On the Ambiguity of a Distinction

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    Art and Morality: On the Ambiguity of a Distinction

    Author(s): Morris GrossmanSource: The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism,Vol. 32, No. 1 (Autumn, 1973), pp. 103-106Published by: Wileyon behalf of The American Society for AestheticsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/428708Accessed: 06/03/2014 11:52Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at

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    104 MORRIS GROSSMANare here dealing with remain fundamen-tallyestranged and violently disconnected. The

    awareness of this makes the moralist, theartist of life, discontent. (There is noth-ing

    that brings things together so much as thepoignancy of their separation, suitablysensed.) The moralist is pressed to question

    the nature of the artistic achievement, the

    masterpiece, which heightens disconnect-edness, and the definition and conception of

    art which gives intellectual fortification to

    that disconnectedness.Just what are we about when we turn parts

    of life into art, separate art and life

    practically, and distinguish between them

    tlheoretically?Are we sacrificing man for his

    art or saving man from his life? In choosingto perfect art at the expense of life, does itperfect man to make this choice, or only his

    art? Though we can conceal the clutter of the

    workshop from others, can we conceal itfrom ourselves? Where are the parings we

    omit from our purview, the unorganized

    residue which does not get into our art?What remains of the large substance of an

    artist's, or any man's, life which never hangsin a museum or sounds in a concert hall or

    gets into a novel, or is simply never anoccasion for worthwhile remembrances?

    These are difficult questions, but once weknow the agony of the quandary the an-swers will come forth of themselves. If anartist is an artist by virtue of what he candiscard, a man remains a man by virtue ofwhat he cannot discard, and this is alwaysthe bulkier, the more challenging, the moreproblematic part of himself. What remains isthe hair and the dirt and the ugliness of

    existence, the rubbish he knows is under therug, the bugs in hiding, the guilts thatburgeon from buried places, the boredom

    and the pain,the waste and the claptrapof life, and its oppressive and random andsheer et ceteras. Here is what waits to bereckoned with, not colors to be squeezedfrom tubes, not tones to be plectrumed andplucked, not words to be rhymed and ca-denced. There is a vale of soul-making that isbeyond all media, which symphonies and

    canvases and poems barely touch. It is a valein which we are pressed beyond mere

    arts to where art and life fuse in a single

    strategy and a total task.In plainer language we can say that the

    materials discarded in fashioning art are no

    loss to the art, and yet they remain a con-tinuing burden. With respect to life there isno context, no place for waste, no way ofgetting rid of what might metaphorically becalled the radioactive debris and the blackoil slicks. Man's condition is like earth'scondition-limited, closed in, contamina-ble. There can only be arrangements and

    rearrangements of what there is, total ma-

    nipulations of total accumulations, a volu-

    minous burden which must be carried and

    projected to an uncertain end.Life apart from art-and there would be no

    apartness apart from the following con-siderations-consists of opposites unseen andconflicts unreconciled. It consists of momentswhich are not reflected upon andassimilated, which intrude on us when we donot want them to, which randomly dis-tractand oppress. They are our accumulat-ing butunaccumulated selves. We cannot shed them;because we cannot use thempositively, they weigh on us negatively. Life

    apart from art, inartistic life, is the negativeweight, the tiresome burden, the existential

    stress of being, the tragic sense of the unen-

    compassed.The tragic sense, tragedy understood this

    way, is not, as it is so often taken to be, a

    reconciliation with death, or a reconcilia-

    tion of specific moral claims. Tragedy,

    rather, is a reconciliation with those mo-

    ments of life which resist a coming together

    in some organizing purpose. Tragedy is the

    sense of, and the ideal victory over, the liv-ing dissolution that continuously pervades

    us, not victory over the actual extinction that

    eventually terminates us. Termination and

    extinction are no great loss when they come

    in due time. The silence at the end of a

    symphony is as necessary as any other part

    of it; indeed, it is sometimes the best part of

    it and a great relief. Dissolution and discon-

    nectedness are the real tragic losses. The

    tragic sense reaches out to those intransi-

    gent elements of our being which otherwiseresist containment, and they become con-

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    106 MORRIS GROSSMANalways a work in progress, always in need ofrevision, always modifiable in the directionof an unrealized and unrealizable goal.These men invite the force of life, with itsraging fires and its unshored fragments, tooverwhelm the temporary ramparts of theart medium. They are writers like Proust,

    for whom a proof sheet was simply anocca-sion for ever-renewed correction andexpan-sion. They are sculptors likeGiacometti, who was always "failing" anddestroying what he did, and for whom it wasapparent agony to face the false finality ofallowing a work to be exhibited. "There is nohope of achieving what I want, of expressing

    my vision of reality." said Giacometti. "I goon painting and sculpting because I am cu-rious to know why I fail."

    For these artists, the separation of art andlife is "performatively" denied by virtue ofthe way in which ongoing artistic activity(not a mere series of art works) is a con-

    scious grapplingwith life. All glimpses ofreality are repudiated for being glimpses,discrete perspectives, less than unitary vi-sions and unitary accomplishments. As Gia-

    cometti put it, "All I ask is to be able to goon and on." He did not, of course. Like therest of us he was mortal. And the various

    pieces he produced, the fragments of his life,

    will make their way into various hands,never to be shored up or united. And yet this

    knowledge of failure, this tragic sense

    constantly alive, is success beyond all art.The best art, the best artists are pervaded by

    the tragic sense, which is awareness of the

    sort of defeat and recalcitrance that life itselfhas always imposed upon the living of it.

    And so artists love to leave loose ends,ambiguities, elements of randomness, as a

    tribute and echo and reminder of what life is

    like and what needs to be done.Art is better than life, and should be; but

    not so much better that it neglects life's

    challenges or departs life's memories. The

    task of great art has always been to tran-scend life but to remain relevant to it, tofocus enjoyment but not to forget sorrow, to

    surmount the futility of blind righteous-ness

    but not to be blind to prevailing evil. This too

    has been the task of the good life, which is a

    self-regenerative process in which art is that

    part which is also the ongoing measure of the

    whole. There is a poem by Yeats with a line

    in it in which he asks, "Shall we perfect the

    life or perfect the art?" To care about the

    question and to sense its poignancy is all theanswer that it needs.

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