On foucault’s Stoicism and Hegel’s critique of the Stoic

OriginalpaperUDC17.031.1(045)doi:10.21464/sp33215

Received:October17,2017

Çetin TürkyılmazHacettepeUniversity,EdebiyatFakültesi,BeytepeCampus,BeytepeMahallese,TR–06800Ankara

[email protected]

On foucault’s Stoicism and Hegel’s critique of the Stoic Point of View in Relation to the Problem of freedom

AbstractI argue that to understand Hegel’s critique of Stoicism in relation to the problem of freedom it is important to appreciate some Foucault’s ideas and those of the Foucauldian circle influenced by his thought. I will begin by discussing Foucault’s reference to Greco-Roman Philosophy in his lectures at CollègedeFrance. In those lectures, by using Hadot’s concept of spiritualexercises, he tries to constitute ethics of the self based on a conception of subjec-tive freedom. Afterwards, I will deal with Hegel’s critique of Stoicism on the ground of the Stoic theory of oikeiōsis. Hegel’s interpretation of this theory is the basis of his critical at-titude towards Stoicism. There is a connection between Stoicism and Foucault’s late period in respect to the conception of freedom, which is entirely based on subjectivity. At the end of this paper, I hope to show that Hegel’s critique of Stoic ethics, beginning with an examina-tion of the theory of oikeiōsis, can provide us with an opportunity to criticise the subjective point of view in the problem of freedom.

KeywordsMichelFoucault,careofself,Stoicism,GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,oikeiōsis,freedom,subjectivity

1. foucault’s Stoic Mood

AFoucauldianapproachtotheproblemoffreedompresentsuswithaper-spectiveofsubjectivefreedom1inwhichtheconceptof“thecareoftheself”(epimeleia heautou/souci de soi)isdominant.InhislecturesatCollège de France inthe1980s,FoucaultappealstoGreco-RomanPhilosophyinordertoattainanewconceptionoftheself(or,sotospeak,ofthesubject)andto

1

Thephrasesof“subjectivefreedom”or“sub-jectivepointofview”refertoasubjectivitytobeaformofinwardnesswhichisabstractedfromallexternaldemandsorrequirements.IfHegelianterminologyisborrowedinordertomakeclearthispoint,itcanbesaidthatsub-jectivity reflected into itself is “theabsoluteinwardcertaintyofitself”(Hegel,1991:163).Itgoeswithoutsayingthatinthiscontexttheconceptoftheselfbecomesmoresignificantthananyotherone.Thefocusofphilosophicalstrivingatthesubjectivelevelisanimmanentrelationshipoftheselftoitself.Forexample,Epictetuspointsoutthatanymaneagerlymust

striveforwithdrawalfromexternalthingsinordertobeabletomakeprogressinaccord-ancewith theknowledgeofwhat shouldbedesiredandavoided.Hewantsfreedom,butthisfreedomisentirelysubjectiveratherthan,forinstance,tobesocialorpoliticalinrespectoftheintersubjectiverelationships.Similarly,Foucault’sideaofthepracticeoffreedomthatcanbe regardedasa formofan intellectualfreedomisgroundedinanethicalperspectiveoftheindividualandthesubject.Itmeansaself-determinedactionof thesubject insteadofbeingdeterminedbyanyexternalpowerorpowerrelations.

https://doi.org/10.21464/sp33215

SYNTHESISPHILOSOPHICA66(2/2018)pp.(539–554)

Ç.Türkyılmaz,OnFoucault’sStoicismandHegel’sCritiqueoftheStoicPoint…540

call attention to thepossibilityof thepracticeof freedom in a situation inwhichpower-relationshipsandthedispositifsdetermine life,andthe“self”isonlyaconstructionfrompower-relations.Tounderstand thebackgroundofFoucault’sideashere,itisusefultounderstandHadot’sconceptofexer-cices spirituels(spiritualexercises).In1977,HadotwroteanarticleentitledExercices spirituels; it can be claimed that this article ismore decisive inthealterationortransformationofFoucault’sthoughtconcerningthesubject-truthrelationship,andinhisturningtowardsancientphilosophythanotherthingswithwhichFoucaultdealtinthisperiod.Inhisarticle,Hadotclaimsthat“[s]piritualexercisescanbebestobservedinthecontextofHellenisticandRomanschoolsofphilosophy.TheStoics,forinstance,declaredexplic-itly thatphilosophy, for them,wasan ‘exercise’” (Hadot,1987:15;1995b:82–83).Bytakingthiscontextasastartingpoint,Hadotemphasisesthatweshouldconsiderthesespiritualexercisesinrelationtoart of life.IntheHel-lenisticandRomanschoolsofphilosophy,thosespiritualexercisesarereal-isedinaccordancewiththeartoflifethatisalsophilosophy itself.2Moreover,itgoeswithoutsayingthatforthoseschools,philosophy,asanartoflife,isnotanabstracttheory,butaconcreteattitude(Hadot,1987:16),andthatithasatherapeuticfunction.Hadot’s ideasaboutancientphilosophyarebasedonhisgeneral thesisac-cording to which this philosophy can be seen as a struggle for attaining atranscendentpointofviewabouteverythingthatphilosophyisinterestedin.Still,toattainsuchatranscendentpoint,Hadotclaimsthatoneshouldstartatanindividuallevelor,strictlyspeaking,asubjectshouldcareforitselfduringtheirentire lifeataphilosophical, thatmeans, therapeutic level.Accordingtohim,fromSocratestotheHellenisticandRomanphilosophers,allancientphilosophycanbeevaluated in the lightof thedealingof the subjectwithitself. It seems that Hadot’s thoughts concerning ancient philosophy musthavebeenveryontheanalysisoftherelationshipbetweenpowerandsubjectin Foucault’s late period.3 Hadot underlines the influence of his article onFoucault’s“thecultureoftheself”(Hadot,1995a:24).FoucaulttoopointedoutHadot’seffectonhisthoughtinthesecondvolumeofhisTheHistory of Sexuality.Hesaysthathehas“benefitedgreatly”fromtheworksofPierreHadot (Foucault,1990:8).But thereare somecrucialdifferencesbetweenthem.Foucault,unlikeHadot,stresses the ideaof thecultureof theself inGreco-Romanphilosophywhichinvolvesaninevitabledutytomakeresist-ancetopower.Tobeabletomakeresistancetopower,Foucaultendeavourstoconstituteethicsoftheself,andheclaims“thereisnofirstorfinalpointofresistancetopoliticalpowerotherthanintherelationshiponehastooneself”(Foucault,2005:252).ItmightbesaidthatheappealstotheGreco-RomanPhilosophytoconstituteanethicoftheself,or,strictlyspeaking,pointingoutthepossibilityofacultureoftheself.Nevertheless,asheclearlyshowedus,theGreco-RomanPhilosophyisnotcomposedofacomplete,identicalcorpusofideas,anditisnecessarytomakesomedistinctionsinit.Forthisreason,FoucaulttakesphilosophyinthefirstandsecondcenturiesA.D.asareferencepoint,anddistinguishesitfromPlato’sperspective:InPlato’stexts,“careoftheselfis(…)instrumentalwithregardtothecareofothers”(Foucault,2005:175).4

Foucault,especiallytakingPlato’sdialogueAlcibiades Iasastartingpoint,saysthatinthisthoughtthegovernmentofothersisdependentonthegovern-mentoftheself,butthebasicaimoftherelationshiponehastooneselfistogoverntheothersinacity-state(polis).Inotherwords,thequestionishowtoconductourselvestolivewithothersinajustsociety.Incontrast,inthe



firstandsecondcenturiesA.D.,“theselfonetakescareofisnolongeroneelementamongothers”,andtheselfisthesoleaimofthecareoftheself,thatmeans,“itisnolongeratransitionalelementleadingtosomethingelse,tothecity-stateorothers”(Foucault,2005:177).Thatistosay,inthatperiodtheaimisnottogovernothers;onthecontrary,thebasicaimofaphilosopherisnothingmorethandealingwithhimselfattheleveloftherapeuticexercises.Another distinction that Foucault made is that the Stoic conception of theselfisapartfromtheotherperspectivesoftheHellenisticandRomanphilo-sophicalschoolssuchasPlatonismorearlyChristianthoughtinthatera.Ifweespeciallyconsiderhis lecturesentitled“L’HerméneutiqueduSujet”, itcanbesaidthat,forFoucault,in“theGoldenAgeofself-cultivation”(i.e.inthefirstandsecondcenturiesA.D.)thelateStoicconceptionoftheselfplaysamoresignificantrolethanthatofotherphilosophicalschools.Thatwhichismade theStoicperspectivemore important thananyotherphilosophicalmovementisthatinStoicismtheselfisthesoleaim(telos)ofthetherapeuticworkontheself,whereas,forexample,inthePlatonictradition“thecareoftheself”isentirelyapartofacatharticendeavour.AsforChristianity,wecaneasilyseeasuddenchangeofthepointofviewinit:takingthischangeintoaccount,FoucaultindicatesthattheChristianconceptmetanoia,i.e.conver-sion,isa“sudden,dramatic,historical-metahistoricalupheavalofthesubject”(Foucault,2005:211).Thus, inearlyChristianity,which is“aconfessionalreligion” (Foucault, 1997a:242), the careof the self is transformed into arenunciationofoneselfordyingtooneselfasaresultofthisconversion.Thesubjecttakescareofitself,butmerelywithanintentionthatitmustattainarenouncingoftheselfattheendofthisacttoreunitewitheternitythatreferstoGod.5

AsaresultofFoucault’sestimationofStoicthought,IwouldliketoarguethathisviewmustbedistinguishedfromHadot’sthoughtaboutancientphi-

2

InDe finibus,CiceroalreadysaidinrelationtoStoicphilosophythat“[a]llthemoreisthephilosopher compelled to do likewise; forphilosophyisthe[Art]ofLife”[“Quomagishoc philosopho faciendum est; ars est enimphilosophiavitae”](Cicero,1931:III,4).

3

ForadetailedinvestigationoftheconnectionbetweenFoucaultandPierreHadot,see(Dav-idson,2005:123–148).Davidsonclaimsthat“Foucault was engaged in intense, if some-timessubmerged,intellectualexchange”withPaulVeyne,GeorgesDumézil,andespeciallyPierreHadot(Davidson:2005:124).

4

IncontrasttoFoucault’sdistinctionbetweenPlato and the Greco-Roman Philosophy, itmightbeclaimedthat“thefigureofSocrates”(especially, thePlatonicSocrates) is a para-digmofthisperiod,andtheroleofSocratesespeciallyintheStoictraditionisdominant.For example, Epictetus says that the life ofSocratesis“anexample(paradeigma)beforeus”(Epictetus,1928:4.5.1–2).AsA.A.Longrightlysaid,fortheStoicsSocrates’lifeis“avirtualparadigmofStoicwisdom’spracticalrealisation”,or“bestactualparadigmoftheir

ownideals”(Long,2002:68;2006:26).Itisveryclearthatthereisacloserelationshipbe-tweentheSocraticwayof lifeandtheStoicconceptionoftheselfinrespecttotheartoflife.However, Foucault’s distinction here isnotbasedonsuchaclaim that the figureofSocratesisnotdecisiveorsignificantinthisperiodbutitisbasedonathoughtthatthereisashiftinthepointofviewfromPlato’spoliti-calconceptionofthecareforselftotheStoicunderstandingoftheself.

5

For a comparison of the Platonic, ChristianandStoic positions in the frameworkof theconceptofmetanoia,see(Weiss,2014:220–221):“PlatonicepistrophēistransformedintoChristian metanoia. Metanoia occurs whenoneisabruptlytransformedintoacompletelydifferentperson,onewhoissuddenlyabletosee truth.ThiswouldseemtogiveFoucaultacluewithrespecttothedifferencebetweenStoicismandChristianity.ForStoicismdoesnotseemtorequirethekindoftotalandab-soluteself-renunciationthatisalwaysapre-conditionformetanoia,sincetheselfcannotberebornwithoutthecastingoffanoldself–allatonce.”



losophy.Firstofall,inconsequenceofhistheoryofhistory,Foucaultdoesnotseeanycontinuousmovementinhistory;onthecontrary,hethinksthattherearesomebreakingpoints,ruptures in thesuccessionofeventswhichshowadiscontinuityinhistory,insteadofcontinuity.6Thesameisatstakeinourcontext.Foucault,byexaminingtheconceptofthecareoftheself,indicatesthattheusingofthisconceptshowsusashiftingpointofviewindifferenthistoricaleras,althoughfrombeginningtoend,i.e.fromtheSocraticinterro-gationtotheChristianwayofthinkingandliving,thecareoftheselfismoreimportantthananyotherconceptincludingthefamousDelphicmaxim“knowthyself”.Thus,forFoucault,thereisevenadiscontinuityinthehistoryofthisparticularconcept.However,PierreHadothasaunifyingimageforallancientphilosophybasedon spirituality.According to him, spiritual exercises andendeavoursarecharacteristicinallancientphilosophyfromtheearlySocratictraditionincludingPlatototheHellenisticperiod,andthe“Socratesfigure”becameanincreasinglydominantoneinthistradition.Atthismoment,itcanbesaidthatFoucaultismuchclosertoHegel’sviewaboutancientphilosophythanHadot’sone.Because,Hegel,too,thinksthatinGreekphilosophypoliswasmoreimportantthananysingleindividualinit;thatiswhyitisimpossibletoseethemapartfromsocietyinanisolatedmanner. For that reason,Hegel states, inPoliteia Plato insists on the ideathat“justiceisnotonlyintheindividual,butalsointhestate,andthestateisgreaterthantheindividual”(Hegel,1995a:91).Ontheotherhand,forHel-lenisticphilosophythecriterionisthesubjectitself,thatis,“thepurerelationofself-consciousnesstoitself”(Hegel,1995a:233).Thisistheprincipleofallphilosophising,Epicureanor theStoic,during thatperiod,“because theprincipleof thisphilosophyisnotobjectivebutdogmatic,andrestson theimpulseofself-consciousnesstowardsself-satisfaction”(Hegel,1995a:234).AnotherdifferencebetweenFoucaultandHadothasitsoriginsintheirdiffer-entviewsabout“thecareoftheself”thatisthemainconcernofanyphiloso-pherinthatperiod.Asisputforwardabove,Hadotclaimsthatthesoleaimofthiseffortistoattainatranscendentpointofview.Foucault,however,thinksthatthegoalofallspiritualexercisesand,tobesure,ofthecareoftheselfisanimmanentrelationshipoftheselftoitself.Thesoleaimofthecultureoftheself,hethinks,isnothingbuttheselfitself.Foucault’sevaluationofStoicismisrelatedtohisconceptionoffreedomor,properlyspeaking,tohisideaofthe“practiceoffreedom”.Inthiscontext,itshouldbenotedthatFoucaultdistinguishedthepracticeoffreedomfromthepracticeofliberation.Hesees“liberation”asa“suspicious”notionthatmustalwaysbethoughtwithinthecertainlimitsofpower-relationswhichareeverywhere.“Insuchastate,itiscertain”,Foucaultargues,“thatpracticesoffreedomdonotexistorexistonlyunilaterallyorextremelyconstrainedandlimited”(Foucault,1997b:283).Hence,weshouldnecessarilyseekthepos-sibilityoffreedombeyondthelimitsofpower-relationsand,forthatreason,BernauerandMahonallegethat“Foucault’sethicsisthepracticeofanintel-lectualfreedomthatistransgressiveofmodernknowledge-power-subjectiv-ityrelations”,andthatitis“theneedtoescapethoseprisonsofthoughtandactionthatshapeourpolitics,ourethics,ourrelationstotheself”(Bernauer;Mahon,2005:160).However,tosaythattheexercisesorpracticesoffreedominvolvesomehowtranscendingthe“political”limits,orovercomingpower-relations,isintensionwithFoucault’sgeneralbeliefthatpoweriseverywhereandthereisnotan“otherside”ofpowerrelations.Forthisreason,thoseex-ercisesoffreedomcanonlyberegardedas“counter-conduct”.



“Counter-conduct,then,isthestruggleagainsttheproceduresandinstitutionsimplementedforconducting,fromwithinconductitself.”(Depew,2016:30)

Foucaulttriestoputforwardthepossibilityofthiscounter-conductfromanethicalperspectiveinwhichtheStoicphilosopherisachampionofindividualfreedom.Inaninterviewin1984,hesays:

“IndividualfreedomwasveryimportantfortheGreeks–contrarytothecommonplacederivedmoreorlessfromHegelthatseesitasbeingofnoimportancewhenplacedagainsttheimposingtotalityofthecity.”(Foucault,1997b:285)

Whenhesaidthat,nodoubt,FoucaulthadespeciallyconsideredtheStoics,becausehe,likeHegel,seesthedifferencebetweenancientphilosophers,but,atthismoment,weshouldask:Howtounderstandthis“individualfreedom”intheframeworkofhisthoughtwhichisnotonly“political”,butalsoan“eth-ical”matter.Iproposethatthisindividualfreedomisoneoftheformsofself-determinationbasedonhisconceptionofethos.Itrequiresaself-determinedaction,orcounter-conductmovementfromanethicalperspective,insteadofbeingdeterminedbyanexternalpower.Itcanbesaidthattheneedtoescapethepresentpower-relationsfromanethicalperspectivealsopointstoastriv-ingtowardsthedeterminationoftheselfwithoutappealingtoanythingelse.Asispointedoutabove,FoucaultseemstohaveadoptedtheHegelianclaimthatthereisadifferencebetweenGreekspiritualityandtheRomanconcep-tionofthesubject.But,inthecontextofthisdistinction,whileHegelprefers Greekspirituality,andseesHellenisticphilosophy,accordingtohisdialecticalunderstandingofhistory,asadeclineincomparisonto,especially,Aristote-lianphilosophy,7Foucaulttakessideswith“theGoldenAgeofthecultureoftheself”thatrefersspecificallytolateStoicphilosophy.Ofcourse,FoucaultcanbynomeansappreciatethistransformationofGreekspiritualityasade-clineorflourishinadialecticalmanner.But,asamatterofhisthoughtaboutthetechnologiesoftheself,forFoucault,theStoicartoflifebecomesmoreimportantthananyotherthing.MichaelUre,inhiswritingaboutFoucault’sandNietzsche’srelationswithStoicism,arguesthat“[a]ccordingtoFoucault,theStoicsoftheimperialagesignificantlymodifiedtheclassicalGreekartsofexistence”(Ure,2007:26).However,itseemstobearguablethatthisisonlya“modification”orrefiningandreworkingofpre-existingclassicalforms.ItseemstomethiscanbeseenasaturningawayfromtheclassicalGreekartsofexistencebecausetheGreekartsofexistencearegroundedinthepolitical,orsocio-politicalinterrelations,whereasintheStoicstheindividualisthecentreofsocialtheory.8IwilllaterreturntothismatterwhenIconsidertheStoic

6

Forthegeneralexplanationofhisconceptofdiscontinuité,especiallysee(Foucault,1969:9–28).

7

InhisdoctoralthesisonDemocritusandEpi-curus,MarxcriticizedHegel’sdeprecationofHellenistic philosophy: “But in the admira-ble great and bold plan of [Hegel’s] historyofphilosophy, fromwhichalone thehistoryofphilosophycaningeneralbedated,itwasimpossible,ontheonehand,togointodetail,andontheotherhand,thegiantthinkerwashinderedbyhisviewofwhathecalledspecu-lativethoughtparexcellencefromrecognis-ing in these systems their great importance

forthehistoryofGreekphilosophy.”(Marx,2010:29–30)Still,forMarx,“thesesystemsarekeytothetruehistoryofGreekphiloso-phy”(Marx,2010:30).WhenMarxempha-sised the importance of these philosophicalschools for thehistoryofGreekphilosophy,heespeciallyhadinmindtheEpicureanma-terialismthatgives himanopportunitytosetouthisconceptionoffreedom,andofemanci-pationfromreligiousfanaticism,onthebasisofamaterialistontology.

8

At this moment, it can be claimed thatFoucault considers primarily Plato’s Alcibi-ades I,anddoesnottaketheApologyintoac-



theoryofoikeiōsisinthecontextofHegel’scritiqueofStoicethics.BecauseofthefactthatsubjectivelytheStoicslaystressonthetransformationoftheselfinrespectofanartoflife,andthat,intheirview,thecareoftheselfisnotinstrumentalinrelationtothecareofothers,thatis,withregardtothegovern-mentofothers,FoucaultseemstohaveapointofviewrootedintheStoiccon-ceptionoftheselfwithwhichtheconstitutionofthesubjects,and,atthesametime,apractiseoffreedomwouldbepossibleaestheticallyandethically.Thisidea conformswith theNietzschean tradition,which includesHeidegger’sanalysisofcare(Sorge)inSein und Zeit.ItseemstomethatFoucaultespe-ciallypursuesatypicallyNietzscheanthoughtabout“howonebecomeswhatoneis”.Nehamas,byquotingNietzsche’sfamousparagraphwhichisentitledas“Onethingisneedful”,andbeginswiththephrase“To‘givestyle’toone’scharacter–agreatandrareart!”inTheGay Science (Nietzsche,1974:232),pointsoutthatthecapacityforresponsibilityforoneselfiswhatNietzsche’scalls“freedom”(Nehamas,2001:274).Ofcourse,responsibilityforoneselfrequires“thecareoftheself”intheframeworkofanartoflife.Inthissense,Nietzscheseesthisartas“togivestyletoone’scharacter”.ThisreturningtoStoicphilosophyalsopointsoutarequirementthatisconfes-sedlyexpressedbyPaulVeyneinhisbookaboutSeneca.AccordingtoVeyne,theFoucauldiancircleconsidersStoicismasprovidinganimmunesystemfortheindividualgiventhatinStoicphilosophy“theindividualcanrelyonlyontheselfforsupportindefenceagainstaworld(…)notmadeforhim”(Veyne,2003:xi).IthinkthatthisindividualisticandsubjectiveviewthatturnsinontheselfcanbecriticizedbyreferringtoHegel’scritiqueofStoicisminrelationtotheab-stractconceptoffreedom.Atthismoment,toputforwardthissubjectivitywithacriticalapproach,IsupposethatweshouldpayregardtoHegel’scritiqueofStoicethicswhichbecomesmoresignificantthananythingelseinthiscontext.

2. Hegel’s critique of Stoic Philosophy Based on the Theory of Oikeiōsis

Hegel’s examination of Stoicism, alongwith Scepticism and theUnhappyConsciousness,inthechaptertitled“FreedomofSelf-Consciousness”inPhe-nomenology of Spirit (Hegel,1977:119–138) iswellknown,andbysomeHegelscholarstheviewofabstractfreedomthatheascribestoStoicisminthischapterisassociatedwiththeKantiantheoryoffreedom.9Inthischapter,HegelarguesthatStoicismintroducesapureabstractionof“I”fromtheouterrealityintermsoftheindependenceofself-consciousness(Das selbststaen-dige Selbstbewusstsein),andfreedomofself-consciousnesswhichiscaughtonlyatthelevelofpurethinking:“Inthinking,Iamfree,becauseIamnotinanother,butremainsimplyandsolelyincommunionwithmyself[bei mir selbst].”(Hegel,1977:120;1996:156)

Atthismoment,Stoicthought,asashapeofself-consciousnessinthehistoryofspirit,canbeseenasastruggletoachieveanabstractidentitywithitselfthroughwithdrawingfromtheouterrealityintoan“innercitadel”10ofpurethinking.Inthissense,asHegelputit,“thefreedomofself-consciousnessisindifferenttonaturalexistence”(gleichgültiggegen das natürliche Dasein),and“freedominthought”lacksthefullnessoflife(Hegel,1977:122;1996:158).Asaresult,asAlanWoodrightlyremarks,intheStoicpointofview,“moralreflectionmustturninwardandseekthereforwhatoutersocialrealityhaslost”(Wood,1990:218).Inthisinwardness,however,theconcretelifeofanindividualislost.



HegelputsthebasiccharacteristicsofStoicthoughtinfiveparagraphsinanessentialway,and, tobesure, thischapter isvery important tounderstandthejourneyofspiritfromconsciousnessandself-consciousnesstoabsolutespirit.But, in this paper, Iwill focuson the chapter aboutStoicism inhisVorlesungen über die Geschichte der Philosophie toestablishaconnectionwiththecurrent“Stoic”conceptionoffreedom,whichisarticulatedfromtheFoucauldianperspective.Firstofall, Iwouldstate thatHegeldeparts, firstandforemost,fromthetextofDiogenesLaërtius,whenhecriticizesthebasicassumptionsofStoicethics,andthathiscritiqueofStoicethicsisthroughoutbasedonhisreadingtheoikeiōsistheoryoftheStoics.Furthermore,IwouldalsotrytoindicatethatHegel’sconsiderationoftheStoictheoryofoikeiōsisdependsentirelyontheconceptofsustasis(constitutio inSeneca’stransla-tion),whichistranslatedintoGermanasZusammenstimmung byHegel.There is ahugeamountof literatureabout the theoryofoikeiōsis followingPohlenz’sarticlein1940(Pohlenz,1940:1–81).Inthosestudies,manyscholarsincludingPohlenzinsistthattheoikeiōsisisthefundamentalconceptofStoicethics,andthattheStoicethicsisbynomeanscompletelyunderstoodunlessthisconceptistakenintoconsideration.Forexample,Pemprokeclaimsthat“iftherehadbeennooikeiosis,therewouldhavebeennoStoa”(Pemproke,1971:114–115).Ontheotherhand,somescholarssuchasStrikerhavedoubtedthatitisafundamentforStoicethics.Strikerclaimsthat“itshouldbeobviousthatoikeiōsis didhavean importantpart toplay, though itwasprobablynot thefoundationofStoicethics”.Accordingtoher,“thecentralthesisofStoiceth-icsisthathappinessformanconsistsinalifeofvirtue”(Striker,1996:295).However,incontrasttoStriker’sview,HegelregardsthetheoryofoikeiōsisasafoundationofStoicethicsbecausehebeginshiscritiqueofStoicismwithatranslationofDiogenesLaërtius’famousparagraph,whichisrelatedtooikeiōsis andthefirstimpulseofalivingbeinginStoicism.Laërtiusexplains:“Ananimal’sfirstimpulse[prōtē hormē],saytheStoics,istoself-preservation,becausenaturefromtheoutsetendearsittoitself[oikeiousēs hautō tēs phuseōs ap’ arkhēs],asChrysippusaf-firmsinthefirstbookofhisworkOn Ends:hiswordsare,‘Thedearestthing[proton oikeion]toeveryanimalisitsconstitution[sustasis]anditsconsciousness[suneidesis]thereof’;foritwasnotlikelythatnatureshouldestrangethelivingthingfromitselforthatsheshouldleavethecreatureshehasmadewithouteitherestrangementfromoraffectionforitsownconstitu-tion[oute poiēsasan auto, mēt’ allotriōsai mēt’ oikeiōsai].Weareforcedthentoconcludethatnatureinconstitutingtheanimalmadeitnearanddeartoitself;forsoitcomestorepelallthatis injuriousandgive freeaccess toall that is serviceableorakin [oikeion] to it.” (DiogenesLaertius,1931:VII/85)

count,whichwouldbesignificantforunder-standing theSocraticartof livingaccordingtowhichthecareoftheselfisrequiredatanindividual level. In his lectures entitled The Government of Self and OthersFoucaultex-aminedtheApologyintheframeworkoftheparadox of the political non-involvement ofSocrates.Asiswellknown,intheselecturesthemainissueisparrhēsia(truth-telling),orparrhēsiasticattitudeagainstpower.Bycon-sideringPlato’sApology,Foucaultstatesthat,atfirstsight,philosophicalparrhēsia,strictlyspeaking,Socraticparrhēsiaispersonalrath-erthanadirectpoliticalactivity.Accordingly,he argues that “it involves renouncing anypoliticalascendancyandpoweroverothers”.Yet,thisrenouncingmeans,inSocrates’case,to avoid being the agent of injustice. Thequestionishowalifebasedonjusticecanbe

realisedbyactingasacitizen,orasasubject.Asaresult,whilehepointstotheparadoxalaspect of the relationship between politicsandphilosophy,Foucaultindicatesthepoliti-calimportanceoftheSocraticparrhēsia,andsays that “philosophy’s question is not thequestionofpolitics; it is thequestionof thesubjectinpolitics”(Foucault,2010:319).

9

Seeespecially(Wood,1990:44–45); (Houl-gate,2005:82).However,Hegelalreadyes-tablishedaconnectionoftheformofabstractthoughtintheStoicpointofviewwithKant’sprincipleofduty.See(Hegel,1995a:273).

10

IrefertoHadot’sbookThe Inner Citadel: The Meditations of Marcus Aurelius.



In this paragraph, starting from Chrysippus’ thought, Diogenes LaërtiuspresentstheStoicconceptofoikeiōsisintermsoftheself-preservationandconstitutionofananimal.Cicero,too,thinksoikeiōsistoberelatedwith“self-preservation”(ad se conservandum)and“constitution”,andtranslatesitintoLatinassibiconciliariandcommendari:“…immediatelyuponbirth(…)alivingcreaturefeelsanattachmentforitself,andanimpulsetopreserveitselfandtofeelaffectionforitsownconstitutionandforthosethingswhichtendtopreservethatconstitution;whileontheotherhanditconceivesanantipathytodestructionandthosethingswhichappeartothreatendestruction.”[simul atque natum sit animal (…) ipsum sibi conciliari et commendari ad se conservandum et ad suum statum eaque quae conservantia sunt eius status diligenda, alienari autem ab interitu iisque rebus quae interitum videantur afferre](Cicero,1931:III,16)

In this context, it canbe askedwhether inStoic thought self-preservation,constitutionanditsconsciousness(orawareness)mustberegardedonanon-tologicallevel,orifitpointsmerelytoapsychologicalpresuppositionwithregardtolivingbeings.Hegelthinksthatthoseexpositionsofpracticaleth-icsarepsychologicalincharacter,andtheyarebasedonChrysippus’ideaofformalharmony(Übereinstimmung)withhimself(Hegel,1995a:258;1986a:277).Hegel,then,claimsthatChrysippusinterpretsoikeiōsisinapsychologi-calsensewhichindicatesonlyoneaspectofoikeiōsis.Itmightbeassertedthat,forHegel,whatananimal’sfirstimpulseis,thatistosay,self-preserva-tionaccordingtoitsconstitutiondeterminedbynature,refersalsotoaprocesswhichoccursinaccordancewiththehēgemonikon ofalivingbeing,i.e.,withitsleadingfaculty.11Atthesametime,onecansaythatfromapsychologi-calperspectivetheStoicsthinkthatnatureinitiallydeterminesananimalasbelongingtoitself.Besides,oikeiōsisisalwaysregardedasopposedtoallo-triosis(estrangement,alienation).12Accordingly,bynomeansitcanbesaidthatnatureisabletoestrange(or,alienate)ananimalfromitself,because,asSenecaemphasized,“innoanimalcanyouobserveanylowesteem,orevenanycarelessness,ofself”(in nullo deprendes vilitatem sui, ne neglegentiam quidem)(Seneca,1925:CXXI/24).Inthissense,accordingtotheStoiccon-ceptionofoikeiōsis,naturecanneverestrangeanylivingbeingfromitselfandthatmeansthatitbelongsto,orendearsto,itselfbynature.Hegel,likeseveralscholarsofStoicphilosophy,statesthattheprincipleofStoicmoralityistheconcordanceofspiritwithitself(das Zusammenstimmen des Geistes mit sich selbst)(Hegel,1986a:284).However,HegelarguesthatthisconcordanceofspiritwithitselfisformalandabstractinStoicthought.Atthismoment,itmustbeconfessedthatitisverydifficultforatranslatortotranslate ZusammenstimmenorZusammenstimmung.Hegel,firstofall,con-sidersheretheetymologyofsustasis.Asisknown,sustasisisderivedfromsunistēmi,thatmeans,“puttingtogether”(con-stitutioinLatin).But,itseemshealsowantstoreferwiththewordZusammen-stimmungtoanothermeaning,thatis,sunphōnēthatmeansboth,literally,“consonance”(con-sonantia),and“inasymphoniousmanner”,or“harmony”.Byconsideringthesemeanings,E.S.HaldaneandF.H.SimsontranslateditintoEnglishasharmony(Hegel,1995a:258);tobesure,thistranslationisnotwrong,butinsufficient.ItseemstomethatwecanregardharmonyastheequivalenceofÜbereinstimmung,anotherconcept,whichisusedbyHegelinrelationtoStoicethics.WenceslaoRoces translates it as la consonancia intoSpanish, by taking into accountsunphōnē(Hegel,1995b:359).Iwouldprefertousetheword“concordance”,similar to theway inwhichPierreGarnion,aFrench translatorofHegel’sLectures on the History of Philosophy,preferstotranslateaphraseasla con-cordance de l’animalavec lui-même(Hegel,1975:665)becauseofthefact



thattheGermanwordStimmungistheequivalenceof“accord”.Ontheotherhand,IwouldliketoclaimthatHegelwaswellawareoftheuntranslatabilityofoikeiōsis.Theuntranslatabilityofoikeiōsishasbeenfrequentlyunderlined.AsJuliaAnnasrightlysaid,“thereisnogoodsingleEnglishequivalent”fortheGreekword(Annas,1993:262).Annasuses“familiarisation”.Ithasbeenproposedasequivalent“appropriation”, or“appropriateness”(Long-Sedley1987:346).Further,“makingakinto”,“endearment”,“affinity”,“affiliation”canalsobethoughtastobeequivalentforoikeiōsis.Kerferd,makingade-tailedetymologicalanalysisofoikeiōsis,describesthethreemeaningsoftheverboikeiō fromwhichoikeiōsisisderived:“(1)toappropriate,acquire,makeone’sown(ofthings),towinover,bringovertoone’sside,bringintoone’shouseholdorfamily(ofpeople);(2)toendearormakefriendly,tofeelendearmentfor;(3)toadmit,acceptorclaimasbelongingto,toclaimorassertkinshipwith.”(Kerferd,1972:180)

Itseemstomethat,consideringthedifficultiesinthetranslationofoikeiōsis,HegeltriedtogivethemeaningofitbytranslatingtwoGreekwords,thatis,thewordsoikeiōsisandsustasis,withasinglephraseZusammenstimmung mit sich selbstintoGerman,exceptheusedtheGermanwordeinheimischastheequivalenceoftheadjectiveoikeion.13Forthisreason,itcanbeeasilysaidthatwhenHegelarrangedLaërtius phraseaboutthenatureofananimalas“thenatureofananimalthatseeksitselfthroughitself,receivesintoitselfthatwhichisinconformity[concordance]withitself”(seiner Zusammenstimmung mit sich gemaess)(Hegel,1995a:258;1986a:277),heregardedthroughoutthetheoryofoikeiōsis,andsawitasthefoundationofStoicethics.Additionally,HegelconsiderstheStoicconceptionofhumanvirtueandes-tablishesaconnectionbetweenthisconceptionandtheprincipleofself-pres-ervationatthepsychologicallevel.Virtue(aretē)isbasedonarationalnatureorlivinginaccordancewithnaturethatisalsologositself.14Therealisationoftheaimofvirtueishappiness(Glückseligkeit).Inthiscontext,thequestionishowtoharmonizevirtuewithhappiness,andvice versa.Because,ontheonehand,aStoicphilosophershouldovercomehispassions,thatistosay,hisliv-inginstinctsorindividualhappinessinhislife,inordertoattainaconditionofvirtueinageneralperspective,andontheotherhand,hemustcareforhimselfonanindividualorpersonallevel.Virtueistofollowagenerallawthatmeanstoliveinaccordancewithnature,butitalsorequiresthesatisfactionofthesubjectinhisparticularity(in seiner Besonderheit):“I,asthewillthatfulfilslaw,amonlytheformalcharacterwhichhastocarryouttheuniversal(Allgemeine);andthus,aswillingtheuniversal,Iaminaccordwithmyselfasthinking.Thetwo

11

In a current article, Jacop Klein similarlysupposes that “[an animal’s impulse to self-preservation]shouldbeidentifiedwithanim-pulsetopreserve(tērein)itsleadingfacultyorhēgemonikon inaconditionofconformitytonature”(Klein,2016:160).Klein’scommentofoikeiōsiswouldbeappropriateforHegel’sassertionaboutthismatter.

12

See (Striker,1993:262);Besides,accordingtoForshner,allotriosasacontradictivecon-ceptof theadjectiveoikoios refers to“whatbelongstoanotherand,inthebroadersense,whatbelongstoastranger”(Forschner,2008:169).

13

Needlesstosay,Hegeliswellawarethatthewordoikeiōnaswellasoikos(homeorhouse-hold;Heiminthewordeinheimisch usedbyHegel) is derived from theGreek rootoik-,whichmeans,generally,“belongingto”.

14

FortheStoictextsabouttheprincipleof“liv-ing according to nature” (homologoumenos tē phusei zēn),or“livinginaccordancewithnature”,see(VonArnim,SVF:III:1–19).InCicero’sDe finibus “livingaccording tona-ture”isputforwardinrespectofoikieōsisandkathēkon (officio: appropriate act, or duty):“Prima est enim conciliatio humanis ad eaquaesuntsecundumnaturam.”(Cicero,1931:III,21)



nowcomeintocollision,andbecauseIseektheonesatisfactionortheother,Iamincollisionwithmyself,becauseIamalsoindividual.”(Hegel,1995a:262–63;1986a:282)

AccordingtoHegel,Stoicphilosophycannotovercomethiscollision,itcan-not achieve a concrete unity of the universal and the individual.There is,ontheonehand,theuniversalidealofthevirtuouswiseman(sophos) lib-erated fromhispassionsordesires, and for this reason, theStoics eagerlyadvisetobeindifferenttotheexistenceoftheindividual;ontheotherhand,theStoicphilosophermustmarchforwardtothisidealinhispersonality,orthroughhisexercises.Consequently,aStoicphilosopher,beingindifferenttotheindividualityofexistence,encountersadilemma:“hemustbeindifferenttotheindividualityofhisexistence,andtotheharmonywiththeindividual[Zusammenstimmung zu dem Einzelnen]asmuchastothewantofharmony[Nichtzusammenstimmung]”(Hegel,1995a:269;1986a:288).However,duetotheirgeneraltheoryofoikeiōsis,hemust,inonewayoranother,beincon-cordancewithhimself,andcannotbeindifferenttothat.Thus,toescapefromthisdilemma,hemustbeinconcordancewithhimselfonauniversalground.Bythisway,negativeconceptionoffreedomappearsinStoicthought.Ac-cordingtoHegel,“Stoicself-consciousnesshasnotheretodealwithitsindi-vidualityassuch,butsolelywiththefreedominwhichitisconsciousofitselfonlyastheuniversal”and,Hegelcontinues,“inthatfreedomtheindividualhasthesenseofhisuniversalityratheronly”(Hegel,1995a:269).Insuchaway,hebecomesthepurethoughtthatannihilatesallmannerofexistenceinit,andheisolateshimselffromeverything,whichheiscapableofgivingupinhisindividuallife.“Thisnegativemomentofabstractionfromexistence”(He-gel,1995a:270)represents,asispointedoutabove,theconceptionofformalandabstractfreedom,whichiscaughtonlyatthelevelofpurethought.But,forHegel,theformalfirmness(Die formelle Festigkeit)ofspirit,whichiso-latesitselffromeverything,“setsupforusnodevelopmentofobjectiveprin-ciples,butasubjectwhichmaintainsitselfinthisconstancy”(Hegel,1995a:273).Thus,itcanbesaidthatthatwhichisatstakehereissubjectivefreedom,whichmeansacontinuouswithdrawalofconsciousnessintoitself.Thus,intheframeworkoftheStoicindividualismorsubjectivism,Hegel’sbasicsuppositioninrelationtoStoicethicsisthatinStoicismthedetermina-tionofabstractfreedominthinkingor,strictlyspeaking,thestrivingforanabstract independence from theexternalworldmust alsogo toauniversaldeterminationofmorality,butthisuniversalityremainsnecessarilyabstractand formal, thatmeans, in thisway, it cannotbeactualised ina livingandconcreteprocess.TheStoicphilosophereagerlydealswiththeirownself,andtheyonlytakecareofthemselvesintheirsubjectivitybut,startingfromthiseinheimisch (oikeiouses)or subjectivepoint, theywant to attainuniversal-ityandobjectivity.Inthiscontext,thereisnoneedtosaythat,accordingtoHegel,theStoicphilosophycanbynomeanssatisfythedemandofconcretefreedom,whichisrealisedinhistory,althoughitisanecessarymomentinthedevelopmentofspirittowardstheconsciousnessoffreedom.Additionally,HegelestablishedaconnectionofthissubjectivepointofviewwiththeRomanworld.Firstofall,HegeldescribestheRomanworldwiththephrase“despoticpower”.IntheRomanworld:“The development [spirit] consists in the purification of inwardness to abstract personality,whichgivesitselfrealityintheexistenceofprivateproperty;themutuallyrepellentsocialunitscanthenbeheldtogetheronlybydespoticpower.”(Hegel,2001:300)

Thequestionhereishowanindividualreconcileswiththatworldofabstractuniversality.Thisquestionissignificantbecause,asHegelstates,



“…inRome,wefindthatfreeuniversality,thatabstractFreedom,whichontheonehandsetsanabstractstate,apoliticalconstitutionandpower,overconcreteindividuality.”(Hegel,2001:297)

Moreover,forHegel,thisreconciliationturnsouttobeamatterinthefaceofthekeendifferencebetweenthe:

“…politicalUniversalityontheonehandandtheabstractfreedomoftheindividualontheother–appear,inthefirstinstance,intheformofSubjectivity.”(Hegel,2001:297)

Thus,therewouldbeonlyonechoiceforanindividualinthisworldofab-stractuniversalityinwhichtheconcretecharacteristicsofthelivingspiritaresuppressedthroughanabstractlegalconstitution:towithdrawintotheself,ortotakecaretheself,andtoattainasubjectivefreedomin thought,notinanobjective,realworld:

“…theconsciousness,whererealuniversalityisdestroyed,mustgobackintoitsindividualityandmaintainitselfinitsthoughts.”(Hegel,1995a:274)

Inthissense,theStoicpointofviewrelatedtofreedomfitstotheRomanworldandspirituality,and“thephilosophyoftheStoicshasmorespeciallyfounditshomeintheRomanworld[in der römischen Welt ist daher besonders die stoische Philosophie zu Hause gewesen]”(Hegel,1995a:276;1986a:296).15

conclusion

FrederickBeisersaysthat

“Hegel’sanalysisoffreedominthePhilosophy of Rightreflectshisfundamentalmoralteachingthatfreedomhastoberealizedintheworld,andcannotbeattainedbyflightfromit.”(Beiser,2005:199)

And,hecontinues:

“InHegel’s view,Christianity, Stoicism andFrench radicalismwere all failed strategies forachievingfreedom.Sincetheyattemptedtoescapetheworld,theydidnotstruggleagainstit,andsoultimatelysuccumbedtoit.”(Beiser,2005:199)

WecanconcludethattheStoicpointofviewdoesnotsatisfythedemandofconcretefreedom,whichcanonlybecomeconcreteinasocietyorinaninter-subjectivearea,insofarasitremainsonlyatthelevelofthesubjectiveorin-dividualapproachtotheproblemoffreedom.Nonetheless,itshouldbenotedthatthereisanotherperspectiveinStoicism,orintheStoictheoryofoikeiōsiswhichisruledoutbothbyHegelandFoucault.Thisperspectiveshowsusthatoikeiōsisshouldnotbeconsideredonlyatthelevelofpersonality,butitreferstothesocialrelationships,andthereby,itopensupanopportunity,ifweuseJuliaAnnas’sphrase,forother-concern(Annas,1993:262).16

15

Inanegativemanner,A.A.LongemphasizesHegel’sthoughtaboutthatthisGreco-Romanperiod is a decline: “For Hegelian idealistspost-Aristotelian philosophy represents amarkeddecline from theapogee reachedbyAristotle and Plato.” (Long, 2006: 361) Onthe other hand, there is a close relationshipbetweenPlato’sSocratesand theGreco-Ro-manethics.Forexample,accordingtoLong,“SocratesgaveHellenisticethicsmuchofitsflavouranditsidealofalifeincontrolofit-self” (Long, 2006: 20). Itmight be claimed

that a continuity between these traditions rather thanacontradiction isatstake.How-ever,itshouldbenotedthattheZeitgeisthadbeenchangeduntilGreco-Romanperiod.

16

ForAnnas’sdistinctionbetweenpersonalandsocialoikeiōsis,see(Annas,1993:275):“So,personaloikeiōsiswillgetmetotheimpartialviewpoint,andsocialoikeiōsiswilljustbeamatterofapplyingthistoothers.”



Thefamousconcentriccircles(kuklois)ofHieroclescanbeanexampleofthissocialoikeiōsis,andoftherelationshipswithothers.AccordingtoHierocles,“…eachofus,mostgenerallyiscircumscribedasthoughbymanycircles,somesmaller,somelarger,somesurroundingothers,somesurrounded,accordingtotheirdifferentandunequalrela-tionstooneanother.”(Hierocles,2009:91)

Yet,inthisconcentricconstruction,whichbeginswithkinrelationships,andgoestotheentireraceofhumanity,“thefirstandclosestcircleisthatwhicheachpersondrawsaroundhismind[dianoia],asthecentre”(Hierocles,2009:91).Moreprecisely,eachpersonisthecentreofallrelationswithothers.Besides,wecaneasilyseeanexampleofthisso-calledsocialoikeiōsisinEpictetus’phi-losophy.Hepointstotheimportanceoftheassociation(koinonia)ofthenaturalandtheacquiredrelationships“thosenamelyofason,father,brother,citizen,wife,neighbour,fellow-traveller,ruler,andsubject(arkhomenon)”(Epictetus,1998:II.14.3).Thissocialoikeiōsis,inadditiontothepersonalone,couldbethoughtinrelationtothecareofotherswhichFoucaultattributestothePla-tonictradition.However,themainfocusofthisso-calledsocialoikeiōsisistobetheindividualitself;thatis,theStoicsattachimportancetotheprivatelifeofawiseman(sophos).SenecapointsoutthisviewinhisEpistles:“IbegyoutoconsiderthoseStoicswho,shutoutfrompubliclife,havewithdrawnintoprivacyfor thepurposeof improvingmen’sexistenceand framing laws for thehuman racewithoutincurringthedispleasureofthoseinpower.”(Seneca,1917:XIV–15)

Accordingtohisnaturalandbiologicaldetermination,eventhougharationalanimalcanbynomeansberegardedasan“unsocial”being,aman,asEpicte-tussaid,shouldnotneglecthimselfandhisowninterest(Epictetus,1998:I.19.13).Inthiscontext,itcanbestatedthatStoicphilosopherwantstoattainsummum bonum (thehighestgood)thatmeanstheharmony,concordanceandunityofthesoulwithitself,andsummum bonum,ifweborrowSeneca’swordsinDe Vita Beata,“istheinflexibilityofanunyieldingmind,itsforesight,itssublimity,itssoundness,itsfreedom,itsharmony,itsbeauty”(Seneca,1932:VIII.5).Asaresultofthisconceptionofharmonyorconcordance,wecansaythatoikeiōsis forarationalbeing,firstandaboveall,isindividualandself-di-rectedinsteadofbeingother-directed,becausethegoalofStoicphilosopher’stakingcareforhimselfistheharmonyandconcordanceoftheindividualwithitself,and,thatis,withnatureinordertoattainahappyorgoodlife(eu zên).Inthissense,asispointedoutabove,forbothHegelandFoucault,StoicismcanbedistinguishedfromthePlatonictraditioninthatitinsiststhatcaringisself-directed,butnotother-directedonpoliticalground.ForHegel,intheHel-lenisticandRomanperiod,thesubjectistheonethatshouldbecaredfor(Das Subject ist so dasjenige, wofür gesorgt warden soll)(Hegel,1986a:251),thatistosay,theconceptofSorge(care)isregardedasapersonalandsubjectivematter.As a result, ifwe consider the Stoic conception ofoikeiōsis, eventhoughStoicthoughtlaysemphasisonan“other-concern”inacertaindegree,itcouldbesaidthatthisemphasisshouldremainlimited,becausetheStoictheoryof ethics isbasedonaconceptionofwisemanaccording towhichonlyasophosmightattainfreedom,andothersarefoolishmen(stultus)andslaves,andasophoscannotestablishafriendshipwiththem.For thisreason,asIhavetried toshowabove,bothFoucault’sandHegel’sconsiderationsaboutthepositionofStoicisminthehistoryofphilosophyareright, but Foucault’s defence of this position in the framework of his owninterestsgivesahintabouthispointofviewconcerningtheproblemoffree-dom.Tobesure,inthiswriting,itwasnotmyintentiontocriticizeFoucault’s



understandingoffreedominallaspects.But,hisconceptionofthecareoftheselfandhisthoughtabouttransformingone’slifeintoaworkofartwhichis,infact,aformofself-determinationwouldbeasubjectofakeencritiquebe-causeofthefactthatthispointofviewregardsallrealandsocialrelationshipsonlyaspower-relationsagainstwhichwemustseekapossibilityofacounter-conduct,and,asVeynesaid,heseesStoicismasanimmunesysteminordertosavehimselffrom“aworldnotmadeforhim”.Againstthispointofview,aHegelianperspectiveconsidersfreedomtobealwaysrelatedtoothers.Atthismoment,ifHegel’sideaoffreedomisregardedasamodeltounderstandwhattherelationshipwithothersmeansinafreesociety,onecansaythatfreedommustbecomeconcrete,objectively,inasocietyandthescopeofintersubjectiverelationships,thoughit,atthesametime,isaformofself-determination.ForHegel,theself-determinationofthesubjectalwaysrequiresanothersubjectwhoisanon-eliminablepartnerintheprocessofmutualrecognition.Inthissense,whenHegeldefinesfreedomas“Bei-sich-selbst-Sein in einem Andere”,thatmeans,“tobewithoneselfinanother”or“tobeathomeinanother”,heissuggestingthatfreedomrequiresamediationofothers,anditcannotbeactual-ized“byfleeingbeforetheother”[durch die Flucht vor dem Anderen](Hegel,1986b:26),onthecontrary,itbecomesconcreteonlyonthegroundofbei sichmediatedthroughanother.However,itseemstomethatFoucault’sethos,asastrivingforself-determinationbeyondthepower-relationships,canbethoughtfleeing into the subjective freedomofan individualbywithdrawal into theself,althoughthisself-determinationmustbeonlyacounter-conductbecauseofthefactthatitisimpossibletogobeyondthepower-relationships.

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Çetin Türkyılmaz

O foucaultovu stoicizmu i Hegelovoj kritici stoičkog gledišta u odnosu spram problema slobode

SažetakDa bi se razumjela Hegelova kritika stoicizma u svezi problema slobode, argumentiram da je važno cijeniti neke Foucaultove ideje te ideje fukoovskog kruga. Započet ću raspravljajući o Foucaultovoj referenci na grčkorimsku filozofiju u njegovim predavanjima na Collège de France. U tim predavanjima, služeći se Hadotovom koncepcijom duhovnih vježbi, pokušava utvrditi etiku sebstva na osnovi koncepcije subjektivne slobode. Nakon toga, bavim se Hegelo-vom kritikom stoicizma na osnovi stoičke teorije oikeiōsisa. Hegelova interpretacija navedene teorije osnova je njegovog kritičkog stava prema stoicizmu. Postoji veza između stoicizma i Foucaultova kasnijeg perioda misli s obzirom na koncept slobode, u potpunosti temeljenog na subjektivnosti. Na kraju rada, nadam se pokazati da nam Hegelova kritika stoičke etike daje priliku kritizirati subjektivno gledište u pogledu problema slobode.

Ključne riječiMichelFoucault,brigaosebi,stoicizam,GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,oikeiōsis,sloboda,subjek-tivnost





Çetin Türkyılmaz

Über foucaults Stoizismus und Hegels Kritik des stoischen Standpunkts in Bezug auf das Problem der freiheit

ZusammenfassungUm Hegels Kritik an Stoizismus in Bezug auf das Problem der Freiheit zu verstehen, argumen-tiere ich, dass es bedeutend ist, einige Ideen von Foucault sowie die Ideen des foucaultschen Kreises zu würdigen. Ich beginne mit der Erörterung zu Foucaults Referenz an die griechisch-römische Philosophie in seinen Vorlesungen an der Collège de France. Indem er sich an Hadots Konzeption der geistigen Übungen stützt, versucht er in diesen Vorlesungen, die Ethik des Selbst auf der Grundlage der Konzeption der subjektiven Freiheit zu etablieren. Danach beschäftige ich mich mit Hegels Kritik des Stoizismus, basierend auf der stoischen Theorie der oikeiōsis. Hegels Interpretation der erwähnten Theorie ist das Substrat seiner kritischen Haltung gegenü-ber dem Stoizismus. Es besteht ein Zusammenhang zwischen Stoizismus und Foucaults späterer Gedankenperiode hinsichtlich des Freiheitskonzepts, die vollständig auf Subjektivität beruht. Am Ende des Aufsatzes versuche ich zu zeigen, dass Hegels Kritik der stoischen Ethik uns die Gelegenheit bietet, die subjektive Sicht im Hinblick auf das Problem der Freiheit einer Kritik zu unterziehen.

SchlüsselwörterMichelFoucault,dieSorgeumsichselbst,Stoizismus,GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,oikeiōsis,Freiheit,Subjektivität

Çetin Türkyılmaz

Sur le stoïcisme de foucault et la critique de Hegel du point de vue stoïque par rapport au problème de la liberté

RésumeAfin de comprendre la critique hégélienne du stoïcisme liée au problème de la liberté, je sou-tiens qu’il est important de reconnaître la valeur des idées de Foucault, mais également les idées du cercle foucaldien. Je commencerai par discuter des références de Foucault à la philo-sophie gréco-romaine lors de ses cours au Collège de France. Dans ces cours, Foucault tente d’établir une éthique du soi basée sur la conception de la liberté subjective en se servant de la notion d’exercices spirituels de Hadot,. Ensuite, j’aborderai la critique hégélienne du stoïcisme sur la base de la théorie stoïque de l’oikeiōsis. L’attitude critique de Hegel envers le stoïcisme se fonde sur sa propre interprétation de la théorie stoïque. Il existe un lien entre le stoïcisme et la période tardive de la pensée de Foucault eu égard au concept de la liberté, qui se fonde dans son ensemble sur la subjectivité. À la fin du présent article, j’espère être en mesure de montrer que la critique hégélienne de l’éthique stoïque nous présente une opportunité pour critiquer le point de vue subjectif eu égard au problème de la liberté.

Mots-clésMichelFoucault,soucidesoi,stoïcisme,GeorgWilhelmFriedrichHegel,oikeiōsis,liberté,subjec-tivité

Documents

On foucault’s Stoicism and Hegel’s critique of the Stoic