On Liberty Mill

8/3/2019 On Liberty Mill

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ON LIBERTY

by

John Stuart Mill

(1859)

CHAPTER II

OF THE LIBERTY OF THOUGHT AN ISCUSSION

THE time, it is to be hoped, is gone by when any defence would benecessary of the liberty of the press as one of the securities against

corrupt or tyrannical go!ernment" #o argument, we may suppose, cannow be needed, against permitting a legislature or an e$ecuti!e, not

identified in interest with the people, to prescribe opinions to them,

and determine what doctrines or what arguments they shall be allowedto hear" This aspect of the %uestion, besides, has been so often and so

triumphantly enforced by preceding writers, that it needs not bespecially insisted on in this place" Though the law of England, on the

sub&ect of the press, is as ser!ile to this day as it was in the time ofthe Tudors, there is little danger of its being actually put in force

against political discussion, e$cept during some temporary panic, when

fear of insurrection dri!es ministers and &udges from their propriety'1 and, spea*ing generally, it is not, in constitutional countries, to be

apprehended that the go!ernment, whether completely responsible tothe people or not, will often attempt to control the e$pression of

opinion, e$cept when in doing so it ma*es itself the organ of thegeneral intolerance of the public" +et us suppose, therefore, that thego!ernment is entirely at one with the people, and ne!er thin*s of

e$erting any power of coercion unless in agreement with what itconcei!es to be their !oice" ut - deny the right of the people to

e$ercise such coercion, either by themsel!es or by their go!ernment"

The power itself is illegitimate" The best go!ernment has no more titleto it than the worst" -t is as no$ious, or more no$ious, when e$erted in

accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it" -f allman*ind minus one, were of one opinion, and only one person were of

the contrary opinion, man*ind would be no more &ustified in silencingthat one person, than he, if he had the power, would be &ustified insilencing man*ind" .ere an opinion a personal possession of no !alue

e$cept to the owner' if to be obstructed in the en&oyment of it weresimply a pri!ate in&ury, it would ma*e some difference whether the

in&ury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many" ut the peculiare!il of silencing the e$pression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the

human race' posterity as well as the e$isting generation' those who


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dissent from the opinion, still more than those who hold it" -f theopinion is right, they are depri!ed of the opportunity of e$changing

error for truth/ if wrong, they lose, what is almost as great a benefit,the clearer perception and li!elier impression of truth, produced by its

collision with error"

-t is necessary to consider separately these two hypotheses, each ofwhich has a distinct branch of the argument corresponding to it" .e

can ne!er be sure that the opinion we are endea!ouring to stifle is a

false opinion' and if we were sure, stifling it would be an e!il still"

0irst/ the opinion which it is attempted to suppress by authority may

possibly be true" Those who desire to suppress it, of course deny itstruth' but they are not infallible" They ha!e no authority to decide the

%uestion for all man*ind, and e$clude e!ery other person from the

means of &udging" To refuse a hearing to an opinion, because they aresure that it is false, is to assume that their certainty is the same thing

as absolute certainty" ll silencing of discussion is an assumption ofinfallibility" -ts condemnation may be allowed to rest on this common

argument, not the worse for being common"

2nfortunately for the good sense of man*ind, the fact of their fallibilityis far from carrying the weight in their practical &udgment, which is

always allowed to it in theory' for while e!ery one well *nows himself

to be fallible, few thin* it necessary to ta*e any precautions againsttheir own fallibility, or admit the supposition that any opinion of which

they feel !ery certain, may be one of the e$amples of the error towhich they ac*nowledge themsel!es to be liable" bsolute princes, or

others who are accustomed to unlimited deference, usually feel this

complete confidence in their own opinions on nearly all sub&ects"3eople more happily situated, who sometimes hear their opinions

disputed, and are not wholly unused to be set right when they arewrong, place the same unbounded reliance only on such of their

opinions as are shared by all who surround them, or to whom theyhabitually defer/ for in proportion to a man4s want of confidence in his

own solitary &udgment, does he usually repose, with implicit trust, on

the infallibility of the world in general" nd the world, to eachindi!idual, means the part of it with which he comes in contact' his

party, his sect, his church, his class of society/ the man may be called,by comparison, almost liberal and largeminded to whom it means

anything so comprehensi!e as his own country or his own age" #or is

his faith in this collecti!e authority at all sha*en by his being awarethat other ages, countries, sects, churches, classes, and parties ha!e

thought, and e!en now thin*, the e$act re!erse" He de!ol!es upon his


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own world the responsibility of being in the right against thedissentient worlds of other people' and it ne!er troubles him that mere

accident has decided which of these numerous worlds is the ob&ect ofhis reliance, and that the same causes which ma*e him a 6hurchman

in +ondon, would ha!e made him a uddhist or a 6onfucian in 3e*in"

7et it is as e!ident in itself as any amount of argument can ma*e it,that ages are no more infallible than indi!iduals' e!ery age ha!ing held

many opinions which subse%uent ages ha!e deemed not only false butabsurd' and it is as certain that many opinions, now general, will be

re&ected by future ages, as it is that many, once general, are re&ected

by the present"

The ob&ection li*ely to be made to this argument, would probably ta*e

some such form as the following" There is no greater assumption ofinfallibility in forbidding the propagation of error, than in any other

thing which is done by public authority on its own &udgment and

responsibility" udgment is gi!en to men that they may use it" ecauseit may be used erroneously, are men to be told that they ought not to

use it at all To prohibit what they thin* pernicious, is not claiminge$emption from error, but fulfilling the duty incumbent on them,

although fallible, of acting on their conscientious con!iction" -f we were

ne!er to act on our opinions, because those opinions may be wrong,we should lea!e all our interests uncared for, and all our duties

unperformed" n ob&ection which applies to all conduct can be no !alidob&ection to any conduct in particular"

-t is the duty of go!ernments, and of indi!iduals, to form the truestopinions they can' to form them carefully, and ne!er impose themupon others unless they are %uite sure of being right" ut when they

are sure (such reasoners may say), it is not conscientiousness but

cowardice to shrin* from acting on their opinions, and allow doctrineswhich they honestly thin* dangerous to the welfare of man*ind, either

in this life or in another, to be scattered abroad without restraint,because other people, in less enlightened times, ha!e persecuted

opinions now belie!ed to be true" +et us ta*e care, it may be said, notto ma*e the same mista*e/ but go!ernments and nations ha!e made

mista*es in other things, which are not denied to be fit sub&ects for the

e$ercise of authority/ they ha!e laid on bad ta$es, made un&ust wars":ught we therefore to lay on no ta$es, and, under whate!er

pro!ocation, ma*e no wars ;en, and go!ernments, must act to thebest of their ability" There is no such thing as absolute certainty, but

there is assurance sufficient for the purposes of human life" .e may,

and must, assume our opinion to be true for the guidance of our ownconduct/ and it is assuming no more when we forbid bad men to


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per!ert society by the propagation of opinions which we regard asfalse and pernicious"

- answer, that it is assuming !ery much more" There is the greatest

difference between presuming an opinion to be true, because, with

e!ery opportunity for contesting it, it has not been refuted, andassuming its truth for the purpose of not permitting its refutation"6omplete liberty of contradicting and dispro!ing our opinion, is the

!ery condition which &ustifies us in assuming its truth for purposes of

action' and on no other terms can a being with human faculties ha!eany rational assurance of being right"

.hen we consider either the history of opinion, or the ordinaryconduct of human life, to what is it to be ascribed that the one and the

other are no worse than they are #ot certainly to the inherent force

of the human understanding' for, on any matter not selfe!ident, thereare ninetynine persons totally incapable of &udging of it, for one who

is capable' and the capacity of the hundredth person is onlycomparati!e' for the ma&ority of the eminent men of e!ery past

generation held many opinions now *nown to be erroneous, and did or

appro!ed numerous things which no one will now &ustify" .hy is it,then, that there is on the whole a preponderance among man*ind of

rational opinions and rational conduct -f there really is thispreponderancewhich there must be, unless human affairs are, and

ha!e always been, in an almost desperate stateit is owing to a

%uality of the human mind, the source of e!erything respectable in

man, either as an intellectual or as a moral being, namely, that hiserrors are corrigible" He is capable of rectifying his mista*es bydiscussion and e$perience" #ot by e$perience alone" There must be

discussion, to show how e$perience is to be interpreted" .rong

opinions and practices gradually yield to fact and argument/ but factsand arguments, to produce any effect on the mind, must be brought

before it"


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sub&ect, is by hearing what can be said about it by persons of e!ery!ariety of opinion, and studying all modes in which it can be loo*ed at

by e!ery character of mind" #o wise man e!er ac%uired his wisdom inany mode but this' nor is it in the nature of human intellect to become

wise in any other manner" The steady habit of correcting and

completing his own opinion by collating it with those of others, so farfrom causing doubt and hesitation in carrying it into practice, is the

only stable foundation for a &ust reliance on it/ for, being cogni=ant ofall that can, at least ob!iously, be said against him, and ha!ing ta*en

up his position against all gainsayers *nowing that he has sought for

ob&ections and difficulties, instead of a!oiding them, and has shut outno light which can be thrown upon the sub&ect from any %uarterhe

has a right to thin* his &udgment better than that of any person, orany multitude, who ha!e not gone through a similar process"

-t is not too much to re%uire that what the wisest of man*ind, those

who are best entitled to trust their own &udgment, find necessary towarrant their relying on it, should be submitted to by that

miscellaneous collection of a few wise and many foolish indi!iduals,called the public" The most intolerant of churches, the >oman 6atholic

6hurch, e!en at the canoni=ation of a saint, admits, and listens

patiently to, a de!il4s ad!ocate" The holiest of men, it appears,cannot be admitted to posthumous honors, until all that the de!il could

say against him is *nown and weighed" -f e!en the #ewtonianphilosophy were not permitted to be %uestioned, man*ind could not

feel as complete assurance of its truth as they now do" The beliefs

which we ha!e most warrant for, ha!e no safeguard to rest on, but astanding in!itation to the whole world to pro!e them unfounded" -f the

challenge is not accepted, or is accepted and the attempt fails, we arefar enough from certainty still' but we ha!e done the best that the

e$isting state of human reason admits of' we ha!e neglected nothing

that could gi!e the truth a chance of reaching us/ if the lists are *eptopen, we may hope that if there be a better truth, it will be found

when the human mind is capable of recei!ing it' and in the meantimewe may rely on ha!ing attained such approach to truth, as is possible

in our own day" This is the amount of certainty attainable by a fallible

being, and this the sole way of attaining it"

?trange it is, that men should admit the !alidity of the arguments for

free discussion, but ob&ect to their being pushed to an e$treme' notseeing that unless the reasons are good for an e$treme case, they are

not good for any case" ?trange that they should imagine that they are

not assuming infallibility when they ac*nowledge that there should befree discussion on all sub&ects which can possibly be doubtful, but


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thin* that some particular principle or doctrine should be forbidden tobe %uestioned because it is so certain, that is, because they are certain

that it is certain" To call any proposition certain, while there is any onewho would deny its certainty if permitted, but who is not permitted, is

to assume that we oursel!es, and those who agree with us, are the

&udges of certainty, and &udges without hearing the other side"

-n the present agewhich has been described as destitute of faith,

but terrified at scepticism,in which people feel sure, not so much

that their opinions are true, as that they should not *now what to dowithout themthe claims of an opinion to be protected from public

attac* are rested not so much on its truth, as on its importance tosociety" There are, it is alleged, certain beliefs, so useful, not to say

indispensable to wellbeing, that it is as much the duty of go!ernmentsto uphold those beliefs, as to protect any other of the interests of

society" -n a case of such necessity, and so directly in the line of their

duty, something less than infallibility may, it is maintained, warrant,and e!en bind, go!ernments, to act on their own opinion, confirmed by

the general opinion of man*ind" -t is also often argued, and stilloftener thought, that none but bad men would desire to wea*en these

salutary beliefs' and there can be nothing wrong, it is thought, in

restraining bad men, and prohibiting what only such men would wishto practise" This mode of thin*ing ma*es the &ustification of restraints

on discussion not a %uestion of the truth of doctrines, but of theirusefulness' and flatters itself by that means to escape the

responsibility of claiming to be an infallible &udge of opinions" ut

those who thus satisfy themsel!es, do not percei!e that theassumption of infallibility is merely shifted from one point to another"

The usefulness of an opinion is itself matter of opinion/ as disputable,as open to discussion and re%uiring discussion as much, as the opinion

itself" There is the same need of an infallible &udge of opinions to

decide an opinion to be no$ious, as to decide it to be false, unless theopinion condemned has full opportunity of defending itself" nd it will

not do to say that the heretic may be allowed to maintain the utility orharmlessness of his opinion, though forbidden to maintain its truth"

The truth of an opinion is part of its utility" -f we would *now whether

or not it is desirable that a proposition should be belie!ed, is it possibleto e$clude the consideration of whether or not it is true -n the

opinion, not of bad men, but of the best men, no belief which iscontrary to truth can be really useful/ and can you pre!ent such men

from urging that plea, when they are charged with culpability fordenying some doctrine which they are told is useful, but which they

belie!e to be false Those who are on the side of recei!ed opinions,

ne!er fail to ta*e all possible ad!antage of this plea' you do not find


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them handling the %uestion of utility as if it could be completelyabstracted from that of truth/ on the contrary, it is, abo!e all, because

their doctrine is the truth, that the *nowledge or the belief of it isheld to be so indispensable" There can be no fair discussion of the

%uestion of usefulness, when an argument so !ital may be employed

on one side, but not on the other" nd in point of fact, when law orpublic feeling do not permit the truth of an opinion to be disputed,

they are &ust as little tolerant of a denial of its usefulness" The utmostthey allow is an e$tenuation of its absolute necessity or of the positi!e

guilt of re&ecting it"

-n order more fully to illustrate the mischief of denying a hearing toopinions because we, in our own &udgment, ha!e condemned them, it

will be desirable to fi$ down the discussion to a concrete case' and -choose, by preference, the cases which are least fa!ourable to mein

which the argument against freedom of opinion, both on the score of

truth and on that of utility, is considered the strongest" +et theopinions impugned be the belief in a @od and in a future state, or any

of the commonly recei!ed doctrines of morality" To fight the battle onsuch ground, gi!es a great ad!antage to an unfair antagonist' since he

will be sure to say (and many who ha!e no desire to be unfair will say

it internally), re these the doctrines which you do not deemsufficiently certain to be ta*en under the protection of law -s the

belief in a @od one of the opinions, to feel sure of which, you hold tobe assuming infallibility ut - must be permitted to obser!e, that it is

not the feeling sure of a doctrine (be it what it may) which - call an

assumption of infallibility" -t is the underta*ing to decide that %uestionfor others, without allowing them to hear what can be said on the

contrary side" nd - denounce and reprobate this pretension not theless, if put forth on the side of my most solemn con!ictions" Howe!er

positi!e any one4s persuasion may be, not only of the falsity, but of the

pernicious conse%uencesnot only of the pernicious conse%uences, but(to adopt e$pressions which - altogether condemn) the immorality and

impiety of an opinion' yet if, in pursuance of that pri!ate &udgment,though bac*ed by the public &udgment of his country or his

contemporaries, he pre!ents the opinion from being heard in its

defence, he assumes infallibility" nd so far from the assumption beingless ob&ectionable or less dangerous because the opinion is called

immoral or impious, this is the case of all others in which it is mostfatal" These are e$actly the occasions on which the men of one

generation commit those dreadful mista*es which e$cite theastonishment and horror of posterity" -t is among such that we find

the instances memorable in history, when the arm of the law has been

employed to root out the best men and the noblest doctrines' with


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deplorable success as to the men, though some of the doctrines ha!esur!i!ed to be (as if in moc*ery) in!o*ed, in defence of similar conduct

towards those who dissent from them, or from their recei!edinterpretation"

;an*ind can hardly be too often reminded, that there was once a mannamed ?ocrates, between whom and the legal authorities and publicopinion of his time, there too* place a memorable collision" orn in an

age and country abounding in indi!idual greatness, this man has been

handed down to us by those who best *new both him and the age, asthe most !irtuous man in it' while we *now him as the head and

prototype of all subse%uent teachers of !irtue, the source e%ually ofthe lofty inspiration of 3lato and the &udicious utilitarianism of ristotle,

i maestri di color che sanno, the two headsprings of ethical as of allother philosophy" This ac*nowledged master of all the eminent

thin*ers who ha!e since li!edwhose fame, still growing after more

than two thousand years, all but outweighs the whole remainder of thenames which ma*e his nati!e city illustriouswas put to death by his

countrymen, after a &udicial con!iction, for impiety and immorality"-mpiety, in denying the gods recogni=ed by the ?tate' indeed his

accuser asserted (see the pologia) that he belie!ed in no gods at

all" -mmorality, in being, by his doctrines and instructions, a corrupterof youth" :f these charges the tribunal, there is e!ery ground for

belie!ing, honestly found him guilty, and condemned the man whoprobably of all then born had deser!ed best of man*ind, to be put to

death as a criminal"

To pass from this to the only other instance of &udicial ini%uity, themention of which, after the condemnation of ?ocrates, would not be an

anticlima$/ the e!ent which too* place on 6al!ary rather more than

eighteen hundred years ago" The man who left on the memory ofthose who witnessed his life and con!ersation, such an impression of

his moral grandeur, that eighteen subse%uent centuries ha!e donehomage to him as the lmighty in person, was ignominiously put to

death, as what s a blasphemer" ;en did not merely mista*e theirbenefactor' they mistoo* him for the e$act contrary of what he was,

and treated him as that prodigy of impiety, which they themsel!es are

now held to be, for their treatment of him" The feelings with whichman*ind now regard these lamentable transactions, especially the

latter of the two, render them e$tremely un&ust in their &udgment ofthe unhappy actors" These were, to all appearance, not bad mennot

worse than men most commonly are, but rather the contrary' men

who possessed in a full, or somewhat more than a full measure, thereligious, moral, and patriotic feelings of their time and people/ the


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!ery *ind of men who, in all times, our own included, ha!e e!erychance of passing through life blameless and respected" The high

priest who rent his garments when the words were pronounced, which,according to all the ideas of his country, constituted the blac*est guilt,

was in all probability %uite as sincere in his horror and indignation, as

the generality of respectable and pious men now are in the religiousand moral sentiments they profess' and most of those who now

shudder at his conduct, if they had li!ed in his time and been bornews, would ha!e acted precisely as he did" :rthodo$ 6hristians who

are tempted to thin* that those who stoned to death the first martyrs

must ha!e been worse men than they themsel!es are, ought toremember that one of those persecutors was ?aint 3aul"

+et us add one more e$ample, the most stri*ing of all, if theimpressi!eness of an error is measured by the wisdom and !irtue of

him who falls into it" -f e!er any one, possessed of power, had grounds

for thin*ing himself the best and most enlightened among hiscontemporaries, it was the Emperor ;arcus urelius" bsolute

monarch of the whole ci!ili=ed world, he preser!ed through life notonly the most unblemished &ustice, but what was less to be e$pected

from his ?toical breeding, the tenderest heart" The few failings which

are attributed to him, were all on the side of indulgence/ while hiswritings, the highest ethical product of the ancient mind, differ

scarcely perceptibly, if they differ at all, from the most characteristicteachings of 6hrist" This man, a better 6hristian in all but the dogmatic

sense of the word, than almost any of the ostensibly 6hristian

so!ereigns who ha!e since reigned, persecuted 6hristianity" 3laced atthe summit of all the pre!ious attainments of humanity, with an open,

unfettered intellect, and a character which led him of himself toembody in his moral writings the 6hristian ideal, he yet failed to see

that 6hristianity was to be a good and not an e!il to the world, with his

duties to which he was so deeply penetrated" E$isting society he *newto be in a deplorable state" ut such as it was, he saw or thought he

saw, that it was held together and pre!ented from being worse, bybelief and re!erence of the recei!ed di!inities" s a ruler of man*ind,

he deemed it his duty not to suffer society to fall in pieces' and saw

not how, if its e$isting ties were remo!ed, any others could be formedwhich could again *nit it together" The new religion openly aimed at

dissol!ing these ties/ unless, therefore, it was his duty to adopt thatreligion, it seemed to be his duty to put it down" -nasmuch then as the

theology of 6hristianity did not appear to him true or of di!ine origin'inasmuch as this strange history of a crucified @od was not credible to

him, and a system which purported to rest entirely upon a foundation

to him so wholly unbelie!able, could not be foreseen by him to be that


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reno!ating agency which, after all abatements, it has in fact pro!ed tobe' the gentlest and most amiable of philosophers and rulers, under a

solemn sense of duty, authori=ed the persecution of 6hristianity" Tomy mind this is one of the most tragical facts in all history" -t is a

bitter thought, how different a thing the 6hristianity of the world might

ha!e been, if the 6hristian faith had been adopted as the religion ofthe empire under the auspices of ;arcus urelius instead of those of

6onstantine" ut it would be e%ually un&ust to him and false to truth,to deny, that no one plea which can be urged for punishing anti

6hristian teaching, was wanting to ;arcus urelius for punishing, as

he did, the propagation of 6hristianity" #o 6hristian more firmlybelie!es that theism is false, and tends to the dissolution of society,

than ;arcus urelius belie!ed the same things of 6hristianity' he who,of all men then li!ing, might ha!e been thought the most capable of

appreciating it" 2nless any one who appro!es of punishment for the

promulgation of opinions, flatters himself that he is a wiser and betterman than ;arcus ureliusmore deeply !ersed in the wisdom of his

time, more ele!ated in his intellect abo!e itmore earnest in hissearch for truth, or more singleminded in his de!otion to it when

found'let him abstain from that assumption of the &oint infallibility ofhimself and the multitude, which the great ntoninus made with so

unfortunate a result"

ware of the impossibility of defending the use of punishment forrestraining irreligious opinions, by any argument which will not &ustify

;arcus ntoninus, the enemies of religious freedom, when hard

pressed, occasionally accept this conse%uence, and say, with Ar"ohnson, that the persecutors of 6hristianity were in the right' that

persecution is an ordeal through which truth ought to pass, and alwayspasses successfully, legal penalties being, in the end, powerless

against truth, though sometimes beneficially effecti!e against

mischie!ous errors" This is a form of the argument for religiousintolerance, sufficiently remar*able not to be passed without notice"

theory which maintains that truth may &ustifiably be persecutedbecause persecution cannot possibly do it any harm, cannot be

charged with being intentionally hostile to the reception of new truths'

but we cannot commend the generosity of its dealing with the personsto whom man*ind are indebted for them" To disco!er to the world

something which deeply concerns it, and of which it was pre!iouslyignorant' to pro!e to it that it had been mista*en on some !ital point

of temporal or spiritual interest, is as important a ser!ice as a human

being can render to his fellowcreatures, and in certain cases, as inthose of the early 6hristians and of the >eformers, those who thin*


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with Ar" ohnson belie!e it to ha!e been the most precious gift whichcould be bestowed on man*ind" That the authors of such splendid

benefits should be re%uited by martyrdom' that their reward should beto be dealt with as the !ilest of criminals, is not, upon this theory, a

deplorable error and misfortune, for which humanity should mourn in

sac*cloth and ashes, but the normal and &ustifiable state of things" Thepropounder of a new truth, according to this doctrine, should stand, as

stood, in the legislation of the +ocrians, the proposer of a new law,with a halter round his nec*, to be instantly tightened if the public

assembly did not, on hearing his reasons, then and there adopt his

proposition" 3eople who defend this mode of treating benefactors, cannot be supposed to set much !alue on the benefit' and - belie!e this

!iew of the sub&ect is mostly confined to the sort of persons who thin*that new truths may ha!e been desirable once, but that we ha!e had

enough of them now"

ut, indeed, the dictum that truth always triumphs o!er persecution, isone of those pleasant falsehoods which men repeat after one another

till they pass into commonplaces, but which all e$perience refutes"History teems with instances of truth put down by persecution" -f not

suppressed fore!er, it may be thrown bac* for centuries" To spea*

only of religious opinions/ the >eformation bro*e out at least twentytimes before +uther, and was put down" rnold of rescia was put

down" 0ra Aolcino was put down" ?a!onarola was put down" Thelbigeois were put down" The


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of its reappearances falls on a time when from fa!ourablecircumstances it escapes persecution until it has made such head as to

withstand all subse%uent attempts to suppress it"

-t will be said, that we do not now put to death the introducers of new

opinions/ we are not li*e our fathers who slew the prophets, we e!enbuild sepulchres to them" -t is true we no longer put heretics to death'and the amount of penal infliction which modern feeling would

probably tolerate, e!en against the most obno$ious opinions, is not

sufficient to e$tirpate them" ut let us not flatter oursel!es that we areyet free from the stain e!en of legal persecution" 3enalties for opinion,

or at least for its e$pression, still e$ist by law' and their enforcementis not, e!en in these times, so une$ampled as to ma*e it at all

incredible that they may some day be re!i!ed in full force" -n the year185C, at the summer assi=es of the county of 6ornwall, an unfortunate

man,D said to be of une$ceptionable conduct in all relations of life,

was sentenced to twentyone months imprisonment, for uttering, andwriting on a gate, some offensi!e words concerning 6hristianity" .ithin

a month of the same time, at the :ld ailey, two persons, on twoseparate occasions, were re&ected as &urymen, and one of them

grossly insulted by the &udge and one of the counsel, because they

honestly declared that they had no theological belief' and a third, aforeigner,F for the same reason, was denied &ustice against a thief"

This refusal of redress too* place in !irtue of the legal doctrine, that noperson can be allowed to gi!e e!idence in a court of &ustice, who does

not profess belief in a @od (any god is sufficient) and in a future state'

which is e%ui!alent to declaring such persons to be outlaws, e$cludedfrom the protection of the tribunals' who may not only be robbed or

assaulted with impunity, if no one but themsel!es, or persons ofsimilar opinions, be present, but any one else may be robbed or

assaulted with impunity, if the proof of the fact depends on their

e!idence" The assumption on which this is grounded, is that the oath isworthless, of a person who does not belie!e in a future state' a

proposition which beto*ens much ignorance of history in those whoassent to it (since it is historically true that a large proportion of

infidels in all ages ha!e been persons of distinguished integrity and

honor)' and would be maintained by no one who had the smallestconception how many of the persons in greatest repute with the world,

both for !irtues and for attainments, are well *nown, at least to theirintimates, to be unbelie!ers" The rule, besides, is suicidal, and cuts

away its own foundation" 2nder pretence that atheists must be liars, itadmits the testimony of all atheists who are willing to lie, and re&ects

only those who bra!e the oblo%uy of publicly confessing a detested

creed rather than affirm a falsehood" rule thus selfcon!icted of


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absurdity so far as regards its professed purpose, can be *ept in forceonly as a badge of hatred, a relic of persecution' a persecution, too,

ha!ing the peculiarity that the %ualification for undergoing it is thebeing clearly pro!ed not to deser!e it" The rule, and the theory it

implies, are hardly less insulting to belie!ers than to infidels" 0or if he

who does not belie!e in a future state necessarily lies, it follows thatthey who do belie!e are only pre!ented from lying, if pre!ented they

are, by the fear of hell" .e will not do the authors and abettors of therule the in&ury of supposing, that the conception which they ha!e

formed of 6hristian !irtue is drawn from their own consciousness"

These, indeed, are but rags and remnants of persecution, and may bethought to be not so much an indication of the wish to persecute, as

an e$ample of that !ery fre%uent infirmity of English minds, whichma*es them ta*e a preposterous pleasure in the assertion of a bad

principle, when they are no longer bad enough to desire to carry it

really into practice" ut unhappily there is no security in the state ofthe public mind, that the suspension of worse forms of legal

persecution, which has lasted for about the space of a generation, willcontinue" -n this age the %uiet surface of routine is as often ruffled by

attempts to resuscitate past e!ils, as to introduce new benefits" .hat

is boasted of at the present time as the re!i!al of religion, is always, innarrow and unculti!ated minds, at least as much the re!i!al of bigotry'

and where there is the strongest permanent lea!en of intolerance inthe feelings of a people, which at all times abides in the middle classes

of this country, it needs but little to pro!o*e them into acti!ely

persecuting those whom they ha!e ne!er ceased to thin* properob&ects of persecution"5 0or it is thisit is the opinions men

entertain, and the feelings they cherish, respecting those who disownthe beliefs they deem important, which ma*es this country not a place

of mental freedom" 0or a long time past, the chief mischief of the legal

penalties is that they strengthen the social stigma" -t is that stigmawhich is really effecti!e, and so effecti!e is it, that the profession of

opinions which are under the ban of society is much less common inEngland, than is, in many other countries, the a!owal of those which

incur ris* of &udicial punishment" -n respect to all persons but those

whose pecuniary circumstances ma*e them independent of the goodwill of other people, opinion, on this sub&ect, is as efficacious as law'

men might as well be imprisoned, as e$cluded from the means ofearning their bread" Those whose bread is already secured, and who

desire no fa!ors from men in power, or from bodies of men, or fromthe public, ha!e nothing to fear from the open a!owal of any opinions,

but to be illthought of and illspo*en of, and this it ought not to

re%uire a !ery heroic mould to enable them to bear" There is no room


14/34

for any appeal ad misericordiam in behalf of such persons" ut thoughwe do not now inflict so much e!il on those who thin* differently from

us, as it was formerly our custom to do, it may be that we dooursel!es as much e!il as e!er by our treatment of them" ?ocrates

was put to death, but the ?ocratic philosophy rose li*e the sun in

hea!en, and spread its illumination o!er the whole intellectualfirmament" 6hristians were cast to the lions, but the 6hristian 6hurch

grew up a stately and spreading tree, o!ertopping the older and less!igorous growths, and stifling them by its shade" :ur merely social

intolerance, *ills no one, roots out no opinions, but induces men to

disguise them, or to abstain from any acti!e effort for their diffusion".ith us, heretical opinions do not perceptibly gain or e!en lose,

ground in each decade or generation' they ne!er bla=e out far andwide, but continue to smoulder in the narrow circles of thin*ing and

studious persons among whom they originate, without e!er lighting up

the general affairs of man*ind with either a true or a decepti!e light"nd thus is *ept up a state of things !ery satisfactory to some minds,

because, without the unpleasant process of fining or imprisoninganybody, it maintains all pre!ailing opinions outwardly undisturbed,

while it does not absolutely interdict the e$ercise of reason bydissentients afflicted with the malady of thought" con!enient plan for

ha!ing peace in the intellectual world, and *eeping all things going on

therein !ery much as they do already" ut the price paid for this sortof intellectual pacification, is the sacrifice of the entire moral courage

of the human mind" state of things in which a large portion of themost acti!e and in%uiring intellects find it ad!isable to *eep the

genuine principles and grounds of their con!ictions within their ownbreasts, and attempt, in what they address to the public, to fit asmuch as they can of their own conclusions to premises which they

ha!e internally renounced, cannot send forth the open, fearlesscharacters, and logical, consistent intellects who once adorned the

thin*ing world" The sort of men who can be loo*ed for under it, are

either mere conformers to commonplace, or timeser!ers for truthwhose arguments on all great sub&ects are meant for their hearers,

and are not those which ha!e con!inced themsel!es" Those who a!oidthis alternati!e, do so by narrowing their thoughts and interests to

things which can be spo*en of without !enturing within the region ofprinciples, that is, to small practical matters, which would come rightof themsel!es, if but the minds of man*ind were strengthened and

enlarged, and which will ne!er be made effectually right until then'while that which would strengthen and enlarge men4s minds, free and

daring speculation on the highest sub&ects, is abandoned"


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Those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no e!il,should consider in the first place, that in conse%uence of it there is

ne!er any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions' and thatsuch of them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may

be pre!ented from spreading, do not disappear" ut it is not the minds

of heretics that are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all in%uirywhich does not end in the orthodo$ conclusions" The greatest harm

done is to those who are not heretics, and whose whole mentalde!elopment is cramped, and their reason cowed, by the fear of

heresy" .ho can compute what the world loses in the multitude of

promising intellects combined with timid characters, who dare notfollow out any bold, !igorous, independent train of thought, lest it

should land them in something which would admit of being consideredirreligious or immoral mong them we may occasionally see some

man of deep conscientiousness, and subtile and refined understanding,

who spends a life in sophisticating with an intellect which he cannotsilence, and e$hausts the resources of ingenuity in attempting to

reconcile the promptings of his conscience and reason with orthodo$y,which yet he does not, perhaps, to the end succeed in doing" #o one

can be a great thin*er who does not recogni=e, that as a thin*er it ishis first duty to follow his intellect to whate!er conclusions it may lead"

Truth gains more e!en by the errors of one who, with due study and

preparation, thin*s for himself, than by the true opinions of those whoonly hold them because they do not suffer themsel!es to thin*" #ot

that it is solely, or chiefly, to form great thin*ers, that freedom ofthin*ing is re%uired" :n the contrary, it is as much, and e!en more

indispensable, to enable a!erage human beings to attain the mentalstature which they are capable of" There ha!e been, and may againbe, great indi!idual thin*ers, in a general atmosphere of mental

sla!ery" ut there ne!er has been, nor e!er will be, in thatatmosphere, an intellectually acti!e people" .here any people has

made a temporary approach to such a character, it has been because

the dread of heterodo$ speculation was for a time suspended" .herethere is a tacit con!ention that principles are not to be disputed' where

the discussion of the greatest %uestions which can occupy humanity isconsidered to be closed, we cannot hope to find that generally high

scale of mental acti!ity which has made some periods of history soremar*able" #e!er when contro!ersy a!oided the sub&ects which arelarge and important enough to *indle enthusiasm, was the mind of a

people stirred up from its foundations, and the impulse gi!en whichraised e!en persons of the most ordinary intellect to something of the

dignity of thin*ing beings" :f such we ha!e had an e$ample in thecondition of Europe during the times immediately following the

>eformation' another, though limited to the 6ontinent and to a more


16/34

culti!ated class, in the speculati!e mo!ement of the latter half of theeighteenth century' and a third, of still briefer duration, in the

intellectual fermentation of @ermany during the @oethian and 0ichteanperiod" These periods differed widely in the particular opinions which

they de!eloped' but were ali*e in this, that during all three the yo*e of

authority was bro*en" -n each, an old mental despotism had beenthrown off, and no new one had yet ta*en its place" The impulse gi!en

at these three periods has made Europe what it now is" E!ery singleimpro!ement which has ta*en place either in the human mind or in

institutions, may be traced distinctly to one or other of them"

ppearances ha!e for some time indicated that all three impulses arewellnigh spent' and we can e$pect no fresh start, until we again

assert our mental freedom"

+et us now pass to the second di!ision of the argument, and

dismissing the ?upposition that any of the recei!ed opinions may be

false, let us assume them to be true, and e$amine into the worth ofthe manner in which they are li*ely to be held, when their truth is not

freely and openly can!assed" Howe!er unwillingly a person who has astrong opinion may admit the possibility that his opinion may be false,

he ought to be mo!ed by the consideration that howe!er true it may

be, if it is not fully, fre%uently, and fearlessly discussed, it will be heldas a dead dogma, not a li!ing truth"

There is a class of persons (happily not %uite so numerous as formerly)

who thin* it enough if a person assents undoubtingly to what they

thin* true, though he has no *nowledge whate!er of the grounds ofthe opinion, and could not ma*e a tenable defence of it against themost superficial ob&ections" ?uch persons, if they can once get their

creed taught from authority, naturally thin* that no good, and some

harm, comes of its being allowed to be %uestioned" .here theirinfluence pre!ails, they ma*e it nearly impossible for the recei!ed

opinion to be re&ected wisely and considerately, though it may still bere&ected rashly and ignorantly' for to shut out discussion entirely is

seldom possible, and when it once gets in, beliefs not grounded oncon!iction are apt to gi!e way before the slightest semblance of an

argument" .ai!ing, howe!er, this possibilityassuming that the true

opinion abides in the mind, but abides as a pre&udice, a beliefindependent of, and proof against, argumentthis is not the way in

which truth ought to be held by a rational being" This is not *nowingthe truth" Truth, thus held, is but one superstition the more,

accidentally clinging to the words which enunciate a truth"


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-f the intellect and &udgment of man*ind ought to be culti!ated, athing which 3rotestants at least do not deny, on what can these

faculties be more appropriately e$ercised by any one, than on thethings which concern him so much that it is considered necessary for

him to hold opinions on them -f the culti!ation of the understanding

consists in one thing more than in another, it is surely in learning thegrounds of one4s own opinions" .hate!er people belie!e, on sub&ects

on which it is of the first importance to belie!e rightly, they ought tobe able to defend against at least the common ob&ections" ut, some

one may say, +et them be taught the grounds of their opinions" -t

does not follow that opinions must be merely parroted because theyare ne!er heard contro!erted" 3ersons who learn geometry do not

simply commit the theorems to memory, but understand and learnli*ewise the demonstrations' and it would be absurd to say that they

remain ignorant of the grounds of geometrical truths, because they

ne!er hear any one deny, and attempt to dispro!e them"2ndoubtedly/ and such teaching suffices on a sub&ect li*e

mathematics, where there is nothing at all to be said on the wrongside of the %uestion" The peculiarity of the e!idence of mathematical

truths is, that all the argument is on one side" There are no ob&ections,and no answers to ob&ections" ut on e!ery sub&ect on which

difference of opinion is possible, the truth depends on a balance to be

struc* between two sets of conflicting reasons" E!en in naturalphilosophy, there is always some other e$planation possible of the

same facts' some geocentric theory instead of heliocentric, somephlogiston instead of o$ygen' and it has to be shown why that other

theory cannot be the true one/ and until this is shown and until we*now how it is shown, we do not understand the grounds of ouropinion" ut when we turn to sub&ects infinitely more complicated, to

morals, religion, politics, social relations, and the business of life,threefourths of the arguments for e!ery disputed opinion consist in

dispelling the appearances which fa!or some opinion different from it"

The greatest orator, sa!e one, of anti%uity, has left it on record that healways studied his ad!ersary4s case with as great, if not with still

greater, intensity than e!en his own" .hat 6icero practised as themeans of forensic success, re%uires to be imitated by all who study

any sub&ect in order to arri!e at the truth" He who *nows only his ownside of the case, *nows little of that" His reasons may be good, and noone may ha!e been able to refute them" ut if he is e%ually unable to

refute the reasons on the opposite side' if he does not so much as*now what they are, he has no ground for preferring either opinion"

The rational position for him would be suspension of &udgment, andunless he contents himself with that, he is either led by authority, or

adopts, li*e the generality of the world, the side to which he feels most


18/34

inclination" #or is it enough that he should hear the arguments ofad!ersaries from his own teachers, presented as they state them, and

accompanied by what they offer as refutations" This is not the way todo &ustice to the arguments, or bring them into real contact with his

own mind" He must be able to hear them from persons who actually

belie!e them' who defend them in earnest, and do their !ery utmostfor them" He must *now them in their most plausible and persuasi!e

form' he must feel the whole force of the difficulty which the true !iewof the sub&ect has to encounter and dispose of, else he will ne!er really

possess himself of the portion of truth which meets and remo!es that

difficulty" #inetynine in a hundred of what are called educated menare in this condition, e!en of those who can argue fluently for their

opinions" Their conclusion may be true, but it might be false foranything they *now/ they ha!e ne!er thrown themsel!es into the

mental position of those who thin* differently from them, and

considered what such persons may ha!e to say' and conse%uentlythey do not, in any proper sense of the word, *now the doctrine which

they themsel!es profess" They do not *now those parts of it whiche$plain and &ustify the remainder' the considerations which show that

a fact which seemingly conflicts with another is reconcilable with it, orthat, of two apparently strong reasons, one and not the other ought to

be preferred" ll that part of the truth which turns the scale, and

decides the &udgment of a completely informed mind, they arestrangers to' nor is it e!er really *nown, but to those who ha!e

attended e%ually and impartially to both sides, and endea!ored to seethe reasons of both in the strongest light" ?o essential is this discipline

to a real understanding of moral and human sub&ects, that ifopponents of all important truths do not e$ist, it is indispensable toimagine them and supply them with the strongest arguments which

the most s*ilful de!il4s ad!ocate can con&ure up"

To abate the force of these considerations, an enemy of free discussionmay be supposed to say, that there is no necessity for man*ind in

general to *now and understand all that can be said against or fortheir opinions by philosophers and theologians" That it is not needful

for common men to be able to e$pose all the misstatements or

fallacies of an ingenious opponent" That it is enough if there is alwayssomebody capable of answering them, so that nothing li*ely to mislead

uninstructed persons remains unrefuted" That simple minds, ha!ingbeen taught the ob!ious grounds of the truths inculcated on them,

may trust to authority for the rest, and being aware that they ha!eneither *nowledge nor talent to resol!e e!ery difficulty which can be

raised, may repose in the assurance that all those which ha!e been


19/34

raised ha!e been or can be answered, by those who are speciallytrained to the tas*"

6onceding to this !iew of the sub&ect the utmost that can be claimed

for it by those most easily satisfied with the amount of understanding

of truth which ought to accompany the belief of it' e!en so, theargument for free discussion is no way wea*ened" 0or e!en thisdoctrine ac*nowledges that man*ind ought to ha!e a rational

assurance that all ob&ections ha!e been satisfactorily answered' and

how are they to be answered if that which re%uires to be answered isnot spo*en or how can the answer be *nown to be satisfactory, if the

ob&ectors ha!e no opportunity of showing that it is unsatisfactory -fnot the public, at least the philosophers and theologians who are to

resol!e the difficulties, must ma*e themsel!es familiar with thosedifficulties in their most pu==ling form' and this cannot be

accomplished unless they are freely stated, and placed in the most

ad!antageous light which they admit of" The 6atholic 6hurch has itsown way of dealing with this embarrassing problem" -t ma*es a broad

separation between those who can be permitted to recei!e itsdoctrines on con!iction, and those who must accept them on trust"

#either, indeed, are allowed any choice as to what they will accept'

but the clergy, such at least as can be fully confided in, mayadmissibly and meritoriously ma*e themsel!es ac%uainted with the

arguments of opponents, in order to answer them, and may, therefore,read heretical boo*s' the laity, not unless by special permission, hard

to be obtained" This discipline recogni=es a *nowledge of the enemy4s

case as beneficial to the teachers, but finds means, consistent withthis, of denying it to the rest of the world/ thus gi!ing to the elite more

mental culture, though not more mental freedom, than it allows to themass" y this de!ice it succeeds in obtaining the *ind of mental

superiority which its purposes re%uire' for though culture without

freedom ne!er made a large and liberal mind, it can ma*e a cle!er nisi

priusad!ocate of a cause" ut in countries professing 3rotestantism,

this resource is denied' since 3rotestants hold, at least in theory, thatthe responsibility for the choice of a religion must be borne by each for

himself, and cannot be thrown off upon teachers" esides, in the

present state of the world, it is practically impossible that writingswhich are read by the instructed can be *ept from the uninstructed" -f

the teachers of man*ind are to be cogni=ant of all that they ought to*now, e!erything must be free to be written and published without

restraint"

-f, howe!er, the mischie!ous operation of the absence of freediscussion, when the recei!ed opinions are true, were confined to


20/34

lea!ing men ignorant of the grounds of those opinions, it might bethought that this, if an intellectual, is no moral e!il, and does not

affect the worth of the opinions, regarded in their influence on thecharacter" The fact, howe!er, is, that not only the grounds of the

opinion are forgotten in the absence of discussion, but too often the

meaning of the opinion itself" The words which con!ey it, cease tosuggest ideas, or suggest only a small portion of those they were

originally employed to communicate" -nstead of a !i!id conception anda li!ing belief, there remain only a few phrases retained by rote' or, if

any part, the shell and hus* only of the meaning is retained, the finer

essence being lost" The great chapter in human history which this factoccupies and fills, cannot be too earnestly studied and meditated on"

-t is illustrated in the e$perience of almost all ethical doctrines andreligious creeds" They are all full of meaning and !itality to those who

originate them, and to the direct disciples of the originators" Their

meaning continues to be felt in undiminished strength, and is perhapsbrought out into e!en fuller consciousness, so long as the struggle

lasts to gi!e the doctrine or creed an ascendency o!er other creeds" tlast it either pre!ails, and becomes the general opinion, or its progress

stops' it *eeps possession of the ground it has gained, but ceases to

spread further" .hen either of these results has become apparent,contro!ersy on the sub&ect flags, and gradually dies away" The

doctrine has ta*en its place, if not as a recei!ed opinion, as one of theadmitted sects or di!isions of opinion/ those who hold it ha!e generally

inherited, not adopted it' and con!ersion from one of these doctrines

to another, being now an e$ceptional fact, occupies little place in thethoughts of their professors" -nstead of being, as at first, constantly on

the alert either to defend themsel!es against the world, or to bring theworld o!er to them, they ha!e subsided into ac%uiescence, and neither

listen, when they can help it, to arguments against their creed, nor

trouble dissentients (if there be such) with arguments in its fa!or"0rom this time may usually be dated the decline in the li!ing power of

the doctrine" .e often hear the teachers of all creeds lamenting thedifficulty of *eeping up in the minds of belie!ers a li!ely apprehension

of the truth which they nominally recogni=e, so that it may penetrate

the feelings, and ac%uire a real mastery o!er the conduct" #o suchdifficulty is complained of while the creed is still fighting for its

e$istence/ e!en the wea*er combatants then *now and feel what theyare fighting for, and the difference between it and other doctrines' and

in that period of e!ery creed4s e$istence, not a few persons may befound, who ha!e reali=ed its fundamental principles in all the forms of

thought, ha!e weighed and considered them in all their important

bearings, and ha!e e$perienced the full effect on the character, which


21/34

belief in that creed ought to produce in a mind thoroughly imbued withit" ut when it has come to be an hereditary creed, and to be recei!ed

passi!ely, not acti!elywhen the mind is no longer compelled, in thesame degree as at first, to e$ercise its !ital powers on the %uestions

which its belief presents to it, there is a progressi!e tendency to forget

all of the belief e$cept the formularies, or to gi!e it a dull and torpidassent, as if accepting it on trust dispensed with the necessity of

reali=ing it in consciousness, or testing it by personal e$perience' untilit almost ceases to connect itself at all with the inner life of the human

being" Then are seen the cases, so fre%uent in this age of the world as

almost to form the ma&ority, in which the creed remains as it wereoutside the mind, encrusting and petrifying it against all other

influences addressed to the higher parts of our nature' manifesting itspower by not suffering any fresh and li!ing con!iction to get in, but

itself doing nothing for the mind or heart, e$cept standing sentinel

o!er them to *eep them !acant"

To what an e$tent doctrines intrinsically fitted to ma*e the deepest

impression upon the mind may remain in it as dead beliefs, withoutbeing e!er reali=ed in the imagination, the feelings, or the

understanding, is e$emplified by the manner in which the ma&ority of

belie!ers hold the doctrines of 6hristianity" y 6hristianity - here meanwhat is accounted such by all churches and sectsthe ma$ims and

precepts contained in the #ew Testament" These are consideredsacred, and accepted as laws, by all professing 6hristians" 7et it is

scarcely too much to say that not one 6hristian in a thousand guides

or tests his indi!idual conduct by reference to those laws" Thestandard to which he does refer it, is the custom of his nation, his

class, or his religious profession" He has thus, on the one hand, acollection of ethical ma$ims, which he belie!es to ha!e been

!ouchsafed to him by infallible wisdom as rules for his go!ernment'

and on the other, a set of e!eryday &udgments and practices, whichgo a certain length with some of those ma$ims, not so great a length

with others, stand in direct opposition to some, and are, on the whole,a compromise between the 6hristian creed and the interests and

suggestions of worldly life" To the first of these standards he gi!es his

homage' to the other his real allegiance" ll 6hristians belie!e that theblessed are the poor and humble, and those who are illused by the

world' that it is easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needlethan for a rich man to enter the *ingdom of hea!en' that they should

&udge not, lest they be &udged' that they should swear not at all' thatthey should lo!e their neighbor as themsel!es' that if one ta*e their

cloa*, they should gi!e him their coat also' that they should ta*e no

thought for the morrow' that if they would be perfect, they should sell


22/34

all that they ha!e and gi!e it to the poor" They are not insincere whenthey say that they belie!e these things" They do belie!e them, as

people belie!e what they ha!e always heard lauded and ne!erdiscussed" ut in the sense of that li!ing belief which regulates

conduct, they belie!e these doctrines &ust up to the point to which it is

usual to act upon them" The doctrines in their integrity are ser!iceableto pelt ad!ersaries with' and it is understood that they are to be put

forward (when possible) as the reasons for whate!er people do thatthey thin* laudable" ut any one who reminded them that the ma$ims

re%uire an infinity of things which they ne!er e!en thin* of doing

would gain nothing but to be classed among those !ery unpopularcharacters who affect to be better than other people" The doctrines

ha!e no hold on ordinary belie!ersare not a power in their minds"They ha!e an habitual respect for the sound of them, but no feeling

which spreads from the words to the things signified, and forces the

mind to ta*e them in, and ma*e them conform to the formula".hene!er conduct is concerned, they loo* round for ;r" and to

direct them how far to go in obeying 6hrist"

#ow we may be well assured that the case was not thus, but far

otherwise, with the early 6hristians" Had it been thus, 6hristianity

ne!er would ha!e e$panded from an obscure sect of the despisedHebrews into the religion of the >oman empire" .hen their enemies

said, ?ee how these 6hristians lo!e one another (a remar* not li*elyto be made by anybody now), they assuredly had a much li!elier

feeling of the meaning of their creed than they ha!e e!er had since"

nd to this cause, probably, it is chiefly owing that 6hristianity nowma*es so little progress in e$tending its domain, and after eighteen

centuries, is still nearly confined to Europeans and the descendants ofEuropeans" E!en with the strictly religious, who are much in earnest

about their doctrines, and attach a greater amount of meaning to

many of them than people in general, it commonly happens that thepart which is thus comparati!ely acti!e in their minds is that which

was made by 6al!in, or Gno$, or some such person much nearer incharacter to themsel!es" The sayings of 6hrist coe$ist passi!ely in

their minds, producing hardly any effect beyond what is caused by

mere listening to words so amiable and bland" There are manyreasons, doubtless, why doctrines which are the badge of a sect retain

more of their !itality than those common to all recogni=ed sects, andwhy more pains are ta*en by teachers to *eep their meaning ali!e' but

one reason certainly is, that the peculiar doctrines are more%uestioned, and ha!e to be oftener defended against open gainsayers"

oth teachers and learners go to sleep at their post, as soon as there

is no enemy in the field"


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The same thing holds true, generally spea*ing, of all traditionaldoctrinesthose of prudence and *nowledge of life, as well as of

morals or religion" ll languages and literatures are full of generalobser!ations on life, both as to what it is, and how to conduct oneself

in it' obser!ations which e!erybody *nows, which e!erybody repeats,

or hears with ac%uiescence, which are recei!ed as truisms, yet ofwhich most people first truly learn the meaning, when e$perience,

generally of a painful *ind, has made it a reality to them" How often,when smarting under some unforeseen misfortune or disappointment,

does a person call to mind some pro!erb or common saying familiar to

him all his life, the meaning of which, if he had e!er before felt it as hedoes now, would ha!e sa!ed him from the calamity" There are indeed

reasons for this, other than the absence of discussion/ there are manytruths of which the full meaning cannot be reali=ed, until personal

e$perience has brought it home" ut much more of the meaning e!en

of these would ha!e been understood, and what was understood wouldha!e been far more deeply impressed on the mind, if the man had

been accustomed to hear it argued pro and con by people who didunderstand it" The fatal tendency of man*ind to lea!e off thin*ing

about a thing when it is no longer doubtful, is the cause of half theirerrors" contemporary author has well spo*en of the deep slumber of

a decided opinion"

ut what (it may be as*ed) -s the absence of unanimity anindispensable condition of true *nowledge -s it necessary that some

part of man*ind should persist in error, to enable any to reali=e the

truth Aoes a belief cease to be real and !ital as soon as it is generallyrecei!edand is a proposition ne!er thoroughly understood and felt

unless some doubt of it remains s soon as man*ind ha!eunanimously accepted a truth, does the truth perish within them The

highest aim and best result of impro!ed intelligence, it has hitherto

been thought, is to unite man*ind more and more in theac*nowledgment of all important truths/ and does the intelligence only

last as long as it has not achie!ed its ob&ect Ao the fruits of con%uestperish by the !ery completeness of the !ictory

- affirm no such thing" s man*ind impro!e, the number of doctrines

which are no longer disputed or doubted will be constantly on theincrease/ and the wellbeing of man*ind may almost be measured by

the number and gra!ity of the truths which ha!e reached the point ofbeing uncontested" The cessation, on one %uestion after another, of

serious contro!ersy, is one of the necessary incidents of the

consolidation of opinion' a consolidation as salutary in the case of trueopinions, as it is dangerous and no$ious when the opinions are


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erroneous" ut though this gradual narrowing of the bounds ofdi!ersity of opinion is necessary in both senses of the term, being at

once ine!itable and indispensable, we are not therefore obliged toconclude that all its conse%uences must be beneficial" The loss of so

important an aid to the intelligent and li!ing apprehension of a truth,

as is afforded by the necessity of e$plaining it to, or defending itagainst, opponents, though not sufficient to outweigh, is no trifling

drawbac* from, the benefit of its uni!ersal recognition" .here thisad!antage can no longer be had, - confess - should li*e to see the

teachers of man*ind endea!oring to pro!ide a substitute for it' some

contri!ance for ma*ing the difficulties of the %uestion as present to thelearner4s consciousness, as if they were pressed upon him by a

dissentient champion, eager for his con!ersion"

ut instead of see*ing contri!ances for this purpose, they ha!e lost

those they formerly had" The ?ocratic dialectics, so magnificently

e$emplified in the dialogues of 3lato, were a contri!ance of thisdescription" They were essentially a negati!e discussion of the great

%uestions of philosophy and life, directed with consummate s*ill to thepurpose of con!incing any one who had merely adopted the

commonplaces of recei!ed opinion, that he did not understand the

sub&ectthat he as yet attached no definite meaning to the doctrineshe professed' in order that, becoming aware of his ignorance, he

might be put in the way to attain a stable belief, resting on a clearapprehension both of the meaning of doctrines and of their e!idence"

The school disputations of the ;iddle ges had a somewhat similar

ob&ect" They were intended to ma*e sure that the pupil understood hisown opinion, and (by necessary correlation) the opinion opposed to it,

and could enforce the grounds of the one and confute those of theother" These lastmentioned contests had indeed the incurable defect,

that the premises appealed to were ta*en from authority, not from

reason' and, as a discipline to the mind, they were in e!ery respectinferior to the powerful dialectics which formed the intellects of the

Socratici viri/ but the modern mind owes far more to both than it isgenerally willing to admit, and the present modes of education contain

nothing which in the smallest degree supplies the place either of the

one or of the other" person who deri!es all his instruction fromteachers or boo*s, e!en if he escape the besetting temptation of

contenting himself with cram, is under no compulsion to hear bothsides' accordingly it is far from a fre%uent accomplishment, e!en

among thin*ers, to *now both sides' and the wea*est part of whate!erybody says in defence of his opinion, is what he intends as a reply

to antagonists" -t is the fashion of the present time to disparage

negati!e logic that which points out wea*nesses in theory or errors


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in practice, without establishing positi!e truths" ?uch negati!e criticismwould indeed be poor enough as an ultimate result' but as a means to

attaining any positi!e *nowledge or con!iction worthy the name, itcannot be !alued too highly' and until people are again systematically

trained to it, there will be few great thin*ers, and a low general

a!erage of intellect, in any but the mathematical and physicaldepartments of speculation" :n any other sub&ect no one4s opinions

deser!e the name of *nowledge, e$cept so far as he has either hadforced upon him by others, or gone through of himself, the same

mental process which would ha!e been re%uired of him in carrying on

an acti!e contro!ersy with opponents" That, therefore, which whenabsent, it is so indispensable, but so difficult, to create, how worse

than absurd is it to forego, when spontaneously offering itself -f thereare any persons who contest a recei!ed opinion, or who will do so if

law or opinion will let them, let us than* them for it, open our minds to

listen to them, and re&oice that there is some one to do for us what weotherwise ought, if we ha!e any regard for either the certainty or the

!itality of our con!ictions, to do with much greater labor for oursel!es"

-t still remains to spea* of one of the principal causes which ma*e

di!ersity of opinion ad!antageous, and will continue to do so until

man*ind shall ha!e entered a stage of intellectual ad!ancement whichat present seems at an incalculable distance" .e ha!e hitherto

considered only two possibilities/ that the recei!ed opinion may befalse, and some other opinion, conse%uently, true' or that, the

recei!ed opinion being true, a conflict with the opposite error is

essential to a clear apprehension and deep feeling of its truth" utthere is a commoner case than either of these' when the conflicting

doctrines, instead of being one true and the other false, share thetruth between them' and the nonconforming opinion is needed to

supply the remainder of the truth, of which the recei!ed doctrine

embodies only a part" 3opular opinions, on sub&ects not palpable tosense, are often true, but seldom or ne!er the whole truth" They are a

part of the truth' sometimes a greater, sometimes a smaller part, bute$aggerated, distorted, and dis&oined from the truths by which they

ought to be accompanied and limited" Heretical opinions, on the other

hand, are generally some of these suppressed and neglected truths,bursting the bonds which *ept them down, and either see*ing

reconciliation with the truth contained in the common opinion, orfronting it as enemies, and setting themsel!es up, with similar

e$clusi!eness, as the whole truth" The latter case is hitherto the mostfre%uent, as, in the human mind, onesidedness has always been the

rule, and manysidedness the e$ception" Hence, e!en in re!olutions of

opinion, one part of the truth usually sets while another rises" E!en


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progress, which ought to superadd, for the most part only substitutesone partial and incomplete truth for another' impro!ement consisting

chiefly in this, that the new fragment of truth is more wanted, moreadapted to the needs of the time, than that which it displaces" ?uch

being the partial character of pre!ailing opinions, e!en when resting

on a true foundation' e!ery opinion which embodies somewhat of theportion of truth which the common opinion omits, ought to be

considered precious, with whate!er amount of error and confusion thattruth may be blended" #o sober &udge of human affairs will feel bound

to be indignant because those who force on our notice truths which we

should otherwise ha!e o!erloo*ed, o!erloo* some of those which wesee" >ather, he will thin* that so long as popular truth is onesided, it

is more desirable than otherwise that unpopular truth should ha!eonesided asserters too' such being usually the most energetic, and

the most li*ely to compel reluctant attention to the fragment of

wisdom which they proclaim as if it were the whole"

Thus, in the eighteenth century, when nearly all the instructed, and all

those of the uninstructed who were led by them, were lost inadmiration of what is called ci!ili=ation, and of the mar!els of modern

science, literature, and philosophy, and while greatly o!errating the

amount of unli*eness between the men of modern and those ofancient times, indulged the belief that the whole of the difference was

in their own fa!or' with what a salutary shoc* did the parado$es of>ousseau e$plode li*e bombshells in the midst, dislocating the

compact mass of onesided opinion, and forcing its elements to

recombine in a better form and with additional ingredients" #ot thatthe current opinions were on the whole farther from the truth than

>ousseau4s were' on the contrary, they were nearer to it' theycontained more of positi!e truth, and !ery much less of error"

#e!ertheless there lay in >ousseau4s doctrine, and has floated down

the stream of opinion along with it, a considerable amount of e$actlythose truths which the popular opinion wanted' and these are the

deposit which was left behind when the flood subsided" The superiorworth of simplicity of life, the ener!ating and demorali=ing effect of the

trammels and hypocrisies of artificial society, are ideas which ha!e

ne!er been entirely absent from culti!ated minds since >ousseauwrote' and they will in time produce their due effect, though at

present needing to be asserted as much as e!er, and to be asserted bydeeds, for words, on this sub&ect, ha!e nearly e$hausted their power"

-n politics, again, it is almost a commonplace, that a party of order or

stability, and a party of progress or reform, are both necessaryelements of a healthy state of political life' until the one or the other


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shall ha!e so enlarged its mental grasp as to be a party e%ually oforder and of progress, *nowing and distinguishing what is fit to be

preser!ed from what ought to be swept away" Each of these modes ofthin*ing deri!es its utility from the deficiencies of the other' but it is in

a great measure the opposition of the other that *eeps each within the

limits of reason and sanity" 2nless opinions fa!orable to democracyand to aristocracy, to property and to e%uality, to cooperation and to

competition, to lu$ury and to abstinence, to sociality and indi!iduality,to liberty and discipline, and all the other standing antagonisms of

practical life, are e$pressed with e%ual freedom, and enforced and

defended with e%ual talent and energy, there is no chance of bothelements obtaining their due' one scale is sure to go up, and the other

down" Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a%uestion of the reconciling and combining of opposites, that !ery few

ha!e minds sufficiently capacious and impartial to ma*e the

ad&ustment with an approach to correctness, and it has to be made bythe rough process of a struggle between combatants fighting under

hostile banners" :n any of the great open %uestions &ust enumerated,if either of the two opinions has a better claim than the other, not

merely to be tolerated, but to be encouraged and countenanced, it isthe one which happens at the particular time and place to be in a

minority" That is the opinion which, for the time being, represents the

neglected interests, the side of human wellbeing which is in danger ofobtaining less than its share" - am aware that there is not, in this

country, any intolerance of differences of opinion on most of thesetopics" They are adduced to show, by admitted and multiplied

e$amples, the uni!ersality of the fact, that only through di!ersity ofopinion is there, in the e$isting state of human intellect, a chance offair play to all sides of the truth" .hen there are persons to be found,

who form an e$ception to the apparent unanimity of the world on anysub&ect, e!en if the world is in the right, it is always probable that

dissentients ha!e something worth hearing to say for themsel!es, and

that truth would lose something by their silence"

-t may be ob&ected, ut some recei!ed principles, especially on the

highest and most !ital sub&ects, are more than halftruths" The

6hristian morality, for instance, is the whole truth on that sub&ect andif any one teaches a morality which !aries from it, he is wholly in

error" s this is of all cases the most important in practice, none canbe fitter to test the general ma$im" ut before pronouncing what

6hristian morality is or is not, it would be desirable to decide what ismeant by 6hristian morality" -f it means the morality of the #ew

Testament, - wonder that any one who deri!es his *nowledge of this

from the boo* itself, can suppose that it was announced, or intended,


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as a complete doctrine of morals" The @ospel always refers to apree$isting morality, and confines its precepts to the particulars in

which that morality was to be corrected, or superseded by a wider andhigher' e$pressing itself, moreo!er, in terms most general, often

impossible to be interpreted literally, and possessing rather the

impressi!eness of poetry or elo%uence than the precision of legislation"To e$tract from it a body of ethical doctrine, has ne!er been possible

without e*ing it out from the :ld Testament, that is, from a systemelaborate indeed, but in many respects barbarous, and intended only

for a barbarous people" ?t" 3aul, a declared enemy to this udaical

mode of interpreting the doctrine and filling up the scheme of his;aster, e%ually assumes a pree$isting morality, namely, that of the

@ree*s and >omans' and his ad!ice to 6hristians is in a great measurea system of accommodation to that' e!en to the e$tent of gi!ing an

apparent sanction to sla!ery" .hat is called 6hristian, but should

rather be termed theological, morality, was not the wor* of 6hrist orthe postles, but is of much later origin, ha!ing been gradually built up

by the 6atholic 6hurch of the first fi!e centuries, and though notimplicitly adopted by moderns and 3rotestants, has been much less

modified by them than might ha!e been e$pected" 0or the most part,indeed, they ha!e contented themsel!es with cutting off the additions

which had been made to it in the ;iddle ges, each sect supplying the

place by fresh additions, adapted to its own character and tendencies"That man*ind owe a great debt to this morality, and to its early

teachers, - should be the last person to deny' but - do not scruple tosay of it, that it is, in many important points, incomplete and one

sided, and that unless ideas and feelings, not sanctioned by it, hadcontributed to the formation of European life and character, humanaffairs would ha!e been in a worse condition than they now are"

6hristian morality (so called) has all the characters of a reaction' it is,in great part, a protest against 3aganism" -ts ideal is negati!e rather

than positi!e' passi!e rather than acti!e' -nnocence rather than

#obleness' bstinence from E!il, rather than energetic 3ursuit of@ood/ in its precepts (as has been well said) thou shalt not

predominates unduly o!er thou shalt" -n its horror of sensuality, itmade an idol of asceticism, which has been gradually compromised

away into one of legality" -t holds out the hope of hea!en and thethreat of hell, as the appointed and appropriate moti!es to a !irtuouslife/ in this falling far below the best of the ancients, and doing what

lies in it to gi!e to human morality an essentially selfish character, bydisconnecting each man4s feelings of duty from the interests of his

fellowcreatures, e$cept so far as a selfinterested inducement isoffered to him for consulting them" -t is essentially a doctrine of

passi!e obedience' it inculcates submission to all authorities found


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established' who indeed are not to be acti!ely obeyed when theycommand what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far less

rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to oursel!es" nd while, inthe morality of the best 3agan nations, duty to the ?tate holds e!en a

disproportionate place, infringing on the &ust liberty of the indi!idual'

in purely 6hristian ethics that grand department of duty is scarcelynoticed or ac*nowledged" -t is in the Goran, not the #ew Testament,

that we read the ma$im ruler who appoints any man to an office,when there is in his dominions another man better %ualified for it, sins

against @od and against the ?tate" .hat little recognition the idea of

obligation to the public obtains in modern morality, is deri!ed from@ree* and >oman sources, not from 6hristian' as, e!en in the morality

of pri!ate life, whate!er e$ists of magnanimity, highmindedness,personal dignity, e!en the sense of honor, is deri!ed from the purely

human, not the religious part of our education, and ne!er could ha!e

grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedlyrecogni=ed, is that of obedience"

- am as far as any one from pretending that these defects arenecessarily inherent in the 6hristian ethics, in e!ery manner in which it

can be concei!ed, or that the many re%uisites of a complete moral

doctrine which it does not contain, do not admit of being reconciledwith it" 0ar less would - insinuate this of the doctrines and precepts of

6hrist himself" - belie!e that the sayings of 6hrist are all, that - cansee any e!idence of their ha!ing been intended to be' that they are

irreconcilable with nothing which a comprehensi!e morality re%uires'

that e!erything which is e$cellent in ethics may be brought withinthem, with no greater !iolence to their language than has been done

to it by all who ha!e attempted to deduce from them any practicalsystem of conduct whate!er" ut it is %uite consistent with this, to

belie!e that they contain and were meant to contain, only a part of the

truth' that many essential elements of the highest morality are amongthe things which are not pro!ided for, nor intended to be pro!ided for,

in the recorded deli!erances of the 0ounder of 6hristianity, and whichha!e been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the

basis of those deli!erances by the 6hristian 6hurch" nd this being so,

- thin* it a great error to persist in attempting to find in the 6hristiandoctrine that complete rule for our guidance, which its author intended

it to sanction and enforce, but only partially to pro!ide" - belie!e, too,that this narrow theory is becoming a gra!e practical e!il, detracting

greatly from the !alue of the moral training and instruction, which somany wellmeaning persons are now at length e$erting themsel!es to

promote" - much fear that by attempting to form the mind and feelings

on an e$clusi!ely religious type, and discarding those secular


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standards (as for want of a better name they may be called) whichheretofore coe$isted with and supplemented the 6hristian ethics,

recei!ing some of its spirit, and infusing into it some of theirs, therewill result, and is e!en now resulting, a low, ab&ect, ser!ile type of

character, which, submit itself as it may to what it deems the ?upreme

.ill, is incapable of rising to or sympathi=ing in the conception of?upreme @oodness" - belie!e that other ethics than any one which can

be e!ol!ed from e$clusi!ely 6hristian sources, must e$ist side by sidewith 6hristian ethics to produce the moral regeneration of man*ind'

and that the 6hristian system is no e$ception to the rule that in an

imperfect state of the human mind, the interests of truth re%uire adi!ersity of opinions" -t is not necessary that in ceasing to ignore the

moral truths not contained in 6hristianity, men should ignore any ofthose which it does contain" ?uch pre&udice, or o!ersight, when it

occurs, is altogether an e!il' but it is one from which we cannot hope

to be always e$empt, and must be regarded as the price paid for aninestimable good" The e$clusi!e pretension made by a part of the truth

to be the whole, must and ought to be protested against, and if areactionary impulse should ma*e the protestors un&ust in their turn,

this onesidedness, li*e the other, may be lamented, but must betolerated" -f 6hristians would teach infidels to be &ust to 6hristianity,

they should themsel!es be &ust to infidelity" -t can do truth no ser!ice

to blin* the fact, *nown to all who ha!e the most ordinaryac%uaintance with literary history, that a large portion of the noblest

and most !aluable moral teaching has been the wor*, not only of menwho did not *now, but of men who *new and re&ected, the 6hristian

faith"

- do not pretend that the most unlimited use of the freedom ofenunciating all possible opinions would put an end to the e!ils of

religious or philosophical sectarianism" E!ery truth which men of

narrow capacity are in earnest about, is sure to be asserted,inculcated, and in many ways e!en acted on, as if no other truth

e$isted in the world, or at all e!ents none that could limit or %ualify thefirst" - ac*nowledge that the tendency of all opinions to become

sectarian is not cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened

and e$acerbated thereby' the truth which ought to ha!e been, but wasnot, seen, being re&ected all the more !iolently because proclaimed by

persons regarded as opponents" ut it is not on the impassionedpartisan, it is on the calmer and more disinterested bystander, that

this collision of opinions wor*s its salutary effect" #ot the !iolentconflict between parts of the truth, but the %uiet suppression of half of

it, is the formidable e!il/ there is always hope when people are forced

to listen to both sides' it is when they attend only to one that errors


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harden into pre&udices, and truth itself ceases to ha!e the effect oftruth, by being e$aggerated into falsehood" nd since there are few

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