On individuating contexts - WordPress.com · 2018. 3. 20. · On individuating contexts JanKöpping [email protected] Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main DGfS2018 JanKöpping

On individuating contexts

Jan Kö[email protected]

Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main

DGfS 2018

Jan Köpping (Goethe-Uni FfM) On individuating contexts DGfS 2018 1 / 31

Plan

1 Kaplanian context theory

2 Constraining the set of possible contexts

3 Counterexamples

4 Conclusion


Plan



3 Counterexamples

4 Conclusion


Cornerstones of Kaplanian context theory

Double indexing:There need to be two sources of dependency: one that gets bound inintensional environments and one that stays free (in English . . . ).Dependent intensions: It needs to be determined “what is said” toyield truth evaluable content

Terminology:Intensions: Functions from “indices” (or “situations”) into extensions.Characters: Functions from “contexts” into intensions.


What is a context?

Entities the extension of indexical expressions depend on (bydefinition).Alternatively: entities on certain aspects of which certain indexicalsdepend.More fine-grained distinctions: I, now and here (among others) arecontext-dependent, but address different aspects (or parameters).Compare: today, tomorrow, yesterday, now etc. vary with the sameaspect.


What is a context?

Minimal assumption / Standardization:Contexts are nothing but lists of parameters, at least:World, Time, Place, Agent, Addressee, . . .Because of actually1, now, here, I, you, . . . (simplified)Notation: Contexts are elements of W × T × P ×D ×D . . .(There is no good reason to use lists opposed to other formal objects.But tuples are easy to handle.)

1Disputed: Lewis (1986); Stalnaker (2014); Yalcin (2015)Jan Köpping (Goethe-Uni FfM) On individuating contexts DGfS 2018 6 / 31

Indexicals

Let k = 〈w , t, p, a, b〉 ∈ W × T × P ×D ×D.

(1) For any i :a. ‖I‖k,i = a;b. ‖you‖k,i = b;c. ‖actually‖k,i = w ;d. ‖now‖k,i = t;e. ‖here‖k,i = p;f. . . .


Individuation

Restricting attention to the parameters mentioned, the set of contexts islabeled K.

Formally, K must be a subset of the whole set:K ⊆ W × T × P ×D ×DIt is pretty clear that K cannot be the whole set:K 6=W × T × P ×D ×DHence, K is a proper subset:K ⊂ W × T × P ×D ×D

Individuation problemWhat do the elements of K have that the others lack?


Plan



3 Counterexamples

4 Conclusion


Individuation: Indices

A part of this problem concerns only the first three coordinates:There are some elements of W × T × P that are impossible evenaccording to the (low) standards of Logical Space.Assuming that the universe indeed is as old and as large as currentphysics claims it is, namely 14.6 billion years and 78 billion light yearsin diameter, then there is no tuple starting with the actual world, anda moment of time 27 billion years in the past, and a point in space150 billion light years away.Hence, not every possibly element of W × T × P should count.

Aside, this constitutes interesting problems:

(2) a. 27 billion years ago, it actually rained here.b. 27 billion years ago, it actually didn’t rain here.

(Zimmermann, 1991, 2012)


Individuation: Indices

Common (e.g. Zimmermann, 1991, 2012) approach:

SituationsA possible situation1 is an arbitrary connected spatiotemporal region of apossible world.

Take only those elements of W × T × P that describe a situation inthis sense. (This is not as harmless as it sounds!)This makes w the world a situation is a part of, and t and p itsmaximal temporal and spatial extension.Set of situations: Logical Space (LS).Corresponding subset of W × T × P: Set of indices (I) (Ind)

1Not the same notion as in Barwise (1988); Kratzer (1989, 2007); less fine-grained.Jan Köpping (Goethe-Uni FfM) On individuating contexts DGfS 2018 11 / 31

Limiting assumptions

Further intuitions:1. Contexts are special kinds of situations.

A subset C of LS contains all the situations that make up the firstentries in K.

2. What makes them special is that there are unique agents andaddressees:

‖I‖k,i = the Agent in c‖you‖k,i = the Addressee in c

No two distinct elements of K start with the same three components:〈w , t, p, a, b〉 ∈ K & 〈w , t, p, a′, b′〉 ∈ K⇒ a = a′ & b = b′ (LA)



1. C ⊆ LS:makes diagonals available: JαKc,c .doesn’t immediately carry over to tuples (because K * I).can be simulated (delete the additional parameters).

2. Existence and uniqueness of speaker and addressee (wrt. C ):problematic: Crowded party with many speaking persons.Even though I overhear a second conversation, the referent of I in myconversation is fixed.



LS

C

I

K



LS

C

I

K

(Ind)



LS

C

I

K

(LA)

(LA)



LS

I

K


What do we need diagonals for?

Allows Kaplan to distinguish two senses of triviality:Necessary truths vs. Non-necessary a priori truths.

Validity as truth at all indices (Necessity)For all sentences ϕ not containing indexicals, for any k : � ϕ iff∀i‖ϕ‖k,i = 1

Validity as truth at all contexts (Apriority)

For all sentences ϕ, and all contexts k : � ϕ iff ‖ϕ‖k,k = 1


A priori statements

Validity as truth at all contexts (Apriority)

For all sentences ϕ, and all contexts k : � ϕ iff ‖ϕ‖k,k = 1

(3) a. I am here now is valid. (Kaplan, 1989b, 508)b. I exist is valid. (Kaplan, 1989b, 540)c. I utter something is not valid. (Kaplan, 1989a, 584)d. I am necessarily here now is wrong. (Kaplan, 1989b, 509)

Compare Lewis (1980, 21):

A context is a location – time, place, and possible world – wherea sentence is said.

If adapted, it carries a lot of presuppositions (the agent is capable ofproducing utterances, etc.)


Constraining K

∀〈w , t, p, a, b〉 ∈ K :

(4) I am here now is valid. Location Constraint: a is located at p in w at t.

(5) I exist is valid. Existence Constraint: a exists in w at t (and p).

(6) I utter something is valid. Utterance Constraint: a utters something in w at t (and p).

An even stronger constraint not discussed today:1

(7) Constraint imposed on interpretation:If ϕ is an expression and ‖ϕ‖ is its character, then ‖ϕ‖〈w ,t,p,a,b〉 isdefined iff an instance of ϕ is uttered in 〈w , t, p, a, b〉.

1Endorsed by von Stechow (1979); Zimmermann (1997); Kupffer (2001, 2014), a.o.Jan Köpping (Goethe-Uni FfM) On individuating contexts DGfS 2018 17 / 31

Plan



3 Counterexamples

4 Conclusion


Answering machine

Kaplan himself mentions an example that contradicts the LocationConstraint:

If the message: I am not here now is recorded on a telephoneanswering device, it is to be assumed that the time referred toby now is the time of playback rather than the time of recording.(Kaplan, 1989b, 491, fn. 14)

If I am not here now is true at the moment of playback, I am here nowcannot be valid and thus something like the Location Constraint needs togo.1

1Cf. Cohen (2013); Cohen and Michaelson (2013) for an overview.Jan Köpping (Goethe-Uni FfM) On individuating contexts DGfS 2018 19 / 31

Kratzer’s examples

Quite common inscription on old houses:

(8) Dies Haus ist mein, und doch nicht mein. // Wer’s vor mir war//s’ war auch nicht sein // Er ging hinaus und ich hinein, //Nach mir wird’s auch noch so sein. (Kratzer, 1978, 18)

(9) [Roughly:] This house is mine, and yet not mine // Whoever’s itwas before // it also wasn’t his // he went out and I went in //after me it remains like this

Looks like this:


Kratzer’s examples

(9) This house is mine, and yet not mine.

The first owner of the house in question ordered some carpenter to inscribethe lines on his house. But later, he passed away. His first son inherited thehouse, owned it several years before he also passed away. Then, his soninherited the house and so on and so forth.

mine seems to shift with the respective ownerthe owner doesn’t have to be in the house(contra Location Constraint)the owner didn’t produce the sentence(the carpenter did; contra Utterance Constraint)

Kratzer has more examples: inscriptions on graveyards, etc.She doesn’t discuss this house which is interesting in its own right.


Kratzer-inspired examples

Whoever obeys the order kicksthe guy (Olaf), not theproducer of the sentence.Olaf didn’t produce anyutterance at all.If Olaf removed the paper andattached it to the back ofsomebody else (e.g. Olga), shewould be the referent of me.



(10) Alice in Wonderlanda. Drink me.b. Eat me.

The agent doesn’t even have tobe sentient.Similarly: I’m for rent writtenon transporters.



(9) This house is mine, and yet not mine . . .

(11) Announcements in trains:Next stop: Freiburg in the Breisgau main station. This trainterminates there.

(12) At this ATM it is possible todraw money in the followingnotes:


Plan



3 Counterexamples

4 Conclusion


Upshot

There are two principled ways to go:1. All of these examples could be regarded as being deviant in some

sense.All feature written or recorded sentences that “survive” theirproduction context and therefore are “liberated” from it.This allows one to claim that the basic constraints used to restrict Kare actually correct.Kaplanian characters then have a straightforward role in theinterpretation of utterances.This view seems to be the standard (more or less).


Upshot

2. All of these examples count as genuine uses.Especially the Utterance Constraint is untenable.As is any substantial notion of Agent.Only the Existence Constraint seems to make it (no counterexamplesfound).Kratzer’s solution:a counts as Agent in w at t (and p).Not mentioned by Kratzer but straightforward:d counts as Object demonstrated by the Agent in w at t(and p).It is unclear how to make this more precise so that it actuallyconstraints K.


Alternative: Division of labour

On the other hand, maybe one can get away with such an ‘empty’notion of Agent.This essentially means that the (LA) needs to be dropped:〈w , t, p, a, b〉 ∈ K & 〈w , t, p, a′, b′〉 ∈ K⇒ a = a′ & b = b′ (LA)Even if we knew which situation we are actually in, we don’t knowwhich context we are in.Lets assume that we are in a situation with the concrete parametersw23, t18, and p6, and that there are three individuals a, b, c . Thepossible contexts then are:

〈w23, t18, p6, a, a〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, b, b〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, c , c〉,〈w23, t18, p6, a, b〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, b, a〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, c , a〉,〈w23, t18, p6, a, c〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, b, c〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, c , b〉


Alternative: Division of labour

〈w23, t18, p6, a, a〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, b, b〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, c , c〉,〈w23, t18, p6, a, b〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, b, a〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, c, a〉,〈w23, t18, p6, a, c〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, b, c〉, 〈w23, t18, p6, c , b〉

But what about intuitions like the following?

In each of its utterances, I refers to the person who utters it.(Kaplan, 1989b, 520)

Doesn’t constrain K (and therefore characters), but acts as a heuristic forthe interpretation of utterances.They help us select one out of all the possible contexts.


References I

Barwise, J. (1988). The Situation in Logic. CLSI Publications, Stanford.

Carroll, L. (1960). The Annotated Alice. Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland & Through the Looking Glass, ed. byMartin Gardner. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, New York [a.o.].

Cohen, J. (2013). Indexicality and the puzzle of the answering machine. The Journal of Philosophy, 110(1):5–32.

Cohen, J. and Michaelson, E. (2013). Indexicality and the answering machine paradox. Philosophy Compass,8(6):580–592.

Kaplan, D. (1989a). Afterthoughts. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H., editors, Themes from Kaplan, pages565–614. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kaplan, D. (1989b). Demonstratives. An essay on the semantics, logic, metaphysics, and epistemology ofdemonstratives and other indexicals. In Almog, J., Perry, J., and Wettstein, H., editors, Themes from Kaplan,pages 481–563. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

Kratzer, A. (1978). Semantik der Rede. Kontexttheorie – Modalwörter – Konditionalsätze. Scriptor, Königstein.

Kratzer, A. (1989). An investigation of the lumps of thought. Linguistics and Philosophy, pages 607–653.

Kratzer, A. (2007). Situations in Natural Language Semantics. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy. Spring 2014 edition.

Kupffer, M. (2001). Learning French from a dictionary. An essay on utterance-dependent meaning. In Féry, C. andSternefeld, W., editors, Audiatur Vox Sapientiae: a Festschrift for Arnim von Stechow, pages 320–347.Akademie Verlag, Berlin.

Kupffer, M. (2014). Does context change? In Gutzmann, D., Köpping, J., and Meier, C., editors, Approaches toMeaning: Composition, Values, and Interpretation, pages 25–44. Brill, Leiden/Boston.

Lewis, D. K. (1980). Index, context, and content. In Kanger, S. and Öhrman, S., editors, Philosophy and Grammar,pages 79–100. Dordrecht: Reidel. Reprinted in and quoted after Lewis, David K.: Papers in philosophical logic,Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 21–44.

Lewis, D. K. (1986). On the Plurality of Worlds. Blackwell, Oxford.


References II

Stalnaker, R. C. (2014). Context. Oxford University Press, Oxford.

von Stechow, A. (1979). Occurrence-interpretation and context-theory. In Gambarara, D., LoPiparo, F., andRuggiero, G., editors, Linguaggi e Fromalizzazioni, pages 307–347. Bulzoni.

Yalcin, S. (2015). Actually, actually. Analysis, 75(2):185–191.

Zimmermann, T. E. (1991). Kontextabhängigkeit. In von Stechow, A. and Wunderlich, D., editors,Semantik/Semantics, pages 156–229. de Gruyter, Berlin/New York.

Zimmermann, T. E. (1997). The addressing puzzle. In Künne, W., Newen, A., and Anduschs, M., editors, DirectReference, Indexicality, and Propositional Attitudes, pages 133–153. CLSI Publications, Stanford.

Zimmermann, T. E. (2012). Context dependence. In Maienborn, C., von Heusinger, K., and Portner, P., editors,Semantics, volume 3 of Handbücher zur Sprach- und Kommunikationswissenschaft / Handbooks of Linguisticsand Communication Science (HSK), pages 2360–2407. de Gruyter, Berlin/New York.


Kaplanian context theoryConstraining the set of possible contextsCounterexamplesConclusion

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On individuating contexts - WordPress.com · 2018. 3. 20. · On individuating contexts JanKöpping [email protected] Goethe-University Frankfurt am Main DGfS2018 JanKöpping