

Adapt?(CarlisleBarracks,PA:StrategicStudiesInstitute,USArmyWarCollege,March2006). 26. Mockaitis,Iraq War,52. 27. JohnA.Nagl,Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya

and Vietnam(Chicago:UniversityofChicagoPress,2005). 28. HeadquartersDepartmentoftheArmyandHeadquartersMarineCorpsCombatDe­

velopmentCommand,DepartmentoftheNavy(jointpublication),FieldManual3-24andMa­

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Irregular Warfare

rineCorpsWarfightingPublication3-33.5,Counterinsurgency (Washington,DC:Headquarters DepartmentoftheArmy,15December2006).

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