ON THE POSITION OF MAIMONA PHILOSOPHY

8/10/2019 ON THE POSITION OF MAIMONA PHILOSOPHY

1/13

On the Position of Maimon's PhilosophyAuthor(s): Nathan RotenstreichSource: The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Mar., 1968), pp. 534-545Published by: Philosophy Education Society Inc.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/20124632.

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2/13

EXPLORATION

ON

THE

POSITIONOF

MAIMONA

PHILOSOPHY

NATHAN

RUTENSTREICH

I

Interwoven

in the complex texture

of Solomon Maim?n

's

(1752-1800)

system

are

strands

of

thought originating

in

the

theories

of his

avowed

creditors. Maim?n is

one

of the

first

modern

philosophers

who

acknowledges

his

debt to

diverse

philo

sophical

trends

and

traditions.

Among

his

major

creditors,

Maim?n

includes Maimonides

and

Spinoza.1

The

present

analysis,

however,

will

be restricted

to

an

exploration

of

his

debt

to

Leibniz,

Hume,

and

Kant.

In interweaving aspects of thought from Leibniz and Hume,

Maim?n

takes

his

departure

from

the

earlier

synthesis

of their

posi

tions,

wrorked

out

by

Kant

in

the

Critique

of

Pure Reason.

But

Maim?n

goes

beyond

Kant,

by

interlacing

theories of

the

critical

philosophy

itself,

with

the web

Kant

had

woven

of

strands

from

Leibniz

and Hume. What

permitted

Maim?n

to

link

the

seemingly

incompatible

systems

of the

rationalist and the

sceptic?

In

the

first

place,

both

thinkers

sought

to

establish the

validity

of

the

relation

between

the

two

pillars

of

knowledge,

concepts

and

sense

data.

Secondly,

both

philosophers

believed

that the

way

to

ac

complish

their

aim

was

to

derive

one

component

of

knowledge

from

the other.

According

to

Leibniz,

the

empirical

factor

can

be

derived

from the

conceptual;

while,

according

to

Hume,

ideas

can

be derived

from

impressions.

But

the

difference

in

direction

does

not

alter the

fact that

both

Leibniz

and Hume

posit

a

genetic

relation

between the

two

factors

:

according

to

both,

concepts

are

applicable

to

sense-data

because

one

factor

grows

out

of the other.

Hume

maintains

that

concepts

1

On Maimon's relation

to

Spinoza

see

S.

H.

Bergman,

The

Philosophy

of

Solomon

Maim?n

(Jerusalem,

1967),

pp.

216

ff.

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3/13

ON THE POSITIONOFMAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY 535

are

valid

because

they

are

copies

of

impressions;

Leibniz maintains

that

the

empirical

factor

can

be

explained

hecause it constitutes

a

stage

in

a

continuous

context

originating

in the monad.

Both

Leibniz

and

Hume,

then,

sought?albeit

in

opposite

directions?a

continuous

transition

between

the

heterogeneous

component

fac

tors

of

human

knowledge.

Kant

rejects

this

method

of

coping

with

the

problem

of

valid

ity.

Taking

his

departure

from

the

assumption

that

there

can

be

no continuous transition between

concepts

and sense

impressions,

Kant

sought

another

way

of

establishing

the

validity

of

concepts,

or

alternately,

a

different tnethod

of

justifying

their

application

to

sense-data.

According

to

Kant,

the

relation between

the

two

fac

tors

is

not

genetic

but

functional.2

Unlike

Leibniz

and

Hume,

who

abolish

duality,

Kant

sustains

it.

Whereas

Leibniz and

Hume

represent

duality

as

the

crux

and

source

of

their

problem,

Kant

represents

it

as

the

framework and foundation for

his

solution.

Arguing

that the

function of

relating

and

ordering

pertains

to

the

very nature of concepts, and that only by being incorporated into

a

conceptually

determined structure

does the datum

occupy

a

log

ical

position.

Kant establishes the

interrelatedness

of

the

two

fac

tors,

without

assuming

that

one

can

be derived

from

the

other.

Unlike

Leibniz,

who

posits

a

genetic

relation

in

which

intelligible

truths find

empirical

realization

and unlike

Hume,

who

posits

a

genetic

relation

in

which

sense

impressions

find their

conceptual

copies,

Kant

posits

a

relation based

upon

the

synthetic

nature

of

knowledge,

i.e.,

a

relation

subsisting

between

heterogeneous

factors.

Both

Leibniz

and Hume furnish

Maim?n

with

criteria for

measuring

Kant's

solution

to

the

problem

of

validity.

On

the

one

hand,

Maim?n

applies

the

Leibnizian

criterion

which?by

repre

senting

the

empirical

factor

as

a

realization of the

rational

factor?

robs

the

former of its

independence.

On

the other

hand,

he

applies

Hume's

criterion

according

to

which

the

empirical

factor

can

be

neither abolished

nor

reduced

to

another factor.

It

is

not

only

against

Kant,

but

also

against

Leibniz

that Maim?n

raises

his

2

See

my

Experience

and its

Systemalization,

Studies in

Kant

(The

Hague,

1965).



4/13

536 NATHAN ROTENSTR?ICH

objections.

For the burden

of

Maim?n

's

objection

is

this:

to

translate

intelligible

truths

into

empirical

truths

is

impossible

owing

to

the

irreducible

residuum

of

experience

established

by

Hume.

If the

heterogeneity

of the

factors

is

ultimate?so

Maim?n

's

criticism runs?then

Kant's

solution is

unsatisfactory.

To

repre

sent

duality

as

the

foundation for

one's

solution,

is

merely

to

pretend

that

the

question

itself is

an

answer.

But

Maim?n

uses

Leibniz

as a

weapon

rather

than

as

a

target

for

criticism.

According

to

Maim?n,

Leibniz

provides

the

only

possibility

of

solving

the

problem:

a

relation between

empirical

data and

intelligible

concepts

can

be

established

only

by

eliminating

the

former,

that is

to

say,

only by making

the

empirical

factor

thoroughly

intelligible.

In

assuming

a

synthetic

connection be

tween the

factors,

Kant

transfers

the

problem

and

its

solution

to

a

new

sphere.

But the

heterogeneity

of the factors is

a

problem

posed

by

synthesis

as

well.

Kant

assumes

that

he has

overcome

the

acute form

of

heterogeneity

which

might

preclude

the

possi

bility

of a

synthetic

connection.

This, however,

is

analogous

to

the

assumption

that

by

bringing

one

extreme

in

contact

with

the

other,

we

cancel the

polar opposition

between them. Like

Hume,

whose

spokesman

he

purports

to

be,

Maim?n

emphasizes

the

ir

reducibility

of

the datum. But

whereas Hume maintains the

primacy

of

the

datum,

Maim?n maintains its

independence

vis-?-vis

the

concept.

In this

respect,

Maim?n

fights

Kant with

a

Kantian

weapon;

for it

was

Kant

who

taught

that

the

empirical-perceptual

factor

is

no

less

independent

than

the

conceptual

factor.

Accord

ing to Maim?n, if the empirical factor is independent, then even

synthesis

is

impossible.

On the

one

hand, then,

Maimon's

position

resembles

Kant's

in

that

it lies

midway

between Leibniz's

and

Hume's.

On the

other

hand,

however,

Maim?n

diverges

from

Kant

in

using

Kant's

system

as

evidence

that

the

impossibility

of

solving

the

problem

raised

by

Hume

implies

the

impossibility

of

realizing

the

solution

proposed by

Leibniz.

To

put

it

another

way,

because

he

con

sciously

confines the

solution

he

proposes

within the limits

of

finite understanding, Kant draws a distinction between archetypal

understanding

and

ectypal

understanding.

Maim?n

apparently

agrees

with

Kant that

the solution

is confined within the

limits of



5/13

ON

THE

POSITION

OF MAIMON'S

PHILOSOPHY

537

finite

understanding.

But

he

goes

beyond

Kant

in

two

respects.

For

one

thing,

he

stresses

the

limits

of

finite

understanding by

putting

more

pointedly

the

problem posed

by

Hume,

i.e.,

by

pointing

out

what

makes

human

understanding

finite.

For

an

other,

he

furnishes

finite

understanding

with

a

criterion

for

measuring

its

own

finitude

by juxtaposing

it

with

the infinite

understanding

posited

by

Leibniz.

From

Hume,

Maim?n

adopted

the

ultimate

fact of sensation and

the

conclusion

Hume

based

upon

it,

namely

that the relations

among

concepts

are

purely

psycholog

ical. From

Leibniz,

Maim?n

adopted

the

cognitive

ideal

by

con

trast with

which

the

nature

of

empirical

knowledge

is

illuminated.

What

conclusions

can

we

draw

from

Maim?n's

adaptation

of

elements

from

Leibniz,

Hume and

Kant? First

of

all,

because

Kant's

system

constitutes the

background

against

which

Maim?n

develops

his

theory,

we

can

increase

our

appreciation

of

Kant

by

studying

Maim?n.

Secondly,

we

may

expect

that

one

problem

with

which

Maim?n

will

be

preoccupied

will

be the

nature

of

valid

knowledge. Finally, we may assume that the other problem with

which

Maim?n

will

be

preoccupied

will

be

the

nature of

the factors

which

prevent

the realization of

valid

knowledge.3

II

What

are

the

distinguishing

marks of valid

knowledge?

To

answer

this

question

it

is

necessary

to

recall that in

classical

philos

ophy

a

distinction

was

drawn between the

intelligible

world

on

the

one

hand,

and

the

empirical

world

on

the other.

The

first

step

toward

cancelling

this

distinction

was

taken

by

Kant.

By

substituting

understanding

and

sensation

for

intelligible

world

and

sensible

world,

Kant

transformed

what liad hitherto

been

a

differ

ence

in

the

structure

of the

world,

into

a

difference

within

the

limits of

knowledge.

But

despite

the

enclosure of

the diverse

factors

within

the realm of

knowledge,

their

duality

remained

intact. The

cognitive

significance

which

Kant

assigns

to

the

differ

3

See

the

most

recent

comprehensive

study

:

Samuel

Atlas,

From

Critical

to

Speculative

Idealism:

The

Philosophy of

Solomon Maim?n

(The

Hague,

1964).



6/13

538

NATHAN

ROTENSTREICH

ence

between

understanding

and

sensation?as

distinguished

from

the

ontological

validity

it had been

assigned

in

classical

philosophy

?can,

perhaps,

be

said

to

constitute

the

logical

condition of

Kant's

idea

of

synthesis.

Maim?n

goes

beyond

Kant

by

asking:

if

under

standing

and

sensation

are

indeed elements

of

knowledge,

then

why

must

their

duality

be maintained? If

understanding

and

sensation

are

indeed constituents of

knowledge,

then

they

ought

to

be understood

as

elements

of

a

single

system,

rather than

as

two

systems,

one of which is based

upon

the other.

In

abolishing

the

ontological

difference,

and

in

substituting

a

difference between

two

sources

of

knowledge,

Kant

took the first

step

toward

rationalization.

The

second

step

toward

rationaliza

tion is

taken

by

Maim?n,

who

abolishes

the difference

between the

two

sources

of

knowledge

and

substitutes

a

duality

immanent

in

the

sphere

of

knowledge;

a

duality

immanent

in

the

process

of

rationalization

which

perpetually

and

progressively

overcomes

the

irrational

factor,

i.e.,

the datum.

By

being

absorbed

into

the

process

of

rationalization,

the irrational factor is robbed of its

irreducibility

which would otherwise

arrogate

a

stable

status.

Integration

into the continuous

process

of

rationalization

is

substituted for

the

fixed

status

of

the

components

of

knowledge.

The

change

undergone

by

the

datum entails

a

new

view

both

of

concepts

and

of

the

syntheses

connected

with

them. From

Kant's

well-known observation

that

concepts

without

intuitions

are

empty,

and

intuitions without

concepts

are

blind,

it follows that

contents

are

created

through

synthesis.

It

is

the

content

which

constitutes the encounter between the different elements. Abolish

ing

the difference between

the

elements entails

the

absorption

of

the

content

into

the

concept

itself,

i.e.,

into

the

concept

as

endowed

with

the

power

of

explication.

As endowed

with

the

power

of

explication,

the

concept

itself

is the

content.

Synthesis

no

longer

denotes

the

self-transcendence

of

concepts

and their

application

to

intuitions. The

fullness

furnished

by

intuition is

implicit,

to

begin

with,

in the

concept;

and

synthesis

is but

the fullness

of

the

con

cept. Being

full

to

begin

with,

not

depending

upon

intuition

for

its fullness, the concept can serve as a starting point for an

explicative

process,

i.e.,

for

a

genetic

process

in

which the

problem

of

validity

finds

its

solution.

It

may

accordingly

be said that



7/13

ON

THE

POSITION

OFMAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY

539

Maim?n

goes

beyond

Leibniz,

Hume,

and

Kant

by developing

the

central

tenet

of

each:

with the

help

of

Kant's

concept

of

synthesis,

Maim?n undertakes

to

demonstrate the

possibility

of

a

transition

from

understanding

to

experience,

which

was

maintained

by

Leibniz and

denied

by

Hume.

But

by

so

doing,

he

assigned

a new

meaning

to

Kant's

conception

of

synthesis;

whereas

Kant

defined

concepts

as

functions which

order

the

datum,

Maim?n defines them

as

the

content

of

the universe.

Ill

Maim?n 's

new

interpretation

of

synthesis

leads

him

to

a new

conception

of

the

rationality

of the universe.

Rationality,

Maim?n

maintains,

consists

in

the

creation of

the

datum

out

of the

concept,

not in

the

explanation

of the

datum

by

means

of the

concept.

Rationality

is realized in the

generation

of

the datum.

Maim?n

sought

concrete

expression

for

this

concept

of

rationality

in

the

following

facets of his

system

:

(A)

Conspicuous

in

its absence from

the

epistemological

sphere

is the

noncognitive

factor

posited

by

Kant,

namely

the

thing-in-itself.4

In

Kant's

system,

the

thing-in-itself

fulfills

the

twofold

function of

(a)

supplying

knowledge

with

the

datum;

and

(b)

guaranteeing

that

the datum will

not be eliminated

from

knowledge.

Kant's

thing-in-itself

frustrates,

as

it

were,

the

ten

dency

of

the

concept

to

produce

the datum

out

of

itself

by

way

of

a

continuous

transition.

If,

however,

by

concept

we

mean

the

element of

fullness,

then there

is

neither

room

nor

reason

for

limiting

its

fullness

by

assigning

a

cognitive

function

to

the

thing

in-itself;

there

is

neither

room

nor

reason

for

allotting

a

cognitive

function

to

a

factor

which

subsists

beyond

the

sphere

of

knowl

edge.

Anticipating

Hermann

Cohen

and

his

followers,

Maim?n

argues

that the

thing-in-itself

cannot

bear

the

brunt of criticism

based

upon

an

analysis

of the

nature

and constituent elements

of

knowledge.

4

See

Bergman,

op.

cit.,

pp.

7

ff.,

and

Atlas,

op.

cit.,

pp.

20

ff.



8/13

540

NATHAN

ROTENSTREICH

(B)

Elimination

of

the

thing-in-itself

is

entailed

by

the

assumption

concerning

the

synthetic

character of

concepts

;

but

no

positive

characteristic

of

synthesis

is

illuminated

by

its

elimination.

The

synthetic

character

of

concepts

finds

positive expression

in

the

apparent pivot

of

Maimon's

system,

the

law of

determinability

(Satz

der

Bestimmbarkeit).

How

is it

possible,

Maim?n

asks,

to

link

a

particular

predicate

with

a

particular subject?

Predication,

a

fundamental

function

of

all

knowledge,

is

not

an

arbitrary

act of

formal assertion. This function must

necessarily

be anchored in

the

meaning

and

structure

of the

concepts

it

combines;

it

is

not

only

from the

perspective

of the

assertion,

but also from the

per

spective

of

content,

that

a

particular

term

must

constitute

a

pred

icate

of

a

particular subject.

Or,

as

Maim?n

puts

it,

the content

must

be

the

measure

of

whether the

subject

is determined

by

the

predicate,

and whether

the

predicate

is the

determination. The

combination

in

the assertion

is

accordingly

based

upon

the

clarity

of the

known

content;

and the known

content

guides

the

combina

tion in the assertion. Not the formal facets of the proposi

tional

structure,

but the known

contents

permit

us

to

say

This is

a

right-angled triangle,

and

prevent

us

from

saying

This

is

a

right-angled

truth.

Whereas,

according

to

the realistic

solution,

knowledge

is valid

because it

copies

the clear

structure

of the

world,

according

to

Maim?n,

knowledge

is valid

when it

is

formulated

in

assertions which

reflect

its

own

clear

structure,

i.e.,

the

structure

of

a

determinable

subject

and its determinations.

Maim?n

also

maintains

that

the

concept

is

not

merely

an

ordering

function

but

also

a

fullness of

content,

because

its

very

nature

leads

us

to

bring

forth from

potentiality

into

actuality

its

implicit

deter

minations.

Here

Maim?n

seems

to

interweave

two

strands

of

Aristotle's

philosophy:

the

element

of

emergence

from

potentiality

into

actuality

as a

law

of the

universe,

and the

element of

related

ness

between

subject

and

predicate

as

the

structure

of

propositions.

As

represented

by

Maim?n,

the

passage

from

potentiality

into

actuality

is

implicit

in

the

relation

between

subject

and

predicate;

the

structure

of the universe is

implicit

in

the

structure

of

proposi

tions.

The

encounter

between

metaphysical

and

logical

structure

occurs neither on the plane of the universe, nor on the plane of

formal

logic,

but

on

the

plane

of

knowledge

saturated with

con

ceptual

content.



9/13

ON

THE

POSITION

OF

MAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY

541

(C)

The

pivotal

notion

of Maim?n's

system

is

not

exhausted

in the

observation that

it combines

an

element

of

Aristotelian

logic

with

an

element of

Aristotelian

metaphysics,

the

subject-predicate

structure

of

propositions

with the

dynamic

structure

of the uni

verse.

For

Maim?n also

adapts

for

his

purposes

the

element of

substance

and

accident.

Maim?n

explicitly

represents

the

relation

between

substance

and

accident

as

displaying

a

structure

which

has

been transferred

to

the

logical

sphere

:

he

correlates

the

determined

subject with substance as being independent of its determination;

and

he

correlates

the determination with the

accident

as

being

dependent

upon

the determined

subject.

Maim?n

's

transfer of

ontological

categories

to

the

logical-conceptual

sphere

clearly

reflects

his

tendency

to

abolish

the

duality

of

the

spheres.

Also

reflected

in

this

transfer is

Maimon's

closely

related

argument

that

the

structure

of substances

cannot

be

transparent

or

rational,

unless

it

is

at

the

same

time the

structure

of

concepts.

To

understand

why

Maim?n transfers the

structure

of

sub

stance and accident to the

conceptual

sphere,

is at the same time

to

understand

why

he criticizes the

notion

that the

category

of

causality

constitutes the

supreme

principle

of

knowledge.

Were

we

to

represent

as

a

central

metaphysical

motif

the

conflict between

the

principle

of

substance

and

the

principle

of

causality,

we

would

have

to

include Maim?n

among

the

leading proponents

of the

former:

measuring

the

principle

of

causality

by

his

standard

of

rationality,

Maim?n

argues

that

the

relation

between

cause

and

effect

is

not

meaningful,

because?being

a

relation of

implication

rather than explication?it is not based upon the inner content of

the

related

terms.

The assertion and

determination which

many

thinkers

represent

as

the

strength

of

the

causality principle

are

represented by

Maim?n

as

its

weakness.

A connection of this

kind,

Maim?n

argues,

is external and

meaningless.

Maimon's

cognitive

ideal,

then,

is

to

find

an

immanent-meaningful

founda

tion

for the

interconnectedness

of

elements,

even

when

their

con

nection

occurs

merely

in

time.

This

ideal

cannot

be satisfied

by

the

merely

temporal

relation

of succession. Maim?n

consequently

tries to correlate the principle of causality with

a

type of continuous

transition

based

upon

the

content

of the

phases

which follow

one

another,

not

upon

their

position

in

a

temporal

sequence.



10/13

542 NATHAN ROTENSTREICH

(D)

The

very

terminology employed

by

Maim?n

reflects

the

rationalization

predominant

in

his

teaching.

Particularly

per

tinent,

in

this

respect,

is

the

term

differential,

which

Maim?n

uses

to

denote the

process

of

creating

the datum

out

of the

con

cept,

the

perceptions

being

integrals

of

the

conceptual

elements.

As

S.

H.

Bergman

has

shown,3

the

position

occupied

by

the

concept

of

differential

in

Maimon's

system

is

parallel

to

the

position

occupied

by

the

concept

of

schematism

in

Kant's

system.

Yet

this

aspect

of Maimon's

concept

need not detain us, since it

pertains

to

the technical

machinery

of

his

system,

rather than

to

its

main

trend

toward

rationalization.

To

throw further

light

on

that

trend,

it

might

be

worthwhile

to

examine the

relations

between

Formal

Logic,

which

pertains

to

the

structure

of

judgments,

and

Transcendental

Logic,

which

per

tains

to

objects.

Maim?n

was

among

the

first

philosophers

to

take issue

with

Kant

on

this

central

matter.

Unlike

Kant,

Maim?n

maintains the

primacy

of

Transcendental

Logic

and its inde

pendence of Formal Logic. In thus diverging from Kant, Maim?n

sought,

first of

all,

to

invest

thought

with

content

and,

secondly,

to

make

Formal

Logic?which

deliberately

disregards

and abstracts

from

content?merely

an

abstraction of

the

full,

and

consequently

creative,

concept.

Once

we

admit that

the

concept

is

dynamic,

that

it is

the

precondition

of rationalization

through generation

of

the

datum

out

of

a

concept,

then

we

are

driven

to

regard

content

saturated

thought

as

primary,

and formal

thought

as

secondary.6

IV

If

Maimon's

system appears

Janus-faced,

it

is

because

the

trend

toward

rationalization

is

accompanied

by

an

awareness

that

ration

ality

cannot be

realized

within

the

limits

of finite

understanding.

Rationalization

is

obstructed

by

the

factual difference

between the

component

elements

of

knowledge,

i.e.,

by

the

dual

structure

de

scribed

in

Kant's

critical

system.

Maimon's

factual

scepticism

is

5

See

Bergman,

op.

cit.,

pp.

65

ff.; Atlas,

op. cit.,

pp.

109

ff.

6

See

Rotenstreich,

Experience

and

its

Systematization,

Studies

in

Kant, pp.

14

ff.



11/13

ON

THE POSITION

OF MAIMON'S

PHILOSOPHY

543

based

upon

two

different

uses

of Kant's

system:

on

the

one

hand,

he

measures

Kant's

system by

the

standard

of

rationalization,

and

finds it

wanting;

on

the

other

hand,

he

measures

rationalization

by

Kant's

system,

and

finds

that

it

cannot

be

realized.

Thus

Maim?n

seems

to

accept

the

Kantian

system

de

facto,

even

though

he

denies that

it

constitutes

a

solution

to

the

problem

it

was

designed

to

solve.

Maimon's

system

may

accordingly

be described

as

a

combination

of

fundamental

rationalism

and factual

scepticism.

What other reason is there for Maimon's factual scepticism?

It

will be

recalled

that

there

is

an

element

of

ambiguity

in

Kant's

concept

of

experience.

Experience

connotes the domain

of

sensuous

encounter with data.

It is

in

this

sense

that

Kant

says

Everything

else

has

to

be

left

to

experience.

7

Yet

when

he

says

that

he

deals

with

experience

as

grounded

both

in

perception

and

in

understanding,8

he refers

to

experience

as

a

synthesis

and

not

as

a

mere

encounter.

In

any

case

Kant does

not

offer

an

exhaustive

explanation

of

the

relation

between

the

two

meanings

of

expe

rience. Maim?n

seems

to

have been

more

precise

in

this

matter;

using

Kantian

terms,

he

maintained

that

a

particular

sense-impres

sion

is

an

actual

experience,

while

the total

system

of

knowledge

represents

possible

experience.

This

implies

that

concepts

are

applicable

to

knowledge

in

general

qua

possible

experience,

and

that

they

are

not

applicable

to

actual

experience

qua

this

or

that

particular impression.

There

is

no

internal connection

between

this

particular

impression

in its

ultimate

factuality

and

the

system

of

knowledge.

Hence

the

applicability

of

the

system

to

the

impres

sion

is

not

demonstrated

by

Kant.

The

question

quid

facti

remains

unsolved;

rationalization

through

generation

of

the datum

from

the

concept

remains

unattainable

within

the

limits

of

finite

under

standing.

In

the

history

of

sceptical

ideas,

Maimon's

factual

scepticism

occupies

a

special

position

His

scepticism

is

aware

of,

and

mea

sures

itself

by,

a

criterion of

knowledge

immune

against

scepticism.

Both

scepticism

and

relativism

are

generally

challenged

on

the

7

Kritik

der reinen

Vernunft,

B,

p.

218. In trans,

by

Kemp

Smith

(London,

1950),

p.

208.

8

Prolegomena

zu

einer

jeden k?nftigen

Metaphysik,

etc.

S

20,

trans,

by

Peter and

Lucas

(Manchester,

1953).



12/13

544

NATHAN

ROTENSTREICH

grounds

that

they

presuppose

what

they

negate.

More

specifically,

it

is

objected,

first

of

all,

that

the

sceptic

assertion

there

is

no

certain

judgment

is

itself

a

certain

judgment.

Secondly,

it is

objected

that

scepticism

is

possible

only

by

comparison

with

some

thing

which

is

beyond

doubt. Neither of

these

objections

seems

pertinent

to

Maimon's

scepticism.

Maim?n

explicitly

restricts

doubt within

the

limits of

empirical knowledge.

Doubt,

as

he

puts

it,

applies

to

the existence of

thought

concerning objects

in

conformity

to the a

priori

conditions of

knowledge.

Such doubt

does

not

cancel

itself

because

it

applies

only

to

knowledge

of

objects,

not to

knowledge

of the

structure

of

knowledge.

Further

more,

such

scepticism

is

explicitly

formulated

by

reference

to

a

definite, crystallized,

cognitive

ideal. Such

scepticism accordingly

implies

the

nonrealization of

the

ideal,

not

the

self-contradiction

or

self-destruction

of

knowledge.

V

The

Janus-faced

character

of

Maimon's

system

carries decisive

weight

from the

viewpoint

of the

development

of

philosophy.

We

may

venture

to

say

that

Maim?n

formulated the

program

of nine

teenth

century

idealism,

fully

aware

that

the

program

could

not

be

carried out.

Nineteenth

century

idealism

may

be described

as a

philosophical

movement

which

endeavors,

or

dares,

to

undertake

the

execution

of

Maimon's

program.

Idealism

tries

to

abolish the

sceptical boundary set by Maim?n; it attempts to abolish the differ

ence

between

finite

consciousness

and infinite-divine consciousness.

It is

not

by

chance

that

Hegel's system

is described

by

Whitehead

as a

philosophic

attitude

of

a

God.9

Hegel's

design

was

to

abolish

the

inner

opposition

between

our

minds and

objects,

and

to

repre

sent

objects

or

objectivity

as

objectified

mind.

Why

do

we

describe

this

realization

of

Maimon's

program

as

daring?

Unlike

Maim?n,

Hegel

does

not

represent

finite

mind

as

a

limitation

of

infinite

mind;

he

represents

infinite

mind

as

an

immanent

explication

of

9

Analysis

of

Meaning,

in

Essays

in Science

and

Philosophy

(London,

1948),

p.

99.



13/13

ON

THE

POSITION

OF

MAIMON'S PHILOSOPHY

45

finite mind.

This

is

why

Hegel

assigns

a

central

position

in

his

system

to

the

Phenomenology of

Spirit;

for

it

is

here

that

he

justifies

his

daring

venture.

Here

he undertakes

to

demonstrate

not

only

that

Maimon's

program

can

be

realized

as

a

matter

of

principle,

but

also that

it is

actually

realized,

and

realized

precisely

by

that

finite

mind

which

Maim?n

represented

as

incapable

of

realizing

rationalization.

What

Maim?n

represents

as

frustrating

the

trend

toward

realization,

Hegel represents

as

sustaining

it.

The

Hebrew

University

of

Jerusalem.

Documents

ON THE POSITION OF MAIMONA PHILOSOPHY