On Perpetual Peace

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IMMANUEL KANT

ON PERPETUAL PEACEA PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH

Translated by Ian JohnstonVancouver Island University

Nanaimo, BCCanada

2012

Richer Resources PublicationsArlington, Virginia

USA


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KantOn Perpetual Peace

Copyright 2012 by Richer Resources PublicationsAll rights reserved

Cover Art by Ian Crowe

No part of this book may be reproduced in whole or in part withoutexpress permission from the publisher, except for brief portions in areview.

Requests for reprints and additional copies of this book should beaddressed to:

Richer Resources Publications1926 N. Woodrow Street

Arlington, Virginia 22207USA

ISBN 978-1-935238-51-5LCCN

Published by Richer Resources PublicationsArlington, VirginiaPrinted in the United States of America


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IMMANUEL KANT

ON PERPETUAL PEACEA PHILOSOPHICAL SKETCH1

1The German in Kants title is ambiguous: it could mean On(or Concerning)

Perpetual Peaceor Towards Perpetual Peace. There is easy way of combining thesetwo possibilities in English.


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TRANSLATORS NOTE

Phrases in square brackets within the text have been added by thetranslator. The footnotes from Kants text are indicated by theinitial phrase [Kants note],and those provided by the translator by[Translators note].

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface 5

Section One: Containing the Preliminary Articles for a PerpetualPeace Among States 5

Section Two: Containing the Definitive Articles for a PerpetualPeace Among States 11

The First Definitive Article 13

The Second Definitive Article 17

The Third Definitive Article 21First Supplement: Concerning the Guarantee of Perpetual Peace 25

Second Supplement: A Secret Article for Perpetual Peace 33

Appendix I: Concerning the Disagreement Between Moralityand Politics in Connection with Perpetual Peace 36

Appendix II: On the Unanimity Between Politics and MoralityAccording to the Transcendental Idea of Public Right 47

A Note on the Translator 56


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ON PERPETUAL PEACE

[PREFACE]1

We do not need to determine whether the satirical phrase PerpetualPeace inscribed above the painting of a graveyard on a Dutchinnkeepers sign is directed at human beings in general, or at rulersof states in particular, who never can have enough of war, orperhaps merely at philosophers who dream the sweet dream ofpeace. However, the author of this essay would like to stipulate onepoint: the practical politician adopts a particular stance towards thepolitical theoristhe looks down on him with great self-satisfactionas a pedant, whose empty ideas pose no danger to the state, whichmust proceed on principles drawn from experience. And so people

can always let the theorist play at knocking down his eleven skittlesall at once, without the worldly wise statesman concerning himselfabout it. This being the case, if a quarrel between the theorist andthe statesman arises, the latter should always act consistently andnot sniff out dangers to the state behind the formers opinions,which he ventures to offer and which he expresses publicly with noulterior purpose. With this clausula salvatoria [saving clause] thewriter of this tract wishes formally and emphatically to

acknowledge that he is protected against all maliciousinterpretation.

SECTION ONECONTAINING THE PRELIMINARYARTICLES FOR A PERPETUAL PEACE

AMONG STATES

1. No peace treaty which is drawn up with a secret reservation ofsome matter for a future war will be considered valid.

For in such a case the treaty would, in fact, be merely a truce, asuspension of conflict, but not peace, which means an end to allhostilities, so that to attach that word perpetual to it is asuspicious pleonasm. The existing causes of future wars may at thetime of the treaty perhaps not yet be known even to the contractingparties, but every one of those causes becomes null and void

1[Translators note]This heading does not appear in Kants text.


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through the treaty of peace, even if perspicacious and skilfulresearch could dig them up out of archival documents. Silentreservations (reservatio mentalis [mental reservations]) concerning

old claims to be considered at some time in the future, issues whichneither party brings into the discussion at this time, because theyare both too worn out to continue the war, while still nurturing theevil desire to use the first favourable opportunity to pursue theseclaimsthat tactic belongs to Jesuitical casuistry and, judged in andof itself, is beneath the dignity of rulers, just as a willingparticipation in this kind of thinking is beneath the dignity of oneof their ministers.

But if, given enlightened ideas about shrewd statesmanship, thetrue glory of the state rests on the constant increase in its power byany means whatsoever, this conclusion will naturally appearacademic and pedantic.

1. No state standing on its own (whether it is small or large isirrelevant here) can be acquired by another state throughinheritance, exchange, purchase, or donation.

For a state, unlike the soil on which it sits, is not a possession(patrimonium) but a society of people, which no one other thanitself may command or dispose of. It is like a tree trunk with its ownroots, and to incorporate it, like a graft, onto another state meansthat one is destroying its existence as a moral person and reducingit to a thing. This, therefore, contradicts the idea of the originalcontract, without which no right over a people is conceivable. 1Everybody understands what dangers this prejudiced way of

acquiring states, which stems from the belief that nations couldeven marry one another, has brought to Europe right up to our ownday (other regions of the world know nothing about it). This hasbeen, in part, a new kind of industry enabling states to makethemselves powerful through family alliances without squandering

1[Kants note]A hereditary kingdom is not a state which can be bequeathed to some

other state. However, the right to rule it can be passed on to another physicalperson. In that case, the state acquires a regent, but the latter, in his capacity as ruler(that is, as someone already in possession of another kingdom), does not acquire thestate.


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their forces and, in part, a way of expanding the territory theypossess.

Moreover, lending the soldiers of one state to another for money to

fight against an enemy who is not hostile to the first state should beincluded here, for the subjects of that state are, in this case, usedand abused as if they were things for the state to deal with howeverit wishes.

2. Over time standing armies (miles perpetuus) shall be completelyabolished.

For standing armies constantly threaten other states with war,

because their preparedness makes them look as if they are alwaysequipped for one, and they encourage nations to compete with oneanother in the number of their armed forces, a contest which hasno limit. Moreover, given the amount of money spent on standingarmies, in the long run peace becomes even more oppressive than ashort war, and thus standing armies are themselves the cause ofaggressive conflicts launched to ease this financial burden. Inaddition, paying men to kill or be killed seems to involve using

human beings as mere machines and tools in the hands of someoneelse (the state), and this practice cannot be properly reconciled withthe rights of humanity in our own person. The situation is entirelydifferent with the periodic and voluntary exercises of citizens underarms, for in this way they keep themselves and their fatherland safeagainst attacks from beyond their borders.

If the state accumulates a large sum of money, that would have thesame effect as a standing army, because it is viewed by other statesas a military threat and would force them to make a pre-emptiveattack. For of the three powers of the statethe power of armies,the power of alliances, and the power of moneythe third wouldprobably be the most reliable instrument of war, if the difficulty ofdiscovering how much money was involved did not presentobstacles.

3. No national debts shall be incurred in connection with the foreignaffairs of the state.

When the intention is to help the domestic economy (improveroads, create new settlements, establish stores of resources fordifficult years of crop failure, and so on), then the expedient of


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seeking aid outside or inside the state is above suspicion. But whena system of credit is used as an instrument of power by statesagainst each other and grows out of sight, yet remains a secure debt

for present demands (because all the creditors do not demandpayment at the same moment), it becomes a dangerous financialpower. For this ingenious invention of a commercial people[England]in this present century creates a treasure for carrying outwar, a fund which is greater than the financial resources of all otherstates collectively. It cannot be exhausted except by an impendingtax default (although that will still be postponed for a long timebecause of the trade stimulus created by the repercussions of the

credit on industry and commerce). This easy way of engaging inwar, combined with the inclination of rulers to do so, somethingwhich seems to be incorporated into human nature, is consequentlya great obstacle to perpetual peace. Hence, forbidding this use ofcredit must be a preliminary article of such a peace, all the more sobecause bankrupting the state, which is eventually inevitable, mustinvolve many other states in the loss, through no fault of their own,and publicly harm them. That being the case, these other nations

are justified at least in forming alliances among themselves againstsuch a state and its arrogant ways.

4. No state shall use force to involve itself in the constitution andgovernment of another state.

For what can justify such an action? Perhaps the offense which onestate gives to the subjects of another? But the example of the greatevil which people have brought on themselves because of theirlawlessness can serve instead as a warning. And generally the badexample which one free person gives to another (as a scandalumacceptum[a received offence]) is no injury to the latter.1But the caseis different if inner dissension splits a state into two parts, each of

1[Translators note] A scandalum acceptum is a term from Catholic theology.Scandalum (scandal)refers to an evil act (or failure to act) which leads to someone

elses spiritual ruin. A scandalum acceptum (a received scandal) is a term for anaction which is perceived as scandalous thanks to the ignorance or weakness of theperson judging it (when, in fact, the person carrying out the action may havebehaved quite morally according to his own standards).


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which represents itself as a separate state claiming the whole. Foran external state to provide assistance to one of these parts couldnot be considered interference in the constitution of the other state

(for at the time it is in a condition of anarchy). However, as long asthis inner conflict has not yet reached this stage, such interferenceby external powers would be an abuse of the rights of anindependent people merely struggling with its own internalsickness and would thus itself, in fact, constitute an offence andmake the autonomy of all states insecure.

5. No state at war with another shall permit acts of hostility whichwould necessarily make mutual trust in a future peace impossible.

Such acts include using assassins (percussores) and poisoners(venefici), breaching the terms of surrender, inciting treason(perduellio) in the enemy state, and so on.

These are dishonourable stratagems. For even in the middle of awar there must be some trust in the way the enemy thinks, becauseotherwise no peace could be concluded, and the hostilities wouldturn into a war of extermination (bellum internecinum). But war is

merely the miserable expedient of asserting ones rights by force ina state of nature, where there is no tribunal which could use thepower of law to render judgment. In war neither of the two partiescan be declared an unjust enemy, because that would presupposethat a judicial sentence had already been made. However, theoutcome of the conflict (as in a so-called judgment of God)determines which side is in the right. But between states a punitivewar (bellum punitiuum) is inconceivable, because with them there isno relationship of superiors and inferiors. Thus, it follows that a warof extermination in which the annihilation extended to both sidesand which could, in the process, strike at all rights, would allowperpetual peace to occur only over the vast graveyard of the humanrace. Hence, such a war, along with the use of those methods whichlead to it, must be absolutely forbidden. What makes it clear thatthe above-mentioned methods invariably lead there is the fact thatonce these hellish and inherently despicable arts are employed,they do not long confine themselves within the limits of war, as wesee from the use of spies (uti exploratoribus), a practice in whichpeople take advantage of the dishonesty of others (which can neverbe eliminated once and for all). These arts are then carried over


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even into a condition of peace. In this way, the goal of peace istotally destroyed.

* * *

Although the laws listed above are objectively(that is, as far as theintention of the rulers is concerned) merely prohibitive laws (leges

prohibitivae), nevertheless, some of them are of the strict kind,which are valid in all circumstances (leges strictae) and whichdemand the immediate abolition of something (for example,Numbers 1, 5, and 6). Others, however, (such as Numbers 2, 3, and4), which are not exceptions to the rule of law, nevertheless, with

respect to their application, are subjectively broader (leges latae).They take circumstances into account and entail permission topostpone their application, provided one does not, however, losesight of their purpose. For example, in the case of Number 2, thisprinciple does not mean that one is permitted to delay untildoomsday (or as Augustus used to promise, ad calendas graecas[tothe Greek calends]) reinstituting the freedom of certain states whichhave been deprived of it, so that their liberty would never be

restored, but only that a postponement is permitted so that one isnot overhasty and thus acting in such a way as to counter the verypurpose of the law. For the prohibition here concerns only themanner of acquisition, which is no longer valid. It does not refer tothe state of possession, which, although it does not have therequisite title of right, nonetheless has been considered lawful bypublic opinion in all states at the time of the putative acquisition. 1

1The calendswas the first day of the month in the Roman calendar, but the Greekshad no calends. Hence, postponing an action ad calendas graecasmeans never doingit.

[Kants note] The question whether, in addition to commands (leges praeceptivae)and prohibitions (leges prohibitivae) there could also be permissive laws (leges

permissivae) of pure reason has up to this point been doubted, and not withoutreason. For laws in general contain a principle of objective practical necessity, butpermission contains a principle of the contingency of certain actions in practice.

Hence, a permissive law would involve the necessity for an action which no onecould be compelled to carry out, and that would be a contradiction, if the object ofthe law in both examples had one and the same meaning. However, in this case withthe permissive law, the presumed prohibition concerns only the future method of

[Footnote continues]


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SECTION TWOCONTAINING THE DEFINITIVEARTICLES FOR A PERPETUAL PEACE

AMONG STATES

acquiring a right (for example, through inheritance), but the freedom from thisprohibition, in other words, the permission, concerns the present state of possession,

which, although it is illegal, can continue to endure even longer in the transitionfrom a state of nature into civil society, ashonourable ownership (possessio putativa),in keeping with permissive laws of natural right, even though a putative possession isforbidden in a state of nature, as soon as it is recognized for what it is, and a similarmethod of acquiring possession in the civil state which emerges (after the transition

has occurred) is also prohibited. This privilege [Befugnis]of continuing ownershipwould not occur if the alleged possession had taken place in civil society, for then itwould be a violation of someones rights, which would have to end as soon as itsillegality was discovered.

Here I have wanted, merely in passing, to draw the attention of teachers of naturallaw to the idea of a lex permissiva [permissive law], which manifests itself in asystematic classification of reason, particularly because it is often used in civil law(involving statutes), but with this difference: the prohibiting law stands alone byitself, while permission is not brought into it as a limiting condition (as it ought tobe). Instead it is thrown in among the exceptions. So the law then says: This or that

is forbidden, exceptNumber 1, Number 2, Number 3, and so on in an endless series.The exceptions are added to the law only haphazardly, not according to someprinciple, but by groping around among cases as they come up. Otherwise theconditions would have had to have been incorporated into the formulation of the

prohibitive law, and that would have immediately made it a permissive law. Thus, itis unfortunate that the subtle question posed in a prize-winning essay by Count vonWindischgrtz, a man as wise as he is acute, has remained unanswered and has beenquickly abandoned, since it emphasized the very point I mention. For the possibilityof such a formulation (similar to those in mathematics) is the only real touchstonefor a piece of legislation which would remain consistent. Without that, the so-called

ius certum [certain law]will remain a pious wish, and we can have merely generallaws (which are valid for the most part) but no universal laws (which are valid inevery case), something which the idea of law seems to require.

[Translators note]Count von Windischgrtz (1744-1892) had posed a question aboutwriting unambiguous land contracts.

Kants point here is that, while the six preliminary articles for peace must all be firmlaws, some of them would not be immediately binding. For example, if Nation Aconquers Nation B and seizes some of Nation Bs land, then Nation As possession is,strictly speaking, illegal, but it can continue as honourable ownership, after war has

concluded, even though any further seizures of land would be unjust. Over time,however, Nation A should restore the liberty of the land it has appropriated (but itshould not do that too quickly if such restoration would disturb the peacefularrangements following the war).


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The condition of peace among human beings who live beside eachother is not a natural situation (status naturalis), for the naturalstate is rather a condition of war. In other words, although there is

not always an outbreak of hostilities, nevertheless there is aconstant threat that this will occur. The state of peace musttherefore be established, for the cessation of hostilities is not yet aguarantee of peace, and unless such a guarantee is given by eachgroup to its neighbour (which can only happen under conditions

governed by law) one party, who has been demanding such aguarantee, can treat the other as an enemy.1

1[Kants note]It is commonly assumed that someone may not act in a hostile manneragainst any other person, unless the latter has already done something to harm himfirst. This is entirely correct when both of them are in living in a civil community

governed by law. For, since each of them has entered this community, they eachafford the other the security he requires (thanks to the authority which has powerover them both). But a human being (or a people) in a mere state of nature removesfrom me this security and simply by living in this state inflicts harm on me becausehe is close by. This harm may not be active (facto), but, given the lawlessness of his

condition (statu iniustu [a state of injustice]), he is a constant threat to me. I canrequire him either to enter with me into the state of a community ruled by law or tomove away from my neighbourhood. So the hypothesis which forms the basis of allthe following articles is this:All people who can exercise a reciprocal influence on eachother must share some form of civil constitution.

Depending on the people who are covered its provisions, a legal constitution is oneof the following:

1. one formed in accordance with the rights of citizenshipof the individuals makingup a people (ius civitatis);

2. one formed in accordance with international law for states in relation to oneanother (ius gentium);

3. one formed in accordance with cosmopolitan law, insofar as individuals and statesstanding in an external relationship of reciprocal influence are to be viewed ascitizens in a universal human state (ius cosmopoliticum).

These divisions are not arbitrary, but are necessarily related to the idea of perpetualpeace. For if even one of these elements in society was in a position to exercisephysical influence on another and yet was still in a state of nature, then a conditionof war would be joined, the very situation from which our purpose here is to freeourselves.

[Translators note] These three constitutions (which confer legal rights) affectindividuals because they are members of a particular state and thus have civil rights,because they are citizens of a state which has forged international agreements withother states and thus have international rights, and because they are all human



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THE FIRST DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACETHE CIVIL CONSTITUTION IN EACH STATE SHALL BE

REPUBLICAN

The republican constitution is founded, firstly, in accordance withthe principles of thefreedomof the members of a society (as humanbeings), secondly, in accordance with the principles of thedependenceof all of its members on a single common system of laws(as subjects), and, thirdly, in accordance with the law of equalityofits members (as citizens). Hence, this form of constitution is theonly one which emerges from the idea of the original contract,upon which all legitimate legislation of a people must be based. 1

beings and thus have human rights. In a state of nature, where there is noconstitution, as free and equal people, we still have private rights, but it is not clearin Kant (here and elsewhere) what these amount to exactly. Since there is noconstitution in a state of nature, there is no law and hence no authority to guaranteeor enforce such private rights.1[Kants note] Lawful(hence external) freedomcannot be defined, as people so oftendo, as the right to do anything one wishes, provided ones actions do not injureanyone else. For what does this right mean? The possibility of an action so long as incarrying it out one does not injure another. So the explanation for the authority

would be a person does not wrong someone else (no matter what he does) if he doesnot wrong someone elseand thus is an empty tautology. Rather than that, theexplanation for my external (lawful) freedom is as follows: it is the right to obey noexternal laws, other than those to which I could have given my consent. In just thesame way, external (legal) equalityin a state is that relationship among the citizensaccording to which no person can legally bind another, unless at the same time hesubmits himself to the law by which he, in turn, couldbe bound in the same way by

the other person. (The principle of lawfuldependence requires no clarification, for itis already present in the general idea of a political constitution). The validity of theseinherited and inalienable rights, which necessarily belong to mankind, is confirmedand ennobled by the principle of the lawful relationship between man himself andhigher beings (when he believes in them), because, in keeping with these veryprinciples, he sees himself also as a citizen of a supernatural world. For where myfreedom is concerned, I have no binding obligation even with respect to divine laws,

which I can recognize only with my reason, except insofar as I myself could haveconsented to them (for through the law of freedom of my own reason I first createfor myself an idea of the Divine Will). Where the principle of equalityis concerned in

connection with the most exalted being in the world other than God, a presence Icould perhaps picture for myself (say, a great Aeon), there is no reason why, if I carryout the duties of my position, as Aeon carries out his, I should be the only one withthe obligation to obey and he should be the one with the right to command. This



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Where the issue of rights is concerned, this is also the constitutionwhich inherently and originally lies at the foundation of every formof civil constitution. So now the only question is this: Is it also the

only constitution which can lead to perpetual peace?Now, apart from the integrity of its originfor it sprang up fromthe pure source of the concept of rightthe republican constitutionalso promises to obtain the desired result, namely, perpetual peace.The reason is as follows: If (as must be the case with a constitutionlike this) the consent of the subjects is required in order to resolvethe question whether there should be a war or not, nothing is morenatural than for them to consider very carefully whether they

should launch such a dreadful gamble. For they would inevitably bedeciding whether to bring upon themselves all the horrors of war(these would include the following: having to fight battlesthemselves, paying for the costs of the war out of their own goods,making wretched attempts to repair the devastation which warleaves in its wake, and finally, to crown their misery, assuming aburden of debt which will make even peace itself something bitterand which will never be paid off, because new wars will always be

an imminent threat). By contrast, in a constitution where thesubject is not a fellow citizen, that is, a state which is not

principle of equality(like that of freedom) does not extend to our relationship withGod, because this Being is the only one to whom the idea of duty does not belong.

However, where the right to equality of all citizens as subjects is concerned, theanswer to the question about the admissibility of a hereditary aristocracydepends

solely on the following question: Does the rankendorsed by the state (which makesone subject superior to another) take precedence over merit, or does merit have totake precedence over rank? Now, this much is clear: when rank is tied in with birth,it is completely uncertain whether merit (skill and integrity in discharging on esoffice) will follow as well. Thus, a hereditary aristocracy amounts to awarding thefavoured person a position (making him a commander) without his having anymerit. This arrangement is something the general will of the people would neveragree to in the original contract (which is the principle of all right). For the fact thatsomeone is a nobleman does not immediately make him a nobleman. So far as thenobility of an official is concerned (a term we might use to describe the rank of a

higher magistrate, which someone must earn by merit), the rank is not attached tothe person, like a possession, but to the position, and equality is not harmed by this,because when someone gives up his official position, he also sets aside his rank andmoves back among the people.


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republican, deciding to launch a war is the most trifling concern inthe world, because the ruling power is not a civil comrade but theowner of the state. With his fine table, his hunting, his pleasure

palaces, his court holidays, and so on, he does not suffer in the leastfrom the war, and thus he can make the decision to fight for pettyreasons, as if it were a sort of pleasant outing, and without worryingabout a justification for going to war in order to look respectable.He can leave that unimportant matter to the diplomatic corps,which is always prepared to assist with such things.

* * *

So that people do not confuse a republican constitution with ademocratic one (as commonly happens), it is necessary to make thefollowing remarks. The forms of the state (civitas) can bedistinguished either by the difference between the people whopossess the highest power in the state or by the way the people aregoverned by the ruling power, whatever it may be. The first isproperly called the form of the sovereignty (forma imperii), and ithas only three possible options, depending on whether one person,

or several people working in combination, or all the people whocollectively make up the civil society possess the ruling power (inother words, an Autocracy, where a monarch has the power, an

Aristocracy, where the nobles have the power, or a Democracy,where the people have the power). The second way ofdistinguishing the form of the state is by the form of the government(forma regiminis). This involves the way the state makes use of itssupreme power, an arrangement based on the constitution (the actof the general will by which a crowd of people becomes a nation).From this point of view, the form of government is either republicanor despotic. Republicanism rests on the political principle ofseparating the executive power (the government) from thelegislative power. Despotism is the form in which the statearbitrarily executes laws which it has given itself. Thus, it will carryout the public will to the extent that this is the same as the privatewill of the ruler. Of these three forms of the state, democracyis, inthe proper sense of the word, necessarily despotism, because itestablishes an executive power in which everyone makes decisionsfor and, if necessary, against any individual who does not agree withthem. Therefore, all the people who decide are not really all the


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people, a situation in which the general will contradicts itself andthe principle of freedom.

In fact, every form of government which is not representative is

really no form at all, because no lawgiver can be, in one and thesame person, also the one who carries out his own will (any morethan the general major principle in a syllogism can be at the sametime the subsumption of the particular under that principle in theminor premise). Although the other two state constitutions,[autocracy and aristocracy], are always defective, insofar as theyleave room for such a form of non-representative government,nonetheless, with them it is at least possible that they come close to

the spirit of a representative system in the way they shape thegovernment. Thus, Frederick II at least used to remarkthat he wasmerely the highest servant of the state.1 The democratic form, bycontrast, makes that impossible, because in it everyone wishes to bemaster.

One can therefore say the following: the smaller the number ofpeople holding state power (i.e., the number of rulers) and, on the

other hand, the greater the number of people they represent, themore the states constitution agrees with the possibility ofrepublicanism, and they can hope with gradual reforms eventuallyto raise themselves to that level. For this reason, reaching thissingle perfectly legitimate constitution is more difficult with anaristocracy than with a monarchy, and with a democracy it isimpossible, except through a powerful revolution.

1[Kants note]People have often criticized the lofty titles which are frequently givento a ruler (e.g., the Lords Anointed, the Representative of the Divine Will on Earth,and the Vicar of God) as gross, dizzying flattery. But, in my view, this criticism hasno foundation. Far from making a sovereign arrogant, these titles must rather makehis soul humble, if he has any common sense (which we must assume he has), forthey remind him that he has undertaken an office which is too great for any man,that is, the holiest which God has on earth, the right to rule mankind, and heconstantly has to worry about offending this apple of Gods eye in some way or other.

[Translators note] Frederick II (1712-1786)Frederick the Greatwas King ofPrussia.


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However, for a nation the form of government is incomparablymore important than the form of the constitution (although a greatdeal depends on how much or how little the constitution is

appropriate to the goals of government).1

But if the form ofgovernment is to conform to the concept of right, it mustincorporate the representative systemthe only form in which arepublican style of ruling is possible and without which (no matterwhat the constitution) the government is autocratic and violent.None of the older so-called republics understood this, and for thatreason they inevitably dissolved into an absolute despotism, which,of all despotisms, is most easily endured under the sovereignty of a

single individual.

SECOND DEFINITIVE ARTICLE OF PERPETUAL PEACETHE LAW OF NATIONS SHALL BE BASED ON A FEDERATION

OF FREE STATES

Nations, as states, could be judged like human individuals who, intheir state of nature (i.e., in their independence from external laws)

inflict injuries on each other by the very fact that they live in closep17roximity to each other. Every nation can and should, for the sake

1[Kants note]In his brilliant sounding but hollow and superficial language, Mallet duPan brags that after many years of experience he has finally become convinced of thetruth of Alexander Popes famous saying: For Forms of Government let foolscontest;/ Whateer isbest administered is best. If that amounts to saying that thebest administered government is the one which is best administered, then Pope has,to use Swifts expression, bitten open a nut and been rewarded with a maggot. But ifit means that the best administered government is also the best form of government,i.e., the best constitution, then it is completely false. For examples of good leadershipprove nothing about the form of government. Who has governed better than Titusand Marcus Aurelius, and yet one left Domitian as his successor and the otherCommodus? That could not have happened with a good political constitution, for thefact that they were unfit for this position was known sufficiently early, and the ruler

was powerful enough to prevent their succession.

[Translators note] Jacques Mallet du Pan (1749-1800) was a Swiss journalist. The

lines from Alexander Pope (1688-1744) are taken from The Essay on Man. Kantquotes the lines in German, but in the text above the quotation comes from Popestext directly. Titus (39-81 AD), Marcus Aurelius (121-180 AD), Domitian (51-95 AD),and Commodus (161 to 192 AD) were all Roman emperors.


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of its own security, demand from the others that they shouldcombine with it under a constitution similar to one in a civil state,in which each of them can have its rights protected. This would be

an alliance of nations. However, it would not have to consist of asingle state made up of these nations, for that would create acontradiction, since every state involves a relationship betweenthose above (the ones who make the laws) and those below (theones who obey, namely, the people), and many nations in a singlestate would amount to only a single nation, a situation whichcontradicts what we are assuming (for here we have to take intoaccount the right of nations with respect to each other, to the

extent that they exist as so many separate nations and are not to befused into a single state).

We look with profound contempt on the attachment of savages totheir lawless freedom, on the way they would rather fight eachother constantly than subject themselves to the restraint of lawswhich they themselves establish, and thus on their preference for awild freedom over a rational one, and we consider them a crude,uncivilized, and brutal degradation of humanity. Thus, one would

think that civilized peoples (each one united in its own state) wouldhurry to come out of such a depraved condition as soon as possible.But instead of this each state considers its majesty (the majesty of apeople is a meaningless expression) arises directly from its notbeing subject to any external legal compulsion, and the glory of itsruler stems from the fact that without his even having to placehimself in any danger, many thousands stand at his commandprepared to be sacrificed for some cause which is of no concern to

them.1

The difference between the European savages and those inAmerica consists for the most part in the fact that, while manyAmerican tribes have been totally devoured by their enemies, thosein Europe know a better way of using the people they haveconquered than making a meal of them: they prefer to have them

1

[Kants note] A Greek emperor in a generous mood offered to fight a Bulgarianprince in single combat in order to end a conflict between them. The prince replied:A blacksmith who has tongs will not take red hot iron from the coals with his ownhands.


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increase the number of their subjects and thus the quantity ofinstruments for still more wide-ranging wars.

Given the viciousness of human nature, which reveals itself openly

in the unrestrained relations of nations with each other (whereas ina lawful civil condition the constraints of government keep itheavily veiled), one could well be amazed that people have not yetbeen able to banish the word rightentirely from the politics of waras pedantic and that no state has as yet been so bold as to advancethis opinion in public. For Hugo Grotius, Pufendorf, Vattel, andothers (all of them merely tiresome comforters) are always sincerelycited as justification for an outbreak of war, although their legal

codes, whether treated in a philosophical or diplomatic manner,have not and cannot have the slightest legal force (because thestates as such do not stand under any common externalcompulsion), and there is not a single example of a state which wasever moved to give up what it planned to do by means ofarguments, even those armed with the testimonies of suchimportant men.1 However, this homage which every state pays tothe concept of rights (at least verbally) shows that there exists in

human beings an even greater moral predisposition, although itmay be asleep at the moment, at some point to become masters ofthe evil principle in them (for they cannot deny its existence). Andthey have the same hope for others. If they did not, the word rightwould never be mentioned by states who wish to attack each other,unless merely as a joke, like that Gallic prince who remarked: Theprivilege that nature has given the strong over the weak is that theweak are to obey them.

The ways in which states prosecute their rights can never involve ajudicial process, as they could if there were an external tribunal.Their only resort is war. But even with war and a favourableoutcome in victory, the question of rights will not be determined. A

1[Translators note]Hugo Grotius (1583-1645) was a Dutch jurist whose writings had a

great influence on developments in international law; Samuel Pufendorf (1632-1694)was a German philosopher who wrote extensively on politics and law; Emerich deVattel (1714-1767) was a Swiss philosopher and diplomat who wrote aboutinternational law (among other things).


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peace treaty may well bring this particular war to an end, but notthe condition of war (people can always find a new pretext, whichwe cannot declare obviously unjust, because in this situation

everyone is a judge in his own cause). Nevertheless, the principlewhich holds that, according to natural rights, human beings inlawless circumstances should move out of this condition does not,thanks to the rights of nations, apply precisely to states, because, asstates, they already have an internal legal constitution and thushave developed beyond the point where others can, according totheir concept of right, forcefully bring them under a wider legalconstitution.

However, reason, on the throne of the loftiest moral-giving power,absolutely denounces war as a legal procedure and, by contrast,makes the condition of peace an immediate obligation. But withouta compact of nations among themselves, peace cannot be foundedor secured. Hence, it requires a special form of alliance, which onecould call an alliancefor peace (foedus pacificum). This would notbe the same as a peace treaty (pactum pacis), for, while the latterseeks merely to end a particularwar, the former seeks to put an end

to allwars forever. This alliance does not seek to acquire any powerwhatsoever of the state but merely to maintain and guarantee thefreedom of a state for itself and at the same time the freedom ofother states in the alliance. But these states are not required tosubject themselves to public laws and their coercive power (ashappens with people in a state of nature).

Our ability to implement this idea of federalism (its objectiverealization), which is to extend itself gradually over all states andthus lead to perpetual peace, can be readily demonstrated. For iffortunate circumstances lead to the point where a powerful andenlightened people can form themselves into a republic (which,according to its nature, must be inclined to perpetual peace), it willprovide a central point of a federal union for other states, so thatthey can attach themselves to it and in this way secure thecondition of freedom for states, in accordance with the idea of theright of nations. Gradually, with more alliances of this kind, thefederation can extend further and further.

It is understandable that a people should say, There shall be nowar among us. For we wish to form ourselves into a state, that is, we


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shall on our own make ourselves a supreme legislative, governing,and judicial power, which will resolve our quarrels peacefully. Butwhen this state says, There shall be no war between me and other

states, although I recognize no supreme legislative authority whichwill guarantee my rights and those of the other states, then it isimpossible to understand what it is on which I should ground mytrust in my rights, unless it is the surrogate for the alliance basic tocivil society, namely, on a free federalism, which reason must ofnecessity link to the idea of the rights of nations, if in fact there isanything further to think about in relation to that idea.

The notion that the rights of nations contain a right to makewaris

truly unintelligible, for that would be a right to determine what islegitimate, not in accordance with the universally valid lawsrestricting the freedom of every individual, but by using one-sidedmaxims driven home by force. Thus, we must understand the rightsof nations as follows: people who think this way about war geteverything they deserve when they destroy each other and thus findeternal peace in the wide grave which covers all the atrocities ofviolent acts, along with those who initiate to them. According to

reason, there can be no way for states, in their relationships witheach other, to emerge from a condition of lawlessness, which entailsnever-ending war, unless they give up their lawless savage freedom,in the same way individual human beings have done, and learn tolive under public and coercive laws and, in the process, construct anever-growing state of nations(civitas gentium), which would end upincluding all the nations of the earth. But since nation states,according to their ideas of national rights, have no desire for this,

they reject in hypothesi [in practice] what is correct in thesi [intheory].1 Thus, if we are not to lose everything, instead of the

1[Translators note] Nation states endorse the idea that they have rights, and thisimplies that these states accept the authority of reason (since the idea of rights arisesfrom reason). Hence, they ought to accept the establishment of a rational solution to

world peace (the thesis, or in thesi). But their desire for no interference in their state

sovereignty prevents the establishment of what is rationally necessary, a governmentof nations (the hypothesis, or in hypothesi).

[Kants note]Once a war has ended and peace treaty has been signed, it might not beinappropriate for a nation to announce a day of penance after its holiday of



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positive idea of a world republic, only its negative surrogate of anenduring and ever-expanding alliance preventing war may checkthe flow of hostile tendencies which reject the idea of rights,

although there will constantly be a danger that war will break out(Furor impius intus . . . fremit horridus ore cruentoVergil [Impiousinner fury with bloody lips roars savagely]Aeneid1.294 ff.).

THIRD DEFINITIVE ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACETHE RIGHTS OF HUMAN BEINGS AS CITIZENS OF THE WORLDSHALL BE RESTRICTED TO THE CONDITIONS OF UNIVERSAL

HOSPITALITYThe issue here, as in the previous article, is not one of philanthropy,but of right, and here hospitality(Wirtbarkeit) means the right of astranger who arrives in the land of someone else not be treated byhim in a hostile manner. The latter can turn the stranger away, ifthis can be done without bringing about his death, but so long asthe new arrival acts peacefully, he cannot treat him as an enemy.The stranger cannot claim the rights of a guest (which would

require a special charitable compact of friendship to make him for acertain period a member of the household) but rather the rights of avisitor. All human beings share in a right to present themselves tosociety, by virtue of their right to a common possession of thesurface of the earth, on which, since it is a globe, people cannot bescattered for infinite distances but finally have to put up with livingin close proximity to each other. But no one originally had more

thanksgiving and, in the name of the state, to pray to heaven for mercy for the greatsin which the human race is guilty of to this day, because in its interactions withother nations it is unwilling to agree to a legal constitution. Instead it takes pride inits national independence and would rather use the barbaric method of war (which,however, does not resolve what is looked for, namely the right of each state). Thecelebrations of thanksgiving during the war for a victory which has been fought and

won and the hymns which people sing to the Lord of Hosts (to use a fine Israeliteexpression) stand in just as sharp a contrast to the moral idea of a Father of Mankind,

because, apart from the indifference these show to the methods nations use to seektheir mutual rights (which is sad enough), they introduce a sense that people arecelebrating the fact that the happiness or the lives of a great many people have beendestroyed.


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right to a particular place on earth than anyone else. Uninhabitableparts of this surface, like the sea and deserts, divide this humancommunity, but in such a way that a ship or a camel (the ship of the

desert) makes it possible for people to approach each other overthese unclaimed regions and thus to make use of their right to thesurface of the earth, which men share in common, for potentialsocial interaction. The absence of hospitality along the sea coasts(for example, the Barbary Coast), the habit of plundering ships innearby seas or of making slaves of stranded sailors or those indesertswhere people (for example, the Arab Bedouins) believethat their proximity to the nomadic races gives them the right to

rob themis thus contrary to natural law, that is, the privilege ofthose visiting a foreign land, a right which does not extend furtherthan the conditions which make it possible for them to attempttointeract with the original inhabitants. In this way, distant parts ofthe world can enter into peaceful relations with each other. Theserelations may end up becoming publicly governed by law, and thusthe human race will finally be able to bring a cosmopolitanconstitution closer to realization.

If we compare these examples with the inhospitableconduct of thecivilized nations, especially with the trading states of our part of theworld, the injustice which they demonstrate in their visitsto foreignlands and peoples (which they consider equivalent to conquest) fillus with horror. America, the Negro lands, the Spice Islands, theCape, and so on were for them, at the time of their discovery, landswhich belonged to no one. For they considered the inhabitantsnothing at all. In the East Indies (Hindustan), using their intention

to establish trading posts as a mere pretext, they brought in foreigntroops, and, along with them, the suppression of the inhabitants,the incitement of the different states of the Indies to widespreadwars, famine, turmoil, disloyalty, and the entire litany of evil whichcan oppress the human race.

China and Japan (Nipon) had made an attempt to cope with guestslike this and have therefore acted wisely.1 China permits them

1[Kants note]In order to call this great empire by the name which it uses for itself(that is, China, not Sina or a word which sounds similar), we need only to examine



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Georgii:Alphab. Tibet [Antonio Georgi, Alphabetum Tibetanum, 1762], pp. 651 to 654,particularly Note b at the bottom. According to the observation of Professor Fischerfrom St. Petersburg, there is really no fixed name this state uses to identify itself. Themost common is still the word Kin, meaning gold (which the Tibetans express asSer). Thus, the emperor is called the King of Gold(king of the most beautiful land inthe world). The word Kin, which in the empire itself is probably pronounced Chin,may have become Kinin the speech of Italian missionaries (because of the gutturalsounds). From this, we see the land of the Seres, called that by the Romans, wasChina. The silk, however, was sent to Europe across Greater Tibet(probably throughLesser Tibetand Bukhara, across Persia, and then on from there). These points lead

to many reflections about the age of this astonishing state at the time of its unionwith Tibet, in comparison with the age of Hindustan, and beyond that, with Japan;whereas, the name Sina or Tschina, which is allegedly given to this land by itsneighbours, leads nowhere. Perhaps we can clarify the ancient association of Europe

with Tibet from what Hesychius maintained about it, something which has neverbeen properly understood, that is, the shout (Konx Ompax) made by thehierophant in the Eleusianian mysteries (see The Travels of Anacharsis the Younger,Part 5, p. 447 ff.). For according to Georgii, Alph[abetum] Tibet[arum], the wordConcioa means God, a word which has a remarkable similarity to Konx. Pah-cio(ibid., p. 520), which could easily have been pronounced by the Greeks as peace,

means promulgator legis [the one who promulgates the law], the divine beingimmanent in all nature (also called Cencresi, p. 177). However, Ohm, which La Crozetranslates as benedictus, or blessed, can, when it describes the divinity, probablymean nothing other than the beatified one (p. 507). Now, when P. Franz Horatius[Father Francisco Orazio]asked the Lamas of Tibet, whom he often questioned, whatthey understood by God (Concioa), he always received this answer: It is theassembly of all the holy ones (that is, the blessed ones who, after many wanderingsthrough all kinds of bodies, according to the lamas doctrine of rebirth, finally returnback to the divinity in Burchane, that is, they are transmigrated souls, beings worthyof adoration (p. 223). And so that mysterious phrase Konx Ompaxprobably should

mean the holy(Konx), blessed(Om), and wise(Pax) Supreme Being permeating theentire world (the personification of nature), and it was used in the Greek mysteriesprobably to designate monotheismfor the Epoptes [those with repeated experience ofthe mysteries], in contrast to the polytheism of the people. P. Horatius [FatherOrazio] (loc. cit.), however, suspected atheism here. But how that mysteriousexpression came from Tibet to the Greeks can probably be accounted for by theexplanation given above and, conversely, through the early communication of theEuropeans with China by way of Tibet (perhaps even earlier than between Europeand Hindustan).

[Translators note] Father Antonio Geogi (1711-1797) was an Augustine friar who

compiled and published materials sent by missionaries back to Italy from Tibet.Hesychius was a Greek living in Alexandria in the 5 th century AD. The Travels of

Anacharsis the Younger in Greece, published in 1788 by Jean Barthelemy, was animaginary travel journal. Father Francesco Orazio Olivieri della Penna (1680-1745)



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coastal access but not entrance into the country, and Japan gave thesame permission to only one European people, the Dutch, who,even so, are treated like prisoners and prohibited from social

intercourse with the inhabitants. The worst result of thisor, fromthe standpoint of a moral judge, the bestis that all these tradingsocieties get no satisfaction from their violence, for they are allclose to ruin. The Sugar Islands [Caribbean Islands]theheadquarters of the most horrific and deliberate slaveryhaveyielded no real profit, but only an indirect one, and what theyproduce is nothing to boast about. For they serve to train sailors forwarships and thus to carry on more wars in Europe. And this is

done by powers which loudly proclaim their piety and, as theydrink up injustice like water, wish to be considered among the electfor their religious orthodoxy.

The greater or lesser social interactions among the nations of theearth, which have been constantly increasing everywhere, havenow spread so far that a violation of rights in one part of the earth isfelt everywhere. Hence, the idea of a cosmopolitan right is not afantastic, hysterical way of imagining rights, but a necessary

completion of the unwritten code of both national andinternational law for the public rights of human beings generallyand so for perpetual peace. Only under the conditions ofinternational law can we flatter ourselves that we are continuallyapproaching such a peace.

FIRST SUPPLEMENT

CONCERNING THE GUARANTEE OF PERPETUAL PEACE

What provides theguarantee of perpetual peace is nothing less thanthe great artist nature (natura daedala rerum [nature the fashionerof things]), whose mechanical course clearly shows a purposefuldesign to allow harmony to emerge from the conflicts amonghuman beings, even against their will. That is why this power, when

was an Italian Capuchin missionary in Tibet who produced a small Tibetan-Italiandictionary and translated some Tibetan works into Italian.


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it works as a necessary causal force by laws unknown to us is calledfate, but when we consider its purposefulness in the course of theworld and see it as the profound wisdom of a Higher Cause directed

at the objective and ultimate purpose of the human race andpredetermining world events, we call it providence.

1We do not, in

1[Kants note] In the mechanical operations of nature, to which human beings, assentient beings, belong, a form manifests itself as the fundamental basis of itsexistence, something which we are incapable of making intelligible to ourselves,unless we conceive of the idea that these operations have a purpose set in advance by

the original creator of the world. This predetermination in nature we generally callDivine Providence. To the extent that this providence is present in the beginningofthe world we think of it as a foundingprovidence (providentia conditrix; semel iussit,semper parent [founding providence; when she commands, they always obey]

Augustine). But insofar as it maintains the actions of nature according to universallaws of purposefulness, we call it rulingprovidence (providentia gubernatrix). Beyondthat, when it manifests itself in special ends which human beings cannot predict butmerely suspect from the result, we call it guidingprovidence (providentia directrix).Finally, when particular events are involved as divine ends, we no longer talk ofprovidence but of dispensation (directio extraordinaria [extraordinary direction]).Human beings want to explain what these are in their essence, but such a desire isfoolish presumptuousness in people, since such events are, in fact, miracles,although they are not called that. For to make conclusions about a special principleof efficient causes on the basis of a single eventto infer that this event is an endand not merely a mechanical and natural consequence of another purposecompletely unknown to usis absurd and full of arrogance, no matter how devoutand humble the language used to talk about such things. In the same way, to divideprovidence (from a materialviewpoint) in connection with objectsin the world intouniversal and particular is false and self-contradictory (for example, to assert thatthere may be a providence which maintains the animal species but which leaves theindividuals to chance). For we describe providence with the specific term universal,

so that we do not consider a single thing exempt from it. Technically speaking, bydividing providence like this, people presumably mean here the ways in which itcarries out its purpose, that is, they separate it into ordinary providence (e.g., theannual death and rebirth in nature according to the changes in the seasons) andextraordinary providence (e.g., the way in which the sea currents carry wood tofrozen coasts where trees cannot grow, for the inhabitants there, who could not live

without it). In this case, although we can quickly explain the physical-mechanicalcause of this phenomenon (for instance, in temperate lands the river banks areovergrown with trees, which fall into the water and are carried far away, perhaps bythe Gulf Stream), nonetheless, we must not overlook the teleological cause, which

indicates the care of a wisdom ruling over nature. But the idea commonly used inphilosophy schools of a divine collaboration or cooperation (concursus) in theoperations of the sensible world must be abandoned. For to want to link togethertwo things of different kinds (gryphes iungere equis[to yoke griffins with horses]) and



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fact, truly recognize this providence in the artistic formations ofnature, nor do we make conclusions about it on the basis of thesedesigns, but, as in all connections between the forms of things and

their final causes generally, we can and must merely supply the ideaof a higher causein order to create for ourselves a concept of theirpossibility, using the analogy of human artistic actions. But to forma picture for ourselves of their relationships to and their harmonywith a final moral purpose, which reason at once prescribes for us,is an idea which from a theoretical point of view transcends ourexperience, but from a practicalpoint of view is dogmatic, and itsreality is well established (for example, in connection with the idea

of our having a duty to perpetual peaceand using the mechanism ofnature in its pursuit). And when, as in this case, our concern ismerely with theory (and not with religion) the use of the wordnature is also more appropriate, given the limits of humanunderstanding (for in considering the relationship of effects to theircauses, we must remain within the boundaries of possibleexperience). It is also more modest, because to use the expression

providence to describe something we could know would be the

to allow Him who is Himself the complete cause of the changes in the world toamend his own predetermining providence during the running of the world (whichthus must have been defective)for example, to say that next to God the doctorhealed the patient, and so He was there as a support is, firstly, inherentlycontradictory. For causa solitaria non iuvat [an isolated cause does not help] . God is

the creator of the doctor and of all his remedies, and so, if we want to ascend to thehighest cause, which is theoretically inconceivable to us, we must ascribe the effectentirely to Him. Or we can also give the entire credit to the doctor, insofar as weexplain this event in terms of natural order in the chain of causes in the world.Secondly, such a way of thinking destroys all the fixed principles by which we assessan effect. But from the view of practical morality, which is directed entirely at thetranscendent world, the idea of a divine concursus [cooperation] is entirely fittingand even necessary, for example, the belief that, if only our basic convictions aresincere, God will make up for the defects in our own justice, even with meansincomprehensible to us, and thus we should not relax our striving for what is good.

From this it clearly follows that no one has to explaina good action (as an event inthe world) by appealing to such cooperation, for that would be assuming atheoretical understanding of the supersensible, and consequently it would beillogical.


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height of presumptionwe would be putting on the wings of Icarusin order to come closer to the secret of its unfathomable design.1

Now, before we go into this guarantee in greater detail, we first

have to explore the circumstances which nature has arranged forthose people who act on her great stage, conditions which finallymake her assurance of peace necessary. Only after that will weconsider the manner in which she provides this assurance.

The arrangements by which nature provides for us consist of thefollowing: (1) she has seen to it that human beings can live in allregions of the world; (2) by means of war she has scattered them

everywhere, even in the most inhospitable regions, so that thesewill be populated; (3) by the very same means she has forced peopleto enter into more or less lawful relationships. Surely it is wonderfulthat in the frozen deserts around the Arctic Ocean, moss still grows,which the reindeer scrapes off from under the snow, so that it canserve as food or draw the sled for the Ostyiak or Samoyed, or thatsalty sand deserts have the camel, which seems to have beencreated for travelling through them, so that those areas will not be

left unused. But natures purpose is even more evident when welearn how, in addition to the fur-bearing animals on the shores ofthe Arctic Ocean, there are seals, walruses, and whales, whose fleshprovides food for the people living there and whose oil gives themfire. But natures providential care excites the most admirationthrough the driftwood which she brings to these barren shores(without our having any clear idea of where it comes from).Without this material the inhabitants could not make their meansof transportation or their weapons or even the huts where they live.

1[Translators note] In Greek mythology, Icarus and his father Daedalus put onartificial wings to fly over the sea away from Crete. Icarus flew too high, and the sunmelted the wax which held the feathers of his wings in place. As a result, he fell intothe sea and drowned.

Kants point here is that we cannot, on the basis of designs in nature, make anytheoretical conclusions about supersensible beings (e.g., God), because we cannot

use our sense experience to make claims about what lies beyond sense experience.However, from a point of view of practical morality we must assume thepurposefulness of nature and assist its mechanical operations in order to move closerto perpetual peace.


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In this region they have enough to do warring against animals, sothat they live peacefully amongst themselves. But what drove thepeople there was probably nothing other than war. Among all the

animals, the first one men used as an instrument of war was thehorse, which they had learned to tame and domesticate at the timethe earth was being populated (for the elephant belongs to a laterage, a period of luxury for already established states). Similarly, theart of cultivating certain types of grasses called grainsones whoseoriginal qualities we no longer knowas well as the copying andrefining of different varieties of fruit by transplanting and grafting(perhaps in Europe of only two species, the crab apple and the wild

pear) could arise only under conditions produced in alreadyestablished states, where there was secure ownership of land, afterhuman beings had moved beyond the earlier lawless freedom of alife of hunting, fishing, and herding animals to a life of working theland.1 Now salt and iron were discovered, which were perhaps thefirst articles searched out far and wide for the commercialinteractions of different peoples and through which they wereinitially brought into a peaceful relationship with one another and

so developed a mutual understanding, a sense of community, andpeaceful relations, even with those living further away.

Now, while nature has seen to it that human beings couldlive in allregions of the earth, she has, like a despot, also willed that theyought to live all over the earth, even when they had no inclinationto do so and even without assuming that this oughtis linked to anidea of duty arising from a moral law which would bind them toher. Instead she has chosen war as the way to achieve this end. For

1[Kants note] Of all the ways of life, hunting is undoubtedly the one mostincompatible with a civilized constitution. For the families must live separate fromeach other, soon become strangers, and then, as they scatter across the sprawlingforests, quickly become enemies, since each of them needs a great deal of room toobtain its food and clothing. The prohibition against blood which Noah received inGenesis, IX, 4-6 (which was often repeated and which later was even imposed as acondition by Jewish Christians on those recently converted from paganism to

Christianityalthough they had something else in mind, Acts XV, 20, XXI, 25appears originally to have been nothing other than a prohibition against the huntersway of life, for with hunters the opportunity to eat raw meat must often occur, andso when they banned the eating of raw meat, they also banned hunting.


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we see certain peoples whose shared ancestry is revealed in thecommon features of their speech, like the Samoyeds of the ArcticOcean, on the one hand, and a people whose speech is similar living

two hundred miles away in the Altai Mountains [in Central Asia],on the other. Between these two another people, namely, theMongols, who ride horses and are therefore warlike, have insertedthemselves and thus driven one part of the original race far awayfrom the other, into the inhospitable icy regions, which theycertainly had no inclination to move to on their own. 1 In the sameway those Finns living in the northernmost regions of Europe, whoare called Laplanders, are just as far distant from the Hungarians,

whose language is related to theirs, because of the intrusion ofGothic and Sarmatic peoples between the two. And what else butwar, which nature uses as her means to populate all regions of theearth, could have driven the Eskimos (perhaps ancient Europeanadventurers, a race completely different from all Americans) intothe north and the Pescharais into the south of the Americas, rightdown to Tierra del Fuego?

War, however, does not require a particular reason for its

motivation but appears to be grafted onto human nature, even assomething inherently noble, to which men are inspired through anurge for glory, without being motivated by selfish desires. As aresult, courage in war (among the American savages as well asamong Europeans in the age of chivalry) is considered something ofimmediate and great value, not merely whenwar is going on (as isreasonable), but also in order to encourage war. Wars have oftenstarted merely to demonstrate this courage, so that an inner worth

has been attributed to war in and of itself. Even philosophers have

1[Kants note]We could ask the following: If nature has willed it that these icy coastsshould not remain uninhabited, what will become of the people living there if thetime comes (as we can expect) when no more driftwood is carried to them? For wecan well believe that with further cultural developments the inhabitants of thetemperate zones of the earth will make better use of the wood which grows on thebanks of their rivers and will not let it fall into the streams and thus be carried away

by the sea. My answer is that the inhabitants who live along the Ob, the Yenisei, theLena, and so on will supply the wood through trade, accepting in exchange theanimal products in which the Arctic seas are so rich, but only when nature has firstforced them to make peace among themselves.


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praised war as a certain ennoblement of human beings, ignoring theproverbial expression of that Greek who said, War is bad, for itmakes more evil people than it destroys. So much, then, about

what nature does in pursuit of her own purpose concerning thehuman race as a class of animals.

Now we come to the questions which concern the essential featureof this design for perpetual peace: What does nature do in thisrespect with reference to the purpose which mans own reasonestablishes as a duty for him? Hence, what does nature do toencourage his moral intentions? And how does she provide aguarantee that man will do those things which he ought to do,

according to the laws of his freedom, and yet fails to do, withoutinjuring his freedom by using her coercive power? How does naturedo this in accordance with the three forms of public right:constitutional rights, international rights, and cosmopolitan rights?When I say of nature that she wills this or that to happen, it doesnot mean that she imposes a duty on us to do it (for that can onlybe done by the practical reason acting without any constraints) butrather that she does it herself, whether we are willing or not (fata

volentem ducunt, nolentem trahunt [The fates lead the willing butdrag the unwilling]).

1. Even if a people were not forced by their inner quarrels to placethemselves under the compulsion of public laws, a war fromoutside would nonetheless compel them to do so, according tothe previously mentioned design in nature, through which everynation finds another neighbouring people pressuring it, and itmust form itself internally into a state in order to be equipped,as a power, against this external nation. Now, a republicanconstitution is the only one which is perfectly adapted to therights of human beings, but it is also the most difficult toestablish and is even more difficult to maintain, so much so thatmany have asserted that a republic must be a state made up ofangels, because human beings, given their selfish tendencies, areincapable of such a sublime form of constitution. But nownature comes to the assistance of that admirable but in practicepowerless general will of human beings, grounded in reason. Shedoes this precisely through those selfish tendencies, so that theonly issue which matters is a good organization for the state(which is certainly within human capabilities), is one in which


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the states inner forces are directed against each other in such away that one checks the destructive effects of the others orneutralizes them. Thus, the outcome, from the point of view of

reason, is as if neither of them were present, and so the humanbeing, even if he is not a morally good person, is nonethelesscompelled to be a good citizen. The problem of establishing astate, as difficult as that sounds, can be resolved, even for anation of devils (provided only that they have reason). We mayexplain the issue as follows: A large number of reasonablebeings who collectively require general laws for their ownpreservation and yet each of whom is inclined secretly to

exclude himself from their control have to be organized and aconstitution has to be established for them, so that, even if intheir private feelings they work against each other, these feelingsnonetheless act as a check against each other in such a way thatin their public behaviour the effect is the same as if they had nosuch evil feelings. There must be a solutionto such a problem.For we do not have to know how to achieve moral improvementin human beings, but only how to use the mechanism of nature

on people in order to direct the conflict of their hostile attitudesin such a way that they mutually require each other to submitthemselves to the control of law and so have to introduce acondition of peace in which the laws have force.

We can observe this happening in actually existing states, evenones which are very imperfectly organized, so that in theirexternal relationships they are already coming very close to whatthe idea of right prescribes, although their inner morality is

certainly not the cause (and we should not expect a goodpolitical constitution to come from this inner moral principlebut rather the other way aroundfor good moral culture amonga people first comes once such a constitution is in place). Thus,the mechanism of nature through these selfish inclinations,which naturally work against each other in their external effects,can be used by reason as a tool to create room for the realizationof reasons end goal, the rule of right, and in the process also

promote and safeguard both inner and external peace, to theextent that the state has power to do that. And so the issue hereis as follows: nature irresistibly wills that right finally hassupreme power. What people neglect to do here will finally be


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accomplished on its own, although with a great deal ofinconvenience. If we bend a reed too much, it breaks, and theperson who wants to do too much, does nothing (Bouterwek).1

2. The idea of international law assumes the separation of manyneighbouring states independent of one another. Although insuch a situation a condition of war already inherently exists(unless a united federation of these states prevents an outbreakof hostilities), nonetheless, according to the idea of reason, thisis still better than the fusing together of these nations thanks toa power which has come to dominate the others and hastransformed itself into a universal monarchy, because, as the

extent of the governments control increases, the laws always keep losing some of their influence, and a soulless despotism,once it has rooted out the seed of good, finally sinks intoanarchy. However, every state (or its ruling power) desires toestablish a lasting condition of peace in this way, so that, ifpossible, it rules the entire world. But naturewills it otherwise.She uses two means to prevent nations from intermingling andto keep them separate: the differences in the languages and in

the religions, which bring with them a tendency to mutualhatred and pretexts for war.2But the developing culture and theway people gradually come closer to a greater agreement inprinciple lead to a common understanding about peace, which,unlike that despotism (the graveyard of freedom), is producedand secured not by a weakening of all forces, but by andbalancing of the most energetic competitive forces.

1[Translators note] Friedrich Bouterwek (1766-1828) was a German philosopher,critic, historian, and novelist.2[Kants note]Difference of religion! An odd expression, as if one were speaking aboutdifferent moralities. There can certainly be historically differentforms of belief, not inreligion but in the history of the ways used to promote religiona subject forscholarly investigation. In the same way there are different religious books (the

Zendavesta, Vedas, Koran, and so on), but there is only one religion, valid for allhuman beings and for all ages. These therefore can be considered nothing other thanthe mere vehicles of religionsomething accidentalwhich can vary according todifferences in time and place.


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3. Just as nature, on the one hand, judiciously separates nationswhich the will of each state, even according the principles ofinternational right, would be happy to combine into one by

duplicity or force, so, on the other hand, by using mutual self-interest, she also unites states which the idea of a cosmopolitanright would not have kept safe from violence and war. Sheachieves this with the spirit of commerce, which cannot co-existwith war and which sooner or later seizes every nation. Foramong all powerful means at the states disposal, the power of

gold may well be the most reliable. Hence, states findthemselves driven to promote noble peace (naturally what

motivates them to do this does not come from morality) and,wherever in the world war threatens to break out, to avert itthrough negotiation, just as if they were in a permanent alliancefor this purpose. Great coalitions formed for waging war can,according to the nature of things, happen only very rarely, andthey succeed even more rarely. In this way, through themechanisms in human inclinations, nature guarantees perpetualpeacenot, it is true, with sufficient certainty for us to prophesy

the future (theoretically), but still well enough from a practicalpoint of view. And this makes it a duty for human beings towork towards this goal (which is not merely illusory).

SECOND SUPPLEMENTA SECRET ARTICLE FOR PERPETUAL PEACE1

A secret article in transactions dealing with public right is, from an

objective point of view, that is, according to its meaning, acontradiction. But subjectively, when we judge it according to thequality of the person dictating it, the clause might well contain asecret which he could consider injurious to his dignity were itannounced publicly as originating from him.

1[Translators note]The Second Supplement was not in the original (1795) edition ofPerpetual Peace. It was added to the second edition of 1796.


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The single article of this kind is contained in the followingproposition: The maxims of the philosophers concerning theconditions which make a public peace possible shall be taken into

account by those states armed for war.However, it seems to be disparaging the legislative authority of astateto which we must naturally attribute the greatest wisdomto seek for instruction from subjects (the philosophers) about theprinciples of its relations with other nations, even though the stateis well advised to do so. Therefore, the state will invite them to dothat silently (while at the same time keeping the matter secret).This amounts to saying that the state will allow philosophers to

speak freely and openly about the general precepts for conductingwar and establishing peace (philosophers will do that anyway ontheir own, unless they are forbidden to do so). For states to come toan understanding with each other on this point does not requirethem to draw up a special international agreement promoting thisgoal, for it is already part of the obligation established by universalhuman reason (which imposes moral laws). However, this does notmean that the state must give the principles of the philosopher

precedence over the opinions of the jurist (who represents theauthority of the state), but only that people should listen to thephilosopher. The jurist, who has made the scales of right and theswordof justice his symbols, not only commonly uses that sword tokeep all foreign influences away from the scales, but also, when oneside of the balance will not move down, throws the sword into it(Vae victis [Woe to the conquered!]). The jurist who is not also amoral philosopher has the greatest temptation to do this because

his official position simply requires him to apply existing laws butnot to explore whether these need to be improved. Moreover,although his faculty is, in fact, a lower one, he considers it nobler,because it involves power (as is the case with the other twofaculties, medicine and theology). The faculty of philosophy standson a step very much lower than this combined power. Hence, thesaying goes, for example, that philosophy is the handmaiden oftheology (and the same has been said about her relationship to

medicine and law). However, we cannot clearly discern whethershe bears the torch before her gracious ladies or carries their train.

That kings become philosophers or philosophers become kings isnot something we should expect or even hope for, because holding


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power inevitably corrupts the free judgments of reason. However,kings or sovereign nations (who rule themselves according to lawsof equality) should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear

or to be silenced, but should let them speak publicly, because thiscasts light on the work they both do, something indispensible tothem. And given that the class of philosophers by its very nature isincapable of stirring up trouble and uniting into political factions, itcannot not be suspected of generatingpropaganda.1

APPENDIX I

CONCERNING THE DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN MORALITY ANDPOLITICS IN CONNECTION WITH PERPETUAL PEACE

Morality is inherently a practical activity [Praxis] in an objectivesense, for it is the embodiment of unconditionally commandinglaws, according to which we ought to act, and, once we haveconceded the authority of this idea of duty, it is clearly inconsistentto continue wishing to assert that nevertheless we cannot act inthat way, because then this idea of morality would collapse on its

own (ultra posse nemo obligatur [no one is obliged beyond what ispossible]). As a result, there can be no conflict between politics asthe practical doctrine of right and morality as a theoretical doctrineof right (hence, no conflict between theory and practice). For such adispute to arise, we would have to understand the word moralitytomean a general doctrine of shrewdness, that is, a theory of preceptsfor selecting the most suitable means for achieving those endswhich we have determined are to our advantageand that would

be to deny the very existence of morality.

Politics says Be as clever as serpents. Morality adds (as a limitingcondition), and as innocent as doves. If both precepts cannotstand together in a single command, then there is truly a dispute

1[Translators note]In this curious and interesting addition to the original text of hisessay, Kant is urging rulers to let philosophers speak openly about political matters

involving war and peace, so that the rulers can benefit from their advice, whilekeeping such assistance a secret, because openly accepting the advice of theirsubjects might be demeaning to the rulers. They can do this safely, he claims,because philosophers are politically ineffectual.


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between politics and morality. If, however, the two are in harmonythroughout, then the idea of opposition is absurd, and the questionabout how the conflict between them might be reconciled does not

even arise as a task to be addressed. Although the saying Honesty isthe best policy involves a theory which practice unfortunately veryoften contradicts, nonetheless, the equally theoretical sayingHonesty is better than all policy is infinitely higher than anyobjection one could make to it and is, indeed, the necessarycondition of policy. The god who marks out the boundaries ofmorality does not yield to Jupiter, the god determining theboundaries of force, for Jupiter still stands subject to fate. That is to

say, reason is not sufficiently enlightened to perceive the series ofpredetermining causes which would allow it to announce withcertainty the happy or unhappy results of everything human beingsdo in accordance with the mechanisms of nature (although it doesallow us to hope that these results will be what we want). However,reason is bright enough to illuminate for us everything we have todo in order to remain on the beaten path of duty (following therules of wisdom) and thus to pursue our final end.

Now, the practical man (for whom morality is merely theoretical,even as he concedes that what oughtto be done canbe done) baseshis dreary rejection of our good-natured hope essentially on thefollowing point: he pretends that he can predict, on the basis ofhuman nature, that people will never be willing to do what isrequired to bring about that goal which leads to perpetual peace. Ofcourse, the will of all individual human beings to live under a lawfulconstitution based on principles of freedom (the distributiveunity

of the will of all) is not enough to achieve this goal. Instead,everyonemust desire this condition together(the collectiveunity oftheir united wills). This solution to a difficult problem is stillrequired so that civil society may become a totality. Since, over andabove the differences among the particular wills of all theindividuals, one still needs to add a unifying cause in order to bringout a common will, something which no collection of individualwill is capable of doing, it follows that, for the implementation of

this idea in practice, no other beginning for a state of justice can berelied upon other than one created by force, on whose coercivepower public right will afterwards be based. This situation, then, inactual experience naturally leaves us right from the start expecting


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huge departures from the theoretical idea of right (since we canhardly assume that the lawgiver in this matter will, on the basis ofhis moral sentiments, simply leave it to the people to bring about a

legal constitution through their common will, once the unificationof a wild multitude into a nation has taken place).

What this means is that once someone has the power in his hands,he will not let the people determi

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