On ‘there is’

ON 'THERE IS' 41

is explained in terms of insight into meaning relations after all. This is the reason why I fail to see that Carnap's explication of necessary truth in terms of the language-relative concept "L-true in S" clarifies our intuitive notion of necessary truth.

Received May 18, 1959

NOTE 1 In P. A. Schilpp, ed., The Philosophy of Rudolf Camap (New York: Tudor,

forthcoming).

On There Is'

by N O E L F L E M I N G , YALE UNIVERSITY, and NICHOLAS

W O L T E R S T O R F F , CALVIN COLLEC•

WHAT we wish to show in this paper is that 'there is' and 'exists' are not univocal terms, and that 'there is' does not always mean the same as 'exists.' A subsidiary conclusion will be that both these terms have very loose and ambiguous uses in English.

1. Suppose someone asks " W h a t exists?" and is told "Everything." He has then been told a falsehood. For there are lots of things that don't exist--e.g., unicorns, square circles, Pegasus. If one is asked to name, or think of, or sketch, something that does not exist, he need be at no loss for examples. So here already is one use of 'there is,' and it is not the same as that of 'exists.'

But sometimes 'there is' and 'exists' are clearly synonymous. One can say either "There is no mountain above 30,000 feet" or "No mountain above 30,000 feet exists"; and "There are no dodoes" or "Dodoes do not exist." So here is a second use of 'there is,' and it is the same as that of 'exists.' W e shall call this the standard use of 'there is' and 'exists.'

A third use of 'there is' is the same as a second use of 'exists.' For a statement like "No such aroma exists" ("There is no such aroma") is ambiguous. It may mean either that no perfume with this aroma ever could be made, or iust that no perfume with this aroma exists at present. Similarly the question "Is there a million-sided figure?" ("Does a million- sided figure exist?") is ambiguous. It may mean "Is there such a thing as a million-sided figure?" that is, could one be drawn? Or it may mean "Are there any million-sided figures?" that is, does one exist now somewhere?

42 PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

And this ambiguity shows that we have here two different uses of 'there is' and 'exists.' Tentatively, we will assume that one of these is the same as the standard use, namely: that according to which we say there is a million- sided figure only if one exists now somewhere.

In none of the uses of 'there is' thus far uncovered would it make sense to say, "There is Socrates." At best one could say, "Socrates exists." But suppose someone is defending the thesis that all great philosophers are productive writers. An objector might then say, "But, there is Socrates," the force of which is, "But you're forgetting about Socrates." And in the same sort of context one might say, "There's the dodo." So here is a fourth use of 'there is.'

Another use occurs in statements like "There is something which Socra- tes is, namely wise" or "There is something that God is, namely infinite." This latter statement might, for instance, be made in a context where someone is holding that God isn't F, and He isn't G, and He isn't H, to which a worried listener finally retorts, "But surely there is something that God is, namely infinite." W h a t is strange about this use of 'there is,' though, is that one cannot say, "There is wise."

2. Another, but rather complicated, use of 'there is' occurs in the context "There is such a thing as . . ." This use cannot be classified as separate and parallel in status to the five already cited, since it itself comprehends a whole range of different uses. According to one very customary use of the phrase, perhaps the most customary, it is true that there is such a thing as a dinosaur, that there is such a thing as a dodo, and that there are such things as tame elephants; but false that there is such a thing as a unicorn or that there are such things as gremlins. Thus one rule for the use of the locution is this: W h e n 'x' in "There is such a thing as x" stands for a common noun referring to particulars, the sentence is true if and only if particulars of that kind did or do exist in the empirical world. First, the particular must exist or have existed. Suppose, for instance, that the first Ford was made in 1904. It would then usually be regarded as false that there is such a thing as a 1903 Ford. Similarly, there is no such thing as a rocket ship capable of going to Venus, and there is no such thing as a Golden Mountain. Secondly, the 'x' must stand for a common noun. If it stands instead for a proper name of a particular, the usual rule seems to be that "There is such a thing as x" is true only if x exists at the time the sentence is uttered. Thus it is true that there is such a person as Truman, though it would usually be regarded as false that there is such a person as Socrates. Rather, there was such a person as Socrates. Thirdly, the 'x' must refer to particulars. For there may be such a thing as a million-sided figure even though no such figure has ever, in the standard sense, existed. If the

ON 'THERE IS' 43

noun refers to universals or properties, the usual rule seems to be that there is such a thing as x if and only if instances of x could or do exist.

But exceptions to these rules are very nearly as frequent as illustrations of them; and it seems that ultimately the only firm conclusion to be drawn is that "There is such a thing as . . ." is a very ambiguous locution. Thus one might reasonably contend that it is false that there is such a thing as a dinosaur, on the ground that there were such things but aren't any more. And, going to the opposite extreme, one might contend that it is a mistake to say, "There's no such thing as a rocket ship capable of going to Venus," on the ground that it makes perfectly good sense to speak of such a vehicle. In the same vein, someone might regard it as true that there is such a thing as a Golden Mountain, arguing that it makes good sense to speak of such a thing even though we have every reason to suppose it doesn't exist. Again, one might very reasonably hold that there is such a thing as perfect equal- •ty and perfect circularity, even while holding with Plato that these never can be instantiated. It seems, though, that one can never say, truthfully, "There is such a thing as a green virtue" nor "There is such a thing as a round square." In summary, "There is such a thing as . . ." seems to range all the way from being true only if the relevant entity exists right now, to being true just if one can intelligibly refer to it. Thus the question "Is there such a thing as a tone of 10 cycles?" may be answered in three different ways: "No, a sound of 10 cycles doesn't any longer sound like a tone"; "No, no one has yet managed to play such a sound"; "Yes, of course one can speak of a tone of 10 cycles."

References to attributes or properties in the locution we are considering seem especially close to the edge of fixed English usage. For instance, it's not at all clear whether one can ever say, truthfully, "There is such a thing as being a round square" or "There is such a thing as being a rational number which is the square root of 2." However, these seem to be so characteristically philosophers' locutions that one can only suggest that philosophers themselves make clear how they wish to construe them.

3. W e have seen, then, that 'there is' has a wide variety of different uses. The most important of these are undoubtedly the first three, plus the use in "There is such a thing as . . ." W e have already examined this latter use, and the standard use needs no further examination in this paper. So let us now consider a bit more carefully the behavior of the first and third.

W h e n is it true to say, "There are x's which do not exist" or "There is an x which does not exist"? Consider first those cases in which 'x' stands for a common noun referring to particulars. One can say, quite naturally, that there are horses that don't (any longer) exist and there are churches that don't (any longer) exist. But "There are horses that never existed"


and "There are unicorns that don't exist" both seem quite wrong. The rule then seems to be that, for sentences of this type to be true, the relevant particulars must have existed. This generalization is also confirmed by our inclination always to say, "There are horses that don't any longer exist."

But three qualifications of this rule should be noticed. In the first place, some oddities occur when qualifying phrases are introduced. Thus it is proper to say, "There are horses which have won the Kentucky Derby that don't (any longer) exist." But one can't say, "There are ten horses in my stable that don't exist." The trouble here seems to arise over tenses; for "There are ten horses in my stable which don't exist" seems to mean, "There are ten horses which are in my stable which don't (any longer) exist." And apparently if ten horses are in my stable, it follows that they exist. W e could say, though, "There are ten horsesmof those once in my stable--that no longer exist." So if one takes care for the tenses implicit in qualifying phrases, our generalization still seems correct. But secondly, suppose there were a systematic scheme for classifying types of horses, and that the scheme yielded a name and a position for a certain type of horse of which we had no evidence for supposing that any instance of the type ever existed. In such a ease, it seems that one could truthfully say, "There is a kind of horse which doesn't exist and never did," and even, "There is a horse which doesn't exist and never did." So such gaps in systematie schemes of nomenclature must be acknowledged as exceptions to our generalization. Thirdly, one can apparently say "There are animals that don't exist, e.g., unicorns," and "There are horses that don't exist, e.g., Pegasus." Thus entities mentioned as examples of the generalization need never have existed at all. But still it seems that some animals, and some horses, must have existed, or even these statements would not be true.

Consider next those eases in which we still refer to particulars, but to a definite one and not to a whole kind. Probably no one would ever say "There is a horse that doesn't exist, e.g., Bueephalus." But someone might very well say (rightly or wrongly), "There is a horse which ran the mile in two minutes that doesn't (any longer) exist." And again, suppose Atlantis were a continent that had disappeared. Then if someone were giving a lecture on the continents he might very well say, "And there is one continent, Atlantis, that doesn't (any longer) exist." Now wherein lies the difference between these last two examples, and the first one? Perhaps just in the fact that, since everyone knows there are thousands of horses that no longer exist, there is no point in calling to someone's attention that at least one doesn't, whereas there would be very much of a point in saying that a continent, or a mile-in-two-minutes race horse, no longer exists. But in any ease, all of these statements fall under the general

ON 'THERE IS' 45

rule that, for the statement to be true, the indicated particular must once have existed. Again, though, this rule seems to be true only for the most part; one can perhaps imagine circumstances in which it would be proper to say, "There is one horse, Pegasus, that doesn't exist."

Finally, when 'x' in "There are x's that don't exist" stands for the common or proper name of a universal, the rule seems to be that the sentence is true if instances of the universal could exist, even if they never have existed. For example, there are shapes that don't exist; and there is a shape, perfect circularity, that doesn't exist. But one feels quite strongly here that 'exist' when predicated of universals is ambiguous. For in another sense it is false to say that perfect circularity doesn't exist, though in this other sense it might still be true to say, "There is a shape, round squareness, that doesn't exist."

4. Our third use of 'there is' seems reserved exclusively for spreadout stuffs like chemical elements, and universals. Thus one might say, "There is a l l0th element, though none of it exists in nature and no one has yet succeeded in producing any." Or, "There is a million-sided figure, though it is far too elaborate for anyone ever to have drawn it." Or again, suppose we had a naming scheme for aromas. A person might then walk into the offices of a perfume company and ask for aroma F, receiving as reply, "Yes, there is such an aroma, but we're the only company that stocks it and we're out right now." (In all these cases, 'exists' might be used instead of 'there is': "A 110th element exists"; "A million-sided figure exists"; and "Such an aroma exists.") The rule here seems to be that the universal or stuff is said to exist if and only if instances could be brought into existence. Thus, for instance, it is not true that there is a tone of 10 cycles, since a noise of 10 cycles always sounds like a series of beats and not like a tone. The could here is probably equivalent to causally could. An ex- ception to this rule would arise if one felt that it was true that the property of being a round square exists. But whether this is true, is not clear; and if it is, must we also say that there is the property of being a green virtue?

We have pointed out several times already that existence statements concerning universals are ambiguous, sometimes illustrating the standard use of 'there is' and sometimes the one we are now considering. Neither of these uses seems, in general, to predominate. For example, we would probably all think it false that there is an aroma consisting of the smell of Eskimo pies and eucalyptus trees, even though such an aroma could exist. On the other hand, suppose we had empirical evidence that human beings could hear tones up to 15,000 cycles, but that tones above 10,000 cycles were so difficult to produce that only those at intervals of 1000 cycles had


ever been sounded. Then we would probably all regard it as true that there is a tone of 14,039 cycles.

5. It is perhaps worth pointing out that at various places in the pre- ceding discussion expected implications simply do not hold. For example, it is true that there are things that don't exist, witness unicorns and Pegasus. Hence one would expect it also to be true that there is such a thing as Pegasus, and that there are unicorns. But in fact neither of these is true. Again, there is something that Socrates is, namely wise. Consequently, one would also suppose that there is wise. But this is just senseless.

6. Now one objection which might be raised to our thesis is that, though 'there is' may indeed be used in a variety of ways, still it can usually be eliminated by some sort of pha, raphrase of the sentence in which it occurs. The first thing to be said about this objection is that it is not strictly an objection to our central thesis, namely, that 'there is' is not a univocal term. For the paraphrases would have to be of a number of different and distinct sorts. Thus "There is a million-sided figure" may be paraphrased as "A million-sided figure exists"; and both of these may perhaps in turn be paraphrased as "A million-sided figure could be drawn," i.e., be made to exist in the way that a figure exists on a blackboard when we have drawn it. But "There are things that don't exist" can hardly be paraphrased as "Some things exist that don't exist." Nor can it be paraphrased as "Some things don't exist that could exist"; for among the things that don't exist are square circles. Its paraphrase would rather have to be something like "It's the case that some things don't exist," or even more simply, "Some things don't exist." Further, "There is such a thing as the dodo" probably means only that there were dodoes; and we have already seen that "There is Socrates" has the force of "Don't forget Socrates." In summary, even though 'there is' can usually be eliminated by paraphrase, there is no one paraphrase which will do for all uses.

But one might suppose that, by admitting that 'there is' can usually be eliminated by paraphrase, the door is left open to someone who wants to maintain that there is only one basic or philosophically important sense of 'there is'--the sense, presumably, in which we should say that there are plane trees by the river, or that there is an even number between 2 and 6, or that there is no longer wisdom. (Incidentally, even here 'there is' and 'exists' aren't really interchangeable. It would be very odd to say, "Plane trees exist by the river," or "Plane trees by the river exist.")

But two things must be said to this. In the first place, the existence of an adequate paraphrase for a given item of speech does not make that item philosophically uninteresting. For instance, Berkeley attempted to give a paraphrase for the standard use of 'exists,' or at least a paraphrase for a

ON 'THERE IS' 47

limited range of cases of saying that there is or is not an x: the range being that in which 'x' stands for something perceivable, and the paraphrase being "x is perceived." Secondly, suppose we admit that a paraphrase for "There are animals which don't exist" is just "Some animals don't exist." This paraphrase, though apparently quite adequate, will not help a sym- bolic logician to reduce all uses of 'there is' to one use. For the logician customarily analyzes "Some x's are F . . . . There is an x, such that Fx." But if one then paraphrases "Some animals don't exist" as "There is an animal such that it does not exist," he must then still have two senses, or be utter- ing a contradiction. Another paraphrase which might be thought to elimi- nate our first sense of 'there is' is this: "There are things that don't exist, e.g., Pegasus" mean "There is the attribute Pegasushood, and there is no physical object which has it." But this suggestion, even if it were adequate in this particular case, could not be followed in general; for there are also attributes which do not exist, e.g., a tone of 10 cycles. In short, even though our first sense of 'there is' can be given a plausible paraphrase, this does nothing to diminish its philosophical importance.

But now what about the context "x exists" or "x's exist" ("There are x's"). This, of course, is the context in which the ambiguity of 'existence' has traditionally been looked for, the argument being that the sense of 'exist' changes according to the category of thing referred to by 'x.' Have we done anything to show that when we say "Wisdom exists" we are using 'exists' in a way different from that in which we use it when we say "A mountain over 29,000 feet exists"?

Now this question raises very general problems about analysis. For suppose someone wishes to show that 'there is' and 'exists,' when used in the context we are considering, are univocal no matter what 'x' stands for. How could this be shown? Apparently only by furnishing a paraphrase which would be adequate for every case of saying that there is or is not an x. But this, so far as we know, has never been done. On the other hand, the negative thesis, that 'there is' when used in this context is not univocal, is in principle even harder to establish. There is in the first place the general difficulty of establishing the truth of a negative universal judgment: in this case, that no one sort of paraphrase can be found. A way of dodging this difficulty might be to try to show that a paraphrase which serves adequately for 'there is' statements about entities in some one category will not serve adequately for 'there is' statements about entities in other cate- gories. But even this line of attack would not be decisive. For if such paraphrases could be found, someone might still maintain that 'there is' is univocal by arguing that these paraphrases only show that the criteria for


the existence of different types of entities vary, and not that the meaning of 'there is' changes. In effect, this reply would be a denial that the suggested paraphrases were really paraphrases--statements that had the same meaning as what they were meant to be paraphrases of. (It is not true that "This car will last 50 years, get more than 30 miles to the gallon, etc." is a paraphrase of "This is a good car.") And because it is often very hard to say when one statement does have the same meaning as another, it would be very difficult to meet this reply in a decisive way.

But we do think there is good reason for supposing that 'there is' varies in meaning depending on whether one is speaking of universals or particulars. Suppose, for instance, that someone says "There is perfect circularity" or "There is a million-sided figure," even while admitting that no perfect circle or million-sided figure ever has been drawn or ever will be. We have already suggested that what this means is: "A million-sided figure could be made to exist," when 'exist' now has its standard use. And since this paraphrase will not work when speaking of a mountain, we see that 'exists' is not univocal. But suppose someone denies that all he means by saying that there is this figure is that it could be drawn. Rather, he iust means that there is this figure. In this case, another paraphrase of saying that there is this figure might be that we can think of, or specify, or describe, this figure; for our being able to think of or describe or specify this figure seems to be a necessary and sufficient condition of its existing. But clearly this paraphrase will not work for our saying that there is a mountain over 29,000 feet; for it is not a sui~icient condition of there being such a mountain that we can describe or think of it. And this gives us some reason for supposing that 'there is' when said of a million-sided figure does not mean the same as 'there is' when said of a mountain.

Received August 12, 19~9

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On ‘there is’